In “Hardball Retrospective: Evaluating Scouting and Development Outcomes for the Modern-Era Franchises”, I placed every ballplayer in the modern era (from 1901-present) on their original team. I calculated revised standings for every season based entirely on the performance of each team’s “original” players. I discuss every team’s “original” players and seasons at length along with organizational performance with respect to the Amateur Draft (or First-Year Player Draft), amateur free agent signings and other methods of player acquisition.  Season standings, WAR and Win Shares totals for the “original” teams are compared against the “actual” team results to assess each franchise’s scouting, development and general management skills.

Expanding on my research for the book, the following series of articles will reveal the teams with the biggest single-season difference in the WAR and Win Shares for the “Original” vs. “Actual” rosters for every Major League organization. “Hardball Retrospective” is available in digital format on Amazon, Barnes and Noble, GooglePlay, iTunes and KoboBooks. The paperback edition is available on Amazon, Barnes and Noble and CreateSpace. Supplemental Statistics, Charts and Graphs along with a discussion forum are offered at TuataraSoftware.com.

Don Daglow (Intellivision World Series Major League Baseball, Earl Weaver Baseball, Tony LaRussa Baseball) contributed the foreword for Hardball Retrospective. The foreword and preview of my book are accessible here.

Terminology

OWAR – Wins Above Replacement for players on “original” teams

OWS – Win Shares for players on “original” teams

OPW% – Pythagorean Won-Loss record for the “original” teams

AWAR – Wins Above Replacement for players on “actual” teams

AWS – Win Shares for players on “actual” teams

APW% – Pythagorean Won-Loss record for the “actual” teams

Assessment

The 2001 Texas Rangers 

OWAR: 48.4     OWS: 278     OPW%: .513     (83-79)

AWAR: 34.2      AWS: 219     APW%: .451     (73-89)

WARdiff: 14.2                        WSdiff: 59  

The “Original” 2001 Rangers placed third in the American League West behind Seattle and Oakland. Sammy “Say It Ain’t” Sosa (.328/64/160) established personal bests in batting average, runs scored (146), RBI and bases on balls (116) while placing runner-up in the MVP balloting. Rich Aurilia (.324/37/97) contributed career-highs in nearly every batting classification including 114 tallies and 206 safeties. Juan “Igor” Gonzalez (.325/35/140) achieved his third All-Star invite and finished fifth in the American League MVP race. Ivan “Pudge” Rodriguez (.308/25/65) merited his tenth straight Gold Glove Award. Jose Hernandez swatted 26 two-baggers and 25 big-flies. The “Actuals” lineup featured Alex Rodriguez (.318/52/135) who paced the circuit in four-baggers and runs scored (133). Rafael Palmeiro (.273/47/123) surpassed the century mark in walks and equaled his single-season HR total. Frank Catalanotto batted at a .330 clip and ripped 31 two-base hits.

Ivan Rodriguez rated thirteenth among backstops according to “The New Bill James Historical Baseball Abstract” top 100 player rankings. “Original” Rangers registered in the “NBJHBA” top 100 ratings include Sammy Sosa (45^th-RF), Juan Gonzalez (52^nd-RF) and Ruben Sierra (70^th-RF). Moreover, Alex Rodriguez (17^th-SS), Rafael Palmeiro (19^th-1B), Ken Caminiti (25^th-3B) and Andres Galarraga (42^nd-1B) achieved the distinction among members of the “Actuals” roster.

  Original 2001 Rangers                              Actual 2001 Rangers

Kevin J. Brown (10-4, 2.65) fashioned a 1.141 WHIP in an abbreviated season (19 starts). Robb Nen (3.01, 45 SV) struck out 93 batters in 77.2 innings and topped the circuit in saves. Jeff Zimmerman (2.40, 28 SV) was nearly unhittable out of the bullpen, producing a 0.897 WHIP.

  Original 2001 Rangers                            Actual 2001 Rangers 

 Notable Transactions

Sammy Sosa 

July 29, 1989: Traded by the Texas Rangers with Wilson Alvarez and Scott Fletcher to the Chicago White Sox for Harold Baines and Fred Manrique.

March 30, 1992: Traded by the Chicago White Sox with Ken Patterson to the Chicago Cubs for George Bell.

Rich Aurilia

December 22, 1994: Traded by the Texas Rangers with Desi Wilson to the San Francisco Giants for John Burkett.

Juan Gonzalez

November 2, 1999: Traded by the Texas Rangers with Danny Patterson and Gregg Zaun to the Detroit Tigers for Alan Webb (minors), Frank Catalanotto, Francisco Cordero, Bill Haselman, Gabe Kapler and Justin Thompson.

November 1, 2000: Granted Free Agency.

January 9, 2001: Signed as a Free Agent with the Cleveland Indians. 

Robb Nen

July 17, 1993: Traded by the Texas Rangers with Kurt Miller to the Florida Marlins for Cris Carpenter.

November 18, 1997: Traded by the Florida Marlins to the San Francisco Giants for Mick Pageler (minors), Mike Villano (minors) and Joe Fontenot.

Rey Sanchez 

January 3, 1990: Traded by the Texas Rangers to the Chicago Cubs for Bryan House (minors).

August 16, 1997: Traded by the Chicago Cubs to the New York Yankees for Frisco Parotte (minors).

November 3, 1997: Granted Free Agency.

January 22, 1998: Signed as a Free Agent with the San Francisco Giants.

November 5, 1998: Granted Free Agency.

December 11, 1998: Signed as a Free Agent with the Kansas City Royals.

October 29, 1999: Granted Free Agency.

December 7, 1999: Signed as a Free Agent with the Kansas City Royals. 

Jose Hernandez 

April 3, 1992: Selected off waivers by the Cleveland Indians from the Texas Rangers.

June 1, 1993: Traded by the Cleveland Indians to the Chicago Cubs for Heathcliff Slocumb.

July 31, 1999: Traded by the Chicago Cubs with Terry Mulholland to the Atlanta Braves for a player to be named later, Micah Bowie and Ruben Quevedo. The Atlanta Braves sent Joey Nation (August 24, 1999) to the Chicago Cubs to complete the trade.

