If you haven’t read Part 1 and Part 2, you may want to go back and check them out. If you would prefer not to, this is a reminder of where these numbers came from:

Using FanGraphs’ terrific leaderboard tools, I found statistics for all players who played at each position in 2014. The following numbers apply only to the time spent at that position. Buster Posey, for example, accumulated 462 plate appearances at catcher, 128 at first base, and 9 at DH, so his plate appearances in those amounts are included for those positions in the table below.

For position players, I calculated WAR per 600 plate appearances. For starting pitchers, I used WAR per 150 innings pitched. For relievers, I used WAR per 50 innings pitched.

In this installment of 2014 WAR Breakdown, players at each hitting position are split into six different age groups. All “small sample size” warnings apply.

CATCHER

The most productive age groups for catchers were the “27 to 29” and “30 to 32” age groups, with both groups averaging 3.1 WAR/600 PA. Not surprisingly, the production by catchers really starts to dwindle as they move into their mid-30’s. The “30 to 32” age group hit a combined .253/.319/.385, while the “33 to 35” age group hit just .220/.310/.307. Russell Martin will be 32 next year and just signed a 5-year, $82 million contract with the Blue Jays. Here’s hoping he ages better than most catchers, for the Blue Jays’ sake.

Best Catcher 23 and under: Mike Zunino, 23 (1.7 WAR)

Best Catcher 24 to 26: Devin Mesoraco, 26 (4.1 WAR)

Best Catcher 27 to 29: Jonathan Lucroy, 28 (6.3 WAR)

Best Catcher 30 to 32: Russell Martin, 31 (5.4 WAR)

Best Catcher 33 to 35: Carlos Ruiz, 35 (3.2 WAR)

Best Catcher 36 and up: David Ross, 37 (0.2 WAR)

FIRST BASE

In 2014, first baseman aged 24 to 26 were the most productive group at the position, averaging 2.3 WAR/600 PA. The “30 to 32” group was next, at 1.9 WAR/600 PA, with the group in the middle (“27 to 29”) finishing third in this metric. The small sample sizes of young (23 and under) and old (36 and older) were quite unproductive, both averaging negative WAR per 600 PA and hitting under .200.

Best First Baseman 23 and under: Will Myers, 23 (0.0 WAR in just 3 PA)

Best First Baseman 24 to 26: Anthony Rizzo, 24 (5.6 WAR)

Best First Baseman 27 to 29: Jose Abreu, 27 (4.4 WAR)

Best First Baseman 30 to 32: Miguel Cabrera, 31 (4.9 WAR)

Best First Baseman 33 to 35: Justin Morneau, 33 (2.5 WAR)

Best First Baseman 36 and up: Raul Ibanez, 42 (0.3 WAR in 20 PA)

SECOND BASE

The most productive group of second basemen skewed older than you might expect. The group aged 30 to 32 had the highest WAR/600 PA and best hitting line. Overall, the three age groups ranging from age 27 to age 35 were the most productive.

Best Second Baseman 23 and under: Kolten Wong, 23 (1.8 WAR)

Best Second Baseman 24 to 26: Jose Altuve, 24 (5.0 WAR)

Best Second Baseman 27 to 29: Brian Dozier, 27 (4.6 WAR)

Best Second Baseman 30 to 32: Ian Kinsler, 32 (5.5 WAR)

Best Second Baseman 33 to 35: Chase Utley, 35 (4.2 WAR)

Best Second Baseman 36 and up: Brian Roberts, 36 (0.3 WAR)

THIRD BASE

Production at third base in 2014 skewed older. Third basemen 23 and under and 24 to 26 were the two least productive groups. The “33 to 35” group had the highest WAR/600 PA, but this was due mainly to just two players—Adrian Beltre and Juan Uribe.

Best Third Baseman 23 and under: Nolan Arenado, 23 (3.1 WAR)

Best Third Baseman 24 to 26: Kyle Seager, 26 (5.6 WAR)

Best Third Baseman 27 to 29: Josh Donaldson, 28 (6.5 WAR)

Best Third Baseman 30 to 32: Chase Headley, 30 (4.4 WAR)

Best Third Baseman 33 to 35: Adrian Beltre, 35 (5.7 WAR)

Best Third Baseman 36 and up: Aramis Ramirez, 36 (2.2 WAR)

SHORTSTOP

At the shortstop position, the age 24 to 26 group had the largest percentage of playing time of any group, but a lower WAR/600 PA than any group except the “36 and up” group. In the “27 to 29” age group, Troy Tulowitzki had 5.2 of the group’s 21.0 WAR (24.8%) despite getting just 372 of the group’s 5261 plate appearances (7%).

Best Shortstop 23 and under: Jose Ramirez, 21 (2.1 WAR)

Best Shortstop 24 to 26: Starlin Castro, 24 (2.8 WAR)

Best Shortstop 27 to 29: Troy Tulowitzki, 29 (5.2 WAR)

Best Shortstop 30 to 32: Jhonny Peralta, 32 (5.3 WAR)

Best Shortstop 33 to 35: Jimmy Rollins, 35 (3.5 WAR)

Best Shortstop 36 and up: LittleNicky Punto, 36 (0.4 WAR)

LEFT FIELD

Thanks to Christian Yelich, the most-productive group of left fielders in WAR/600 PA was the group of player’s aged 23 and under. It’s interesting to see the WAR/600 PA drop-off from the “30 to 32” group to the “33 to 35” group. The “33 to 35” group hit nearly as well as the younger group, but they had a couple of particularly bad fielders (Rajai Davis and Matt Holliday) who brought their WAR total down.

