Note: I have no idea if I’m the first to do this, but quite frankly I don’t care.

Long before I was a fan of baseball (much less a fan cognizant of sabermetrics), I was a fan of the NFL, and more specifically, of people writing their opinions of the day-to-day happenings of the NFL. One of my favorite opinion-writers (or “columnists”, if you prefer) was, and is, a Mr. Gregg Easterbrook, who wrote, and still writes, a weekly column for ESPN during the NFL season, entitled Tuesday Morning Quarterback. One of the article’s more enjoyable endeavors–for me, at least–was tracking the best of the “unwanted players”, the criteria for which Mr. Easterbrook defined as follows: “A player must have been undrafted, or been waived, or been let go in free agency when his original club made no bona-fide attempt to retain him.”

In baseball, more so than most other sports (or so it seems), the majority of successful players are high-round draft picks (i.e. first 3 rounds). So recently, I began wondering: which active players have been good, over the course of their careers, after being “unwanted”?

For the purpose of this exercise, I defined “unwanted”  as simply late-round draft picks, as there doesn’t appear to be too many examples of undrafted* U.S. players having done well (the only active ones I could find were Greg Dobbs and a bunch of relief pitchers, and Greg Dobbs is fucking Greg Dobbs). As a cutoff (to ensure only true “unwanted” players were included), I excluded everyone drafted within the first 200 picks–sorry, Shane Victorino and Aaron Harang–and everyone with less than 20 career WAR–so long, Marlon Byrd and Josh Willingham. Also, draft spots were determined via ESPN (at the bottom right of each player’s page is their draft year and position, among other information); there may be some discrepancies between those and, say, Baseball-Reference’s. Oh, and WAR values are as of Tuesday, August 6th.

These criteria yielded 24 results; they are listed below in order of lowest to highest draft pick.

Matt Holliday–210th overall (7th round) in 1998; 43.8 WAR**

Prior to this post, I Googled “mlb late round draft picks“, and looked at a few of the top results, on Comcast, Yahoo, and ESPN. Many of the players listed appear later on this list, but Holliday was conspicuously missing. I can’t decide which is odder–that a player that had 4 consecutive 5-WAR seasons went in the 7th round, or that no one seems to realize this. Regardless, the Rockies ended up picking Holliday out of Stillwater HS (OK), after drafting such quality players as Matt Roney, Choo Freeman, and Jeff Winchester, and it worked out pretty well for them.

Most teams were apparently scared off because they thought he might pursue football instead, after being one of the top quarterbacks in the state; he was recruited by Oklahoma State, but instead chose to go to MLB. Based on his -24.8 career Outfield Arm runs above average, I can’t be too certain he’d have made it as a passer. (As an aside, one of the Rockies’ other picks in that draft is later on this list.)

Allan James Burnett–217th overall (8th round) in 1995; 35.9 WAR

Contrary to popular belief (or at least my belief, before I looked this up; not a whole lot of people care about Burnett, from what I understand), Burnett was not drafted by the Marlins, with whom he spent his first 6 major-league seasons; the Mets selected him out of Central Arkansas Christian HS, seeing him as everyone else saw him–a raw prospect with potential, but someone who needed a lot of work.

Just how much work was needed became apparent pretty quickly, when Burnett walked 7.35 (!) batters per nine innings in his Mets career. In no small part because of these control issues, in 1998 the Mets traded him to the Marlins in one of their (i.e. the Marlins’) many infamous fire sale deals. Along with Burnett, the fire sales brought the Marlins Derrek Lee and…well, that’s pretty much it. Burnett, however, couldn’t have been happier with the trade, later saying “if [he] hadn’t gotten traded, [he] probably would’ve retired.”

So, a major league player, that is to say, an ACTUAL HUMAN BEING, at one point desired a trade to Baseball Hell? Hold on, I need a sec…Okay, I’m good. Who’s next?

Coco Crisp–222nd overall (7th round) in 1999; 27.2 WAR

I’m with DJ Gallo on this one–it’s simply criminal that it’s taken TWELVE YEARS to have a Crisp-cereal tie-in. And, of course, Billy Beane is the one to make it happen. That son-of-a-bitch, thinks he’s so damn smart…But I digress. After being a graduate of baseball’s RBI program, Crisp was selected by the Cardinals, in the same year they selected one of the BOAT (Best Of All Time, for those who are unedumacated), who will also appear further down on this list. I think it’s a sign of the insanity of baseball that the Cardinals–widely known to be one of MLB’s most well-run organizations–could get three (count ’em, three) first rounders in one draft, and completely whiff on all of them (not to mention whiffing on their next six picks). But, of course, being the Cardinals, they still ended up drafting two quality major leaguers.

Moving on…Crisp had shown impressive plate discipline, but little power, and academic issues hindered him along the way. (In that article, he brags about getting a 1070 on his SAT; am I missing something here?) Because he frequently transferred from high school to high school, he actually only ended up playing one season of high school ball, then went to Southern University in Louisiana. They wouldn’t let him play, however, as they couldn’t sort through all his high school transcripts (what are they, the VA?); since he had only gone there to play baseball, he sat out of classes, and was nearly expelled.

That summer, he was signed by the Angels; as a freshman at a four-year college, the Angels were forbidden from signing him–apparently they didn’t know he was in college–and the deal was voided by MLB. Crisp, however, was thankful for the error, saying it “put [him] back on the radar.” The next year, he went to Pierce Junior College in California, and was good enough academically that he was able to be drafted, albeit as a second baseman. The Cards moved him to the outfield, traded him to the Indians for Chuck Finley, and Cereal Man’s career was off.

Kevin Youkilis–243rd overall (8th round) in 2001; 28.4 WAR

The man with the most annoying batting stance in the majors (not to mention the most ironic nickname) was not, unlike many of the Red Sox’ other recent great players, a high round draft pick. Rather, he slid to the 8th round, where the Sox picked him out of Cincinnati; this was due to concerns about his, uh, voluptuous physique, along with–get this!–concerns about his defense. As an Orioles fan who has seen more than his (or the Orioles’, I guess) fair share of base hits robbed by Youk, this was news to me. Apparently, with a career 27.2 Fielding Runs Above Average, this is news to everyone else, too.

As an added irony, the Red Sox’ top pick in that draft was Kelly Shoppach–basically the polar opposite of Youk. And of course, as another irony, the player the Red Sox traded him to get more playing time for–Will Middlebrooks–is also basically his polar opposite.

Mark Ellis–271st overall (9th round) in 1999; 26.1 WAR

I’m going to be honest here for a second: Before I embarked on this endeavor, I had no idea who the hell Mark Ellis was. I vaguely remembered him from a series the Dodgers played against the O’s back in April, but other than that? Nada. But, for the purpose of this list, I needed to find out more about him, so I’d be able to fill this space. So I searched. And I searched. And I searched some more, ’till my searcher was sore. And you know what conclusion I came to? Mark Ellis is completely insignificant. He’s average. He’s every kid on the playground that didn’t get picked on. He’s a business casual potted plant, a human white sale. He’s VH1, RoboCop 2 and Back to the Future 3. He’s the center slice of a square cheese pizza–actually, that sounds delicious. I’m the center slice of a square cheese pizza. He’s Jim Belushi.

Sorry, had to get that out of my system. But seriously, though Ellis has had a pretty nice career, he’s just flown pretty much under the radar for most of it. He was drafted by the Royals out of Florida, and went to Oakland (where he spent most of his career) in the three-team Johnny Damon trade. As a prospect, he had excellent plate discipline, but little power, and was probably severely undervalued. This was probably just a problem with being drafted in the pre-Moneyball era; had he been 10 years younger, he probably would’ve been drafted much higher. Of course, once he came up, his numbers spoke for themselves.

Howie Kendrick–294th overall (10th round) in 2002; 20.0 WAR

Funny story with Kendrick: I actually started writing this piece on Saturday the 3rd, with only 23 players meeting the criteria. Then I saw Kendrick, who at the time had 19.8 career WAR. I knew by the time this piece was finished, he’d probably have 20, meeting the criteria and making me look like a dumbass for excluding him. So, even though this piece was finished by early Saturday, I had to wait until Tuesday to publish it.

Anyways…Kendrick was taken by the Angels out of St. John’s River State Community College in 2002; yeah, I’m confused too. I mean, really, what kind of self-respecting baseball player goes to a goddamn community college? It’s not like any historically great hitters–hitters that may or may not appear later on this list, and that may or may not have already been referenced as appearing later on this list–went to a community college.

Annnnnnyways…Angels guru Tom Kotchman found Kendrick’s talents wasting away at SJRSCC (damn, long anagram), and was thunderstruck that “there weren’t other scouts there…” and that “…other JC’s [had] cut this guy…” He alerted the Angels immediately, who drafted him later that year. Oddly enough, like Youkilis, concerns about Kendrick’s defense were apparently what scared other teams off. 8 years and 30.3 fRAA later, it’s safe to say those concerns were unfounded.

