MLB Franchise Four: AL East

Major League Baseball has a campaign asking fans to vote for the four “most impactful” players in their team’s history, with the winners being announced at the 2015 All-Star Game in Cincinnati. A panel of experts created an eight-man ballot for each team. This panel consists of MLB’s Official Historian John Thorn and representatives from MLB’s official statistician (the Elias Sports Bureau), MLB.com, MLB Network, and the Baseball Writers’ Association of America.

“Most impactful” is open to interpretation, which makes this an interesting exercise. It isn’t “best” or “most famous” or “most popular”, but “most impactful.” I decided to look at the eight players on the ballot for each franchise and where they rank in FanGraphs WAR during their time with that franchise.

For each franchise, I’ve listed their top 10 in FanGraphs WAR along with any players who are on the ballot who are below the top 10. The players in BOLD are those who are on the ballot and the years listed are the years in which they played for that team.

 

Boston Red Sox (1901-2015)

 

(1) Ted Williams, 130.4 WAR (1939-1942, 1946-1960)

(2) Carl Yastrzemski, 94.8 WAR (1961-1983)

(3) Roger Clemens, 76.5 WAR

(4) Wade Boggs, 70.8 WAR

(5) Dwight Evans, 64.3 WAR (1972-1990)

(6) Cy Young, 54.8 WAR (1901-1908)

(7) Tris Speaker, 54.4 WAR

(8) Bobby Doerr, 53.3 WAR

(9) Pedro Martinez, 52.6 WAR (1998-2004)

(10) Jim Rice, 50.8 WAR (1974-1989)

(11) David Ortiz, 41.3 WAR (2003-2015)

(16) Carlton Fisk, 38.3 WAR (1969, 1971-1980)

 

On the ballot: It’s pretty amazing to think about Ted Williams and Carl Yastrzesmki manning left field for the Red Sox from 1939 to 1980, other than the few years Williams missed time because of his service to the military. For nearly 40 years, two all-time great players held down that spot in front of the Green Monster. Williams, of course, is one of the greatest hitters in baseball history who is 10th all-time in FanGraphs WAR. He hit .344/.482/.634 in his 19-year career and led the league in on-base percentage 12 times. He won two AL MVP Awards and arguably should have won more (he finished second the year he hit .406). Carl Yastrzemski was also very good during his 23-year career with the Sox. He had over 3400 hits, was an All-Star 18 times, won seven Gold Gloves, and was the AL MVP and Triple Crown winner in 1967. You can’t have a Red Sox Franchise Four without Teddy Ballgame and Yaz.

It’s interesting that Dwight Evans made the eight-man ballot despite getting little support in three years on the Hall of Fame ballot. He deserved better in the voting for the Hall of Fame. Evans is 14th all-time among right fielders in WAR, ahead of Hall of Famers Tony Gwynn, Dave Winfield, and Andre Dawson. It’s nice to see him on the ballot here.

Cy Young only pitched for the Red Sox for eight years but had 54.8 WAR during that time thanks in part to an average of 341 innings pitched per season. Those were different times. It makes for an interesting comparison with Pedro Martinez, who pitched for the Red Sox for seven years and had 52.6 WAR despite averaging just 198 innings per season. Pedro won his first Cy Young in his last season with the Montreal Expos in 1997. He joined the Red Sox in 1998 and won back-to-back Cy Young Awards in 1999 and 2000. Over these two seasons, Martinez was at his absolute best, going 41-10 with a 1.90 ERA and 0.83 WHIP. FanGraphs has him worth 11.7 and 9.5 WAR for those two seasons. Pedro was also part of the 2004 Red Sox team that won their first World Series since 1918.

Jim Rice was a Red Sox slugger in the 1970s and 1980s and David Ortiz is a Red Sox slugger currently and they have been worth similar value in their years with the team. Rice averaged 3.2 WAR per season during his 16 years with the Red Sox. Ortiz has averaged 3.4 WAR per season in the first 12 full seasons of his Red Sox career. Ortiz has the added narrative of three World Series championships, including a World Series MVP award in 2013, while Rice was part of two Red Sox teams that went to the World Series but lost both times (1975 and 1986). Carlton Fisk was a teammate of Rice in that 1975 series and is famous for his game-winning home run in the bottom of the 12th inning of Game Six. He actual played more years with the Chicago White Sox than the Boston Red Sox.

Notable snubs: Roger Clemens pitched more years and had more WAR for the Red Sox than Cy Young or Pedro Martinez, yet is conspicuously absent from the eight-man ballot. Wade Boggs had over 2000 hits and a .338/.428/.462 batting line with the Red Sox. Clemens and Boggs are third and fourth all-time in WAR for the Red Sox, which is better than six of the eight players who are on the ballot.

My Franchise Four: Ted Williams, Carl Yastrzemski, Pedro Martinez, David Ortiz

 

New York Yankees (1901-2015)

(1)Babe Ruth, 149.9 WAR (1920-1934)

(2) Lou Gehrig, 116.3 WAR (1923-1939)

(3) Mickey Mantle, 112.3 WAR (1951-1968)

(4) Joe DiMaggio, 83. WAR 1 (1936-1942, 1946-1951)

(5) Derek Jeter, 71.6 WAR (1995-2014)

(6) Yogi Berra, 63.8 WAR (1946-1963)

(7) Andy Pettitte, 58.0 WAR

(8) Bill Dickey, 56.1 WAR

(9) Whitey Ford, 54.9 WAR (1950, 1953-1967)

(10) Willie Randolph, 51.4 WAR

25) Mariano Rivera, 39.8 WAR (1995-2013)

 

On the ballot: The Yankees have such an abundance of good candidates for their Franchise Four that it will be difficult for voters to figure out who to include and who gets left out. It’s hard to imagine a Yankees Franchise Four without Babe Ruth, Lou Gehrig, Mickey Mantle, or Joe DiMaggio, but the current generation of Yankees fans will likely want a spot for Derek Jeter and, perhaps, Mariano Rivera.

Then you have Yogi Berra, a Hall of Fame catcher who won 10 World Series rings as a player and two more as a coach with the Yankees in the 1970s (and one as a coach with the 1969 Mets). Whitey Ford played with Berra for many years and was on 11 World Series teams, won six titles, and was World Series MVP in 1961. His career World Series ERA is 2.71.

Based on FanGraphs WAR, Babe Ruth is the greatest player in baseball history. In the context of his time what he did on the field was simply unreal. He led the league in on-base percentage 10 times, home runs 12 times, and slugging percentage 13 times. The Yankees went to the World Series seven times in his 15 years with the team, winning four world championships as Ruth hit .326/.470/.744 in World Series play.

Lou Gehrig batted right behind Ruth for many of those years and hit .340/.447/.632 in his career while leading the league in home runs three times and RBI five times. Like Ruth, Gehrig was very good in World Series play, hitting .361/.483/.731 in 34 World Series games.

Other than three years spent in the military during World War II, Joe DiMaggio was the Yankees’ centerfielder from 1936 to 1951. Mickey Mantle continued the run of great center field play for the Yankees into the 1960s. Both DiMaggio and Mantle were three-time AL MVPs and they have 16 World Series rings between them.

Derek Jeter won five World Series titles in a 20-year career that included 14 All-Star games, a Rookie of the Year Award, and over 3400 career hits.

Mariano Rivera is only 25th in WAR for the Yankees but he’s the best closer in baseball history, won five World Series rings with the Yankees, and has a 0.70 ERA in 141 career post-season innings. There are just too many good players to choose from on the Yankees.

Notable snubs: None, really. One could argue that Mariano Rivera’s place so far down the list of career WAR for the Yankees makes him less worthy than Bill Dickey or Andy Pettitte, but he was a major part of five World Series championships and almost unhittable in high leverage situations in postseason play.

My Franchise Four: Babe Ruth, Lou Gehrig, Mickey Mantle, Joe DiMaggio

 

Baltimore Orioles (1901-2015) 

(1) Cal Ripken, Jr., 92.5 WAR (1981-2001)

(2) Brooks Robinson, 80.2 WAR (1955-1977)

(3) Jim Palmer, 59.1 WAR (1965-1967, 1969-1984)

(4) Eddie Murray, 56.7 WAR (1977-1988, 1996)

(5) George Sisler, 49.8 WAR

(6) Mike Mussina, 47.8 WAR

(7) Bobby Wallace, 41.7 WAR

(8) Boog Powell, 40.1 WAR (1961-1974)

(9) Ken Williams, 38.6 WAR

(10) Harlond Clift, 37.4 WAR

(11) Paul Blair, 36.4 WAR (1964-1976)

(13) Dave McNally, 34.0 WAR (1962-1974)

(15) Frank Robinson, 33.4 WAR (1966-1971)

 

On the ballot: The eight players on the Orioles Franchise Four ballot are divided between the players on the very good Baltimore teams of the late 1960s and early 1970s—Brooks Robinson, Jim Palmer, Boog Powell, Paul Blair, Dave McNally, and Frank Robinson—and two players who were part of the good Orioles teams in the early 1980s—Cal Ripken, Jr., and Eddie Murray.

