Something appears to have happened to Madison Bumgarner. Specifically, his four-seam fastball has gone missing. Depending on which data source you use, it figuratively and literally disappeared. Regardless of data source used, Bumgarner’s fastball isn’t performing.

Two leading data sources disagree on what has happened to Bumgarner’s fastball. Because of this, I chose to look at both sources independently: Pitch Info (through Brooks Baseball) and Statcast (through Baseball Savant). This analysis spans four seasons, 2015 through 2018, encompassing Bumgarner’s two best and two worst complete seasons.

According to Pitch Info, Bumgarner threw four-seamers in 2018 at a career-low frequency — 34.5% of the time in 2018, down from 48.2% in 2016 and 49.6% in 2015. It has been losing effectiveness since its peak in 2014. Using Pitch Info’s runs above average metric, we see Bumgarner’s four-seamer peaked in quality at 1.25 runs above average per 100 pitches in 2014 and has dropped each year since then: 0.97 in 2015, 0.39 in 2016, -0.35 in 2017, and -1.14 in 2018, a career low.

As seen in the Pitch Info Whiff Percentage charts above, Bumgarner’s four-seam fastball had its lowest whiff rate of our period of study in 2018 (seen on the left), likely leading to it’s ineffectiveness. Similarly, Bumgarner’s four-seam is measured to have had more vertical sink, independent of gravity, than it had throughout this period (seen on the right). Depending on the pitch, more movement generally increases whiff rates. A four-seam fastball moving more like a two-seamer, however, would lose swing-throughs: sinkers (two-seamers) generate more contact in the form of ground balls.

Bumgarner produced his highest ground-ball rate with his fastball since 2013 while also generating the fewest whiffs with his fastball of his career. Couple the results with the change (increased vertical movement), and it appears his fastball began to behave like a two-seam fastball.

This seems to be clear already. According to Statcast, Bumgarner threw his four-seam fastball only once in 2018, as compared to 38.6% of the time in 2016 and 41.1% of the time in 2015. He replaced them mainly with two-seam fastballs, but also with some curveballs and changeups.

When comparing Statcast to Pitch Info, I wondered if Statcast could have been misclassifying four-seam fastballs as two-seamers. Through looking at the above plots, however, it’s clear a cluster of pitches was missing in 2018. The above graphs are of every pitch Bumgarner threw, by horizontal (x-axis) and vertical (y-axis) movement, colored by Statcast pitch classifications. Even when ignoring pitch type labels, a pitch type is seen to be missing. Specifically, Bumgarner’s high-rising, fairly straight pitch was no longer thrown. On a side note, notice how inconsistent 2017’s movements were: likely because Bumgarner had to recover form a major shoulder injury and struggled.

With Statcast data, we can evaluate what happened with greater depth than through other methods. Below is a table of statistical changes in both Bumgarner’s two-seam and four-seam fastballs.

Velocity is measured in miles per hour, spin in revolutions per minute, extension is feet from the rubber, and horizontal and vertical movements are in inches from release point. Ignore 2017, as it was a very inconsistent year (as seen with the movement chart above). Both two-seam and four-seam fastballs in 2015 and 2016 had significant vertical rise due to spin. In 2018, however, Bumgarner couldn’t or wasn’t spinning his fastballs as much, resulting in less rise and more downward movement. This could be why Statcast is misclassifying his fastballs.

Why has Bumgarner lost spin on his fastballs? The data suggests two reasons why, both of which could be correlated. He’s lost velocity, and release speed correlates with spin rate. Similarly, Bumgarner has less extension on his fastballs than in 2016. His 2018 extension is similar to his 2015 extension, but because he’s lost velocity, the loss of extension could be penalizing. This loss of extension could explain the loss of spin if it’s related to grip or release.

Extension loss to home plate reduces the perceived velocity the batter anticipates, making it easier for the batter to time the pitch. Both loss of velocity and extension would, when combined, greatly benefit the batter at the expense of Bumgarner’s fastball.

What could have caused the loss of velocity and extension? Bumgarner is 29 years old, so there is a chance he’s entered his decline. The likely culprit, however, is injury: Bumgarner fell of a dirt bike in April 2017, injuring his left shoulder, and he broke his left hand on a line-drive comebacker in spring training in 2018, requiring surgery. Being left-handed, both injuries could have significantly affected his 2018.

One year away from free agency, Bumgarner likely hopes he can recover lost velocity and spin on his fastball. Whether it was an organizational change, a declining skill set, or driven by injury, his 2018 fastball difference was one to forget. His shoulder should be better healed, one year further removed from his accident, and hopefully his throwing hand does the same.

This and other postings like it can be found on my personal blog, First Pitch Swinging.

The slow progression that leads to a self-acknowledged decline was a process Felix Hernandez, unfortunately, entirely skipped. His career arch was a natural regression to average, injury, failure to adjust; sudden, poignant, and ridden of organizational, cognitive bias. The stark drop-off resulted in a split between a player who once meant everything being the roughest point in a rotation embattled in a playoff race. The hope that Hernandez could return to a balanced tactician on the mound was probably maintained one game too long – the last time he held a team to no runs was on opening day. Even more egregious, there was no subtle change to change his approach. The long leash of hope allowed him to stay stagnantly desperate.

His last outing against the Texas Rangers was the final capitulation to put him into the bullpen, no longer scheduled to make his start on Sunday August 12. The seven runs he allowed were built off his consist frustration leading to a parochial process. He no longer worked through counts with cognition for how batters were attacking – he was simply throwing. Analytically, Hernandez works from a fastball to a breaking ball; speed leading to mistimed swinging later in the count. Simply put, his fastball is necessary for leading into the breaking ball, and with his fastball dead in the water, his breaking ball is also dead. Batters no longer deceived now look forward to teeing off on a very predictable and forced breaking ball.

As the arm dies, the fastball dies. The changeup and breaking ball, however, does not always die. Furthermore, spin may die on the curveball, but spin rate makes an average curve deadly. Henceforth, Hernandez, does not need an incredible fastball to work toward an average changeup/curve. Yet, as a starter he has failed to figure out how to work into his changeup; he is beholden to a fastball which no longer averages 90 MPH. Experimenting with velocity and pitch utilization reached a maxim in 2018, leading to nowhere even after dropping the four-seam fastball. It is a crutch he has been unable to move past.

The following charts display how Hernandez has attacked batters based on the count from 2012, 2016, and 2018. As stated, in 2012, he used his fastball to work into a changeup on ahead counts ahead or a sinker when behind. Through 2016 and 2018, injury forced him to drop the fastball on the opening pitch, instead of using the fastball sinker. This creates two problems: the sinker is no longer effective to land a strike when behind counts because it is used as the opening pitch and the sinker becomes exposed to each batter, leading to the predictable approach. His sinker now owns a 1.64 BB/K ratio with a 1.001 OPS.

Moving to the bullpen should not necessarily be a point to fix Hernandez for an eventual transition as a starter. He is, for better or worse, an abbreviated pitcher, and as of right now, cannot endure multiple innings. His limited arsenal establishes him as a stretch reliever for two innings at best. To become an endurance starter, he needs to improve his curveball to break across both sides of the plate – or, McCullerize himself.

The focus for 2018 Hernandez is bullpen effectiveness and no more. Unfortunately, precedent for a pitcher in the Statcast era who utilizes a slow fastball and curveball/changeup is limited; limited to Sean Marshall. (This is assuming that Hernandez continues to forego his fastball in the bullpen. Most curveball relievers have a fastball which averages 93-97 MPH. Fernando Rodney is another reliever who is comparable with a sinker/changeup arsenal, but even he has maintained a 94 MPH sinker at age 41.) Thus, there is some new paths to be paved with Hernandez in the bullpen, making the transition even more intriguing.