Dan “Yo Mama So” Uggla***–338th overall (11th round) in 2001; 24.5 WAR

Long before he was subjected to the unbridled fury of any and every Braves fan (seriously, when you type “Dan Uggla is” into Google, results 2-4 are “terrible”, “a jerk”, and “a douche”; also, people apparently care about his marital status), Uggla was actually drafted, not by the Marlins, but by the Diamondbacks, out of Memphis. The Marlins swiped him in the Rule 5 draft, just one of many shrewd management moves by the genius owner Jeffrey Loria.

Many teams were scared off because of Uggla’s vertically-challenged nature–less than 6 feet tall? The horror!–and tendency for whiffing; this problem has manifested itself in the major leagues as well. As with Youkilis and Kendrick, he was also viewed as a defensive liability. “Well, Youkilis and Kendrick sure proved their doubters wrong!” you, the naively optimistic reader, say. “Golly gee whiz, I’ll bet Uggla did the same thing!” Yeah, about that…

Juan Pierre–390th overall (13th round) in 1998; 23.4 WAR

Couple things on Pierre:

1. The fact that he exists on this list shows the inherent flaw with it–I’m taking career aggregate WAR values, as opposed to averages per, say, 600 plate appearances. Oh, well. Maybe next time.

2. I’m racist, I guess. Before this, I had always thought Pierre was Hispanic, and was signed as an IFA out of some Central-American country. Now, in my defense, how many people who aren’t Hispanic are named “Juan”? I mean, really? Well, as it turns out, I’m not the only one confused about this; also, he was apparently named after Juan Marichal.

3. When the Rockies picked Pierre out of South Alabama (in the same draft they picked Holliday), the scouts liked his speed, but were unsure how he’d fare with wooden bats, fearing it might sap what little power he already had. Huh. Maybe those people who are payed to evaluate talent for a living are actually good at their jobs! I mean, now that I write that, I realize that I should have seen this all along. I mean, it’s not like scouts have ever completely missed on a guy who turned out to be…

Albert Pujols–402nd overall (13th round) in 1999; 87.4 WAR

…One of the best hitters ever. *Sigh* Well, anyways…

Pujols had to fight adversity long before his major league career even began; after immigrating to America from the DR, he had to deal with an alcoholic father and no mother. Despite this, he still managed to excel at high school baseball–when he wasn’t being IBB’d, he hit 8 home runs in 33 plate appearances–but received little attention from big name colleges and was forced to go to Maple Woods Community College in Missourah. (Fun fact: Logan Morrison, the Marlin first baseman, also attended MWCC. That is the only time Logan Morrison will be mentioned in the vicinity of Albert Pujols in his life.)

Pujols (predictably) raked at MWCC, hitting .461 with 22 homers; he was (predictably) ignored by everyone, mainly because they were unsure where he’d play, and were doubtful about his age. And, like so many of the players on this list, teams were concerned over his build. The Cardinals, apparently the only sane team in the majors, were happy to swoop in and pick him with the 401st pick, and the rest is history.

While on the subject of Pujols: it seems that one of the best players of the generation should have some good nicknames assigned to him. When I Googled “Albert Pujols Nickname“, it gave me a lot of results, but none that I’d heard used before. Does he have any nicknames that are actually popular?

James Shields–466th overall (16th round) in 2000; 26.1 WAR

Before I start, I’d like to make a suggestion to Cameron, Sullivan, or whoever else, for a future article: Players (maybe just active players) with the highest career gap between fWAR and rWAR. Shields’ differential is pretty high, as his rWAR is only 19.5. Most of the players, I’m sure, would be pitchers, but it might also be interesting to see for position players as well. Food for thought.

Anyways, Big Game James was drafted by the Rays out of William S. Hart HS (CA); he had been good his junior year there, but a shoulder injury (i.e. pitcher Kryptonite) he suffered his senior year scared many teams off; fear that he may forgo the draft and go to LSU didn’t help either. The shoulder injury worry wasn’t an illusion–he missed the entire 2002 season after undergoing surgery on it–but it sure as hell hasn’t resurfaced since, as he’s pitched (or is on pace to pitch) 200 innings in every year since his rookie year. In a draft where Rocco Baldelli was the top pick, this was probably the best possible outcome for the Rays.

Jake “Michelle Bachmann Hates Vaccinations for H” Peavy****–472nd overall (15th round) in 1999; 35.8 WAR

The curious case of Jake Peavy is one of hypocrisy. In his senior year at St. Paul’s Episcopal School (AL), Peavy dominated the competition, leading to many scholarship offers. Peavy was especially interested in Auburn, which was offering a full ride; apparently, Peavy committed to Auburn, but then said he would go pro if taken in the first 4 rounds. When Peavy was drafted by the Padres in the 15th round, he eventually did sign with them–but for the price of a fourth-rounder. So, just to recap, he lied to Auburn, saying he’d play for them; then he lied to MLB, saying he’d only play for them if drafted in the first 4 rounds; then swindled them out of 4th-rounder money(yeah, it probably wasn’t that much more money, whatever).

Concerns about college weren’t the only problem with Peavy. In the words of former Padres scout Mark Wasinger, who discovered him prior to the draft in 1999, “At 6-foot-1, he wasn’t the 6-foot-5, Brandon Workman physical type that is the prototype. A lot of people thought that for Peavy, maybe that wear and tear might not suit him for the long term.” Sure enough, injuries have plagued Peavy (at least to some degree) for his career–he’s been on the DL in 5 of the past 6 seasons. Still, for a player who averaged 4.3 WAR between 2004 and 2008, this was one helluva bargain.

Ian Kinsler–496th overall (17th round) in 2003; 28.0 WAR

Kinsler was drafted not once, but twice, by the Diamondbacks, in the 29th round in 2000 and the 26th round in 2001, deciding to forgo them for Central Arizona College and ASU, respectively. By the time the Rangers took Kinsler out of Missourah in 2003, he had moved all the way up to the 17th round! So that just goes to show, kids–if you keep working hard, you can improve from completely irrelevant to slightly less completely irrelevant! Oh, and be a three-time All-Star, 2-time member of the 30-30 club, and one of the best second baseman, if not all-around players, in the game of baseball.

Kinsler himself has said that he didn’t worry about his major-league future while in college, saying he “…always knew [he]’d get a chance and get drafted, but [he] basically had to prove [him]self to put [him]self on the map.” When he was drafted, he weighed 170 pounds–pretty light for a six-footer. He made a commitment to himself after that to pack on some muscle mass, and given that he’s now listed at 200 pounds, I’d say he achieved that goal.

Mike “The Foulin’ Italian” Napoli*****–500th overall (17th round) in 2000; 21.3 WAR

Before he was providing a soothing breeze to everyone in the first few rows, Napoli was drafted by the Angels out of Charles W. Flanagan HS (FL). Apparently, he didn’t “fit the prospect prototype“, or as former Angels scout Todd Claus put it, “lots of people…couldn’t get past his body.” Concerns about that body, along with the usual worrying over defense, led to him skidding in the draft, until the Angels picked him up. Oddly enough, though, one caveat not mentioned about the pre-draft Napoli was fear of injury–odd, considering he’s qualified for the batting title exactly once in his eight-year career.

Interesting side note (which the article points out): the 17th round of the 2000 draft also featured future quality major-leaguers Josh Willingham, Rich Harden, and (although he didn’t sign) Paul Maholm. The best pick of that round, however, was Napoli, an catcher who was much better at the plate than behind it–the antithesis to which would be…

Russell Martin–511th overall (17th round) in 2002; 25.0 WAR

Even before his incredible year this year, Martin had 21.2 career WAR, making him the 4th-best catcher in baseball over that time (Napoli was 5th). So why was he still around in the 17th round, when the Dodgers selected him out of Chipola Junior College (which another player on this list also attended)? Well, he didn’t really have a position–the Dodgers picked him as a third baseman, but thought he might play shortstop or even a corner outfield spot. In spring training 2003, however, the Dodgers experimented by having him attempt to catch flamethrowing, wild righty Jose Diaz, with good results. From there on out, he was a catcher.

Also a cause for his low draft position: the Dodgers feared he didn’t have enough power to be an everyday third baseman. At the major league level, however, he has a respectable .141 ISO, and as as everyone knows (or should know) offensive standards for catchers are much lower than for third baseman. That’s why this guy somehow continues to exist. In a draft where the Dodgers would pick James Loney, Jonathan Broxton, Eric Stults, and Martin’s current teammate James McDonald, he (i.e. Martin) was clearly the best pick.

Placido Polanco–530th overall (19th round) in 1994; 38.5 WAR

Earlier this year, Matt Klaassen wrote a swan song for Carlos Lee; soon, I fear, the same shall have to be done for Placy. However, the purpose of this is not to examine the career of one of the best defenders of this millenium, but to look back at how that career came to be. And for Polanco, that proved to much easier said than done. Seriously, there’s almost nothing on the guy! But I persevered, and this is what I discovered:

Polanco was born in the DR, leaning baseball in Manny Mota’s Little League program. After excelling at this level, he won a scholarship with Miami-Dade Community College, and immigrated to the U.S. (though he did not become a citizen until 2008). Because he went to a junior college, he was not as publicized–remember, they didn’t got no internet–and as a result, he went undrafted until the 19th round, when the Cardinals took him.