Brooks Robinson and Paul Blair were defensive standouts for the Orioles teams that went to the World Series four times in six years from 1966 to 1971 (winning two championships). Robinson won Gold Gloves in 16 consecutive seasons from 1960 to 1974. Paul Blair won seven consecutive Gold Gloves and eight in nine seasons from 1967 to 1975.

Jim Palmer and Dave McNally were starting pitchers on those great Orioles teams, including the 1971 team that had four 20-game winners. Palmer led the league in innings pitched four times and ERA twice and won three AL Cy Young Awards in four years from 1973 to 1976.

Boog Powell and Frank Robinson brought the lumber for the O’s in those years. Powell was the AL MVP in the 1970 season when the O’s won the World Series and was second in MVP voting in 1969. Over those two years he hit .300/.398/.554 and averaged 36 homers and 118 RBI. Frank Robinson was the AL MVP in the Orioles’ 1966 championship year when he hit .316/.410/.637 with 49 homers and 122 RBI. At the end of his playing career, Robinson became the first African American to manage in major league baseball. He managed for four different MLB teams, including the Baltimore Orioles from 1988 to 1991.

Eddie Murray and Cal Ripken, Jr. were key contributors to the good Baltimore Orioles teams of the early 1980s. Eddie Murray was part of the Orioles team that lost the 1979 World Series to the “We R Fam-a-lee” Pittsburgh Pirates in seven games. The O’s finished second in 1980. Cal Ripken, Jr. came up in 1981 and the team finished second in the AL East in his first two seasons with the team, then made the playoffs and the World Series in 1983, beating the Phillies in five games. Ripken played 21 years with the Orioles, was an All-Star 19 times, an MVP twice, and won the 1982 AL Rookie of the Year Award.

Notable snubs: Mike Mussina should be one of the starting pitchers on the fictional “Bobby Grich All-Underappreciated team.” He’s 16th all-time in WAR for pitchers, ahead of numerous Hall of Famers, yet has received just 20.3% and 24.6% of the vote in his first two years on the ballot. And, true to form, he is not one of the eight players on the ballot for the Orioles Franchise Four despite having more career WAR as an Oriole than four of the players who made the ballot.

My Franchise Four: Cal Ripken, Jr., Brooks Robinson, Jim Palmer, Eddie Murray

 

Toronto Blue Jays (1977-2015)

(1) Roy Halladay, 49.1 WAR (1998-2009)

(2) Dave Stieb, 44.0 WAR (1979-1992, 1998)

(3) Tony Fernandez, 35.1 WAR (1983-90, 1993, 1998-99, 2001)

(4) Carlos Delgado, 34.7 WAR (1993-2004)

(5) Jose Bautista, 29.7 WAR (2008-2015)

(6) Jesse Barfield, 29.6 WAR

(7) Jim Clancy, 28.7 WAR

(8) Jimmy Key, 28.2 WAR

(9) Vernon Wells, 24.6 WAR

(10)Lloyd Moseby, 24.6 WAR

(15) Roberto Alomar, 20.4 WAR (1991-1995)

(16) George Bell, 20.2 WAR (1981, 1983-1990)

(49) Joe Carter, 7.4 WAR (1991-1997)

 

On the ballot: After joining the American League as an expansion club in 1977, it took until 1985 for the Blue Jays to make the playoffs for the first time. Dave Stieb was the best pitcher on the Blue Jays during the 1980s. At his best he averaged 4.6 WAR per season from 1980 to 1985. As good as Stieb was in the 80s, Roy Halladay was that guy in the 2000s, although the Jays never made the playoffs during Halladay’s time with the team. Halladay was a six-time All-Star for the Blue Jays and won the AL Cy Young award in 2003.

Tony Fernandez had four different stints with the Blue Jays and hit well in three different American League Championship Series and the 1993 World Series. He was a teammate of George Bell from 1983 to 1990. Bell’s best year was his AL MVP season of 1987 when he hit .308/.352/.605 with 47 dingers and 134 ribbies (worth 5.3 WAR).

Carlos Delgado had two regular season plate-appearances on the Blue Jays’ 1993 championship team and did not play in the post-season. He didn’t do much at the big league level in 1994 or 1995 but broke out in 1996 with a 25-homer, 92-RBI season and was at his best in 2000 when he had 7.4 WAR, hitting .344/.470/.664.

The only two players on the Blue Jays’ eight-man ballot who were on both of the Blue Jays world championship teams are Roberto Alomar and Joe Carter. Alomar was the MVP of the ALCS in 1992 and Joe Carter hit his famous game-winning home run off Mitch “Wild Thing” Williams that won the 1993 World Series. Despite his World Series heroics, Carter is 49th in career WAR for the Blue Jays and was worth negative WAR in his last three years with the team.

The one active player on the Blue Jays’ ballot is Jose Bautista, who joined the Blue Jays in 2008 and broke out big time in 2010 with a 54-homer season, then followed that up with a 43-homer season in 2011, leading the league both years. As good as he’s been in his seven-plus years with the team, last year was the first time they finished higher than third in their division since he’s been a Blue Jay.

Notable snubs: Well, Joe Carter has his signature moment with the Blue Jays, but his body of work with the team is unimpressive. He has less WAR as a Blue Jay than Roy Howell, Ricky Romero, and one of the Alex Gonzalezes, among many others (does it matter which Alex Gonzalez? No). Perhaps Jon Olerud would have been a better choice for the ballot than Carter. Olerud was part of the two Blue Jays World Series teams and led the league in hitting and on-base percentage with a .363/.473/.599 line in 1993.

My Franchise Four: Roy Halladay, Dave Stieb, Tony Fernandez, Roberto Alomar

 

Tampa Bay Rays (1909-2015) 

(1) Evan Longoria, 39.2 WAR (2008-2015)

(2) Carl Crawford, 36.7 WAR (2002-2010)

(3) Ben Zobrist, 35.0 WAR (2006-2014)

(4) James Shields, 24.0 WAR (2006-2012)

(5) David Price, 23.8 WAR (2008-2014)

(6) B.J. “Melvin” Upton, 22.3 WAR (2004, 2006-2012)

(7) Scott Kazmir, 15.5 WAR (2004-2009)

(8) Carlos Pena, 14.1 WAR (2007-20010, 2012)

 

On the ballot: All but one of these players is still active in the major leagues but only Evan Longoria is still with the Rays. He’s an easy pick for the Tampa Bay Rays Franchise Four with 5 or more WAR in five of his first seven full seasons with the team. In the years before Evan Longoria arrived, Carl Crawford was the Rays’ best player. He played nine full seasons in Tampa and had five seasons with 4.5 or more WAR, including a very good 7.7 WAR season in 2010.

Ben Zobrist ranks just below Crawford on the Rays leaderboard. It took Zobrist a few years to get going. He was on the 2008 team that lost the World Series to the Philadelphia Phillies but was not yet a full-time player. He broke out in a big way in 2009, amassing 8.6 WAR as he hit .297/.405/.543 and played great defense at multiple positions. He continued to be one of the team’s best players until his trade to the Athletics last offseason.

James Shields was the Rays’ #1 starter on their 2008 World Series team and David Price was a rookie on that squad who pitched very well in the postseason. They are very close in career WAR in their time with the Rays but Shields accumulated his 24.0 WAR in 1454.7 innings, while Price had 23.8 WAR in 1143.7 innings. Price also had more All-Star appearances and won a Cy Young in 2012.

With his most-recent two seasons being so incredibly bad, it’s easy to forget that B.J. Upton was an above-average player for six years with the Rays from 2007 to 2012.

Scott Kazmir and Carlos Pena are a good deal behind the other six players on the ballot in WAR, but they each had their moments with the Rays. Kazmir was a two-time All-Star and Carlos Pena led the league in home runs in 2009.

Notable snub: None. The eight players on the ballot for the Tampa Bay Rays Franchise Four are the top eight players in career WAR for the team. The next-highest WAR total belongs to Julio Lugo and no one wants Julio Lugo on the ballot except maybe his mother, but definitely not his ex-wife.

My Franchise Four: Evan Longoria, Carl Crawford, Ben Zobrist, David Price


MLB Franchise Four: AL Central

Major League Baseball has a campaign asking fans to vote for the four “most impactful” players in their team’s history, with the winners being announced at the 2015 All-Star Game in Cincinnati. A panel of experts created an eight-man ballot for each team. This panel consists of MLB’s Official Historian John Thorn and representatives from MLB’s official statistician (the Elias Sports Bureau), MLB.com, MLB Network, and the Baseball Writers’ Association of America.