Best Left Fielder 23 and under: Christian Yelich, 22 (4.2 WAR)

Best Left Fielder 24 to 26: Justin Upton, 26 (4.1 WAR)

Best Left Fielder 27 to 29: Michael Brantley, 27 (4.5 WAR)

Best Left Fielder 30 to 32: Alex Gordon, 30 (6.6 WAR)

Best Left Fielder 33 to 35: Matt Holliday, 34 (3.8 WAR)

Best Left Fielder 36 and up: Endy Chavez, 36 (0.1 WAR)

CENTER FIELD

Mike Trout had 664 of the 3523 plate appearances (19%) credited to players 23 and under, but 34% of the WAR for this group. With Trout, Billy Hamilton (3.5 WAR) and Marcell Ozuna (3.4 WAR) all in the 23 and under group, this was the most productive collection of players of any of the age groups in WAR/600 PA. Center field is a young person’s position. Just 4.6% of the plate appearances by center fielders went to players 33 and over.

Best Center Fielder 23 and under: Mike Trout, 22 (7.5 WAR)

Best Center Fielder 24 to 26: Juan Lagares, 25 (3.8 WAR)

Best Center Fielder 27 to 29: Andrew McCutchen, 27 (6.8 WAR)

Best Center Left Fielder 30 to 32: Jacoby Ellsbury, 30 (3.9 WAR)

Best Center Fielder 33 to 35: Rajai Davis, 33 (1.0 WAR)

Best Center Fielder 36 and up: Reed Johnson, 37 (0.0 WAR)

RIGHT FIELD

Players 23 and under had 4.7 WAR as a group in 2014. Yasiel Puig had 3.7 of that total. In the “30 to 32” age group, Hunter Pence (4.7 WAR) had more than half of the total WAR (9.2) for the group.

Best Right Fielder 23 and under: Yasiel Puig, 23 (3.7 WAR)

Best Right Fielder 24 to 26: Giancarlo Stanton, 24 (6.2 WAR)

Best Right Fielder 27 to 29: Mat Kemp, 29 (2.4 WAR)

Best Right Fielder 30 to 32: Hunter Pence, 31 (4.7 WAR)

Best Right Fielder 33 to 35: Jose Bautista, 33 (6.1 WAR)

Best Right Fielder 36 and up: Marlon Byrd, 36 (1.9 WAR)

DESIGNATED HITTER

There wasn’t much WAR accumulated by players at the DH position in 2014. It’s hard to produce WAR with no defensive value and a strong positional adjustment.

Best DH 23 and under: Kennys Vargas, 23 (0.7 WAR)

Best DH 24 to 26: Yan Gomes, 26 (1.0 WAR)

Best DH 27 to 29: Chris Carter, 27 (2.2 WAR)

Best DH 30 to 32: Adam Lind, 30 (0.9 WAR)

Best DH 33 to 35: Victor Martinez, 35 (3.9 WAR)

Best DH 36 and up: David Ortiz, 38 (2.7 WAR)

PITCHER (HITTING)

Ha! Pitchers hitting. That’s funny.

Best Pitcher (hitting) 23 and under: Shelby Miller, 23 (0.5 WAR)

Best Pitcher (hitting) 24 to 26: Madison Bumgarner, 24 (1.2 WAR)

Best Pitcher (hitting) 27 to 29: Travis Wood, 27 (1.0 WAR)

Best Pitcher (hitting) 30 to 32: Zack Greinke, 30 (0.7 WAR)

Best Pitcher (hitting) 33 to 35: Dan Haren, 33 (0.3 WAR)

Best Pitcher (hitting) 36 and up: Bronson Arroyo, 37 (0.1 WAR)

PINCH-HITTER

Pinch-hitters hitting are only slightly less funny than pitchers hitting. Players 23 and under were better pinch-hitters than any other age group.

Best Pinch-Hitter 23 and under: Cory Spangenberg, 23 (0.3 WAR)

Best Pinch-Hitter 24 to 26: Lonnie Chisenhall, 25 (0.4 WAR)

Best Pinch-Hitter 27 to 29: Delmon Young, 28 (0.6 WAR)

Best Pinch-Hitter 30 to 32: John Mayberry, Jr., 30 (0.8 WAR)

Best Pinch-Hitter 33 to 35: Jeff Baker, 33 (0.3 WAR)

Best Pinch-Hitter 36 and up: Lyle Overbay, 37 (0.4 WAR)

Next up is a comparison of WAR in 2014 to WAR in 2002.

Last week Miles Wray examined an emerging spending pattern of the New York Yankees, suggesting that the club’s approach to free agent spending varies, depending possibly on how many dollars had recently come off their books: They appear to spend each offseason either signing seemingly every premium free agent available (2008-9, 2013-4) or they limit themselves to the bargain bin, focusing on late-offseason signings, reclamation projects, and trades.

