Archive for Player Analysis

2015 was the year of Bryce Harper. He led qualified hitters with a 197 wRC+, the highest since the turn of the century among players not named Barry Bonds. This was a vast improvement on his already-impressive 2014 season, in which he totaled a 115 wRC+.

Depending on how you look at things, you could say Bryce Harper was the most improved batter in 2015. I choose not to for two reasons: 1) it’s too easy, and 2) it makes this article more fun. There’s also another more objective reason: with only 395 plate appearances in 2014, Harper didn’t qualify for the batting title.

This poses a question: what minimum do we set to determine who improved the most between 2014 and 2015? If we say that the player needed to qualify for the batting title each year, we get Chris Davis as the most improved batter, who increased his wRC+ from 94 in 2014 to 147 in 2015. If we set no minimum, our wonder-boy is none other than notorious slugger Carlos Torres, the Mets pitcher who upped his wRC+ from -100 to 491.

Clearly, there needs to be some minimum. For the purpose of the article, I’ve decided to set it at 100 PA. This seems a reasonably small enough number to include a wide array of players, but large enough to get rid of anomalies (I’m looking at you Carlos). When we set this minimum, we discover that the batter whose wRC+ increased the most between 2014 and 2015 is… Ryan Raburn. However, since Jeff Sullivan already talked about Raburn, I decided to go with the next name on the list: J.B. Shuck.

If you don’t know who that is, I don’t blame you. I didn’t until I started this research. If you do know him, I’m going to guess that you’re either a White Sox, Indians, or Angels fan. Either that, or you have more time to watch baseball than a college student taking a full course-load of credits. Who’s to say?

The reason the casual fan might not know Shuck is because, well, he’s not exactly a star player. Here are the players with the lowest wRC+ in 2014 of those with at least 100 PAs:

That’s right, he was literally the worst batter that year. Almost as bad as if I were to join the majors. It should be no surprise, then, that he was able to improve so much — he had the lowest starting point. Even so, he still had needed to improve quite drastically in order to surpass Harper’s wRC+ improvement. And that’s exactly what he did:

In 2015, Shuck improved so much that he almost managed to be an average player. But how did he manage to do it? Was it a matter of luck, or did he actually get better?

The number that stands out the most in Shuck’s 2014 season is his .146 BABIP (batting average on balls in play). For those of you that don’t know, that number is quite bad. Like, less than half of what it should be. His BABIP in other seasons is right around league average, so something must have gone amiss last year. Looking at the underlying numbers, some things showed up:

So. His FB% and Pull% numbers were way up as compared to other years. For some context, the league-average FB% has been approximately 34% the past two years, while Pull% has been approximately 40%. These numbers suggest that Shuck spent too much time trying to pull the ball over the fence two years ago, and the video suggests the same thing. Here’s an example of him trying to do just this to a pitch on the outside corner, but instead weakly grounding to first. You can see how he opens his hips before he even starts his swing, forcing him to simply slap at the ball if he wants to make any contact:

And here he is in 2015, driving a similar pitch into left field:

The cause of his change in approach is hard to say. He did get a new hitting coach to start off the year, switching from Jim Eppard to Don Baylor. From 2013 to 2014, the Angels as a team increased their FB% from 33% to 34% and their Pull% from 37% to 42%, so that argument does have some merit. Regardless of the reason, it’s clear that it had an effect. Here’s Shuck’s ISO by zone:

As can be seen on the left, Shuck had trouble hitting anything not on the inside edge of the plate in 2014. This past year, he learned to control more of the strike zone, and even though there’s less red than there was in 2014, there’s also a lot less dark blue. Shuck drove the ball from all parts of the zone to all parts of the field, and his numbers improved because of it.

While Shuck may not be an All-Star anytime soon, his year-to-year improvement is truly remarkable. If he can go from being the worst hitter in baseball to an average one, anyone can. And if that doesn’t inspire the Brendan Ryans of the world, I don’t know what will.

A few days ago, Joe Posnanski wrote about the possibility of Bryce Harper getting the first $500m contract ever. I agree with him on how both amazing and ridiculous it would have sounded 2 or 3 years ago. I also agree it is possible, almost likely, to happen. I might not be a Bryce Harper fan but he is so young that is he is on track to accomplish big things. He is not Mike ‘King’ Trout but he is very good.

Harper’s current contract runs through the end of 2018, which is when I assume he would get the big fat check. The Nationals will try to extend his contract before he is a free agent, just like the Marlins and the Angels did with Giancarlo Stanton and Mike Trout. However, in this post we will assume Harper will not pursue that path, making him a highly-coveted free agent in 2018. I will also exclude the possibility of 9- or 10-year contracts, which would make the mark easily achievable. Let’s run the numbers for Harper’s future:

We have here Harper’s projected value profile. As usual, I am using FanGraphs’ model, which has a player’s aging curve that follows +0.25 WAR/year (Age 18-27), 0 WAR/year (Age 28-30),-0.5 WAR/year (Age 31-37),-0.75 WAR/year (38 and older). It also assumes that open-market WAR sits at $8.4m in 2016 and grows at 5% per year. The starting point is Steamer’s 2016 projection: 6.8 WAR.

Three years from now, in the winter of 2018, he will be negotiating his new contract that includes his theoretical peak 27-30 years at ~7.8 WAR/year. The truth is that a 7-year / $500m+ contract would only be likely if by 2018 he can position himself as a player who consistently accounts for almost 8 wins per year. That is the only reason a team would be eager to invest half a billion dollars in a single player, marketing-related reasons aside.

Now, the question comes down to what he needs to do by 2018 in order to cement that positioning. The model needs him to be a 21.2-win player during the next 3 seasons. While Harper might have taken a significant step up performance-wise, we need to remind ourselves that before 2015 he was “just” a ~4-5 WAR guy. In order to meet the model’s expectations he needs to double those numbers, and remain at that level  for 3 years in a row (i.e.: Between 8-9 WAR for that 3-year period). If he meets those marks, Harper would have accrued 40 WAR during his career by 2018. While that is entirely possible, it is not easy. This is the list of highest cumulative WAR by age-25:

So, two conclusions can be quickly drawn. First, Mike Trout is not human. He is only 24 years old and is already on this list with guys like Cobb, Mantle, Foxx and company. Second, no, it is not an easy task for Harper. I know that you are thinking that he just put up a 9.5 WAR season, why can’t he do it again? Another season like that and he should get to his target easily but, truth be told, those Trout-esque seasons are unlikely to happen. I say this for three main reasons. First, Harper is not an elite defender and has gotten worse every year. For the last 3 seasons (2013-2015), he ranks 37^th in UZR/150 out of 60 qualified OF. In 2015, he compiled -8.5 on Defense (Def) metric, per FanGraphs, which is position-adjusted, in his case for RF. Out of the 69 individual seasons with 8 or higher WAR from players 25 or younger, only 5 players (Hank Aaron, Ted Williams, Stan Musial, Mike Trout (!) and Bryce Harper) had -8 or worse Defense. No, it is not impossible but it is hard.

