Archive for Player Analysis

On Friday the Cardinals acquired Brewers reliever John Axford for a player to be named later. While dominant in 2010 and 2011, Axford’s lackluster performance since 2012 has many Cardinals fans uninspired by the move. In fact, most of the media attention has centered around his public farewell to Milwaukee fans.

Bernie Miklasz of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch offered his own analysis of the deal, calling it a “smart gamble” for the Cardinals. In addition to acknowledging Axford’s well documented HR/FB% struggles, Miklasz highlighted that the former closer has been particularly challenged by an ineffective fastball and poor performance in high-leverage situations.

PITCHf/x data on Axford’s fastball:

Axford’s performance in high-leverage situations:

FanGraphs readers will know that Cardinals GM John Mozeliak and his organization’s pitching staff have developed a reputation in recent years for quietly acquiring mediocre pitchers and helping them reach previously unimagined levels of success on the mound. To the extent that Mozeliak and company have similar designs for Axford, one must ask how they plan to help him reclaim his once dominant form.

The Cardinals may suggest any number of tweaks to Axford’s approach, but smart money has them coaching him to focus on throwing more first-pitch strikes. Jeff Sullivan recently reminded us of the importance of pitching ahead, and its import is surely not lost on manager Mike Matheny and pitching coach Derek Lilliquist. Since 2012, Redbird pitchers rank tops in the majors in terms of throwing first-pitch strikes.

In the same piece, Sullivan also noted that since arriving in St. Louis in July 2012, Edward Mujica has established himself as the league leader in first-pitch strikes, increasing that figure from a pedestrian 60.9% in 2011 to an elite 75.6% in 2013. Doing so has no doubt played a large part in his improved performance in high-leverage innings.

Mujica in 2011 with the Marlins:

Mujica in 2013 with the Cardinals:

While Mujica’s 2011 performance in high-leverage situations was not nearly as poor as Axford’s has been in 2012 and 2013, there exists a similar opportunity for improvement.

Specifically, Axford is getting absolutely crushed when behind in the count this season.

Axford’s 2013 pitching splits:

As they did when acquiring Mujica last year, look for the Cardinals to initially deploy Axford into low-leverage situations in which he can regain his confidence and focus on getting ahead in the count. If successful, one would expect the club to move Axford into higher-leverage situations, particularly if Mujica or Trevor Rosenthal wears down or runs into trouble down the stretch.

Despite leading the AL in saves,  Orioles closer Jim Johnson is having a rough year compared to 2012 when he posted a 2.51 ERA and saved 51 games in 54 opportunities. Early in 2013, an enthusiastic Orioles sportswriter named Johnson the best closer in baseball, a statement that doesn’t look quite so good a few months later. As a closer who relies on the groundball, Johnson is something of an odd bird (pun intended). In 2012 his 15.2 K% ranked 130th out of 136 qualified relievers and his Zone-Contact% was 2nd highest. This year his 18.0 K% ranks 111th out of 140 qualified relievers and his Zone-Contact% is 9th highest. While Johnson has struck out a few more hitters, he has also walked slightly more, from 5.6% to 7.1%, and his groundball rate is down. Overall, his fielding-independent numbers are basically the same as last year. Various explanations have been offered for Johnson’s lack of success in 2013 compared to 2012. Bill Castro, the Orioles interim pitching coach (check out his 1979 season) attributes Johnson’s struggles to overthrowing, and a failure to locate down in the zone which has resulted in less early contact outs. I prepared the following chart to check up on these explanations.

So Johnson is throwing slightly more pitches in the lower third of the zone, and actually getting more swings and misses on pitches in the zone. The overthrowing statement seems faulty, as Johnson’s velocity on his sinker is actually down. A look at the Pitch f/x data shows that his sinker has flattened out slightly from last year, though the difference is slight overall. The following chart shows what kind of contact batters are making off Johnson compared to last year.

And to go in even more detail the following two charts show BABIP by zone and then the slugging by zone for Johnson.

So balls put in play against Johnson have been falling for hits more frequently this year and those hits have been more damaging in each third of the strike zone. In particular, the pitches Johnson has thrown over the middle have been getting hammered. Last year, the results on those pitches were quite tame. Granted, this is a pretty small sample size of balls in play, and nowhere near the point where BABIP is expected to stabilize, but it goes to show that Johnson has not fared nearly as well when hitters are making contact in 2013. But, this is not an uncommon issue for high-contact, groundball pitchers. David Robertson can suffer through a .335 BABIP in 2012 and still post a 2.67 ERA on the strength of a 32.7 K%. Pitchers like Johnson who cannot strike out hitters regularly are subject to variance on batted balls. Take a look at most groundball, contact-type pitchers, and you’ll find years where BABIP and ERA go through the roof. With the 60-70 inning seasons relievers work, the results can get skewed very badly. To get a sense for where Johnson stands relative to other groundball relievers, I did an analysis of all qualified relievers since 2002 and separated the 30 highest and 30 lowest groundball rates (Johnson was 24th).

So not a whole lot of good things to say about the groundball heavy group. Jonny Venters was the only member of the group with a strikeout rate above 20%. They limit home runs pretty well, which is to be expected with so few fly balls. However, many of those groundballs are going for hits, while fly balls that aren’t leaving the yard are twice as likely to be outs.  That 30 point difference in BABIP is pretty huge, and that’s over a sample of more than 20,000 balls in play for each group. Overall, the decrease in home runs isn’t worth the extra hits and walks. With guys like Kenley Jansen and Rafael Soriano, it’s not surprising that the fly ball group features a much better ratio of shutdowns to meltdowns. For the most part, the groundball group is filled with situational guys that have bounced around with sporadic success. While relievers of all types tend to be unreliable, groundball and contact types are subject to the additional randomness of batted ball variance.