“Most impactful” is open to interpretation, which makes this an interesting exercise. It isn’t “best” or “most famous” or “most popular”, but “most impactful.” I decided to look at the eight players on the ballot for each franchise and where they rank in FanGraphs WAR during their time with that franchise.

For each franchise, I’ve listed their top 10 in FanGraphs WAR along with any players who are on the ballot who are below the top 10. The players in BOLD are those who are on the ballot and the years listed are the years in which they played for that team.

 

Cleveland Indians (1901-2015)

 

(1) Nap Lajoie 74.9 WAR (1902-1914)

(2) Tris Speaker 72.6 WAR (1916-1926)

(3) Lou Boudreau 63.1 WAR (1938-1950)

(4) Bob Feller 62.6 WAR (1936-1941, 1945-1956)

(5) Earl Averill 47.7 WAR (1929-1939)

(6) Mel Harder 47.6 WAR

(7) Jim Thome 46.3 WAR (1991-2002, 2011)

(8) Sam McDowell 45.6 WAR

(9) Larry Doby 45.0 WAR (1947-1955, 1958)

(10) Stan Coveleski 43.7 WAR

(31) Omar Vizquel 27.6 WAR (1994-2004)

 

On the ballot: All but two players on the ballot for Cleveland had their careers end before 1960. This is a ballot for an older generation and no one goes back farther than Nap Lajoie, whose time with the Indians ended more than 100 years ago. From 1902 to 1914, he led the league in hitting four times and finished with a .339 career average with the team. In fact, he was so good the team was known as the Cleveland Naps from 1903 to 1914.

Tris Speaker started his career with the Boston Red Sox, then joined the Indians in 1916 at the age of 28 and immediately led the AL in hitting with a .386 batting average. He also led the league in on-base percentage (.470) and slugging percentage (.502). He was well known for his defensive abilities in addition to his strong bat and averaged 6.6 WAR per season with the Indians.

Lou Boudreau was the player-manager and MVP of the 1948 Indians, the last Cleveland team to win a World Series. Bob Feller was also on that 1948 squad. Feller pitched 62 innings as a 17-year-old with the 1936 Cleveland Indians. From 1938 to 1941, Feller was a four-time All-Star and averaged 23 wins and 309 innings per season. He then missed three-and-a-half seasons to military service, which very likely prevented him from winning 300 games in his career (he had 266). He was back in the Indians’ rotation full-time in 1946 and pitched 371 1/3 innings with 348 strikeouts and a 2.18 ERA. He was worth 10 WAR that season. Feller was visible after his playing career ended and much-loved in Cleveland with frequent appearances at memorabilia conventions.

Earl Averill played for the Indians from 1929 to 1939. The team never finished higher than third during his tenure, but he was an All-Star for six straight years in his 11 years with the team.

I’ve always felt Larry Doby should be honored right along with Jackie Robinson on April 15th each year. Jackie Robinson was the first African-American to play in the modern major leagues when he debuted with the Dodgers on April 15, 1947, but it gets forgotten that Larry Doby debuted with the Indians less than three months later and dealt with the same racist attitudes and actions that Jackie Robinson did. Doby was just a part-time player his first year with the Indians but soon became a perennial All-star with the team.

Jim Thome and Omar Vizquel are the only two players on the ballot who played for the team in the last 50 years. They were on the very good Cleveland teams of the mid 1990s that made the playoffs five straight years and six times in seven years, including two losing World Series appearances.

Notable ballot snub: Kenny Lofton is 11th on the all-time WAR list for the Indians and was an under-appreciated part of those good Cleveland teams in the mid-1990s (except for 1997, when he was with Atlanta). He’s 20 spots higher than Omar Vizquel with almost 16 more WAR than Vizquel had with the team, but did not get a spot on the eight-man ballot.

My Franchise Four: Nap Lajoie, Lou Boudreau, Bob Feller, Jim Thome

 

Kansas City Royals (1969-2015)

 

(1) George Brett 84.6 WAR (1973-1993)

(2) Amos Otis 42.0 WAR (1970-1983)

(3) Kevin Appier 41.8 WAR

(4) Mark Gubicza 40.1 WAR

(5) Bret Saberhagen 38.5 WAR (1984-1991)

(6) Willie Wilson 35.2 WAR (1976-1990)

(7) Dennis Leonard 34.5 WAR

(8) Paul Splittorff 33.2 WAR

(9) Frank White 31.1 WAR (1973-1990)

(10) Hal McRae 27.6 WAR (1973-1987)

(11) Alex Gordon 27.0 WAR (2007-2015)

(25) Dan Quisenberry 14.4 WAR (1979-1988)

 

On the ballot: Some players should be automatic Franchise Four players for the team they played with. One of those players is George Brett with the Kansas City Royals. He played 21 years with the team, has almost twice the WAR of the next-highest player, and was with the team during the most successful years of the franchise, including seven of the eight years in team history that the Royals made the post-season. The gap between Brett and Amos Otis is the fourth highest for any top two players on their team’s all-time WAR leaderboard. Brett was a 13-time All-Star for the Royals and won the AL MVP Award in 1980 when he hit .390/.454/.664. He had over 3000 hits and 1500 RBI in his career. His postseason numbers are even more impressive than his regular season numbers: .337/.397/.627. Brett is as automatic as can be for a Franchise Four candidate.

Willie Wilson, Frank White, and Hal McRae were teammates of Brett during all seven years the team made the playoffs from 1976 to 1985, while Amos Otis was there for the first five of those post-season years. Wilson was the leadoff hitter who hit .294/.331/.387 with an average of 51 steals over the ten years of his prime from 1979 to 1988. Frank White won six consecutive Gold Gloves from 1977 to 1982. Hal McRae was a two-time All-Star who hit .293/.356/.458 with the Royals in his career. Amos Otis provided strong defense in center field, was a five-time All-Star, and won three Gold Gloves.

The two pitchers on the ballot are Dan Quisenberry and Bret Saberhagen. Quisenberry came aboard in 1979 and led the AL in saves five times in six years in the early 1980s and finished in the top five in AL Cy Young voting five times. He was known for his submarine pitching and quirky sayings (“I found a deliver in my flaw”) and was one of the most popular players on the team in the early 1980s. Bret Saberhagen showed up in 1984, then was the AL Cy Young winner on the 1985 World Series Champion Kansas City Royals. He won two games against the Cardinals and was named World Series MVP.

Alex Gordon is the only current player on the ballot. He has nearly the same WAR as Hal McRae in their respective time with the Royals but he doesn’t have the multiple playoff series that so many of the guys on the ballot have.

Notable snubs: There isn’t necessarily a snub here because all of the players on the ballot have either quality play or a good narrative behind their selection, or both, but Kevin Appier and Mark Gubicza provided more value to the Royals than six of the players who made the ballot.

My Franchise Four: George Brett, Amos Otis, Bret Saberhagen, Willie Wilson

 

Detroit Tigers (1901-2015)

 

(1) Ty Cobb 143.4 WAR (1905-1926)

(2) Al Kaline  88.9 WAR (1953-1974)

(3) Charlie Gehringer 78.6 WAR (1924-1942)

(4) Lou Whitaker 68.1 WAR

(5) Harry Heilmann 64.4 WAR

(6)Alan Trammel 63.7 WAR (1977-1996)

(7) Mickey Lolich 62.0 WAR

(8) Hal Newhouser 60.4 WAR

(9) Sam Crawford 60.1 WAR (1903-1917)

(10) Hank Greenberg 57.9 WAR (1930, 1933-1941, 1945-1947)

(16) Justin Verlander 43.5 WAR (2005-2014)

(18) Miguel Cabrera 39.9 WAR (2008-2015)

 

 On the ballot: There are some players who are “no-doubters” when it comes to this Franchise Four exercise. George Brett is one for the Royals. For the Tigers, I believe there are three—Ty Cobb, Al Kaline, and Charlie Gehringer. Not only do all three players sit atop the Tigers’ WAR leaderboard, they all have long career with the team. Al Kaline and Charlie Gehringer played their entire careers in Detroit, while Cobb played his final two seasons with the Philadelphia Athletics, but is deeply associated with the Tigers in the early part of the 20th century.

Ty Cobb is ranked fourth all-time in FanGraphs WAR, with 149.3, just 0.6 behind Willie Mays. He led the league in hitting 12 times in 13 years from 1907 to 1919 and had a .377 batting average during this stretch. He also led the league in on-base percentage seven times and slugging percentage eight times. He had three years with more than 10 WAR, with 1917 being his best, at 11.5 WAR, when he hit .383/.444/.570 (200 wRC+). The 54.5 WAR gap between Cobb and Al Kaline is the largest gap between any top-ranked player over the second-best player of any franchise in baseball.