Second, he is an above-average baserunner, but not an awesome one. Lastly, Harper has not exhibited good health over his career. He has had injuries in 2 out of 4 seasons, which may not seem many but in 2013 and 2014 he only played 67% of Nationals games. Predicting health is tough, especially because there are unforeseeable events. You cannot control a hit by pitch at your wrists or a concussion sliding in second base but your health track record is your best bet on your future injury report. Those three things are vital to get to 21.2 WAR during the next 3 years. Harper needs those factors to come in play in order to get to the 7yr/$500m contract. Harper’s advantage is his age – just like Jason Heyward this offseason.

We have implicitly talked about Mike Trout. He is arguably the best player in baseball right now and was on track to smash the contract record, until he negotiated a 6yr/$144.5m contract extension. That will keep him locked up from ages 24 to 29 at LAA. Now, the question is what type of contract will he command in 2020? Mind you, it is hard enough to try to predict what a Free Agent might get in 2016, but still we took a stab a it.

Here is Trout’s projection. Again, 2016 WAR is courtesy of Steamer. We might think the aging curve slightly benefits Trout because it forecasts a ~10% increase in WAR, and he has not posted those 10 WAR seasons since 2 years ago. Then again, let’s toy with the idea. The $500m contract here seems more feasible for three reasons. First, in MLB, you get paid for what you did and not for what you will do.  By 2020, Trout could have ~85 WAR under his belt –he would be 28 years old. That is just ridiculous and will not happen, right? No one, ever, has done that by age 28 (Ty Cobb is the leader with 78.6 WAR). But what if he does? What if Trout is around the 70 WAR mark with 8 or 9 great seasons on his resume? Second, he needs to do what he has already done e.g. Trout has posted two +10 WAR already. The other two seasons were 8 and 9. This guy runs well and plays above-average defense. Trout does it all and will not stop. Third, unlike Harper, Trout has been very much healthy. During the 2013-2015 period, he played 157, 157 and 159 games, respectively. Again, injuries are hard to predict but we will take what he has shown so far as a given, which is good health. Fourth, fair to say, time value of money. A dollar today is not worth the same as a dollar tomorrow. Therefore, getting a $500m contract in 2020 should be easier than in 2018.

In summary, I think Harper can do it but I would not bet on it. From my perspective this is a long shot. If you ask me today on who is more likely to become baseball’s first 500-million-dollar man, I would put my money on Mike Trout to beat Bryce Harper on this as well.

Note: This analysis is also featured in our emerging blog www.theimperfectgame.com

Only a few of the major free-agent names remain available as we approach the new year. One of the most intriguing is Alex Gordon. He’s not only been an excellent fielder over the course of his career, but he’s also been an above-average hitter. His age-25 and 26 seasons were cut short by injury and I think we can give some leeway to a 23-year-old rookie for not having an above-average bat, but otherwise he’s had an excellent career. Here’s are his stats throughout his career:

There’s no doubt that he’s a great baseball player. He’s also accumulated 3 seasons with 6+ WAR since his rookie season. But there’s always the question as to whether a player has peaked or not, especially when their age starts creeping into the 30s. To try and answer this I look at the OPS values he’s put up over the years and extrapolated those numbers into his age-40 season. Below, in black, are the seasons that he’s already played. I’ve also included a line-of-best-fit through the data with the black portion representing past seasons and the red portion representing his future offensive output. Based on the seasons he’s put together, the model predicts that he will peak at about 34 years of age. Most players peak in their late 20s, but it’s not unheard of for players to peak later. Projections should always be taken with a grain of salt, but whichever team decides to take a shot on Gordon could expect his offensive production to remain relatively constant over the next few years.

So what does this graph tell us? Well basically nothing! It’s not very good practice to extrapolate past the range of your data, but it is interesting nonetheless. Also, considering Gordon has been so good for so long it’s tough to assume that he hasn’t peaked yet. That’s not to say he can’t continue to improve or even perform at a high level, but since it’s getting later in the offseason and so much money has been thrown at pitchers let’s assume he signs for 4 years. Below are his projected OPS values and as you can see from the graph above that Gordon may not even be in his offensive prime.

So far I’ve shown you data for Gordon’s career and also used that data to project his performance over the next 4 years. Assuming he signs a 4-year contract this off-season I wanted to find his closest comparables from his career so far and see how those players performed through their age-35 season. In order to compare players I used the Mahalanobis distance for all players that fell into the following criteria; (1) played in every season from their age 29 to 31 seasons, (2) at least 1200 ABs over that time and (3) played every season in their age 32-35 seasons. The Mahalanobis distance was calculated using common offensive statistics standardized by the number of at-bats. Here is a table with the lowest Mahalanobis Distance’s to Alex Gordon through his career thus far as well as their cumulative WAR for their age 32-35 seasons.

Last year Dave Cameron broke down the cost for WAR here and found the number to be somewhere around $7 million. Tim Dierkes projected a 5-year, $105-million contract or roughly $21 million per year. In order to live up to that annual salary, he would have to produce about 3 WAR per season which is 12 WAR for a 4-year contract and 15 WAR for a 5-year contract. Melvin Mora, Jim Edmonds, Ken Caminiti and Lou Whitaker each exceeded that 3-WAR threshold.

As this offseason progresses, offers will undoubtedly be presented to his agent so now it’s only a matter of when he signs. Based on the players that he was compared to, Alex Gordon definitely has the potential, not to mention the ability to exceed the standards of the contract he inevitably signs.

This week we will be following up on our previous piece regarding Least Valuable Players. There we identified Hanley Ramirez and Pablo Sandoval as the two worst performers of the 2015 season. We are not fans of beating the proverbial dead horse, but given that this was just the first year of their respective contracts we were interested in figuring out just how bad these deals are shaping up for the Red Sox.  The short answer? It is bad. Like, Lucas Duda throwing to home in high-pressure situations bad.

As you might recall, during the 2015 season Sandoval accumulated a -2 WAR whilst Hanley finished up with a -1.8 WAR.  Even after that woeful start, the Red Sox are still on the hook for 5 more years and $89.4 million for Sandoval, and 4 years and a total $90.25 million for Hanley. Just let that sink in for a minute: 9 seasons of potentially below-replacement-level performance for $180 million. That makes the Barry Zito deal sound like a real steal.

For the sake of argument, they do not have to be that bad for the rest of the contract, do they? I mean, these guys were 3-win players just two seasons ago; maybe this was just a hiccup. Well, Steamer seems to partially agree with this logic and projects them to improve substantially. More precisely, it projects Sandoval to have 1.8 WAR and Hanley 2.2 WAR during 2016. Returning to these levels of performance is something, but is it enough to salvage these deals?