At first, he struggled a bit in the minor leagues, especially–believe it or not–with the glove, committing 10 errors in his first 32 games (yeah, errors are a terrible statistic for measuring defensive contributions, I know; that’s still really bad, though). He later said he “…made a lot of throwing errors, from not really knowing the game, not knowing when to hold on to the ball and when to throw it.” Suffice to say, he now knows when to hold and when to throw.

Andy Pettitte–594th overall (22nd round) in 1990; 66.9 WAR

How’s this for surprising? Pettitte–the only one of the US-born Yankees who wasn’t a high-round draft pick–said in 2008 that signing with the Yankees “was the dumbest thing [he’s] ever done.******” How’s this for more surprising? Pettitte was apparently hefty enough to be the starting center and nose tackle on his Texas high school football team, as well as a pitcher who threw in the mid-80’s. Because of this combination of (relatively) low velocity and a burly figure, he was picked late in the draft by the Yankees, but went to San Jacinto Junior College.

Now, this is where it gets tricky. Pettitte was picked in 1990, but went to college instead. So why does his profile page on ESPN list him as not having attended college? Well, because of the “draft-and-follow” rule–which states, in a nutshell, that a pick who attends a junior college may be signed at any point 51 weeks after the draft–the Yankees were able to sign him on May 25th, 1991, almost pushing the DAF rule to its limit. But why would they devote this much time to a mere 22nd-round pick? Were they able to see into the future with the crystal ball Rex Ryan used to predict the Jets’ Super Bowl victory?

Perhaps…or perhaps, during the DAF year, Pettitte was coached by the now-legendary Wayne Graham, who shaped him from an offensive lineman physique into…well, Andy Pettitte. As is detailed in the first article, when Pettitte got fitter, his fastball got faster, up to the low- to mid-90’s it occupied during his dominant stretch in the 1990’s and early 2000’s. So to summarize, the Yankees got one of the best pitchers in their history through a rule quirk that almost no one knows about. I think I speak for all of us when I say…goddamn Yankees.

Jose Bautista–599th overall (20th round) in 2000; 21.8 WAR

As you’ve probably forgotten by now, this whole brouhaha was based on the concept of “unwanted” players as told by Gregg Easterbrook. His definition involves not only players who were undrafted (which, I’ve discussed, are scarce in MLB) but also those who had been repeatedly released by their teams, and had bounced around for a few years before finding a true home. By this definition, Joey Bats is the best unwanted player on this list. Just in case you didn’t know, here’s the story of his major-league career:

1. Goes to Chipola Junior College in Florida (the college of Russell Martin) after immigrating from the DR.

2. Is drafted by the Pirates. (To all the Bucs fans, pining for their team to plunder the farm system for Giancarlo Stanton, just know that your team could’ve had one of the best right fielders in baseball. Just remember that, along with every other misery Pirates fans must always carry with them.)

3. Is selected in the 2003 Rule 5 Draft by the Orioles, and is on the Opening Day roster. Go O’s!

4. Is claimed off waivers on June 3rd by the Rays. Stupid O’s!

5. Is purchased on June 28th by the Royals. Stupid Rays!

6. Is traded on July 30th to the New York Mets in exchange for Justin Huber. Stupid Royals!

7. Without playing a game for the Mets, is traded back to his original team (i.e. the Pirates) along with Ty Wigginton and Matt Peterson, in exchange for Jeff Keppinger and Kris Benson. Stupid Mets! Also, Jeff Keppinger? Ha!

8. Just to recap, Bautista was on 5 teams in the same season. Know how many other players have done that? NONE!

9. Plays in only 11 games for the Pirates in 2005.

10. Is a Pirates regular for 2006 and 2007; posts wRC+’s of 96 and 97, respectively.

11. Struggles through 2008, and is traded midseason to the Blue Jays for a PTBNL (Robinzon Diaz). Stupid Pirates!

12. Is mediocre in 2009, posting a 102 wRC+.

13. This.

‘Nuff said.

Jason Bay–645th overall (22nd round) in 2000; 20.4 WAR

Now, here’s where I bend the rules a bit. See, at the time of my writing this, Bay no longer exists on any major league roster, and is therefore not an “active player”. However, he did play this season, so I’m including him (along with the player two spots down on the list).

Long before Bay was the poster boy for horrible contracts in sports (and the poster boy for, well, the Mets), he was a quality major leaguer–over 2003 to 2009, the fifth-best offensive left fielder, in fact. Long before that, he was picked out of Gonzaga by the Expos, and involved in many a trade before he became a regular (Lou Collier, Jason Middlebrook, and Brian Giles******* going the other way in those trades).

Long before all that, however, he was a Canadian high schooler who was interested in, and very good at, a non-hockey sport–not exactly a one-way ticket to success. Undeterred, he went to North Idaho CC–basically the only place that would take him–and proceeded to crush the competition. And his reward for the perseverance? He played at glamorous Gonzaga and was drafted by a now-defunct franchise! Well, at least he’ll always have the hatred of the largest city in the U.S.…

Roy Oswalt–684th overall (23rd round) in 1996; 49.6 WAR

Oswalt’s career path was similar to that of Pettitte–a dominant high-school pitcher, who fell in the draft because of concerns about his weight. Except, Oswalt’s problem was the opposite of Pettitte–he weighed too little, a 150-pound senior at nearly 6 feet tall. So I guess Oswalt’s more like Kinsler than Pettitte. Whatever.

The obscurity of Oswalt’s school, in (essentially) the pre-internet days, certainly didn’t help his case. Oswalt attended Weir High, in Weir, Mississippi; the town had a total population of about 500, and there were about 30 in Oswalt’s class. Before Oswalt badgered the school, it didn’t even have a baseball team. After a year pitching for Holmes Community College, the Astros were apparently the only team to scout Oswalt, and they were smitten. Not quite smitten enough to draft him before the 23rd round (because they were the only team to scout him, they let him fall in the draft, knowing no one else would take him), but still smitten. He didn’t sign immediately however, and the Astros used the DAF rule on him, allowing him to pitch another year at Holmes CC. So, I guess he is more like Pettitte. Whatever.

Signing him proved to be a little daunting, as he was being offered a full ride from Mississippi State, and his boyhood dream had always been to pitch for the Bulldogs. Getting half a million as a signing bonus tends to make people forget about their boyhood dreams, however, and Oswalt was no exception. On May 18th, 1997, pushing the DAF rule to its limit (like Pettitte), Oswalt signed with the Astros, and, well, you know the rest. Pretty good for a 23rd-rounder in 1996. Speaking of which…

Ted Lilly–688th overall (23rd round) in 1996; 26.3 WAR

On Lilly, I have a few things to say:

1. If only he’d finished .1 WAR lower! Then I could’ve called him “Marathon Man”, and made horrible puns like “Why don’t you just try pitching?” and things of that ilk. Oh, well. A man can dream, though.

2. Lilly, like Bay, is no longer on a major league roster, so he shouldn’t technically be considered an active player. However, he played in the majors this season (not well, but he played), so he’s on the list. Deal with it!

3. Was the 23rd round of the 1996 draft the best late draft round ever? If not, certainly one of the best. I mean, only 3 players from it made it to the major leagues, and one of them was Jason Smith, so it wasn’t exactly deep, but still–74.7 combined WAR, for the TWENTY-THIRD FUCKING ROUND! Maybe a subject for a future article…

4. Lilly was drafted by the Dodgers in 1996, then traded to the Expos in 1998, along with Peter Bergeron, Wilton Guerrero, and Jonathan Tucker, for Hiram Bocachica, Mark Grudzielanek, and Carlos Perez. Obviously, looking back, Lilly was the best player in that trade (though an argument could be made for Grudzie), so why was he considered  a low-level prospect? Well…I’m not really sure. Seriously, I couldn’t find anything about the bastard! I mean, there was this article, which talked about his minor-league ascension and success, but nothing about him pre-draft. Well, 23 out of 24 ain’t bad. Hey, at least I’m better than the Phillies.

Kyle Lohse–862nd overall (29th round) in 1996; 24.7 WAR

Yeah, that’s right, another pitcher from 1996! Think I’m done? Baby, I’m just gettin’ started! Well, anyways…Lohse’s main clam to fame is being one of the only Native Amuricans in MLB, along with Joba Chamberlain and Jacoby Ellsbury (insert racist joke about how “he should play for the Indians or Braves!” here). Despite being a star athlete in high school, he was largely unnoticed, and fell in the draft. He went to Butte College after the Cubs picked him, ‘cuz of that nifty DAF rule, and signed with them at the end of his freshman year.

What kept him so low in the draft? His velocity was never great as a minor leaguer, and he projected to be a back-of-the-rotation starter; with a career ERA of 4.79 innings prior to 2011, he achieved that goal. Then, of course, came 2011 until the present, during which he’s pitched to a 3.14 ERA and provided 6.7  of that career WAR. This sudden turnaround, while fairly unprecedented, is not necessarily luck–he did make some major changes to his pitch selection, and changing your repertoire can lead to new success, even for old, unproven pitchers (see Dickey, Robert Alan).

