There were a number of great moments for some of baseball’s biggest stars during the first week of the MLB season. Albert Pujols hit his 521^st career home run, which tied him for 18^th place on the career list with Hall of Famers Ted Williams, Willie McCovey, and Frank Thomas. Mark Buehrle won his 200^th career game and is now tied for 113^th on the all-time list with Chuck Finley, George Uhle, and Tim Wakefield (wow, Tim Wakefield won 200 games). Alex Rodriguez hit home run #655 and is just five away from the legendary Willie Mays.

But this isn’t about those guys. Those guys get plenty of notice. This is about the lesser-knowns, the guys you’ve never heard of or had forgotten about. These are my guys. They are the scrubs, the journeymen, the players who refuse to hang up their spikes . . . the grinders.

• San Francisco Giants pitcher Matt Cain’s arm injury opened the door for Chris Heston to get the second start of his major league career. Heston is 27 and debuted with the Giants just last season, so he’s not really a prospect, if he ever was one. He played college baseball at Seminole Community College in Florida and was drafted in the 47^th round of the 2007 Major League Draft. He did not sign. When you’re drafted in the 47th round, it’s like the team is telling you, “Hey, we need someone to carry the bats from the clubhouse to the dugout for one of our minor league teams and you look like you might be able to handle that job.” Heston went back to school for another year, then was drafted in the 29th round by the Washington Nationals the following year. When you’re drafted in the 29th round, it’s like the team is telling you, “Hey, we need someone to take up space on one of our minor league rosters so the real prospects can have someone to play against.” Heston chose to go back to school, this time to East Carolina University, and ended up being drafted again, this time in the 12th round. He signed with the Giants and pitched in their minor league system for five years before getting into three games during last year’s Championship run. He pitched a grand total of 5 1/3 innings as part of the team that won the World Series so he has a ring on his finger. No matter what he does for the rest of his major league career, Chris Heston has a World Series ring. In his start on Wednesday, Heston pitched six scoreless innings for his first major league victory.
• A guy I hadn’t thought of in a few years, and didn’t know was still playing baseball, had a big hit on Wednesday. This player got off to a great start to his major league career, hitting .300/.336/.549 in 70 games in his rookie year of 2005 and was featured on the cover of Sports Illustrated with the caption: “The Natural”. “The Natural” tanked the following year (.260/.293/.449) but rebounded for a 3.3 WAR season in 2007 (.293/.338/.444). Since 2008, he’s had one above average season, two seasons close to replacement level, and four seasons below replacement level. If you haven’t guessed by now, this player is Jeff Francoeur. Jeff Francoeur is a survivor. Just when you think you’ll never hear another thing about Jeff Francoeur, he shows up once again. After hitting .235/.287/.378 in 2012, you might have thought his career would be over. Then when he hit .204/.238/.298 in 2013, it wouldn’t have been a stretch to say a fork was sticking out of his back because surely he was done. And certainly after he had 2 hits in 24 at-bats last year, you would think it was time for him to ride off into the sunset. But he didn’t ride off into the sunset. He signed with baseball’s most pathetic team, the Philadelphia Phillies. On Wednesday, he came to the dish in a scoreless game in the bottom of the sixth and hit a 3-run jack to help the Phillies beat the Red Sox. The only possible conclusion is that Jeff Francoeur is a zombie.
• In Cincinnati, the Pittsburgh Pirates and Cincinnati Reds played a closely fought ballgame that went to extra innings. The Pirates brought in Radhames Liz to pitch the bottom of the 11^th. Liz had been signed as an amateur free agent by the Orioles in 2003 and played three seasons with the O’s from 2007 to 2009 but had major control problems as he walked 6.2 batters per nine innings. He spent the 2009 season in the Padres’ minor league system then pitched in Korea for three years before returning to the states and signed a minor league contract with the Blue Jays before the 2014 season. He pitched at two levels in 2014, then signed a one-year deal with the Pirates. His appearance in the bottom of the 11^th inning on Wednesday was his first major league action since 2009. Unfortunately, it did not go well. He started off the inning by getting Brandon Phillips to pop out. He then plunked Zack Cozart. In 2014, Zack Cozart was the worst hitter in all of baseball who had enough plate appearances to qualify for the batting title when he hit .221/.268/.300 (56 wRC+). The last person you’d ever want to hit with a pitch is Zack Cozart, but that’s just what Radhames Liz did. He regained his composure to strike out Matt Dominguez. Of course, Matt Dominguez was the second-worst hitter in all of baseball last year (63 wRC+). It’s kind of amazing that the two worst hitters in baseball last year were batting back-to-back in this situation, but life has those little amazing things happen every now and then. Still, there were two outs and a runner on first and Billy Hamilton was coming to the plate. Billy Hamilton, by the way, was the 13th-worst hitter in all of baseball last year out of the 146 hitters who qualified for the batting title (79 wRC+). Surely, Radhames Liz could get Billy Hamilton out and send this game to the 12th inning, right? No, not right. Not right at all. Radhames Liz walked Billy Hamilton. This is not a particularly easy thing to do because Billy Hamilton does not walk very often (5.7% of the time in his career). Walking Billy Hamilton meant there were now runners on first-and-second and Radhames Liz would have to face Joey Votto, the best hitter on the Reds. Joey Votto singled to right, Zack Cozart scored, and Radhames Liz had single-armedly lost the game for the Pittsburgh Pirates in his first major league action in six years.
• On Friday, Jerome Williams started for the Philadelphia Phillies against the Washington Nationals. Williams is on the seventh major league team of his career, including three just last season. His best year was his rookie year back in 2003 with the San Francisco Giants when he was worth 2.0 WAR. He hasn’t come close to that performance since. In 2008, he played for the Long Beach Armada of the independent Golden Baseball League (other GBL alums include Mark Prior, Jose Canseco, and Rickey Henderson). In 2010, he played for the Uni-President Lions of Taiwan in the Chinese Professional Baseball League. He was with the Los Angeles Angels from 2011 to 2013 and spent the 2014 season with the Astros, Rangers, and Phillies. In his nine major league seasons, he’s had an ERA under 4.00 just two times. He’s still kicking around, though, and pitched 6 innings while allowing just a single run on five hits in his first start this year.
• The Tampa Bay Rays are without three-fifths of their projected starting rotation, so they got creative on Friday and started Steven Geltz. Geltz signed with the Los Angeles Angels as an undrafted free agent in 2008 out of the University of Buffalo. It’s highly unlikely for an undrafted free agent to ever making the major leagues. In addition, Geltz is listed as 5’10”, 170 pounds and he’s a right-handed pitcher. Short, right-handed pitchers are a rare breed in major league baseball. Scouts are generally looking for size and projectability when scouting pitchers and this is even more true for right-handed pitchers. It’s easier to be short and slight if you’re a left-handed pitcher slinging breaking balls than if you’re a righty. Geltz doesn’t have a great fastball (averages around 92 mph) but he’s been quite good in 7 seasons in the minor leagues, with a career 3.38 ERA and 1.10 WHIP in 362 minor league innings, while striking out 12 batters per nine innings. He got a cup of coffee with the Angels in 2012 and a Mocha Grande with the Rays last year and has pitched in 15 major league games with a 2.84 ERA, 1.34 WHIP, and 13.5 K/9. All of his previous professional appearances have been as a reliever and he has never faced more than 10 batters in an outing before. So, there he was on the mound to start Friday night’s game against the Marlins. He went two innings, throwing 35 pitches, 25 for strikes, and allowed one run. Not bad. There’s a pretty good chance that this will be the only start of his major league career.