While this description is certainly accurate, at least since 2008-9 when this pattern began to emerge, there’s little discussion of why a team would choose to invest in free agency this way.  Presumably, teams like the Yankees, the Dodgers, or the Red Sox, which are capable of fielding significantly higher payrolls than any other team in the league, would prefer to do the opposite: Selecting from a much more limited subset of free agents would limit the advantage gained over other teams.  It’s also not inconceivable that a team with as much money as the Yankees might have concerns that they’d be driving up the entire market, increasing their own cost of acquiring talent.  This approach also has very real impacts on team age and roster flexibility as an entire free agent crop begins to enter their decline years together.

Moreover, the Yankees may very well not be the only team taking this approach.  An argument can be made that the Boston Red Sox are following a similar strategy, albeit at a pace accelerated by their shorter duration contracts they signed in the 2012-3 offseason and their salary-dump trade with the Dodgers four months earlier.  The team signed both Hanley Ramirez and Pablo Sandoval, arguably the two top hitters available in free agency, only a year after they signed precisely one free agent, Mike Napoli, who was their own.

So what does a team gain by going on spending sprees followed by (relative) austerity?  I submit they pursue this approach to gain one thing: draft picks.

Consider for the moment what happens in the case where the Yankees are not following this feast/famine strategy in free agency, and instead they sign a premium free agent each year.  In 2009-10 they might’ve signed Matt Holliday or Jason Bay.  2010-1, Carl Crawford or Jason Werth.  In 2011-2, Fielder/Pujols/Reyes.  In 2012-3 Upton/Hamilton/Bourne/Grienke.  All were free agents tied to compensation, meaning in addition to the dollar-cost of signing that player, the signing team also forfeited a draft pick.  (It’s probably also worth noting how godawful most of those signings look today, but that’s the nature of free agency – The last couple of years are almost always ugly.)  The mechanics of where those picks go have changed since the 2012-3 offseason but the cost to the signing team remains the same: A first round draft pick, or a later round pick if the first round pick is already spoken for.

Instead of signing those players, over that span the New York Yankees signed only a single draft-pick-compensation free agent, Rafael Soriano, 2010-11, and it was over the objections of Brian Cashman.  They kept their first-round draft picks in 2010, 2012, and 2013, and picked up a few compensation picks from departing free agents like Nick Swisher, Javier Vázquez and Soriano.

As Miles points out, however, the Yankees simply can’t stockpile picks and rebuild like a normal team.  This restraint is made possible by lavish spending in the 2008-9 offseason, where the Yankees signed pretty much everybody and then went out and won the World Series.  Signing Teixeira, Sabathia, and Burnett means the Yankees not only forfeited their first round draft pick, but their second and third round draft picks as well.

When viewed in the whole, however, this doesn’t appear to be that bad of a deal for the Yankees.  By moving their spending forward into the 2008-9 offseason instead of spreading it out over four years, they essentially traded their second and third round draft picks in 2009 for first-round draft picks in 2010, 2012, and 2013.  They repeated this approach 2013-4, signing Brian McCann, Jacoby Ellsbury, and Carlos Beltran, and while the early returns from those transactions are not promising, it should be noted that the McCann and Ellsbury deals, at least, were considered sound at the time they were signed.  Beltran?  Not so much.  With the last free agent with draft pick compensation attached off the board, they’re keeping their 2015 first round pick as well.

At a time when the aging curve for older players have suddenly become unforgiving, the value of young players is certainly up, and the Yankees appear to be maximizing their chances of acquiring young talent in the draft by minimizing the draft pick cost of signing free agents.  This approach is remarkably similar to their strategy in the international market, where they’ve determined the best way to acquire talent is not to stick to a limited bonus pool each year, but to sign ten or eleven of the top thirty international free agents, (and possibly one more.)  This approach costs them a great deal of money in luxury tax and international bonus pool “overage” tax, but may make sense given how much surplus value an above-average, cost-controlled young player generates.  Now, if only they could do something with all those draft picks…

For most of his baseball career Xander Bogaerts has been an extremely successful player, whether it’s been in the low or high minors. He’s also always been a highly touted prospect, primarily praised for his ability to hit the baseball all the while playing reasonably good defense as a shortstop. It’s not simply Bogaerts’ ability to impact the baseball that made him such a touted prospect, but also his approach. In his brief stint in the majors, in 2013, Bogaerts was lauded for his impeccable plate discipline, especially in the playoffs. As he should have been; in 2013, Bogaerts had a 10% walk rate, and in the postseason it skyrocketed to 17.6%.

This, however, was in a small sample size; Bogaerts only had 50 plate appearances in the majors in 2013, and only 34 in the playoffs. In 2014, Bogaerts, got off to a very strong start. He didn’t hit for much power at the beginning of the year but he walked an awful lot and the power was slowly starting to creep up. Around the end of May, Bogaerts had close to a 400 OBP.

The wheels though fell off after that. Bogaerts simply stopped walking and hitting well. He basically struggled the rest of the year apart from September where he did show signs of improvement. Bogaerts’ failures though went almost side by side with his walk rate apart from the last month of the season where he did have a spike in BABIP. Below is a chart of Bogaerts’ walks per month displayed by Baseball Savant.

As you can see Bogaerts’ walks just took a huge dip after May. So what happened — why did Bogaerts just stop walking? Well there are a number of factors to consider here. First I think it’s important to look at how Bogaerts was pitched — did pitchers make a sudden adjustment? Below is a chart of hard, breaking, and off-speed pitches used against Bogaerts in 2014. Provided by Brooks Baseball.