We replicate the player assessment analyses we used in our piece comparing offseason splurges in pitchers, just to figure out the net value of these deals.  We use Steamer’s 2016 projections as a starting point for WAR and then apply a player aging curve that goes as follows:  WAR increases annually by +0.25 for ages 18-27, stays flat for ages 28-30, decreases annually by -0.5 for ages 31-37 and lastly decreases annually by -0.75 for ages 38 and above. With regards to the market value of wins we start off at $8 million per win and we apply a 5% yearly inflation rate.

Even after considering the improvements suggested by Steamer, none of the 9 seasons controlled by the Red Sox would produce a net positive value, and overall the net loss of these deals comes at $79.4 million.

We ran the numbers, and in order for the Red Sox to recoup their investments, even after letting 2015 go down as a sunk cost, Sandoval would have to accrue 10.35 WAR for the rest of the contract (73% more than the projection), whilst Hanley would have to accumulate 10.56 WAR (82% more than the projection). This seems to be rather unlikely, especially when you consider that the Steamer projection already seems bullish, implying a 4 WAR improvement between seasons.

We wanted to test just how bullish this prediction is. We set out to find the past seasons most like the ones Sandoval and Hanley just endured and tried to identify how those players fared off the year after as well as for the rest of their careers.  We searched the last 30 seasons for players between the ages of 28 and 32, that produced a -1.5 WAR or worse in at least 400 PA, after accumulating at least 5 WAR in the previous two seasons. Namely, we were searching for players that had been performing at a high level, still in their prime or early phases of decline, which suddenly plummeted in performance.

Lo and behold the mother of small samples. We found just 5 players that met these requirements, 4 of them are already retired and one of them, well, one of them also plays for the Red Sox.  Out of these five players four of them improved after their decline season, the other one was out of the game. Out of the ones that improved, only one, Joe Carter, was able to meet the 4 WAR improvement inherent to the Steamer prediction, actually he was the only one that was better than replacement level after the decline season. So far Joe Carter has also been the only one able to play more than one season in the majors after the decline, with the jury still out on Allen Craig.

Just how good were Joe Carter’s first five seasons after the decline? Well he won back-to-back World Series with the Blue Jays, starred in one of the most memorable moments of baseball history and amassed a total of 9.4 WAR; a figure similar to what would be required for either Hanley or Sandoval to break even in their contracts. Just how bad is the alternative? Another season of negative WAR (-1 is the average for those not named Joe Carter) and 0 WAR from then on; a scenario like this would produce net value losses for the Red Sox close to $200 million or 150% more than what emanates from the Steamer scenario.

I know that we are dealing with extremely small sample sizes, but entertain this thought for a second. Let’s imagine that the above players represent the universe of possibilities and hence Pablo and Hanley each have a 20% chance of becoming Joe Carter and returning a net value of 0, that means breaking even and getting fair value for investment, and 80% of teetering off and producing a net loss of around $100 million.  Under that scenario the expected value of keeping both players comes somewhere at a net loss of $160 million over the life of the contracts. That is not necessarily crippling as it translates roughly to 3-4 lost wins per year, but these bad decisions can find a way to add up quickly.

Based on this, the Red Sox would certainly welcome another Dodger bailout, however this time around they might have to add additional value for a deal to go through. Moving forward the Red Sox might want to pursue one of three alternatives. First off, they might use that $160 million expected net loss value as an upper bound of how much they would be willing to send (in either money or player value) to another team as compensation for taking these contracts off their hands. Secondly, they could settle on the Steamer projection and set that upper bound on $80 million. Lastly, they could try to make the other team believers of the Joe Carter dream, and try to get away with not sending anything else, and even hoping to get something of value back in return, but this seems rather unlikely.  In theory by sending something (money or players) of less value than those upper bound figures to facilitate the deals they would be effectively cutting their losses.

With regards to the debate between sending some money or a player with value to make the deal work, it should be noted that $160 million in net player value over 5 years is something like Xander Bogaerts and a Top 25-50 prospect. Despite all the good will that recent deals have gained Dombrowski, there is no way Red Sox Nation would look kindly into giving up that kind of talent just to undo a mistake. The Red Sox are looking to become consistently competitive for the years to come and it does not make much sense to mortgage the team’s present and future by giving up so much controllable high-end talent. It may be time for the Red Sox to leverage their financial fortitude, bite the bullet, subsidize part of the contracts if need be, and move on.

For the first six years of his career, Evan Longoria was the best position player in baseball based on WAR (as FanGraphs calculates it). Despite losing over a season’s worth of games to various injuries during that time, his combination of tremendous hitting and elite defense at the hot corner made him a superstar when healthy.

Then 2014 happened. Injuries weren’t the issue, as Longoria played all 162 games for the first time, but his production cratered. He batted .253/.320/.404—well below his career averages of .275/.357/.512 coming into the season. He’d been so good up to that point, though, and he was only 28, so his off year appeared to be nothing more than a fluke. Surely Tampa Bay’s $100-million third baseman would bounce back.

He didn’t. His numbers improved slightly, to .270/.328/.435, but his 2015 was essentially the same as his 2014. Once again he was healthy, appearing in all but two games, making his struggles even more mystifying. That made two down years in a row for Longoria, in what were supposed to be his prime years.

Unless there’s a career-altering injury involved, great athletes typically don’t fall off a cliff in their late 20s. Oftentimes, they get better. They’re still young enough to be at their physical peaks, but also experienced enough to have acclimated to major-league competition. These are supposed to be an athlete’s greatest seasons.

For Longoria, they have been his worst.

Over the last couple years, Longoria has slipped from a great player to a merely good one, declining in all facets of the game. It’s been five years since he won his last Gold Glove, with defensive metrics suggesting he’s now closer to an average fielder than the vacuum cleaner he was previously. His baserunning has also fallen off considerably. Once an asset with his legs, he’s managed just 14 steals and provided negative value on the basepaths over the past five years.

Defense and speed peak early, however, so it’s not surprising that Longoria lost some of both as he approached 30. What’s concerning is how he’s become a league-average hitter after previously producing like David Ortiz.

A major red flag is Longoria’s plummeting walk rate, which has declined every year since 2011. Once a very patient hitter, he’s now drawing free passes at a league-average rate. Longoria’s chasing, and hitting, more pitches outside the zone than ever before, which explains both his eroding walk rates and hard-hit frequencies. When batters expand the strike zone, their swings become longer and generate weaker contact. After swinging at just a quarter of pitches outside the strike zone in 2013–tied for 20th out of 140 qualified batters–he’s chased over 31 percent of non-strikes each of the last two years, falling back to the pack in this department.