Seasons with inflated BABIP and ERA should be an expected consequence for a contact pitcher like Johnson. Of course, it would have been very difficult for the Orioles to demote Johnson to a lower-leverage bullpen role after the success he had in 2012. However, all signs indicate that Johnson is an average bullpen arm whose performance last season far outweighed his ability. He is better suited for the role he played in 2010 as a mid-leverage arm who was not limited to one inning. The Orioles should look for a strikeout arm for high-leverage situations. While Buck Showalter has consistently defended Johnson, not too many managers will bring back a closer after a season leading the league in blown saves.

Typically when people think of five-tool players they think of guys like Mike Trout, Andrew McCutchen or Carlos Gonzalez. Basically up-the-middle players who do everything well. Paul Goldschmidt however is not an up-the-middle player but I believe he does have the five tools.

For those who don’t know the five tools are what scouts use (among other things) to evaluate a player. The five tools are hitting for power, hitting for average or contact ability, defense, arm and finally speed.

When looking at Goldschmidt the one tool that stands out is his power. He put up at least a .600 slugging percentage (SLG) and at least a .290 isolated power (ISO) and 2 seasons of 30 home runs in his 3 minor league seasons. His power has showed in the majors as well. In 2012 his first full season in the majors he hit 20 home runs, had a .490 SLG and a .204 ISO. This season his power has taken another step forward. He currently has 31 home runs, .548 SLG and a .251 ISO, all of which currently lead National League first basemen. I specify National League here because that Chris Davis guy has been pretty darn good this season.

Goldschmidt’s hit tool is solid but not close to as good as his power tool. With that being said Goldschmidt is still coming into his own in terms of contact rate. His contact rate has improved each season he has been in the big leagues as per pitch f/x, it rose from 70.7% in 2011, to 77.1 in 2012 and to 78.7% this season. With that contact rate increasing his strikeout rate, as to be expected, has decreased at roughly the same rate. His strikeout percentage has dropped from 29.9% in 2011, to 22.1% in 2012 and to 20.6% this season. Batting average is never the best way to evaluate a player but it does judge a players’ hit tool. His BA has risen from .250 in 2011 to.286 in 2012 to .298 this season. His BABIP is high this season at .333 but it is actually down from last season’s .340.  He had very high BABIPs in the minors and from his batted-ball profile looks like he may be a guy who consistently posts BAPIPs above .300.

His defense is again a work in progress. Defensive numbers take about three seasons to become relevant and we don’t quite have that yet but we do have 2695.2 innings for Goldschmidt at 1B. In those innings he has shown to be an above average defender. This season Goldschmidt has an ultimate zone rating of 4.9 which is fifth among qualified first-basemen. Over the last three seasons Goldy’s UZR is 2.9 which among first basemen with a minimum of 2500 innings ranks 7th out of 13. Essentially an average defender. DRS however tells a different story, this season anyway. Per DRS Goldy has been among the best fielding first basemen. He has saved 11 runs, which is tied for the lead with Adrian Gonzalez and Anthony Rizzo.

A first baseman’s arm is very difficult to judge as it is hardly ever needed. To my knowledge  there are not yet stats that judge a player’s arm. So the only way to evaluate a player’s arm is by scouting the player. I did a quick Google search trying to find a scouting report on Goldschmidt’s arm and I found nothing. Thankfully FanGraphs has a feature where fans can submit their reports on players. Of course this isn’t the most accurate analysis, but it will do. The fans gave Goldschmidt a 48 (0-100 scale) in arm strength in 2011 and a 44 arm strength in 2012. His accuracy was given a 53 and 41 in 2011 and 2012 respectively. We can conclude from this that Goldschmidt has about an average arm.

Finally the last tool to look at is arguably Goldy’s second-best tool, his speed.  Goldy stole 18 bases last season which was tops among qualified first basemen. This season he has 13 which again is tops among qualified first basemen. There is more to speed than just pure stolen bases, the ability to go first to third or score from second on a single.  There is a stat that measures this, called base-running runs above average (BsR). It takes all base-running into account including steals and caught stealing. Goldschmidt has again been elite in this category. This season he has been worth 1.2 runs above average which is 4th among first basemen. Last season he was worth 3.2 runs above average which was tops in the National League and second to only Eric Hosmer.

To conclude, perhaps Goldschmidt is not the five-tool player I had anticipated. He does however have 2 very elite tools in his power and speed. He has 2 average tools in his contact rate and defense. His arm is average to below average but for a first basemen that’s not too important. He isn’t quite a five-tool first baseman but 4 average to elite tools with only 1 below average tool make him about as close to a complete-package first baseman as you’re going to find in the game today.

Of course, the concept of “stuff” is very subjective, and my formula is not so much of an attempt to quantify a subjective concept as it is an attempt to measure how well pitchers do things we associate with great stuff. Because I used Pitch f/x data exclusively, the ratings were limited to pitchers from 2007 to the present.

My formula is ((4*O-Zone Swing% *O-Zone Whiff%)+(3*Whiff%)+(5*Zone-Whiff%)+(2*IFFB%)*(FBv/100)*(4))

I will probably tinker with the formula, and will welcome any suggestions with regards to improving it. I have only applied it to starting pitchers. Of course it can be applied to relievers, but their scores run much higher unless some kind of a “relief penalty” is applied. The STUFF ratings for all starting pitches who threw at least 160 innings since 2007 run between 3.4 and 9.7. The following list presents the top 15 career STUFF pitchers since 2007.

1. Rich Harden 9.7. If you’re having trouble remembering just how filthy Harden could be, visit his player page. Harden got swings and misses like no other starter. In 2008 he had an unearthly 48 ERA- and 68 xFIP- despite the fact that injuries had already started to take their toll on his fastball velocity, as it dropped to 91.7, compared to 94.1 the year before. In 141 innings in 2009, he got whiffs on 22.6% of swings on pitches in the zone. Max Scherzer, the 2013 leader in that category, gets whiffs in the zone at an 18.4% clip. When Aroldis Chapman averaged 100 mph on his fastball in 2010, he sat at 21.9%. Unfortunately, a litany of injuries would decimate Harden’s career, and he was recently released by the Twins, an organization known for their disdain for swing and miss stuff.