What is primarily noticeable is that pitchers, as the year went on started throwing fewer hard pitches and more breaking pitches. This, however, only shows us that pitchers made an adjustment to Bogaerts it doesn’t show us the full story; it doesn’t show us how Bogaerts reacted to the adjustments the pitchers were making.

There are many factors that can indicate how a player reacts to pitching adjustments. We can look at his swing rate or his whiff rate but the question, which we are really trying to answer, is: did something change in the player’s approach? Below I think is the most accurate example of how Bogaerts changed his approach at the plate and why he started walking a lot less. It’s a chart provided by Brooks Baseball that examines a player’s aggressiveness and passiveness, essentially his plate approach on hard, breaking, and off-speed pitches.

As you can see Bogaerts early on in the year was a very patient hitter but as the season went on he became increasingly aggressive at the plate. In fact he didn’t just start getting more aggressive on one type of pitch, but rather in general. He went away from what made him successful on the outset and began his prolonged slump throughout the year. What can be rather alarming is that it wasn’t just a one or two-month spike in aggressiveness, but rather trend in increased aggressiveness throughout the year.

Xander Bogaerts is still a very young player — he’s going into his age 22 seasons and this breakdown by no means should be taken as a prediction for future failures. This is really just part of maturing as a young athlete, getting better and making adjustments. Bogaerts went through the highs and lows of a baseball season in 2014. While I don’t expect him to be a superstar next year, I do expect that we will see significant improvement in not just his stats but his approach at the plate. My advice to Bogaerts on this behalf would be to look back at what made him successful in the first two months of the 2014 season and try and replicate that. Don’t be so aggressive at the plate, just wait for your pitch and when you get it, put a good swing on it. This is of course an annoying cliché but I do think it applies in Bogaerts’ case.

Last week I looked at the AL, so it is time to talk about the Senior Circuit depth. After that I will discuss the limitations that I think exist in both my approach and Jeff’s, part of which could be a new form of MVP debates. What is depth?

Again, I started with a rough look at front line versus second for the teams:

I had to adjust my method of using the multiple of using front divided by second line a little bit to account for the Reds and Phillies who have negative second line projections by using absolute values.  The National League is structured in a more stars and scrubs way this year versus the American League where there are no teams that you point at and think they will be horrible.  In Philadelphia, Atlanta, and Arizona things are looking pretty grim on the front lines though I could argue that Atlanta has some upside relative to how much Steamer seems to hate their outfield and starting pitching.

This changed how my depth ranking compared to Jeff’s by making the Diamondbacks and Mets look pretty good depth-wise only due to a combination of okay backups mixed with pretty low overall front line WAR.  This is a limitation of the multiples I use as shrinking the numerator can make for a lower multiple if a bad team has a couple of decent bench players.  I will come back to the discussion of what is depth in a second.

Only one other team was ranked far away from Jeff, the Pirates, and they look a lot like the Yankees did in the AL.  In Pittsburgh, they have good players all over the front lines, but the team is going to depend on those guys a lot according to the projection.  Jeff is giving them credit for guys like Sean Rodriguez who could be capable fill-ins according to the projections, not a sentiment I necessarily disagree with and is something recommending the way he approached it.  So what is depth?

I think you can argue several different approached to depth.  Jeff is looking at total number of theoretically useful players, I am looking at a ratio of front line to second line performance to see how much the team is expected to lean on it’s front line, but I also think you could look at two approaches similar to these.  How many capable fill-ins and back-ups are there, Jeff’s number of players minus the number of starters in it would be a simple possible approach to look at how many holes are behind the first group.  Another would be total WAR drop from group 1 to 2 as a percent of front-line, or in other words how much worse is the second group in percent terms.  I could keep going as I have at least three other possibilities, but hopefully you get the point that depth is not a concrete concept just like what does valuable mean in MVP.

What I think might be the best statistical approach to this sort of problem is to have multiple independent people do what I and Jeff have already done and then aggregate the rankings.  Then our approaches can be biased by whatever version of depth we lean toward and let the problems with any given system of measurement be offset by the others.  This isn’t necessary to evaluate all teams, the Reds depth is bad period, but if you look at teams like the Yankees who I think are a little harder to project this year it could be useful.  Since I am a hobbyist who nearly no one knows or cares about, you can now disregard that pipe-dream, though I think over time a system like that would help in understanding how valuable depth is.

This might be a scary thought to consider if you’re a Red Sox fan or if you’re a member of the Red Sox front office. Most of us including myself perceive Buchholz to be a really good pitcher who just happened to have a terrible year in 2014, which he did. Buchholz last year finished with a 5.34 ERA, which was the worst ERA of his career. His peripherals were better — that being said they were not great — his FIP was 4.01 and his xFIP was 4.04. The problem is that I think the Red Sox are banking or hoping that Buchholz has a bounce back year in 2015 and finds the “Cy Young” caliber form he displayed in 2013.

Buchholz in 2013 posted a great ERA at 1.74, and his FIP was really good too at 2.78. The problem was that he just couldn’t stay healthy throughout the year only pitching 108 innings. This has been a chronic problem for Buchholz throughout his career. Buchholz has never pitched 200 innings in a season; the most he’s ever pitched was in 2012, where he threw 189.1 innings. The other problem is that Buchholz performance has always been very volatile, one year he has a good ERA and then the next he has a bad ERA.

