Archive for Player Analysis

The bulk of the work I do pre-draft and in-season is essentially based on an SGP (standings gain points) projections and ranking system. I use SGP data from leagues that match the format and settings of the league I’m ranking for (ideally from 10+ years of data from the actual league, where possible). While I usually do my own projections for 30-40 players of specific interest, in general I’m happy to utilize the projections published by experts that actually know what they’re doing and do it for a living. Specifically (and in no particular order) I use Steamer, Pecota, and Baseball HQ.

These lists may not be useful in ‘absolute’ terms – again, the data I’m using here reflect the SGP settings I use that reflect the league I play in. However, I still believe the lists offer an interesting way to notice a) how each projection system differs on its view of individual players, and b) general overall differences in each projection system. Blindly following a projection set is probably going to be better than randomly picking players by throwing darts at the wall. But you can squeeze a lot more value out of these rankings and the projections you use by gaining a deeper understanding of how each set of projections work, and what ‘biases’ and tendencies might be part of the numbers.

What I like to do each year is generate ‘top X’ lists of players at each position for each projection set I use, then play around in the results to spot any glaring differences.  Is one projection overly conservative on expected ABs? Is one projection set basically expecting a repeat of last year’s career year? I can use that as a starting point to drill down into some of the numbers to see what might be behind the differences. Personally, I find it all too easy to get overwhelmed at all the different numbers available to be looked at – far too often I find myself deep down the rabbit’s hole, spending three hours looking at average fly ball distance on balls hit on the second Wednesday of the month on even-numbered days or something. I find this approach helps me narrow in on specific players or numbers of interest. And the benefit of doing this by SGP, broken down by category, is that it is easier to see specifically how each player is projected to impact each category. Player stats will not win your fantasy league, roto points will win you your fantasy league: I get a better understanding of the player’s ‘value components’ and how it impacts the particular league I play in.

First, a quick overview of SGP. Standings Gain Points is a way to measure the contribution of each player to your overall roto league standings. Larry Schecter’s excellent book, ‘Winning Fantasy Baseball’ is a great primer on the subject. Other places to read about SGP online are here and here. In a nutshell the system looks at the average stats needed to gain one point in the standings for a particular rotisserie category. For example, suppose in your league over the past 10 years, you needed 10 HRs to gain one point in the HR category standings. A player projected to hit 30 home runs would be credited with 3 SGPs for the HR category. Tally up all the SGPs the player is expected to add (or subtract) for all categories, and you get a total SGP score.

There’s a ton more to it, but that’s the basics – ever tried to figure out if the guy hitting a lot of HRs but no average was more valuable (and if so, by how much) than the guy hitting for a decent average and some SBs but no power? Now you have an idea.

In this first article, I look at at Catchers. I’ll add reports on all the hitter positions over the next couple of weeks. A reminder that these rankings are based on SGP values which are basically unique to my specific league, so your numbers will differ if you play in a different league format, but again, we’re looking a relative differences, not absolute numbers (For the record, the league format for the SGP rankings here: Standard 12-team 5×5 roto, 1 catcher, three OF and two util, 1250 innings cap).

Here is the list of top 12 catchers ranked by my league’s SGP, based on Baseball HQ projections:

Figure 1. Top 15 catchers by SGP & BHQ projections

Nobody should be surprised to see Buster Posey at the top of any catchers list; he’s there because he has such a huge advantage over everyone else at the position in Batting Average. And he has a full point advantage over the next tier of players. Gomes and Mesoraco at 2^nd and 3^rd? Probably more of a surprise. Gomes has legit power, and the batting average isn’t a fluke (career BABIP: .323). Mesoraco had a career year last year – his 25 HRs in 440 PA is only 6 fewer than he hit in 1,100 PAs in 2013, 2012, 2011 combined. Yes, he plays in a tiny crackerjack box of a park. But his FB% jumped 10ppt (33.8% to 43%) from 2013 and 2014, while his HR/FB rate more than doubled, from a constant 10% or so in 2011-2013 to 20.5% in 2014. Color me less than convinced. And with only .44 points separating them, the next four players (Gomes, Mesoraco, Gattis and Lucroy) are basically interchangeable.

Russell Martin’s ranking gets a big boost from expected SB contribution; if those SBs dip he falls quite a bit. Would anyone be surprised if a catcher that turns 32 in February and was only 4-of-8 in stolen base attempts last year doesn’t run that much in 2015?

Conversely, if Zunino can boost his average a bit, he could be excellent late-round value. He gets a massive -1.52 hit to his SGP total after hitting less than his weight last year. On the one hand, one could possibly expect a bit of an uptick in the batting average; his BABIP last year of .248 was the lowest mark he’s recorded at any point for a full season going back to 2012 and his days in the Arizona Fall League. On the other hand, he struck out 33% of the time last year, so…yeah.

Finally – what’s surprising about this list is who’s not on it – no d’Arnaud, no Rosario.

Figure 2. Top 15 catchers by SGP & Steamer projections

The first thing to notice about this list – in general the total ‘SGP’s provided are considerably lower than for the BHQ group above. At 8.90 total SGPs, Wieters wasn’t even in the top 10 in the BHQ list; 8.90 SGPs almost makes him a top-5 pick on this list. The numbers suggest that Steamer is a bit more conservative (or BHQ overly optimistic) in its forecasts, particularly for HR and RBIs. My understanding is that BHQ’s projections are largely based on playing time projections, so perhaps the numbers will change as we get closer to spring training and the start of the season and jobs are won/lost etc. It will be interesting to see how (if) these numbers change.

Looking at the list itself, Posey and Gattis again in the top five, no surprise there. McCann in the top five looks somewhat surprising (despite a rather big gap between Gattis and McCann). Maybe Steamer remembers that McCann still hit 23 HRs last year and still plays in a favorable park? His LD% was stable last year, GB% down a tick, FB% up a tick. His HR/FB rate was down quite a bit from 2013, which is surprising given that the conventional wisdom suggested he was moving to a more favorable ballpark…but his 2014 HR/FB rate was almost exactly in line with his average since 2008. Steamer might also be expecting an uptick on that awful .231 BABIP from 2014, although not sure if it’s factoring in the increased defensive shifts he saw last year. Less than .50 points separate d’Arnaud at #6 and Ramos at #11. Of the group, Wieters is now the grizzled veteran of the bunch and looked like he was on his way to a career year before getting hurt last year. If he’s healthy, he ironically could be the ‘safe’ pick of the bunch.

Grandal makes an appearance. Interestingly, Steamer is forecasting almost exactly the same number of Runs, RBIs and HRs this year – in the same number of at-bats – as last year, despite Grandal moving from a horrible Padres team (last year at least) to a much better Dodgers team (last year at least). I’d normally expect a bit of an uptick in those numbers.

Spoiler alert, but this is the only projection where Chirinos comes in the top 15; Steamer appears to be a bit more optimistic in projected at-bats, giving him a bump in Runs and RBIs that he doesn’t enjoy in the other projections.

Figure 3. Top 15 catchers by SGP & Pecota projections

Pecota loooooves it some Gattis, putting him in the top spot over Posey. The Pecota rankings for catchers have fairly clear tiers: Gattis and Posey at the top, a substantial gap to McCann, Martin, and Lucroy, then another gap, followed by only a point or so between d’Arnaud at #6 and Iannetta at #14. Iannetta actually only shows up here because Pecota is significantly more bullish on Iannetta across the board vs the other projection sets; this almost certainly is due to differing views on ABs; Pecota’s AB projection for Iannetta is about 80 ABs higher than the BHQ projection, and over 150 more than the Steamer projection.

The difference between the Pecota numbers for Yan Gomes and the BHQ numbers are interesting – BHQ projects Gomes as one of the top 3-4 HR hitters at the catcher spot; here he’s projected to be 8th.

Martin again gets a big SB bump, which just manages to offset a rather large Avg hit (particularly compared to, say the BHQ projection, where the Avg hit was minor). Pecota is probably looking at his .290 average last year and figuring it’s a .336 BABIP-fueled fluke; Martin hadn’t had a BABIP over .290 since 2008.

Zunino again projects to have great all-around numbers except for the black hole at Batting Average. If he somehow is able to hit even .250, Zunino would likely be a top-five fantasy play behind the plate.