It’s no secret that older players become more aggressive to compensate for diminished bat speed, as they have to guess more often and start their swing earlier to catch up with fastballs. It could also be that Longoria is responding to an increase in first-pitch strikes. Whereas his first-pitch-strike percentage was below the league average every year from 2009-2013, he’s seen more first-pitch strikes than average over the past two seasons combined. When batters fall behind early, they can’t afford to be patient and are at the pitcher’s mercy. In 2015 the league hit just .225/.265/.344 after going down 0-1. Longoria isn’t much better, batting .234/.277/.388 for his career after first-pitch strikes. Since he’s seeing more of those, it follows that his numbers have nosedived. As for why Longoria’s seeing more first-pitch strikes, the larger strike zone is likely to blame, but pitchers also appear to be challenging him more often.

What’s really troubling, though, is Longoria’s evaporating power. After averaging 33 home runs per 162 games with a .237 ISO through his first six seasons, he’s averaged just 22 long balls with a .158 ISO over the past two. His doubles were down too, from 41 per 162 games to 31, so it’s not like he was just getting unlucky with his HR/FB rates (though he did post the lowest one of his career–10.8 percent–in both 2014 and 2015). He’s not trading contact for power, either, as his strikeout rates and contact rates have held steady.

The reason for Longoria’s diminished power is simple and one I alluded to earlier; he’s not hitting the ball as hard as he used to. After reaching a high of 41.5 percent in 2013, his hard-hit rate crashed to 32.1 percent in 2014 and 30.6 percent last year. Meanwhile, his soft-contact rate nearly doubled from 2013 to 2015. This data, along with his rising infield-fly rates (he popped up as often as he homered last year) and shrinking fly-ball distances, suggests he’s not squaring up the ball as well as he used to. That’s a side effect of hacking, to be sure, but also reflects his waning bat speed and exit velocity.

Recent studies have shown that position players are peaking earlier than they used to, closer to age 26, and it appears that’s what happened with Longoria. His seemingly premature decline has likely been accelerated by injuries suffered early in his career as well as the rigors of playing a demanding defensive position. On that note,  his career seems to be following the same path as David Wright’s. Both peaked early and were at their best in their mid-20s, looking like future Hall of Famers. Then their performance started suffering in their late 20s, because of injuries with Wright and the reasons outlined above with Longoria (both were hurt by their home parks as well). Wright has yet to recapture the consistent greatness he exhibited through his first five seasons and, should Longoria continue on his current trajectory, neither will he.

After the announcement of the Cy Young and MVP winners, the award season is officially over and the offseason is in full stride. Most, except perhaps Royals and Mets fans, have moved on from the 2015 season and are focused on the year ahead. However, before doing so, I wanted to answer one final question about the past season: Who were the league’s Least Valuable Players (LVPs)?

Inspired by Neil Paine’s piece on Bryce Harper and the MVP I define the LVPs as position players (with at least 400 plate appearances) that not only had a bad year in terms of performance, but had an even worse performance relative to the salary they were being paid.

Why the distinction?  First off, most teams, with a few apparent exceptions (I’m looking at you Dodgers) have some sort of payroll limitation. Therefore having an expensive player stink up the place limits the opportunity that teams have to replace them via free agency or trade.

Secondly, it is my initial assumption, that underperforming players with large contracts may get disproportionally more playing time than similarly underperforming players with cheap contracts. This might be because teams hope that by giving players a chance to work things out at the plate they may salvage their initial investment or even entice another team to take a flyer with them. This, in the end, might be compounding the issue in the long-term as it robs the team the opportunity to try out existing farm-level talent at the position for instance.

It should be noted that it is possible that unlike most replacement-level players, underperforming players with big contracts were at some point actually good players and might have some other intrinsic value for their teams (i.e.: leadership, tradition, marketing, etc.) that justifies playing time; think of Ken Griffey Jr during his last few seasons or Derek Jeter’s farewell tour. However, for the intents and purposes of this article we will not be discounting player’s terribleness by any of these measures.

As far as methodology goes we will be replicating Paine’s approach from the previously mentioned article. FanGraphs calculates the monetary value of a player by estimating how much teams spent during the preceding offseason per projected WAR and then multiplying this value by accrued WAR during the season to get a sense of how much those wins above replacement would’ve cost in the “open market”. Then, from this “open market” value we subtract the actual salary (or rather salary cap hit from spotrac) of the players to get a grasp for their relative value or net value. In the case of over performing players this would turn into a value surplus for the team, whilst for underperforming players this would represent an additional cost for the team.

For example, per FanGraphs, the cost of a win in the 2015 offseason was approximately $8 million. Mike Trout accumulated WAR of 9.0 during the year, which means that the value his 2015 season was around $72 million. Meanwhile, his salary was a “mere” $6.1 million, which makes the surplus for the Angels somewhere around $66 million. In other words, the Angels paid $6.1 million in salary to get $72 million worth in production, which is a bargain of historic proportions.  Conversely, during the 2015 season Ryan Howard accumulated a WAR of -0.4, which translates into a -$3.2 million value. Not only that, but Howard was paid a cool $25 million for his services, which means that the true cost to the Phillies was of $28.2 million. In other words Philadelphia invested $25 million to get -$3.2 million in production, which over time is the kind of decision that leads to this.

So without further ado here are our Top 50 LVPs from the 2015 season:

The American League LVP is a tight race between two teammates in which Hanley Ramirez narrowly beats out Pablo Sandoval, even after failing to accumulate enough plate appearances to qualify for the batting title. Meanwhile, Ryan Howard stands head and shoulders above the competition in the National League specially after considering that the Dodgers heavily subsidized Matt Kemp’s salary.

When considering teams most affected by this subset of underperforming stars we can highlight the Red Sox and White Sox leading the way with over $60 million of net value lost each seriously shooting themselves in the foot as both had aspired to contend in 2015.  This was particularly damning for Boston; had they not had these terrible contracts on hand, and holding all else constant, the Red Sox would have finished with the 6th best positional net value in the AL, ahead of playoff teams like the Astros, Rangers and Yankees and with sufficient cash to spend to shore up their well-documented starting rotation deficiencies.

Lastly, it’s worth noting the vast number of players on the list that were signed as free agents, extended or traded for during the past year. All in all roughly half of the players on this list fit that description, which is something to keep in mind when your team announces its next big move during the coming offseason (uh-oh).

Note: This analysis is also featured in our emerging blog www.theimperfectgame.com

The idea for the graphs in this article started with a post I read at Tom Tango’s website, which linked to this article. That article gave further credit to Sky Kalkman. Jeff Zimmerman also had a post in 2009 with this graphical representation, so be aware that I’m building off of the work of others, with some changes.