Travis Hafner–923rd overall (31st round) in 1996; 20.9 WAR

Okay, seriously? How many players from the goddamn 1996 draft are there?!?! *Sigh* Well, Pronk was similar to Kendrick and Pujols in that he went to a community college–Cowley County CC–and this certainly contributed to his low position in the draft. (As an aside, whoever enters colleges for ESPN must’ve really liked CCCC.) Though Hafner had natural ability at baseball (obviously) before coming to CCCC, he knew absolutely zilch about the rules and lingo, having to ask his coach during practice, “What’s a fungo?” Nature, however, won out over nurture, and Hafner soon mashed at the (low) collegiate level.

When he was drafted by the Rangers, though, he struggled early on; by the time he hit his stride in 1999, and was major-league ready in 2002, the Rangers (like the Rangers today) had a plethora of high-caliber first baseman-DH types (namely, Mark Teixeira and Rafael Palmeiro). With Ivan Rodriguez an impending free agent, however, they needed a catcher, so after the 2002 season, the Rangers traded him to the Indians, along with Aaron Myette, in exchange for Ryan Drese and Einar Diaz. The Indians were prepared to let Jim Thome, a free agent, walk, so they needed a new first base-DH type; after a mediocre first year, Hafner did a pretty good Thome impersonation (at least when healthy).

Raul Ibanez–1006th overall (36th round) in 1992; 20.8 WAR

Well, we’re down to our final two. I feel like we’ve grown closer over this whole process. You know what I mean? At the beginning, we were just doing this because we felt like we had to, but now, we’re doing it because we want to. What’s that? I’m just being creepy, and I should get to the explanation of why Ibanez was drafted as late as he was? Okay then. I thought what we had was special, but I guess I was mistaken.

Ibanez (one of the two “millennium men” in the countdown; if you can’t figure out why they’re called that, you’re on the wrong website) was successful at high school and went to play college baseball at Miami-Dade CC (the same school as Polanco). He was viewed as a project by major league scouts, and was drafted by the Mariners accordingly. Now, this isn’t an uncommon path–a player is told he’s flawed, gets drafted in the late rounds, goes back to school to correct those flaws, and gets drafted higher the next year. In Ibanez’s case, though, going back to school wasn’t an option, as his father died a few months before the draft; knowing that his father would’ve wanted him to play, Ibanez signed with the Mariners (who were prepared to use the DAF rule on him).

Now, back to why he was drafted so late: Ibanez was seen as someone who would take several years to develop into an everyday player; as the article above puts it, “Ibañez is to baseball what Kurt Warner was to the NFL, a late-blooming talent no one knew how to develop.” Once he did develop, he turned into a quality player, which makes him–unquestionably–the best of the active late-round draft picks. At least, it would make him that, if not for…

Mark Buehrle–1139th overall (38th round) in 1998; 47.3 WAR

Buehrle?…………..Buehrle?…………..Buehrle?…………..Buehrle?…………..

The premier innings-eater of the new millennium, as well as heading towards a 13th straight 200-inning season (pretty impressive when you put it in perspective), Buehrle must’ve been, at the very least, a third- or fourth-round pick, right? Nope. He is, in fact, the other millennium man on the list.

As a high schooler in Missourah, Buehrle had the MJ treatment (i.e. he didn’t make the baseball team his freshman and sophomore years); this was enough to make him consider quitting baseball forever. He couldn’t stay away, however, and was good enough in the two years he did play that he got accepted to glamorous Jefferson College, where he had a successful two years. One of those years was prior to the draft, when he was picked by the White Sox; the other was after, when the DAF rule was used (he did threaten to re-enter the draft in 1999, so the White Sox had to make a pretty large offer). Never a top prospect due to a mediocre repertoire, Buehrle slipped under most everyone’s radar. It’s safe to say that wasn’t how things should’ve played out.

Overall, it’s safe to say that all of these players outperformed their expectations significantly. It’s men like this–the hard workers, the perseverers, the ne’er-quitters–that make baseball so great. Oh, and also this guy.

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*Apparently, “undrafted” isn’t a word, or so the red squiggly would have me believe. Huh. So “squiggly” is a word, but “undrafted” isn’t? ‘Tis a strange, strange world. Also, “tis” isn’t a word either? WHEN WILL IT END?!?!?

**Am I the only one who’s annoyed by some of the columnists on this site using a plus sign before every WAR value? Call me crazy, but I’d say the positivity is implied by the lack of any preceding symbol.

***I’m so funny, aren’t I?

****Might’ve crossed a line here. Also, FanGraphs should really start doing footnotes, à la Grantland.

*****I swear to God, I’ll make this work.

******Yes, I get that this was done sarcastically.

*******Another unproven prospect traded in that Giles deal? Oliver Perez, whose career has been eerily similar to that of Bay.

The success of the Pirates has become arguably the biggest narrative of this season. They sit pretty at 67-44, with a game and a half lead on the St. Louis Cardinals. While some fans of the Pirates are merely thirsting for fourteen more wins to guarantee the end of the 20-year losing skid, analysts widely regard the Pirates as playoff-bound, if not contenders for the division.

Presently, we’ll continue the endless discussion of why the Pirates have succeeded thus far, but perhaps with a new spin.

The Pirates have been trending up under the tenure of Clint Hurdle, but a closer look at the numbers doesn’t necessarily indicate an offensive success, but a noticeable improvement in the defense.

Run Differential

In 2010, the last season before Clint Hurdle, the Pirates finished 57-105 with a despicable -279 run differential. Since then, the run differential has improved incrementally to -102 in 2011 and -23 in 2012, when finishing .500 felt inevitable. This year, the Bucs have outscored their opponents by 49 runs, which isn’t much, but is in an improvement over where it was on August 3^rd in 2010 (-205,) 2011 (-12,) and 2012 (+33.)

Metrics

Additionally, a look at some of the advanced metrics indicate an improvement in the defense of the Pirates. In 2010, the Pirates had -77 DRS and a -7.7 UZR/150. In 2011, that improved to -29 and -3.5 (respectively,) and in 2012, -25 and -2.6. Still not great numbers, but they reflect an ostensible difference under Clint Hurdle. In 2013, these numbers are all in the green: 43 DRS, 5.1 UZR/150. Obviously, these are subject to change, but the trend continues.

BABIP

Perhaps it is an illogical step to go backwards from advanced stats like DRS and UZR/150 to one as simple as BABIP, but it seems to me that this one sticks out the most and combines the picture of improved pitching and an improved defense. The noticeable trend has continued, as these are the defensive BABIPs of the Pirates over the last few years:

2010: .311

2011: .300

2012: .286

2013: .270 (1^st in MLB)

My simplistic mind appreciates BABIP in this particular instance, because this tells me something clear. These numbers are microcosmic of the fact that the Pirates are improving in the area of simply converting batted balls into outs, and that is nothing but a good sign for a club looking to win games, but it is especially good for a club with the offensive woes the Pirates endure.

Say what you will about the overuse of the Pirates bullpen, and it will not be argued at present. It is my hope that someone can combine these defensive numbers with pitch f/x data and create a more clear picture of how the Pirates have succeeded with a group of ragamuffins. This is a start to a conversation and hopefully a case study into the effectiveness of a good defense and how it can counteract and overcome an anemic offense such as that of the Bucs. We may just see how it works out in the postseason.

Besides having a great last name, Jarrod Saltalamacchia has been a productive hitter for the Red Sox. Since 2011, he has increased his wRC+ each year, posting a 94,96, and 110 wRC+ the last three years, respectively. Despite Saltalamacchia’s career-high .340 wOBA, his ISO stands at .186, a drop from the .215 and .232 numbers he posted in 2011 and 2012. After leading the Red Sox in homeruns with 25 a year ago, Salty has only 10 homeruns this year. His PA/HR  has fallen from 17.9 in 2012 to 34.0 in 2013.

Last year, 20% of Saltalamacchia’s fly balls left the park, a career-high average. This year, only 12.3% of Saltalamacchia’s fly balls have reached the seats, his lowest number since joining the Sox, and below his career 13.5%. However, a look at baseballheatmaps shows that Salty is 15th in average fly ball distance at 303.8 feet, only a little behind teammate David Ortiz who at 305.5 enjoys an 18.1% HR/FB ratio. Salty’s fly ball distance is ahead of notable AL home run leaders such as Edwin Encarnacion, Jose Bautista, Mark Trumbo, Adrian Beltre, Adam Jones, and Raul Ibanez. While Fenway is tied with Chase Field for the 3rd-most hitter-friendly park with a park factor of 105, Fenway slightly suppresses home runs. Fenway’s 97 home run factor is tied for 17th. Digging further, we find that Fenway’s home run factor for left-handed hitters is 92, the 6th lowest in baseball. The switch-hitting Saltalamacchia has generated more power from the left side of the plate, as only 7 of his 51 homeruns in a Red Sox uniform have come from the right side of the plate despite experiencing 23% of his plate appearances from that side. However Fenway’s quirky dimensions do not appear to be swallowing up Salty’s flyballs, as his HR/FB ratio is 17.4% at home, compared to a paltry 5.7% on the road. Chalk this up to randomness, and expect Salty’s HR/FB ratio to move closer to 15%.