The main goal in the bullpen is inducing ground balls; that was the magic of Hernandez’s changeup in his prime. Marshall achieved this in his prime with ground ball rates of 52.2, 57.5, and 56.3 percent from 2010 to 2012. He opened his counts with a slider, moving to a curveball when ahead and staying with his slider when behind. His curveball broke left (right from Marshall’s view) and was best when slyly placed out of the zone.

Hernandez breaks his curveball in the same style, just the opposite direction. In fact, while the spin rate has dropped, without injury, there is a clear improvement in control (2018 curve map versus 2015 curve map). Using the curve to introduce batters can theoretically be complemented by a changeup which paints the other side of the plate. Even so, his changeup is falling more in the zone as he ages (implicative of lack of a fastball to paint the inside, 2012 changeup versus 2018 changeup).

Putting the different strings together, a bullpen focused Hernandez would utilize a curveball to specialize for attacking the right side of the plate, with an increase to break across both aspects. His changeup then becomes the quick out option to force quick ground balls. If he slowly beings to move that pitch into the corner of the zone again, he can end at-bats on weak contact and topped contact. Despite his demise, the changeup is a quality pitch for inducing topped contact if he is ahead of counts. (Emphasis on if, and, there is a base loss of control which cannot be ignored; again, the point he is a limited inning pitcher with an onus on control). Thus, control with the curve to land a strike or foul from the corner can lead to an inning of what might remain of a magical changeup.

Chris Archer is the classic two-pitch pitcher. He’s got a high velocity, albeit slightly flat, fastball, as well as one of the game’s dirtiest sliders. His fastball has never missed many bats, and it’s always had a wRC+ of over 120 in every year save for 2013. His fastball is nothing like that of the “spin king” Luke Bard, as it holds a pretty pedestrian 2192 RPM, less than the average MLB fastball spin rate of 2264 RPM. However, his high velocity fastball, ranking 21st this year for starters averaging about 95 mph, contrasts well with his wipeout slider.

As you can see here in this sequence to strikeout Josh Donaldson, the two pitches complement each other well. It is hard for any hitter to adjust from a 97 mph fastball to a knee buckling slider.

His slider, save for this year, has been devastating. Nobody really likes to hit his slider, and that is why he is one of the most prolific slider throwers in the game. He’ll make lefties and righties alike to look silly.

For example, Yangervis Solarte and Zack Cozart have both fallen victim this season.

https://twitter.com/PitchingNinja/status/993181847315238914

https://twitter.com/PitchingNinja/status/99743282699065344

The bread and butter for Archer is fastball away and up away and sliders below the zone with two strikes. Despite a 95 wRC+ on his slider this year, compared to his career mark of 65, the swinging strike rate on his slider is still high and there’s no reason the pitch can’t return to form.  There’s not much that’s changed with this pitch. The average spin rate is about the same as the last year, sorry @Trevor Bauer.

Archer’s past two years have been somewhat rough.  In 2016, Chris Archer went 9-19. Only he and James Shields had done that in the last 14 years.  I know I’m not really supposed to talk about wins and losses, but James Shields -1.1 WAR season is not great company.  In 2017, Chris Archer posted a strong 4.6 WAR and fell victim to a .325 BABIP that is almost 30 points higher than his career.  He’s still looking to repeat the 5.2 WAR 2015 with a 3.23 ERA and a 2.90 FIP.

Archer has also always liked to throw the slider more with two strikes.  Over his career, he has thrown 2719 sliders with two strikes, compared to 3734 sliders before two strikes.  Archer has always relied heavily on the two strike slider to both lefties and righties.

This year, Archer has faced 134 lefties and struck out 23, just under 18%.  For his career, he strikes out lefties at a 25.3% rate. Strikeout rate stabilizes after about 70 batters faced, so clearly something is up with Chris archer when he faces lefties. Here was Chris last year against lefties, his best year striking them out.

And here is Archer this year.  Can you tell the difference?

No lefties are missing whiffing in the zone, or above it anymore.  While Archer doesn’t have the typical rise or spin rate of a high fastballer, he needs his second best pitch to generate some whiffs.  Archer has thrown 217 fastballs this year to lefties, 14 swinging strikes. No swinging strikes with 2 strikes. Archer has yet to strikeout a lefty with his fastball.  Now this in not a huge difference, as lefties struck out on his fastball just 14 times last year, with a 7.5% whiff rate on it.

The issue is not the fastball, but that lefties just aren’t missing his slider.  They know the slider is coming; it’s Archer’s put away pitch. And when he puts it right below the zone, it’s practically unhittable.  That’s what Archer wants to do, throw below the zone and back foot sliders to lefties. This year and last, Archer induced 147 swinging strikes to lefties on sliders below the zone, on 330 sliders, a whiff rate of 44%.  But when he throws the slider in the zone to lefties, it has a whiff rate of 10%, compared to 18% last year.

The reasons for Archer’s troubles against lefties may be explained in a great piece, http://theprocessreport.net/archers-struggles/, which  Jason Collette wrote for the Process Report.  

Archer has moved from the first base side of the rubber, last season on the left, to the third base side of the rubber, this year on the right.  How has he done with this so far?

His fastball has been failing against righties and lefties and his slider results are divergent.  

Pitchers don’t move where they stand for no reason.  Clearly, it makes it harder for righties to see the slider coming out of his hand, and they have a far worse angle on the pitch.  But, a slider is also a hard pitch to throw to a batter of opposite handedness, especially when you have to throw it for a strike.  When Archer’s slider is coming at an angle where lefties can read the spin even easier, they will miss a little bit less. For example, here is a slider in the zone to a lefty, and J.P. Crawford doesn’t miss.  

https://baseballsavant.mlb.com/videos?video_id=1938512583

Archer’s move from one side of the rubber isn’t easy.  He’s facing batters in a way that he’s likely never faced them before.  And this has resulted in some dramatic success against righties. But if he wants to throw fastballs or sliders in the zone to lefties, they just aren’t going to miss.  At this point in his career, Archer is hardly going to try to develop a great slider. It’s just not in his DNA. So, we know the results of Archer’s change, and he has to ask himself, what is the cost.

Writing about Marcell Ozuna has become a sort of an annual early-summer tradition. Back in 2016 on May 20th, Craig Edwards wondered if Marcell Ozuna, then 25 years old, was breaking out. That hot streak didn’t last, as Ozuna saw his 132 wRC+ pre-Edwards article drop to 97 post-Edwards article.

Just over a year later in June of 2017, Craig revisited another Ozuna hot streak. That one lasted the rest of the season, and qualified as a breakout in most minds.

Now, nearly a year after that second article, some things have changed. Ozuna is no longer a Marlin. He’s a Cardinal! He’s the Cardinals cleanup hitter. And, through May 20th, Ozuna has been the St. Louis Cardinals worst hitter.

What?

Among the twelve Cardinals with at least 25 plate appearances so far, Ozuna’s 63 wRC+ ranks twelfth. Last. Worse than Matt Carpenter, whose recent hot streak lifted his mark from 60 to 89. Worse than Dexter Fowler. Worse than Francisco Pena. Last. Dead last.