In his 20-year career with the Tigers, Al Kaline only reached the postseason twice, but this included the 1968 season when the Tigers won their first World Series in 23 years. Even though he had only played 102 games during the 1968 regular season, Kaline played all seven games of the 1968 World Series and hit .379/.400/.655. At his best, Kaline was an All-Star every year from 1955 to 1967 and won 10 Gold Gloves for his defense in right field.

Charlie Gehringer spent 19 years with the Tigers and saw postseason action three times, including a World Series title in 1935. In his prime, Gehringer rarely missed a game and hit for a high average with a good on-base percentage while playing strong defense at second base. His career batting line is .320/.404/.480.

Beyond those three it becomes difficult to pick a fourth for the Tigers. Alan Trammel is another Tiger player who never left Detroit, and he won a World Series title in 1984. Hank Greenberg played all but one of his 13 seasons in the big leagues with the Tigers and was part of the 1935 World Series titlists. Sam Crawford was a big part of three straight World Series teams for the Tigers from 1907 to 1909.

The contemporary Tigers on the ballot, Justin Verlander and Miguel Cabrera, are pretty far down the list of WAR leaders for this franchise but will add to their totals in the years to come. Current voters might be tempted to vote for one or both of them, but they don’t really compare with the players above them on the Tigers’ ballot just yet.

Notable snub: Like Bobby Grich, Lou Whitaker is criminally underrated. He ranks just below Grich on the all-time WAR leaderboard for second basemen and, like Grich, was “one-and-done” in Hall of Fame balloting (2.9% in 2001). He’s fourth all-time among Tigers’ players in WAR, yet is not on the ballot, while his longtime double-play partner, Alan Trammel, is on the ballot.

My Franchise Four: Ty Cobb, Al Kaline, Charlie Gehringer, Alan Trammell

 

Minnesota Twins (1901-2015)

 

(1) Walter Johnson 117.9 WAR (1907-1927)

(2) Harmon Killebrew 66.3 WAR (1954-1974)

(3) Rod Carew 56.9 WAR (1967-1978)

(4) Bert Blyleven 55.8 WAR (1970-1976, 1985-1988)

(5) Jim Kaat 53.3 WAR (1959-1973)

(6) Sam Rice 50.3 WAR

(7) Camilo Pascual 48.1 WAR

(8) Joe Judge 45.6 WAR

(9) Kirby Puckett 44.9 WAR (1984-1995)

(10) Joe Mauer 44.8 WAR (2004-2015)

(11) Goose Goslin 42.2 WAR

(12) Tony Oliva 40.7 WAR (1962-1976)

 

On the ballot: It’s definitely strange to see Walter Johnson on top of the Twins’ WAR leaderboard because he, of course, played for the Washington Senators long before the team moved to Minnesota before the 1961 season. Because he never wore a Twins jersey, it will be interesting to see if the voting fans consider him a Franchise Four player. Johnson is fourth in career FanGraphs WAR, just behind Greg Maddux and ahead of Randy Johnson.

Harmon Killebrew was a Washington Senator for the first seven years of his career but then played another fourteen years as a Twin before one final year with the Royals. Killebrew led the American League in home runs five times as a Twin, including three years in a row when he hit 48, 45, and 49 bombs from 1962 to 1964.

Rod Carew led the AL in hitting seven times as a member of the Twins, including a stretch where he led the league in hitting six times in seven years. He also led the league in on-base percentage four times in five years.

Bert Blyleven had two stints with the Twins during his playing career and is third in wins all-time for the franchise. He’s also been an announcer for the team since 1996 (“Circle me, Bert!”) and was recently elected to the Hall of Fame. A teammate of Blyleven for four years in the early 1970s, Jim Kaat won the second-most games in Twins’ history. He played 15 of his 25 years with the team.

Kirby Puckett was a roly-poly fan favorite in the Metrodome through the last half of the 1980s and first half of the 90s. He was an All-Star in each of the last 10 years of his career and helped the Twins win two World Series Championships before glaucoma caused him to lose vision in his right eye, which ended his career. He hit .314/.379/.515 (123 wRC+) in his final year with the team.

Joe Mauer has played the first 12 years of his career with the Twins and is signed through 2018. He has three batting titles and an MVP award.

Finally, Tony Oliva was a Twins’ All-Star from 1964 to 1971 and led the league in hits five times.

Notable snubs: None.

My Franchise Four: Walter Johnson, Harmon Killebrew, Bert Blyleven, Kirby Puckett

 

Chicago White Sox (1901-2015)

 

(1) Luke Appling 72.7 WAR (1930-1943, 1945-1950)

(2) Frank Thomas 68.1 WAR (1990-2005)

(3) Eddie Collins 64.6 WAR (1915-1926)

(4) Red Faber 54.7 WAR

(5) Ted Lyons 54.6 WAR

(6) Billy Pierce 51.0 WAR

(7) Ed Walsh 49.2 WAR

(8) Nellie Fox 43.8 WAR (1950-1963)

(9) Minnie Minoso 41.8 WAR (1951-1957, 1960-1961, 1964, 1976, 1980)

(10) Mark Buehrle 40.1 WAR

(17) Luis Aparicio 32.0 WAR (1956-1962, 1968-1970)

(26) Harold Baines 24.5 WAR (1980-1989, 1996-1997, 2000-2001)

(28) Paul Konerko 23.6 WAR (1999-2014)

 

On the ballot: Luke Appling is the White Sox franchise leader in WAR, was named by the BBWAA as the greatest player in the history of the White Sox in 1970, hit .388/.474/.508 in 1936 and, to top it all off, hit a home run off Warren Spahn in the 1982 Old-Timer’s Game at the age of 75. Put that man on the White Sox Franchise Four, stat!

Frank Thomas had eight seasons with five or more WAR as a member of the White Sox and hit .307/.427/.568 with the team in his career. He led the league in on-base percentage four times in seven years from 1991 to 1997 and won back-to-back AL MVP Awards in 1993 and 1994.

Eddie Collins played the first half of his career with the Philadelphia Athletics and the second half of his career with the Chicago White Sox. As a member of the White Sox, Collins won the 1917 World Series and was a member of the 1919 World Series team that lost to the Cincinnati Reds in the “Black Sox” scandal that saw eight teammates, including Shoeless Joe Jackson, banned from baseball for life by the commissioner. Collins, of course, was not part of the “eight men out.”

Nellie Fox, Minnie Minoso, and Luis Aparacio were White Sox teammates in the 1950s and early 1960s. Fox was a 12-time All-Star and won the 1959 AL MVP award when the White Sox made the World Series. Like Fox, Luis Aparacio was another big part of the 1959 World Series team known as the “Go-Go Sox” because of their propensity to steal bases. Aparacio led the AL that year with 56 steals. Minnie Minoso was a four-time All-Star in nine seasons with the Sox. After his playing career ended he lived in Chicago for many years and represented the franchise as “Mr. White Sox” well into this century.

Harold Baines was a White Sox icon in the 1980s. In the middle of the 1989 season, the White Sox made a much-derided trade with the Rangers that saw Baines leave the team. This would become known as the “white flag” trade. In a bizarre twist, the White Sox retired Baines’ #3 about a month later, which is rare for an active player. Baines would go on to play another twelve seasons and would have his number unretired in two different stints with the team later in his career.

Paul Konerko is pretty far down on the White Sox WAR leaderboard but was part of the last White Sox team to win the World Series back in 2005 and was the MVP of the ALCS that year.

Notable snub: Among contemporary players, I would argue Mark Buehrle is a more deserving candidate for the ballot than Paul Konerko. Buehrle has 40.1 WAR as a White Sox player compared to 23.6 for Konerko and both were on the 2005 World Series championship team. Buehrle also has one of the two perfect games thrown by a White Sox pitcher.

My Franchise Four: Luke Appling, Frank Thomas, Nellie Fox, Minnie Minoso


MLB Franchise Four: AL West

Major League Baseball has a campaign asking fans to vote for the four “most impactful” players in their team’s history, with the winners being announced at the 2015 All-Star Game in Cincinnati. A panel of experts created an eight-man ballot for each team. This panel consists of MLB’s Official Historian John Thorn and representatives from MLB’s official statistician (the Elias Sports Bureau), MLB.com, MLB Network, and the Baseball Writers’ Association of America.

“Most impactful” is open to interpretation, which makes this an interesting exercise. It isn’t “best” or “most famous” or “most popular”, but “most impactful.” I decided to look at the eight players on the ballot for each franchise and where they rank in FanGraphs WAR during their time with that franchise.

For each franchise, I’ve listed their top 10 in FanGraphs WAR along with any players who are on the ballot who are below the top 10. The players in BOLD are those who are on the ballot and the years listed are the years in which they played for that team.