A further explanation for Saltalamacchia’s decreased power lies in a changed plate approach. While Saltalamacchia’s home run to fly ball ratio is low, his BABIP is very high, at .376, a huge increase from last year’s .265. Much of the increase can be attributed to a line drive rate of 28.6%, a jump from the 22.8% he posted in 2012. The line drives have come partly at the expense of fly balls, as Salty’s fly-ball rate has fallen from 46.6% in 2012 to 40.7% in 2013. All this has combined to produce an xBABIP of .344.  The graphs below illustrate Saltalamacchia’s uptick in line drives and decrease in fly balls and the corresponding change in BABIP%.

Looking at these charts, it appears that Saltalamacchia has gone to a more BABIP-friendly approach by trading fly balls for line drives. While this has resulted in a decrease in his ISO from .232 to .186, his overall offensive production has increased. His wRC+ climbed from 96 in 2012 to 110 in 2013.  For catchers with at least 250 PA, Salty’s wRC+ rose from 21st in 2012 to 8th in 2013. Though Saltalamacchia’s line-drive approach has reaped dividends, expecting a .376 BABIP the rest of the way is being unrealistic. Most likely, the BABIP will regress some, but the HR/FB ratio should improve. Saltalamacchia will likely maintain a similar level of production the rest of the way, but it will likely come in the form of a decreased batting average and increased ISO.

This Saturday and Sunday I caught the Pawtucket Red Sox on the road against the Buffalo Bisons. The matchup of the Red Sox and Blue Jays AAA affiliates featured several of the top prospects in the Red Sox organization with the following members of Marc Hulet’s preseason Top 15 Red Sox prospects on the Pawtucket roster: #1 Xander Bogaerts, #3 Jackie Bradley Jr., #4 Allen Webster, #10 Brandon Workman, #12 Bryce Brentz and #14 Anthony Ranaudo. Additionally, 2012 #2 Will Middlebrooks manned the hot corner for Pawtucket. Bogaerts at #2, JBJ at #38, and Ranaudo at #49 also appeared on Hulet’s 2013 midseason top 50 list.

I offer the following (perhaps voluminous) review for your reading pleasure. Furthermore, I included the following images and GIFs for your viewing pleasure.

  (Image from Milb.com)

Xander Bogaerts: The Red Sox wisely held onto Bogaerts this trade deadline, the crown jewel of their farm system, and the consensus top shortstop prospect in baseball. The 20 year-old has thrived following a promotion to AAA, with a .282/.378.477 line in 47 games along with a .387 wOBA and 139 wRC+, despite a BABIP% of .311, 31 points lower than his minor league career average. Impressively, the youngster has posted a 12.4 BB%, and has actually cut his strikeout rate from 21.6% to 16.9% after being promoted from AA to AAA. Bogaerts has excellent bat speed and real power, and hit a couple balls hard the other way, including a fly ball to the wall in right-center. While Bogaerts appeared to recognize off-speed pitches well, he swung through several breaking balls, including three straight in one poor at-bat. Improved patience will be key for Bogaerts to realize his full potential at the next level.

Tall and lean at 6’3 and 185 pounds, Bogaerts looked smooth at the shortstop position. He flashed some nice range making a sliding backhand play and putting plenty on the throw to first. While he may eventually outgrow the position his defense is sufficient for the major-league level. In the best-case scenario, Bogaerts provides elite-level offense combined with solid defense from the shortstop position a la Troy Tulowitzki or a young Nomar Garciaparra. Bogaerts may have the opportunity to make a Manny Machado-like impact as a late-season call-up. With Stephen Drew being a free agent this offseason, Bogaerts will likely have the opportunity to win the Red Sox starting shortstop job in 2014, which would be his age-21 season. Nomar Garciaparra, the last great Sox shortstop, took over the position full-time in his age-23 season.

 (overthemonster)

Jackie Bradley Jr.: An outstanding spring earned Bradley Jr. a starting spot in left field for the Red Sox.  He then promptly reminded fans how little spring stats mean, as he has posted a .155/.258/.310 slash line, with a .259 wOBA and 54 wRC+, compiling a -0.4 fWAR in 23 games. A 30.3 K% hampered him in 66 PA with the Sox. Fortunately, his minor league stats have shown much more promise, as he is currently at .278/.378/.489 with a .388 wOBA and 140 wRC+ with Pawtucket. Bradley Jr. has also exhibited good patience with a 12.3 BB%. Plate discipline has been a strength of Bradley Jr’s. game, as he has posted a 14.0 BB% and a 16.7 K% over his minor league career. While his career minor league BABIP% of .350 will likely fall some at the big league level, it will certainly be higher than the .194 this year, with his true talent likely being in the .310 range. Though Bradley is only 31/46 in stolen bases for his professional career, scouts have noted his base running chops. Additionally, his speed, range, throwing arm and instincts give him the potential to be a plus defender. With the likely departure of Jacoby Ellsbury this offseason, JBJ will have every chance to win a starting spot in 2014.

 (GIF from SBNation)

Will Middlebrooks: Middlebrooks burst onto the scene last year, offering a bright spot for the Red Sox during a mostly dismal 2012 campaign. He slashed his way to .288/.325/.509 with a .357 wOBA and 122 wRC+ compiling 1.9 fWAR before a broken bone in his hand ended his season after 75 games. These numbers may have obscured his plate-discipline issues, as his strikeout and walk percentages were 24.5% and 4.5%, respectively. However, 2013 has not been so kind to Middlebrooks, who was sent down on June 25. At the time of his demotion, he was .192/.228/.389 with a woeful .266 wOBA and 60 wRC+, posting a -0.6 fWAR. His K% increased to 27.8%, with his BB% at 4.2%. A major culprit of his struggles are BABIP-related.  In 2012 his xBABIP% was .336, and his actual BABIP% was .335.  This neat symmetry has been dashed in 2013 as his xBABIP% is .327, a far cry from the .221 he has experienced. Furthermore, his struggles have been compounded by a HR/FB % that has dropped from 21.4 to 15.0 despite his average fly ball distance experiencing a small increase from 278.9 to 280.4. Middlebrooks’ batted ball profile suggests that his poor offensive numbers are due for a positive correction. In 40 AAA games Middlebrooks has shown improved contact skills, posting a K% of 18.8% with a BB% of 8.0%, improvements on his career minor league rates of 25.6% and 7.5%. He showed more patience at the plate when I saw him, laying off several breaking balls, and pouncing on a hanger. His BABIP% of .281, compared to his minor league career average of .346, has limited him to a solid but unspectacular .339 wOBA and 107 wRC+. Middlebrooks showed a strong arm and good athleticism and footwork at third, but he occasionally gets sloppy on his throws and his range to his left could be improved.

While Middlebrooks’ stock may have fallen with his struggles in the majors this year, and less than great AAA results, Red Sox fans should not lose faith. His stellar results in 75 games in 2012 may have caused some fans/personnel to gloss over his raw plate approach. While pitchers seemed to do a better job of exploiting that weakness before Middlebrooks’ demotion in 2013, at least some of his poor results can be attributed to a .221 BABIP. His contact rate in AAA has been an improvement on his career minor-league numbers, and despite fewer of those balls in play going for hits, he has managed decent numbers. If Middlebrooks can hold a K% and BB% around 20% and 6-7% at the next level, he should be a very productive player for the Red Sox, as his BABIP% will likely undergo positive regression to go along with his excellent power.

 (Image from overthemonster)

Allen Webster: Webster had a rough go of it over six starts at the big-league level, as the 23-year-old right-hander posting a 9.57 ERA in 26.1 innings with 21 strikeouts and 14 walks and a whopping 7 home runs. While his DIPS numbers were less awful, his 6.57 FIP and 5.07 xFIP earned him a -0.3 fWAR. Nevertheless, Webster showed some promise. Despite a strikeout rate of only 16.4%, Webster’s contact rate was only 71%, well below the MLB average of 78%. When I saw Webster June 28 against Toronto, I was impressed by his fastball, which ranged from 92-97 with sinking action that produced lots of ground balls. In six starts his GB% is 41.8. For the season, his fastball has averaged 94.1 mph, which is 18^th highest among pitchers with 20 or more innings. His changeup, which he throws 26.8% of the time is his favorite secondary offering. At an average of 85.3 mph there is good separation from the fastball, and it showed good depth and tilt. His slider, which he throws only 9.8% of the time looked promising, with some late bite. It averages 84.5 mph. He mixed in a couple curveballs at 77mph, but this looked like more of a show-me pitch than something Webster can feature. Generally Webster had a smooth, clean delivery, and his 6’3 frame allowed him to get a good plane on his pitches. His release point faltered as he tired in the 5^th and 6^th innings. Webster’s control and command will have to progress to realize his potential as a starting pitcher, as his professional walk rate of 10% is on the high side. If Webster can lower his walks and import his minor league 22.3 K% and 3.09 FIP, he could be the Red Sox #2/3 pitcher. If not, his fastball velocity will likely slot him into a high-leverage relief role.