The methodology:

• I used only BBWAA-elected Hall of Fame players. Since I’m looking at players currently up for election by the BBWAA, I thought it would be best to look at players previously voted in by the BBWAA. The BBWAA has a higher standard for entry than the various Veterans Committees. Many of the Hall of Fame players with the lowest WAR totals were put in by Veterans or Old Timers Committees.
• I separated catchers from the rest of the hitters. I also created two graphs for relief pitchers. One compares relievers to all pitchers. The other compares relievers to just BBWAA-elected relievers.
• I used FanGraphs WAR. The articles I linked to above used Sean Smith’s WAR database, which uses Baseball-Reference WAR.
• BBWAA-elected Hall of Fame players are ranked by their highest WAR season to lowest WAR season.
• All of the highest season values for the Hall of Famers were grouped together, then the second highest seasons, then the third highest seasons, etc.
• When the WAR values went negative, they were zeroed out from that point forward.
• I found the 75^th, 50^th, and 25^th percentile for each season. This band is shaded in gray, with the black line representing the 50^th

The “No-Doubters” Tier

Barry Bonds (164.4 WAR, seasons above the median: all)—Setting aside the PED issue and focusing on just what he did on the field, Barry Bonds could be in a two-man Hall of Fame with Babe Ruth (168.4 hitting WAR). They are both nearly 15 WAR ahead of the next player, Willie Mays (149.9 WAR). Then again, if you add in the 12.4 WAR Babe Ruth earned for his pitching, the gap between Ruth and Bonds is greater than the gap between Bonds and Mays. Babe Ruth could be in his own personal Hall of Fame, where the hot dogs are always cooked to perfection and the beer flows freely.

Pre-1999 Barry Bonds (99.2 WAR)—The purple line on the graph represents the best 13 years of Barry Bonds career before the 1999 season, which is when it is commonly thought Bonds started using PEDs. Even if Bonds had retired before his incredible stretch of seasons from 2001 to 2004, he looks like an easy Hall of Famer.

Jeff Bagwell (80.2 WAR, seasons above the median: 13)—Bagwell compares favorably to Ken Griffey, Jr. His best three years are surpassed by Griffey’s best three years, but Bagwell had a longer stretch of seasons well above the Hall of Fame median. On the MLB Network recently, I heard Ken Rosenthal discussing Bagwell and Piazza’s Hall of Fame case with regard to the voters. Rosenthal suggested that some voters have hesitated to vote for Bagwell and Piazza because of the possibility they used PEDs and the fear that if they are elected and we find out down the road that they used PEDs, this would have implications for Bonds and Clemens. Essentially, if they find out there is a player in the Hall of Fame who has used PEDs, then how do they then justify not voting for Bonds or Clemens? To be clear, Rosenthal doesn’t feel this way himself; he was just explaining how other voters may feel.

Ken Griffey, Jr. (77.7 WAR, seasons above the median: 10)—He’ll go in easily. Like Frank Thomas before him, the writers feel Griffey was clean. Whether that’s true or not, we don’t really know. His best 10 seasons were at or above the median Hall of Fame level and he has five other seasons in the gray zone.

The “In the Conversation” Tier

Larry Walker (68.7 WAR, seasons above the median: 6)—Remember, these are BBWAA-elected Hall of Fame players and the gray zone represents the 25^th to 75^th percentile seasons for those players. Larry Walker has an interesting line. His two best seasons were at or above the two best seasons of the Hall of Fame median but his third through sixth best seasons drop below that level. His remaining seasons in descending order are generally close to the median. Other factors that likely hurt him with the BBWAA voters are his games played in Coors Field and that he always seemed to miss 20 or more games each year. In his 17-year career, Walker only played 150 or more games one time.

Mark McGwire (66.3 WAR, seasons above the median: 5)—McGwire’s line is similar to Walker’s, but with fewer seasons below the 25^th percentile level early in his career. McGwire’s sixth-best through tenth-best seasons are above the median, but he drops off quickly after his best 11 seasons.

Alan Trammell (63.7 WAR, seasons above the median: 1)—Trammell is consistently in the range between the 25^th and 50^th percentiles, but it isn’t until his 14^th best season where he is above the median for the Hall of Fame groups’ 14^th best season. More than half of the shortstops in the Hall of Fame were non-BBWAA selections. Trammell has more career WAR than many of those players, but beats out only one BBWAA-elected shortstop, Luis Aparicio. Trammell has been on the ballot for 14 years. His high total in voting was 36.8% in 2012, but he dropped to 25.1% last year. This is his final chance with the BBWAA.

Edgar Martinez (65.5 WAR, seasons above the median: 5)—Edgar has some things going against him. First off, playing primarily as a DH hurts him in the eyes of many voters. Second, based on the chart above, Edgar didn’t have the peak that many BBWAA-elected Hall of Famers had, as his five best seasons are in the gray zone between the 25^th and 50^th percentile. His sixth through tenth best seasons are above the zone and he does have 10 seasons with 4.7 or more WAR. That hasn’t been enough for the voters so far. His vote totals have dropped in each of the last three years.

The “Another Tier, Much Like the Previous Tier” Tier

Tim Raines (66.4 WAR, seasons above the median: 3)—Raines is a favorite candidate of many who is thought to be underrated and under-appreciated by Hall of Fame voters. He has gained support over the years, though, moving from 24.3% in his first year on the ballot to a peak of 55.0% last year. His place on the chart above shows that he’s similar to Alan Trammell. They both had long careers consistently in the gray zone below the median. Compared to the other BBWAA-elected hitters, Raines is a borderline candidate. He wouldn’t raise the level of BBWAA-elected hitters, but he’s better than some recent inductees. That being said, I added Tony Gwynn to this graph and it’s easy to see how similar Gwynn and Raines were in WAR. Gwynn made the Hall of Fame in his first year on the ballot. The key difference for voters may have been their distribution of hits and walks. Gwynn had 3,141 hits and 790 walks, for a total of hits plus walks of 3,931. Raines had 2,605 hits and 1,330 walks, for a total of hits plus walks of 3,935. Those 3,000 hits go a long way. Despite that, there isn’t enough of a separation between them that one should sail right in on his first ballot (97.6%) and the other gets 24.3% on his first ballot.

Jim Edmonds (64.5 WAR, seasons above the median: 5)—Half of Edmonds’ ten best 10 seasons were above the median Hall of Fame level and the other five were in the gray zone. His 11^th best and beyond seasons fall short.

Gary Sheffield (62.1 WAR, seasons above the median: 2)—Despite being such different players, Sheffield’s line is very similar to Tony Gwynn’s line, with a similar pattern of highs and lows. It’s uncanny.

The “It’s Not the Hall of Good” Tier

Fred McGriff (56.9 WAR), Jeff Kent (56.1 WAR)—Jeff Kent and The Crime Dog were good players with long careers, but they don’t compare favorably with other BBWAA-elected Hall of Fame hitters.

Nomar Garciaparra (41.4 WAR)—Six of Nomar’s first seven seasons were worth 4.8 WAR or more, but it was a steep drop-off from there. He played 14 seasons and those six seasons accounted for 92% of his career WAR.