Looking at all three rankings, the projections differ – sometimes significantly – on some players. The BHQ-based SGP rankings loved Yan Gomes and Mesoraco; Steamer and Pecota, not so much. At the other end of the spectrum: Salvador Perez was ranked 7th in all three projection systems, largely because he’s one of the few catchers expected to make a reasonably-sized positive contribution to batting average. Although we saw last time that maybe targeting batting average wasn’t all that important…

Pinch-hitting is difficult. You’re sitting on the bench all game, you may not have taken batting practice that day, you might be facing a relief pitcher throwing hot cheese, it’s just really difficult to come off the bench and do something productive.

There were 574 different players used as pinch-hitters in 2014, with this group of players accumulating 5483 plate appearances and hitting just .213/.291/.322. As a group, pinch-hitters accounted for negative 0.9 WAR. At the bottom of the pinch-hitting group was Greg Dobbs, who hit .107/.138/.107 in 29 plate appearances, good for negative 0.5 WAR.

There were other players who struggled nearly as much as Dobbs. Chris Denorfia was 3 for 32 as a pinch-hitter. Tony Gwynn, Jr. was 2 for 30. Little Nicky Punto was 0 for 14.

Along with the individual strugglers, there were whole teams who cost themselves at least one win because of lousy pinch-hitting. The Washington Nationals finished dead last in pinch-hitting WAR, with a mark of -1.2. Their combined triple-slash line was .118/.244/.234, for a wRC+ of 38. There were a couple teams who hit even worse than the Nationals (the Braves and Astros), but the Nationals had more pinch-hitting appearances, so finished with less WAR.

The Nationals had five players who were particularly bad at pinch-hitting in 2014: Tyler Moore (1 for 14), Greg Dobbs (2 for 15), Nate McLouth (2 for 23), Nate Schierholtz (1 for 14), and Scott Hairston (5 for 38). Combined, these five players hit .106/.199/.163 with 36 strikeouts in 121 plate appearances and accounted for -1.0 WAR. Of course, there was some bad luck involved. The Nationals’ pinch-hitting BABIP was .171. They were the only team in baseball with a pinch-hitting BABIP below .200. All teams in major league baseball had a BABIP of .282 while pinch-hitting, with a high BABIP of .440 for the Chicago White Sox. The Nationals were not only bad at pinch-hitting; they were also unlucky.

On the other side of the coin, there were three teams who received 0.7 WAR from their pinch-hitters: the Orioles, Diamondbacks, and Rockies. The Orioles were kind of amazing in this regard. The Diamondbacks had 249 pinch-hitting plate appearances and the Rockies had 266, but the Orioles earned 0.7 WAR from their pinch-hitters in just 77 at-bats, thanks to a .313/.395/.522 batting line (156 wRC+). Delmon Young (0.6 WAR as a pinch-hitter) was the driving force behind the Orioles’ league-leading pinch-hitter WAR total. Young only had 23 pinch-hitting plate appearances, but hit .500/.565/.800.

As good as Delmon Young was, he wasn’t the top pinch-hitter of 2014. That title belongs to John Mayberry Jr., King of the Pinch Hitters. Mayberry had 32 pinch-hit plate appearances and hit .400/.438/.933. As a pinch-hitter, Mayberry accounted for 0.8 WAR, tops in baseball. For the season, Mayberry had just 0.2 WAR, so he was worth negative WAR in his non pinch-hitting appearances. Let’s look at a table (smalls sample size warning, yada, yada yada):

John Mayberry’s Hitting Prowess, by position

As a first baseman, John Mayberry did not hit well. As a left fielder, John Mayberry was truly awful. As a center fielder, John Mayberry was really bad. As a right fielder, John Mayberry was actually good. As a pinch-hitter, John Mayberry rocked the house. He brought the noise and the funk.

This hasn’t always been the case for John Mayberry the Younger. Before his mighty 2014 season as a pinch-hitter, Mayberry had three straight years with sub-par pinch-hitting production (wOBAs of .280, .285, and .258). Then again, in his first two seasons (very small sample size), Mayberry had wOBAs of .407 and .611. Overall, John Mayberry the Second is a career .304/.355/.545 hitter as a pinch-hitter. This is considerably better than his overall career batting line of .241/.305/.429. See the table below for this information in numerical form:

John Mayberry’s Pinch-Hitting Record by Year

The problem with pinch-hitting it that it’s just so unreliable. Last year, the aforementioned Greg Dobbs hurt his team more than any other player when he came off the bench to pinch-hit. Early in his career, though, Mr. Dobbs had three very good years coming off the bench from 2006 to 2008, increasing his production each year, with wOBAs of .342, .384, and .387. He was so good at pinch-hitting, he was given around 60 pinch-hit plate appearances per year in 2007 and 2008. He was reliable, consistent, someone you could count on when the chips were down. If you needed a guy to come off the bench and get a hit, dial up Dobbs! He was Mr. Dependable!

Only then he wasn’t. In 2009, Dobbs hit .167/.250/.241, for a wOBA of .230, but still got 60 plate appearances off the bench. The next year, he hit .122/.204/.286 (.213 wOBA), but old reputations die hard and Dobbs was sent up as a pinch-hitter 54 times.

Then, just when you thought it was time to give up on old Greg Dobbs as a pinch-hitter, he hit .370/.400/.519 (.396 wOBA) in 2011. D-TO-THE-O-TO-THE-DOUBLE-B-S! Greg Dobbs, pinch-hitter extraordinaire was back, baby!

Only he wasn’t. He was less-than-stellar in 2012: .268/.289/.366 (.272 wOBA). He was pretty bad in 2013: .208/.298/.250 (.222 wOBA). And he was truly unpleasant in 2014: .107/.138/.107 (.116 wOBA). This table says it all:

THE DOBSTER AS A PINCH HITTER

Greg Dobbs had some very good years as a pinch-hitter. He also had some very bad years as a pinch-hitter. Just when you thought he had proven to be a good pinch-hitter, he disproved it. You just never know with pinch-hitters.

John Mayberry Jr. was the King of the Pinch Hitters in 2014. Given the history of pinch-hitters, it is unlikely that he will retain that crown.

(This is Part 3 of a four-part series answering common questions regarding starting pitchers by use of discrete probability models. In Part 1 we explored perfect game and no-hitter probabilities and in Part 2 we further investigated other hit probabilities in a complete game. Here we project the probability of winning a pitchers’ duel for who will allow the first hit.)

IV. Pitchers’ Duels

Bronze statues and folk songs are created to honor legendary feats of strength and stoicism… And Madison Bumgarner is deserving given his performance in the 2014 World Series. On baseball’s biggest stage, Bumgarner not only steamrolled an undefeated Royals team that was firing on all cylinders but he also posted timeless statistics (21 IP, 0.43 ERA, 0.127 BAA) that were beyond Ruthian or Koufaxian. Even as a rookie hidden among the 2010 Giants World Series rotation, Bumgarner’s potential radiated. So what do you do with an athlete who transcends time? You throw him into hypothetical matchups versus other champions. It would be thrilling, unless you like runs, to pit him against a pack of no-hitter-throwing pitchers (his 2010 rotation-mates) and even his 2010 self. We would be treated to great pitchers’ duels comparable to the matchups we would expect from a World Series.

When you oppose an excellent starting pitcher against another (and their hitters), the results will likely not reflect each players’ season averages. Hits and walks will be hard to come by and runs will be even harder. For our duels, we use each pitcher’s World Series probability of a hit, P(H), Bumgarner from 2014 and 2010 and the rest from 2010; P(H), hits divided by the same base as on-base percentage (AB+SF+HBP+BB), represents the quality of pitching we want from our duels. Even though 2014 Bumgarner faced a different lineup (the Royals) than the lineup his 2010 rotation-mates faced (the Rangers) to produce their respective averages, we are encapsulating the performances witnessed and assuming they can be recreated for our matchups. If okay with this assumption, then we can construct a probability model that predicts which pitcher will allow the first hit in our hypothetical pitchers’ duels. If interested further, we could also switch the variables to predict which pitcher will allow the first base runner by using on-base percentage (OBP).