 (GIF from SBNation)

Anthony Ranaudo: The 6’7 225 right-hander from LSU was the 39^th overall pick for the Sox in 2010. After posting a 2.95 ERA, 3.51 FIP, 24.0 K%, and 9.7 BB% in 109.2 AA innings, he earned a promotion to AAA.  I caught Ranaudo’s first AAA start, and he went 6 shutout innings with 5 strikeouts and no walks, throwing 85 pitches, 56 for strikes. His fastball was in the 89-92 range, and gets up to 94. It had good sink and a downward plane and produced lots of ground balls. He features a curveball at 75-79 with good downward break as this grainy GIF shows. His changeup could develop into above-average pitch, but is currently an inconsistent offering. Ranaudo’s stock has risen significantly after a lackluster 2012 in AA where he walked 27 hitters in 37.2 innings before having his season shut down due to injuries. If his shoulder and elbow hold up, Ranaudo could be a solid #3 starter at the next level.

 (Image from mlblogs.com)

Brandon Workman: The tall right-hander was optioned to Pawtucket following the acquisition of Jake Peavy. In 4 appearances at the big-league level (3 starts) and 20.1 innings, Workman posted a 3.54 ERA with a 2.75 FIP and 3.11 xFIP, accumulating 0.7 fWAR. Additionally, Workman had stellar strikeout and walk rates at 26.8% and 4.9%, respectively. His repertoire consists of a fastball which has averaged 91.8 mph, and a cutter, curveball, and changeup, which have improved to become average to above-average pitches. Workman has had consistent success throughout the minors, with a 23.4 K%, 6.9 BB% and 3.33 FIP. Moreover, he has been durable, throwing nearly 400 professional innings over 2+ seasons. While Workman will be pitching out of the bullpen in Pawtucket with the possibility of returning to the majors in that role down the stretch, long term he projects as a quality back-end innings eater. At his worst he is probably a lower-leverage bullpen arm.

 (Image from randombaseballstuff)

Bryce Brentz: A power-hitting outfield prospect for the Sox, Brentz is likely to miss the remainder of the season following right-knee surgery to repair a torn meniscus suffered on a slide into second base July 5^th. Brentz also missed spring training in 2013 after accidentally shooting himself in the leg. Prior to the knee injury Brentz had a slash line of .272/.321/.487 with a .359 wOBA and 120 wRC+. Brentz’s biggest weakness is recognizing breaking balls, and he has posted 2013 strikeout and walk rates of 23.5% and 5.9%, respectively. His impressive minor-league stats are fueled in part by a career .332 BABIP, which is likely to fall to the .260 range at the major-league level. Brentz is not a great runner, and the knee surgery will likely affect his slightly below-average range. A former two-way player, Brentz does feature a very strong arm which resulted in 10 outfield assists in 87 games in 2012. Brentz is unlikely to post high walk rates, so future big league success will depend heavily on tapping into his impressive raw power while keeping his strikeout rate from ballooning above the 20-25% range.

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Stats provided by Baseball-Reference, FanGraphs, and baseballheatmaps.com. Thanks to Marc Hulet’s prospect rankings for additional insights.

The Blue Jays were in a tough spot this trade deadline. They came into the season with huge expectations and as you may know they have failed to live up to those lofty expectations. They should have been sellers in my opinion this deadline; instead they decided to hold, which is understandable as most of the core is at least signed though next season. Casey Janssen is considered one of those core pieces.

With that being said here are three reasons why I think that Janssen should not be a core piece and should have been dealt this past deadline.

Reason #1 Get a piece for the future.

Here’s how Janssen compares to the other “proven closer” who got traded this deadline.

The numbers are similar but clearly Janssen has been better this season, meaning he could have brought back something better than Danry Vasquez who the Astros got for Veras. That type of prospect could have helped the Blue Jays’ depleted system recover somewhat from all the off-season trades.

Reason #2 Blue Jays have a replacement closer in the wings.

If Janssen had been dealt the Blue Jays could have handed the closer’s job to all-star Steve Delabar. Delabar has all the traits you look for in a closer: he throws hard, averaging a touch over 94mph this season. He gets strikeouts, 13.59 K/9 and 34.7% K rate. He is also getting good results sporting a pitching triple slash line (ERA/FIP/xFIP) of 2.90/2.44/3.11.  He also doesn’t have a platoon issue, allowing a .297 wOBA against righties and a .304 wOBA against lefties. I don’t see how the Blue Jays management could have a problem giving Delabar a shot at the closer’s job if they had dealt Janssen.

Reason #3 Janssen is declining

This is the big reason why the Blue Jays should have dealt Casey Janssen. His skills are declining and selling him now would have been the perfect time before he potentially implodes next season. Here’s why I see Janssen declining and not being the same next season. He will turn 32 this September so he is on the wrong side of the pitcher aging curve. He is at that age where across the board numbers usually begin to decline, and we are already starting to see that this season.  Let’s start with velocity; he is down almost 2MPH this season from 91.7mph the last 2 seasons to 90.0mph this season. We know velocity is highly correlated with strikeouts so it’s not surprising to see a significant drop in both his K/9 and K%. His K/9 is down from 9.47 last season to 8.91 this season and his K% has dropped from 27.7% to 25.4%. His swinging strike rate has never been great but it peaked last season at 9.5% which was just barely above the league average. It has dropped back to 2010-2011 levels at 8.2% and is now below average. His O-Swing rate is down, which leads me to believe his stuff isn’t fooling batters as it had in the past, and it supports why his walk rate has shot up from 1.55 BB/9 last season to 2.36 this season.

We can clearly see his skills are declining, but despite all that Janssen has managed to post the best FIP and xFIP of his career. I see this as being significantly influenced by luck. He is posting the lowest BABIP of his career at .225 vs. a career .290; his HR/9 and HR/FB% are also at career lows sitting at 0.26 and 3.7% respectively. Pitching in Toronto you have to figure there is no way he keeps suppressing home runs at his current rate.

To sum this up, we have a closer who has declined across the board, who will be 32 next month, and who is getting results by suppressing home runs in a hitter-friendly park. Yet he was kept around despite the possibility of being able to get a decent prospect and having a potential closer replacement waiting. But hey who knows what will happen in a year from now, maybe Janssen will keep it up for one more season and make me look like an idiot, but I wouldn’t bet on it.

News Today

     The Yankees welcomed Third Baseman Alex Rodriguez in Chicago today to make his season debut tonight against the White Sox.  A-Rod is expected to be in the lineup, returning to his original position for the club.  The other major event on Monday is Commissioner Bud Selig announcing the suspensions of 12 players for 50 games, and Rodriguez’s 211 game suspension, which takes effect  on Thursday, August 8th.  This has been appealed by A-Rod already as reported by the MLB Twitter account.   A-Rod will be on the active roster through the appeal process, and  should be able to play a few weeks before his status is ultimately decided on, so what can we expect to see from him on the field?

Looking at his Performance

     Rodriguez played in 15 minor league rehab games to ease his return to the big leagues from off-season hip surgery. In those games, he hit .214 with a double, and 3 HR, while driving in 10 runs.  In this extremely small sample size of varying levels, it’s difficult to make any reasonable assessment.  However, we can look at a few peripheral statistics to try and gauge they type of A-Rod we’re going to see.  In his 51 minor league plate appearances, A-Rod struck out 13 times and walked 6.  This leads to a 25.5% K-Rate and an 11.8% BB-Rate.  The small sample size accounts for a large amount of error, but these numbers don’t appear to be too drastically apart from his usual self.  A-Rod’s career K-Rate is 18.2%, and it is 19% over the last five seasons.  As he’s aged, Rodriguez’s strikeout numbers have marginally increased, and seems to be following that trend.  He walked 10.9% of the time over his career, and 11.3% over the last five seasons.  A-Rod has become a more disciplined hitter with time, as pitchers have also been more cautious and pitch around him at the plate.

     Due to A-Rod’s K% and BB% in the minors seeming to be fairly stable compared to his past performance, I believe that we’ll see A-Rod maintain his current career trajectory.  His durability is not what it has been in the past, but he should return to the player he would’ve been in 2013, injury or not.  I don’t see a sudden huge drop-off, or surprising upturn in performance happening.

Career Trajectory

     The following three plots show A-Rod’s Career trajectory in OPS (On-Base Percentage Plus Slugging Percentage), wOBA (Weighted On-Base Percentage),wRC+ (Weighted Runs Created, adjusted to the league where 100 is average), and WAR/162 (Wins Above Replacement prorated for 162 Games).  In all of the categories, higher numbers indicate a better performance.  I used 4th power exponential trend lines to approximate in all of these cases except for WAR, where I used a 6th power polynomial to account for the increased variance.