So let’s take a look at Buchholz’s underlying numbers to try and get a better understanding of his erratic performance records. First let’s look at 2013, where he conceptually had the best year of his career. He as I’ve already mentioned posted a great ERA though in a limited sample size. His BABIP that year was also very low at .254. What, however, was most alarming was his left on base percentage (LOB%). His LOB% in 2013 was at 83.7%, which is extremely high. A normal or league average LOB% is normally around 72%, Buchholz that year was well above that and quite frankly unsustainably high. Then if we look at his HR/FB ratio, at 4.5%, it’s also at an unsustainable rate. If you combine these factors, the low innings pitched, the BABIP, the HR/FB, and the LOB% for Buchhotlz great 2013 ERA, it’s easy to see why he had such a low ERA and why that probably was just a fluke.

Now let’s look at his 2010 season, which was considered by most to be his breakout year. In 2010 as you might have guessed Buchholz had a great ERA at 2.33, which probably gave the impression that he had a great year. His FIP however was at 3.61, which is above average, but his xFIP was at 4.07. His BABIP and HR/FB were also at unsustainable rates that year. His BABIP was .261 and his HR/FB ratio was at 5.6% creating his low ERA.

Finally let’s take a look at his 2012 season, the year where he pitched the most innings of his career, 189.1. I think this is the year that best describes Buchholz’s true value and not the skewed value of his 2010, 2013, and 2014 seasons (If you’re wondering what about 2011? Well he only pitched 82.2 innings so I pretty much discounted that year from the analysis). In 2012, Buchholz finished with a 4.56 ERA, his FIP was 4.65, and his xFIP was 4.43. These are not good numbers, in fact they’re well below-average numbers. This is a scary scene especially if you’re the Red Sox and hoping that Buchholz will bounce back. The essential problem is that the only year where Buchholz’s ERA lined up perfectly with his peripherals, the numbers weren’t pretty. His LOB% granted was a little bit low at 69.7% but his BABIP was also low at .283.

This is not a welcoming sight. I’m not actually certain that Buchholz was ever that good of a pitcher or rather a top of the rotation starter. It for the most part seems that his good years or good ERAs were merely a product of low BABIPs and good luck. It’s also not like he’s ever been a pitcher with a high strikeout to walk rate. His career K/9 is at 6.88 and his BB/9 is at 3.33. His K/9 and BB/9 have also always remained around his career average, with not much fluctuation, so it’s not like he’s been trending upward in that regard. Who I really think got Buchholz’s value just about right is Steamer. In 2015 Steamer projects him to finish with a 4.19 ERA and a 4.06 FIP, which is right around where I think Buchholz true talent and value lies. For those who think Buchholz has the great potential of a top of the line starter, well I’m sorry but at this point I just don’t see it; I think he’s probably more of a mid to back of the rotation starter. A useful piece in the rotation but definitely not someone who you should count on.

The 15-team LABR Mixed Draft is the most exciting of the expert fantasy drafts each year. Amateur fantasy owners from all over the globe tune into the live spreadsheet broadcast and debate each one furiously on social media.

Most of these amateurs are looking for expert guidance to help them in their own draft. They see a player getting drafted well above their ADP and they often move the player up on their own personal big board.

I do not think this is the best way to approach and absorb the most information out of LABR. When one expert reaches on a pick, we have no idea if there is a consensus. It could have been just one expert making a stand on a player he himself feels strongly about, or there could have been several owners who felt the same way about that player. We just don’t know.

What we do know is that when certain players drop well below their public rankings, there is an agreement of pessimism. That is the information that could be significant for the rest us. Every owner in the league letting a player fall well below their ADP is the expert consensus we should be looking for.

Here’s a quick look at nine players who the experts are cool on.

Read the rest of this entry »

If you haven’t read Part I, you should consider doing so. For those who would prefer not to, this is a reminder of where these numbers came from:

Using FanGraphs’ terrific leaderboard tools, I found statistics for all players who played at each position in 2014. The following numbers apply only to the time spent at that position. Buster Posey, for example, accumulated 462 plate appearances at catcher, 128 at first base, and 9 at DH, so his plate appearances in those amounts are included for those positions in the table below.

For position players, I calculated WAR per 600 plate appearances. For starting pitchers, I used WAR per 150 innings pitched. For relievers, I used WAR per 50 innings pitched. Here is the table:

The table below shows a combination of all position players split into different age groups. The PA% column shows the percentage of plate appearances for each age group out of the total plate appearances for all hitters. As you can see, the 27 to 29 age range had the largest percentage of plate appearances and the “36 and up” group had the lowest. Similarly, the WAR% shows the percentage of total WAR accumulated by each age group. The column labeled “W%-PA%” shows the difference between the WAR% and the PA% columns. A positive difference is good. This means that age group was responsible for a higher percentage of WAR than their percentage of plate appearances.

POSITION PLAYER BREAKDOWN BY AGE

The meaty production for position players comes in the two age groups spanning ages 27 to 32. Players in this age range accounted for 51.1% of the total plate appearances and 57.6% of the total WAR. This age group didn’t hit as well as the “33 to 35” age group, but accumulated more WAR/600 PA, mainly due to the difference in the defensive component of WAR.