Finally, we have the journiest-journeyman of all the journeymen, Buddy Carlyle:

New York Mets’ reliever Buddy Carlyle was originally drafted by the Cincinnati Reds out of a Nebraska high school in the second round of the 1996 MLB Draft. Then this happened:

• 1996: Pitched for the Princeton Reds in the Appalachian League
• 1997: Pitched for the Charleston AlleyCats in the South Atlantic League
• April 8, 1998: Traded to the San Diego Padres for Marc Kroon.
• 1998: Pitched for the Chattanooga Lookouts and the Mobile BayBears in the Southern League
• 1999: Pitched for the Las Vegas Stars in the Pacific Coast League
• Made his major league debut on August 29, 1999 with the San Diego Padres.
• 2000: Pitched for the Las Vegas Stars and the San Diego Padres
• November 3, 2000: Contract was sold to the Hanshin Tigers of Japan’s Nippon Professional Baseball League.
• 2001 and 2002: Pitched for the Hanshin Tigers
• December 18, 2002: Signed as a free agent by the Kansas City Royals
• 2003: Pitched for the Wichita Wranglers of the Texas League and the Omaha Royals of the Pacific Coast League
• October 15, 2003: Granted free agency
• December 23, 2003: Signed as a free agent with the New York Yankees
• 2004: Pitched for the Trenton Thunder of the Eastern League and the Columbus Clippers of the International League
• October 14, 2004: Granted free agency
• November 18, 2004: Signed as a free agent by the Los Angeles Dodgers.
• 2005: Pitched for the Los Angeles Dodgers and the Las Vegas 51s of the Pacific Coast League.
• December 15, 2005: Signed by the Florida Marlins.
• 2006: Pitched for the Albuquerque Isotopes of the Pacific Coast League
• May 18, 2006: Sold to the LG Twins of the Korean Baseball Association
• December 4, 2006: Invited to spring training by the Atlanta Braves
• 2007: Pitched for the Richmond Braves of the International League and the Atlanta Braves
• 2008: Pitched for the Richmond Braves and Atlanta Braves
• 2009: Pitched for the Atlanta Braves, the Rome Braves of the South Atlantic League, and Gwinnett Braves of the International League
• October 9, 2009: Granted free agency
• 2010: Returned to Japan to pitch for the Hokkaido Nippon-Ham Fighters of the Nippon Professional Baseball League.
• December 2, 2010: Signed a minor league contract with an invitation to spring training with the New York Yankees.
• 2011: Pitched for the New York Yankees, the Scranton/Wilkes-Barre Yankees of the International League, and the Toros del Este of the Dominican Winter League
• January 30, 2012: Signed a minor league contract with the Atlanta Braves
• 2012: Pitched for the Gwinnett Braves of the International League
• November 3, 2012: Granted free agency
• December 11, 2012: Signed a minor league contract with the Toronto Blue Jays.
• 2013: Pitched for the Buffalo Bison of the International League
• November 5, 2013: Granted free agency
• February 18, 2014: Signed a minor league contract with the New York Mets
• 2014: Pitched for the Las Vegas 51s of the Pacific Coast League and the New York Mets
• November 4, 2014: Granted free agency
• January 5, 2015: Signed as a free agent with the New York Mets

By my count, this is Buddy Carlyle’s 20^th year in professional baseball but only the eighth year in which he pitched in the major leagues. He’s played on 26 teams for 14 different organizations in four different countries. He’s been a Red, an AlleyCat, a Lookout, a BayBear, a Star, a Padre, a Tiger, a Wrangler, a Royal, a Thunder, a Clipper, a Dodger, a 51, an Isotope, a Twin, a Brave, a Ham Fighter, a Yankee, a Toro, a Bison, and a Met.

Before last season, Carlyle had pitched 284.3 major league innings with a 5.13 ERA and 1.39 WHIP, while striking out 7.2 batters per nine and walking 3.4. Last year, at the age of 36, Carlyle found major league success by posting a 1.45 ERA, 0.90 WHIP, 8.1 K/9, and 1.5 BB/9.

On Opening Day this year, the Mets were holding a 3-1 lead heading into the ninth but their closer, Jenrry Mejia, was injured with a sore elbow. Jerry Blevins got the first out of the inning, then Buddy Carlyle came in to get Ryan Zimmerman and Wilson Ramos for his first major league save. He was immediately added to nearly 2,000 fantasy baseball teams on Yahoo by ever-watchful saves scavengers. More importantly, it was a great moment for a guy who just kept plugging away at it all these years. Hat tip, Buddy Carlyle.

Being a sports fan is hard. On average, a major league team’s chance to win the World Series in a given year is 3.3 percent. I promise the math works out. Some teams, particularly larger-market teams, may have a greater chance, but for fans of any team you are more likely to end the season sad than happy. However, in April there is hope for every team. This is an old baseball cliché, but it is also generally true!

If you look at FanGraphs’ playoff odds, every team has a chance to make it at least to the wild-card game. Even the Phillies! So the cliché is grounded in a bit of reality, as clichés usually are. On the other hand, two teams are listed as having 0.0 percent chance of winning the World Series. Those darn Phillies and the Atlanta Braves.

Let’s talk about those Braves and their chances at fortune. For purposes of this exercise, we are going to assume that the playoff odds are correct up until the playoffs actually occur. Maybe you think the Braves 3.2 percent chance of making the playoffs is pessimistic. After starting 3-0, it has jumped from 3.1 percent, so that’s something! Maybe you think that is too low (or too high), but that doesn’t matter, this exercise could be done using many bad teams. The Braves have a 3.2 percent chance of making the playoffs but a 0.0 percent chance of winning the World Series. This is very unlikely to be true.

I don’t have the statistical skills to delve into the projection models, but I believe there is a fundamental flaw that essentially double dips on poorly projected teams. The playoff odds beyond simply making the playoffs are calculated assuming each team is as good or as bad as projected. The problem with this method is that it doesn’t comport with reality. If the Braves (or the Phillies, Diamondbacks, Rockies, Brewers, Twins or Rangers) make the playoffs, it will be at least partially due to them being a much better team than the projections thought they were. Of course, the projections know that this is possible, hence the slim odds instead of no odds of making the playoffs.

For purposes of this chart, I’m going to make generous assumptions on the decimal points that we cannot see. These assumptions work against my conclusion and I believe my conclusion still holds. For percentages that are listed as 0.0, I’m going to assume 0.05. * For 0.1, I’m going to assume 0.15. And so on. These odds all come from FanGraphs projections as of Friday, April 10, 2015.

Below is a list of teams with less than a 10-percent chance of making the playoffs. Assuming they make the playoffs, based on these conservative assumptions, the odds of these teams winning the World Series are:

Team                         1 in…

Phillies                      24

Rangers                     16

Twins                         16

Diamondbacks         19

Braves                     64

White Sox                  18

Reds                            30

Brewers                      36

Rockies                       39

The three teams in the AL actually don’t look that bad. I’d say they are perhaps a little too pessimistic, but not drastically so. In the NL, the Braves are the worst example, but the Reds, Brewers, and Rockies are all clearly unrealistic considering what we know about the playoffs (that it is something, perhaps a big something, of a crapshoot). My guess is that this could be fixed by regressing the odds of each team heavily towards a typical playoff team to account for the fact that poorly projected teams that make the playoffs are likely way towards the top end of their possible outcomes. If the Braves make the playoffs, it will be largely because they are good, and probably also because they got a decent amount of luck. I’m not saying they’d be 8-1 (as a division winner) or 16-1 (as a wild card team), which is what their odds would be based on coin flips. But there is no way the Imaginary Good Braves would go into the playoffs as 64-1 longshots to win the World Series. You don’t need a calculator or anything other than common sense to know this. And remember, I used very conservative assumptions. It is likely that if I had access to more significant digits, some of these numbers would look much worse.

