June is here and summer has been kicked into full swing. And of course you can’t have summer without baseball and with about a third of the season gone, we now have an idea of how the year is shaping up. There have been some surprises — at the beginning of the year many were wondering if Bryce Harper would regress even more, and of course they’re not talking about that now. Many had A-Rod not producing at all but so far this year, he’s returned to A-Rod form. We have rookie sensations who are delivering right away in Joc Pederson and Kris Bryant but there’s another rookie who has put up great numbers but hasn’t seen the same hype or support from analyst and in ways, even his team, that the others have. I’m talking about Alex Guerrero of the Los Angeles Dodgers of course. Technically a rookie with clause in his contract that keeps him from being sent to the minors, at the beginning of the year some thought it would hurt the Dodgers to have Guerrero on the roster but so far he’s been an offensive surprise (and for not playing third base or the outfield much, defensively he’s done better then let’s say former Dodger, Hanley Ramirez.) So what I want to know is, where’s the love for Alex Guerrero?

After filling in at third for an injured Juan Uribe, Guerrero quickly impressed with his bat going 4-10 with one homer and six RBI. Once Uribe came back however, Guerrero was relocated to do what some consider to be one of the hardest things to do it in sports, pinch-hit. It didn’t seem to stop Guerrero who continued to hit, going 3-5 in a five-game stretch, hitting two homers with five RBI. It was easy to understand everyone’s apprehension when Guerrero came out hitting this way. He was operating at a Superman-like pace and the logical thought would be he’d eventually come back down to earth, so neither analysts nor even the Dodgers themselves fully committed to Guerrero. The Dodgers also had a clubhouse favorite and adequate third baseman in Uribe, a full outfield and a deep bench; it seemed like there was no place for Guerrero in the starting lineup. So as April turned to May, Guerrero would find himself jumping all around the left side of the field, playing third, left field, and of course, pinch-hitting. It still didn’t seem to stop Guerrero. From April 23-May 13, when Carl Crawford went on the DL, he hit .310 with three homers. He did have, as many predicted, a drop-off in production, but still put up numbers that warranted playing time and with the injury to Crawford, it seemed like he would have just that.

Guerrero is a swinger. It’s hard to say he’s a free swinger because he seems to have a pretty good understanding of the strike zone. He doesn’t walk much or steal bases and in the baseball world that generally doesn’t result in runs scored. But I’d look at where he’s batting in the Dodgers lineup to explain some of his less appealing numbers. In 2015 he’s batted fifth six times with Ethier, Heisley, Grandal and Van Slyke batting behind him. He’s batted sixth eight times, seventh eight times, eighth six times, and pinch-hit nine times. He’s never started in the top part of the order.

That seems odd for a guy who has put up the offensive numbers Guerrero has. Joe Maddon has made waves this season batting his pitchers eighth. One of his reasons is to get the nine-hole hitter better pitches to see in order to get on base and turn the lineup over to their best hitters. I’m not suggested the Dodgers bat their pitchers eighth but I do think Guerrero would benefit from having the production of someone like Adrian Gonzalez behind him. Forcing pitchers to challenge Guerrero in the strike zone in order to hopefully keep him off base and minimize any damage Gonzalez may inflict. Guerrero is definitely susceptible to the slider off the plate but I wonder if he would see less of those if he were batting third?

And although Guerrero swings a lot, 60.3% of the time to be exact, he’s also got a contact percentage of 77.9% better then Josh Donaldson, Paul Goldschmidt and Joc Pederson. And when Guerrero does make contact, he is generally hitting the ball hard, with an ISO of .371, second only to Bryce Harper. Guerrero is averaging a home run every 10.8 at bats. The Dodgers lead the majors with 23.7 at bats per home run but they’re also second in the league with 21 solo home runs — Guerrero has hit three of them. It’s obvious the Dodgers have a good offense but I wonder if it’s as productive as it could be and I wonder if Guerrero can play a bigger role?

Another reason for apprehension with Guerrero is the sample size we have. Guerrero didn’t put up these numbers in the minors and many didn’t expect him to contribute the way that he has in the show. All that leads to doubt from the outside. Guerrero has about 100 fewer at bats that the top hitters in the league. That being said however, it’s interesting to note how similar they are anyway. When added to the top hitters in the league, Guerrero is fifth in wOBA, third in SLG and as I mentioned before second in ISO.

With the rate that Guerrero is on, if he gets another 300 at bats would be 37 HR/ 59 R/ 93 RBI. If he got another 400 at bats it would be, 46 HR/ 74 R/ 116 RBI. As realistic or unrealistic as the projections may be, Guerrero even with a regression can put up solid major-league numbers. Would anyone say no to 25 homers and 80 RBI? I think the answer to the season-ending stats lie in how the Dodgers choose to handle the situation. They’ve already dealt Uribe to free up third base and with Crawford being moved to the 60-day DL, it looks like left field is Guerrero’s for the summer. But Yasiel Puig is coming back soon and Ethier has been playing better then expected this year, so is Mattingly going to platoon Ethier and Guerrero in left?

In many ways this is a great problem to have for the Dodgers — they’re a veteran team that wants to win now and having a versatile bench helps shift people around and keep everyone healthy. That being said, this is baseball and with the trade deadline less then two months away and the Dodgers with a beat-up starting rotation, who’s to say some of that offensive depth can’t be flipped for some pitching help? The question then becomes, who gets traded? But that’s a topic for another day. Until then we’ll just have to hope Mattingly and the Dodgers give Guerrero a chance in the top part of the order.

The struggles of Robinson Cano in 2015 have been talked about frequently, especially as the Mariners’ struggles continue. Recently, Mariners hitting coach Howard Johnson suggested that Cano is pressing at the plate. Cano disagreed with the assessment, but the numbers back up Johnson.