 

Los Angeles Angels (1961-2015)

(1) Nolan Ryan, 47.7 WAR (1972-1979)

(2) Chuck Finley, 44.7 WAR (1986-1999)

(3) Jim Fregosi, 42.6 WAR (1961-1971)

(4) Brian Downing, 36.5 WAR (1978-1990)

(5) Bobby Grich, 35.6 WAR

(6) Tim Salmon, 35.5 WAR (1992-2004, 2006)

(7) Mike Witt, 33.4 WAR

(8) Frank Tanana, 33.2 WAR

(9) Jered Weaver, 32.5 WAR

(10) Mike Trout, 30.3 WAR (2011-2015)

(13) Garret Anderson, 26.2 WAR (1994-2008)

(19) Vladimir Guerrero, 20.2 WAR (2004-2009)

 

On the ballot: Nolan Ryan played 27 years in the major leagues and eight of those years were with the Angels, during which he averaged almost six WAR per season and over 300 strikeouts per season. He was an All-Star five times with the Angels and is their team leader in career WAR. Ryan is also on the ballot for the Houston Astros and Texas Rangers, for whom he ranks 8th and 17th in WAR, respectively. He seems like a no-doubter for the Angels.

The number two player in career WAR for the Angels is Chuck Finley. While Ryan’s 47.7 WAR for the Angels came in just eight years with the team, it took Finley 14 years to accumulate 44.7 WAR, an average of 3.2 WAR per season. Finley’s best year was in 1993 when he was worth 5 WAR. Along with Ryan and Finley, Jim Fregosi is the only other Angels player with more than 40 WAR with the team, but his career was so long ago that he may not resonate with the voting fans like more recent players such as Tim Salmon, or Garret Anderson, who were teammates on the Angels in the late 1990s and early 2000s. They were both part of the Angels’ 2002 World Series championship team.

Brian Downing is the ultimate hipster—he was down with OBP before it became popular. He was also one of the first players to seriously embrace weight training and one of very few players who wore glasses while playing in the major leagues. He even had those tinted lenses that only the coolest dudes can pull off.

Even though he’s just in his fifth year in the big leagues, Mike Trout should get strong consideration for a spot on the Angels Franchise Four. In his three full seasons he averaged 9.6 WAR per season and had a good case to be AL MVP all three years (he won it last year and finished second the previous two years). He’s signed through 2020 and could replace Nolan Ryan at the top of the Angels’ WAR leaderboard within two or three years.

Finally, Vladimir Guerrero is the least-deserving player on the ballot based on career WAR with the Angels, as he only played six seasons with the team and had his three best seasons with the Expos earlier in his career. In his favor, he did win the 2004 AL MVP Award with the Angels and was a four-time All-Star with the team.

Notable snubs: Poor Bobby Grich. He got no love from Hall of Fame voters (just 2.6% of the vote in his only year on the ballot in 1992) despite being eighth all-time in WAR among second baseman (ahead of Hall of Famers Craig Biggio, Roberto Alomar, Ryne Sandberg, and others). Here, once again, he gets no love in this Franchise Four activity, not even a place on the ballot. Troy Glaus is pretty far down on the Angels’ all-time WAR list (18th place, with 20.7 WAR), but I associate him more strongly with the Angels than I do Vladimir Guerrero.

My Franchise Four: Nolan Ryan, Mike Trout, Tim Salmon, Brian Downing

 

Houston Astros (1962-2015)

(1) Jeff Bagwell, 80.2 WAR (1991-2005)

(2) Craig Biggio, 65.8 WAR (1988-2007)

(3) Lance Berkman, 51.5 WAR (1999-2010)

(4) Jose Cruz, 47.8 WAR (1975-1987)

(5) Cesar Cedeno, 46.6 WAR

(6) Roy Oswalt, 46.3 WAR

(7) Jimmy Wynn, 38.7 WAR (1963-1973)

(8) Nolan Ryan, 36.4 WAR (1980-1988)

(9) J.R. Richard, 32.2 WAR (1971-1980)

(10) Larry Dierker, 31.8 WAR

(16) Mike Scott, 26.1 WAR (1983-1991) 

 

On the ballot: Jeff Bagwell and Craig Biggio are easy picks here and it’s hard to think of the two “Killer Bs” without the third “B”, Lance Berkman.

Bagwell played his entire 15 year career with the Astros and finished with 449 career homers and a .297/.408/.540 batting line. He was the 1991 NL Rookie of the Year and the NL MVP for the strike-shortened 1994 season in which he had 104 runs scored, 39 homers, and 116 RBI in just 110 games. He hit .368 that year and had a chance at 50 homers and 150 RBI if not for the labor dispute.

Craig Biggio was also an Astros’ lifer. He had a tremendous 1997 season worth 9.3 WAR when he hit .309/.415/.501 with good defense at second base. He had over 3000 hits in his career and led the league in getting hit by pitches five times.

Lance Berkman played the first 12 years of his career in Houston, then played for three other teams at the end of his career. His best days were with the Astros, though. He had six seasons with 6 or more WAR, including a 7.7 WAR season in 2008 when he hit .312/.420/.567 with 29 homers, 114 runs, 106 RBI, and 18 steals.

For a generation of fans in Houston, Jose Cruz WAS the Houston Astros. I don’t think you can have a Franchise Four without Jose Cruz on the Astros. His signature high front leg lift and those colorful uniforms of the 1970s just can’t be forgotten.

A player from the early years in Houston, “They Toy Cannon” Jimmy Winn, was able to hit for great power in the old Astrodome, a very tough park for hitters. He also posted very good on-base percentages when getting on base wasn’t as valued as it is today. He had six seasons with more than 100 walks.

Nolan Ryan spent more years with the Astros than he did with any other team during his long career and was on three Astros playoff teams in the 1980s. His 1987 season was very bizarre. He led the league in ERA at 2.76 and strikeouts with 270 but had a win-loss record of 8-16.

Sadly, J.R. Richard’s career was cut short when he suffered a stroke before a game in 1980. Richard was 30 years old at the time and was coming off a 1979 season during which he struck out 313 batters and finished third in the NL Cy Young voting. When he suffered the stroke in 1980, he was 10-4 with 1.90 ERA. He never again pitched in the major leagues.

The lowest ranking guy on the ballot is Mike Scott, who was the NL Cy Young winner in 1986, then was 2-0 with 2 complete games and a 0.50 ERA against the New York Mets in the NLCS. He was very good that year (8.6 WAR) and good again in 1987 (5.3 WAR), but his overall body of work with the Astros doesn’t compare to the others on the ballot.

Notable snubs: As good as Mike Scott was in 1986, his career contributions to the Houston Astros don’t stand up to what Roy Oswalt did during his career and I’m surprised that Oswalt didn’t make the ballot. Also, Cesar Cedeno was an All-Star four times in a five-year stretch for the Astros from 1972 to 1976.

My Franchise Four: Jeff Bagwell, Craig Biggio, Jose Cruz, Lance Berkman

 

Oakland Athletics (1901-2015)

(1) Rickey Henderson, 68.6 WAR (1979-1984, 1989-1995, 1998)

(2) Jimmie Foxx, 64.6 WAR (1925-1935)

(3) Eddie Plank, 57.8 WAR

(4) Eddie Collins, 55.9 WAR

(5) Lefty Grove, 54.3 WAR (1925-1933)

(6) Al Simmons, 51.6 WAR (1924-1932, 1940-1941, 1944)

(7) Sal Bando, 47.5 WAR

(8) Reggie Jackson, 45.2 WAR (1967-1975, 1987)

(9) Mark McGwire, 44.4 WAR

(10) Bob Johnson, 44.3 WAR

(26) Catfish Hunter, 27.2 WAR (1965-1974)

(45) Dennis Eckersley, 19.5 WAR (1987-1995)

(57) Rollie Fingers, 15.8 WAR (1968-1976)

 

On the ballot: The players on the ballot for the Athletics go as far back as Al Simmons to as recent as Rickey Henderson and Dennis Eckersley. Henderson last played for the A’s in 1998, so there’s a lack of very recent players for Athletics’ fans to choose from. This makes for a difficult ballot. Also, all eight players on the ballot had success with other teams along with their stints with the A’s.

I think Rickey Henderson is obvious. He’s the greatest leadoff hitter of all-time and had his most famous seasons with the A’s, like in 1982 when he stole a single-season record 130 bases. Henderson played 14 seasons for Oakland and led the league in steals eight times while with the team. He was also very good at getting on base and hit for surprising power for a leadoff hitter. He came up with the A’s at the young age of 20 in 1979 and played a little more than a half season, then averaged 6.6 WAR per season over the next five years. After spending 4 ½ seasons with the Yankees, Henderson rejoined the A’s in 1989 and had his best season in 1990 when he hit .325/.439/.577 with 119 runs, 28 homers, and 65 steals, good for 10.2 WAR. In his career, Henderson had over 3000 career hits, 2000 career walks, and a .401 lifetime on-base percentage.