*The Phillies listed odds of making the NLCS are 0.0 percent. Based on this, I halved the odds for winning the NLCS and then halved them again for winning the World Series. Thus, I conservatively estimated that the FanGraphs odds for the Phillies winning the World Series are 0.0125 percent. Thanks again, Phillies, for making things harder.

I’m about to drop a cold, hard truth-bomb…

I’m not a professional general manager.

BOOM!

I know your mind just exploded, but it’s true.

Anyway, what I’m saying is that if I were a general manager (again I’m really not), I would hand out a lot more contracts like the one the Cleveland Indians just gave Carlos Carrasco, 28. For those of you not familiar, they agreed on a 4 year- $22 million contract. That shakes out to $5.5 million per year.

Now Carrasco is far from a sure thing as a top of the rotation guy, but he did have an encouraging season last year. He had 9.4 K/9 and an impressive 4.83 K/BB. Also, his FIP was just 2.44, suggesting that it wasn’t a fluky season, but a sign of things to come.

While we should expect some regression to the mean with Carrasco and can’t expect him to post a 2.55 ERA over the next four seasons, all the metrics suggest that Carrasco has what it takes to be a very good starting pitcher.

This isn’t an (article? blog post? stupid collection of words?) about Carrasco, though, it’s more about the type of contract he was given. We’ve seen it before, a player in his twenties being locked up to a long-term, rather low-per-year deal. Andrew Friedman was notorious for doing this with the Rays. For example, he locked up Chris Archer to a 6 year/$25 million deal when Archer was 25. Matt Moore got a 5 year/$14 million extension at just 22. Most notably, he gave Evan Longoria a 6 year/$17.5 million extension with an upside of $44.5 million over 9. These are good deals. Andrew Friedman is smart, so Andrew Friedman made these deals. (Logic!)

Why are they smart? Well, for a small-market team like Tampa, the deals allow them to maintain their homegrown stars for a longer time and at a relatively low average salary. For a big market team like the Yankees, these deals also make sense because if the player fails, it’s not a big deal to just eat the money they owe him. For example, if the Yankees decided to give Michael Pineda an extension in the range of 4 year/$30 million (give or take x million, I can not stress enough how bad I am at projecting contracts), to kick in starting in the 2016 season, I think that would be a really smart move, for both the Yankees and Pineda.

Pineda, when not injured or poorly concealing pine tar, has been a really good pitcher. I don’t want to bore you with numbers, just kidding I do. He has a lifetime FIP of 3.16 and a 3.78 K/BB ratio in 253.1 innings. Last year, he was filthy, posting a 2.61 SIERA, 2.71 FIP, and 8.43 (!) K/BB ratio. So, yeah, when he’s not a bonehead or hurt, he’s pretty freaking good. I recognize the inherent risk he carries, but (please don’t yell at me) he has shown flashes of a pitcher who can command $100 million when he hits free agency. Having a guy with that much upside and skill through his age-30 season at just 7 to 8 million dollars per year is really a bargain. If it doesn’t work out, they’re the Yankees and can afford to eat the money. It’s not like its a huge, burdensome contract.

The deals also make sense for the players, however. Look at Carrasco, first. Last season was the first in which he did not spend any time in the minors. Sure, the way he pitched suggested that if he continued like that and hit free agency eventually, he could be taking home a big contract, but when you have had just one, albeit good, season in the majors and you are offered $22 million, you probably take it.

Same goes for Pineda. He started 28 games in 2011, then missed two full season with injuries, and only started 13 last year. Sure, he’s looked awesome, but if you were a guy with his background of injuries and uncertainty, and you were offered $30 million, I imagine you take it. The deal also allows him to hit free agency when he’s 30/31 and, if he pitches well enough, get that huge contract.

So what have we learned:
1) I’m not a general manager
2) Long term/low AAV extensions can benefit both the teams and players
3) More contracts like this should happen

FIN

Sources:
fangraphs.com
mlbtraderumors.com
http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=3353025

How much gravity does insurance have in Major League Baseball front office decisions?

Puns aside, let me tell you the funny thing about a black hole. You see astronomers cannot really see one, instead they are detected through their effects on the universe around them. Although less extreme, insurance is similar in this regard on its impact on baseball teams. Most teams insure some of their larger contracts in case their players cannot play due to an exterior factor such as injury. Perhaps the impacts of this major facet of the game does not cross our mind often because it is not eminently visible. However, make no mistake that insurance is a major factor when teams make major decisions regarding the DL, contract extensions, playing time and so on.

First, consider the history of baseball insurance to better understand why it impacts baseball. It can be said that by the late 1990s it had become common place for teams to insure their larger contracts. The first time baseball and insurance first truly started getting media attention was with Albert Belle in 2001 due to confusion over his insurance contract. Albert Belle had suffered a career-ending hip injury with the Orioles. Fans grew excited however despite the disheartening news when in 2002 the all-star slugger was added back onto the Orioles’ 40 man roster. Disappointed Orioles fans can tell you that Belle never played another MLB game however. Instead, he was added back onto the 40-man roster so the Orioles could collect insurance on his contract (some MLB insurance contracts do not cover a player unless they remain on the 40-man roster). At the time the MLB insurance contract covered the remainder of the salary owed on Belle’s contract. According to writer Michael Branda, the Orioles recovered an astounding 27.3 million out of a 39-million-dollar loss represented by Belle’s injury. Since the huge losses on Belle’s contract in the early 2000s, insurers in baseball have become much more stringent with their underwriting in baseball contracts.

Belle was not the only reason for teams being more stringent with their underwriting. The associated risks with insuring a MLB player have increased. One reason is PEDs. The MLB really did not enforce its ban on PEDs up until the late 2000s, but now being caught using PEDs can result in a significant loss in playing time. According to MLB Trade Rumors a syndicate of the MLB, Ervin Santana a first-time offender was suspended for 80 games on April 3^rd of 2015. Santana was expected to make 13.5 million dollars this season. Despite being suspended, the Minnesota Twins are expected to still have to pay half of Santana’s salary (only players caught for the second time or more for steroids lose most of their salary).

To account for this insurers enforce a 60 to 90 day deductible policy in order to shield themselves from these sort of losses as well as claims made for short-term injuries. In addition to the 90 day deductible insurance policies are typically term policies of about three years with an option for renewal after the conclusion of the contract. As a result, if a contract proves to incur severe losses the liabilities will be only in the short term. Obviously to further protect themselves insurers only cover players with no preexisting injuries and all players must be inspected by the insurer. Furthermore, with wide variability and unpredictability in player health an insurer can in a way readjust its rate every three years to better reflect the player’s risk of not playing.

These more stringent underwriting practices have influenced the game, oftentimes when deciding when to take a pitcher off of the DL. Adam Kilgore of the Washington Post explained it best when he talked about how in 2012 Stephen Strasburg was “shut down” during a playoff push for the Nationals due to potential health concerns. In this decision there appeared to be a delicate balance between contention and the considerations of the insurance company that would not have covered Strasburg if he had been injured due to these health concerns. It is not crazy to think that finances come into play when making a decision on baseball players. Jeff Moorad, a decision maker for the Padres explained that in 2010 Chris Young was eligible to come off the DL. The Padres ultimately chose to put Young back on the field but Moorad added, “the accounting department much preferred that he [had stayed] on the disabled list.”

Baseball insurance has grown steadily more expensive. Although it is difficult to ascertain how much a team actually spends on insurance it is clear that it can be a burden for smaller teams. For instance, the Arizona Diamondbacks’ rotation once featured the dominant starting pitcher Brandon Webb. Between 2006 and 2008 Brandon Webb made three all-star games and finished first, second and second respectively in Cy Young voting. In this span Webb also led the league in innings pitched once. In essence Webb was due for a large payday once his contract expired. However contract negotiations between Webb and the Diamondbacks hit a snag in June of 2008. Despite a track record as a durable starter, no insurance company was willing to write a policy for injury risk to the Diamondbacks hurler. The reason is because insurance companies refused to accept the risk of Webb injuring his arm or if they were willing to, they were going to charge exorbitant rates.