2. Matt Harvey 9.4. The young right-hander with the dynamic fastball places near the top in all five of the STUFF factors, with only Scherzer, Harden, and Escobar topping his 17.6 Zone-Whiff%. Besides the fastball, Harvey also features a slider, curveball, and changeup. Harvey’s plethora of filthy offerings produces whiffs on over a quarter of his pitches overall. Furthermore, Harvey is one of the rare pitchers who has actually experienced an increase in fastball velocity since his debut season.

3. Yu Darvish 9.2. Darvish uses his assortment of pitches to produce whiffs on over half of swings at pitches he throws outside of the zone, easily the best in the sample. Combine that with a whiff rate of 15.9%  for swings on pitches in the zone and you get an overall whiff rate of 28.6%, also the best in the sample. Pitch f/x credits Darvish with six different pitches, four of which he throws at least 12 percent of the time. Though Darvish averages 92.9 mph on his fastball, he has thrown his slider nearly as often as his four-seamer and two-seamer combined. The unconventional approach has produced five games of 14+ strikeouts in 2013.

4. Kelvim Escobar 8.9. Escobar only had one year of data, but what a year it was. At the age of 31, Escobar’s fastball velocity surged to 94.1, higher than any of the pre-pitch f/x years, and he utilized an excellent changeup to get whiffs on over a third of swings at pitches he threw outside of the zone and a quarter of swings overall. However, in spring training of 2008, Escobar was diagnosed with a shoulder injury that required surgery and except for a 5 inning stint in 2009, he never returned to the majors.

5. Michael Pineda 8.7. Like Escobar, Pineda only has one year of data in the sample due to shoulder surgery. Elite fastball velocity combined with a slider that helped generate swings on a third of the pitches he throws out of the zone and contact on less than sixty percent of those swings earns him this ranking. The big righty also used his height to get one of the highest infield fly rates in the sample. Pineda was placed on the DL shortly after an August 2 rehab start resulted in stiffness in his shoulder, and it appears unlikely that the righthander will pitch again in 2013.

6. Matt Moore 8.6.While Moore’s fastball velocity has dipped steadily since he came into the league in 2011, its overall average is still 93.6. Moore’s ranking is based heavily on his 2012 STUFF rating of 9.3, his 2013 rating has fallen to 7.4. Moore has battled elbow soreness this year, and hopefully this will not be a long-term issue and he can return to the form that generated a dominant 19.0 Zone-Whiff% in 2012.

7. Francisco Liriano 8.6. Liriano’s slider has long been one of the best pitches in the game, and only Darvish can top his whiff rate on pitches outside the zone. Since joining the Pirates, Liriano has been using the slider even more, throwing it on 37.1% of his pitches. Liriano is also throwing his changeup more than he ever has before. While his 13.1 Zone-Whiff% in 2013 is one of the lowest numbers of his career, the offspeed pitches have resulted in a 36.1% chase rate, the highest of his career. It’s anyone’s guess as to how long Liriano’s oft-troubled elbow holds up, but Pirates fans should enjoy the ride while it does.

8. Cole Hamels 8.5. A master of deception, Hamels’ changeup has helped him produce a career whiff-rate of 24.5%. Among pitchers on this list, Hamels 90.9 mph fastball is faster than only fellow changeup artist Johan Santana. However, the 8-9 mph difference between his fastball and changeup produces a 33.8 chase rate, the 5th highest in the sample, and his 37.0 rate in 2013 leads the majors. Hamels has also been very durable, among the top 15 STUFF pitchers, only Justin Verlander has thrown more innings.

9. Stephen Strasburg 8.5. While Strasburg’s fastball velocity has fallen from its pre-Tommy John high of 97.6, his 95.9 average is still tops Felipe Paulino, the next closest in the sample by 0.7 mph. While we will probably not see the pure electricity of the pre-injury Strasburg which produced a 9.5 STUFF rating in 2010, Strasburg still gets whiffs on over 15% of swings on pitches in the zone and 25% overall. If the Nationals’ controversial innings-management plan pays dividends and the 25 year-old can stay healthy, he should be getting whiffs for years to come.

10. Max Scherzer 8.3.  It seems fitting that a noted sabermetrician would obtain a high ranking on a list based on Pitch f/x and batted-ball data. To the misfortune of AL hitters, Scherzer has vastly improved his secondary pitches while maintaining his fastball velocity. Before his trade to the Tigers, Scherzer threw his fastball over two-thirds of the time. With the Tigers, Scherzer’s fastball usage has decreased each year, and his use of secondary pitches, particularly his changeup, has increased. Not surprisingly, this has resulted in higher chase and whiff rates, and his Zone-Whiff%  of 19.9 since 2012 leads the majors.

11. Clayton Kershaw 8.1. Kershaw burst onto the scene in 2008 as a 20 year-old rookie with a 94 mph fastball and 73 mph 12-6 curveball. Since then he has added a slider to make life even more miserable for hitters. Kershaw ranks near the top in all five of the STUFF factors. Kershaw appears to be the odd bird that can use his pitch arsenal as much to suppress BABIP as to generate swings and misses, and this factor probably keeps him from being ranked even higher.

12. Tim Lincecum 8.0. You would be hard-pressed to find a smaller starting pitcher than Lincecum. While that height limits his ability to get infield flies, the dynamic changeup more than compensates for his lack of size. Of the top 15 pitchers, only Darvish and Liriano have higher whiff rates on swings at pitches out of the zone. Lincecum’s fastball velocity has steadily dropped from its high of 94.0 in 2008 to 90.2 in 2013. Since 2011, Lincecum has been throwing a slider more often, and while he has been prone to the longball, he still gets whiffs on a quarter of swings. While Lincecum is no longer the pitcher that won CY Young awards in 2008 and 2009, he is a very intriguing free agent, and at the least, it seems that he could be a dominant reliever.