In news that should not surprise anyone, the “36 and up” age group was the worst, accumulating 4.4% of the total plate appearances but finished with -1.6 WAR with a wRC+ of 80.

Have you heard that on base percentage is an “older player’s skill”? Well, this table backs that up, as OBP increases for each age group from the “under 23” group up to the “33 to 35” group. That skill only lasts for so long, though, as offensive production plummets across-the-board in the “36 and up” age group.

STARTING PITCHER BREAKDOWN BY AGE

In the hitter’s breakdown by age, the two most productive age groups spanned the ages from 27 to 32. For starting pitchers, the two most productive age groups were from age 24 to 29, with the “27 to 29” group being the most productive. This “27 to 29” age group had the best ERA, WHIP, and K/9. For starting pitchers, the “36 and up” age group was actually better than the “33 to 35” group, although the sample size was small, including just 13 pitchers 36 and older.

Strikeouts are important for every pitcher and the above chart shows how strikeouts dwindle as a pitcher ages. The “27 to 29” group has a K/9 of 7.8. This drops to 7.4 K/9 for the “30 to 32” group, then to 6.6 K/9 for the “33 to 35” age group.

RELIEF PITCHER BREAKDOWN BY AGE

For relief pitchers, the bulk of the production is right there in the “27 to 29” age group. This group accounted for 31.5% of the relief pitcher innings and 40.9% of relief pitcher WAR. They also were tops among all groups in ERA, WHIP, and K/9. The next-oldest group of relievers (“30 to 32”) was the worst, accumulating 20.6% of the relief pitcher innings but just 11.1% of relief pitcher WAR. This looks like the age where strikeouts drop precipitously. Relief pitchers aged 27 to 29 averaged 8.8 K/9 as a group, while those in the “30 to 32” age group had just 8.1 K/9.

The information above is the big picture breakdown by age group for all hitters, starting pitchers, and relief pitchers. Part 3 of this series will show the age group breakdown for each position.

Set forth below is a description of a short-hand stat designed to measure how well a batter hits when he hits a fair ball.  I call it “Contact Quality” or “CQ.”

Obviously, BABIP is the most common measure of hitting balls-in-play.  But BABIP excludes home runs, and doesn’t otherwise distinguish between singles and extra-base hits.  One possible approach would be to compute slugging average on fair balls (“fair balls” refers balls-in-play plus home runs).  However, the weights used in slugging average do not accurately reflect the value of different types of base hits.

CQ uses the weights from wOBA, in a simplified fashion, before the adjustment to normalize the scale to OBP.  Rounding the weights, I assign 0.8 for a single, 1.1 for a double, 1.4 for a triple, and 1.7 for a home run.  Or, in other words, 0.5 for a hit and 0.3 per total base.

So, the formula is:  (0.5*H+0.3*TB)/(AB-K)

Interestingly, the average CQ in 2014 was .312, as compared to an average OBP of .314.

CQ is intended to be a simple stat that, together with K% and BB%, gives a pretty good profile of any batter.

If a batter’s CQ is above .400, he is considered a member of Mensa (contact quality division).  In 2014, among qualified batters, the following were Mensa members:

1. Giancarlo Stanton (.453)
2. Mike Trout (.450)
3. Jose Abreu (.435)
4. Chris Carter (.407)
5. Justin Upton (.405)
6. Andrew McCutchen (.404)
7. Matt Kemp (.403)

Rounding out the top 10:

8. Miguel Cabrera (.388)
9. Anthony Rizzo (.387)
10. Marlon Byrd (.386)

What better to do in the middle of winter when there are still a couple weeks until pitchers and catchers report than to look at WAR. In particular, I was curious about WAR in 2014. What positions had the most WAR? What age group? How did younger pitchers compare to older pitchers? So many WAR questions…

I started with the breakdown of WAR by position.

Using FanGraphs’ terrific leaderboard tools, I found statistics for all players who played at each position in 2014. The following numbers apply only to the time spent at that position. Buster Posey, for example, accumulated 462 plate appearances at catcher, 128 at first base, and 9 at DH, so his plate appearances in those amounts are included for those positions in the table below.

For position players, I calculated WAR per 600 plate appearances. For starting pitchers, I used WAR per 150 innings pitched. For relievers, I used WAR per 50 innings pitched. Here is the table:

HITTERS

PITCHERS

Some things that stand out for me are listed below. These aren’t earth-shattering insights, but interesting nonetheless:

• You can see the influence of the positional adjustment and defensive value by comparing some positions. For example, left fielders and center fielders had similar offensive numbers in 2014 (LF: .321 wOBA, 104 wRC+; CF: .319 wOBA, 103 wRC+), yet there was a 1.0 difference in WAR/600 PA.
• The three weakest-hitting spots—catcher, second base, and shortstop—make up for it with their defensive chops and the defensive adjustment.
• Players at first base had the best hitting numbers (.332 wOBA, 112 wRC+) but the lowest WAR total among all position players (DH not included).
• Players in the Designated Hitter spot accounted for just 8.4 WAR and three players accounted for 8.8 WAR (the rest accumulated negative WAR): Victor Martinez (3.9 WAR), David Ortiz (2.7 WAR), and Chris Carter (2.2 WAR).
• Starting pitchers had a better ERA than relievers (3.82 to 3.58), which isn’t surprising, but relievers had a higher WHIP (1.28 to 1.27), which did surprise me. Relievers struck out more batters (8.5 K/9 to 7.4 K/9) but also walked more (3.3 BB/9 to 2.7 BB/9).