The “New Guys Who Don’t Have a Chance” Tier

The eight players on the above two charts are unlikely to get the 5% needed to stay on the ballot, but they may get some scattered votes here and there. In case you were wondering, that 8-win season for Troy Glaus came in 2000 when he hit .284/.404/.604, with 120 runs, 47 home runs, 102 RBI, and 14 steals. He was fourth in the AL in WAR but didn’t receive a single MVP vote. The winner that year was Jason Giambi (with 7.7 WAR).

The Catchers

Mike Piazza (62.5 WAR, seasons above the median: 10)—Piazza is on the cusp of entry into the Hall of Fame. His voting totals have gone from 57.8% to 62.2% to 69.9%. Based on his numbers, he should have been voted in three years ago. Hopefully, he’ll get the 75% needed for induction this time around.

Jason Kendall (39.8 WAR)—Kendall has more career WAR than a couple of Veterans Committee inductees (Rick Ferrell and Ray Schalk) and more WAR than Roy Campanella, who had his career start late and end early. Kendall had six seasons with 3.9 WAR or more, which is impressive, but he doesn’t compare to the BBWAA-elected Hall of Fame catchers.

Brad Ausmus (17.2 WAR)—Ausmus hit .251/.325/.344 in one of the best eras for hitting in the history of the game. Imagine how poorly he would have hit had he played in the 1960s.

Starting Pitchers

Roger Clemens (133.7 WAR, season above the median: all)—Roger Clemens is the Barry Bonds of pitchers. They were both well above the median of BBWAA-elected Hall of Fame players and they are trapped in Hall of Fame voter purgatory for the time being, both with roughly 37% of the vote on last year’s ballot. They have seven more years on the ballot.

Mike Mussina (82.2 WAR, season above the median: 12)—Mussina and Schilling are an interesting comparison. Schilling’s six best seasons are better than Mussina’s six best seasons. From their sixth-best seasons and beyond, Mussina was better. Mussina has been on the ballot two years and saw his vote total go from 20.3% to 24.6%. Compared to other BBWAA-elected Hall of Fame starting pitchers, both seem worthy of induction.

Curt Schilling (79.7 WAR, season above the median: 12)—Schilling and Mussina both had 12 seasons above the median and similar WAR totals, but Schilling has the edge in voting so far. Schilling has been on the ballot three years, going from 38.8% to 29.2% to 39.2% in the voting.

Mike Hampton (28.0 WAR, season above the median: 0)—He doesn’t compare to the other pitchers on this ballot, but Hampton did hit .315/.329/.552 in 152 plate appearances with the Rockies in 2001-2002, which is pretty cool.

Relief Pitchers

Lee Smith (26.6 WAR, season above the median: 12)—The top graph shows how these three relievers compare to all pitchers elected by the BBWAA. In short, they don’t compare favorably. The difference in innings pitched is just so great between starters and relievers that it’s hard for a reliever to be as valuable. The bottom graph includes just relief pitchers elected by the BBWAA, but without John Smoltz or Dennis Eckersley, who each had more than 350 starts and around 200 wins. The four “true” relievers are Hoyt Wilhelm, Goose Gossage, Rollie Fingers, and Bruce Sutter. Lee Smith didn’t reach the heights of those four, but did have 12 seasons above the median, starting with his third-best season. He’s been on the ballot for 13 years and peaked with 50.6% of the vote in 2012. Last year, he was down to 30.2%.

Trevor Hoffman (26.1, season above the median: 9)—For what it’s worth, Harold Reynolds thinks Trevor Hoffman is a “slam-dunk” Hall of Famer. Of course, that’s worth exactly nothing because it’s coming from Harold Reynolds and he doesn’t have a vote. Hoffman does have those 601 saves, but he doesn’t stand out here as being much better than Smith or Wagner.

Billy Wagner (24.2 WAR, season above the median: 6)—It wouldn’t surprise me to see Hoffman get considerable support and Wagner be a “one and done” candidate, despite how comparable they actually were.

If I Had a Ballot:

Barry Bonds

Roger Clemens

Mike Piazza

Jeff Bagwell

Ken Griffey, Jr.

Mike Mussina

Curt Schilling

Edgar Martinez

Larry Walker

Alan Trammell

Mike Leake is going to be paid $16 million dollars a year for the next five years. It seems to have people up in arms. This is why MLB ticket prices keep rising!

Mike Leake isn’t an elite pitcher. But he’s not the completely mediocre pitcher that he’s made out to be. He is a professional pitcher that has a track record of showing up to pitch. That holds a lot of value. There’s not many out there.

There are 30 teams in major-league baseball and, generally, they all use 5-man rotations. The best 150 pitchers would be all we would consider in a world with no injuries. We don’t live in that world.

We live in a world that has produced 851 qualifying pitcher seasons over the past 10 MLB seasons. A qualified pitcher needs to throw 162 innings, or one inning per game. In the case of starting pitchers who averaged 5 innings per appearance, that would be 33 starts. Essentially, to qualify you need to be on the mound consistently.

Since 2011, Leake’s five full seasons in the majors, there have been 195 pitchers who have combined for 429 qualifying seasons. That’s a little over 86 qualifying seasons per year.

Mike Leake has five of those seasons. Over those five seasons Leake has accumulated 8.9 WAR, or about 1.8 WAR per year. If we roll with the assumption that a win goes for between $7.5–8 million on the open market this deal makes perfect sense. But, this deal makes sense beyond that simple reason.

The Cardinals were a 100-win team. Their best pitcher from the prior year (Carlos Martinez) missed the playoffs with an elbow issues (not encouraging) but their best pitcher (Adam Wainwright) will be back healthy this year, which may compensate for some level of trepidation about Martinez’s durability and availability through 2016. Lance Lynn is done with Tommy John surgery and John Lackey has moved on to the Cubs. And while Leake hasn’t ever performed to the level Lackey did last year, or the level Lynn has over the past four years, he has shown the ability to eat innings at an above-average rate while throwing as an above-average pitcher.

Moreover, the things that Mike Leake doesn’t do well seem to be correctable and the Cardinals are an organization that tends to correct things.

First, Leake’s changeup is terrible. It may be time to consider scrapping that pitch altogether considering he possesses a slider and curveball that he uses regularly. The chart below, taken from BrooksBaseball.net, shows opponents’ slugging percentage against each of Leake’s offerings. As you can see the changeup hasn’t served any good since 2011. On the other hand, Leake’s slider has been improving where his changeup has been declining

A look at opponents’ batting average against tells the same story:

Leake’s second issue has been home runs. This is odd because Leake throws a sinker that often achieves its desired results. He has a 50.2% groundball rate for his career and 2014 and 2015 saw him induce the most groundballs in career, with 53.4% and 51.8% rates in those respective seasons. But when hitters put the ball in the air on Leake, they hit home runs at a 13.7% rate. This has been a consistent problem throughout Leake’s career, so it’s not as simple as looking at his xFIP and seeing hope for improvement.