The first formula we construct determines the probability that 2010 Pitcher A will allow m hits before 2014 Bumgarner allows his 1^st hit; it is possible for the m^th hit from A and the 1^st hit from Bumgarner to occur after the same number of batters, but in a duel we want a clear winner. Let a be P(H) for 2010 Pitcher A and be a random variable for the total batters faced when he allows his m^th hit; similarly, let b be P(H) for 2014 Bumgarner and be a random variable for the total batters faced when he allows his 1^st hit. If 2010 Pitcher A allows his m^th hit on the j^th batter, he will have a combination of m hits and (j-m) non-hits (outs, walks, sacrifice flies, hit-by-pitches) with the respective probabilities of a and (1-a); meanwhile 2014 Bumgarner will eventually allow his 1^st hit on the (j+1)^th batter or later and he will have 1 hit and the rest non-hits with the respective probabilities of b and (1-b). We can then sum each j^th scenario together for any number of potential batters faced (all j≥m) to create the formula below:

If we assume an even pitchers’ duel of who will allow the 1^st hit, for m=1, then we have the following intuitive formula for 2010 Pitcher A versus 2014 Bumgarner:

This formula takes the probability that 2010 Pitcher A allows a hit minus the probability that both pitchers allow a hit and divides it by the probability that 2010 Pitcher A or 2014 Bumgarner allow a hit. Furthermore, if we let this happen for m hits, we arrive at our deduced formula. We should also note that according to the deduced formula, we should see the probability decrease as m increases. This logic makes sense because the expected span of batters until 2014 Bumgarner allows his 1^st hit, , stays the same, but we are trying to squeeze in more hits allowed by 2010 Pitcher A, which makes the probability become less likely.

Table 4.1:  Probability of 2010 Pitcher A Allowing m^th Hit Before 2014 Bumgarner Allows 1^st

In Table 4.1, we compare 2014 Bumgarner and his 0.123 World Series P(H) versus each starter from the 2010 World Series Giants rotation and their respective P(H). We expect 2014 Bumgarner to have the advantage over 2010 Lincecum, Cain, and Sanchez, given how he dominated the 2014 World Series; clearly he does. In an even pitchers’ duel, he would win with a probability greater than 50% even after the chance of a tie is removed; we could even see 2 hits from the other pitchers before 2014 Bumgarner allows his 1^st with a probability greater than 25%. However, against a comparably excellent pitcher, himself in 2010, he would likely lose the duel because 2010 Bumgarner actually has a better P(H). Notice that from Sanchez to Lincecum and from Lincecum to Cain, the P(H) descends steadily each time; consequently, the same pattern of linear decline also follows duel probabilities when transitioning from pitcher to pitcher for each of the different hits allowed. Hence, the distinction between exceptional and below-average pitchers stays relatively constant as we allow more hits by them versus 2014 Bumgarner.

We can also construct the converse formula to calculate the probability that 2010 Pitcher A allows 1 hit before 2014 Bumgarner allows his n^th hit. We let be a random variable for the total batters faced when 2014 Bumgarner allows his n^th hit and for when 2010 Pitcher A allows his 1^st hit. However, instead of directly deducing the probability that 2010 Pitcher A allows 1 hit before 2014 Bumgarner allows his n^th hit, we’ll do so indirectly by taking the complement of both the probability that 2014 Bumgarner allows his n^th hit before 2010 Pitcher A allows his 1^st hit (a variation of our first formula) and the probability that 2014 Bumgarner allows his n^th hit and 2010 Pitcher A allows his 1^st hit after the same number of batters.

The resulting formula takes the complement of the probability that 2014 Bumgarner allows n hits and 2010 Pitcher A does not allow a hit in (n-1) chances and divides it by the probability that 2010 Pitcher A or 2014 Bumgarner allow n hits. In this formula we can contrarily see the probability increase as n increases. By extending the expected span of batters, , to accommodate 2014 Bumgarner’s n hits instead of just 1, we’re granting 2010 Pitcher A more time to allow his 1^st hit, resulting in an increased likelihood.

Once again, if we set n=1 for an even matchup, we get the same formula as before:

Table 4.2:  Probability of 2010 Pitcher A Allowing 1^st Hit Before 2014 Bumgarner Allows n^th

In Table 4.2, we again use 2014 Bumgarner’s 0.123 P(H) versus those displayed in the table above. As expected, the probabilities from the even duels are the same as Table 4.1 because the formulas are the same. Although this time from Sanchez to Lincecum and from Lincecum to Cain, the difference between each pitcher noticeably decreases as we adjust the scenario to allow 2014 Bumgarner more hits. Thereby, there is less distinction between exceptional and below-average pitchers if we widen the range of batters, , enough for them to allow their 1^st hit versus 2014 Bumgarner.

Madison Bumgarner may have dominated the 2014 World Series as a starter, but he also forcefully shut the door on the Royals to carry his team to the title (by ominously throwing 5 IP, 2 H, 0 BB). Given the momentum he had, he proved himself to be Bruce Bochy’s best option. However, not every game is Game 7 of the World Series, where a manager must decisively bring in the one reliever he trusts the most. A manager needs to assess who is the appropriate reliever for the job and weigh which relievers will available later. Fortunately, an indirect benefit of the pitchers’ duel model is that it can calculate the relative probability between two relievers for who will allow a hit or baserunner first; this application could be very useful in long relief or in extra innings.

Table 4.3:  Probability of 2010 Pitcher A Allowing m^th Baserunners Before 2014 Bumgarner Allows 1^st

Suppose we’re entering extra innings and the only pitchers available are 2014 Bumgarner and 2010 Bumgarner, Lincecum, Cain, and Sanchez with their respective statistics from Table 4.3 (where we substituted P(H) in Table 4.1 for OBP). We wouldn’t automatically throw in our best pitcher, 2014 Bumgarner, with his 0.151 OBP; we need to compare how he would perform relative to the other 2010 pitchers and see what the drop off is. Nor is it a priority to know how many innings to expect out of our reliever because we don’t know how long he’ll be needed. What is crucial in this situation is the prevention of baserunners as potential runs. 2010 Bumgarner, Cain, and Lincecum would each be worthy candidates to keep 2014 Bumgarner in the bullpen, because each has a reasonable chance (greater than 40%) of allowing a baserunner by the same batter or later than 2014 Bumgarner. Hence, the risk of using a pitcher with a slightly greater chance of allowing a baserunner sooner may be worth the reward of having 2014 Bumgarner available in a more dire situation. Yet, we would want to avoid bringing in 2010 Sanchez because the risk would be too great; the probability is approximately 49% that he could allow two baserunners before 2014 Bumgarner allows one. Preventing baserunners and using your bullpen appropriately are both high priorities in close game situations where mistakes are magnified.

After spending the first four years of his career primarily in the bullpen, Jeff Samardzija became a full-time starting pitcher in 2012. In his first two years as a starting pitcher, Samardzija was worth 2.8 and 2.6 WAR, but he bumped that up to 4.1 WAR last year in the best season of his career.

Jeff Samardzija, first two years as a starter (combined)

Jeff Samardzija, 2014 season

Considering just the years he’s spent as a starting pitcher, in 2014 Samardzija set career bests in innings pitched, ERA, FIP, xFIP, WHIP, BB%, HR/FB%, BABIP, and GB%. When a player takes a step forward like this, there’s always the question of how sustainable this step forward is.

With Samardzija, it’s important to break down his 2014 season between the time he spent with the Chicago Cubs and the time he spent with the Oakland A’s.

The two statistics that stand out most are Samardzija’s BB% and BABIP in his time with the A’s. Samardzija made his last start with the Cubs on June 28^th, 2014. At that point, he had a 6.9% BB% and .305 BABIP. His BB% was a career best and his BABIP was almost a perfect match for the BABIP allowed by the Cub’s team during the entire 2014 season (.304).

After the trade to Oakland, Samardzija’s BB% plummeted from 6.9% with the Cubs to 2.8% with the A’s and his BABIP also dropped significantly, from .305 to .262. Samardzija’s BABIP with Oakland was even better than Oakland’s team BABIP during the 2014 season (.272).

So, is this much-improved walk rate over a half-season of starts sustainable? Considering that before coming to Oakland, Samardzija had pitched 496 1/3 innings as a starter over the previous two-and-a-half years with a walk rate of 7.9%, I would say it’s not. He had a good stretch of 16 starts with a much lower walk rate than his career average, but it’s unlikely that he can sustain that low walk rate going into 2015.

Then there’s the issue of his superlative BABIP with the Oakland A’s. Again, through 496 1/3 innings pitched as a starter in the two-and-a-half-years before coming to Oakland, Samardzija had allowed a BABIP of .306. With Oakland, it dropped to .262. As mentioned above, Oakland’s team BABIP was .272 last year, so that drop for Samardzija is not surprising given that he was pitching in front of a better defense. Now that Samardzija is with the White Sox, he won’t have such a good defense behind him. The White Sox allowed a .306 BABIP last year and were in the bottom tier of all teams in baseball defensively. Since then, they’ve added Adam LaRoche, Melky Cabrera, and Emilio Bonifacio. LaRoche and Cabrera have not been good defenders over the last two years, while Bonifacio was good last year but not notably good in previous years. The bottom line is that it doesn’t look like the White Sox defense will do Samardzija any favors in 2015.