The good news is that when Robinson Cano is making contact, it’s been pretty good. Cano is hitting the ball harder than he has over his career. His hard hit percentage is 35.2%, compared to his career 32.9% mark.  The 24.4% of line drives on batted balls would be the third highest mark of his career, exceeding his 21.4% career average.

The bad news is where Cano is hitting the ball.  Cano is hitting out of character. In particular, Cano has had some difficulty, or aversion, to hitting the ball to the opposite field. The chart below shows Cano’s 2015 batted-ball locations and his career batted-ball locations.

This is a big issue because he is muting his best hitting ability. Cano is a .369 hitter when hitting the ball to the opposite field. Last year he hit .417 when going the opposite way; in 2013 he hit .455. This year he is hitting .303, but he is not giving himself the opportunities to take advantage of the success that has been consistent throughout his career and stellar in his most recent seasons.

The impact of this shift can be displayed by taking Cano’s 174 plate appearances in which he has not walked or struck out, and allocating the results of where the ball is hit by his career average Pull%, Center%, and Oppo%. I then applied his career batting averages for the batted ball location to those figures.

The following would be the resulting average on batted balls, batting average, and on-base percentage based upon Cano’s 40 strikeouts and 12 walks:

These numbers are good, but they are still not remarkable, and they don’t look like the numbers we would expect from Cano.

This leads to Cano’s second issue: increased strikeouts. Cano’s 17.5% strikeout rate is well above his career average of 11.2%.

The Baseball Info Solutions Plate Discipline data shows two figures that stand out. (1) Cano’s Contact% is down 3.9% from his career average and (2) Cano is seeing 5.4% more first-pitch strikes than he has over his career.

Lets start with the second figure. This is nothing Cano has control over and the cause is almost certain to be the presence of Nelson Cruz behind him in the lineup. But how can Cano adjust to this? He’s a batter that’s used to being pitched carefully, particularly last year, when he was a hitting oasis in the desert that was the Mariners’ lineup.

The first figure, Cano’s drop in Contact%, may be tied back to where this article started and the point mentioned above: hitting approach and batting count. Cano has performed pitifully when facing sliders and changeups this year, two pitches he has handled well over his career (see the chart below displaying Baseball Info Solution’s runs above average/100 pitches for each pitch type Cano has faced). This makes sense if he is seeing pitches behind in the count, and if he is aggressively seeking to pull the ball, for additional power; to be worth $24 million a year, or whatever reason that may be causing the change in hitting approach.

Howard Johnson is probably right. Robinson Cano is pressing. Cano needs to approach at-bats like he has his whole career and he’ll see a return to what we would expect from Robinson Cano. However, the Mariners can make it easier on him by changing up the order. Maybe Cano isn’t a hitter that thrives on being pitched to. It may benefit the Mariners to swap Cruz and Cano in the order. While Cruz has been great, the Mariners and Cano have been the opposite. A change couldn’t hurt.

But first, Robinson Cano needs to accept the hitter he is, because that hitter is very good.

In “Hardball Retrospective: Evaluating Scouting and Development Outcomes for the Modern-Era Franchises”, I placed every ballplayer in the modern era (from 1901-present) on their original team. Therefore, Jim Edmonds is listed on the Angels roster for the duration of his career while the Astros declare Rusty Staub and the Athletics claim Lefty Grove. I calculated revised standings for every season based entirely on the performance of each team’s “original” players. I discuss every team’s “original” players and seasons at length along with organizational performance with respect to the Amateur Draft (or First-Year Player Draft), amateur free agent signings and other methods of player acquisition.  Season standings, WAR and Win Shares totals for the “original” teams are compared against the “actual” team results to assess each franchise’s scouting, development and general management skills.

Expanding on my research for the book, the following series of articles will reveal the finest single-season rosters for every Major League organization based on overall rankings in OWAR and OWS along with the general managers and scouting directors that constructed the teams. “Hardball Retrospective” is available in digital format on Amazon, Barnes and Noble, GooglePlay, iTunes and KoboBooks. The paperback edition is available on Amazon, Barnes and Noble and CreateSpace. Additional information and a discussion forum are offered at TuataraSoftware.com.

Don Daglow (Intellivision World Series Major League Baseball, Earl Weaver Baseball, Tony LaRussa Baseball) contributed the foreword for Hardball Retrospective. The foreword and preview of my book are accessible here.

Terminology

OWAR – Wins Above Replacement for players on “original” teams

OWS – Win Shares for players on “original” teams

OPW% – Pythagorean Won-Loss record for the “original” teams

Assessment

The 2002 Toronto Blue Jays         OWAR: 51.4     OWS: 312     OPW%: .572

GM Pat Gillick acquired 65% (35/54) of the ballplayers on the 2002 Blue Jays roster. 43 team members were drafted by the club. Based on the revised standings the “Original” 2002 Blue Jays captured the American League Eastern Division title by nine games over the New York Yankees and topped the Junior Circuit in OWAR and OWS.

The middle of the Blue Jays’ batting order was stacked. Shawn Green (.285/42/114) scored 110 runs and placed fifth in the MVP balloting. Jeff Kent (.313/37/108) laced 42 doubles and recorded a career-best in home runs. Carlos Delgado tallied 103 runs scored and blasted 33 round-trippers in the midst of a ten-year streak with at least 30 home runs per season (1997-2006). John Olerud (.300/22/102) rapped 39 two-base knocks and garnered his second Gold Glove Award. Shannon Stewart contributed a .303 BA and registered 103 tallies from the leadoff spot. Alex S. Gonzalez slashed 27 doubles and clubbed 18 circuit clouts while fellow shortstop Chris Woodward batted .276 with 13 dingers. Vernon Wells produced a .275 BA with 23 four-baggers and 100 ribbies.