As a result, the Diamondbacks could not get an insurance contract that did not have an exclusion on arm, shoulder or elbow injuries, all vital and injury-prone body parts for pitchers. According to AZCentral, a news outlet that covers the Arizona Diamondbacks, due to Webb not being insurable the Diamondbacks broke off all contract negotiations. In the long run, this proved to be a smart move since ten months later after contract talks ceased Brandon Webb never pitched in the majors again due to injuries. The point of this is that not only is baseball insurance so expensive it can prove to be impractical, it shows that most insurers are unwilling to insure some pitchers. Walt Jocketty, the former general manager for the middle-market St. Louis Cardinals explained that insurance has “become so expensive that it’s a cost item we really have to look at when you put your payroll together.”

In addition to insurance contracts altering how teams manage their rosters they influence how teams treat their players. In essence there is a human side to these contracts. Consider Josh Hamilton who is in the middle of a massive five-year, 125-million-dollar contract with the Angels and who has been playing quite ineffectively relative to his salary. Josh Hamilton who recently suffered a relapse on his drug addiction before the 2015 season is a prime example of insurance influencing teams to treat their players in a way they hopefully normally would not. Despite being a repeat offender, an arbitrator chose not to suspend Hamilton for any period of time. What makes this story scandalous is the Angels’ seemingly acerbic response to this news. It appears that the Angels almost wanted Hamilton to be suspended to spare them the expense of his failed contract. Clearly the Angels have little incentive to help Hamilton recover from his addiction. Instead, it is in their interest to see that Hamilton never plays another game of baseball again because if he does not play for an extended period of time the Angels can potentially collect insurance and definitely reduce their payroll.

Insurance influences baseball more than many people may realize. When it comes to playing time, DL decisions and contract negotiations, insurance seems to be an integral piece in the decision-making process. For me though, part of what makes baseball great is the inherent competition of players, often with disregard to their own body (*cough* Adam Eaton *cough*). There is little harm of teams protecting themselves from the inherent risks of baseball players becoming injured. The risk is that insurance becomes an incentive for teams to make decisions that may be bad for the game, such as not playing players for financial gain. Let’s hope that ultimately, teams do not get engulfed into this black hole.

In “Hardball Retrospective: Evaluating Scouting and Development Outcomes for the Modern-Era Franchises”, I placed every ballplayer in the modern era (from 1901-present) on their original team. Therefore, Fergie Jenkins is listed on the Phillies roster for the duration of his career while the Pirates claim Barry Bonds and the Rays declare Carl Crawford. I calculated revised standings for every season based entirely on the performance of each team’s “original” players. I discuss every team’s “original” players and seasons at length along with organizational performance with respect to the Amateur Draft (or First-Year Player Draft), amateur free agent signings and other methods of player acquisition.  Season standings, WAR and Win Shares totals for the “original” teams are compared against the “actual” team results to assess each franchise’s scouting, development and general management skills.

Expanding on my research for the book, the following series of articles will reveal the finest single-season rosters for every Major League organization based on overall rankings in OWAR and OWS along with the general managers and scouting directors that constructed the teams. “Hardball Retrospective” is available in digital format on Amazon, Barnes and Noble, GooglePlay, iTunes and KoboBooks. The print edition is coming soon. Additional information and a discussion forum are available at TuataraSoftware.com.

Terminology

OWAR – Wins Above Replacement for players on “original” teams

OWS – Win Shares for players on “original” teams

OPW% – Pythagorean Won-Loss record for the “original” teams

Assessment

The 1999 Texas Rangers         OWAR: 50.4     OWS: 284     OPW%: .512

GM Tom Grieve acquired 79% (38 of 48) of the ballplayers on the 1999 Rangers roster. 38 of the 48 team members were selected through the Amateur Draft process. Based on the revised standings the “Original” 1999 Rangers placed six games behind the Mariners in the American League Western Division race. Texas (83-79) claimed the Wild Card by a one-game margin over Chicago and Kansas City.

Perennial All-Star backstop Ivan Rodriguez enhanced his trophy case with the 1999 A.L. MVP award. “Pudge” produced a .332 BA while notching career-bests in home runs (35), RBI (113), runs scored (116), base hits (199) and stolen bases (25). Rodriguez collected 13 Gold Glove Awards including 10 in consecutive seasons (1992-2001). “Slammin’” Sammy Sosa launched 63 moon-shots, drove in 141 baserunners and registered 114 tallies. Juan “Igor” Gonzalez belted 39 round-trippers, knocked in 128 runs and delivered a .328 BA after an MVP season in the previous campaign.

Fernando Tatis (.298/34/107) enjoyed a career year over at the hot corner, scoring 104 runs and swiping 21 bags. Rusty Greer clubbed 41 doubles, 20 big-flies and plated 101 baserunners while eclipsing the .300 mark for the fourth successive season. Rich Aurilia (.281/22/80) and Mike Stanley (.281/19/72) supplied additional thump towards the bottom of the lineup. Warren Morris parlayed a .288 BA and 15 long balls into a third-place finish in the Rookie of the Year balloting.

Rodriguez slots into 13^th place in “The New Bill James Historical Baseball Abstract” among backstops. He certainly elevated his ranking after playing ten additional years following the publication of NBJHBA in 2001. Right fielders Sosa and Gonzalez are listed in 45^th and 52th place, respectively.

Kevin J. Brown, the undisputed ace of the Texas rotation, compiled a record of 18-9 with a 3.00 ERA, 1.066 WHIP and 221 strikeouts. The balance of the starting staff submitted sub-par efforts in contrast to their career norms. Jeff Zimmerman (9-3, 2.36) fashioned a 0.833 WHIP and received an invitation to the Mid-Summer Classic during his rookie campaign.

The “Original” 1999 Texas Rangers roster

Honorable Mention

The “Original” 2001 Rangers              OWAR: 48.4     OWS: 278     OPW%: .513

Sosa shredded opposition pitching to the tune of a .328 BA while launching 64 moon-shots, registering 160 RBI and scoring a League-best 146 runs. Aurilia delivered career-bests with a .324 BA, 37 dingers, 97 ribbies and 114 tallies as he topped the circuit with 206 safeties. Gonzalez swatted 35 big-flies and knocked in 140 baserunners. Zimmerman notched 28 saves and Brown furnished a 2.65 ERA in 19 starts.

On Deck

The “Original” 1924 Senators

References and Resources

Baseball America – Executive Database

Baseball-Reference

James, Bill. The New Bill James Historical Baseball Abstract. New York, NY.: The Free Press, 2001. Print.

James, Bill, with Jim Henzler. Win Shares. Morton Grove, Ill.: STATS, 2002. Print.

Retrosheet – Transactions Database

Seamheads – Baseball Gauge

Sean Lahman Baseball Archive

As a Red Sox fan, I got very excited opening day when Dustin Pedroia hit two home runs. One of the big questions of this offseason is whether he has upper-single-digit homer power, or upper-teens homer power. Of course, as a thinking baseball fan, my head tells me to avoid getting overly excited about a small sample size. But does the two-HR outbreak actually tell us nothing? I think the expectations going into the season combined with Pedroia’s performance in his first game is a perfect situation to use Bayes’ Theorem.