Compounding the issue, or at least the prevalence of the issue, is that every single one of Ozuna’s plate appearances have come from the cleanup spot in the batting order. Individually, he’s been the second-worst cleanup hitter with at least 75 plate appearances in that spot. He’s dragged the Cardinals as a team down to the third-worst cleanup hitter production.

Of course, we know players go through slumps. Early season slumps tend to stick in our heads more because they’re more noticeable. Even still, this has been Ozuna’s third-worst slump of his career. He’s only had a powerless stretch this long once before. And yet, it doesn’t appear that the Cardinals have an alternative for his lineup spot.  Ozuna is, or was supposed to be, the Big Bat.

On the surface, it seems like there’s hope for a bounce back. While I haven’t been as adamant as I was for Carpenter, I’ve noticed plenty of bad luck plaguing the St. Louis slugger.

According to Baseball Savant, his average exit velocity is at a personal Statcast-era best of 92.6 mph, up nearly 2 mph over last year and in the top 30 across the MLB. His average launch angle is up a half degree from last year and in line with his career norms. And with the tenth worst gap between his expected wOBA and actual wOBA so far, we can attribute much of his slump to luck.

Luck doesn’t explain all of the difference between this year and last, though. Even if Ozuna’s actual wOBA was in line with his expected, he’d own a .339 wOBA and a wRC+ similar to that of Harrison Bader. Don’t get me wrong, a wRC+ around 115 is good – it’s 15% better than league average – but it’s not what we wanted from the Cardinals biggest offseason acquisition and it’s not what we expected from a guy who just least season broke out to mash 37 home runs while hitting .312 en route to a career best 142 wRC+.

Two paragraphs ago, I cited Ozuna’s average exit velocity and average launch angle. In my opinion, that’s the most common fallacy in the widespread use of Statcast data. Neither of those metrics are best thought of as averages. Ozuna’s average exit velocity is up, but what if he’s hitting every ball 92 mph or one ball 112 mph and another 72 mph? What if he’s hitting them into the ground where that exit velocity will do less damage?

To answer that, I compared Ozuna’s average exit velocity on line drives and fly balls to his exit velocity on grounders over the last three years. To tease out some luck, good or bad, impacting his production, I used expected wOBA instead of actual wOBA.

In 2016, Marcell Ozuna hit his line drives and fly balls only 2 mph harder than his grounders. In 2017, he sacrificed exit velocity on his ground balls to increase his exit velocity on line drives and fly balls. So far in 2018, he’s back to a near-even exit velocity between his grounders and line drives or flies.

Sometimes a gain in air ball exit velocity at the expense of ground ball exit velocity is indicative of an uppercut. Sometimes it might indicate a player has lowered their hands. Maybe they’re selecting better pitches to drive. Usually, it means a player’s swing is directed more ‘upward’ than it used to be.

On the other hand, when a player gains ground ball velocity as the expense of air ball velocity, the opposite is likely true. A swing that’s flatter or on a more downward plane will generate harder hit ground balls at the expense of harder hit line drives and fly balls.

Going off the above, it looks like Ozuna had a downward swing in 2016. It looks like he had a more upward swing in 2017. Now, it looks like Ozuna is back to a downward swing.

I went to the video room to see if I could identify any difference between Ozuna’s swing this year and last. While I couldn’t find anything noticeably different in the swing, there are significant differences in his set up and trigger. I’m going to show you two pitches. He didn’t swing at either. There are still big differences.

First, a take from 2018:

Next, one from 2017:

And here’s a still side-by-side of his stance, below.

Don’t make anything of the bat placement. He moves it around, and I didn’t take care to match that up. But look at his feet. His back foot is a little closer to the plate and his front foot is a little more towards third base. I don’t know how much of a difference that makes, and whether it’s good or bad. But it’s different.

Then there’s this:

Now that’s something. Ozuna has a toe tap. He had a toe tap last year, and he had one the year before that. Last year, after tapping his toe, his stance was slightly closed. This year, it’s dead straight. Last year, he had a bend in both legs during his tap. This year, his front leg is straight. Last year, his butt looks a little lower than this it does this year – he used to attack the ball from a slightly lower position. All together, in 2017,  Ozuna looked more like a tightly coiled spring. He was in a more powerful and explosive position.

Next, compare his 2016 toe tap (far right), when his air ball / ground ball exit velocity splits were nearly identical to what we’ve seen so far in 2018.

It’s not identical, but it’s really close. In 2016, Ozuna used a stiffer front leg. It looks like 2018 Ozuna, following his monster 2017 season, has gone back to his 2016, pre-breakout toe tap.

The obvious follow-up question: why? Why change what wasn’t broken? It hasn’t helped his plate discipline. It hasn’t improved his contact quality. It’s made him, essentially, the same hitter he was back in 2016. Was it a coach’s decision? Ozuna’s? An accident? In any case, despite breaking out in 2017, Marcell Ozuna isn’t the same hitter he was a year ago.

The St. Louis Cardinals, riddled thus far with injuries, are desperate for someone to step-up offensively.  They might start by taking a closer look at his toe tap.

Between catching pitches for one of the worst pitching clubs in Baseball (The Royals have the worst team ERA in baseball), and being made a fool by Adeiny Hechavarria at the plate (5/14/18), Salvador Perez is having an embarrassing year. Yet below the obvious misfortune, a slow insidious killer lies. Salvador Perez seems to have forgotten about the strike zone.

In 2016 Salvador Perez won a Silver Slugger award. How can a relatively recent award winning catcher have forgotten about the strike zone? Well, the thing is, the strike zone and Ol’ Salvador have been in a tenuous relationship for a long time now. From 2016 to 2018, nobody in the MLB has swung at more outside pitches than Perez. Over the past 4 years, Perez has swung at 42.5%, 44.2%, 47.9% and 49.1% of pitches outside the strike zone (O-Swing%), respectively. All these percentages place him near the top of the leaderboards for each of these years. His contact rate on outside pitches during that time (O-Contact%) is 73.6%, 65.8%, 70.4%, and 63.1%, respectively. The nature of Perez’s efficacy on swinging for outside pitches is worth a deeper dive.

Does Perez benefit from his lack of plate discipline? In order to simplify the the study, I am going to only be looking at Salvador Perez in 2018 so far. Whether the lack of discipline worked for him in the distant past is not the focus, instead I am going to look at the efficacy of this kind of batting for Perez moving forward, using 2018 data to support my prediction. Perez’s season started April 24th due to a MCL tear. As of the end of play on 5/18, Perez has seen 333 pitches this year. Perez has swung at 56.4% of those pitches, meaning that he has swung at roughly 187 of all of the pitches he has seen this season. Of this 187 pitches swung at, Salvador Perez has swung at approximately 46 pitches outside the strike zone this season. One look at Perez’s Swing% heat map shows that he seems to believe that the strike zone is larger than it actually is.

Perez swings at a markedly higher percentage of pitches outside the strike zone than his contemporaries. Jorge Alfaro, and Wilson Ramos are the only two Catchers so far in 2018 that have swung at outside pitches at anything near the rate of Perez’s O-Swing of 49.1%, with the other catchers at a rate of 44.1% and 43.2% respectively, (Min PA 100). Perez has been a far better contributor to his team this season when he has shown more plate discipline. He has had a far inferior wOBA on days in which he has an O-Swing above 50%. His average wOBA on 50% O-Swing days is an abysmal .237, which is .067 less than league average for catchers and is .078 less than the overall league average. In comparison, on days in which Perez has an O-Swing% below 50, his wOBA is .440, a vast improvement, and a wOBA that puts him .04 above Mike Trout. If an outlier game against Detroit on May 5th in the below 50% dataset in where he had a wOBA of .000 is removed, his below 50% O-Swing wOBA would become .484, a number that would put him not far off the wOBA of Mookie Betts (.495). All this is to say that Perez is a very valuable hitter on the days in which he shows better, more league average (29.9% O-Swing) plate discipline.