So, what should we expect from Samardzija in 2015?

Mike Podhorzer has written about the difference in ballparks as Samardzija moves from the O.co Coliseum in Oakland to US Cellular in Chicago. The takeaway is that the Cell could help Samardzija pick up a few more strikeouts at the expense of more walks and more homers allowed. Here are the strikeout, walk, and home run park factors for Wrigley, O.co, and US Cellular:

In his three years as a starting pitcher in more pitcher-friendly ballparks, Samardzija has a strikeout rate of 23.7%, a walk rate of 7%, and a HR/FB% of 12.2%. To project Samardzija for 2015, we could slightly increase his strikeout rate, up his walk rate by a bit more, and his home run rate by even more, and factor in regression as Samardzija turns 30 years old. The following chart shows Samardzija’s numbers over the last three seasons, along with the average for those three seasons and what I would project for Samardzija in 2015.

To projection Samardzija’s stats for 2015, I used the formula for FIP and plugged in expected strikeouts walks and home runs, based on my projections above. This produced a FIP for Samardzija of 3.71. In his career as a starter, Samardzija’s FIP has been about 0.20 lower than his actual ERA. Last year, the White Sox team FIP was 0.20 lower than their team ERA. With this in mind, I bumped up my projection for Samardzija’s ERA to 3.80.

For WHIP, I used the walk rate I projected above and a .305 BABIP to come up with hits allowed and project a 1.26 WHIP for Samardzija in 2015. Here is a chart with my projection, along with projections from Steamer, ZiPS, and the FanGraphs Fans:

The Fans are more optimistic in their projection for Samardzija’s innings, ERA, and WHIP. I’m more optimistic than Steamer and the FanGraphs Fans that Samardzija will strike out a few more batters, but I also expect him to walk more and have a higher WHIP. Samardzija was the 22^nd starting pitcher drafted in the recent FanGraphs Early Mock Draft, taken ahead of Masahiro Tanaka, Jake Arrieta, Hisashi Iwakuma, and Hyun-Jin Ryu, among others. I will definitely be moving Samardzija down my draft sheets a bit.

So we all know the Cubs signed Jon Lester to a six-year, $155 million dollar contract this offseason. The Cubs presumably believe they will be competitive if not this season then the next, and therefore decided to get themselves an ace. This however bodes the question, is Jon Lester even the Cubs’ best pitcher going into 2015?

Last year proved to be a breakout year for right-hander Jake Arrieta. Arrieta was drafted in 2007 by the Baltimore Orioles and made his Major League debut in 2010. He spent a little over six years with the Orioles before he was traded to the Cubs in 2013. Arrieta posted good numbers in the minors, in fact in 2010, at Triple A he had a 1.85 ERA before getting the call to the Majors that same season. In the Majors, however it was a different story. From 2010-2013 Arrieta was downright awful, never pitching more than 119.1 innings in a season and never posting an ERA below 4.66, which he did in his rookie year.

2014, though, was different. Arrieta posted the best numbers of his career, finishing with a 2.53 ERA, a 2.26 FIP, and a 2.73 xFIP. He also recorded a career high in innings, netting 156.2 innings pitched. How was Arrieta able to this? A guy who had never had an ERA below 4.66 recorded a Cy Young-caliber season? He even might have had a shot at the Cy Young Award if he’d pitched more innings.

Well Arrieta essentially stopped walking hitters and started striking out a bunch of hitters. He posted the best K-BB% of his career at 20.5% and he also stopped giving up home runs at .29 HR/9. There are several ways a pitcher can become better; some of them create a new pitch, some of them make a mechanical adjustment, and some just sequence their pitches better. I think in Arrieta’s case it comes down to sequencing and maybe mechanical although I have no way of truly knowing whether the latter is true or not.

Here is an example of the type of pitches Arrieta threw from 2010-2013 according to Brooks Baseball.

Here is Arrieta’s sequencing in 2014.

Two elements really stand out to me through these tables. The first is that Arrieta has not added a killer new pitch. The second is that Arrieta is throwing a lot less four-seam fastballs and a lot more sliders, especially to left-handed hitters. He’s also increased his curveball usage. Arrieta essentially is mixing his pitches a lot more than in previous seasons, which could be an answer to his sudden spike in production. If you’re thinking, well, maybe he’s throwing harder, he’s not. His fastball velocity last year was 93.4, which is pretty much where it’s been its entire career (career fastball velocity: 93).

Does this guarantee that Arrieta will be better than Lester next season? Probably not. Lester still has Arrieta by a wide margin in innings. Lester’s consistently pitched more 200 innings throughout his career, while Arrieta’s never pitched more than 156.2. Also even though Arrieta is mixing his pitches better, this isn’t necessarily predictive that he will keep doing it or keep doing it with the same success rate. If I personally had to put money on it I would still give a slight edge to Lester. That being said I wouldn’t be surprised if Arrieta was better than Lester next season and going forward.

Arrieta at 28 is still three years younger than Lester (31). While Arrieta’s fastball velocity had kept steady, Lester’s fastball velocity has been on a steady downward decline since 2010. Last year his fastball velocity was the lowest of his career at 91.5 and if it keeps dropping we could see a significant decline in Lester’s production. Throughout his career, Lester’s ERA and peripheral indicators have consistently been in the mid- to low-threes. It wouldn’t surprise me if Lester fell back to that norm, or even took a step back.

Essentially, it is difficult to predict which pitcher will regress and which one will keep the same level of production. For all we know, they could both regress. The point here is to demonstrate that Lester will not necessarily be that much better (if better at all) than Arrieta in 2015. For all we know, Arrieta might be the next Cubs ace.

Ever since the Cubs acquired top shortstop prospect Addison Russell from the Oakland Athletics in the Jeff Samardzija and Jason Hammel deal people began to speculate that Starlin Castro’s time in Chicago may be coming to a close sooner rather than later. Castro’s name began to pop up in trade rumors all the time, Castro to the Mets, Castro to Seattle etc… but Cubs President Theo Epstein and General Manager Jed Hoyer told teams that Castro wasn’t going anywhere. With all the middle infield talent the Cubs have people see Castro as the odd man out. The front office repeated their message about Castro being their guy early in the offseason by saying “ Starlin is our shortstop in 2015.” I know a lot of people expect Castro to be traded at some point, but I’ll go over why I think they should keep the three-time All-Star, and how he’s becoming a better player.

Contract

First off Castro is still young currently 24 years old (he’ll turn 25 in spring training). Castro also has a team friendly deal at 7yr/$61M with an option for the 2020 season. This contract averages out to $8.7M each year, although the contract is back loaded, but still an average of $8.7M is a bargain for a premium position in today’s MLB market.

Lets compare Starlin’s contract to another young shortstop, Elvis Andrus of the Texas Rangers. Andrus signed an 8yr/$120M contract with the Rangers.

As you can see Andrus is due significantly more money than Castro. Compared to Andrus’ contract Castro’s seems like a bargain. But the real question is who is the better player, and is Andrus worth $60M more than Castro? Lets look at each player’s career numbers.

Andrus has posted of career line of (.272/.335/.345) with an OPS of .680, 20 points lower than league average. He has totaled 20 home runs in 6 seasons. Castro has a career line of (.284/.325/.410) with an OPS of .735, 35 points higher than league average. Starlin has clubbed 51 career home runs in one fewer year than Andrus. By comparing these two players numbers and contracts you can clearly see that the Cubs are getting a great deal on Castro. Castro not only makes far less than Andrus he is a superior offensive player, and is also younger with more upside. I believe that Castro’s contract could become more of a steal if Castro becomes a better player, which he is starting to show signs of. Lets go over how Castro is starting to become better in all facets of the game.

Improving Power

Castro totaled 14 home runs in 2014 tying his career high set back in the 2012 season. Starlin would have easily set a new career high if not for an ankle injury that cost him most of September. Despite missing almost 30 games Castro still put up a career high SLG% of .438 besting his 2011 season SLG% of .432. Keep in mind that is the season where Castro hit .307 and had over 200 hits so therefore his slugging percentage was based more on singles and triples and fewer long balls.