To elaborate, I think Pedroia’s expectations going into this season have a bimodal distribution. If you look at his 2008-2012 seasons, he averaged 16 HR per year. His last two seasons averaged 8 HR per year. Was this due to a real decline, or due to injuries that sapped his power? While someone like Mike Trout might have a nice normally-distributed expectation around 35 HR, I expected Pedroia to have an either/or season: he’d either get back to 2008-2012 production, or continue as a 8-HR guy.

Now for a review of Bayes’ Theorem: it tells you how to update your prior beliefs given an observation. The formula for this is P(A|B) = P(B|A)*P(A)/P(B), where A and B are events, P(A) and P(B) are the probabilities of those events, and P(A|B) or P(B|A) should be read as “Probability of A given B,” or “Probability of B given A,” respectively. Specifically, in this case, A is “Dustin Pedroia is a 16-HR guy”, and B is “Dustin Pedroia hit 2 HR in his first game of the season”. I had a preseason belief about P(A), but I want to update it given that event B has occurred.

As implied above, I’m going to simplify Pedroia’s season outcomes into two possible outcomes: He is an 8-HR guy, or a 16-HR guy. Before the season, I’m going to guess that I had about a 50-50 belief that he was either one. Another assumption I’m going to make, to make the math easier, is that a season will see 640 plate appearances. You can make your own assumptions, but this is a demonstration of how much Bayes’ Theorem helps us update beliefs based on just one observation.

We need to determine three quantities to do our calculation now:
1. P(A)—probability that Pedroia is a 16-HR guy
2. P(B|A)—probability that we would see Pedroia hit 2 HR in his first 5 plate appearances, given that he is a 16-HR guy
3. P(B)—probability that we would see Pedroia hit 2 HR in his first 5 plate appearances (taking our 50-50 chance that he’s a 16 or 8-HR guy as a given)

1. Probability that Pedroia is a 16-HR guy

Easy. By assumption, P(A) is 50%.

2. Probability that we would see Pedroia hit 2 HR in his first 5 plate appearances, given that he’s a 16-HR guy

Tougher, but we can use a binomial probability model. That is 5C2*P(HR)^2*(1-P(HR))^3. When we have 16 HR in 640 plate appearances, P(HR) is 1/40, and 1-P(HR) is 39/40. This turns out to be .00579. P(B|A)= 0.579%.

3. Probability that we would see Pedroia hit 2 HR in his first 5 plate appearances, with preseason assumptions

This is the weighted average of all his possible season outcomes—so probability of 2HR in 5PA, given that he is a 16-HR guy, times the chance that he’s a 16-HR guy, PLUS, probability of 2HR in 5PA, times the chance that he’s an 8-HR guy. The same calculation as in number 2 can be done for if he’s an 8-HR guy, yielding an answer that the chance that he’d hit 2HR in 5PA is 0.151%. Given our calculation in the above paragraph, and our preseason assumption that it’s 50-50 that he’s an 8 or 16-HR guy, that gives us a weighted average P(B) = 0.365%.

So now we can mash all of those numbers into Bayes’ equation, and we find that .50*.00579/.00365 = .794, or 79.4%! Turns out that my Red Sox-loving lizard brain was not wrong! If you believed preseason that there was a 50%-50% chance that Pedroia would return to his 2008-2012 form, you should rationally update your beliefs to 80%-20% on the minuscule sample size of just two home runs in five plate appearances! Another note is that we should be forward-looking: since he has nearly a full season of plate appearances remaining, it might be rational to think that he’s likely to be an 18-HR guy, now that he has 2 in the bag.

This method could be adapted to a continuous expectation of outcomes, allowing a chance that Pedroia might be something besides an 8HR guy or a 16HR guy (although you and I know that that is clearly absurd).

No, really. It isn’t. More ink has been spilled on Bryant than on every other just-sent-to-AAA layer combined. So you won’t get any more of that here.

Ok, this is actually a little about Bryant, in the sense that he is a future Cubs third baseman, and this is about the recent Cubs’ third basemen that have gone before him. It is, by and large, an uninspiring lot, but the list reveals something about how the Cubs used to assemble rosters, and how that now appears to have changed.

Here’s a list of WAR that each major-league team has accumulated at third from the beginning of the division era (1969) to the present. If you scroll waaaay down to the bottom you see the Cubs, down there at 25 out of 30. The only teams worse are all expansion teams. Here’s the same list resorted by wRC+. The Cubs inch up to 24, and a couple of storied (or at least old) franchises now appear below them, but the message is essentially the same: a message of dismal underachievement. This message is not confined to third – those of you who are either Cubs haters or masochists can play with those tables and look at the other positions. It’s the same tale of woe except in the few cases where the Cubs have had Hall-of-Fame-caliber players at a position for some length of time (e.g., Sandberg and Sosa*).

What accounts for this prolonged failure? Could it be The Curse? FanGraphs Community sought comment from the Major League Baseball Ruminants Association, and here’s what their spokesgoat had to say: “The Chicago Cubs’ multiple decades of ineptitude have nothing to do with supernatural forces or the actions or inactions of our members. Rather, the Cubs’ continual suboptimal performance is due to that franchise’s historic inability to integrate such concepts as advanced statistics and an even rudimentary understanding of aging curves into their roster assembly thought processes.”

Pretty strong words there from the MLBRA; let’s see if evidence backs them up.  What follows is a review of the top 10 Cubs third basemen by WAR since 1969. I’m leaving out guys like Mark Bellhorn and Jose Hernandez who played quite a bit at third, but whose primary position was elsewhere. The fact that I even have to say “I’m leaving out guys like Mark Bellhorn and Jose Hernandez” should be sending visible shivers down your spine.

10. Kevin Orie  684 PA, 79 wRC+, 1.9 WAR, Age 24-29

The only player on this list to come up with the Cubs during the divisional era, Orie got off to a promising start in 1997, with a 101 wRC+ in 415 plate appearances, as well as superior defense. He plunged into the abyss in 1998, and after putting up a 39 wRC+ through July, the disgusted Cubs offloaded him to the Marlins for Felix Heredia, whose left-handed arsenal of kerosene would reward opposing hitters for years to come. If you think baseball players get paid too much, take a look at Kevin Orie’s transaction list on Baseball Reference.  This is what life is like for the vast majority of players who aren’t good enough to hold down a steady major-league job.

9. Vance Law  1075 PA, 103 wRC+, 2.3 WAR, Age 31-32

Signed as a free agent in 1988, Law had a BABIP-fueled year in which he also swatted 29 doubles and 11 homers. The alien inhabiting Vance Law’s body returned to its distant galactic home in 1989, and Law reverted to his good-glove, small-stick self. He did get to play in two postseason games in Wrigley, which is two more than the vast majority of living humans can claim.

8. Steve Buechele  1290 PA, 94 wRC+, 3.6 WAR, Age 30-33

Danny Jackson’s disastrous arson spree in Chicago ended in July 1992, when the Cubs traded him to Pittsburgh for Buechele. His main contribution came in 1993, when the BABIP alien returned to Chicago, jacking Buechele’s BABIP up from his career .275 mark up to .305. Buechele produced a respectable 108 wRC+ that year, together with good defense. The rest of his time in Chicago he was essentially a slightly better version of Vance Law.

7. Bill Mueller  670 PA, 112 wRC+, 4.0 WAR, Age 30-31

Acquired after the 2000 season from the Giants for an aging Tim Worrell, who would give them three excellent seasons in relief, Mueller represented a rare venture by the Cubs into the land of sabermetrics. His problem wasn’t sabermetrics; it was injuries. Mueller was an excellent two-way advanced stat contributor when healthy, but in an 11 year career, Mueller exceeded 500 plate appearances just four times, none of them with the Cubs.