13. Chris Sale 8.0. The lanky, or perhaps paper-thin lefthander has made a successful transition from the bullpen to the rotation. After experiencing a predictable velocity drop from the move, Sale has actually regained some of that velocity this year, as his fastball has jumped from 91.3 to 92.4. Since moving to the rotation, Sale has added a changeup to go along with his excellent slider. Sale’s herky-jerky sidearm delivery and late movement have helped him generate a 32% chase rate, 5th best among pitchers on this list. While concern’s about Sale’s elbow and durability are certain to persist, Sale is on pace for over 200 innings this year after throwing 192 last year.

14. Johan Santana 7.9. Shoulder troubles robbed Santana of some of his fastball velocity, and his average of 90.3 is the slowest among pitchers in the top 15. However, his changeup was devastating. In its heyday in 2007, Santana had a Zone-Whiff rate of 23.2%. While some of Santana’s best years were in the pre-Pitch f/x era, the Mets still got highlights such as a 36.0 chase rate in 2009, and the no-hitter in 2012. Santana’s changeup also had the effect of suppressing BABIP,  as noted by a .276 career mark. Of the top 15, only youngsters Harvey and Moore can top Santana’s 12.9 IFFB%.

15. Justin Verlander 7.9. It took Verlander a couple of years to fine-tune the curveball, but when he did, he started churning out elite swing-and-miss rates. Since 2012, Verlander has been utilizing the changeup more than the curveball, and it too has produced excellent whiff rates. The secondary offerings go along with an average fastball velocity of 94.8 that only the less battle-tested Stephen Strasburg, Matt Harvey, and Felipe Paulino can top. Since 2007, Verlander has thrown over a 100 more innings than Cole Hamels, the next closest person on this list.

Clearly, the list favors younger, less tested pitchers. But I don’t think there’s anything wrong with that. As pitchers age, their velocity declines, and while Felix Hernandez is a better pitcher throwing 92 then when he was a young flamethrower, he probably doesn’t create the same kind of excitement in fans or fear in hitters when he averaged 96 with his fastball.

I also made a list of the worst 15 starting pitchers by STUFF since 2007. I didn’t think it would be worth anyone’s while to go through the list, but suffice it to say that the worst three were Steve Trachsel, Sidney Ponson, and Livan Hernandez. Yeah, I’d say that sounds about right. Aaron Cook of the 1.9 K/9 in 2012 also made the list. The following table is a comparison of the best and worst 15 starting pitchers since 2007 by STUFF rating.

So the best STUFF pitchers seem to have an ability to limit hits on balls in play and overachieve their peripheral stats, while the worst STUFF pitchers allow hits at slightly above the league average and underachieve their peripherals. Some of this is due to infield flies, which was a factor in the STUFF formula. The best 15 had an IFFB% of 11.0, while the worst 15 had an IFFB% of 7.4. But there are other factors involved. Tim Lincecum has a 7.4 IFFB% and a .296 BABIP while Nick Blackburn has a 8.6 IFFB% and a .309 BABIP while the BABIP of their respective teams since 2007 is .297 and .300. Both of these pitchers are well past the stabilization point for BABIP. So it seems that pitchers with dominant STUFF have some control over hits on balls in play outside of IFFB. Of course I cherrypicked an example, and I’m sure there are counterexamples, but the general idea seems good. Great STUFF can have an effect beyond generating swings and misses.

Young players are exciting. They’re fun to watch, fun to talk about, and especially fun to project, and young players that succeed early in their careers are even more exciting. If, over the next few weeks, you find yourself sitting in Progressive Field holding a $4 beer (yes, they’re that cheap) while watching the Indians play a meaningful late-season game for the first time since 2007, mention Danny Salazar to the fans in your section. About the worst thing you’ll hear someone say about him is, “Salazar? Potential front-line arm, but I dunno, maybe he throws too hard?”

I’m just as fascinated with young talent as those title-starved Indians fans drinking their reasonably priced beverages, and one player who’s caught my eye this year is Chris Archer, the 24-year-old, flame-throwing pitching prospect currently shutting down MLB lineups to the tune of a 2.95 ERA over 15 starts this season. When a pitcher with Archer’s level of raw talent shows flashes of that potential brilliance right out of the gate, it’s easy to get carried away and envision him turning into the next Max Scherzer (who Harold Reynolds thinks is the AL Cy Young, hands down), but is that a fair comparison? Are we putting too much emphasis on Archer’s string of early successes?

Unfortunately, we can’t really know the answer to that question until Archer himself is 29 years old and either anchoring the front end of an MLB rotation, filling in at the back end, contributing out of the bullpen, or worse. Fortunately, we can speculate. Even more fortunately, there’s a wealth of data and numbers from which we can speculate.

Using pitch data compiled by FanGraphs and readily available on player pages and custom leaderboards, I looked at every player-season from 2002-2012 for Archer’s closest pitching comparison. I considered factors such as pitcher age and experience, pitch usage rates, velocities, and effectiveness, batted ball distribution, strikeout and walk rates, and even non-pitching factors like height and handedness, which matter for release point and pitch trajectory.

After crunching the numbers, I am officially proclaiming Edwin Jackson the winner.

On the surface, this comparison makes some sense. Back in 2007, Jackson was a 23-year-old pitcher of the same height and weight as Archer is currently listed, and both were getting their first extended major league looks. Jackson was drafted out of high school in the sixth round of the 2001 amateur draft. Archer was drafted out of high school in the fifth round of the 2006 amateur draft.

Both paid their dues in the minors as Jackson compiled a 4.39 ERA over 556 innings in parts of six minor league seasons, whereas Archer was slightly better with a 3.77 ERA in 769.2 innings over parts of eight seasons. Both showed big-time velocity but struggled with control. Jackson’s strikeout rate in the minors was lower than Archer’s, but so was his walk rate. All told, Jackson posted a strikeout-to-walk ratio of 1.91. Archer’s was nearly identical at 1.80.

Pretty similar, huh? Well, it gets a little eerier.

The table above shows Archer’s pitch usage, velocity, and effectiveness over his first 15 starts of 2013 versus what Jackson did during his first full season back in 2007. Right off the bat, we see three-pitch pitchers who featured a fastball and slider prominently while occasionally mixing in a change-up. Both could dial up the heat, and both used the slider as their out pitch.