Kent placed 48^th at the keystone position in “The New Bill James Historical Baseball Abstract” and Olerud ranked 53^rd among first sackers.

Roy “Doc” Halladay (19-7, 2.93) led the American League with 239.1 innings pitched and merited the first of eight All-Star invitations. David “Boomer” Wells equaled Halladay’s win-loss record. Billy Koch amassed 11 victories and saved 44 contests while Jose Mesa closed out 45 games with a 2.97 ERA. Steve Karsay (3.26, 12 SV) and Ben Weber (2.54, 7 SV) provided solid relief in the late innings.

 The “Original” 2002 Toronto Blue Jays roster

Honorable Mention

The “Original” 2001 Blue Jays           OWAR: 51.5     OWS: 297     OPW%: .547

Toronto outpaced Boston to claim the A.L. East by a four-game margin. Shawn Green dialed long distance 49 times and plated 125 baserunners. John Olerud (.302/21/95) earned his second All-Star nod. Carlos Delgado launched 39 moon-shots and Jeff Kent drilled a career-high 49 two-baggers.

On Deck

The “Original” 1953 Braves

References and Resources

Baseball America – Executive Database

Baseball-Reference

James, Bill. The New Bill James Historical Baseball Abstract. New York, NY.: The Free Press, 2001. Print.

James, Bill, with Jim Henzler. Win Shares. Morton Grove, Ill.: STATS, 2002. Print.

Retrosheet – Transactions Database

Seamheads – Baseball Gauge

Sean Lahman Baseball Archive

I’ve been thinking about this one a lot, and I think people in general still view Price as a top-10 pitcher. I’ve seen him appearing in expert lists as such, and that’s the general vibe I’ve gotten from the fantasy community. I just think top-10 at this point is too high, especially when we’ve got such talented young stars ranked below him, both according to the expert lists and public perception (I’m talking about guys like Archer, deGrom, and Cole).

I’d actually have him closer to top 20-25 at this point (there are so many great pitchers). His K/9 has plummeted to 7.6 and K-BB% has fallen nearly nine percentage points to 14.3%.

At 14.3%, David Price is the No. 39 pitcher in the league in K-BB%.

Am I putting too much stock into a small sample, or has the decline begun, but people haven’t realized it yet (he still sports a solid 3.15 ERA)?

His peripherals also support his regression, as his xFIP is 3.94 and SIERA is 3.87.

Encouraging signs: FIP still has him at 3.27. Swinging strikes are similar to last year at 10.4% (only 0.2% difference). No velocity loss — in fact, his fastball is faster this year than last year.

Over his career, however, Price has been only slightly better than average at giving up/suppressing home runs, so I think xFIP and SIERA are the better ERA estimators than FIP. League average HR/FB is 10.8%, and Price was at 9.7% last year, 8.6% in 2013, 10.5% in 2012. So he may be slightly better than average, but unlikely to maintain 6.6% going forward.

It’s also worth noting that last year’s 9.8 K/9 was a career high. In 2013, he had a 7.3 K/9. From 2010-2012 his K/9 hovered in the 8s (and in 2008 and 2009 his K/9 was also sub-8, although I don’t give any weight to that at all as he was still developing as a pitcher). It could be that his high K/9 last year was an aberration.

I’m choosing to give weight to his current K-rate and peripherals (the sample size is now significant), while accounting for some improvement (this is David Price after all). Doing that, by my rough calculations, I’m looking at about a 3.5+ ERA ~8 K/9 pitcher going forwards.

Those are quality numbers, but not top-10 numbers, which is where people still value him. I’d flip Price for any top-20 pitcher with upside in an instant.

I don’t have an answer as to why the K-rate has plummeted so far. I did take a look at his usages, and he seems to have reduced the usage of his two-seam fastball. His entire career, that has been his most-used pitch. Last year he used it 40%. This year, he’s only throwing it 23% of the time, instead favoring a four-seam fastball as his dominant pitch. I believe this *may* be related to his K-rate drop, but it’s just an observation at this point. Regardless, we’ve reached the point in the season where it might be wise to be proactive.

A lot has been made of the Red Sox inability to win games after they spent $245 million this offseason on a bunch of hitters and middle-of-the-rotation starters. The Red Sox were unable to sign Jon Lester, and they made almost no effort to replace him in the rotation. Things have come to a front after Koji Uehara blew a save on Sunday to end a six-loss road trip at the hands of the Twins and Rangers.

With no defined ace in the squad, the Red Sox starting pitching has come under fire. In fact only the Blue Jays have a worse team ERA in the AL.[1] The pitcher from the Red Sox opening day roster with the lowest ERA is Clay Buchholz at an unsavory 4.33 and Justin Masterson’s is the worst at 6.37. The Sox won’t even sniff the playoffs if they don’t sort out their pitching situation, but I think the Red Sox starting pitchers have come under an unfair amount of criticism.

The Red Sox starting pitchers have had some horrendous outings, but despite their heinous ERAs the Sox starters have managed to put together 24 quality starts, a mark equal to the average in the AL and just one below the MLB average. Obviously quality starts are not a perfect metric for starting pitching, but considering the pre-season expectations for the Sox starting pitchers, being league average in keeping the team in the game (the basic idea behind quality starts) is not so bad.

In games where the Red Sox starter throws a quality start, the Sox are 14-10 (58%). Based on stats from all the quality starts from 1947-2006 the average team wins quality starts 67% of the time. At the current rate, the Red Sox will win 44/76 games in which their starters throw quality starts, seven games worse than they would if they won quality starts at the league average. In the worst AL East in recent memory, seven wins could make the difference for a Red Sox team that has struggled in the first third of the season.