November 5, 1999: Granted Free Agency.

December 16, 1999: Signed as a Free Agent with the Milwaukee Brewers.

Kevin J. Brown 

October 15, 1994: Granted Free Agency.

April 9, 1995: Signed as a Free Agent with the Baltimore Orioles.

November 3, 1995: Granted Free Agency.

December 22, 1995: Signed as a Free Agent with the Florida Marlins.

December 15, 1997: Traded by the Florida Marlins to the San Diego Padres for Steve Hoff (minors), Derrek Lee and Rafael Medina.

October 26, 1998: Granted Free Agency.

December 12, 1998: Signed as a Free Agent with the Los Angeles Dodgers.

Honorable Mention

The 2007 Texas Rangers 

OWAR: 36.9     OWS: 249     OPW%: .496     (80-82)

AWAR: 27.8      AWS: 225     APW%: .463     (75-87)

WARdiff: 9.1                        WSdiff: 24  

Texas finished a distant sixteen games behind Seattle in ’07. Carlos Pena (.282/46/121) registered 99 tallies and achieved personal-bests in virtually every offensive category. Mark Teixeira tagged 30 long balls, drove in 105 baserunners and contributed a .306 BA. Ian Kinsler swiped 23 bases in 25 attempts, scored 96 runs and clubbed 20 dingers during his sophomore season. Travis “Pronk” Hafner blasted 24 dingers and eclipsed the century mark in RBI for the fourth consecutive campaign. Ivan Rodriguez drilled 31 two-base hits while third-sacker Edwin Encarnacion delivered a .289 BA with 16 jacks. Aaron Harang (16-6, 3.73) posted a career-best 1.144 WHIP and placed fourth in the Cy Young balloting. Joaquin Benoit whiffed 87 batsmen over 82 innings while furnishing a 2.85 ERA along with a WHIP of 1.171.

On Deck

What Might Have Been – The “Original” 2003 Indians

References and Resources

Baseball America – Executive Database

Baseball-Reference

James, Bill. The New Bill James Historical Baseball Abstract. New York, NY.: The Free Press, 2001. Print.

James, Bill, with Jim Henzler. Win Shares. Morton Grove, Ill.: STATS, 2002. Print.

Retrosheet – Transactions Database 

The information used here was obtained free of charge from and is copyrighted by Retrosheet. Interested parties may contact Retrosheet at “www.retrosheet.org”.

Seamheads – Baseball Gauge

Sean Lahman Baseball Archive

Last week I explored how exciting it is when certain things happen in baseball that shouldn’t. Some of the moments are quirky, like Ben Revere homers, while some of them are static shocks of excitement, like a guy getting on despite being behind in the count. They’re all enjoyable though.

But let’s be fair. Sometimes hitters are up at the plate with the advantage. They’re ahead in the count, have the pitcher behind the 8-ball and the defense extra up on its toes, but then…womp womp. They strike out, hit a weak fly ball, or tap a grounder to short, and the at-bat ends with the curt sound of a deflating balloon. And we’d be remiss to not acknowledge the guys who left us deflated most in 2016.

Like last time, that’s the top 10 from last year, plus their previous two years for some context. This list is just as interesting because it’s just as diverse in terms of position, age, and spot in the lineup. Certain guys do stick out though. You can’t help but think how the consistency in the numbers for Albert Pujols could speak to his decline. From 2008-10, which are the first three years of data available from Statcast, his BABIP when ahead was .389, .313, and .288. Those are also the last three years his batting average was .300 or better, which is understandable if you consider the possibility that pitchers have become less fearful of him when they give him advantageous counts.

Then there’s the Curious Case in the Collapse of Jason Heyward. Nobody expected him to be so bad so quickly in his first year with the Cubs. How much of it had to do with his BABIP loafing on the Mendoza line when ahead? As such an aberration, does it suggest he could bounce back with anything more than terrible luck? Probably at least a little.

And let’s not forget Francisco Lindor! He’s the only guy to show up on this list and the best-when-behind list. Perhaps that speaks to his relative youth — maybe too much comfort when ahead and focus that wants to make up for it when behind. That will be interesting to track as he moves into the next phase of his career.

Collectively, these guys were all more comfortable when ahead, as you may have guessed. Pujols sticks out again in terms of how the ball comes off his bat. While he’s been making outs at a high rate when ahead the last three years, he’s also still squaring up the ball pretty darn well. As for Heyward, his launch angle when ahead might be another reason he could improve in 2017, even if his exit velo is almost definitively average. Unless his combo of loft and soft-ish hitting gives defenders enough time to get to the ball. Then maybe he’s doomed forever.

Kyle Seager has the highest launch angle when ahead and second-highest in other counts. While he clearly likes to put the ball in the air, his decent-but-not-exceptional exit velo might make for a lot of long outs. And at the other end of the spectrum, Christian Yelich’s numbers tell us he’s hitting it low and hard a ton. That makes it easier to grasp why he made 80 outs when ahead in the count last year, but he also more than doubled his career home-run total last year, so he’s starting to put some loft under the ball.

Based on the numbers immediately above, Carlos Santana might get on base even more in the coming season. Hitting it as hard and at the angles he did in 2016 makes it seem unreasonable that he made the most outs in the league when ahead.

And finally, we examine when these guys made their outs when in hitters counts. Like the best-when-behind list possibly provided some inkling when to tune into a game or one of those players’ at-bats, this data might tell you when to tune out. Unless you’re into disappointment or schadenfreude.

Only two guys made more outs in the last three innings than they did in the first or middle three: Eric Hosmer and Jason Heyward. It’s intriguing that everyone else trended down as the game went on. I don’t readily buy into the idea of players being “in the zone” or “a great place mentally.” However, I am curious about the possibility of mentality making an impact on action in this context because I do believe mind and body are one. That they might come together as the stakes get higher would speak to the crux of how any of these hitters have become professionals.