By now I think we’ve done a pretty good job of establishing just how similar these two pitchers are (though if you’d like, you can check out the deliveries of Jackson here and Archer here), but what does that mean for Archer’s future? Let’s pretend for a moment that he does in fact follow in Jackson’s footsteps. How good has Jackson been?

Well, Jackson’s been about as average as they come. His career ERA is 4.45, and he’s never finished with a single-season ERA better than 3.62. In six-plus seasons since Jackson became a full-time starter in 2007, there have been 50 pitchers that have logged over 1,000 innings (Jackson has tossed 1,295). Of those 50, Jackson’s 4.36 ERA ranks 44th, ahead of only Kevin Correia, Jason Marquis, Barry Zito, Roberto Hernandez/Fausto Carmona, Joe Blanton, and Livan Hernandez. Jackson’s 17.6 WAR over that span is good for 26th, but his WAR/IP drops him down to 35th. His most notable accomplishments are ranking 17th among that group in innings pitched and 11th in games started.

Jackson has been very durable, and there’s something to be said for durability, but if all Archer turns into is a league-average starter best known for taking the mound every fifth day, then Rays fans will long for the days when Archer unexpectedly bolstered Tampa’s rotation and when he showed filthy stuff, a fiery demeanor and, most importantly, promise.

Note: I have no idea if I’m the first to do this, but quite frankly I don’t care.

Last Friday against the Rockies, Matt Wieters had a plate appearance that perfectly epitomized his 2013 season. Coming to the plate in the bottom of the 3rd, with the Orioles up 2-0, two outs in the inning, and the bases loaded, Wieters worked Juan Nicasio for an eight-pitch full count; on the ninth pitch of the at-bat, Wieters hit a perfect, textbook line drive…right to DJ LeMahieu at second, for the third out of the inning.

While watching this game with my father, I was forced to restrain him from destroying the flatscreen upon which this atrocity had been viewed. My level of outrage was not nearly at that of my progenitor’s, however, for I–being more statistically inclined than him–knew that Wieters had been rather unlucky on batted balls this season; after another lineout in Saturday’s game, and two more on Tuesday against the Diamondbacks², Wieters now has a .596 BABIP on line drives, “good” for 170th out of 183 qualified players. At this late in the season, a player’s numbers start to level off to what they’ll be at season’s end, and despite the reassurances of experts, Wieters has not ceased to be unlucky.

Which got me thinking…

Would there be a way to measure how lucky or unlucky a player has been as a whole? Not just for one individual stat, but for an entire stat line, over the course of a whole season? After exhaustive Google searches returned nothing, I decided to take matters into my own hands. Using my rudimentary statistical knowledge, and the findings of Mike Podhorzer–who created equations for xK% and xBB%–and Jeff Zimmerman–who devised an xBABIP equation–I created a basic equation to determine how lucky a player has been 0verall³. Because I have absolutely no idea how linear weights and all that shit works, I kept it simple:

bFI = 100*((xK%–K%) + (BB%–xBB%) + (BABIP–xBABIP))

I call it the Basic Fortune Index; I would’ve called it the Luck Index, but I didn’t want to confuse it with Leverage Index. Basically, I took the difference between each player’s xK% and K%, BB% and xBB%, and BABIP and xBABIP, added them together, and then multiplied it by 100 for shits and giggles. Since a lucky hitter would have a lower K% than expected (as opposed to a higher BB% and BABIP than expected), I took the difference from xK% to K%, instead of the other way around. A positive bFI would indicate a lucky player, and a  negative value would indicate an unlucky player. Also, due to time constraints, I was only able to compile stats for the AL.

On to the leaderboards⁴!

Wieters ended up 70th out of the 85 players, as his xBABIP wasn’t as high as I thought it would’ve been.

After compiling this table, I noticed a trend (one that has been noticed by others before me): the “lucky” players were mainly good players, whereas the “unlucky” players were mainly bad offensive players. I then matched each player’s wRC+ up with their bFI, and made a table of the result⁵:

Apparently, the correlation was not as strong as  I had initially hoped (thanks, Dunn and Ibanez!), as the .53746 R Squared implies.

In the end, it’s probably not a very good statistic–more of a Pseudometric–which, to be fair, is why I named it the Basic Fortune Index. Like most everything I post here, there really wasn’t a point to this whole thing. In addition, it’s fairly likely that, if this is actually published, someone will be so kind as to inform me that there is already a better stat out there for determining the luck of a hitter, and that–despite the disclaimer–I should care about this. If, however, this is an original idea, I invite those more statistically knowledgeable than myself to expound upon it (assuming, of course, I receive all the credit).

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¹How should that be capitalized?

²I refuse to use their nickname, and usage of it by anyone else should be considered cause for legal euthanasia.

³I wanted to use HR/FB%, but since Parts 6 and 7 of this series were never released, I was forced to go without.

⁴All stats are as of Tuesday, August 20th.

⁵I tried to put in the graph, but couldn’t figure out how.

‘Pitching to contact’ and ‘throwing ground balls’ are classic baseball buzzwords. Twins pitching coach Rick Anderson has essentially built a career around this philosophy. It seems like every time a young pitching phenom arrives and starts striking hitters out, people start talking about how he needs to pitch to contact. The strategy has been around since this guy played, and while Kirk Rueter pitched in his last game in 2005, Kevin Correia is still hanging around and Jeremy Guthrie signed a three-year deal last offseason. And, lest we forget, Aaron Sele got a Hall of Fame vote. To take a more in-depth look at the merits of pitching to contact I grouped all 394 starting pitchers from 2002 onward (the batted ball era) who had thrown 200 or more innings, and organized them by Contact% into eight groups. The following spreadsheet details the results of my study. Groups 1-4 are classified as contact pitchers, while groups 5-8 are strikeout pitchers.