One reason for Castro’s improving power is that he is starting to hit more fly balls, and those fly balls are starting to leave the ballpark. In 2010 when Starlin got called up as a 20 year old he looked like a 16 year old due to his lean frame. Castro hit only 3 home runs that year and was mainly a singles hitter when he first started his career. In 2010 Castro’s groundball percentage (GB%) was 51.3% and his fly ball percentage (FB%) was 29.2%, this equaled a groundball to fly ball ratio (GB/FB) of 1.76. Castro’s home run to fly ball ratio (HR/FB) in 2010 was only 2.6%, which ranked 19^th out of 22 qualified shortstops. As you can see when Starlin first came up he was a singles hitter who mainly hit the ball on the ground, which isn’t a bad thing, and when he did elevate the ball it rarely left the yard.

Let’s look at these same numbers in 2014. His GB% dropped to 45.3% and his FB% rose to 32.3%, which equaled a GB/FB ratio of 1.40. Now where the biggest change happened is in his HR/FB ratio — it skyrocketed to 10.1%. This means 1 out of every 10 fly balls that Starlin hit traveled over the wall for a homer. His increased HR/FB ratio brought him to 4^th among qualified shortstops in HR/FB ratio, which is a huge improvement over his rookie season.

With more fly balls from Castro you’ll see more of this…

and this…

and this…

Not only is Castro hitting more home runs; he is hitting more impressive home runs like these above. Watching Castro’s 2014 season I found myself saying, “wow that was far” on more of his home runs than ever before in previous seasons.

For these reasons above I believe that Castro is poised to show even more power in the coming seasons due to his increased FB% as well as his vastly improved HR/FB ratio.

Improving Defense

Lets take a look at Castro’s fielding numbers from the beginning of his career until now.

When Starlin came up in 2010, defense was the biggest weakness of his game by far. In 2010 he committed 27 errors in 123 games, which ranked as the 2^nd most in the MLB that year. His FP% of .950, was 2^nd to last among qualified shortstops in 2010. In 2011 Castro committed 29 errors, which was the most in the majors that year, although he still ranked last in FP% among shortstops, his FP% rose by 11 points. In 2012 Castro tied for the major league lead in errors at 27. 2013 was more of the same tying for the second most errors in the majors, but in 2014 we saw a great improvement by his committing only 15 errors. This improvement is Starlin’s fielding brought him towards the middle of the pack in FP% among shortstops. Castro even had a 38-game errorless streak in 2014 as well, showing that he has gotten over his problem of making the routine throw to first.

Although the metrics are down on Castro as a defender, I see Castro get to balls that he has no business getting to. For example Castro is one of the best shortstops at making plays on bloopers and shallow fly balls, like this for example.

Castro has great range on balls hit over his head. Not only can he make the plays in shallow left and center field, he covers a lot of ground moving laterally and is quickly able to get to his feet and unleash a strong throw, like this for example.

As you can see Castro is improving his defensive game year by year and there is no evidence to suggest that he can’t get any better in 2015 as well. This is just one of the many ways that Castro is steadily improving his overall game.

Comparing Castro to Other Shortstops

As offensive numbers are down in recent years, finding a premium offensive shortstop is a hard thing to do. Lets see how Castro stacks up compared to other shortstops around the league in 2014.

Among qualified shortstops Castro led all of them in batting average at .292, He was 2^nd in OBP at .339, and 3^rd in SLG at .438. I’ll take a guy any day of the week that ranks in the top three of those categories among his position. Castro also ranked sixth in line drive percentage at 22.3% (which beat his previous career high by 2%), trailing the leader by only 2%. Castro also ranked first in batting average on balls in play (BABIP); these two categories combined shows that he is putting the ball in play and hitting the ball hard all over the field, which will generate a good average as well as power. Another stat where Castro is ranked in the top three among shortstops is wRC+; his wRC+ was 115, 15 points over league average, good enough for third among shortstops.

One knock on Castro in his career is that he doesn’t walk enough, but looking at the shortstop position as a whole no one is posting a staggering OBP (Except for Troy Tulowitzki, who is in another league compared to every other shortstop, but he can’t stay healthy). Therefore Castro’s .339 OBP is extremely good for a shortstop in the game today. I think people need to compare players to others playing that same position, because if you look at Castro’s numbers compared to other shortstops Starlin is clearly a top three shortstop in the game offensively.

What Do You Do With All These Shortstops?

Some people see the Cubs’ surplus of shortstops as a problem, but I see it as a good problem to have. Normally your shortstop is your most athletic player and covers the most ground, so why not have three of them in the infield? I think if the Cubs fielded and infield of Castro, Javier Baez, and Addison Russell, that infield would gobble up every groundball. Whether Castro sticks at short or if Russell comes up and becomes the shortstop that everyone thinks he will be, the Cubs could have a huge defensive advantage by playing three shortstops in the IF.

Playing three shortstops in the IF would shift Kris Bryant, who will be an average defensive 3B at best, to the outfield where his defense wouldn’t be as much of a concern. Bryant in LF would fill the one spot where the Cubs don’t have a top prospect. This would mean you would have a top prospect at every position in the future. For example C: Kyle Schwarber (if he can stick at C), 1B: All-Star Anthony Rizzo, a combination of Baez, Castro, and Russell all fitting at 2B, 3B, and SS (future positions TBD), LF: Bryant, CF: Albert Almora or Arismendy Alcantara (Alcantara could become super utility as well, a Ben Zobrist role), RF: Jorge Soler. I don’t know about you but a lineup filled with all those top prospects and all that power excites the heck out of me.

Overall I think Starlin Castro is severely under-appreciated not only by the MLB, but also by Cubs fans. Castro has improved in many areas, and I believe that he is among the top three shortstops in the game. Castro is starting to show that he has more power in that bat with an increased FB% and in his FB/HR ratio. Keeping Starlin Castro as well as all of the other shortstops could be very beneficial for the Cubs.

The A’s winning the West after a huge offseason makeover in 2015 might seem like an unlikely achievement, but here are seven reasons why this is not at all unachievable:

1. The New-Look Infield

In 2015 the Athletics will be throwing out a fresh face at each of the four starting infield positions. Here’s a quick look:

Especially from an Athletics fan’s perspective, the left side of this chart looks very nice. The names Moss and Donaldson are very important and dear to you; however, the right side of this chart is actually more productive overall. While Moss and Donaldson have the highest wOBA of the eight players at .351 and .339 respectively, Jed Lowrie and Eric Sogard have the two lowest at .300 and .262 respectively. This averages out to be a wOBA of .313. The Average wOBA for 2015’s infield is .320.

You might be thinking that Lawrie does not compare to Donaldson, and you could be right. The fact of the matter is that Lawrie is a downgrade from Donaldson, but not by all that much, meanwhile, Zobrist is a huge upgrade from Sogard at 2B. And even Sogard is an upgrade from Punto as the UTIL infielder.

Other important categories that favor the 2015 infield are BB%, K%, FB%, Contact%, OPS, OBP, etc. Also, the new infield got quite a bit younger and faster.

The 2015 infield also has a higher average wRC+ at 104 in comparison to 2014’s 102.5. These aren’t huge differences, but the A’s are expecting better years from Lawrie, who was injured a lot in 2014, Davis, who hit 32 HR in 2012, and Semien, who hasn’t really had much of a chance in the majors yet. These moves were necessary, not only to save money, but because the 2014 team didn’t actually win the AL West. I’m now going to compare this new INF to a team that did win the West, the 2012 A’s.

The 2012 INF consisted of Josh Donaldson, Stephen Drew, Cliff Pennington and Brandon Moss. There were other guys in the mix earlier on in the season, i.e. Jemile Weeks, Brandon Inge, however, these were the guys that got it done down the home stretch.

These numbers are almost identical, however the 2015 team has a slight edge in every category. That is despite the fact that the A’s expect growth from the incoming players this season. Even after the significant losses of Josh Donaldson and Brandon Moss the A’s infield is more than capable of pushing them toward another Western division title.

2. The Designated Hitter

The Athletics’ DH numbers from 2014 are not where you want them to be. Yes, Melvin will still use this spot as a “half-rest” day for players like Crisp, Reddick and Lawrie, but the newcomer Billy Butler will most likely fill the spot the majority of the time. Butler is a huge upgrade from the A’s team DH numbers last season in which Callaspo, Moss, Norris, Jaso, Vogt, Dunn, among countless others had at bats. Let’s take a look at the 2014 A’s DH numbers vs. Billy Butler’s 2014 numbers. (he also had a down season):

This chart shows that Butler is a significant upgrade at the DH spot, as he will bring a lot more production to the middle of this lineup. I should also bring up his career numbers, which are a wOBA of .351 and wRC+ of 117. If Butler can get back to his career form, the A’s offense is looking at a huge boost, but even if he doesn’t and repeats his 2014 performance, the DH spot is still getting a nice upgrade.