I don’t think these numbers are as informative in the players’ approaches when ahead as much as they are a matter of BABIP. And by no means do I think that’s bulletproof. They still tell us how they hit the ball and when, which means they leave open opportunities to examine where tweaks might occur, though. With the variability of average on balls in play, it’s unlikely these players post the exact same numbers, but if any of them come close, it could account for roughly 20% of the total outs they make all year. Or 20% of the reasons you see what other games are on.

Center fielder/sabermetric superstar Kevin Kiermaier signed an extension with the Tampa Bay Rays for 6/$53.5M this week. Dave Cameron of FanGraphs notes that he will receive roughly $30M for three arbitration seasons and $12M per year for three free-agency seasons. There will also likely be a $12M team option. Cameron’s article, while rightfully criticizing Major League Baseball’s flawed arbitration system, will run counter to my argument. Kiermaier is an excellent player, no doubt – a defensive whiz, a great base runner, and a league-average bat to boot. One thing that is not on his side is age. Kiermaier will be 27 this season, would have been 30 in free agency, and will be 33 or 34 when his contract is over. Much of Kiermaier’s value is derived from his defensive prowess; he has recorded a 44 UZR for his work in center field in his career. While this is impressive, the precedent for Kiermaier to continue this excellence through his free-agent years is unlikely. Let’s consider the center fielders of the UZR era who have signed significant free-agent contracts.

Major Free Agent Center Fielders’ UZR

*data via FanGraphs

Here we see a list of center fielders with (mostly) fantastic defensive records before signing a free-agent contract around the age of 30. With the exception of Carlos Beltran, the youngest player on this list, every single one of these players’ defensive values in center cratered. All of them were or will be rendered unplayable in center before the expiration of their contracts. Kevin Kiermaier is a fantastic center fielder, but even he is no immortal among these men. With the stench of the Jacoby Ellsbury deal still fresh in the air, it is likely that most executives around the game will prefer developing defense rather than buying it.

The Rays get to pay Kiermaier $24-36M for 3-4 free-agent seasons in exchange for the guaranteed money during his arbitration years, but if Kiermaier the hypothetical free agent isn’t going to be paid for his defense, is his bat really going to be worth 3/$24M or 4/$36M? Looking at Kiermaier’s place among center fielders with at least 1000 plate appearances in the previous three seasons, his wRC+ made him this red mark on the graph.

He’s holding his own (league average), and this is around where he has been for his whole career, but this is also supposed to be his prime. If this is the offensive peak (plateau?) of Kevin Kiermaier, it’s hard to imagine him creating $24-36M worth of value if the plateau crumbles around the age-30 mark.

While Kevin Kiermaier is a bona fide stud, it’s likely he will only be one until he reaches what would have been his free-agent years. By signing this extension, I believe Kiermaier increased his career earnings, while taking that money guaranteed. However, don’t presume that Tampa was reckless about the $24-36M they will allocate to Kiermaier over those last three or four years; precedents can be broken, and he is an awesome player. It’s also important to consider the new asset that Tampa upgraded to, a nice Adam Eaton-esque carrot to dangle in front of interested teams – seven years of control of Kevin Kiermaier.

The 2016 Atlanta Braves were built to suck.  After all, starting a season 0-9 basically kills any hope left in the fan base, and gets them prepared for the contagious losing.  For the few fans who paid to go see their beloved Braves play in the now retired Turner Field, losing 93 games is heartbreaking.  A large volume of articles exists detailing the extent at which the Atlanta Braves, under both John Hart and John Coppolella, are remodeling their organization.  This article serves the purpose of examining one thing:

That’s right! The 2016 second-half Atlanta Braves won more games than they lost!  If you did not already know this you either (a) are not a Braves fan, or (b) could not manage to care less.  However, this could have some real value behind it.  While the Braves managed to be outscored by 20 runs in the second half, they still managed to win two more games than they lost.  They scored 35 more runs in 17 fewer games.  Their runs/game increased 3.45 to 4.75, which would have placed them in between the Mariners and Cardinals in that regard had it been 4.75 the entire 2016 season.  The most important takeaway is how much better the second-half Braves were at preventing runs — 149 fewer runs allowed than in the first half.  Shaving off that many runs in only 17 fewer games is huge.

But let’s not get ahead of ourselves.  A winning record is unsustainable at a deficit of 20 runs in 72 games.  But I am not asking whether the 2017 Atlanta Braves can win even 82 games.  Can they win 81?  Could the great finish down the stretch of the 2016 season carry over into 2017?  While going .500 is technically meaningless because a .500 team will not make the playoffs, not losing more than they win in the new SunTrust Park will energize the organization and the fan base, and prepare the team for future success.

When the 2016-2017 offseason kicked off, the Braves signed two popular starting pitchers, and acquired one via trade, to eat innings so their crop of young pitching could ripen on the farm.

Two of the three had subpar years in 2016.  The other one became an internet sensation for his antics in the batter’s box and even hit a homer against the San Diego Padres.  But let’s assess what each pitcher brings to Atlanta’s rotation.

Bartolo Colon ages like a fine wine.  His ERA was better last year than any Atlanta starter except Julio Teheran.  While pitching record is not a statistic to measure performance, it is worth noting he won more games last year than any Atlanta starter.  He was better pretty much across the board than anyone not named Julio Teheran.  But can he keep this level of production up?  I would like to think so.  His two-seam velocity has stayed relatively consistent over the past three years.  All the Braves should ask Colon to do is turn in around 20 quality starts (he turned in 19 last year).  Consistency was a hallmark of his time with the Mets, and should continue in Atlanta for at least the 2017 season.

The other old guy the Atlanta Braves picked up this offseason happens to be knuckleballer — R.A. Dickey, 2012 National League Cy Young Award winner.  While Dickey will more than likely not be in the running for any hardware as he nears his 43rd birthday, he can still meet the immediate needs of his new team.  From 2011 to 2015, Dickey’s lowest inning count was 208.2, and peaked in his legendary 2012 with 233.2 innings pitched.  This is what the Braves need.  They need Dickey to turn in a mountain of good, quality innings.  If he could get over 200 innings again, and remain viable at the big-league level, then it is mission accomplished.