Of the Group 1 pitchers, only 5 had an xFIP- better than the league average, and only 6 had an ERA- better than league average.  Two of these were posted by aging control artists Rick Reed and David Wells, who had success on the strength of their walk rates of 4.0% and 3.7%, respectively. Chien-Ming Wang rode his 59.5 GB% to a 98 xFIP- and 99 ERA-. Overall, Nate Cornejo was more typical of the group than these three. xFIP- went down with decreasing contact, and except for a small blip between groups 2 and 3 (both contact groups), so did ERA-.

There is a strong connection here between fastball velocity and contact rates, but there is also a strong connection between fastball usage and contact rates. Group 1 had both the slowest average fastballs and the highest use of fastballs. As anyone watching Gerrit Cole and the Pirates can tell, contact rate has almost as much to do with fastball usage as fastball velocity.

Though the contact pitchers had lower walk rates than the strikeout groups, their strikeout rates were far below average. The separation between strikeout and walk rates was better for the strikeout pitchers, with an average separation of 11.3, compared to 6.7 for the contact pitchers. In terms of K/BB, the strikeout pitchers posted a 2.4 K/BB, and the contact pitchers were at 1.9 K/BB. The old adage that groundball pitchers prevent home runs did not bear out. While the contact pitchers had a groundball rate of 43.7% compared to 42.7% for the strikeout pitchers, the contact pitchers had a HR% of 2.8, and the strikeout pitchers had a HR% of 2.6. Home runs are connected to contact.

The contact pitchers also slightly underachieved their peripherals. The ERA- for the contact groups was an average of 4.5 points higher than their xFIP-, while the ERA- for the strikeout groups was on average less than 1 point higher. The contact pitchers had an average BABIP of .298 compared to the .291 for the strikeout pitchers. High strikeout pitchers can often sustain slightly lower BABIP than their counterparts.

The connection between contact and efficiency is slight. The difference in Pitches/IP was the biggest between group 1 and group 5. The difference of 0.6 Pitches/IP translates to only 120 pitches per 200 IP. While the pitch count and innings limit debate has overtaken the nature of starting pitching, pitching to contact does not seem to be the answer. Teams and pitching coaches that are advocating pitching to contact as a means to pitch longer in games are essentially sacrificing a lot of quality for a tiny amount of quantity. And with 12 or 13 man pitching staffs being the rule of the day, this strategy seems absurd.

Despite mounting evidence that pitching to contact is a futile strategy, teams keep encouraging their young pitchers to stash away their strikeout stuff in the name of efficiency. Young pitchers Nathan Eovaldi and Gerrit Cole currently own the 3rd and 4th fastest fastballs among starting pitchers. Both of them, and Cole in particular, posted very high strikeout rates in the minor leagues. Yet both of them own strikeout rates well below the NL average, and Cole and Eovaldi’s respective xFIP- rates of 99 and 101 are decidedly average.  I know, almost anybody with a good fastball can rack up a lot of strikeouts in the minors, and Eovaldi in particular has a limited repertoire that may keep him from reaching his potential. But shouldn’t young pitchers focus on developing strikeout pitches rather than trying to get ground balls? After all, fastball velocity peaks early and Cole and Eovaldi will probably have a tougher time getting outs on contact when they aren’t throwing 96. While Mike Pelfrey has carved out a decent career for himself, I’m sure most teams hope for more out of their top pitching prospects.

Strikeout rates have climbed since 2006, while league wOBA has dropped.  Responses to ballooning strikeout rates have been mixed. One response is to trade one of your best hitters, while another is to lead the MLB in home runs. Some clubs are more averse to strikeouts than others.

It’s no secret that Diamondbacks GM Kevin Towers hates strikeouts. Since taking over in 2010, Towers has discarded every Diamondbacks player who struck out 100 times or more from the 2010 club that set the major-league record for strikeouts in a season by striking out 24.7% of the time. His 2013 squad’s 18.5% strikeout rate is 10th-lowest in the majors. However, the decreased strikeout rate has not resulted in increased offense. The 2010 D-Backs scored 4.40 runs per game, posting a .325 wOBA and 93 wRC+, a shade better than that of the more contact-driven 2013 Diamondbacks who currently average 4.17 runs per game with a .313 wOBA and 92 wRC+. While the 2010 team had the 4th-best walk rate at 9.5%, the 2013 Diamondbacks are just 13th at 8.1%. Though the 2010 Diamondbacks struck out more, they also walked more, and made more quality contact, as shown by a .312 BABIP% and .166 ISO which were 2nd and 4th in the majors, respectively. The 2013 team has a .301 BABIP% and .135 ISO, good for 10th and 23rd in the majors. A look at the plate discipline numbers shows that the 2013 Diamondbacks swing at more pitches out of the strike zone and make more contact on those swings than the 2010 team.

If a hitter can cut his strikeout rate while maintaining his walk rate and power production, that is special. However, there is usually a tradeoff between power/walks and contact. After all, not everyone can be vintage Albert Pujols. To dig deeper into the balance between power and contact, I separated MLB hitters by strikeout percentage into five groups, with 30 hitters per group. I limited the study to qualified hitters, to eliminate the presence of pitchers and small sample size hitters. Not surprisingly, the first group was the clear leader in home run rate.

I included WAR even though it includes defensive and baserunning values because I thought that the contact-heavy hitters in group 5 might make up for their offensive deficiencies by being better defenders or baserunners. However, the total WAR for each group tracked offensive production for the most part. The first four groups are very close together with regards to wOBA. As I expected, the most strikeout-heavy group owned the highest walk and home run rates. Group 2 made up for its lower home run rate with a higher BABIP%. The rates of doubles were very close in all groups, ranging from 4.5% in group 5 to 5.2% in group 3. Group 5 had the lowest homerun and walk rates. Despite group 5’s ability to put the ball in play, the contact generated was of a lesser quality due to higher contact rates on pitches out of the zone. With the exception of Edwin Encarnacion, Adrian Beltre, and Buster Posey, none of the hitters in group 5 had more than 20 weighted runs above average (wRAA). The group average was 0.9 wRAA. Though group 5 had the lowest WAR of any group by a wide margin, they had the 3rd most plate appearances.