What remains to be seen is if the bullpen or the batting lineup lets the starters down. The Red Sox bullpen has pitched 49 innings in games and the guys out of the pen have shone in those moments. The Red Sox bullpen has a 2.39 ERA and 1.04 WHIP in those games.[2] That compares favorably to the league averages out of the bullpen of 3.52 ERA and 1.27 WHIP. Koji Uehara has blown saves in a couple of these games, most recently on Sunday, but on the whole the bullpen pitchers have done very well protecting their starters’ quality starts.

The Red Sox were banking on being above average in their ability to carry their pitchers, but when their pitchers put them in a chance to win, they perform worse than the league average. In their 24 quality starts the Red Sox have averaged 3.75 runs per game. That’s close to the MLB average 4.14 runs per game, but not quite cracking the average is embarrassing for a lineup that was supposed to carry the team.

What’s more, the runs-per-game mark is buoyed by four outings of 8 runs or more (8, 8, 8, 9). If you exclude those four games, the Red Sox average only 2.75 runs per game, simply unacceptable for a team with playoff aspirations. In Red Sox quality starts, Red Sox batters have a weak 0.254/0.322/0.386 triple slash[3] and 0.249 batting average with RISP. Again this compares poorly with the MLB averages: 0.251/0.314/0.395 triple slash and 0.257 average with RISP.

Before the season ZiPS projected[4] the Red Sox batters would have a 0.265/0.333/0.407 triple slash. Until the Red Sox begin to bring their collective triple slash up to that level, particularly in games which their starters put together quality starts, they will continue to flounder at the bottom of the AL East. Paul Sporer and Eno Sarris pointed out the Red Sox failures at the plate in the May 28 episode of The Sleeper and the Bust. As the season goes on, analysts should follow their lead and consider the failures of the Red Sox batting order in addition to criticizing the low-hanging fruit that is the Red Sox starting rotation.

[1] All stats from ESPN unless otherwise noted. All stats are as of 6/1/15.

[2] As far as I could find there was no data complied on the Red Sox stats during quality starts so I compiled the statistics myself here.

[3] While this is bad, the Red Sox actually hit better in quality starts than on average – their triple slash for the season is 0.241/0.315/0.369. If I were arguing that the Red Sox are in last place because of their offense’s inability to perform in the same games that their pitchers do well, this stat would ruin my argument. However, since I am just using the stats in games when pitchers do well to highlight the fact that the pitchers get too much of the criticism, I feel that my argument is not undermined.

[4] I aggregated the zips projections of every players zips projected to get more than 25 at bats for this stat.

Imagine a batter hits a long fly ball that’s destined for the right-field seats only for the outfielder on the other team to clear the wall and rob him of his home run. In traditional stat sheets, this is treated the same way as any other out and there’s no real way of distinguishing that from a dribbler down the third-base line. But intuitively we know that these are two very different things, and a batter who does more of the first is going to end up being more valuable than one who does more of the second. Thus, if we wanted to truly measure how well a player has performed, we need to separate the performance from the results. The best way of doing that is to break down a batted ball in the most granular way possible and look at the average performance for similar batted balls, and today I’ll reveal a personal tool to do this. This work was inspired by Tony Blengino’s terrific posts on batted-ball data, and I suggest reading his introductory post as background on the theory and methodology that I employ.

This tool uses information on the type, velocity, direction, and distance of a hitter’s batted balls to calculate an expected AVG, OBP, and SLG for him. It divides batted balls into buckets based on the type (GB, FB, LD, PU) and either the direction and velocity or the direction and the distance and calculates the resulting AVG and SLG for all batted balls that meet that criteria. It then goes through all of a batter’s plate appearances and uses these data to calculate both the observed and expected AVG/OBP/SLG for each PA. The table below shows the top 30 hitters by Expected wOBA (xwOBA) as of 5/26/2015.

The tool uses the velocity and direction, rather than the distance and direction, of a batted ball to calculate the expected values with a few exceptions. If the velocity is not available for a fly ball or a line drive, it uses the distance and the direction of the batted ball to calculate the expected values. If the velocity of the batted ball is not available for a ground ball, the tool assumes it was of average velocity and only considers the direction it was hit when calculating the expected values. It does not consider distance for ground balls, as the distances are calculated using where the ball was fielded, so using distance would be describing what actually happened rather than what we expected to happen. For all line drives and fly balls hit over 375 feet it uses distance and direction rather than velocity and direction. The reason for this is that I do not have information on the hang time of batted balls, and in going through the data I found that fly balls and line drives that traveled over 375 feet but weren’t hit very hard were being severely underrated by the tool. As an example of the underlying data, the table below shows the reference data for fly balls hit to center field.

I’m providing a link to a Google Sheets document with a leaderboard for all qualified batters, along with leaderboards broken down by each batted ball type. The document also contains a reference page that contains all the information for how batted balls performed in each bucket based on 2015 StatCast data for velocity references and 2014-2015 MLBAM data for distance references. The numbers in the reference page will continue to be updated as more data becomes available from StatCast. Feel free to look through this section and point out any inconsistencies you may see, and note that all data comes from BaseballSavant.

I’ve also provided a Methodology Example in the document so you can dig through what the behind the scenes data looks like as it’s being processed. Note that you may see some discrepancies in a player’s actual AVG seen here and his AVG seen elsewhere, as I treat sac flies as regular outs. The “Notes” tab gives a general outline of the procedure, and also contains a link to an Excel sheet that you can download to perform these calculations on your own.

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1-XohbJlWIceDS2Rc8_7-rOxv9avU3IwMCecPkUNxlYU/edit?usp=sharing

Before I wrap up, I should also mention the limitations. It’s been noted elsewhere on FanGraphs that the StatCast data isn’t always completely accurate. Also, the tool currently doesn’t incorporate a player’s speed in any way, so guys like Dee Gordon are going to be fairly underrated in terms of their ground ball performance. I’ve been brainstorming ways to incorporate this and am open to any input you may have. Furthermore, I’ve noticed the tool can be pretty stingy with labeling balls as pop-ups and occasionally pretty generous with labeling them as line drives. I’ve noticed some fly balls with velocities over 95 MPH that only traveled 300 feet, indicating they were hit almost straight up in the air. Unfortunately, without data on the vertical angle of the ball off the bat or on the hang time of the ball in play, it will be difficult to fix this issue.