The third major addition to the Atlanta rotation is southpaw pitcher Jaime Garcia.  On December 1 of last year, the St. Louis Cardinals accepted minor-league infielder Luke Dykstra, right-handed pitcher John Gant, and righty Chris Ellis for Garcia’s services.  First, let’s look at the positives of this — Garcia is a definite mid-rotation talent, who posted a 3.73 ERA in 31.1 IP and a 3.18 ERA in 28.1 IP in April and May of last year, respectively.  He gives Atlanta a lefty in a rotation filled with righties.  The downside?  His low ERAs early in the season turned into a 5.40 ERA in June and a 5.60 ERA in the second half of the season.  So much for success in the second half driving this article, right?  Let’s remain optimistic.  After all, that is the whole purpose of this.  Garcia’s HR/FB rate was up from 7.1% in 2015 to a ghastly 20.2% in 2016.  He got consumed by the league-wide power surge.  I do not think such a high rate is sustainable or will happen again.

Let’s make a prediction.  Bartolo Colon makes us all fall back in love with “The Great Bart-Bino” all over again and he turns in around 16-20 quality starts for the upstart Braves.  Dickey, the workhorse of the staff, follows suit and dizzies batters with his knuckler for over 200 innings.  Garcia returns to early-2016 form, and posts something in the ballpark of 1.5 WAR.  Of course, the likelihood of all three scenarios playing out is small, but what I am trying to get across is it is possible.

Now, time to switch gears. The Braves lineup has changed its look dramatically since this time last year, sticking with a solid mixture of recognizable names and some guy named Dansby Swanson.  Here is a look at their projected Opening Day lineup:

The projected WAR was retrieved from FanGraphs.com ZiPS projection

Look at the first half of their lineup.  To me, those three guys, Inciarte, Swanson, and Freeman, look like the core of a team poised to wreak havoc on the NL East before the end of this decade.  It is hard to project exactly what we are going to get out of Dansby Swanson, but most Braves fans and analysts expect him to take reign as the face of the franchise.

Starting in the leadoff spot is Ender Inciarte, who was brought over as icing on the cake in the Shelby Miller trade that landed Swanson and pitching prospect Aaron Blair.  In his first year in Atlanta, Inciarte posted a .732 OPS and won a Gold Glove for his outstanding play in center field.  I really could not think of a better leadoff guy for the Braves.  He is signed through 2021 at a team-friendly cost of $30.5 million, with a $9-million team option in 2022.  In his first years in the bigs, Inciarte has played in at least 118 games, posted a WAR above 3.7 (produced a figure of 5.3 in 2015), and shows no sign of slowing down as his prime years lay ahead. What if he crosses the 3.0 WAR plateau for the fourth time in four seasons, and maybe even adds another Gold Glove?  That is all his organization needs out of him.

Inciarte is a vital part of the Braves defense, which, according to 2017 PECOTA projections, leads the NL East in Fielding Runs Above Average (they are projected to attain an average figure of 3.6, while the other four teams are either at 0.0 or negative).  BaseballProspectus.com explains FRAA as an “individual defensive metric created using play-by-play data with adjustments made based on plays made, the expected numbers of plays per position, the handedness of the batter, the park, and base-out states.”  In short, the higher the number, the better the fielder, and vice versa.  The higher the team average, the better the team is overall in the field.  In his Gold Glove campaign, Inciarte registered a FRAA of 23.0, according to BP.  The graduation of Dansby Swanson and the addition of web-gem-prone second baseman Brandon Phillips will certainly strengthen the middle cone of the field.  Just how good is this team going to be at preventing runs?  Many projection systems think they will be around the top of their division, and many fans are excited to see the double-play tandem of Swanson and Phillips at work.

Freddie Freeman is the undisputed anchor of the lineup, and has finally seen the Braves ADD instead of SUBTRACT from the lineup around him.  The addition of Matt Kemp has helped tremendously.  With a recognizable slugger swinging behind Freeman, managers and pitchers had to pitch to him in the latter months of the year. With Kemp slotted behind him, Freeman hit to the tune of a .340/.456/.665 slash with 16 home runs and 18 doubles.  Kemp also matched the theme of this article with a strong second half — hitting .280/.336/.519 with 12 bombs in 241 plate appearances as a Brave.  The duo should have Braves fans excited for a full season of similar production from Freeman if Kemp is behind him.  Kemp, on the other hand, has a lower bar to pass, and could re-tool his value as an offensive player in his first full year off the West Coast.

So why is it unreasonable for the 2017 Atlanta Braves to win 81 games?  I do not think it is that far-fetched.  This article has not mentioned their incredibly deep farm system, which includes guys such as Ozzie Albies, Sean Newcomb, and Lucas Sims, but instead focuses on the immediate roster — a roster which has the potential to do unexpected things in 2017.  The dominoes would have to fall in all the right places, but this is baseball.  Anything is possible.

Theodore Hooper’s Official 2017 Atlanta Braves Prediction: 81-81

The statistics used in this study were found on BaseballProspectus.com, Baseball-Reference.com and FanGraphs.com, and the rosters on RosterResource.com were a great help in referencing players and transactions. 

By now you’ve seen the Statcast Catch Probabilities. They’re great! Or, at the very least, they’re a shiny new toy to play with until the regular season rolls around. But, as you may have noticed, there are a few frustrating details about it — namely, the actual math behind the statistic is completely opaque, and the details about when an individual catch happened are hard to find. So let’s fix those two problems! We’ll create a catch probability metric that anyone can compute in Excel, using data that anyone can download easily.

You may have noticed a problem with this plan, though — the data that is used for the official Statcast catch probability isn’t easily accessible. We’ll have to make do with what we can get from the Statcast search at Baseball Savant. Specifically, instead of using hang time and distance traveled, we’ll use exit velocity and launch angle. Note that this completely disregards defensive positioning and it even disregards the horizontal angle off the bat*! It’s going to make for a less perfect metric, of course, but (spoiler alert) it will turn out okay.

*This really makes more sense if you think about it in terms of probability of the hitter making an out. The old saying goes “hit ’em where they ain’t” but in recent years we’ve come to understand that it’s really “hit it hard and in the air.”