Jimmie Foxx and Lefty Grove were both very good with the Athletics but also had good years with the Red Sox. They were teammates on the great A’s teams from 1929 to 1931 that went to three straight World Series and won two of them. Al Simmons was also part of those great A’s teams and had his best years with the Philadelphia Athletics but also played eight years with other teams.

Reggie Jackson was the “straw that stirs the drink” with the New York Yankees, after being part of three straight championship teams in Oakland in the early 1970s. He played more than twice as many games with the A’s as he did with the Yankees but it was his time in New York that earned him the nickname “Mr. October.” Still, it shouldn’t be forgotten that Reggie had five seasons with the A’s that were worth 5.7 or more WAR.

Catfish Hunter was also well-known for his play with the Yankees after being one of the first big free agent signings before the 1975 season, but he was much more successful (and healthy) with the A’s.

The two Athletics’ relievers on the ballot, Dennis Eckersley and Rollie Fingers, both had strong seasons with other teams. Eckersley pitched more years in Oakland but many more innings with the Red Sox because he was a starter early in his career and became a closer with the A’s. In 1992, Eck won the AL Cy Young Award and was the AL MVP. Over the three years from 1989 to 1991, Eckersley amazingly struck out 215 batters and walked just 16 in 207 innings (13.4 K/BB).

Notable snubs: Eddie Collins is fourth on the A’s all-time WAR leaderboard and third on the White Sox’ list. He made the White Sox ballot, but not the A’s. Collins played in four World Series for the A’s and they won three of them. Another old-timer, Eddie Plank, was also part of those four World Series squads and ranks third all-time in WAR for the franchise but is also absent from the ballot.

My Franchise Four: Rickey Henderson, Jimmie Foxx, Lefty Grove, Reggie Jackson

 

Seattle Mariners (1977-2015) 

 

(1) Ken Griffey, Jr., 67.6 WAR (1989-1999, 2009-2010)

(2) Edgar Martinez, 65.5 WAR (1987-2004)

(3) Ichiro!, 54.9 WAR (2001-2012)

(4) Felix Hernandez, 47.9 WAR (2005-2015)

(5) Randy Johnson, 45.5 WAR (1989-1998)

(6) Alex Rodriguez, 35.0 WAR

(7) Jamie Moyer, 30.2 WAR (1996-2006)

(8) Mike Moore, 23.5 WAR

(9) Jay Buhner, 22.4 WAR (1988-2001)

(10) Erik Hanson, 22.0 WAR

(11) Alvin Davis, 21.2 WAR (1984-1991)

 

 

On the ballot: You can’t argue with any of the eight players on the ballot for the Mariners. The top five should definitely be on the ballot and Jamie Moyer and Jay Buhner were on the first three teams in Mariners history to make the playoffs. Alvin Davis, even though he’s 11th on the Mariners’ all-time WAR list, was “Mr. Mariner” in the 1980s. Those were bleak years and he was the one bright spot on the team at the time, even winning the Rookie of the Year award in 1984.

Ken Griffey, Jr. is automatic and I believe Edgar Martinez is also an easy pick for the Mariners Franchise Four. Griffeyput Seattle baseball on the map. Before he joined the Mariners, the team might as well have been in Siberia. Griffey started with the Mariners as a 19-year-old in 1989, then began a stretch of 10 straight season as an American League All-Star, along with 10 straight Gold Gloves and the 1997 AL MVP Award. He led the AL in home runs in each of his final three seasons with the team and averaged 52 homers and 142 RBI per year in his final four years with the M’s.

Edgar Martinez got a late start to his Major League career because the Mariners foolishly kept him in AAA in 1988 and 1989 while Jim Presley manned third base in Seattle. Edgar hit .363/.467/.517 in 1988 and .345/.457/.522 in 1989 in the Pacific Coast League. Meanwhile, Jim Presley combined to hit .232/.278/.367 with the Mariners over those two seasons. Looking back, it was quite ridiculous. Edgar became a full-time player in 1990 and hit .321/.429/.537 over the next twelve years, which included batting titles in 1992 and 1995. That 1995 season was his best in the bigs. He hit .356/.479/.628 and was worth 7 WAR. He then hit .571/.667/1.000 in the five game American League Divisional Series against the Yankees, which ended with Edgar’s game-winning double in the bottom of the 11th that scored two runs and put the Mariners in the ALCS. It’s perhaps the signature moment in the history of the Seattle Mariners.

Griffey and Edgar may be automatic picks but choosing two out of Ichiro, King Felix, and Randy Johnson will be difficult for Mariners’ fans. Ichiro joined the M’s in 2001 and was the AL Rookie of the Year and AL MVP on a team that won 116 games. This was after the Mariners had lost Ken Griffey, Jr., Alex Rodriguez, and Randy Johnson. Also, Ichiro was an All-Star during his first ten seasons with the team with a .331 average and 224 hits per season from 2001 to 2010.

Randy Johnson (“The Big Unit”) was integral to the first two playoff teams in Mariners’ history when he went 18-2 in 1995 and 20-4 in 1997. In that 1995 season, the Big Unit won the one-game playoff against the Angels to put the Mariners in the post-season, then won two games against the Yankees in the ALDS, including one in relief while pitching on one day’s rest. He has the post-season narrative to promote his case for the Mariners Franchise Four.

King Felix, of course, has been the face of the Mariners for the better part of the last decade and is signed through the 2019 season. He won the AL Cy Young Award in 2010 and was second last year. It will be interesting to see what the fans do here with five very good players competing for four spots.

Most likely, Jamie Moyer, Jay Buhner, and Alvin Davis will be left out in the cold, as they just don’t compare to the top five. They all had great moments with the Mariners and are well remembered by the fans.

Notable snubs: He doesn’t really compare to the top five on this list and Mariner fans have no love for him, but A-Rod had five seasons with five or more WAR with the Mariners early in his career, so he was worth more to the team than Moyer, Buhner, or Davis.

My Franchise Four: Ken Griffey, Jr., Edgar Martinez, Ichiro Suzuki, Randy Johnson

 

Texas Rangers (1961-2015)

(1) Ivan Rodriguez, 49.4 WAR (1991-2002, 2009)

(2) Rafael Palmeiro, 42.3 WAR (1989-1993, 1999-2003)

(3) Buddy Bell, 34.6 WAR

(4) Jim Sundberg, 31.4 WAR

(5) Juan Gonzalez, 30.2 WAR (1989-1999, 2002-2003)

(6) Toby Harrah, 29.5 WAR

(7) Ian Kinsler, 29.1 WAR

(8) Frank Howard, 27.9 WAR (1965-1972)

(9) Alex Rodriguez, 27.0 WAR

(10) KennyRogers, 25.6 WAR

(11) Michael Young, 24.4 WAR (2000-2012)

(13) Adrian Beltre, 22.4 WAR (2011-2015)

(14) Josh Hamilton, 22.2 WAR (2008-2012)

(17) Nolan Ryan, 21.1 WAR (1989-1993)

 

On the ballot: Ivan Rodriguez looks like an easy pick for the Rangers Franchise Four. He spent 12 years with the Rangers at the beginning of his career and averaged over 4.0 WAR per season, including five seasons with 5.0 or more WAR. He was the face of the Rangers throughout the 1990s. Not only was he a very good-hitting catcher, he was terrific behind the plate with a rifle for an arm. With the Rangers, he was a 10-time All-Star, 10-time Gold Glove winner, and won the 1999 AL MVP Award when he hit .332/.356/.558 with 35 homers and 113 RBI.

Rafael Palmeiro is second all-time in WAR for the Rangers, but his case will be difficult for the voters. Some will choose him as one of the Rangers Franchise Four based solely on his numbers during two stints with the team, while others will consider other factors and not give him a vote. In 10 years with the Rangers, Palmeiro hit .290/.378/.519 with an average of 32 homers and 104 RBI per season.

Whether they were deserved or not, Juan Gonzalez won two MVP awards with the team. His first came in the 1996 season. He hit 47 home runs and had 144 RBI that year, but FanGraphs has him worth just 3.5 WAR. He won the AL MVP Award again in 1998 when he led the AL with 50 homers and 157 RBI, but even that year he was worth just 4.9 WAR, which was much less than many other players, including Alex Rodriguez, who was worth 7.9 WAR.

When Frank Howard was on the team that would become the Texas Rangers they were called the Washington Nationals. I don’t think he’ll resonate with fans as a Franchise Four candidate of a team whose uniform he barely wore (35 games as a Ranger in 1972).

Other than Nolan Ryan, the other players on the eight-man ballot are more recent. Josh Hamilton is unlikely to get much traction from fans but Michael Young and Adrian Beltre could get significant support, as could Nolan Ryan thanks to his post-playing-career role as team president. Young played 13 years with the Rangers, while Ryan played just five years with the team and Beltre is in the midst of his fifth season with Texas.