Even with these limitations, the tool works extremely well at determining how well guys have been hitting the ball and identifying who has been helped or hurt by factors beyond their control. Take the time to dig through the data and the code and point out areas for improvement, and I’ll incorporate them in future versions.

Joc Pederson: your leading runner for rookie of the year. Pederson started off at the beginning of the year in the bottom half of the order and was mashing the ball with authority. Don Mattingly had us all scratching our heads when he refused to bat Joc Pederson first in favor of the aging Jimmy Rollins. But after tremendous production from Pederson and lack thereof from Rollins, Mattingly finally made the switch.

Batting mostly from the bottom of the order in March and April, Pederson walked at an ungodly 22.1% and batted his way to an inflated .406 BABIP en route to a .440 wOBA. His strikeout sat at an ugly 28.6% but with his walk rate also in the 20’s, it balanced out nicely.

Upon his move to the leadoff spot, Pederson has gotten very aggressive. His walk rate has plunged, and his strikeout rate has increased; sitting at a 12% and 30%, respectively. Despite these negative trends,  Joc has adjusted nicely and is still hitting the ball with authority… against righties. All of 12 of his home runs have come off of righties and he has compiled a total of 19 extra-base hits against them. Against lefties, Pederson has only collected one extra-base hit, a double off of Madison Bumgarner on 5/21, and has walked only once. Given these struggles, Joc has hit a bit of snag lately dropping his average tremendously and has neutralized his BABIP a bit. He has hit for the occasional home run but that’s about it.

Is it time to panic? Absolutely not, Joc is a rookie and has only 35 plate appearances against lefties, making it a small sample size. He’s raised his average against lefties above .200 at the end of May suggesting he is starting to adjust. However, for those who own Pederson, be aware he is young and is still going through the growing pains of being in the majors. Continue to send him out in your lineups, but be aware that the production he had in the bottom order may not continue through the year in the leadoff unless he adjusts. Given his talent, that’s certainly possible.

Previously, I looked at hitters and how their current in-season performance has changed their rest-of-season projections. Here, I do the same for pitchers.

I limited my analysis to starting pitchers. For starting pitchers, I compared their preseason Depth Charts projections to their rest-of-season Depth Charts projections, then found the five starters with the biggest positive and negative differences in their projected ERA. All statistics are from May 27^th.

The Biggest Losers

Adam Warren (+0.29 in ERA)

50.7 IP, 3.91 ERA, 4.54 FIP, 4.42 xFIP, 1.24 WHIP—current

166 IP, 3.81 ERA, 1.28 WHIP—preseason

115 IP, 4.10 ERA, 1.33 WHIP—rest-of-season

Used exclusively as a reliever in 2014, Adam Warren had a career-high 8.7 K/9 and career-low 0.5 HR/9. As a starting pitcher this year, Warren has seen his K/9 drop to 5.7 and his HR/9 go up to 1.1. Even though he has a 3.91 ERA, his 4.54 FIP and 4.42 xFIP explain why his rest-of-season ERA projection has increased by 0.29 from his preseason projection. He’s lost a little more than two miles per hour on his fastball, from 94.2 to 91.9 but has increased the use of the fastball at the expense of his slider and has seen his contact percentage go up from 76% in 2014 to 81% this year. Warren is a good illustration of the difficult transition from reliever to starter. As a reliever, he threw harder and used his slider more and struck out more batters in short stints. As a starter, he’s throwing his slider less, using more two-seam fastballs and generating fewer strikeouts.

Phil Hughes (+0.29)

64.7 IP, 4.59 ERA, 4.60 FIP, 4.16 xFIP, 1.29 WHIP—current

205 IP, 3.66 ERA, 1.15 WHIP—preseason

144 IP, 3.95 ERA, 1.19 WHIP—rest-of-season

Phil Hughes had an unreal 1.9% walk rate last year that was coupled with the best strikeout rate he’s had as a starting pitcher (21.8%). This year, he’s still been quite stingy with the walks (2.2% BB%) but his strikeout rate has dropped to 15.1%, his lowest mark since 2011. The biggest change in his pitch types (per PITCHf/x) has been a dramatic rise in the percentage of two-seam fastballs, from 5.2% last year to 23.9% this year, with a drop in four-seam fastballs (61.8% to 50.2%) and cutters (16.7% to 12.8%). He’s also lost about one mile per hour on his fastball. Batters are making more contact on his pitches and they are doing damage with the long ball, which had long been a problem for Hughes before last season. From 2010 to 2013, Hughes allowed 1.4 HR/9 and had a HR/FB rate of 10.8%. Last season, those numbers dropped to 0.7 HR/9 and 6.2%. This year, he’s back to his old ways, giving up 1.6 HR/9 and a 12.3% HR/FB. Looking at Hughes’ last six years as a starting pitcher, it’s clear that his 2014 season was the aberration.

Matt Garza (+0.29)

57 IP, 6.00 ERA, 5.31 FIP, 4.37 xFIP, 1.58 WHIP—current

185 IP, 3.96 ERA, 1.26 WHIP—preseason

124 IP, 4.25 ERA, 1.32 WHIP—rest-of-season

Garza came into this season with a walk rate consistently in the range of 7.5% over the previous five seasons but has seen that rate jump to 10.5% so far this year. He also may be experiencing age related decline as his strikeout rate is on pace to decline for the fourth straight year right along with his fastball velocity, which has also gradually declined over that time from 93.8 miles per hour in 2011 to 92.5 this year. Like other pitchers in the “biggest losers” category, Garza has had trouble with home runs, giving up 10 so far in 57 innings with a career-high 18.2% HR/FB rate. Last year, pitching for the same team in the same ballpark, Garza allowed just 12 home runs in 163 1/3 innings (7.0% HR/FB). He’s also had trouble stranding runners for the second year in a row (67.5% LOB% this year, 66.6% last year).