6. Steve Ontiveros  1633 PA, 96 wRC+, 4.1 WAR, Age 25-28

The good news: the Cubs got him young. The bad news: they traded Bill Madlock to get him. Ok, the Cubs also got Bobby Murcer in that deal. Meh. Ontiveros had outstanding plate discipline (career K rate: 11.4%; career BB rate: 12.2%), but no power whatsoever (career ISO: .093). Released in 1980, he took his keen batting eye to Japan.

5. Ron Cey  2108 PA, 110 wRC+, 5.6 WAR, Age 35-38

The Penguin waddled into Chicago in 1983 on a salary-dump trade from the Dodgers. He put up good offense for the Cubbies, but by this point in his career had a range not far exceeding that of the third base bag itself. The Cubs probably figured that putting Cey next to an aging Larry Bowa would hide the problem, but Bowa’s range had eroded as well. In 1984, Cey became the first Cubs third baseman to reach the postseason since Stan Hack. I’m sure that’s something he brings up with the grandkids a lot.

4. Luis Valbuena  1241 PA, 100 wRC+, 6.1 WAR, Age 26-28

A waiver acquistion from the Blue Jays in April 2012, Valbuena initially looked like a glove-first utility guy, but his offense gradually improved, until breaking out last year with a 116 wRC+.  The BABIP alien is being sought for questioning: Valbuena’s was .294 last year, compared to a career rate of .269. Although he has a reputation as a platoon bat, his career splits are just about even, so he may have a future as a starter, but it won’t be with the Cubs. Kris Bryant’s long shadow led the Cubs to trade Valbuena to the Astros, where he should have an easier time fending off Matt Dominguez.

3. Bill Madlock  1632 PA, 137 wRC+, 11.1 WAR, Age 23-25

This is the kind of trade the Cubs have all too often failed to make: After a disappointing 1973 season, the Cubs correctly recognized that they needed to retool, and thus dealt Ferguson Jenkins to the Rangers for Bill Madlock.  In his three seasons in Chicago Madlock supplied excellent offense that outweighed his spotty defense. Then in February 1977 the Cubs sent Madlock to San Francisco in exchange for Ontiveros and an aging, declining Bobby Murcer. This is the kind of trade the Cubs have all to often made. Yes, Madlock had issues, but the Pirates would eventually find a way to make use of him after the Giants also gave up on him. If the Cubs had recognized the value of his talent, they might have tried harder to do the same.

2. Ron Santo, 3135 PA, 122 wRC+, 19.9 WAR, Age 29-33

We now know why Ronnie didn’t age particularly well, but he still put up two outstanding seasons (in 1969 and 1972) and three good ones in his remaining time with the Cubs. His later years seem disappointing only in comparison to his four-year reign of terror over NL pitchers from 1964-67 (with respective OPS of .962, .888., .950, and .906). His lowest ISO during that period was .212 in 1967.  The mounds may have been higher back then, but they were never high enough to silence his bat.

1. Aramis Ramirez, 4705 PA, 126 wRC+, 28.5 WAR, Age 25-33

In backhanded revenge for Bill Madlock, in July 2003 the Cubs obtained Ramirez from the Pirates along with Kenny Lofton in exchange for Jose Hernandez and a PTBNL, who turned out to be second round bust Bobby Hill.  A particularly fiery pit in GM Hell awaits Dave Littlefield for this awful deal, but one man’s Hell is another man’s Ramirez, and this trade enabled the Cubs to enjoy the only stability they’ve known at third since Santo’s retirement. Ramirez hit 34 homers for the Bucs in 2001, but in 2002 the homers turned into strikeouts. Ramirez made some progress in 2003, but not enough to kill Littlefeld’s sick fascination with Herrnandez, and so the deal was done. Ramirez immediately blossomed with the Cubs, raking at a .233 ISO rate for the remainder of that season, and continuing his excellent output for many years thereafter. He is the fourth best Cubs third baseman of all time, behind only Santo, Hack, and Heinie Zimmerman.

So yes, this list bears out the ruminant’s ruminations, at least to some extent. Ramirez is the only good third baseman since 1969 that the Cubs had control of during his mid-career years. The Cubs often resorted to trading for or signing aging third basemen with declining performance and expanding paychecks, because their farm system had failed to produce anything better. The few young players they did obtain they either failed to develop (Orie, Ontiveros) or gave up on too soon (Madlock). Valbuena is an exception here, but even he is likely to top out as a second division starter at best. And remember, these are the good guys.

So you can see why Cubs fans are so obsessed with Bryant. For many of the last 45 years, the hot corner in Wrigley has been ice cold.

This is part 3 of the Player Evaluator and Calculated Expectancy (PEACE) model, which is an alternative to Wins Above Replacement.  This article will introduce evidence that z-scores can be converted into runs (or points in other sports) with accuracy and reliability, as well as analyze the results that zDefense has produced.

Recall that zDefense is broken down into 4 components: zFielding, zRange, zOuts, and zDoublePlays.  The fielding and range components depend on the accuracy of Calculated Runs Expectancy, which I introduced in Part 1.  Outs and double plays, though, use a different technique: they take z-scores for the relevant rate statistics, then multiply by factors of playing time.  Here were the equations:

• zOuts = [(Player O/BIZ – Positional O/BIZ) / Positional O/BIZ Standard Deviation] * (Player Innings / Team Innings) * (√ Player BIZ / 2)

• zDoublePlays = [(Player DP/BIZ – Positional DP/BIZ) / Positional DP/BIZ Standard Deviation] * (Player Innings / Team Innings) * (√ Player BIZ / 2) * Positional DP/BIZ

We can set up models in other sports that estimate point differentials using very similar techniques.  I’ve developed one for college football and another for the NBA.

For the first model, I’ve used the data for every Division I FBS football team from 2000-2014 (1,802 teams), and I defined the relevant statistics and their “weights” as such:

• zPassing = [[Completion Percentage z-score * Completions per Game] + [Passing Yards per Attempt z-score * Passing Attempts per Game]] / 10
• zRushing = [Rushing Yards per Attempt z-score * Rushing Attempts per Game] / 10
• zTurnovers = [Turnovers per Game z-score]
• zPlays = [Number of Offensive Plays per Game z-score] 

These 4 components summed make up zOffense, while taking each team’s opponents’ calculations results in zDefense.

What I found after summing the different components was that the resulting number, when divided by the number of games played, was a very accurate estimator for a team’s average point differential.

Among the nearly 2,000 college football teams, the average difference between zPoints (calculated margin of victory) and actual MOV was just 3.21 points, with a median of 2.77, and a max difference of 13.97 points.  About 20% of teams’ MOV were calculated to within 1 point or less, 53% were accurate to 3 points or less, 79% to 5 points or less, and 99% to 10 points or less.  The regression model for this dataset can be seen below:

http://imgur.com/kUDwbA7

The NBA model has similar results using 6 parts:

• z3P (3-point shots) = [[3P FG% z-score * 3-point attempts * 3] / 10
• z2P (2-point shots) = [2P FG% z-score * 2-point attempts * 2] / 10
• zFreeThrows = [FT% z-score * free throw attempts] / 10
• zTurnovers = [Turnovers per Minute z-score * League Average Points per Possession] * 2
• zORB (offensive rebounds) = [Offensive Rebounds per Minute z-score * League Average Points per Possession]
• zDRB (defensive rebounds) = [Defensive Rebounds per Minute z-score * League Average Points per Possession] 

Similar to the football model, these 6 components make up zOffense, while each team’s opponents’ calculations make zDefense.  I particularly like z3P, z2P, and zFT because they multiply the z-score by the “weight”: 1, 2, or 3 points.  Recall that zRange is multiplied by the IF/OF Constant, which is just the difference, on average, in runs between balls hit to the outfield vs. balls that remain in the infield.