As the above table shows, there is not a significant negative connection between higher strikeout rates and offensive production. In fact, the most contact-heavy hitters are far less productive offensively than their more strikeout-prone counterparts. Of course, the plate approach of Chris Davis would not work for Marco Scutaro and vice versa. The idea of an ideal groundball rate for individual hitters has been posited. I would suggest that there is also an ideal strikeout rate for individual hitters. The following is a list of five hitters who I believe would benefit from a more or less contact-friendly approach.

Matt Holliday has trimmed his strikeout rate from 19.2% in 2012 to 14.4% this year. However, he has also trimmed his wRC+ from 141 to 137. His BABIP% is down from .337 to .312, but this is likely due to a less formidable batted ball profile, as his xBABIP% has dropped from .328 to .304. His Line Drive/Infield Fly ratio is down from 89/11 to 58/16. Furthermore, his home runs on contact has dropped from 5.7% to 4.8% and his overall homerun rate has dropped from 4.9% to 3.5%. His flyball distance has decreased from 305.15 to 294.66. A look at the PITCHf/x data shows that Holliday is swinging more and making more contact on those swings. His Swing% has jumped from 47.2 to 49.9 and his Contact% has gone from 78.5 to 81.8. His O-contact% has gone from 65.0 to 66.1 and his Z-contact from 86.1 to 89.0. While Holliday is striking out less while walking at the same rate, his swings have been noticeably less aggressive, and his overall offensive production is down.

Mike Moustakas has reduced his strikeouts even more than Matt Holliday, going from 20.2% in 2012 to 13.6% in 2012 while essentially maintaining his walk rate. However, his offensive production is down significantly, from 90 wRC+ to 79 wRC+. His home run rate has dropped from 3.3% to 2.6%, and his home runs on contact is a paltry 3.3% compared to 4.5% in 2012. His fly ball distance has dropped to 279.2 to 274.6. Moustakas’ increased contact rate has come largely from swings on balls outside of the zone, as he has seen as increase in O-Contact% from 63.7 to 74.3. During GM Dayton Moore’s tenure, the Royals have had an emphasis on putting the ball into play. Their 16.4 K% since 2007 is the lowest in the league over that time frame. However, they have only a 92 wRC+ over that span, good for 21st in the league and their BB% of 7.0 is dead last. While the Royals’ emphasis on contact appears to have helped Eric Hosmer, its application to Moustakas has had a negative impact on his production.

Adrian Gonzalez has undergone a significant change since being traded from the Padres. While playing in the spacious Petco Park Gonzalez posted home run rates between 3.8-5.9% and walk rates of 8.2-17.5%. His wRC+ numbers ranged from 123 to 156. His home run rate dipped to 3.8% in his first year at Fenway, his lowest since his first full season, but a still solid walk rate of 10.3% and a .380 BABIP% led him to an excellent 154 wRC+. Since then, his ability to draw walks and hit for power have plummeted. From 2012 to the present, Gonzalez has a 2.9 HR% and a 6.7 BB%. While Gonzalez has posted his three best contact rates since 2011, his O-Contact% has been between 70.1 and 75.9, well above his career rate of 67.1. Though Gonzalez has slightly improved his power production from 2012, his 126 wRC+ remains a far cry from his peak years. In Gonzalez’ best years, he had strikeout rates in the 17-20% range. He can still be a productive player, but the make-contact approach has taken away much of his power and walks.

Asdrubal Cabrera is posting career high strikeout and fly-ball rates in 2013. Unfortunately for him, this approach has not led to an increased power output, as his home runs on contact, average fly ball distance, and ISO are virtually unchanged from 2012. The 22.0% strikeout rate has conspired to cut his wRC+ from 113 to 91. In an effort to hit for more power, Cabrera’s contact rate has gone from 84.0% to 78.6%, a career-low figure, and his walk rate has dropped from 8.4% to 5.8%, also a career low. Though Cabrera’s BABIP%  has dropped from .303 to .286, his xBABIP% is up from .319 to .334, suggesting that he can be productive when he puts the ball in play. Not yet 28, it is time for the Indians shortstop to go back to the plate approach that made him a productive hitter in 2009-12, controlling the strike zone with a more level swing. In picture form, here is a swing from 2011 when Cabrera had a K% of 17.8 and a 119 wRC+.

 Yoenis Cespedes has improved his home runs on contact from 5.9% in 2012 to 6.4% in 2013. However, because of the jump in his strikeout rate from 18.9% to 23.9% his overall home-run rate remains at 4.3% and his ISO is basically the same. His wRC+ is only 96, compared to 136 in his debut season. Cespedes is hitting more fly balls at 47.7% compared to 39.9%, and their average distance is the same, but those fly balls have come at the expense of line drives and ground balls, which has caused his xBABIP% to sink from .305 to .279 and his actual BABIP% to go from .326 to .255. Because Cespedes is relatively new to the league, I wanted to see if pitchers are attacking him differently. However, Cespedes has been pitched to in largely the same fashion as 2012, but with slightly more fastballs and less changeups. Cespedes has been less able to hit those fastballs, as he is only 0.37 runs above average per 100 fastballs, compared to 1.71 last year. Cespedes has been seeing slightly more pitches out of the zone, as his Zone% has decreased from 46.2% to 45.1%, but his O-Zone Swing% is mostly the same. For the most part, Cespedes has been getting beat in the strike zone, as his Z-Contact% down from 84.2% to 81.0%. Because Cespedes’ raw power and athleticism are so impressive, there is a temptation to be overaggressive at the plate. He will likely always be an aggressive hitter, but if he can cut his strikeout rate to his 2012 level, it will be worth the decrease in home runs on contact.

Unlike many people, I do not think that strikeouts are inherently bad. For some hitters, the increased strikeouts are the cost of home runs and walks. Other hitters would be well served to put more balls in play while suffering a loss of power. However, start implementing a one-size fits all approach of strikeout avoidance and you’ll end up like the Royals.