     The reason for choosing a 4th degree polynomial is that I believe it truly reflects the path of A-Rod’s career.  He burst on to the scene during his first full year in 1996 with the Mariners, as he was named an All-Star, won the Silver Slugger Award, and finished 2nd in MVP voting.  His line that year was .358 / .414 / .631 and an OPS of 1.045.  Rodriguez experienced a “Sophomore Slump” if you can call it that where he hit a measly .300 / .350 / .496 and an OPS of .846, garnering his second All-Star Game appearance.  it would take A-Rod two more years to return to his 1996 performance, causing this first curve.  This curve started slowly climbing upward in 2001, his first year with the Rangers where Rodriguez admitted steroid use due to the pressure he felt to perform.  He reached his peak in 2007, an MVP season where he hit .314 /.422 /.645 with an OPS of 1.067 and 54 Home Runs, the most of his career.

     This is where his current downward trend begins, as A-Rod began creeping into his mid-late 30s which bring us to where we are today.  I’ve indicated A-Rod’s drop-off since 2007 by the vertical black lines.  Notably, A-Rod’s agent Scott Boras announced during the Game 4 of the 2007 World Series, as the Red Sox were about to clinch a championship, that Rodriguez would be opting out of his contract.  The Yankees initially didn’t want to negotiate with A-Rod, but later signed him to a new deal, worth $275MM over 10 years.  Seeing A-Rod’s current decline, this was not a good move for the Yankees.  However, this was perfect for A-Rod, as he secured the deal coming off of an MVP caliber season when his value was the highest.  It’s just Boras working his magic again.

     Alex Rodriguez is on a downward decline, but as stated earlier, we should see a version of A-Rod resembling what he would be if he never missed time for injury.  This is a much needed boost for the Yankees, as their 3B for the year have accumulated a -0.9 WAR, which is 26th in the league.  With A-
Rod, who I projected to have a 2.1 WAR, the Yankees greatly improve at his position.  Assuming A-Rod plays 15 games before we know the results of his appeal, he’ll accumulate a 0.19 WAR, while the Yankees other 3B options would produce a -.08 WAR based on their performance this season.  This is a 0.27 WAR swing for the Yankees.  If you prorate this over a 162 game season, this would be a 2.92 WAR improvement which is on the Solid Starter/Good Player borderline.  For however long the Yankees have Alex Rodriguez in the lineup, he will be a huge improvement in their lineup.  It’s just a question of how well A-Rod can focus on playing during one of the most controversial and stressful times in his long career.

From my personal blog: msilbbaseball.wordpress.com

Path to the Draft

     What’s the usual story with first-year draftees?  They put up stellar numbers in college and/or high school, but can’t replicate those numbers after they’re drafted due to better competition in the minors.  A college All-American who hit .400 can struggle to stay above .200 as they adjust to minor-league ball.  It’s nothing to worry about, just the way things go.  So what would you expect to see from a college senior infielder, converted outfielder, converted back to infielder who hit .176 in 330 career at-bats, who didn’t hit a home run until the end of his last season, and who only had six extra-base hits in his entire college career?  I’d have my doubts that this player would even record one minor-league hit.  However, I present to you Cody Dent, the man who’s mirroring the trend.

Speaking of home runs, his father did this.

     Cody played for four years at the University of Florida, and reached the College World Series three times.  Throughout his career, he was a light-hitting utility infielder who saw a majority of his time as a defensive replacement.  During his senior year, Dent started 48 games for the Gators, but his struggles at the plate still remained.  Cody hit .233 his freshman year, then .207, .134, and .169 in each subsequent season.  But, he’s 6th on UF’s all-time sacrifice bunt leaderboard with 26 in his college career.  So, that’s something; It seems like he’d make a good-hitting pitcher.

     Dent’s bright spot was the 2011 NCAA Tournament, where he played in and started 11 games, and hit .273 with a double, triple, and 4 RBIs as the Gators made it the championship series in Omaha.  He was named to the All-Tournament team.  Following his senior season, the previously undrafted Dent was selected by the Washington Nationals in the 22nd round of the 2013 First-Year Player Draft, likely/hopefully for his defense.

Faux-Struggles?

     As a student a the University of Florida, I attended a large amount of baseball games, and I always rooted for Cody to do well.  He never showed negative body language, and went about his business professionally.  Also, he was the king of the “at ’em ball”.  I can’t count how many times he’s hit a rope right at an outfielder.  I always imagined what kind of horrible BABIP Dent would have, so I calculated it.  During his senior season, Cody Dent had a .193 BABIP.  With an average BABIP ranging from about .290 – .310, this created a huge dent in his average (pun intended).  Some players have established BABIPs in a different range (ex. Miguel Cabrera and Ichiro Suzuki around .345), however .193 can not be the true average for an SEC starter with MLB bloodlines.  By personally watching Dent play, I can also attest that he’s better than the numbers show.  I consider BABIP to be a measure of luck, and use it to determine whether a player is playing at their true ability.  A BABIP far under the average means that a player is under performing, and a BABIP far above the average means that a player is over performing.  To re-iterate, Dent’s senior BABIP was .193.  This, coupled with only an 11.7% Strikeout Percentage (K%) creates a sense of hope that Cody could grow into a serviceable/not as dreadful bat.

Professional Performance

     So what does he do during his first 27 games in Short-Season A ball?  Hit .278/ .365 /.300 with a .326 wOBA and a 108 wRC+.  With 100 being the standard average for wRC+, this means that Cody Dent is an above-average producer in Short-Season A ball.  ABOVE AVERAGE!!!  Considering the offensive woes he went through as a Gator, this is absolutely huge.  Maintaining his improved offense will be a challenge for Cody, as he’s in danger of regressing.  Dent’s minor-league BABIP is .387, way above average, and astronomically above his college numbers.  Is this a sign of the real Cody Dent?  Is he having a lucky month?  Or has Cody Dent gone through enough punishment and suffering from the baseball gods that they’re rewarding him for his perseverance?  It’s time to sit back and watch The Curious Case of Cody Dent.

Like Father, Like Son

     Also, now he’s breaking up perfect games. This came against the Lowell Spinners, the Boston Red Sox’s New York-Penn League team.  The pure perfection of this can’t be explained. Cody “Bleeping” Dent!

Kendrys Morales and Gerardo Parra aren’t two players you tend to think about together. Parra is an elite defensive player with solid offensive skills and Morales is a slugging DH. Parra walks a little bit more and strikes out a little bit less, but Morales makes up for that differential by slugging about 80 points higher. Parra stands right around average at the plate in 2013 with a 99 wRC+ and Morales is above average at 138 wRC+. They’re both valuable in different ways, but they are also the only two players to date in 2013 to be credited with an extra-base hit to the pitcher.

Their batted ball profiles are quite different as Parra tends to put the ball on the ground and Morales makes his money in the air.

Parra swings more often and makes more contact along the way, but Morales seems to hit the ball with more force considering his higher home run total in a less hitter-friendly park. These are two players who aren’t all that similar but happen to be the only players to accomplish one of the stranger feats in baseball during the 2013 season.

Up front, it’s important to know this comes from Pitch F/X classifications, meaning that the play had to be scored a double, triple, or home run and it had to be fielded by the pitcher or hit into his zone. I don’t know exactly how the latter determination is made but I will assume that there aren’t massive mistakes in classification. I’ve watched Parra and Morales’ hits to confirm, but I obviously haven’t watched every double this season to make sure there aren’t any missing points.

What’s wonderful about these two extra base hits to the pitcher (both doubles) is that they match the respective players so perfectly.

May 5, 2013 – Mariners at Blue Jays

With Brandon Morrow on the mound Morales came to the plate in the Top of the 8th inning and worked a 1-1 count. Amazingly, before Morrow could throw his 3rd pitch of the at bat, a fan ran onto the field and stopped play. I have no idea if that was responsible for what happened next, but the coincidence is too hilarious not to mention.

When play resumed Morrow came at Morales with an 85.7 MPH slider which the Mariners’ DH hit way up into air. With the roof open and sun beating down, the infielders converged toward the back of the pitcher’s mound to field the routine pop fly.

There are three professional athletes within 10 feet of where the baseball is going to land and they are all close enough to make the play quite easily. However, things take a comical/terrible turn depending on your personal feelings toward the Blue Jays.

As you can see, hopefully, Encarnacion called the ball vigorously and then fell over causing the third baseman to jump out of the way and lose sight of the ball, thus removing any hope of catching it himself. The baseball bounced about 10 feet into the air and Morales, who had been hustling, cruised into second base.

Morales hit his double to the pitcher in a very Morales fashion. He hit a fly ball and the defense didn’t catch it. The fan who ran on the field may have been in the minds of the players, but it’s more likely Encarnacion was trying so hard to fight the sun that he forgot about the hill located in the center of the diamond.

May 14, 2013 – Braves at Diamondbacks

In the Bottom of the 3rd, Cliff Pennington stood on first base and Julio Teheran climbed onto the mound. Parra dug in and took the first two pitches for balls, putting him into a nice hitter’s count. On the next pitch, Teheran delivered an 89.3 MPH fastball with some nice tailing action that Parra slapped to the right side.