3. The Rotation

The starting rotation for the A’s no longer consists of Jon Lester, Jeff Samardzija or Jason Hammel, but it is still a very strong group with huge potential. I’m going to compare the projected 2015 group to the 2012 and 2013 rotations that led the A’s to division titles.

2012

2013

Projected 2015 (2014 STATS)

As you can see, the 2015 rotation wins four out of the six categories. They won the majority of the categories already, but this 2015 staff has the potential to be better than these numbers show. In past years, the A’s success had a lot to do with their strong pitching staff — this is a big reason why I believe they will win the west in 2015 — however, we need to take a look at the projected rotations of the four other teams in the division to see how the A’s compare to each of them.

Here are the five teams’ projected rotations for 2015:

Angels

Mariners

Rangers

Astros

Athletics

The Mariners and the Athletics both have really solid pitching staffs. The Mariners have arguably the best pitcher in the American League in Felix Hernandez. The Angels also have a good young ace in Garrett Richards, but he is coming off an injury; it will be interesting to see how he bounces back. Sonny Gray proved that he is a true ace last season, going over 200 innings and pitching extremely well in big games. The numbers do give the A’s a slight edge; they won three of the six categories and the Mariners won two of them. King Felix, Iwakuma and the solid supporting cast are hard to bet against, but 1-5, the A’s have a better staff according to last year’s numbers.

4. Speedee Oil Change

Anytime manager Bob Melvin calls on the bullpen, the A’s should be confident. There are so many capable arms out there that it’s really not fair. Honestly, a starter could go four innings with a lead and that would be enough for this bullpen with Otero, Abad, Cook, O’Flaherty, Clippard and Doolittle in the mix. There are plenty of other options as well that might not get a shot because it’s already crowded with talent out there. The starters, however, are very capable of giving you six or seven innings consistently, which makes this bullpen even that much more deadly, allowing Melvin to create left-on-left matchups or vice versa. The fact of the matter is, if you can’t score, you can’t win. While the starting staff is very solid, getting to the bullpen might not be the opponent’s best option when facing the A’s. Another positive for the A’s has been their ability to fight their way back into ballgames the last few years. With a bullpen like this who can keep the deficit where it is, the probability of achieving a comeback is that much greater.

As shown by the Royals on the successful end and the Dodgers on the opposite end, the strength of your bullpen can make or break your season.

Let’s compare the A’s bullpen to the other teams in the division by highlighting the projected top six bullpen arms for each team:

Angels

Mariners

Rangers

Astros

Athletics

The Mariners and Athletics each won two out of the five categories. The Athletics also came in second in two other categories. Although this chart shows the Mariners and the A’s as pretty evenly matched, the Mariners have a lot of aging players in their pen, so we cannot be sure if they will keep up the good numbers. The Astros got a lot better by adding Luke Gregerson and Pat Neshek, but that still wasn’t enough to make them the best in the division, especially after the A’s went out and traded for the two time All-Star, Tyler Clippard. All of these teams except Texas have a very strong bullpen, so trying to come back from a deficit is going to be a tough feat in this division.

The A’s also have a lot of other options past these six players, probably more so than the other four teams, making injuries less of a factor for them.

5. Coco Crisp

When Coco Crisp is at the top of the lineup, the A’s are a better team. Over the past three seasons there’s no player who has had as much of an overall impact on this team than Coco. Whether it’s at the plate, in the field or in the clubhouse, Crisp’s impact is significant. Despite losing a lot of star players, the A’s will not take a step backward because they still have their most important piece in Crisp. If Crisp would have been traded away this offseason, I don’t believe the A’s would be ready to compete for the AL West title in 2015. There would be too long of an adjustment period, someone else would need to step up big time and fill his shoes. Luckily, the A’s don’t have to worry about that yet. Bottom line: the A’s need Coco Crisp.

6. Depth and Versatility

Having a deep roster is always important in a 162 game season. You will have players go on the DL, it is unavoidable. Being able to replace the injured players with capable major leaguers is key to a team’s success in the long run. Billy Beane has constructed a 40-man roster with tremendous depth, especially with pitching. The A’s have eight or nine guys capable of making the starting rotation, not to mention two others (Jarrod Parker and A.J. Griffin) due back this summer. There are upwards of ten players competing for a spot in the bullpen as well. It will be interesting to see who makes it on to the 25-man roster, but I wouldn’t be surprised if Triple-A Nashville has a stacked opening day roster. Having great options in the minor leagues is key for any team, and the A’s will definitely have that this season with Kendall Graveman, Chris Bassitt, Sean Nolin and Brad Mills, four starters likely to be starting in Triple-A. Also, RJ Alvarez, Eury De La Rosa and Evan Scriber, three above-average bullpen arms will likely be starting down there as well.

The A’s lineup is a very versatile group this season. Eric Sogard, A’s second baseman the last few seasons, has moved into a utility INF role; he plays excellent defense, and for a defensive replacement, he can handle the stick pretty well. Ben Zobrist is known for his ability to play all over the diamond with above-average defense, and also for getting the job done from both sides of the plate; his career wOBA is .344. Craig Gentry and Sam Fuld can play all three outfield positions with ease while providing speed off the bench in pinch running situations. Marcus Semien will likely be the everyday SS, but he can play all over the infield as well. Stephen Vogt will mostly catch, but he can play first base and corner outfield if the A’s need him to. The amount of options the A’s have, if injuries do occur, are limitless. It will be entertaining to see how Bob Melvin constructs his lineup card every day.

7. The Manager

Bob Melvin is the perfect manager for a team of misfits and players who have never played together previously. He will bring this group to play for each other, as a unit, one day at a time. Melvin is great at creating matchups that benefit the team and give them the best chance to succeed. The roster that has been assembled this season is perfect for just that. It is loaded with skilled, versatile players. Bob Melvin has done it before and he will do it again.

Earlier this offseason, the Dodgers and Marlins completed a large trade, with Dee Gordon, Dan Haren, and Miguel Rojas getting shipped to Florida (along with $10 million) while Andrew Heaney, Enrique Hernandez, Austin Barnes, and Chris Hatcher headed out west in return. The Dodgers, whose new front office was in a midst of one of the most ridiculous trading benders in recent memory, then turned around and less than an hour later sent Heaney to the Angels in exchange for second baseman Howie Kendrick. While Heaney was a valuable piece, touted as one of the game’s top left handed pitching prospects who was also considered close to the majors if not already capable of handling it, the Dodgers were clearly happy to get Kendrick in return, an under the radar stud at second base who was worth over four and a half wins last year.

Ignoring the other teams in the trades for a moment, the Dodgers come out of these moves looking much better than they had before. Austin Barnes and Chris Hatcher are both valuable pieces that provide the Dodgers with bullpen and bench depth that they sorely needed. Even if Dee Gordon’s first half was not an aberration, and even if you take issue with both players’ defensive stats, the worst anyone could argue is that both second basemen are close to equal, but most would agree that Kendrick is an improvement over Gordon.

Now obviously, there was more to the trade than their straight up value. Gordon is young and affordable with five more years of team control. Kendrick, while also relatively cheap, is 31 and in the last year of his contract. However, I’m not interested in comparing Kendrick and Gordon. I’m interested in the last piece that the Marlins sent to the Dodgers in their trade, a 23-year-old utility player by the name of Enrique Hernandez. Hernandez broke into the majors for the first time in 2014, playing a total of 42 games with both the Astros and Marlins (he was a part of the Jarred Cosart deal). Among many other skills (which we will soon examine), Hernandez has the ability to play second base, and he was actually pretty decent in his short stint in the majors last year. So what I’m curious to look at is whether the Dodgers are better off with Kendrick manning second and Hernandez on the bench, or whether giving Hernandez the starting job and keeping Heaney might have been the better move for the organization.

Let’s start by examining Hernandez. His primary weapon is versatility, having spent time at SS, 2B, and 3B, as well as all three outfield positions, providing plus defense everywhere he played. On top of that, he also managed to provide value with the bat, posting a .248/.321/.421 line, which was good for a 110 wRC+ last year (I know, offense was crazy down last year). Now granted, that was only in 134 PAs, which leads to the question whether that success was sustainable. Hernandez was not a good hitter in the minors. A 6^th round pick in 2009, he averaged an 85 wRC+ across three levels from 2011-2013, and for a while it didn’t look like he was going to amount to anything much. However, something seemed to click in 2014, as he posted above average numbers across three levels, including the big leagues.