This is where Leake’s biggest fault lies. If the Cardinals identify, or have identified, something to bring Leake’s home-run rate on fly balls down then they have just landed a bargain. But as of now, they landed a fair deal for a fair pitcher.

Mike Leake isn’t the reason tickets to a Cardinals game are expensive, but if you can make it out to the ballpark you’re going to see Mike Leake there, being Mike Leake; a professional pitcher; a reliable pitcher; a pitcher who shows up to work.

For this list there will be two requirements:

1. The players under consideration must not have thrown even a single pitch in the major leagues. This throws out notable names such as Steven Matz, Jon Gray, and others who have already done so.
2. The players under consideration must be projected to graduate from the prospect label in 2016 and have a significant influence on a major-league team. This throws out notable names like Julio Urias, Lucas Giolito, and others who are projected to be unlikely call-ups for the 2016 season.

So here we go, my projections for the top five pitching prospects you should keep an eye on for your fantasy team in 2016.

1. Tyler Glasnow

Team: Pittsburgh Pirates

Throws: Right

Height/Weight: 6’8”/225

Age: 22

Projected Path: Opening day rotation

Rundown: Nobody in this year’s projected rookie class boasts a bigger frame or, more importantly, a bigger fastball than Glasnow. Standing at an intimidating 6’8”, Glasnow is known to be able to pound the catcher’s mitt repeatedly with an upper 90s fastball that routinely overpowers hitters. MLB.com gives his fastball a 75 on the 20 to 80 scale, a truly remarkable grade. Add that to an above-average power curveball and an improving changeup, and it is easy to see why scouts rave about this guy’s immense upside.

But really, who cares about what scouts think? Not me, and neither should you. Let’s check out some upper-minor-league numbers Glasnow produced in 2015. Glasnow’s largest body of work in 2015 came in AA where he threw an even 63 innings over a span of 12 starts. Here he struck out a remarkable 33.1% of batters while only walking a respectable rate of 7.7% of batters he faced. His strikeout rate was tied with fellow highly-touted right-hander Jose De Leon for tops in all AA leagues among pitchers who threw at least 60 innings. Throw in his respectable walk rate, and he led all AA pitchers with the same inning restrictions in K-BB%. In AA he had an ERA of 2.43 while only stranding 66.4% of baserunners, a statistic generally attributed to luck. Again the average LOB% from 2015 was 72.3%, so one can assume he was a little unfortunate giving up some of those runs. With that said, his ERA could have easily looked more like his FIP which was an outstanding 1.98.

Either way, Glasnow proved to be dominant in AA and was later called up to the next level. In 43 innings of AAA ball he struck out a similarly great 27.6% of hitters. He walked some extra guys, leading to a high 12.6% BB%. Unsurprisingly, he was able to strand more runners in AAA, 73.3% of them to be exact, and yielded a 2.20 ERA. His FIP was 2.82.

Final take: Go get this guy. If he’s available late for a cheap price, Glasnow could be the ultimate diamond found in the rough. His best strength is in his strikeout numbers which plays really well for fantasy. The only weakness to his game is the walks. If he can find a way to limit walk totals, Glasnow could join the conversation for top young arms in 2016 and beyond.

2. Jose Berrios

Team: Minnesota Twins

Throws: Right

Height/Weight: 6’0”/190

Age: 21

Projected Path: Opening day rotation

Rundown: Perhaps more polished than Glasnow, Jose Berrios is a very strong name to have on your radar. As an undersized righty, Berrios hits mid-90s with his fastball, but will mainly live in the lower 90 range. He also throws a slurve-like breaking ball with various velocities as well as an above-average changeup. The best thing about Berrios is his plus command. As a 21 year old, he walked only 6.5% and 4.7% of batters in 90⅔ innings in AA and 75⅔ innings in AAA respectively. His strikeout numbers were also strong with a 25.1% mark in AA and a 27.7% effort in AAA. An interesting note on Berrios was his major improvement from AA to AAA. His K-BB% improved by 4.5%, as well as his FIP and ERA numbers.

Final Take: I was going back and forth for quite sometime trying to decide who was more valuable between Berrios and Glasnow. In the end I chose Glasnow mainly due to the unprecedented strikeout potential as well as the national league benefit. However, that by no means says that Berrios can’t be better. Led by his impressive ability to limit walks, go into your draft with Berrios’ name in mind.

3. Blake Snell

Team: Tampa Bay Rays

Throws: Left

Height/Weight: 6’4”/180

Age: 23

Projected Path: Opening day rotation

Rundown: Blake Snell is one of the most intriguing names in the prospect heap for 2016, partly because he came into the year as a relatively unknown 22-year-old in the Tampa Bays Rays A+ affiliate. The other part is that in 2015 he didn’t let up a run until his 50th inning of work. He escaped A+ ball in 21 innings without letting up a run and then rattled off another 28 scoreless innings in AA. Eventually though, he did prove to be human as he let up a first-inning home run to the Cubs’ Wilson Contreras ending his scoreless inning streak at 49. Nevertheless, he put up astounding numbers across three levels of the minor leagues in 2015.

Like Glasnow, Snell’s best tool is his ability to strike hitters out. He does this with a low to mid-90s fastball as well as an above-average slider and changeup. His biggest flaw is the walks, as he walked over 10% of the batters he faced in both AA and AAA. Like Berrios, he posted his best K-BB% numbers in AAA. In 44⅓ there he struck out 33.3% of batters and only walked 7.6%, good for an incredible 25.7% K-B%. Although it is very difficult to project his basic run-prevention skill without the aid of batted-ball type or velocity, he certainly excelled in that area in 2015. In 21, 68⅔, and 44⅓ innings in A+, AA, and AAA his ERA was 0.00, 1.57 and 1.83 respectively.   

Final Take: Like I said at the beginning, Blake Snell is intriguing. Walks will hold him down, strikeouts will bring him up. If you like what see take a shot and thank me later. He has the potential of an elite starter.

4. Jose De Leon

Team: Los Angeles Dodgers

Throws: Right

Height/Weight: 6’2”/185

Age: 23

Projected Path: Mid/late season call up

Rundown: The only thing holding De Leon back from being closer to the top of this list is the Dodgers’ management. Most likely, he will not make the team out of camp and will head to AAA to start the year.  However, due to the Dodgers’ thin staff and postseason desperation, De Leon is bound to make a splash sometime in 2016. As mentioned earlier, he was tied with Tyler Glasnow in K% in AA during the 2015 season among pitchers with more than 60 innings pitched. De Leon pitched a total of 76⅔ innings at the AA level through 16 starts. Before that, also in 2015, he threw 37⅔ innings at the A+ level. He put up ridiculous numbers there, striking out batters at a rate of a nearly unheard of 40% while only walking 5.4% of hitters. His walk rate increased a little bit in AA, but he still boasts better command than the likes of Glasnow and Snell. De Leon pairs his low to mid-90s fastball with a slider and changeup.