What of the pitches that Perez swings on outside the strike zone, and actually makes contact? Perez boasts a 63.1 O-Contact%, which is the best contact percentage of Catchers (100 PA minimum) with above an 40% O-Swing. Are these contacts worth anything, or are they just mostly foul balls and popups? Perez has made contact with 22 pitches outside the strike zone. (There is a discrepancy of approximately 6 pitches here between the data supplied to FanGraphs, and the data supplied to BaseballSavant. I have decided that this slight difference does not compromise the integrity of the article, as my conclusions are the same. As such, some of the pitch numbers may be slightly off due to the slight difference between the O-Swing and O-contact% of FanGraphs and the statistical equivalent Chase and Chase Contact% of BaseballSavant, however the use of BaseballSavant was necessary for the exact pitch breakdowns.) Of these 22 pitches Perez has fouled off 13 of them, and has hit the other 8 chased pitches. Of these 8, he hit into an out in 7 of them, with the remaining contact being a single. So while Perez’s contact numbers while chasing are impressive, they amount to naught. Even with this high contact percentage the previous conclusion still stands, Perez is a bad hitter when he is in a chasing mood, and a very good one when he works the strike zone.

Is there something special about the 46 pitches that Perez chased outside the strike zone? (The data of both sites confirm that Perez has swung at 46 pitches outside the strike zone, so there is no problem here.) Is the number mostly made up of pitches that are right on the edge of the zone? The answer to both these questions is no. Perez has been lit up for a total of 19 swinging strikes to just the outside bottom-right of the Strike Zone alone. Meaning that of the 46 chased pitches so far this season, a staggering 41% of them have been swinging strikes to the outside bottom-right. The final tally of Perez’s adventures outside the strike zone sit at a pitiful, but not wholly unexpected, 24 Swinging Strikes, 14 Fouls, 7 hit into outs, and 1, lone, sad, pathetic, inconsequential, single.

In conclusion, Salvador Perez desperately needs to work on his plate discipline if he wants to continue to be a Major League catcher worth anything close to the $7.5M and $10M the Royals are paying him this year and the next. If Perez cannot reverse the negative course that his batting discipline has been on the last couple of years, his O-Swing% having jumped 4.9% in the past two years alone, he will begin to become an non-factor at the plate. Perez’s WAR has been in a steady decline ever since his O-Swing% began the leap to its current heights. If Salvador Perez cannot find more discipline at the plate, the former Silver Slugger will no longer be worth having on a Major League Team.

‘

(Data courtesy of Fangraphs and Baseballsavant)

Disclaimer: I started writing this post prior to Duvall’s on Friday night, right about the time he decided he was going to make me look silly. Stats do not include games on Monday 4/15.

A quick glance at the Reds offensive production so far in 2018 provides some context for a horrendous start.  Jumping down towards the bottom of stat sheet, we find 2016 All-Star Adam Duvall, who has been off to a terrible start at the plate. He leads the team in both home-runs and RBI (not saying much at this point) but has struggled to get much going other than that and currently owns a 59 wRC+. And that follows two strong performances since I started writing this, when he had a 29 wRC+. He is not the only reason the Reds offense is struggling , but he is among the biggest culprits.

Duvall’s calling card is no secret; he is a slugger. Over the 2016 and 2017 seasons, he ranks 15^th in the MLB with an ISO of .244. He hits the ball harder than average and pulls the ball more than average. So while a high pull rate isn’t necessarily a bad thing, it is interesting that he is currently well above his own normal.

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League average is just under 40% while Duvall’s career average is just under 48%. So far in 2018 he is pulling almost 63% of balls, highest in the league among qualified hitters. Even for power hitters, there is an optimal amount of pulling the ball, and Duvall is way above it. Presumably, this is not something he is trying to do, but rather has been influenced in part by pitch location.

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Not surprisingly, the highest concentration of pitches Duvall saw in 2017 (left) were on the outside part of the plate as pitchers try to avoid playing to Duvall’s strength. In 2018 (right), he has seen a more even distribution of pitches across the strike zone. So if more balls are coming closer to where he can pull them, why is he not having success?

The easiest answer is that is has not been catching any breaks. While his BABIP as of Sunday night was a .156, it had been down to a .091 just a couple days earlier. The small sample of the young season shows how quickly a couple balls here or there can change things. Still though, a low BABIP indicates that there are better days ahead.

However, in addition to the high pull rate, other components of Duvall’s batted ball profile are not ideal. He is creating more soft contact than normal and is also hitting more groundballs than normal. It is not to a level he has not been before, but his soft contact was increasing in the latter half of 2017 and could be a larger trend. And the increase in ground balls has been accompanied by an all-time low line drive rate, which is generally the result of weak contact.

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Duvall has always gotten the ball in the air, as his career average 20.1-degree launch angle and 47% fly ball rate will attest to. So far this year, it has pretty much either been in the air or on the ground. And of the balls in play to the left side of the field this year, his launch angle is 4.6 degrees, compared to 9.8 degrees last year. Even though he has gotten pitches to the inside of the plate, he has not been able to drive them as he has in the past.

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Even with a high concentration of balls hit to 3B in 2017 (left), Duvall still made good use of left and center field. 2018 (right) has been way more concentrated to the infield, with very few balls going anywhere besides 3B or LF.

On top of his batted ball profile, plate discipline metrics also tell an interesting story.

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So far this year, 42% of pitches to Duvall have been in the strike zone, just below is career average of 43.4%. While that number may be a bit low, it is nothing compared to the drop off in Swing% which is 41.8% and well below his career average of 49%. Improving selectivity is something that players are always striving to do, so this makes sense, especially at the start of a new season. And while his BB% is slightly up, so is his K%, even despite a lower SwStrike%. Dvuall is taking too many pitches in the zone, most likely as he is not yet comfortable with his new approach. However, it could be an effect of not seeing the ball well out of the gate, which could also explain the weaker contact.

It is not like pitchers have figured out a magical way to always get Adam Duvall out. There is some variance at the pitch type level, specifically more sinkers and less four-seamers, but the overall breakout between hard, breaking and offspeed pitches is very much in line with what Duvall saw in 2016 and 2017. The only variation is with how Duvall has performed against the pitches.

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Higher whiffs per swing on breaking and offspeed pitches could be another indication that he is just not seeing the ball well at this point in the year. Even though he is swinging less and swinging and missing less overall, he is really struggling with non-fastballs.

Add it all up and Duvall is getting decent pitches to hit, but he is either taking them more so than before, swinging and missing on breaking/offspeed stuff, or swinging and not making solid, hard contact, leading to a lot of grounders to third base. Time will tell if he maintains and improves upon his newfound patience and starts connecting with and driving good pitches, utilizing the power that got him here.

The best thing about Spring Training statistics for fantasy owners is that you can spin them whichever way is convenient for you, the owner. If you’re heavily invested in a certain player who is struggling in Spring Training, you can always say “It’s only spring, these numbers don’t count!” Or, on the other hand, you can use a hot spring to justify reaching for a player who you believe will breakout. So yes, largely spring statistics are meaningless. Except, Jeff Zimmerman wrote an article earlier this year highlighting batted ball data to spot potential breakouts. With limited Statcast data provided at many Arizona and Florida ballparks, the ground out/fly out ratio may be the best indicator for hitters to spot those breakouts. Luckily MLB.com provides the GO/AO ratio for all spring statistics, so we can put Jeff Zimmerman’s hard work to use now that 2018 Spring Training is in the books. Let’s look at three players that look poised to breakout in 2018. I’ll write a part-two portion including three or four players who had previously broken out (relatively speaking) in 2017 but are projected to regress some by the masses.