I’ve only done the calculations for the 2013-2014 season, where teams averaged 1.033 points per possession.  To convert to zPoints in this model, add zOffense and zDefense, then divide by 5.

In most seasons, elite teams will have an average point differential of +10, while terrible ones will hover around -10.  On average, the NBA model had an average difference between the calculated and actual differential of just 1.331 points, with a median of 0.800.  17 out of 30 teams were calculated within 1 point, 25 within 2, and 29 out of 30 were accurate to within 5 points per game.

The fact that these models can be created using the same general principle (rate statistic z-scores multiplied by a factor of playing time equates relative points) provides some evidence that similar results are calculable in baseball.  This is the basis for zDefense in PEACE.  Let’s look at the results.

Most sabermetricians would turn to the Fielding Bible Awards for a list of the best fielders by position in any given year, so we’ll use those results to compare.  If we assume that the Fielding Bible is accurate, then we would expect zDefense to produce similar conclusions.  Comparing the 2014 winners to the players ranked as the best at their position by zDefense, we can see some overlap.  The number in parentheses is the positional ranking of the Fielding Bible Award winner by zDefense.

• Position: Fielding Bible Winner (#)…zDefense Winner

• C: Jonathan Lucroy (12)…Yadier Molina
• 1B: Adrian Gonzalez (1)…Adrian Gonzalez
• 2B: Dustin Pedroia (2)…Ian Kinsler
• 3B: Josh Donaldson (2)…Kyle Seager
• SS: Andrelton Simmons (8)…Zack Cozart
• LF:Alex Gordon (1)…Alex Gordon
• CF: Juan Lagares (3)…Jacoby Ellsbury
• RF: Jason Heyward (1)…Jason Heyward
• P: Dallas Keuchel (5)…Hisashi Iwakuma

The multi-position winner, Lorenzo Cain, was also rated very favorably by zDefense.  While most positions don’t have a perfect match, every single Fielding Bible winner was near the very top of their position for zDefense.  This is the case for almost every instance, which isn’t surprising: if there were drastic disagreements about who is truly elite, then we would suspect one of the metrics to be egregiously inaccurate.  Instead, we see many similarities at the top, which provides some solid evidence that zDefense is a valid measure.

As always, feel free to comment with any questions, thoughts, or concerns.

Wow. Craig Kimbrel traded right before the start of the season. I have to admit to being rather shocked. I know the Braves are rebuilding this off-season and it made sense to trade him. He is very highly valued for a player who only pitches 60 innings a season, perhaps over-valued. If the Braves are going to be hopeless this year then who needs a dominant single-inning pitcher?

The trouble is I love watching Kimbrel pitch, no matter the situation. I live in London, in the UK, so a lot of Braves games happen from 1-4am and I don’t get to watch them live. Every morning I use my MLB.com subscription to check the last night’s action. If I don’t have the time to watch the whole game, which is common, I skip to the innings where the Braves scored plus any inning Kimbrel pitches. Pace, a banana curveball and strikeouts, Kimbrel is one of those rare players who is worth watching every minute he plays. Even when he is (rarely) hit you feel a strikeout is coming next. So emotionally, I hate to see him traded (just like I hated seeing Heyward traded). Lots of reporters are saying the trade is a good deal for both sides or an outright win for the Braves, so in emotional despair, I thought I’d have a proper look into it.

The facts of the trade

To the San Diego Padres:

• Craig Kimbrel – 3 years at $34.75m (includes option buyout) or 4 years at $46.75m
• Melvin Upton Jr – 3 years at $48.15m

To the Atlanta Braves:

• Carlos Quentin – 1 year at $11m (includes option buyout) or 2 years at $18m
• Cameron Maybin – 2 years at $16.2m (includes option buyout) or 3 years at $24.2m
• 2 prospects and 41^st pick 2015 draft

N.B. Bold text highlights the likely choices.

I’ll not be analysing the prospects in much detail, instead ignoring the less relevant trade pieces and looking at the end outcomes. My method is below, but if you like, skip to the summary, that’s the important bit.

Methods

From the Padres POV

• Upton not wanted/needed. Treat him as a league-minimum replacement-level 5^th outfielder for 3 years (cost $1.5m). Add the rest of his salary to the Kimbrel contract.
• Dumped 2 unneeded players and $27.2m in contracts off the books. Remove these values as savings for the Kimbrel contract
• Gained Craig Kimbrel. Assume option taken (it is great value – see later*). Contract for 4 years at $46.75m – $27.2m (from Quentin and Maybin savings) + $46.65m (Upton cost)
• Given up 3 prospects (effectively); 1 good (Wisler), 1 risk (Paroubeck) and 1 draft pick

I feel these are all reasonable assumption/treatments. The Padres want Kimbrel, don’t care much about what they get from Upton (assuming he continues as in 2013-14) and used the Quentin and Maybin savings to pay for it all.

From the Braves POV

• Quentin not wanted/needed (not sure why – seems a better bench bat than most and nobody will trade for him as they know they can get him for minimum once the Braves cut him). Add his contract to the 2015 payroll – $11m
• Maybin – Assume continues poor health/form and option buyout is taken. Treat as decent defensive replacement OF (23 career DRS in 8 years). Possibly gets 75 games a season but produces nothing more than T.Cunningham in AAA so set effective salary to league minimum – $1m for 2 years. Add rest of his contract to 2015-16 payroll ($15.2m over 2 years)
• Payroll changes:
  • Savings – Kimbrel ($46.75m – 4 years), Upton ($48.15m – 3 years)
  • Wastings – Quentin ($11m – 1 year), Maybin ($15.2m – 2 years) – both include buyouts
• Receive 3 prospects (effectively); 1 good (Wisler), 1 risky (Paroubeck) and 1 draft pick

Again, I feel these assumptions/treatments are reasonable. Maybin may produce better than this, but his batting numbers were as bad as M. Upton the last few years (70-80 wRC+) so I don’t think we can expect much more of him than Melvin (apart from his defence being better).

Summary

Padres POV

• Get Craig Kimbrel – effectively 4 years for $66.2m ($16.55m/year)
• Get spare replacement-level 5^th OF at minimum salary for 3 years
• Lose 3 prospects; 1 good, 1 risky, 1 draft pick

Braves POV

• Lose Kimbrel (and M.Upton)
• Get spare replacement-level 4^th OF at minimum salary for 2 years
• Payroll savings $67.7m over 4 years ($16.9m/year average)
• Get 3 prospects; 1 good, 1 risky, 1 draft pick

Analysis

Lots of contract money going back and forth, but the end result is that the Braves get payroll savings of around $17m a year for 4 years and 3 prospects and the Padres give up 3 prospects to get Kimbrel at a reasonable free agent price* of around $17m a year for 4 years.

If you consider that the Padres would have lost that 3^rd prospect (the draft pick) if they signed Kimbrel as a free agent, the deal starts to look pretty good for San Diego and AJ Preller. The Padres almost certainly wouldn’t have been able to sign Kimbrel as a free agent with other teams competing (everyone needs a Kimbrel and the Dodgers/Yankees/Tigers/Red Sox etc all have the money for him). The contract would certainly have been longer as well (see footnote on Kimbrel’s historic value*). The Padres are paying Kimbrel a lot, but the amount is fair and they didn’t give up much.

The Braves had signed Kimbrel to a much friendlier contract than he would have got as a free agent (he’s homegrown and a Braves fan so gave a large discount – again see footnote*). Kimbrel gets $13m /year for his free-agent years, when he could have had much more. John Hart effectively used Kimbrel’s generosity to swap the spare value for 3 prospects, one of whom is extremely risky (Paroubeck) and one who is completely unknown (the draft pick). The Braves have rid themselves of Upton, but in taking back other contracts they have effectively only saved the money they should have been paying Kimbrel (had he not given a home discount).