I’m not going to go into the details of how I computed this metric; it’s standard machine learning stuff. If you want to follow along with the computation, I’ve put my code up on GitHub. Instead of going through all that here, I’ll just jump to the finish line: the formula for catch probability ends up being

1/(1+exp(-(-10.152 + 0.057 * hit_speed + 0.218 * hit_angle)))

Now you might be worried that such a simple formula, excluding tons of information, might be totally worthless. I was worried about that too! But applying this formula to a test set revealed this formula to be surprisingly accurate:

(if you’ve never seen those numbers before — closer to 1 is better. Trust me, it’s pretty good.)

Well, that’s all well and good, but how can you get this for yourself and play around with it? Start by downloading the data you’re interested in from Baseball Savant. For instance, you can get all the data from, say, May 1 of last year by going here. Download the CSV with the link at the bottom and then you can simply add the above formula in a new column in Excel. If you need a concrete example of how this looks in Google Sheets, I’ve put one here.

Okay, now you’ve got this, but what are you going to do with it? One possibility is to use this to try to figure out which plays the official metric estimated as being difficult. For instance, let’s say you’ve noticed that Miguel Sano made two highlight-quality plays but you don’t know Mike Petriello well enough to ask him which ones those are. Just compute your own probabilities and you’re off! Although, as expected, the numbers differ. Our numbers do have Sano making two plays in the 0-25% range, but they’re not the same ones that Statcast flagged (sorry about the quality of the GIFs).

Catch #1: estimated catch probability 18.3%
https://gfycat.com/IdealisticNecessaryIslandwhistler

Catch #2: estimated catch probability 21.3%
https://gfycat.com/ChubbyUnkemptBunny
The Twins announcers praised his first step in the former video, while in the second they talked about how the ball “hung up” for Sano to be able to catch it. Not spectacular plays by any means, but neither were the other two, of course.

Finally, because I’m sure you’re curious, here’s the top catch of 2016 according to this metric (estimated catch probability: 8.6%).
https://gfycat.com/DearJaggedFish
Of course it’s a Kevin Kiermaier catch. Hey, at least we know we’re doing something right.

I’ve been particularly intrigued recently by Carl Edwards Jr., a Cubs reliever who got called up last season. He had always seemed to be surprisingly good, but I wasn’t aware quite how good he was until I calculated wOBA allowed by pitchers in 2016 and found that he had the third-lowest in the league, behind only Kenley Jansen and Zach Britton, and in front of Clayton Kershaw, Aroldis Chapman, and Andrew Miller. Ranking Edwards among four of the game’s top closers and the game’s best starter seemed strange. Here are the six pitchers with the lowest wOBA against last season:

Edwards stands out negatively in several respects here. He pitched the fewest innings out of that group by far, and was almost certainly put in the least-stressful situations. His ERA is almost two points higher than the next-highest, and his FIP is nearly a point higher than Britton’s, the second-highest mark. His BABIP is also remarkably low, due in part to luck and in part to the Cubs’ historically good defense. So why is his wOBA so remarkable?

Looking through Edwards’ game log, two bad appearances stand out:

1. August 13th, where he allowed five runs on one hit and four walks while recording just two outs.
2. September 17th, where he allowed three runs on three hits (two of them home runs) in an inning’s work.

If we remove the August 13th outing, Edwards’ ERA drops to 2.55, almost an entire point. If we remove the September 17th outing as well, it drops to 1.83. Removing the first performance, his FIP drops to 2.56. Removing the other brings it down to 1.96, which is still higher than the other five pitchers, but much closer. Bad pitching performances are part of a pitcher’s year, and shouldn’t be entirely disregarded. However, it seems likely that something was off (mechanically, physically, or mentally) on August 13th.

We’ll get back to these games later.

As the Cubs consistently carried three catchers last season, I thought it would be interesting to compare Edwards’ performance across all three:

The baseballr package also allows us to look at Statcast data from Baseball Savant:

From the table, we can see that Edwards throws two main pitches — a four-seam fastball and a curveball. He pitched most often to Willson Contreras, then Miguel Montero, then David Ross (and once to Tim Federowicz). Edwards threw his fastball a notch faster to Ross than other catchers, which could be due to the small sample size. He also threw his fastball more to Ross than other catchers; despite throwing 16.67% of his curveballs to Ross, he threw 21.57% of his fastballs to him. There are several reasons this might be the case:

1. Edwards focused on his fastball earlier in the season before gaining more confidence in his curve.
2. Ross saw that Edwards’ fastball was producing better results and called it more often.
3. Contreras was more confident in his agility and therefore ability to block a curveball than Ross was.
4. Random sampling and a small sample size.

Let’s take a look at the results these pitches got. By plotting hit velocity and hit distance, we can compare results across catchers:

When Ross was catching, Edwards tended to generate softer contact that went shorter distances. We can use the Statcast data to see why that is.

This chart, plotting spin against pitch velocity, shows something interesting: Edwards’ pitches had the highest spin when throwing to Ross. Curveballs with higher spin tend to induce more ground balls[^2], which is advantageous for Edwards thanks in part to the defense behind him. High spin on his four-seamer is essential to Edwards’ style, and that was maximized when Ross was catching. Of course, this isn’t necessarily related to the catcher. It could be the case that Ross just happened to catch Edwards on his better days. For greater parity, we can look to see what happens to Contreras’ numbers if we take away the two worst games in Edwards’ season.

Already we see that removing the two bad outings brings Contreras much closer to Ross and Montero in terms of average hit speed and hit distance. Now we can look at how removing the bad outing affects velocity and spin.

There isn’t any effect on the spin of Edwards’ curveball while Contreras is catching, but the spin on his fastball gets much closer to Ross than Montero. Let’s compare Edwards’ Statcast data between the August 13th outing and his overall averages (the bolded rows are from the 13th):

If we add in the other poor outing:

Adding in the second bad outing makes the numbers more similar, lending credence to the idea that the first outing was an outlier. On August 13th the spin on his fastball, his extension, and his velocity were all down a tick.