NEVER TRUST ANYONE OVER 30

The following tables show the breakdown for all hitters, starting pitchers, and relief pitchers by age; specifically, the group of players aged 29 and younger compared to the “30 and over” group.

Not surprisingly, players 29 and under were better than players 30 and over and this was true for hitters and pitchers. There was a big difference in the magnitude, though. For hitters, the difference was about 0.3 WAR/600 PA. This is true even though the older group of hitters had a better wRC+. Defense matters.

For starting pitchers, the difference was 0.6 WAR/150 IP, with starting pitchers 29 and under accumulating 65.3% of the innings pitched by starting pitchers and 72.2% of starting pitcher WAR. Starting pitchers 29 and younger had a K/9 of 7.5, while those 30 and older saw their K/9 drop to 7.0.

Relief pitchers showed the greatest difference between the two age groups in WAR% – IP%, with the younger group finishing at +10.0% (65.3% of the innings pitched, 75.2% of the WAR). There was a big difference in strikeout rate for the two groups, with the younger relief pitchers getting more strikeouts (8.7 K/9 to 8.0 K/9).

POSITION BREAKDOWN BY AGE (29 AND UNDER vs. 30 AND OVER).

Young catchers had 0.3 more WAR/600 PA than older catchers. On the offensive side, young catchers outslugged older catchers (.394 to .360) but had a lower OBP (.308 to .311).

Best catcher 29 and under: Jonathan Lucroy, 28 (6.3 WAR)

Best catcher 30 and older: Russell Martin, 31 (5.4 WAR)

Dishonorable Mention: Jose Molina, 39 (-1.3 WAR)

First base had a near 50-50 split in plate appearances for players 29 and under and 30 and over, but the younger players were 0.5 WAR/600 PA better.

Best first baseman 29 and under: Anthony Rizzo, 24 (5.6 WAR)

Best first baseman 30 and older: Miguel Cabrera, 31 (4.9 WAR)

Dishonorable Mention: Jon Singleton, 22 (-1.1 WAR)

Second base was one of four positions (DH included) at which players 30 and over had more WAR/600 PA than the younger group.

Best second baseman 29 and under: Jose Altuve, 24 (5.0 WAR)

Best second baseman 30 and older: Ian Kinsler, 32 (5.5 WAR)

Dishonorable Mention: Stephen Drew, 31 (-1.0 WAR)

Third base had the biggest discrepancy between players 29 and under and 30 and over when it comes to WAR/600 PA, with a difference of 1.2 WAR/600 PA in favor of the older group, even as the younger group had almost three times as many plate appearances.

Best third baseman 29 and under: Josh Donaldson, 28 (6.5 WAR)

Best third baseman 30 and older: Adrian Beltre, 35 (5.7 WAR)

Dishonorable Mention: Matt Dominguez, 24 (-1.7 WAR)

Shortstop was another position at which players 30 and over had more WAR/600 PA, thanks in part to a better hitting line across the board.

Best shortstop 29 and under: Troy Tulowitzki, 28 (5.2 WAR)

Best shortstop 30 and older: Jhonny Peralta, 32 (5.3 WAR)

Dishonorable Mention: Josh Rutledge, 25 (-0.8 WAR)

You can see how youth plays a role in the different outfield positions by observing the plate appearance percentage for each position. In left field, the split is roughly 60-40 in favor of players 29 and under. In centerfield, where speed is more important, 77% of the plate appearances were given to player 29 and under. In right field, it was much closer to 50-50. All three outfield positions saw more WAR/600 PA from the younger group of players in 2014.

Best left fielder 29 and under: Michael Brantley, 27 (4.5 WAR)

Best left fielder 30 and older: Alex Gordon, 30 (6.6 WAR)

Dishonorable Mention: Domonic Brown, 26 (-1.6 WAR)

Best center fielder 29 and under: Mike Trout, 22 (7.5 WAR)

Best center fielder 30 and older: Jacoby Ellsbury, 30 (3.9 WAR)

Dishonorable Mention: Junior Lake, 24 (-2.5 WAR)

Best right fielder 29 and under: Giancarlo Stanton, 24 (6.2 WAR)

Best right fielder 30 and older: Jose Bautista, 33 (6.1 WAR)

Dishonorable Mention: Oscar Taveras, 22 (-1.2 WAR)

The DH spot is an older player’s spot, with 63% of the plate appearances at DH given to players 30 and over. This group accounted for 89% of the DH WAR, with a higher batting average, on-base percentage, and slugging percentage.

Best DH 29 and under: Chris Carter, 27 (2.2 WAR)

Best DH 30 and older: Victor Martinez, 35 (3.9 WAR)

Dishonorable Mention: Kendrys Morales, 31 (-1.5 WAR)

Pitchers are just terrible hitters, old and young, fat and skinny, tall and short. They stink at hitting. Older pitchers are a little more stinky at hitting than younger pitchers.