Let’s start with Brandon Nimmo, the young outfielder for the Mets. Nimmo had a hot spring and with Michael Conforto starting the season on the DL, Nimmo got the nod to leadoff and play centerfield for Opening Day. Conforto is progressing much quicker than expected and should be back before the end of the month. halting Nimmo’s playing time. Thanks to the Mets signing on Adrian Gonzalez, effectively blocking Jay Bruce from moving from right field to first base, Nimmo is left without a spot. I won’t speculate on injuries (too much) but Yoenis Cespedes rarely plays a full season and I don’t expect Adrian Gonzalez to be at first base all season.

Back to Nimmo, he hit .306 with three home runs and whooping nine extra-base hits in Spring Training. In addition to all those loud numbers, his GO/AO ratio sits at 0.87 for the spring. For context, his minor league ratio is 1.32 and so far in limited major league experience (250 at-bats) it’s 1.12. Based on Zimmerman’s conversion table, we are looking at a ground ball rate of between 42% and 43%. Throughout his minor league career his ground ball rates have ranged between 45% to 56%, let’s call it 50%. That difference in groundball rate could mean an improvement in fly ball rate to near 40%. Nimmo has never been considered a power hitter but he’s been graded with a 50 in raw power, so a change in approach may unlock 20+ home runs. His previous career high is 12 in 2016, mostly in AAA and one at the major league level. His plate discipline is already fantastic evidenced by his incredible minor league walk rates. If he were to unlock average to above average power, Nimmo could become a Matt Carpenter-type leadoff hitter for years to come.

Steven Duggar is a name I haven’t seen on many people’s radar this offseason. He performed well this spring and has impressed the coaching staff of the Giants. But alas, he was Optioned to AAA to receive everyday at-bats. The Giants believe he is the centerfielder of the future and given the health track record of players like Hunter Pence and the mediocrity of Gregor Blanco, I wouldn’t be surprised to see Dugger by June (if not sooner). Duggar is a good athlete with a good hit tool and above average speed. His raw power is only graded out as average but I’ve noticed an approach change that began in High-A last year where he, like many others began elevating the ball more. He missed some time last year but also saw a solid HR/FB% at about 13% along with the increase in fly balls. This is a good sign. So let’s compare some numbers for Duggar.

In his first two seasons of minor league ball, his GO/AO ratio was 1.52 with fly ball rates typically below 30%. In 2017, again he dealt with injuries and only played in 42 games, but improved on his GO/AO ratio and fly ball rate to the tune of 0.82 and 43% respectively. This spring he’s continued elevating the baseball with a GO/AO ratio of 0.92 along with 4 home runs and six extra-base hits. His patience at the plate is incredible, much like Brandon Nimmo and his outfield defense is good enough to play centerfield for the Giants right now. He’s been a doubles machine in the minors and it’s possible those doubles start turning into home runs. I don’t see the upside in terms of home runs compared to Nimmo but I think Duggar can steal more bases, so both can be solid fantasy contributors, especially in OBP formats.

Based on all the hype in Ozzie Albies’ direction this offseason, you would be under the impression that he already broke out. However, he was only up with the Braves for all of 57 games and 244 plate appearances. In that short amount of time, he performed admirably with a triple slash line of .286/.354/.456 with six home runs and eight steals at the ripe age of 20 years old. Impressive to say the least, but before 2017 he had hit a total of eight home runs in 293 games. So, should we just chalk up the 15 he hit between AAA and the majors in 2017 to luck or an outlier?

How about neither, you know better than that! Ozzie was a ground ball machine in the minors which is typical for a speedster with 70-grade speed and five foot nine inch, 160-pound frame. Prior to 2017, Albies’ minor league GO/AO ratio was 1.5. Last year between AAA and the majors, it was 0.9 which matches his approach this spring at 0.85. Albies has hit over .300 with three homers and six extra-base hits this spring. I realize that Albies only played in 57 games in 2017 but I set some parameters for comparison sake to Ozzie Albies’ short time in the Majors, because why not? It’s fun. Take a look. Not bad, right? I set the walk rate above 8%, the K rate below 17%, the flyball rate above 39%, and the Hard contact above 33%. The player I want to highlight of this group is fellow five foot nine inch Mookie Betts. Let’s compare Mookie’s 200+ PA cameo at age 21 to Albies’ 200+ PA cameo last year.

I should point out that Betts didn’t strike out as much as Albies did in the minors but still impressive, to say the least. New SunTrust Park plays much better in terms of power for left-handed batters and yes, Albies is a switch hitter, but should bat from the left side at least 65% of the time. Hitting from the left side should help his power production. The infatuation with Albies continues to grow. If he builds on his success from 2017, there’s nothing in his batted ball profile that would prevent him from hitting 20+ home runs as he reaches his peak. The kid’s a star! I envision multiple seasons of 20 home runs and 30 steals with a great average for Albies.

During one of my recent visits to the Fangraphs home page, while scrolling across the leaberboards, I was confronted by a fact I had once known but had long ago forgotten over this slow and tired off-season. Aaron Judge led the league in WAR! as a rookie?! and by quite a wide margin. That happened last season? Shoot just over a year ago Judge was still relatively unknown and Jeff Sullivan was telling us not to underestimate his power.

This realization conjured up memories of last season’s AL MVP vote, how one of Sabermetrics’ patron saints shook the foundations of Sabermetrics’ most prominent statistical achievement, and how article after article were written about clutch hitting.

This, in turn, reminded me of another leaderboard Judge topped last season, this one more dubious. He led (lagged?) the league with the lowest Clutch score. He was fourth in WPA/LI with 5.85 Wins, trailing only this generation’s Mickey Mantle, Judge’s clone, and some guy who plays for the Reds and just a fractional win behind the leader. In contrast, he ranked just 38th in WPA tied with some guy who used to play in Korea. Add this up and he had by far the lowest Clutch score at -3.64 wins, a full win lower than the rest of MLB save for one blue-eyed Cub.

Which led me to ask the question: What would Aaron Judge have had to do to be a clutch batter? And I don’t mean the obvious answer, “Hit better in high leverage situations“. Duh! He batted an astounding 190 wRC+ in low leverage situations to just a 107 in high leverage at bats. But that’s not the answer I was looking for. I wanted to know specifically, what would Aaron Judge have had to do to be a clutch batter? as in what could we change from his epic near MVP season to bring his Clutch stat into the positive?

So I set to find out.

Using Fangraph’s own Play Log, and with plenty of assistance from BaseballSavant.com and Statcast, I decided to play as one of the “Baseball Gods” and see if I could tweak a few of Judge’s plays to make him more clutch. As a “Fair and Just Baseball God” I wouldn’t be aiming to increase Judge’s overall stat line. If I nudge a groundball a little to turn an out into a single in a high leverage situation, I’d do the opposite in a low leverage situation (Judge had nearly 50 PA’s with a Leverage Index, LI, of effectively 0) nudging another grounder into a fielder’s glove for an out.