R.A. Dickey (+0.28)

64 IP, 5.77 ERA, 5.70 FIP, 4.80 xFIP, 1.33 WHIP—current

209 IP, 4.08 ERA, 1.28 WHIP—preseason

140 IP, 4.36 ERA, 1.33 WHIP—rest-of-season

Dickey’s preseason Depth Charts projection called for a 7.1 K/9, which was reasonable considering he’d been over seven strikeouts per nine in each of the last three seasons. Unfortunately, the knuckleballer has seen his strikeout rate plummet this year. Through 10 starts, he’s at 4.9 K/9. Dickey has also seen his walk rate go up in each of the last three seasons and he’s giving up more homers than he has since establishing himself as an above-average starting pitcher with the Mets in 2010. So, strikeouts down, walks and homers up, that’s a recipe for disaster.

Taijuan Walker (+0.28)

43 IP, 7.33 ERA, 5.48 FIP, 4.84 xFIP, 1.84 WHIP—current

158 IP, 3.98 ERA, 1.30 WHIP—preseason

116 IP, 4.26 ERA, 1.34 WHIP—rest-of-season

Taijuan Walker pitched well in 11 games and 53 innings over his first two partial seasons in the major leagues at 21 and 22 years old (2.89 ERA, 3.28 FIP, 1.21 WHIP). He then ramped up the hype machine with a sterling spring training this year that saw him give up just two runs in 27 innings with 26 strikeouts and five walks. He had a nice projection for a 23-year-old pitcher coming into this season. Unfortunately, he’s been lit up so far in 2015, posting a 7.33 ERA and 1.84 WHIP. His .356 BABIP and 63% LOB% are a big part of the problem, as are the eight home runs allowed in 43 innings (1.7 HR/9, 14.5% HR/FB). His FIP (5.48) and xFIP (4.84) are much better than his actual ERA, but still nothing to be excited about, which is why his rest-of-season projection for ERA is 0.28 higher than it was before the season started.

That 14.5% HR/FB should come down but Walker has also allowed many more fly balls than he did last season, up from 26.2% to 39.0% so he is likely to give up more home runs than he has in the past even with regression in his HR/FB rate. He’s also giving up a higher percentage of hard-hit balls, increasing from 23.8% last year to 34.3% this year. On the bright side, his fastball velocity has stayed at the same level since his rookie year. Walker still has the raw skills to be a good major-league pitcher but a combination of giving up more fly balls and seeing more fly over the fence, along with a below-average left-on-base percentage has really hurt him this season.

The Biggest Winners

Michael Pineda (-0.40)

64.3 IP, 3.36 ERA, 2.54 FIP, 2.52 xFIP, 1.14 WHIP—current

142 IP, 3.74 ERA, 1.20 WHIP—preseason

117 IP, 3.34 ERA, 1.12 WHIP—rest-of-season

Last year, Phil Hughes had the second-lowest walk rate of any pitcher who qualified for the ERA title since 2001. He walked just 1.9% of the batters he faced. Only Carlos Silva in 2005 (1.2%) has had a better rate over the last 15 years. This year, Michael Pineda is walking even fewer batters than Hughes did last year, allowing just 1.7% of the batters he’s faced to reach via the base on balls. Pineda has the added bonus of a 25% strikeout rate to go with that miniscule walk rate. Along with elite strikeout and walk rates, Pineda has added the ability to induce groundballs to his arsenal. He came into this year with a career groundball rate of 37.2%. This year, his groundball rate is up to 52.4%. He’s turned into Felix Hernandez Lite. Imagine if the two of them were on the same staff. Jesus (Montero) that would be nice for Mariner fans. Pineda’s 3.34 ERA is actually higher than you’d expect based on his peripherals, mainly due to a .339 BABIP and 68.3% left on base percentage.

Jake Odorizzi (-0.24)

66.3 IP, 2.31 ERA, 2.52 FIP, 3.61 xFIP, 0.96 WHIP—current

178 IP, 4.05 ERA, 1.31 WHIP—preseason

136 IP, 3.81 ERA, 1.27 WHIP—rest-of-season

Jake Odorizzi has seen his strikeout rate drop from last year’s 24.2% to 20.2% this year but he’s offset that with a walk rate that has dropped at an even greater rate, from 8.2% last year to 4.6% so far this year. According to PITCHf/x Pitch Types, he’s changed his pitch arsenal in a number of ways. Consider the chart below:

Odorizzi has dropped his usage of the four-seam fastball and almost completely eliminated his slider and increased the use of his two-seamer, cutter, and splitter. The result has been a lower strikeout rate but better control and an increase in ground ball percentage, from 29.9% last year to 41.2% this year. Last year, Odorizzi gave up the second-highest percentage of fly balls of any pitcher who qualified for the ERA title, at 48.7%, behind only Chris Young (58.7%). This year, he’s 34^th out of 109 pitchers who qualify. Fewer fly balls generally mean fewer home runs allowed and Odorizzi has seen a big drop there also. Last year, he gave up 20 homers in 168 innings. This year, he’s allowed just two long balls in 66 1/3 innings, although a very low 2.8% HR/FB rate is part of that decrease and he’s not likely to sustain a home run per fly ball rate that low for the whole season. Still, despite the lower strikeout rate, Odorizzi has been even more effective this year than previously because he’s made up for it with better control and more ground balls.