Best Pitcher (hitting) 29 and under: Travis Wood, 27 (1.0 WAR)

Best Pitcher (hitting) 30 and older: Madison Bumgarner, 30 (1.2 WAR)

Dishonorable Mention: Bartolo Colon, 41 (-0.7 WAR) Colon was 2 for 62 with 0 walks and 33 strikeouts. Somehow, he managed to score 3 runs. That’s kind of mind-boggling, really.

This might surprise some people. When I think of pinch-hitters, I picture the aging veteran who calmly comes off the bench to deliver a big hit, like Manny Mota in the 70s or Rusty Staub in the 80s or Matt Stairs in the 00s. Last year, though, pinch-hitting was a younger man’s game. Players 29 and under had 59% of the pinch-hitting plate appearances and a slightly better triple-slash batting line.

Best Pinch-Hitter 29 and under: Delmon Young 28 (0.6 WAR)

Best Pinch-Hitter 30 and older: John Mayberry, 30 (0.8 WAR)

Dishonorable Mention: Greg Dobbs, 35 (-0.5 WAR)

That’s probably enough for now. More likely, it’s way too much. Either way, if you notice anything interesting about these numbers, please make your observations known in the comments. Next up is a more involved breakdown of WAR by age group for hitters and pitchers.

In “Hardball Retrospective: Evaluating Scouting and Development Outcomes for the Modern-Era Franchises”, I placed every ballplayer in the modern era (from 1901-present) on their original team. Consequently, Dave Winfield is listed on the Padres roster for the duration of his career while the Athletics claim Rickey Henderson and the Twins declare Rod Carew. I calculated revised standings for every season based entirely on the performance of each team’s “original” players. I discuss every team’s “original” players and seasons at length along with organizational performance with respect to the Amateur Draft (or First-Year Player Draft), amateur free agent signings and other methods of player acquisition. Season standings, WAR and Win Shares totals for the “original” teams are compared against the “actual” team results to assess each franchise’s scouting, development and general management skills.

Expanding on my research for the book, the following series of articles will reveal the finest single-season rosters for every Major League organization based on overall rankings in OWAR and OWS along with the general managers and scouting directors that constructed the teams. “Hardball Retrospective” is available in digital form on Amazon, Barnes and Noble, GooglePlay and KoboBooks – other eBook formats coming soon. Additional information and a discussion forum are available at TuataraSoftware.com.

Terminology

OWAR – Wins Above Replacement for players on “original” teams

OWS – Win Shares for players on “original” teams

OPW% – Pythagorean Won-Loss record for the “original” teams

Assessment

The 2013 Arizona Diamondbacks    OWAR: 37.3  OWS: 274  OPW%: .542

Josh Byrnes and Joe Garagiola, Jr. procured all but one of the ballplayers on the best “Original” Diamondbacks roster in team history – the 2013 crew. Thirty-nine of the 50 players entered the organization via the Amateur Draft with the remaining 11 signed as amateur free agents. Byrnes’ selections focused on the pitching staff while Garagiola placed a distinct emphasis on offense. Based on the revised standings the “Original” 2013 Diamondbacks secured the National League West division title with an 88-74 record .

Max Scherzer (21-3, 2.90) anchored the starting staff and earned the Cy Young Award with a dazzling campaign. Arizona’s first selection in the 2006 Amateur Draft fashioned a League-best WHIP of 0.970, whiffed 240 batsmen in 214.1 innings pitched and merited his first All-Star appearance. Portsider Jorge De La Rosa compiled a 16-6 record along with an ERA of 3.49. Fellow left-hander Wade Miley (10-10, 3.55) eclipsed 200 innings pitched in his sophomore season after placing runner-up in the 2012 NL ROY balloting. Jarrod Parker (12-8, 3.97) yielded admirable results from the fourth slot in the rotation. The D-Backs bullpen featured a capable collection of late-inning relievers, none of which assumed the reins of the closer’s role.

Paul Goldschmidt (.302/36/125) finished second in the 2013 NL MVP voting. Arizona’s eighth-round pick in the 2009 Amateur Draft topped the Senior Circuit in home runs, RBI and SLG (.551). Justin Upton jacked 27 long balls while outfield mate Carlos Gonzalez swatted 26 big-flies. Dan Uggla contributed 22 taters but struggled mightily at the dish, batting a mere .179 while striking out in nearly 40 percent of his at-bats. Miguel Montero experienced an off-year and Carlos Quentin endured an injury-plagued season for the second straight campaign. Stephen Drew tied a career-high with 67 RBI while A.J. Pollock laced 28 two-base knocks in his first full season. Gerardo Parra collected his second Gold Glove and supplied some pop as the fourth outfielder.

The “Original” 2013 Arizona Diamondbacks roster

Honorable Mention

The “Original” 2006 Diamondbacks    OWAR: 40.4  OWS: 213  OPW%: .523

Brandon Webb (16-8, 3.10) achieved Cy Young honors as Arizona attained its first National League Wild Card berth.

On Deck

The “Original” 1922 Browns

Previous Articles

The “Original” 2003 Marlins

References and Resources

Baseball America – Executive Database

Baseball-Reference

James, Bill, with Jim Henzler. Win Shares. Morton Grove, Ill.: STATS, 2002. Print.

Retrosheet – Transactions Database

Seamheads – Baseball Gauge

Sean Lahman Baseball Archive