Thus his overall stat line and his WPA/LI would remain effectively the same, and since in those low leverage situations no (or nearly no) WPA was added, we’ll only be looking at how the play’s I change increase Judge’s WPA.(And I’ll only be going through the plays I add not the ones I’d need to take away.) I also won’t worry about any of the time traveler unintended consequences stuff, I’ll assume that only the single event changes without it affecting other plays in the same game or others. (I’ll let some of the other “Baseball Gods” worry about that stuff…)

Recall the Equation for Clutch:

Clutch = (WPA)/(pLI) – (WPA/LI)

With my rule that Judge’s pLI (0.95) and WPA/LI (5.85) will remain fixed we are just looking to increase Judge’s WPA.

With that lengthy explanation out of the way, let’s begin!:

Judge Initial WPA = 2.10
_________________________________________________________
Situation #1:

July 27th, Bottom 9, 1 Out, Runner on Third, Yankees down 1.
LI = 5.81 – Actual Play – Judge Fly’s Out to Right. – WPA = -.252

We’ll start with a big one, in fact Judge’s second highest leverage play of his season!
With a chance to tie the game in the 9th, Judge just miss-hits the ball sending it not quite far enough to allow the speedy Brett Gardner to score from third. As you can see, similar hit balls all had the same result:

But as my first act as “Baseball God” I’m gonna adjust this hit ever so slightly, notching Judge’s bat up a millimeter to two to lower the Launch Angle of this hit and allow it to carry just a bit further. Something more like this:

That should be far enough out to score Gardner giving Judge a Sac Fly.

New Play – Sac Fly – New WPA = .112 – Net WPA Change = .364

Judge’s New WPA = 2.46
_________________________________________________________
Situation #2:

August 2nd, Bottom 8, No Outs, Runner on Second, Yankees down 2.
LI = 2.72 – Actual Play – Strike out swinging. – WPA = -.08

Sometimes the job of a “Baseball God” is rather easy. In this case I’ll just need to do some umpire convincing. In this at bat Judge struck out on a 3-2 slider, but earlier in the at bat, after three wild pitches, here was the 3-0 offering from Bruce Rondon:

Ok, sure, most umpires probably call this a strike on a 3-0 count, but I’m gonna go ahead and give this one to Judge. Ball Four!

New Play – Walk – New WPA = .087 – Net WPA Change = .167

Judge’s New WPA = 2.63
_________________________________________________________
Situation #3:

September 19th, Bottom 2, 2 Outs, Runners on Second and Third, Tie Game.
LI = 2.03 – Actual Play – Fly out to Center. – WPA = -.061

Judge crushed a Jose Berrios offering at 107 MPH:

Here’s what it looked like.

He was just a little under this one, wouldn’t take much more to send this ball out. So we’ll make the charge and turn this loud out into a bomb.

New Play – Three Run Home Run – New WPA = .249 – Net WPA Change = .310

Judge’s New WPA = 2.94
_________________________________________________________
Situation #4:

September 9th, Top 9, No Outs, Runner on First, Tie Game.
LI = 3.40 – Actual Play – Fielder’s Choice to third, out at second. – WPA = -.084

Judge grounds one to third, and nearly into a double play.
Here’s what it looked like.

Thing is, Rougned “De La Hoya” Odor is in such a hurry to turn two that it almost looks like he jumps off Second too early. Take a closer look:

Your guess is as good as mine, but here’s the thing: As a “Baseball God“, I don’t have to guess. I’ll just make the throw from third just a little higher and wider pulling Odor off the bag and leaving both runners safe on a throwing error. Did you know that errors count as positive WPA plays?!

New Play – Reach on Error, Throwing Error at Third, Runners safe at First and Second – New WPA = .109 – Net WPA Change = .193

Judge’s New WPA = 3.13
_________________________________________________________
Situation #5:

August 18th, Top 6, 2 Outs, Bases Loaded, Yankees down 1.
LI = 4.52 – Actual Play – Ground Out to Shortstop. – WPA = -.119

Judge hits a sharp ground ball at 103 MPH.

Here’s what it looked like.

Hit hard, but right into Xander Bogaerts‘ glove for a routine out. But per Statcast balls hit at that Velocity and at that Launch Angle become hits about half the time.

One can imagine Judge hitting this ball just a little closer to the pitcher’s mound, and seeing it get past a diving Bogaerts. With the runners going, that hit would easily score 2.

New Play – Ground Ball Single up the Middle Scoring 2, – New WPA = .275 – Net WPA Change = .394

Judge’s New WPA = 3.53
_________________________________________________________
Situation #6:

June 14th, Top 7, No Outs, Runners on First and Second, Tie game
LI = 2.89 – Actual Play – Fly Out to Left. – WPA = -.085

Judge ropes one into left field, where Eric Young Jr. makes an awkward dive for it.

Here’s what it looked like.

Young makes the out, but just barely. Imagine if his dive is just a little more awkward… That ball probably gets by him and clears the bases.

New Play – Bases Clearing Double to Left Field – New WPA = .219 – Net WPA Change = .304

Judge’s New WPA = 3.83
_________________________________________________________
Situation #7:

June 15th, Top 9, No Outs, Bases Empty, Yankees down 1.
LI = 2.88 – Actual Play – Strike Out Looking. – WPA = -.073

Were picking up steam now! And as a “Baseball God” I haven’t had to work very hard changing these last few plays. Now it’s time to work just a little harder.

Leading off a do or die ninth, Judge took three easy balls, then saw and fouled consecutive fast balls. This set up a full count pitch where Santiago Casilla froze him with a beautiful knuckle curve. Here’s what it looked like.

No doubt that’s a beautiful pitch. But guess what? Umpires sometimes miss calls, especially when they get some inadvertant dust in their eye…

New Play – Walk – New WPA = .110 – Net WPA Change = .183

Judge’s New WPA = 4.02
_________________________________________________________
Situation #8:

September 10th, Top 3, 1 Out, Bases Loaded
LI = 2.26 – Actual Play – Sac Fly to Right. – WPA = -.002

In an RBI situation, Judge blasts one.

Here’s what it looked like.

So Judge clearly gets under this pitch… but he still hit it over 300′ and scores a run.
The thing is the next two times up he did this and this!
I’m just gonna do a little rearranging on when these homers take place…

New Play – Grand Slam to Right – New WPA = .256 – Net WPA Change = .258

Judge’s New WPA = 4.27
_________________________________________________________
Situation #9:

April 18th, Bottom 9, 2 Outs, Bases Loaded, Yankees Down 3
LI = 3.86 – Actual Play – Fielder’s Choice to Shortstop, Out at Second. – WPA = -.100

Judge ends the game on a weakly hit grounder to shortstop.

Here’s what it looked like.

Looks like a routine grounder, but per Statcast similar balls become hits about a third of the time. And we don’t really need a hit here, Tim Anderson looks a little shaky fielding the grounder as it hops to his glove. In a critical situation like this who’s to say he doesn’t boot one? The answer is me, the “Baseball God“. I say he boots it…

New Play – Fielding Error at Shortstop, 1 Run Scores – New WPA = .090 – Net WPA Change = .190

Judge’s New WPA = 4.46
_________________________________________________________
Situation #10:

July 21st, Top 3, 1 Out, Runners on First and Third, Tie Game
LI = 2.12 – Actual Play – Sac Fly to Center. – WPA = +.016

Another well struck ball that just stays in the yard for a sac fly.

Here’s what it looked like.

But Judge would get one more try at Andrew Moore that game, and you may remember it. Judge’s next at bat was that time he broke Statcast!