Notable snubs: For a generation of Ranger’s fans in the early 1980s, Buddy Bell was the team’s best player and regular All-Star representative. He only played six-and-a-half seasons with the team but had more than 4 WAR in all six full seasons and had three seasons with greater than 6 WAR, in large part due to terrific defense at third base.

My Franchise Four: Ivan Rodriguez, Rafael Palmeiro, Michael Young, Nolan Ryan


Hardball Retrospective – The “Original” 1992 Chicago White Sox

In “Hardball Retrospective: Evaluating Scouting and Development Outcomes for the Modern-Era Franchises”, I placed every ballplayer in the modern era (from 1901-present) on their original team. Therefore, John Smoltz is listed on the Tigers roster for the duration of his career while the Rockies declare Matt Holliday and the Royals claim Carlos Beltran and Johnny Damon. I calculated revised standings for every season based entirely on the performance of each team’s “original” players. I discuss every team’s “original” players and seasons at length along with organizational performance with respect to the Amateur Draft (or First-Year Player Draft), amateur free agent signings and other methods of player acquisition.  Season standings, WAR and Win Shares totals for the “original” teams are compared against the “actual” team results to assess each franchise’s scouting, development and general management skills.

Expanding on my research for the book, the following series of articles will reveal the finest single-season rosters for every Major League organization based on overall rankings in OWAR and OWS along with the general managers and scouting directors that constructed the teams. “Hardball Retrospective” is available in digital format on Amazon, Barnes and Noble, GooglePlay, iTunes and KoboBooks. The print edition is coming soon. Additional information and a discussion forum are available at TuataraSoftware.com.

Terminology

OWAR – Wins Above Replacement for players on “original” teams

OWS – Win Shares for players on “original” teams

OPW% – Pythagorean Won-Loss record for the “original” teams

Assessment

The 1992 Chicago White Sox         OWAR: 48.7     OWS: 278     OPW%: .547

GM Roland Hemond acquired 48% (12 of 25) of the ballplayers on the 1992 White Sox roster. Larry Himes’ brief term as the GM of the Pale Hose yielded a bumper crop of future stars including Frank E. Thomas, Robin Ventura, Jack McDowell and Alex Fernandez. 20 of the 25 team members were selected through the Amateur Draft process. Based on the revised standings the “Original” 1992 White Sox outpaced the Athletics by a five-game margin in the American League Western Division race.

Thomas (.323/24/115) paced the Junior Circuit with 46 doubles, 122 walks and a .439 OBP. The “Big Hurt” was inducted into the Baseball Hall of Fame in 2014 after posting a .301 lifetime batting average with 521 home runs and 1704 RBI. Ventura (.282/16/93) ripped 38 two-base hits and earned his second of six Gold Glove Awards. Brian Downing (.407 OBP) and Harold Baines platooned as the Sox’ designated hitter.

Thomas ranks tenth among first basemen in “The New Bill James Historical Baseball Abstract.” Ventura (22nd-3B), Downing (38th-LF) and Baines (42nd-RF) also placed in the top 100 at their respective positions.

LINEUP POS WAR WS
Brian Downing DH 1.85 13.83
Randy Velarde SS 1.89 12.15
Frank Thomas 1B 5.99 36.23
Robin Ventura 3B 5.27 28.53
Ron Karkovice C 2.58 12.13
Daryl Boston LF 1.18 10.4
Tim Hulett 2B/3B 0.65 4.19
Cecil Espy RF 0.06 3.81
John Cangelosi CF/LF -0.16 0.81
BENCH POS WAR WS
Craig Grebeck SS 2.17 9.71
Harold Baines DH 0.44 12.52
Mike Maksudian 1B -0.04 0
Matt Merullo C -0.38 0.25

Doug Drabek (15-11, 2.77) fashioned a WHIP of 1.060 and whiffed a career-high 177 batsmen. Jack McDowell notched 20 victories with a 3.18 ERA and finished fifth in the 1992 American League Cy Young balloting. “Black Jack” claimed the award in the subsequent campaign with a 22-10 mark. Bobby Thigpen struggled in the closer’s role (22 SV, 4.75) and eventually relinquished the title to Scott Radinsky (15 SV, 2.73). Rich “Goose” Gossage rates 37th among pitchers in the “NBJHBA”.

ROTATION POS WAR WS
Doug Drabek SP 5.18 19.31
Jack McDowell SP 5.17 19.77
Alex Fernandez SP 0.21 6.39
Bob Wickman SP 0.43 2.91
Buddy Groom SP -0.57 0
BULLPEN POS WAR WS
Scott Radinsky RP 0.49 6.98
Rich Gossage RP 0.4 2.33
Bobby Thigpen RP -0.56 3.07
Donn Pall RP -1.17 2.17
Vicente Palacios RP/SP 0.08 1.92
Tony Menendez RP 0.09 0.68
Pedro Borbon RP -0.04 0

The “Original” 1992 Chicago White Sox roster

NAME POS WAR WS General Manager Scouting DIrector
Frank Thomas 1B 5.99 36.23 Larry Himes Al Goldis
Robin Ventura 3B 5.27 28.53 Larry Himes
Doug Drabek SP 5.18 19.31 Roland Hemond
Jack McDowell SP 5.17 19.77 Larry Himes
Ron Karkovice C 2.58 12.13 Roland Hemond
Craig Grebeck SS 2.17 9.71 Ken Harrelson
Randy Velarde SS 1.89 12.15 Roland Hemond
Brian Downing DH 1.85 13.83 Ed Short
Daryl Boston LF 1.18 10.4 Roland Hemond
Tim Hulett 3B 0.65 4.19 Roland Hemond
Scott Radinsky RP 0.49 6.98 Ken Harrelson
Harold Baines DH 0.44 12.52 Roland Hemond
Bob Wickman SP 0.43 2.91 Larry Himes Al Goldis
Rich Gossage RP 0.4 2.33 Ed Short
Alex Fernandez SP 0.21 6.39 Larry Himes Al Goldis
Tony Menendez RP 0.09 0.68 Roland Hemond
Vicente Palacios SP 0.08 1.92 Roland Hemond
Cecil Espy RF 0.06 3.81 Roland Hemond
Mike Maksudian 1B -0.04 0 Larry Himes
Pedro Borbon RP -0.04 0 Larry Himes
John Cangelosi LF -0.16 0.81 Roland Hemond
Matt Merullo C -0.38 0.25 Ken Harrelson
Bobby Thigpen RP -0.56 3.07 Roland Hemond
Buddy Groom SP -0.57 0 Larry Himes
Donn Pall RP -1.17 2.17 Roland Hemond

Honorable Mention

The “Original” 2006 White Sox          OWAR: 45.0     OWS: 293     OPW%: .533

Chicago captured the American League Central division title by 5 games over Cleveland. “Big Hurt” rebounded from two sub-par campaigns to swat 39 big-flies and drive in 114 runs. Mike Cameron clubbed 22 round-trippers, pilfered 25 bags and claimed his third Gold Glove Award. Joe Crede established personal-bests with 30 jacks, 94 ribbies and a .283 BA. Likewise second baseman Ray Durham set career-highs in home runs (26) and RBI (93). Carlos “El Caballo” Lee slugged 37 circuit clouts and plated 116 baserunners. Magglio Ordonez contributed a .298 BA with 24 dingers and 104 ribbies.

On Deck

The “Original” 2012 Dodgers

References and Resources

Baseball America – Executive Database

Baseball-Reference

James, Bill. The New Bill James Historical Baseball Abstract. New York, NY.: The Free Press, 2001. Print.

James, Bill, with Jim Henzler. Win Shares. Morton Grove, Ill.: STATS, 2002. Print.

Retrosheet – Transactions Database

Seamheads – Baseball Gauge

Sean Lahman Baseball Archive


Rafael Montero Scouting Report

Rafael Montero is one of the New York Mets’ top pitching prospects, and he was given the spot start the other evening against the Mets’ division rival the Miami Marlins.  Montero got the loss after giving up three runs in the sixth but looked sharp striking out six and walking one over 5.2 innings.  Although Montero was sent back to the Mets’ Triple-A affiliate in Las Vegas, he will be back up later this season for bullpen help and will be the first called up to replace any starters that get injured during the long 162-game season.

Positives

Fastball movement and command

Although Montero’s fastball is not overpowering (90-93 mph, topping out at 94 mph), he placed it on both sides of the plate and kept it knee-high throughout his start.  This translated into Marlins hitters taking called strikes early in their at-bats, striking out looking (See first inning Dee Gordon and third inning Adeiny Hechavarria) and a good groundball rate of 48.1% for Montero (50%+ is considered an above-average groundball pitcher).  Montero’s fastball also showed strong arm-side run and sink at 90-93 mph, which projects a continued strong groundball rate in future outings.