I think one of the most fun parts of baseball is this part of the year; as we wind down, you can start to root for unlikely things to happen. For example, I’m kind of hoping the Pirates manage to lose at an .800+ clip and keep their sub-.500 streak alive. I’d love to see the Royals make the playoffs. Finally, I’d love to see Yasiel Puig win the NL batting title.

The rules of the game are that you have to have 502 plate appearances to win a batting title. If you’re short, you’re given an 0-fer for the rest. So if Puig finished with 492 PAs, he’d take an 0-for-10 for the purposes of the batting title. Right now, Puig is projected by STEAMER to finish the year with 435 PAs. We’ll accept that number for now, but given that number, let’s think about how likely it is that he has a high enough batting average to win the title.

The first step is to figure out the mark he needs. Let’s go with STEAMER again, and we see Michael Cuddyer, Joey Votto, Yadier Molina, and Chris Johnson all projected to finish at about .320. Let’s assume that one of those four players finishes right at his 87.5% projection (the middle of the highest quartile)…I’ll say Joey Votto, who is projected to go .302 for the rest of the year (the highest of the bunch). Using the binomial distribution, there’s a 16.2% chance Votto finishes 51/149 or better given his “true” .302 batting average. We’ll say that that is the target Puig has to reach: Votto (or one of the others) adds something like 51/149 to his current stats, for a .329 batting average.

What are the chances Puig reaches that clip? To keep it simple, let’s assume STEAMER is right on the number of PAs, ABs, and Puig’s true chance of getting a hit, and then figure out Puig’s chance of getting enough hits to finish at .329 or better. He’s going to end the year with 435 PAs and 390 ABs, if he keeps up his current pace. To that, add an 0-for-67 to get him up to 502 PAs. So he needs enough hits to have a .329 batting average in 457 ABs. That number is 150. He currently has 85 hits in 224 ABs, so for the rest of the year he needs 65 hits in 166 ABs.

Given that STEAMER projects a .293 batting average for the rest of the year, it’s pretty unlikely that he’ll hit at a .392 clip. In fact, his chances of doing so are only about 0.4%, using the binomial model.

What could help his chances? First, there’s no guarantee Votto/Johnson/Molina will get hot enough to make the mark .329. If we drop the required average to .320, using the same method as above, he’d only need 146 hits, which raises his chance to about 2.3%.

Another possibility is that he’s a better hitter than STEAMER projects. If he only regresses to .310, which would make him one of the better hitters in the league admittedly, he has about a 1.6% chance of winning the batting title. And if he is truly a .310 hitter, AND none of the other players near the top of the leaderboard stay hot enough to beat .320, Puig has a whopping 6.6% chance of winning the batting title.

Yeah, I know batting average is stupid. And I know this is a minuscule chance. But isn’t it amazing that Puig has a chance to do something like this at all, after making his debut in June? Baseball!

Besides having a great last name, Jarrod Saltalamacchia has been a productive hitter for the Red Sox. Since 2011, he has increased his wRC+ each year, posting a 94,96, and 110 wRC+ the last three years, respectively. Despite Saltalamacchia’s career-high .340 wOBA, his ISO stands at .186, a drop from the .215 and .232 numbers he posted in 2011 and 2012. After leading the Red Sox in homeruns with 25 a year ago, Salty has only 10 homeruns this year. His PA/HR  has fallen from 17.9 in 2012 to 34.0 in 2013.

Last year, 20% of Saltalamacchia’s fly balls left the park, a career-high average. This year, only 12.3% of Saltalamacchia’s fly balls have reached the seats, his lowest number since joining the Sox, and below his career 13.5%. However, a look at baseballheatmaps shows that Salty is 15th in average fly ball distance at 303.8 feet, only a little behind teammate David Ortiz who at 305.5 enjoys an 18.1% HR/FB ratio. Salty’s fly ball distance is ahead of notable AL home run leaders such as Edwin Encarnacion, Jose Bautista, Mark Trumbo, Adrian Beltre, Adam Jones, and Raul Ibanez. While Fenway is tied with Chase Field for the 3rd-most hitter-friendly park with a park factor of 105, Fenway slightly suppresses home runs. Fenway’s 97 home run factor is tied for 17th. Digging further, we find that Fenway’s home run factor for left-handed hitters is 92, the 6th lowest in baseball. The switch-hitting Saltalamacchia has generated more power from the left side of the plate, as only 7 of his 51 homeruns in a Red Sox uniform have come from the right side of the plate despite experiencing 23% of his plate appearances from that side. However Fenway’s quirky dimensions do not appear to be swallowing up Salty’s flyballs, as his HR/FB ratio is 17.4% at home, compared to a paltry 5.7% on the road. Chalk this up to randomness, and expect Salty’s HR/FB ratio to move closer to 15%.

A further explanation for Saltalamacchia’s decreased power lies in a changed plate approach. While Saltalamacchia’s home run to fly ball ratio is low, his BABIP is very high, at .376, a huge increase from last year’s .265. Much of the increase can be attributed to a line drive rate of 28.6%, a jump from the 22.8% he posted in 2012. The line drives have come partly at the expense of fly balls, as Salty’s fly-ball rate has fallen from 46.6% in 2012 to 40.7% in 2013. All this has combined to produce an xBABIP of .344.  The graphs below illustrate Saltalamacchia’s uptick in line drives and decrease in fly balls and the corresponding change in BABIP%.

Looking at these charts, it appears that Saltalamacchia has gone to a more BABIP-friendly approach by trading fly balls for line drives. While this has resulted in a decrease in his ISO from .232 to .186, his overall offensive production has increased. His wRC+ climbed from 96 in 2012 to 110 in 2013.  For catchers with at least 250 PA, Salty’s wRC+ rose from 21st in 2012 to 8th in 2013. Though Saltalamacchia’s line-drive approach has reaped dividends, expecting a .376 BABIP the rest of the way is being unrealistic. Most likely, the BABIP will regress some, but the HR/FB ratio should improve. Saltalamacchia will likely maintain a similar level of production the rest of the way, but it will likely come in the form of a decreased batting average and increased ISO.