Carl Edwards had a quietly great year out of the bullpen for the Cubs. He was among the league leaders in wOBA against, which is initially surprising based on his peripheral numbers. Upon removing an outing where the spin rate and velocity on his signature pitch took a steep downturn, Edwards’ peripheral numbers match up more closely with the type of performance you’d expect from someone in that elite group of pitchers. Carl Edwards had a bad day — here’s to more good ones.

I recently had the opportunity to tour Chase Field, home of the Arizona Diamondbacks.  While there, I saw a lot of banners for Zack Greinke.  After all, he is the face of the franchise (if you’re not considering Paul Goldschmidt).  After signing a six-year/$206.5-million contract before the 2016 season, Greinke changed the focus and the philosophy of the Diamondbacks.  Suddenly, they were contenders.

After signing Greinke, the D-Backs traded for Shelby Miller, who was coming off what many considered one of the best years in baseball.  However, his price was laughable.  It cost Arizona top prospect Dansby Swanson, who has emerged as a candidate for a franchise player in Atlanta.  They also coughed up Ender Inciarte, a very capable center fielder who posted a .732 OPS and won a Gold Glove in 2016.  But wait, there’s more! The Braves also received pitching prospect Aaron Blair.

The purpose of this study is not to criticize former General Manager Dave Stewart’s transactions.  After all, he truly believed, after signing ace Zack Greinke, the Diamondbacks were in a position to win — and rightly so.  Stewart felt, as did many people inside the Arizona organization, their core was established.  Below is their lineup in 2016, with the players being who played the most at their position:

AJ Pollock, who was coming off an All-Star season in which he produced 7.4 WAR and posted an .865 OPS, played in 12 games.  Inciarte was traded to the Braves after providing 5.3 WAR playing right field in 2015.  David Peralta, who started in left field in 2015, played in 48 games last year.  Nick Ahmed also had an injury-plagued season following a strong 2015 in which he put up 2.5 WAR in his first full year in the MLB.

The injuries to Pollock, Peralta, and Ahmed were unfortunate.  The Diamondbacks got near or around replacement-level production from their positions in 2016.  In a hypothetical situation, let’s say the three guys stay healthy, and, after subtracting their counterparts’ production, up the total runs scored by the Diamondbacks from 752 to 790 runs.  After some number crunching, the Diamondbacks’ Pythagorean expectation comes out to around 71 wins.  Give or take a few, a healthy trio of Pollock, Peralta, and Ahmed would have helped Arizona’s win expectation increase by between two and five games.

But let’s be optimistic — the hypothetical healthy trio helps Arizona to an expected 74-88 record, far better than their 69-93 actual record.  That would have moved them up in the standings from fourth in the NL West to…drum roll please…fourth in the NL West.  The problem Arizona experienced in 2016 was run prevention, not run support.  As a matter of fact, total runs increased to 752 from 720 in 2015, when they went 82-80.  However, the real increase was in runs allowed — up to 890 (!!!) in 2016, as opposed to 713 in 2015.

So why does a pitching staff that added Zack Greinke, a bonafide ace and top-tier talent, and Shelby Miller, who would fit well in the center of any rotation, give up such a whopping number of runs?  Catching.  Below is a chart of how many runs these two respective pitchers had prevented or added by their respective catchers in 2015:

As you can see, any pitcher would love to pitch to Yasmani Grandal.  In 2015, he ranked as the best in framing runs.  Essentially, what the statistic does is quantify the catcher’s ability to get strikes called, which is incredibly valuable to a staff.  Positive is good and negative is bad.  While there is not as direct a correlation between Shelby Miller’s success and AJ Pierzynski’s lack of pitch-framing ability, it is apparent there is a direct link between Greinke’s 2015 performance and Yasmani Grandal.

In 2016, Greinke and Miller both joined a staff caught by Welington Castillo.  The best way to describe Welington is he’s an offense-first, defense-second catcher.  The theme of this study is to advocate for the use of defense-first, offense-second catchers.  Look at this chart of past World Series champion catchers:

After looking at that chart, there are a couple of observations to make.  One, three out of the five previous World Series teams have had top-four catchers in terms of pitch framing and pitch presentation.  Second, Jarrod Saltalamacchia was replaced by AJ Pierzynski who was replaced by Blake Swihart who is now competing with Sandy Leon and Christian Vazquez, both of whom are defense-first catchers lauded for their ability to frame pitches.  Third, Salvador Perez is the heart and soul of the Kansas City Royals, and I guarantee Dayton Moore could not care less about his pitch-framing abilities.

Essentially, what you should take away from this is teams that win have skilled catchers.  Luckily for the Giants, Buster Posey can also hit the baseball.  To bring this full circle back to the Diamondbacks — Wellington Castillo is the wrong type of catcher.  He does not frame like Posey or Montero, and the bat is nothing too special.

But alas! Castillo is no longer part of the Arizona organization! This offseason, freshly-appointed general manager Mike Hazen has added four new catchers to the picture: Chris Iannetta, Jeff Mathis, Hank Conger, and Josh Thole.  Let’s look at their pitch-framing stats from last year:

As you can see, the Diamondbacks have added a starting catcher who is not very good at framing pitches and three back-ups who do or might fit the desirable profile of this study.  Chris Iannetta signed a $1.5 million, one-year deal; Mathis signed a $4 million, one-year deal; the other two are minor-league contracts. Hazen, who came over to the Diamondbacks from the Boston Red Sox (who are leaning towards more defense-first options at catcher), made some efforts to boost his catching corps’ defensive ability, but was it enough?

In a perfect world, I think a guy like Jason Castro fits the bill perfectly in Arizona.  While the financial situations in Arizona may have made the price for Castro too high, he fits the type of catcher this study calls for, and the type of catcher Zack Greinke and Shelby Miller deserve.  He tallied +16.3 framing runs in 6,623 chances in 2016, good for third in MLB behind Buster Posey and Yasmani Grandal.  He signed for $24.5 million over three years with the Minnesota Twins, and will surely help their young staff develop.