I’m just gonna move that Statcast breaking smash up one AB if you don’t mind…

New Play – Three Run Home Run – New WPA = .216 – Net WPA Change = .200

Judge’s New WPA = 4.66
_________________________________________________________
Ok, awesome we’re 10 plays in, and as a “Baseball God” I don’t feel like I’ve had to work all that hard. But were still only at 4.66 WPA, nearly a win short of our target. It’s time to pull out the big guns. It’s time to perform a MIRACLE!

Situation #11:

July 30th, Bottom 9, 1 Out, Runners on First and Second, Yankees down 2.
LI = 4.78 – Actual Play – Foul out to First. – WPA = -.112

Representing the go ahead run, Judge pops up in foul ground to the first baseman. You can see his hit in blue in the image below.

(As to why this shows up as a -57° LA I think sometimes Miracle Work messes with Statcast…)

Just a lazy pop-up. Not much a “Baseball God” can do to affect this play without revealing myself to the world. So I’ll just void the play and blows this ball a little further to the right and into the seats where Trevor Plouffe can’t catch it!

So I’ve just given Judge a new lease on this particular at-bat. I hope he uses it wisely. I’ll just assume it goes something like this!

New Play – Walk Off Three-Run Home Run – New WPA = .793 – Net WPA Change = .905

What?! You don’t think that’s fair. Tough! I am Beerpope the Baseball God and this is my Miracle, don’t tell me what’s fair!

Judge’s New WPA = 5.57

And with that spectacular finish, we check Judge’s Clutch score:

5.57 / 0.95 – 5.85 = +.01 Wins

And there you have it. Aaron Judge – CLUTCH BATTER. My work here is done.

So what does this all mean? Really I’m not sure. Does the fact that it took 10 twists of fate and one walk-off miracle just to bring Judge barely into the positive show just how deeply un-clutch he was last season? Maybe. But it may also show us how futile it is to focus of how clutch or un-clutch a batter is if an ump call, miss hit, or bounce here or there in just 10 at bats can invalidate the other 600 plus plate appearances in a player’s season.

I’ll leave that determination to the readers.

Now enough with the 2017 Season. It’s time for me to begin contemplating what Miracles to perform thus upcoming season…

Cheers!

(Editor’s note: this post was submitted prior to the start of the season but it seems rather timely now)

I can’t shake myself from latching onto spring training hype trains. Even after all we’re taught about small sample sizes, I find myself watching games and wondering whether this could be the year for any number of players.

Watching the Braves and the Nationals last weekend, something about Dansby Swanson seemed different. I started digging and emerged on the other end of a rabbit hole that brought me from hitting guru Jason Ochart (@Jason_cOchart) to Coach Bobby Stevens Jr. (@StevieBobbins, BattersBoxChicago.com, GoWindyCityBaseball.com) to gif-ing up everything and more.

I’ll admit, I forgot Dansby Swanson was sent to the minor leagues in late July. The former number one pick relinquished his major league role after mustering only a .287 OBP in just under 400 plate appearances. Two weeks later he was recalled with little more than generalities to sift through in hopes of unearthing what the Braves wanted to change mechanically if anything at all.

After Swanson’s return to the major leagues tinkering began.

Video via MLB.com – 1, 2

It’s a relatively simple adjustment, but the ramifications and reasoning behind the alteration bubbles numerous points to the surface.

“Getting [your front foot] down too early can mess up timing and alter the kinematic sequencing of the swing.” Jason Ochart quickly summed up via Twitter what I speculated might be true.

For almost all of Swanson’s 2017, before his change in late August, his front foot was down earlier than your standard hitter (in the video on the left above).

“For most hitters, the pressure shifting onto the front foot is what initiates their swing. Force plate data shows that the forceful heel drop works as the trigger of the swing and works as a brake to send energy upward through the body… to accelerate the bat late in the swing arc, as all the best hitters do.”

Breaking down Orchart’s points make a complex explanation simple. A hitter’s front foot is used to initiate their swing. When this foot plants, it helps transfer energy from one’s lower body to upper body. Eventually, that energy affects a hitter’s bat.

“Force plate data” sounds complex, but it’s nothing more than a plate on the ground that measures exerted force. In this case, the force from a hitter’s front foot. (YouTube is always here to help as well).

Ochart went on to state research shows that shorter time between the peak of one’s front-foot force and contact with the baseball can lead to greater exit velocity. If your front foot peaks early, as a hitter’s might if they’re planting as early as Swanson was, the effects could be detrimental on the one variable most hitters are focused on.

Stats, however, have a tough time backing up a substantial performance boost solely through the hovering of Swanson’s front foot.

Upon Swanson’s return to the majors in August, there was a strong uptick productivity that lasted until the beginning of September. This correlates nicely with his front-foot alteration but doesn’t sustain through the end of the season, as one would hope a material adjustment would. A variety of other factors could counter the change: production uptick being artificial, fatigue, comfort with the new approach, etc.

But what about other components of Swanson’s swing that might have been affected by this change?

“Hitting is controlled all through the back hip in relation to controlling your weight and ‘staying back’ on pitches. The issue is in the explanation of ‘stay back’. Stay back in what position? With your foot off of the ground? With your front foot on the ground? In your stance? That is where understanding is lost in my opinion.” Stevens took a different route to a similar conclusion that buoys the case Swanson had beneficial intentions, even if stats cloud improvement.

“A hitter must ‘stay back’ in their hip with their foot off the ground or hovering. This does not mean that you lift the front foot off the ground and balance on your back leg, though. It means that we load or coil into our back hip, then as our lead leg begins to stride out towards the pitcher, we want to ‘stretch’, or use our back muscles, to hold our weight back until we decide it is time to launch the swing.”

Stevens’ broadening of terminology related to “staying back” unearths numerous other factors related to what Swanson did. Each of his points made me consider other aspects of Swanson’s kinetic chain, particularly how the most visible change – foot down early to hover – could be covering up other, more important changes to help the former college star, acting as the low-hanging fruit.

So why bring this front-foot change up now, six months late? Because Swanson’s lower body alteration was actually the second thing I noticed, behind another change that caught my eye on his long home run off Max Scherzer in spring’s first weekend of action.

Video via MLB.com – 1, 2

First his lower body, now his upper body. While the above camera perspective when comparing is slightly askew thanks to spring training parks and their uniqueness, Swanson is starting his hands lower and bringing them up into his load. In 2017, he started his hands higher and kept them there for the duration of his pre-swing rhythm. Now, his momentum is built up into the hitting position, yet the path and aesthetic of his swing after his load are nearly identical to the naked eye. This feels like a conscious attempt at relaxation in the box, with the foresight to alter the path to his load as opposed to how exactly he is loading. What could be invisible, however, to my untrained scouting eyes are the concepts Stevens talked about above relating to a hitter’s back hip and launch into his swing.

Swanson’s adjustment is similar in direction to Zack Cozart’s alteration from 2016 to 2017, one that brought Cozart a substantial uptick in power. Some might say Billy Eppler’s new third baseman’s breakout came demonstrably because of health, but Cozart admitted last Spring he wanted to start his bat on his shoulder to relax himself at the plate and come up into the hitting position. What Swanson is doing above mimics that concept – coming up into his load – even if the point at which the process begins is different. Swanson’s relaxation also reminds me of Anthony Rendon’s gradual adjustment, as the All-Star began to push his hands further south when comparing his swing at Rice University to that of later in his career.

Most relevant to my gracious sources, Ochart and Stevens, Swanson retains his front-foot hover from late in 2017 in the gif above.