You can see the baseball came right between the pitcher and first baseman as neither could make the play on the weakly hit bouncer. Generally this situation should result in a respectable infield single. After all, if I hadn’t prepared you, it would seem likely that the second baseman would pick up the ground ball and hold the runners at 1st and 2nd. You can see the third baseman is manning his position and just off the screen I assure you the shortstop is doing the same.

However, it didn’t exactly happen like this. Dan Uggla over-ran the ball, perhaps because he was expecting to run to the bag and couldn’t decide quickly enough to change course.

As a result, the pitcher had to back up the second baseman on a ground ball as Parra hustled into 2nd base.

This strikes me as a very Gerardo Parra type of hit. He put it on the ground and used his legs to turn it from an infield single into an infield double. It required a defensive mistake, but it was a defensive mistake that was, in part, forced by his ability.

Didi Gregorius singled in the next at bat to plate the Dbacks only two runs of the game, which also happened to be decisive in their win over the Braves. The final score was 2-0, so Pennington would have scored the winning run even if Uggla made the play on Parra, but it’s possible the defensive implosion took focus from Teheran or simply exhausted him given how far he had to run to make get the ball and resulted in poorer pitches

Nothing came of the Morales double as the Mariners didn’t score and went on to lose 10-2 despite that double coming as a result of much more egregious defensive play. Parra was going to have a single unless the Braves made an excellent play, but Morales shouldn’t have been on base at all. Apparently, the Baseball Gods agreed and didn’t punish Morrow as much as Teheran.

Baseball is often remarkable for the strange things you see. If you had to guess which two players doubled to the pitcher in 2013 you probably wouldn’t have picked Morales and you probably wouldn’t have expected that neither case involved someone failing to cover second base. This is one of those wonderfully weird moments in baseball that ties together to very different players with an odd set of circumstances.

Twice this season a player has doubled to the pitcher and both times that player did so in a way that was partly in line with their style of play, but both were very different. In one case the play was critical to the outcome and in one case it was meaningless.

Doubles to the pitcher are rare as a database search going back to 2008 reveals these as the only two. They happened nine days apart and are the only extra-base hits to the pitcher recorded by Pitch F/X in the last six seasons. Next time something like this happens, maybe the batter will try to stretch it into a triple in order to have an honor all his own.

Let’s start with a picture. What it communicates won’t surprise you and it tells you essentially two things. First, over the last nine seasons, we’ve seen a modest decline in home runs. Second, that doesn’t apply to Joe Blanton.

Now, Blanton has had a respectable career. He’s accumulated 19.3 WAR which is good for about 2 WAR per season and in all but one of his seasons, he has provided or is on pace for at least 175 IP. He has essentially been the definition of an innings-eater with a flash of greatness in 2007.

But over the last few seasons, Blanton has turned himself into one of the most homer-prone pitchers in baseball. Since the start of 2010, only three qualifying pitchers have allowed more HR/9 than Blanton’s 1.45 mark. It’s not terribly interesting that Blanton started giving up more home runs when he moved from Oakland to Philadelphia, but it is interesting that he’s giving up even more this season since moving to Angels Stadium.

In fact, Blanton’s 2013 mark is the 9th highest HR/9 total in the xFIP Era (2002-present). You’ll notice something interesting about the list of the qualifying pitchers who have given up the most home runs:

Most of them aren’t great even if you factor out their fluky high HR/FB rate and home park, and Joe Blanton is the only pitcher in the top 14 on this list with an xFIP- below 100. He’s getting a decent number of ground balls (43.7%) and his K% (18.1%) and BB% (5.2%) are both pretty good. Usually guys who give up a ton of long balls are also doing a lot of other things poorly. Blanton doesn’t seem to be on the surface.

But with an ERA of 5.52, FIP of 4.82, and xFIP of 3.81 it makes you wonder exactly what’s going on. This is a pitcher who has a solid strikeout profile, good walk numbers, and a solid ground ball rate. Not only should that lead to pretty good run prevention, but it shouldn’t go hand in hand with a high HR/9.

These are all the qualifying seasons since 2002, with Blanton labeled in red. Of pitchers in that cluster of HR/9 above 1.7, only Braden Looper in 2009 had a higher GB%. On average, pitchers who throw 43% ground balls allow around 1.00 HR/9. Everything about Blanton’s huge homer total screams that the HR/FB rate is unsustainable. It’s 17.3%. It will come down.

It’s the highest of his career, but he’s now calling Los Angeles home. He gave up more home runs when he moved from Oakland to Philly, but now he’s giving up more in his move from Philly to LA.

Look at that trend. It makes sense that it would go up between 2008 and 2009, but it went up every year he was in Philadelphia and is going up again now that he’s in a pitcher friendly park. Keith Law remarked recently that HR/FB and BABIP regression paradigms don’t apply to guys with stuff as poor as Blanton’s, and while I’m not sure I would go that far, this information has me wondering.

This doesn’t look like luck to me. You buy the first jump because of the ballpark and I know it’s only been 120 innings this season, but this is the 10th highest HR/FB% since 2002. And only one pitcher who has posted a higher HR/FB% had a GB% below 50%. In other words, the guys who have the really bad HR/FB% are usually guys who don’t allow many fly balls to begin with.

It’s reasonable to expect some regression because that’s always the reasonable thing to do, but Blanton’s HR/9 and HR/FB% have gone up since moving to a better park. It’s worth considering if there is something about Joe Blanton that’s causing this to happen because pretty much everything else he’s doing seems to be working. In fact, if you normalize his home run rate he’s actually above average even now that he’s back in the AL.

What stands out to me is what hitters are doing against his four-seam fastball according to Pitch F/X data. 12 of his 24 HR allowed have come on the fastball, and he’s allowed a .442 wOBA against that pitch, which is the pitch he throws most often in 2013. Against the fastball, he’s allowing a 27.3 HR/FB% and has allowed the ball to be hit in the air more often against it than any other pitch at 32.8%. Let’s take a look at the average movement on his four-seam fastball:

The vertical movement fluctuates some over time but it’s getting worse since 2011 and the horizontal movement is trending in a bad direction especially considering he’s throwing this pitch more often than anything else he’s got. Some of this could be classification issues, but the basic numbers say this is his main pitch and it’s not moving nearly enough. It was never a great pitch, but now it’s one of the straightest fastballs in the game and he’s getting crushed on it.

Of the 12 HRs he’s allowed on fastballs, the average velocity was 89 mph with less than three inches of horizontal break, and only one missed the strike zone. Those aren’t flukes, they are asking to be crushed. Here’s a look at his home runs allowed this year with Angel Stadium superimposed. He’s not giving up too many cheap ones considering the size of that stadium.

I’m not sure I have a perfectly clear conclusion to offer. If you only looked at Blanton’s 2013 stat line, you’d feel pretty confident that his HR/FB% would come down and he would pitch closer to his xFIP going forward given the decent strikeout, walk, and ground ball numbers he’s putting up. But if you look at his 2013 in the context of his other seasons and in the context of recent history you come to a different conclusion. If you’re looking with a wider lens, it seems as if Blanton isn’t going to rein in the home-run rate.

The trends don’t look good for Blanton who is allowing more home runs than ever before after moving to a bigger park thanks to a fastball that has less bite than at any time in his career. He’s throwing 89 mph heaters with little life down the middle and opposing hitters aren’t missing. This doesn’t seem like something that’s due for regression, it seems like it’s a function of the pitcher Blanton is right now.

I haven’t watched his starts closely, so perhaps an Angels fan can speak to this better, but I think I might bet against a whole lot of regression in this case. I think Law’s point my be valid, at least in this case. Blanton’s fastball might not be good enough for us to apply our standard beliefs. Blanton might be the exception that proves the rule.

Normally we expect a pitcher’s HR/FB% to come back to the pack, but only if that pitcher’s skills are close enough to average. Maybe that’s what we’re seeing with Joe Blanton in 2013. He’s routinely throwing a pitch that isn’t good enough to get hitters out and it’s costing him. It’s also possible that this is all a mirage and things will even out with more time.

I don’t have a perfect answer, but I think it’s worth raising the question and following Blanton’s season the rest of the way in order to find out.

Remember lichens? Those organisms you learned about in biology that form as a partnership between fungi and algae in which both benefit? I would argue that a new such mutualistic symbiotic relationship has formed: the one between the Atlanta Braves and Waffle House. Long a revered Southern institution, Waffle House was installed at Turner Field last Friday (though it’s rumored after last week’s ankle injury that Tim Hudson prefers IHOP). Since then, the Braves have been on a tear, winning six straight, including a sweep of the (at the time) red-hot St. Louis Cardinals. Coincidence? I think not!  As always, let’s take a look at the numbers.

The following charts will be broken up into two distinct periods: the first 102 games (“pre-WaHo”) and the past six games (“post-WaHo”). We’ll start with the bottom line.

If the numbers are to be believed (and Numbers Never Lie, right ESPN?) then the Braves, a strong team already pre-Waho, are now unbeatable post-WaHo. It remains to be seen if this is merely a home game effect, however. It’s also possible that the Braves are playing similar baseball post-WaHo compared to pre-WaHo and are fortunately getting better results. To investigate, let’s dig deeper into the components that drive wins: run scoring and run prevention.