Let’s not dwell on the hypotheticals.  The Diamondbacks have five and a half million dollars invested in two guys: Chris Iannetta and Jeff Mathis.  While Iannetta had an abysmal year in 2016 in terms of framing runs, his track record is mixed.  In 2013, for example, he recorded a framing-runs figure of -16.6, which is comparable to his 2016 number.  In 2015, however, he recorded a figure of +13.1, good for fifth in all of baseball.  What caused such a dramatic, roller-coaster shift?  I do not know — that question could be the subject of an entire different study.

Should Iannetta get most of the starts, I would say Mike Hazen would not care if he hits below the Mendoza line if his defensive statistics match his 2015 numbers.  Should he not get most of the starts at catcher, they will more than likely go to veteran backstop Jeff Mathis.  Mathis, who is lauded for his skills behind the plate, is essentially a cheap Jason Castro.  If you divide the number of framing runs Mathis achieved in 2,248 chances last year, and multiply the decimal by Castro’s number of chances, you get around a number of +21.2 framing runs.  That would have ranked him third behind Grandal and Posey.  Of course, this method is unreliable because every chance is another chance for his framing runs to drop as well as increase.  With that being said, the efficiency of Mathis behind the plate makes giving him a chance to handle the Diamondbacks’ staff worthwhile.

The addition of Taijuan Walker, who was the return on shipping Jean Segura to Seattle, is a healthy investment in the pitching staff.  With him slotting in along with Zack Greinke, Shelby Miller, Robbie Ray, and Patrick Corbin, the Diamondbacks have the makeup of a sleeper-type rotation — one that could surprise a lot of people in 2017.  If the front office has embraced the importance of defense at the catcher position like their offseason moves suggest, their staff could cut down on runs allowed dramatically, putting their lineup in position to do some damage in the NL West this year.

One team who should be noted in this study is the Houston Astros.  Whether Jeff Luhnow’s front office emphasized framing runs and having defensively-elite catchers or not, two of the catchers mentioned in this study were teammates in Houston — Jason Castro and Hank Conger.  Castro and Conger were the only two backstops on the 2015 Houston Astros, the year Dallas Keuchel won the American League Cy Young award.  This serves the purpose of further validating the benefits a defense-first catcher can have on a pitching staff.

In conclusion, baseball is trending toward sacrificing offense for defense at a premium position.  One club that can change the face of their organization by embracing the principles outlined in this study is the Arizona Diamondbacks.  While the Diamondbacks may face public scrutiny for far after Shelby Miller and Zack Greinke are gone, fans should be optimistic about 2017.  An elite defensive catcher can make a world of difference in the performance of a pitching staff.

The statistics used in this study were found on baseballprospectus.com, the historical rosters and statistics were found on baseball-reference.com and fangraphs.com, and rosterresource.com was a great help in referencing players and transactions.

For the uninitiated, this piece heavily relies on my previous work around refining the inning/score matrix to quantify bullpen usage, and more recently, using RE24 to adjust the score differential for the base/out state in cases where the pitcher is not entering into a “clean” inning.

In that most recent piece, I concluded by alluding to a sort of “leaderboard” for base/out state adjustments. One hypothesis that you might have – certainly, one that this author had – was that we might see elite non-closers at the top of the list, implying that those pitchers are being brought in with runners on base more often than usual. Although closers are generally among the most highly-regarded relief pitchers in the game, the managerial status-quo has been to use closers almost exclusively in the “clean inning” state entering the 9^th. Thus, while closers might not lead in terms of score adjustments due to inherited runners, an elite setup man certainly might.

Without further ado, here’s what that leaderboard looked like in 2016.

So… this isn’t exactly what I thought I’d find. There aren’t any closers in this group, but there really aren’t many top-flight middle relievers, either. If anything, this group came in when the team was tied or trailing more often than not. What’s going on here?

What we can’t discern is whether mid-inning appearances tend to be high-leverage affairs. There are most certainly cases where long men are used in the middle of the 4th inning to relieve an ineffective starter. That situation isn’t interesting in a vacuum; but it may be interesting to know what portion of those mid-inning appearances are of this low-leverage variety, and which are of the high-leverage variety.

One way that we can answer this question is to stratify qualifying relief pitchers by their average inning when entering the game. To accomplish this, let’s define a “closer” as a pitcher with an average inning of 8.5 or higher, and a “middle reliever” as a pitcher with an average inning between 7 and 8.5. Then we can look at the percentage of appearances for each group which were not “clean” innings.

(Click the graph for an interactive version)

As you might expect – even if you vehemently disagree with the practice – closers very rarely enter the game mid-inning. 85-90% of their appearances come in clean innings. Middle relievers, on the other hand, come into the game at the start of an inning closer to 60-65% of the time. That number has been on the rise recently, which seems a bit odd, or at least, at odds with what we’ve seen in the postseason recently (more on that in a bit).

Some small percentage of the time – the area between the lines of the same color – pitching changes are made with 1 or 2 outs in the inning but with no one on base. This is probably not optimal: The pitcher coming into that situation has an easier-than-average job, as they’re essentially getting a shortened inning to work through. If a guy like Dellin Betances can face 300 batters in a season, why waste 20 of them on situations that are easier than average?

The orange lines represent a subset of the overall middle relief group where the team in question is either tied or has no greater than a 3-run lead, in either the 7th or 8th inning. These are situations of high importance and leverage. An effective manager might be employing mid-inning pitching changes more often in these situations in order to limit damage and preserve leads.

Yet, this subset isn’t very different than the overall middle relief group. Whatever difference exited in 2012 and 2013 has been eroded in the last few years, as part of a general trend: Mid-inning appearances in the regular season are becoming less common.

As a final step, let’s contrast this picture of usage with an analogous graph on postseason appearances. We’ll maintain the same definitions of “closer” and “middle reliever” for consistency.