So what changed? Well, his strikeout rate dropped (at least in the minors, it spiked once he started facing big league pitching), and his walk rated jumped. He also started hitting for a lot more power, which did manage to carry over to the majors. In an interview with Jimmy Price, Hernandez credited his recent success to a mechanical adjustment in winter ball.

I went into winter ball and decided to figure out what was wrong with my swing. I tried a few things, not really worried about how my season was going, I was just trying to get better and there it was. I tweaked a little something in my batting stance and it clicked. All of the sudden [sic] I was seeing the ball better, recognizing pitches a lot earlier and I started driving the ball again.

These signs (increased walk rate, more power, a mechanical adjustment) all point to a real offensive outbreak as opposed to a fluky few games. On top of that, he even posted a below average BABIP in the majors while still being productive. ZiPS also thinks his breakout is at least somewhat sustainable, projecting him for a .306 wOBA for next year. Combine that with his plus defense, and the system believes he will be worth 2 WAR. While nothing remarkable, that seems like a completely capable starting second baseman.

So now let’s turn our attention to Howie Kendrick, who will be manning second base for the Dodgers on Opening Day, save any Simpsons-esque misfortunes. I suppose injury would be another possibility, but I digress. Kendrick was a top prospect coming up through the Angels system, with sky-high expectations set upon him. While Kendrick didn’t turn into a superstar, he carved out a nice niche for himself, playing plus defense while always being at least average with the bat, sometimes much more. And while he started out his career as an average regular, he turned himself into a well above-average player as he entered his prime, averaging more than four wins per season over the past four years. Last year Kendrick hit a very solid .293/347/397, good for a 115 wRC+. He also provided plus defense, posting a 6.7 UZR. In short, he was really good.

However, next year isn’t necessarily a guarantee of the same thing. ZiPS still likes Kendrick to produce 3.7 WAR, which would be right in line with his past few years. However, Steamer is quite pessimistic, projecting a drop in both offense and defense, and sees Kendrick only being worth 2.4 wins. Let’s split the difference and say that Kendrick will be about a 3-win player next year. Now even here, Kendrick is a clear upgrade over Hernandez, but he does come with some caveats of his own. For starters, Kendrick is 31 years old, and he is also in the last year of his contract that will see him make $9.5 million in 2015. While the salary is a major bargain, the Dodgers will likely have to purchase some of Kendrick’s decline years at the price of his prime years if they sign him to an extension, and he could turn from a bargain into another bad veteran contract.

Now if the Dodgers don’t extend him, they can just take his 2015 and its surplus value, offer Kendrick a qualifying offer at the end of the year, accept the draft pick and move on. Since estimates peg a sandwich round pick to be worth about two wins, we can also factor that into Kendrick’s value. But now we turn our attention to the piece that brought Kendrick to Los Angeles from Not Los Angeles: Andrew Heaney.

The 23-year-old Heaney was highly touted coming up through the minors. He was rated as the Marlins’ number-one prospect by Baseball Prospectus and the number-30 prospect in baseball headed into the 2014 season. Scouting reports were all positive, pegging him with three plus pitches and a repeatable delivery. Bringing all of this from the left side made him all the more attractive. Heaney did nothing to disprove that, starting the year by tearing up AA and holding his own in AAA as well. That culminated with him getting called up to the majors in June when the Marlins were in need of some rotation help.

Unfortunately for them (and Heaney), he was flat-out bad upon reaching the show. Across four starts in June, the young southpaw gave up 15 runs in just 20.2 innings. Heaney only struck out 13 while walking six, but his true enemy was the longball, as he gave up five home runs. Those are all bad totals, which led to his FIP of 6.18. His BABIP of .297 also suggests that he wasn’t really unlucky in any discernible way. These bad outings led to Heaney being sent down on July 6, a day after giving up five runs in just 3.2 innings.

After he spent the rest of the minor league season in Triple-A, the Fish called Heaney back up for another cup of coffee in September, this time using him out of the bullpen. While he wasn’t anywhere near as terrible as his starts in the summer, Heaney wasn’t extremely impressive either, posting a 3.71 FIP in 8.2 innings of long relief. While Heaney is still a highly regarded prospect, and his two stints in the majors are an incredibly small sample size, there are some worrying signs. The home runs are obviously not good, but Heaney also had a Z-Contact% of 93.9. This means that pitches in the strike zone that hitters swung at were hit 94% of the time. That number would have been the highest among qualified starters last year by a lot, and it might suggest that he doesn’t quite have enough to get it by major league hitters, at least not on his fastball.

However, a SwStr% of 9.6 was actually quite good, suggesting he might have to live off his breaking stuff in the show. FanGraphs’ pitch values also support this, rating his fastball as a poor pitch while his slider is average and his change is plus. However, these reasons might have given the Marlins the motivation to move him for Dee Gordon when the opportunity arose. Yet, most scouts (or at least the ones who write on the internet) still look highly upon Heaney. Kiley McDaniel gives him an overall future value of 60, which translates to an above-average starter in the majors. ZiPS also sees potential, projecting the youngster to produce more than a win if given a starting role, albeit with a 4.42 FIP (the system anticipates he’ll still have home run troubles).

But the value of Heaney isn’t what he is now, it’s what he will become. Heaney offers his team six years of team control, his age 23 through 29 seasons. Those are exactly the years you want to control, getting a player right through his prime, then being able to say goodbye as the guy turns 30 and starts to decline. Even if Heaney follows a late aging curve, and doesn’t start realizing his potential until 26, and even if he just becomes a league average starter, it’s still a reasonable expectation that he will produce at least 9 wins over the next six years, save for any injury (which is obviously a realistic but unpredictable possibility).

So, would the Dodgers have been better off keeping Andrew Heaney? Going by ZiPS projections, Heaney and Hernandez combined might be able to provide Kendrick’s 2014 in the aggregate this year, and that doesn’t even include the value the Dodgers would have gained from Heaney in the future. But, there is a lot more to it than that. So even factoring in the potential draft pick or extension Los Angeles might get, the two seem to be more valuable over the long term. However, the Dodgers obviously want to win now. Kendrick not only provides an upgrade over Hernandez for 2014, but they can also fill their fifth slot in the rotation with someone better than Andrew Heaney, which they might have done with the combination of Brett Anderson and Joe Wieland. It also allows the Dodgers to move Hernandez to the bench, where his versatility can be fully utilized. Considering the Dodger’s relatively old infield, it wouldn’t be unreasonable to expect Hernandez to start at least twice a week, possibly more, while providing the team with value on both sides of the ball.

So while keeping Heaney might have provided more value in the long run, it is important to remember that a win now might be more valuable than a win later to a team that is expected to contend for the World Series. Also, the front office folks might not have been as high on Heaney after his brief foray into the major leagues, but they took advantage of an Angels team that still wanted him. Or after already signing Brandon McCarthy, trading for Joe Wieland, and possibly planning on acquiring Anderson as well, the Dodgers might not have wanted to stunt Heaney’s development with another year in the minors. Regardless of the motivation, the LA brass decided that the team was better off with Howie Kendrick than it was with Andrew Heaney. If Heaney turns into a star and Kendrick implodes this year, it might be a move they end up regretting, but this Dodger front office has been executing a very specific game plan all offseason long, and this trade was just another part of it. So odds are they won’t end up regretting this move, because if there is one thing we know for certain, it’s that those guys are much smarter than I am.

Clay Buchholz is probably the hardest pitcher to project (I also waited until the end to write this write-up) because his performances in the past have been so widely inconsistent. To borrow a line from Jason Mastrodonato, “Baseball-reference.com creates comparable player lists based on the numbers, and the players Buchholz is compared to – Rich Harden, Shaun Marcum, Ricky Nolasco, Ian Kennedy and Wade Miller, among others – are perhaps equally talented as they are sporadic.”

So before going down the rabbit hole let’s take a look at his baseline numbers first. From 2008-13 he has a 3.66 ERA. 1.30 WHIP, 17.9% strikeout rate and 9.1% walk rate. Last year he was really bad; last year’s ERA was the highest it’s been since his rookie year in 2008. When asked about his poor numbers not even Buchholz himself was able to identify why.

He was incredibly unlucky last year as his BABIP and strand rate were much than his career norms. It’s easy to say both numbers will positively regress, but there’s a reason why last year’s BABIP was 30 points higher than his career average and the strand rate was nearly ten percentage points lower than his career average.