Final Take: Although De Leon is unlikely to make the team out of spring camp it is worth keeping this guy on your fantasy radar. Pay attention for any news on a potential call-up, and if you find any, don’t waste time to add him to your roster. In deeper formats, De Leon certainly deserves a late-round draft choice.

5. Josh Hader

Team: Milwaukee Brewers

Throws: Left

Height/Weight: 6’3”/160

Age: 21

Projected Path: Mid/late season call up

Rundown: After coming to the Brewers in the Carlos Gomez deal, Hader quickly improved his prospect stock by increasing his K-BB% by almost 10% with the move from the Astros AA affiliate to the AA affiliate of the Brew Crew. Although he started his only 7 games with Milwaukee, Hader spent time both starting and coming out of the pen before the deal in Houston. Over there he was not nearly as impressive with a higher BB% as well as significantly lower K% in 65⅓ innings. Like I promised, things got better in his 38⅔ innings for the Brewers in AA. Hader struck out a robust  32.9% of hitters while only walking 7.2%. Overall, Hader finished sixth in K-BB% among starters under 25 in AA who logged more than 60 innings. Hader pairs his mid-90s fastball with an average changeup and curveball. Due to his shot forward with the Brewers, and the lack of organizational pitching skill combined with likely trades of veterans either during the offseason or before the July trade deadline, Hader could be looking at a potential midseason call-up where his ability to get strikeouts would be an asset, especially in the NL. On top of this, Hader has better command than most 21-year-olds.

Final Take: Hader’s upside is real. A strong fastball, paired with above-average command bodes well for National League pitchers. Now all he has to do is continue his success in the minor leagues for the Brewers, and he will almost certainly see a call-up to the big-league rotation. If this happens make sure you remembered his name.

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Stats and research courtesy of FanGraphs and MLB.com

When Zack Greinke signed his six-year, $147 million contract with the Los Angeles Dodgers after the 2012 season, he became the highest-paid pitcher in baseball history in terms of annual salary. Now, after opting out of that deal and inking an even bigger one with the Arizona Diamondbacks, he’s the highest-paid player in baseball history in terms of annual salary.

How did Greinke get the same contract length and $60 million more at 32 than he he did at 29? By stringing together three straight dominant seasons in Los Angeles, the last of which was easily the best of his career and, in a normal year, would have earned him his second Cy Young. Greinke’s timing was impeccable, as he hit the open market after posting the lowest ERA (1.66) in 20 years and leading the majors in WHIP (0.84), winning percentage (.864), pitcher WAR (as calculated by Baseball-Reference), and ERA- (44). His two years before last weren’t too shabby, either, as he posted sub-three ERAs and drew Cy Young votes both years.

But were his last three campaigns really that much better than the three that preceded his Dodgers contract? It depends which stats you use:

2010-2012:  41-25  W-L  3.83 ERA  (106 ERA+)  1.22 WHIP  .248 BA  8.4 bWAR

2013-2015:  51-15  W-L  2.30 ERA  (156 ERA+)  1.03 WHIP  .219 BA  17.5 bWAR

By traditional metrics, Greinke was a much better pitcher from ages 29-31 than he was from 26-28, which are supposed to be a player’s prime years. His ERA was a run and a half lower in the same number of innings, which explains why his bWAR more than doubled (B-R bases pitcher WAR off ERA and innings pitched). He won more games, lost fewer, and improved his WHIP and opponent batting average considerably.

Advanced metrics tell another story. Let’s start by looking at the two things pitchers can control, strikeouts and walks. I don’t include home runs because those have a lot to do with park factors, temperature, air density, wind currents, and a bunch of other things beyond a pitcher’s sphere of influence:

2010-2012:  23.3 K%  6.2 BB%

2013-2015:  23.3 K%  5.4 BB%

Greinke’s strikeout rate remained identical, which one would expect given that nobody gains velocity as they get older. His walk rate improved a bit, which works out to be one fewer walk every two or three starts — hardly a big difference in the grand scheme of things.

People also believe pitchers have control over the type of hits they allow. Has Greinke’s distribution of batted balls become more favorable?

2010-2012:  20.3% LD  47.4% GB  32.3% FB  7.9 % IFFB

2013-2015:  21.8% LD  47.5% GB  30.8% FB  11.1% IFFB

Not really. Greinke’s groundball rate stayed the same, and he seemed to offset an increase in line drives with an increase in pop-ups. It’s weird that his line-drive rate went up, seeing as how he induced more soft contact and less hard contact over the past three years:

2010-2012:  Soft 17.0%  Med 54.7 %  Hard 28.3%

2013-2015:  Soft 19.3%  Med 53.3%   Hard 27.6%

Again, not much change, though there is some indication that he’s gotten better at generating weaker contact. Not enough to radically improve his results, mind you, or significantly alter his BABiP (keep that in mind for a minute).

While his ERA doesn’t reflect his stable peripherals, his FIP, xFIP, and SIERA all do.

2010-2012: 3.16 FIP 3.17 xFIP 3.26 SIERA

2013-2015: 2.97 FIP 3.12 xFIP 3.23 SIERA

As you can see, fielding-independent metrics support the information above, suggesting Greinke was essentially the same pitcher over the past six years.

So why, then, are his Dodgers numbers so much shinier? Moving to Dodger Stadium (where he has a 2.00 career ERA) and a weaker division gave him a boost. Leaving behind a god-awful defense in Milwaukee also helped. Having a better bullpen behind didn’t hurt, either.

But also, a lot of it was just pure luck. Greinke was fairly unlucky in the three years before coming to Los Angeles, only to become one of the most fortunate pitchers in baseball during his time with the Dodgers. Greinke had the highest strand rate in baseball over the last three years, but from 2010-2012 he had the worst of anyone who threw as many innings as him. Dodger Stadium and superior defense also helped him on balls in play. From 2010-2012, only Justin Masterson had a higher BABiP among pitchers who threw at least 600 innings. Over the last three years, however, Greinke had the third-lowest BABiP at .271 — roughly 30 points below the league average.

Greinke also had better luck on balls not in play, as in home runs. His HR/FB% dropped almost a full percentage point, which is substantial considering the league average is around 10% (Greinke’s mark from 2010-2012). Accordingly, his HR/9 rate improved by 16 percent. That works out to be only a handful of homers per season, but those long balls can make a serious dent in a pitcher’s ERA if they come with multiple guys on base.

Taking all this into consideration, Greinke is not a better pitcher now than he was three years ago. His park, fielders, and bullpen have made him look like a better pitcher, as has better luck, but at his core he’s the same guy. Here’s one more figure to prove it:

2010-2012: 13.6 fWAR (8th in pitcher fWAR)

2013-2015: 13.6 fWAR (8th in pitcher fWAR)

Greinke is getting paid to be the best pitcher in baseball, even though he’s not. After a few starts in the Arizona heat, that should become abundantly clear.