Jake Arrieta (-0.23)

58 IP, 2.95 ERA, 2.39 FIP, 2.68 xFIP, 1.09 WHIP—current

173 IP, 3.62 ERA, 1.25 WHIP—preseason

127 IP, 3.39 ERA, 1.21 WHIP—rest-of-season

Over the first four years of his career, Jake Arrieta had a 5.23 ERA (4.75 FIP) and 1.43 WHIP. He struck out 17.5% of the batters he faced, walked 10.2%, and induced ground balls on 43.3% of his balls in play. Since the beginning of 2014, Arrieta has a 2.64 ERA (2.29 FIP), and 1.02 WHIP. He’s struck out 27.1% of the batters he’s faced, walked 6.5%, and has a 49.8% ground ball rate. All of the most important things you want a pitcher to do better, he’s done better. He’s done this by changing his pitch arsenal. If you go by Baseball Info Solutions pitch types, Arrieta started throwing cutters nearly 30% of the time in 2014 and has continued to do so this season after not throwing any cutters from 2010 to 2012 and throwing it 6% of the time in 2013. According to PITCHf/x pitch types, he went from throwing sliders roughly 14% of the time prior to the 2014 season to nearly 30% of the time this year and last. I don’t know enough about the difference in classification between the two sources but Arrieta made a change of some sort and it is working. It may be more cutters, it may be more sliders. Maybe it’s a slutter. Whatever it is, this change in pitch type that has resulted in much improved numbers since the beginning of last season would suggest to me that even that improved rest-of-season projection is likely going to come in on the high side for Arrieta.

Aaron Harang (-0.22)

65 1/3 IP, 1.93 ERA, 2.86 FIP, 4.30 xFIP, 1.03 WHIP—current

155 IP, 4.51 ERA, 1.40 WHIP—preseason

125 IP, 4.29 ERA, 1.37 WHIP—rest-of-season

Based on some metrics, Aaron Harang is off to a terrific start. He’s currently seventh in WAR among all pitchers with a sub 2.00 ERA. His 2.86 FIP is also quite good but that comes with a caveat—Harang’s 2.3% HR/FB rate, which would be much better than anything he’s ever done before. In his career of over 2215 innings, Harang has allowed 9.9% of his fly balls to leave the yard, so it’s hard to believe he has somehow magically developed the ability to limit home runs on fly balls. He has improved his walk rate but is also striking out fewer batters and has a .258 BABIP, which is much lower than his career .304 BABIP. All signs point to regression from his current numbers, but his rest-of-season projection doesn’t think he’ll be as bad as his preseason projection thought he’d be. That’s still not good, of course.

Chris Archer (-0.21)

59.3 IP, 2.12 ERA, 2.46 FIP, 2.59 xFIP, 0.99 WHIP—current

183 IP, 3.69 ERA, 1.29 WHIP—preseason

138 IP, 3.48 ERA, 1.26 WHIP—rest-of-season

Chris Archer was good in 2013 and 2014 but has turned it up a notch this year. Over the first two years of his career, Archer had a 21.2% strikeout rate, 7.9% walk rate, and 46.3% ground ball rate. This year, he’s increased his strikeout rate to 30.7%, dropped his walk rate to 7.5%%, and increased his ground ball rate to 52.5%. Archer has increased his slider usage by about 10% over last year (based on BIS and PITCHf/x) and is generating more swinging strikes than he ever has, up to 12.1% this year compared to 9.3% last year.

Gregory Polanco has been one of the most talked-about Pirates prospects in recent years. Baseball America rated him #51 and #10 respectively in 2013 and 2014 rankings. Moreover, prior to the 2015 season, Jayson Stark wrote an article for ESPN entertaining the idea that the Pirates may have the best outfield in baseball with Gregory Polanco, Andrew McCutchen and Starling Marte.

When Polanco came up in June of 2014, the budding 22-year-old looked like the future McCutchen. With a home run in his first at-bat and a strong slash line in his first month (.288/.374/.375), Polanco looked like the real deal. After a few weeks of success, his game leveled out. Most writers attributed his downfall in the latter half of the 2014 season to the fact that he had played 127 games in 2013, then went to Winter Ball, and followed that up with 158 games in 2014. And there may be some truth to that.

Fully rested, Polanco came into the 2015 season with high expectations. To this point, his fielding has been stellar: he is tied for 1st amongst all right fielders with Giancarlo Stanton in UZR at 3.6 and is in sole possession of 1st in DEF at 2.0.

He is definitely holding up on his defensive abilities, but to this point, his offense has been underwhelming. His OPS has dropped from .650 in 2014 to an abysmal .626 in 2015. Thus far, he has only hit one home run on the season and driven in just 12 runs. The gleam of light in his offensive game has been his work on the base paths. Stealing 40 bags in A-ball in 2012 and then a combined 38 from A+, AA, and AAA in 2013, Polanco was projected to be a speedster, but his decline from there seemed alarming. He stole only 14 bases in 19 attempts in 2014 for the Pirates, but is already close to eclipsing that mark. Polanco is 12 for 14 in steal attempts this year, and in most cases is doing so based on good reads and strong jumps rather than on speed alone.

Most casual fans appreciate the defense and see the potential as a real threat on the base paths, and simply hope that he shows more pop as he matures at the plate. But there are also other warning signs with Polanco. He was to work on his plate discipline this year, but his walk rate has actually lowered from 9.6% to 8.9% and his strikeout rate has risen from 18.9% to an unsightly 22.6%. Especially if he will not produce power numbers, these numbers are trending in the wrong direction.

I started thinking back to other Pirates who were young and showed promise only to become mediocre players, and then I found this.