In conclusion, John Hart basically declared he didn’t want a well-paid but high-value closer and swapped it for one good (but not great) prospect and two unknown prospects. So how do I feel now? I would have preferred to watch Kimbrel play for my team every week… Enjoy it San Diego.

*A footnote on Kimbrel’s free agent value

Craig Kimbrel is currently 26 years old and 10 months. Below is a summary list of contracts for comparable relievers and their ages when signing.

You’ll notice that Kimbrel is younger than them all and although the average yearly value is not as high as Kimbrel’s $13.0m 2016 salary, the elite arbitration-eligible relievers are likely to beat them all (apart from maybe Rivera). If he were a free agent this last winter, you can assume that he would have been offered 5-year (and possibly longer) contracts.

Kimbrel’s career numbers are also historically unprecedented at his age. This has been said many times before, but my favourite Kimbrel stat is the WAR leaders for relievers over the last 10 years. Kimbrel has the 5^th highest WAR from 2005-2014. He entered the league at the end of 2010. Since entering the league in 2010 he leads reliever WAR by 1.5 over Holland and Chapman (who have comparable service time). Before signing his (very team friendly) extension Matt Swartz estimated his first year of arbitration salary should be $10.2m. For a detailed analysis of how much Kimbrel is worth I recommend you read his article (http://bit.ly/1GEjKyT). The point being, he is probably worth at least a $17m/year, 4 year contract.

References

http://www.spotrac.com/mlb/san-diego-padres/melvin-upton/

http://www.spotrac.com/mlb/atlanta-braves/cameron-maybin/

http://www.spotrac.com/mlb/san-diego-padres/craig-kimbrel/

http://www.spotrac.com/mlb/atlanta-braves/carlos-quentin/

http://www.fangraphs.com/statss.aspx?playerid=5015&position=OF

http://www.fangraphs.com/statss.aspx?playerid=5223&position=OF

http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/evaluating-the-prospects-san-diego-padres/

http://www.baseball-reference.com/players/r/riverma01.shtml

http://www.fangraphs.com/leaders.aspx?pos=all&stats=rel&lg=all&qual=y&type=8&season=2014&month=0&season1=2005&ind=0&team=0&rost=0&age=0&filter=&players=0

http://www.mlbtraderumors.com/2013/10/arbitration-breakdown-craig-kimbrel.html

Nowadays all the rage seems to be about Tommy John surgeries, as it should be. The number of players who’ve had the surgery is rising at an alarming rate. Therefore many studies have been done on the issue. Most notably by Jeff Zimmerman and John Roegele, who have combined forces to create the biggest and most complete list of Tommy John surgeries. This led them to delve into many studies, such as the effects of Tommy John on performance, the success rate of the surgery, the effects of velocity, the effects of certain pitches, etc… Therefore I decided to do my part.

While a lot has already been done on Tommy John surgeries, not a lot of studies have examined the percentage of hard-throwing pitchers who have had the surgery. Jeff Zimmerman did look at pitchers who hit 100 MPH or more and the percentage of them who have had Tommy John (25% had the surgery). What I will be doing, however, is somewhat different. I will look at the pitchers whose fastball averaged 95 or more and the percentage of them who have had Tommy John surgery, as requested by Jeff, “Help Out: While I looked at pitchers who threw over 100 mph, 100 may not me the key number. Maybe it’s 97 mph, or 95 mph. The increase in velocity and increase in TJS can’t be ignored. It is time to perform a more thorough assessment.”

Before I dive into this, some of you reading might not be familiar with Tommy John surgeries, so I’ll give a brief explanation. If you are, however, then you can probably skip this paragraph. Tommy John surgeries or the ulnar collateral ligament (UCL) reconstruction is a surgical procedure where a ligament in the medial elbow is replaced with a tendon from elsewhere in the body. The procedure was first performed in 1974 on a pitcher called Tommy John, by Dr. Frank Jobe; the surgery was named after Tommy John. The procedure is rather devastating and it will usually take around a year for a pitcher to get back onto the field. Now, some pitchers of course never make it back, and some pitchers come back but are never the same. The success rate of the recovery varies and is debatable; some have estimated it at around 80%. For a more elaborate explanation of the success rate I recommend reading Jon Roegele’s article here. The final element you should know is that the Tommy John surgery is on the rise; it’s being performed at an alarming rate, which has spurred many studies. Below is a graph of all the Tommy John surgeries performed since 1974 (not including the ones that occurred in 2015).

So Tommy Johns are on the rise, and reached an all-time high in 2014. You know what’s also on the rise? Pitcher velocity. Since PITCH f/x was made available in 2007, there has been a steady and consistent increase in pitcher velocity. Both the rise in Tommy John surgeries and the rise in velocity seem to be linked. (The velocity below is on an average per year basis).

This, however, doesn’t mean that one causes the other. A big question, at the end of almost every Tommy John article, is the attempt to figure out or contemplate what is causing the increase in the surgery. Especially since it seems practically every pitcher that throws hard is getting the surgery, Zack Wheeler being the latest example. Hopefully what follows will show or will give some inclination into whether pitchers who throw hard are more likely to have the surgery.

So first I’ll explain my process. I went on Baseball Prospectus and I looked at every pitcher’s average velocity from 2007 to 2014. I looked at both starters and relievers and I didn’t set an innings limit, in order to get as big of a sample size as possible. Then I took every pitcher who threw 95 or over as the arbitrary definition of hard throwers, which left me with 191 pitchers. After I got every pitcher who 95 MPH or more and I looked up their injury history, to see whether or not they had received the surgery. Here is what I found; I also included the pitchers who threw 96+ MPH because while I was compiling the data, I thought I noticed a slight increase in Tommy John surgeries. A final element to note is that I didn’t look at Minor League pitchers, only the Major Leaguers because unfortunately there is no PITCH f/x data available for minor leaguers (at least that I know of).

Of those pitchers who threw 95+ here’s a list of those who have had more than one Tommy John surgery:

Okay, so now what to make of this? 32.46% seems like an awful lot, but one needs to put it into perspective. Jeff Zimmerman in his “100MPH = Tommy John Surgery?” article pointed out that, “The number of major league pitchers with the surgery now stands at 33% according to Will Carroll.” I personally felt that that number was awfully high.

So I read Will Carroll’s article and found it somewhat problematic. “One-third of current MLB pitchers have had Tommy John surgery. Of the about 360 who started the season, 124 share the all-too-familiar triangular scar.” While I do respect Will Carroll’s work, why did he limit himself to the pitchers who started the season? And what does that even mean? Is it the pitchers who threw on opening day? Was it the pitchers on opening day rosters? Did he use an innings limit? At this point, I’m simply befuddled at how he came to the number of “360 pitchers”. Due to baseball’s Minor League system one first needs to define what qualifies as a Major League pitcher. I’m not sure that Carroll did that or rather cannot tell from his article how he did that. I think a more thorough study needs to be done. For example, not simply looking at the pitchers who start the season. I think a good barometer could be, to set an innings limit, for a certain amount of years and looking at the percentage of those pitchers who had Tommy John. I think that will give us a better sense of the total percentage of pitchers who have had the surgery. Or hell one could do it on a year-by-year basis.

As for this study, what we can conclude is that around one in three pitchers who throw 95+ MPH have to suffer the surgery. If we simply go by Will Carroll’s study, this doesn’t seem like it increases a pitchers chance of getting the surgery at all. I, however, think that with a more thorough study we will find that throwing harder does actually lead to more Tommy Johns. This is of course just a hypothesis, and by no means should be taken as fact. Also saying that 95 MPH is the benchmark for hard throwers is relatively arbitrary, maybe 94+ or 93+ MPH will give us different results.