(Click the graph for an interactive version)

Chaos! This graph looks more disorganized than the regular-season version, but then again, the postseason is more chaotic in general. We’re dealing with smaller samples and we can’t put too much faith into these trends. That said, two things stand out when comparing postseason usage to regular-season usage:

• Closers are no longer treated as a special species. Even through 2014, closers were entering postseason games in clean innings about 80% of the time. In the postseason! When the managers are paying attention! When there are high-leverage situations at every turn! But in the past two seasons, closers have been used increasingly with runners on base – in fact, even more so than middle relievers have in close/lead situations during that time. Again, small samples, but this screams efficiency. If your closer is your most effective weapon, you should be using him with runners on base and a late lead, instead of using your second-most effective weapon instead.
• Middle relievers have been used more often in “matchup” situations. 2014 and 2016 stand out in this regard, and it probably has something to do with guys named Bochy and Maddon representing large shares of the sample in those years. Recall that the gap between the dotted and solid lines of the same color represents the frequency of “1+ out, 0 on” appearances. Those gaps are huge in 2014 and 2016! While mid-inning appearances among all classes of pitchers were highest in 2016, that’s not the case at all for “men on base” appearances, which were more or less in line with historical norms. This represents an increase in match-up-based thinking, not leverage-based thinking.

These graphs look different, and they probably always will. Teams have relatively fewer resource constraints in the bullpen come October. They have more days off between games, and fewer games to budget resources for in the future.

That said, there’s been no carryover at all from the wild, and relatively new, bullpen management seen in the postseasons of 2015 and 2016. Constraints will limit the extent to which managers can call upon their best arms with runners on base late in games, but it would be hard to imagine that a status quo which holds the closer for the 9th inning almost 90% of the time can’t be improved upon in some way. Teams have spent more on bullpens, but they haven’t figured out how to use them any more efficiently in the regular season, and the differences we’ve witnessed in the postseason show that they’re only getting it about half right, even when it matters most.

Some of my favorite moments in baseball are provided by players who, for one reason or another, absolutely should not have done what they just did. Ben Revere hitting a dinger. Vlad Guerrero swinging in the middle of an intentional walk. Willie Mays Hayes sliding short of the bag. Those moments are magical and hilarious.

And perhaps less amusing, but more exciting, there are guys who don’t give a flip if they’re behind in the count and don’t have any leverage. They’re still reaching base at a strong clip, providing small thrills by getting there when it looks like they’re all but back in the dugout. Below are the guys who did it most in 2016.

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Kevin Pillar recently announced that he played through a torn thumb for the majority of last season’s second half. I was curious to see how much this injury impacted his offensive production, so I decided to delve into his pre- and post-injury numbers. His elite defense in CF makes him a staple in John Gibbons’ lineup card on a daily basis — but how much would this injury negatively impact his ability to help his team at the plate?

Pillar is best known for his glove, and across the league he is often recognized for his diving catches in the outfield, like this gem.

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However, despite him not being one of the Blue Jays’ major offensive contributors, the fact that his defense keeps him in the lineup every day, even when hurt, begs the question: At what point do you start sacrificing offense for stellar defense? Among the CFs who ranked in the top 15 in WAR last season with at least 400 PA, he was the only one with a negative offensive WAR component, at -11.9, which was the seventh-worst offensive WAR component last season for any qualified player. His 2016 wOBA (.295) and wRC+ (80) were identical to Billy Hamilton’s — not exactly the type of player you want to model your bat skills after.

But of course, his defense was incredible, as he led all OFs in defensive WAR (23.6), UZR/150 (26.3) and RngR (21.8). He was the third-best defender measured by WAR, only trailing Brandon Crawford and Francisco Lindor. His total WAR was 3.2 in 2016, and this is despite playing hurt from August 6 onward.

Pillar is an elite defender and a fan favorite — but what can he do offensively to make himself a positive offensive WAR player? First, let’s look at what he did pre-injury. Before August 6, Pillar slashed .261/.292/.385 with 7 HR, a 2.9 BB% and a 15.8 K%. When he returned from his DL stint, still feeling the effects of his torn thumb, he slashed .283/.338/.346 with no homers, but his walk rate was 7.8% and his strikeout rate dropped slightly to 14.2%. This is unfortunately based off a small sample size of 141 PA, and his batting average was inflated by a .333 BABIP, vs. his career mark of .305.

The major change to his output is what you would expect from someone battling a hand injury, and that was a major drop-off in power, as his ISO was cut in half after sustaining the injury. Pillar likes the ball up and in and struggles with pitches down and away. You can see how playing through a thumb injury could really hurt his ability to drive and pull the ball. Below is his pre- and post-injury ISO/P.

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To further illustrate this point, below are his pull and hard-hit rates for the 2016 season. The line in the graph indicates when he returned from the DL.

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He pulled the ball more, but was not able to barrel it up and make hard contact due to his thumb injury. He attempted to pull the ball on pitches not in on his hands, as shown by the two heat maps below for his pre- and post-injury swing percentage.

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Despite having his setbacks, Pillar was able to post a slightly higher wOBA after his injury (.303 vs. .292), proving that he could still be a productive player, but in a different way. The Blue Jays quite frankly do not need Pillar to hit 15-20 HR and I don’t even think they care if he hits more than 10. Offensively, they need him to get on base more and provide speed on the basepaths. He needs to focus more on hitting line drives and ground balls rather than trying to hit fly balls, considering that last season Pillar had the third-worst batting average on fly balls (min 100 PA) at .139. He has already shown an improvement in changing his approach by decreasing his FB and IFFB rates by around 2.5% from 2015 to 2016.

All current projections on FanGraphs predict that Pillar will have another negative offensive season; however, in a healthy 2015 season he posted an offensive WAR component of 3.2. I believe that it is possible for him to do that again in a healthy 2017, but he needs to make a few adjustments at the plate and needs to stay healthy. This is something that he’s struggled a bit with in his career, as he tends to go all-out in the field.

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He should have a better offensive season in 2017 than he did in 2016, and he appears to be healthy in spring training, so far hitting 10-for-20 with 5 doubles, which is promising but not that meaningful. I hope he can continue to make offensive strides this season without any injury setbacks, but expectations should probably be set that the Blue Jays organization and their fans may just need to accept the fact that they have a stud defender, yet not much more than a mediocre hitter.