Each through 131 Career Games:

Player A: .286/ .341/ .386 – 26 doubles; 7 home runs; 41 RBIs; 44 walks; 28 stolen bases

Player B: .235/ .306/ .336 – 19 doubles; 8 home runs; 45 RBIs; 45 walks; 26 stolen bases

Player B is obviously Gregory Polanco, and player A is Jose Tabata.

In no way am I saying that Polanco will fall in the footsteps of the powerless Tabata, but the numbers are eerily similar. With Tabata, writers and fans alike hoped for the same changes: better discipline at the plate, the stolen bases to continue to rise, and the power to follow.

The big difference between Polanco and Tabata is that Polanco is an elite fielder today. Through advanced metrics, it is easier to quantify the impact of guys like Jason Heyward and Alex Gordon, and perhaps that will be the same fate of Polanco. Since 2010, Heyward is ranked 19th and Gordon is ranked 13th in cumulative WAR according to FanGraphs. Defensive impact should not be overlooked.

Polanco is still young, and he has tremendous upside. Even if the power stroke never emerges, he can still be a great player. As the 2015 Pirates season continues, Polanco needs his strikeout rate to drop, his on-base percentage to rise, and to run on a more frequent basis.

In “Hardball Retrospective: Evaluating Scouting and Development Outcomes for the Modern-Era Franchises”, I placed every ballplayer in the modern era (from 1901-present) on their original team. Therefore, Roy Halladay is listed on the Blue Jays roster for the duration of his career while the Braves declare Joe Torre and the Brewers claim Prince Fielder. I calculated revised standings for every season based entirely on the performance of each team’s “original” players. I discuss every team’s “original” players and seasons at length along with organizational performance with respect to the Amateur Draft (or First-Year Player Draft), amateur free agent signings and other methods of player acquisition.  Season standings, WAR and Win Shares totals for the “original” teams are compared against the “actual” team results to assess each franchise’s scouting, development and general management skills.

Expanding on my research for the book, the following series of articles will reveal the finest single-season rosters for every Major League organization based on overall rankings in OWAR and OWS along with the general managers and scouting directors that constructed the teams. “Hardball Retrospective” is available in digital format on Amazon, Barnes and Noble, GooglePlay, iTunes and KoboBooks. The paperback edition is available on Amazon, Barnes and Noble and CreateSpace. Additional information and a discussion forum are offered at TuataraSoftware.com.

Don Daglow (Intellivision World Series Major League Baseball, Earl Weaver Baseball, Tony LaRussa Baseball) contributed the foreword for Hardball Retrospective. The foreword and preview of my book are accessible here.

Terminology

OWAR – Wins Above Replacement for players on “original” teams

OWS – Win Shares for players on “original” teams

OPW% – Pythagorean Won-Loss record for the “original” teams

Assessment

The 2005 Los Angeles Angels      OWAR: 48.2     OWS: 309     OPW%: .560

GM Bill Bavasi acquired 43% (17/39) of the ballplayers on the 2005 Angels roster. 32 team members were drafted by the club. Based on the revised standings the “Original” 2005 Angels battled the Athletics down to the wire as Oakland seized the pennant by a lone game. The Halos earned the Wild Card entry as a consolation prize.

Jim Edmonds (.263/29/89) anchored the third slot in the lineup and played flawless defense in center field to earn his eighth Gold Glove Award. Troy Glaus manned the hot corner and batted cleanup for the Halos, thumping 37 round-trippers and knocking in 97 baserunners. Bengie Molina supplied a career-high .295 batting average along with 15 jacks and 69 ribbies. Darin Erstad triggered the offense with 33 two-base hits from the leadoff slot.  Garret Anderson (.283/17/96) cracked 34 doubles and merited his third All-Star selection. Eduardo Perez (.255/11/28) and Mark Sweeney (.294/8/40) provided additional power potential while platooning as the designated hitters.

John Lackey compiled a record of 14-5 with a 3.44 ERA and a personal-best 199 strikeouts. Jarrod Washburn fashioned a 3.20 ERA but failed to earn a decision in 13 of his 29 starts. Ervin Santana accrued 12 victories in his rookie campaign despite an ERA of 4.65.

Francisco J. Rodriguez (2.67, 45 SV) captained the Halos’ sensational bullpen. “K-Rod” whiffed 91 batsmen in 67.1 innings. Roberto M. Hernandez (8-6, 2.58) and Scot Shields (10-11, 2.75) locked down the late-inning threats. Matt Wise contributed a 3.36 ERA and a WHIP of 0.964 to round out the relief corps along with Bobby Jenks (50 K’s in 39.1 IP) and Scott Schoenewis (3-4, 3.32).

The “Original” 2005 Los Angeles Angels roster

Honorable Mention

The “Original” 1997 Angels               OWAR: 40.3     OWS: 313     OPW%: .547

Los Angeles outdistanced Seattle by a seven-game margin, taking the Western Division title with a record of 89-73. Tim “Kingfish” Salmon (.296/33/129) recorded a personal-best in RBI. Damion Easley joined the 20-20 club as he swiped 28 bases and belted 22 long balls while scoring 97 runs. Roberto M. Hernandez registered 10 victories and saved 31 contests with a 2.45 ERA. Darin Erstad posted a .299 BA, tagged 34 doubles and pilfered 23 bags. Jason Dickson (13-9, 4.23) made his lone All-Star appearance and finished third in the 1997 A.L. Rookie of the Year balloting.

On Deck

The “Original” 2002 Blue Jays

References and Resources

Baseball America – Executive Database

Baseball-Reference

James, Bill. The New Bill James Historical Baseball Abstract. New York, NY.: The Free Press, 2001. Print.

James, Bill, with Jim Henzler. Win Shares. Morton Grove, Ill.: STATS, 2002. Print.

Retrosheet – Transactions Database

Seamheads – Baseball Gauge

Sean Lahman Baseball Archive