While the stats seem doubtful a tangible change in the Braves shortstop, numbers can often be blind to progression mechanically that hasn’t manifested on the spectrum of production. My confidence in an improved Swanson is driven by the theory around adjustments he seems to have made, starting with the hover of his front foot to the repositioning of his hands preload. Add him to the list of players I’ll be watching closely in one month’s time.

A version of this column can be found on BigThreeSports.com.

You should do that thing where you follow me on Twitter – @LanceBrozdow.

Matt Davidson was not good last year. He got 443 plate appearances in his first full MLB year on a rebuilding White Sox club, and it didn’t go well as he posted a WAR of -0.9. That mark was seventh-worse in MLB for position players with at least 400 PA. There’s little mystery how he got there, as he combined DH-only caliber defense with a paltry 83 wRC+.

Davidson achieved that uninspiring number by hitting like a three-true-outcomes guy without the walks, more or less a poor man’s Chris Carter. Good news first: last year, he ran a pretty decent ISO of .232, putting him close to good-to-great hitters like Francisco Lindor, Anthony Rendon, and Anthony Rizzo, cracking 26 homers along the way. His raw strength is very real: he blasted a tape-measure 476-foot moonshot out of Wrigley with a 111MPH exit velocity in July. Big power is a good trait to have, but it’s been devalued in today’s game, where guys like Carter and Logan Morrison can hit 35+ homers in a year and then can’t find contracts of even $5M the following offseason.

Still, significant pop is necessary for a high offensive ceiling, so what’s holding Davidson back? In a word, strikeouts. He struck out a horrifying 37.2% of the time in 2017, second-most in the majors.  Unsurprisingly, his whiff rate was a scary 16.3%, sixth-highest among his peers; for reference, that’s identical to how often hitters swung and missed against Andrew Miller last year. The walk rate that keeps most K-prone sluggers’ OBP somewhat afloat wasn’t in evidence, as Davidson walked only 4.3% of the time. You won’t be shocked to find that he finished second-worst in K/BB with an ugly 0.12. Although he did hit the ball hard (we’ll come back to that), his flyball-heavy batted ball profile and below-average speed kept his BABIP suppressed to .285. That mark was in close agreement with his xBABIP of .283.

The astronomical K% and below-average BABIP held him to an ugly .220 AVG, which combined with the poor BB% led to a truly abysmal OBP of .260, second-worst among hitters with 400+ PAs. The only guy worse in that column was Rougned Odor, who has a similar offensive profile, but at least he can partially blame a particularly unlucky .224 BABIP.

Looking at last year’s stats, there appears to be approximately zero reason for optimism for Matt Davidson. He hit for power well, but was near the top of all the peripheral leaderboards that you really don’t want to be at the top of.  So why is this post being written at all? In short, Davidson seems to have turned over a new leaf this spring.

Now, I know the sabermetric kneejerk reaction to that last sentence: spring training means nothing and spring training stats mean less than that. But that’s not entirely true, as this excellent piece in the Economist way back in 2015 details. If you don’t want to read the whole piece, that’s fine, because it can be summed up very briefly: a hitter’s strikeout rate in spring training actually has a pretty high correlation with their strikeout rate in the regular season. Of course, one of the chief objections to drawing conclusions from spring training stats is the tiny sample sizes with which we’re working. Fortunately, strikeout rate is one of the fastest-stabilizing peripheral rates there is; Fangraphs itself puts the threshold for stabilization of strikeout rate at about 60 PA.

That piece was linked somewhere recently and I read it for the first time. A couple days later, being entirely starved for any form of baseball through this long winter, I reached the rock bottom of scouring the spring training stats of the team I supported, the White Sox. To my own surprise, there was actually something interesting buried there; as you might guess, it was in Matt Davidson’s stat line.

Luckily for us, and this piece, Davidson’s played the most of any White Sox this spring, totaling 60 PA as of March 20. He’s struck out twelve times, a K rate of 20%. He has walked seven times, for a walk rate of 11.7%. In this small sample, he’s almost halved his strikeout rate and nearly tripled his walk rate from 2017. On the one hand, that sounds like an insane improvement that cannot possibly be maintained; on the other, those rates from spring training are by themselves quite unremarkable for a major league hitter. Using BBRef’s summed 2017 stats to calculate league-wide rates, 20% K and 11% BB would have both been slightly better than average league-wide in 2017.

A significant walk rate improvement wouldn’t actually be terribly surprising. If you peruse Davidson’s player page, you’ll find that before last year he never posted a BB% worse than 9.1%, ranging up to 12.0%, from Double-A onwards, a total of five seasons spent mostly at Triple-A plus a month in the majors with Arizona. His walk rate at least doubling this coming year wouldn’t be coming out of left field; rather, it would be him returning to the player he has been in that sense for pretty much his entire professional career minus last year. It will probably come down from 11.7%, given that MLB pitchers likely have better control than those he’s faced this spring, but still, a big jump in walk rate seems likely for him this year.

That strikeout rate is a different animal, though. He’s always struck out a lot, never posting a K rate below 20% at any stop in the minors, and the whiff rate mentioned previously supports that. On the other hand, the sample size is now at the point where this being a complete fluke is pretty unlikely. Is this a real improvement or a mirage? I don’t know, and we don’t have plate discipline numbers in ST to see underlying patterns, but according to Davidson himself, making more contact is exactly what he’s trying to do. It sure seems like he’s succeeding in that thus far. As another small data point, he doesn’t seem to have a pattern of ST flukes in K rate, as in 58 PAs during last year’s spring training he struck out in 37.8% of his plate appearances, a number that echoes his full-season 37.2%.

This wouldn’t be as interesting a case if Davidson did nothing well offensively. He’s a large and very strong man, which is why he hasn’t just been released by the White Sox years ago. Take a look at his contact profile. Basically, last year, he pulled balls, hit more fly balls than ground balls, and vaporized balls in to play, with a quality-of-contact triple-slash line of 15.7% Soft/46.1% Med/38.2% Hard. His HR/FB% was a robust 22.0%, rubbing statistical shoulders with established sluggers like Nelson Cruz and Edwin Encarnacion. In short, when he actually did hit the ball, he looked for all in the world like a poster child for the fly ball revolution. Those underlying numbers hint at a lot more offensive potential than anyone outside of the White Sox organization sees in him, if he could just reduce that giant 32.9 K-BB%.

Now he’s showing signs of significant improvement in that fatal flaw of plate discipline. It doesn’t seem like the improvement in K% and BB% thus far in spring training has cost him much in power, considering that he’s demolished ST pitching to the tune of .358/.433/.679 (1.113 OPS & .321 ISO). Obviously, he’s not going to keep hitting quite that well, but the still-rebuilding White Sox aren’t about to outright bench or demote him either. Maybe it’s all a lot of noise, and he’ll be bad again this year. Or maybe Matt Davidson, at the age of 26, is about to be the Next Big Breakout™. Just as a reminder, it took J.D. Martinez until 26 to figure it out and become the “King Kong of Slug”; Justin Turner was 29-year-old replacement-level utility infielder who suddenly blossomed offensively in 2014; Jose Bautista was almost 30 before he turned into a nightmare for AL pitchers in 2010. So, here’s an prediction I would have laughed off for 2018: Matt Davidson is about to bust out in a big way.

UPDATE 3/29: Davidson hit three homers on a cold day in Kauffman Stadium, every single one of them with a 114+ MPH exit velocity. He also walked and did not strike out. Jump on the bandwagon now while there’s still room.