Let’s take a look at the performance of his pitches (table below). I categorized his pitch types into two categories: Hard and Soft. Hard consists of the fastball, sinker and cutter and Soft consists of the curveball, splitter and changeup.

The biggest reason why his BABIP was so high was due to the Hard pitches. Even though the Hard pitches had a high BABIP he didn’t allow a lot of hard contact as evidenced by normal slugging percentage. Let’s take a deeper dive and look at his performance against left-handed and right-handed hitters.

The table below shows his performance throwing Hard pitches against left-handed and right-handed batters.

He had huge spike in BABIP against lefties last year, but like the previous table lefties didn’t make a lot of hard contact against him. He also saw an uptick in BABIP against righties too so maybe it was bad pitch location that caused the high BABIP?

The image below shows the percentage of pitches by pitch location for Hard pitches. The three locations are Up, Down or Middle.

Last year he continued to throw Hard pitches down in the zone so it’s counter-intuitive because keeping the ball down in the zone is one of the most effective ways to be successful. If he kept the ball down then why was his BABIP so high? The table below shows the BABIP of Hard pitches thrown in various locations. Those locations are classified as Up, Middle and Down.

He’s thrown Hard pitches down in the zone at the same clip for the past three seasons, but his BABIP shot up immensely which indicates he was extremely unlucky last year.

Some fantasy owners may say the reason for his poor performance was a decrease in fastball velocity, but his velocity was barely less than 2013 and only one mph less than the 2011 season.

In late September he had surgery to repair a torn meniscus in his right knee, which could have been a factor to his poor performance because it was the same knee that put him on the DL in May. However, when asked Buchholz insisted he was fully healthy.

After looking at all this data I conclude he got unlucky with the BABIP and if he continues to throw Hard pitches down in the zone he should be very successful next season. The big question is how successful?

Last year he posted the lowest walk rate of his career while continuing to throw Hard pitches down in the strike zone. If he’s able to continue both trends and the BABIP positively regresses he could have an ERA in the 3.40-3.50 range with a sub 1.29 WHIP. Injuries are always going to be a concern for Buchholz (he’s never pitched more than 190 innings in a regular season), but he has tremendous upside. The infield defense should be very good and he’ll likely be pitching with a lot of runs on the board. His ADP will likely be suppressed so fantasy owners will likely be able to draft him at a substantial discount. I’m going to take a chance on him and so should you.

Johnny Cueto was very good in 2014. By traditional metrics, he was excellent: 20 wins, 242 strikeouts in 243 2/3 innings, a 2.25 ERA and 0.96 WHIP. By more advanced metrics, he was good but not quite that good: 3.30 FIP, 3.21 xFIP, 3.15 SIERA. Per FanGraphs, Cueto had 4.1 WAR, ranking him 14^th among pitchers. Baseball-Reference had Cueto with 6.4 WAR, which placed him 6^th among pitchers. No matter how you look at it, Johnny Cueto was good in 2014.

Johnny Cueto threw 3659 pitches during the regular season last year, making him one of only six pitchers to throw 3500 or more pitches. [NOTE: for this article, I’m only using major league regular season pitches thrown.] Cueto is not a big guy for a pitcher. He’s listed at 5’11, 215. The other five pitchers to throw 3500 or more pitches last year were David Price (6’6”, 220), Corey Kluber (6’4”, 215), James Shields (6’3”, 215), Max Scherzer (6’3”, 220), and R.A. Dickey (6’3”, 215). Of these six pitchers, Cueto had the greatest increase in pitches thrown from the previous year.

So, based on his high pitch total last year and low pitch total the year before, should we be worried about Johnny Cueto in 2015?

Let’s start with the high pitch total. Using the Baseball-Reference Play Index and the FanGraphs Leaderboards, I gathered some information. The following chart shows the number of pitchers who threw 3500 or more pitches each year going back to 2000, along with the average number of pitches thrown per pitcher in their high-pitch year, the average number of pitches thrown by those same pitchers in the following year, and the difference between the two.

As you might expect, pitchers who throw 3500 or more pitches one year are likely to throw fewer pitches the following year. That’s the nature of regression to the mean. To throw 3500 pitches, a pitcher is likely to be having a good, healthy season. Things happen in baseball and it’s difficult for any group of pitchers to have back-to-back good, healthy seasons. Some are going to get injured and some are going to pitch worse and pitch less. In this case, the average difference was 379 pitches. Over the last fourteen years, pitchers who throw 3500 or more pitches one season have averaged 379 fewer pitches the following season. These days, 379 pitches is about 3 or 4 starts.

What about performance following a 3500-plus pitch season? The following chart shows how pitchers who threw 3500 or more pitches in one season performed in the following season.

Once again, keeping in mind regression to the mean, it’s not surprising to see that these pitchers were worse the following season. Looking at ERA+, 58% of these pitchers were worse in the year following their high pitch total year. The majority (63%) also had lower strikeout rates, but improved walk rates (52% improved their walk rate in the year after their high pitch year).

More specifically, the following chart shows the difference in innings pitched (IP) and runs allowed per 9 innings (RA/9):

Over the last fourteen years, pitchers who threw 3500 or more pitches in one year averaged 228 innings pitched that year. In the following year, they dropped to 205 innings pitched, a difference of 23 innings (this matches up well with the 379 fewer pitches thrown). In their high pitch count year, these pitchers had an RA/9 of 3.87. The following year, their RA/9 went up to 4.08, an increase of 0.21 RA/9.

Is this bad news for Johnny Cueto and the other five pitchers who threw more than 3500 pitches in 2014? Not really. I’ve mentioned regression to the mean a couple times. Based on regression, we would expect these pitchers to pitch fewer innings and have a higher RA/9.

With this in mind, here is a look at these 131 pitchers and their innings pitched and RA/9 in the year after they threw 3500 or more pitches compared to their Marcel projections for that year. Thanks to The Baseball Projection Project, I was able to find Marcel projections going back to 2001. The following chart shows each pitcher’s next-year Marcel projection for innings pitched and RA/9, along with each pitcher’s next-year actual innings pitched and RA/9.

Over the last fourteen years, pitchers who threw 3500 or more pitches in a season were projected by Marcel to pitch 194 innings the following season. They actually pitched 205 innings in that following season, for an increase of 11 innings over their Marcel projection.

When it comes to performance, we find that these pitchers averaged a 3.87 RA/9 in their high pitch total season and were projected by Marcel for a 4.05 RA/9 for the following season. They actually had a 4.07 RA/9 in the following season. It’s a very slight increase of 0.02 RA/9, which shouldn’t be anything to worry about, really.

So it would appear that throwing 3500 pitches in one season should not be a big cause for alarm. The pitchers who have done this recently did not perform any worse than their projections would have expected.

With Cueto, though, there was that other thing that worried me—his large increase in pitches thrown from 2013 (953 pitches thrown) to 2014 (3659 pitches thrown).

With this in mind, I looked at the 131 pitchers in this study to find the pitchers who had the largest increase in pitches thrown from one year to the next. I set the limit at no more than 2000 pitches thrown in the year prior to that pitcher’s 3500-plus pitch season. There were only 10 pitchers, including Cueto, who threw fewer than 2000 pitches in one season and more than 3500 pitches the next season. That screams “small sample size!”

Unfortunately, there is a problem with even this group of comparable pitchers—they aren’t very good matches for the Johnny Cueto Experience. For example, one of them was Barry Zito. Zito only had 92 2/3 innings in the major leagues in 2000, the year before he threw more than 3500 pitches, but he also pitched 101 2/3 minor league innings that year, so there really wasn’t a big increase in the number of pitches thrown from one year to the next. He gets eliminated. The same is true for Steve Sparks, Roy Halladay, Randy Johnson, Noah Lowry, and Adam Wainwright, all of whom had additional minor league innings that would push them over the 2000 pitch limit. Unfortunately, that leaves very little to work with—just three pitchers (Woody Williams, Roy Oswalt, and Chris Capuano).

These three pitchers did throw fewer innings in the year after their 3500-plus pitch year, but to a lesser degree than the group as a whole and they pitched more innings than projected by Marcel. Also, this group actually improved their RA/9 in the year after their 3500-plus pitch year and were much better than their Marcel projection.

Based on throwing 3500 or more pitches, it doesn’t appear there’s anything to worry about with Cueto. Based on such a large increase in pitches thrown from one year to the next, we don’t really know because there just haven’t been many pitchers allowed to do that over the last 14 years. My gut still tells me to be wary but the numbers don’t see a problem.