Kept pitches down in the zone

Montero kept nearly all of his fastballs and off-speed pitches thigh high or below which resulted in very few hard-hit balls by Marlins hitters.  The only three pitches that were hard hit off of Montero were:

  1. A Gordon fourth inning double on a four-seam fastball that was more a case of Gordon’s ability to hit rather than poor command by Montero.
  2. A Giancarlo Stanton fourth inning line out to Mets third baseman Eric Campbell that was a product of a knee-high and inside two-seam fastball which showed the importance of keeping the ball down in the zone. If that fastball was a bit higher, it could have resulted in either a double down the third-base line or a two-run home run.
  3. A Gordon sixth-inning single (advanced to second on Curtis Granderson fielding error) on a four-seam fastball that was left up in the strike zone. It was one of the few poor pitches left up and over the plate by Montero all night.

Use of slider

After a few appearances last year where Montero threw nearly 80% fastballs, the Mets have pushed him to throw his off-speed pitches more often.  Although Montero only threw 46% of his sliders for strikes last night, he did throw his slider for a strike when he needed to (see sixth inning Stanton 3-1 slider for called strike).  The 46% strike percentage can also be misleading because many of the times Montero threw his slider low and out of the strike zone in an attempt to cause a swing and miss.

Negatives

First-pitch strikes

Analyst that argue first-pitch strikes are overrated due to the small differences in 0-1 and 1-0 batting averages fail to understand that the first pitch of an at-bat will dictate which pitches will be thrown in the following pitches.  This is the reason that every pitching coach in America stresses the importance of first-pitch strikes to their pitchers.

Having said that, Montero did an average job getting ahead of hitters with first-pitch strikes or creating balls in play on the first pitch at a combined rate of 60%.  If Montero wants to become a second or third starter in a rotation, it will be imperative to get the first pitch of the at-bat into the strike zone closer to 75% to 80%.  When Montero does not get ahead of hitters, it is difficult for him to come back in an at-bat from 1-0, 2-0 and 2-1 counts because his off-speed pitches aren’t sharp enough to create many swing and misses.  This will force him to throw more predictable fastballs that will be hit into play harder.

Pitches up in the sixth inning

There were two notable pitches in the sixth inning that led to the Marlins go ahead runs:

  1. The four-seam fastball noted earlier to Gordon that resulted in a line drive single to right field.
  2. A 3-2 fastball to Stanton which resulted in a RBI single to left field.

On both of those fastballs, Montero didn’t get his hand on top of the baseball during his release or more commonly known as “finishing his pitch”.  This causes his four-seam fastball to stay up in the zone and allows his two-seam fastball to come back on a flat plane over the plate as opposed to a sinking plane left to right over the plate.  The reason Montero wasn’t able to finish his pitches well was most likely due to his small frame becoming tired on his 90th pitch of the game.

Comparison

Montero’s body type is similar to Pedro Martinez with his six-foot, 185-pound frame but large enough hands to have the ability to manipulate movement on the baseball.  The one main difference is Martinez threw a consistent mid-90’s fastball and much sharper breaking off-speed pitches.  Montero’s repertoire of pitches can better be compared to Tim Hudson with his low-90’s two-seam sinker and the ability to locate an above-average slider.


Who’s Wilin to Give Rosario a Chance?

So the seemingly inevitable came to fruition last week when the Colorado Rockies sent Wilin Rosario down to Triple-A Albuquerque after just 14 at-bats with the Rockies this year. According to the man himself, it was to allow another bullpen arm to join the big-league club. Fair enough you might say, the team’s immediate needs are a priority (try telling Kris Bryant that) and the Rockies needed another pitcher in the pen.

Just a couple of years ago, Rosario posted a .270 batting average, tallying 28 home runs and an .843 OPS in 426 plate appearances in the most demanding of positions as a 23-year-old rookie.

What did he do for an encore? Well in 2013 Rosario managed a .292 batting average but launched only 21 home runs and his OPS dropped to a paltry .801 in 466 plate appearances. I jest. Still very productive for a young catcher, even if he gets the assistance of Coors field 50% of the time.

So how did it reach the point where this seemingly top prospect is now battling for a spot in the Majors aged 26?

Well, it begins with Rosario’s skills behind the plate. As a 23 year old, the Rockies knew Rosario had the bat to play but needed to improve defensively to become an everyday catcher in the Majors. Bumps and hiccups are to be expected and in 2012 he had 13 errors and 21 passed balls in 105 games.

This improved in 2013, when Rosario committed nine errors and cut passed balls to nine in 106 games.

But then in 2014, things began to fall apart again and in just 96 games, he had 12 passed balls and seven errors. Granted, a strained left wrist troubled him much of the season, and landed him on the disabled list. In May, a nasty bout with type-B influenza cost him 12 games and 11 pounds. All this culminated in a drop in production at the plate. The batting average dropped to .267, homers fell to 13 and his OPS to .739 whilst appearing at the plate 410 times.

On paper, the batting stats don’t look too bad for a catcher suffering illnesses and injuries. After two good years, one disappointing one couldn’t undo all the potential shown in the previous two seasons, surely?

Looking a little deeper then, there’s the issues Rosario has had with facing righties during his career. Below is a breakdown of his 2012, ’13 and ’14 seasons, showing his splits against RHP and LHP.

2012

Split PA H 2B 3B HR BB SO BA OBP SLG OPS
vs RHP 308 68 15 0 14 19 78 .239 .286 .440 .726
vs LHP 118 39 4 0 14 6 21 .348 .381 .759 1.140

2013

Split PA H 2B 3B HR BB SO BA OBP SLG OPS
vs RHP 328 89 14 1 14 8 85 .279 .299 .461 .760
vs LHP 138 42 8 0 7 7 24 .323 .355 .546 .901

2014

Split PA H 2B 3B HR BB SO BA OBP SLG OPS
vs RHP 303 70 16 0 5 18 56 .249 .290 .359 .650
vs LHP 107 32 9 0 8 5 14 .317 .346 .644 .989

Rosario is considered someone who cannot hit righties effectively and one highly-regarded publication even had written this about him heading into 2015. If every opposing pitcher was a lefty, he’d win an MVP. Any hope for solving RHPs? “. Not exactly a ringing endorsement. But again, his stats against righties aren’t terrible for a young catcher in the National League, certainly serviceable.

However, you now have enough question marks to take stock at what you have; someone who had a bad year, who struggles against right handed pitching and is not performing defensively. So the Rockies had a solution, move him over to first base. His WAR had dropped from starter level in 2012 and 2013 (both years he sported a 2.1 WAR) to replacement level in 2014 (-0.1 WAR). So it seemed like a good idea. Rosario is yet to hit his peak, his bat has more than enough upside for long-term production and without the pressures of needing to improve at the immensely challenging catcher position anymore, things can only trend up.

But then a spanner is thrown into the works in the form of Justin Morneau and his $12.5 million two-year contract which runs through the 2015 season (with a mutual option for 2016). So the simplest short-term solution is to keep Rosario in Triple-A for the season, work out his issues against righties, develop his skills at first and decline the option on Morneau’s contract for 2016, freeing up monies to be used elsewhere. Rosario is arbitration-eligible the next two years and cannot become an unrestricted free agent until 2018 but a long stint in the minors could add an extra year of team control.

So let’s play a bit of devil’s advocate for a moment. If the Rockies extend Morneau through 2016, if the Rockies don’t see Rosario as an everyday first baseman going forward, if they think they can use Rosario to get better elsewhere it begs the question: Who could be Wilin to give Rosario a chance?

As things stand, the Rockies have a winning record and it’s still too early to say if they’ll be contending this year or whether they’ll try to rebuild a little. So let’s look at three possible trades the Rockies could target at the end of this season if they feel the need to move on from Rosario.

Boston Red Sox

Mike Napoli’s contract ends this year and the Red Sox won’t be renewing it. He’s having a bad year and injuries have caught up with him. Rosario on the other hand could be the perfect fit what with the Green Monster and its hitter friendly confines. So the Red Sox could do with getting Rosario. But who could they trade? The Rockies need pitching above all else (which hasn’t bothered the front office too much in the past) but the Red Sox don’t really have any pitching options to trade. If anything, they need the help too.

So let’s look at the outfield. The Red Sox will enter 2016 with Mookie Betts, Rusney Castillo, Jackie Bradley Jr, Daniel Nava and Allen Craig as outfield options, whilst the Rockies will have Corey Dickerson, Carlos Gonzalez and Charlie Blackmon (based on existing contracts and no renewals/trades). So there’s one name which may intrigue. Brock Holt.

Brock Holt is a bit of a utility guy the Red Sox are trying to find at-bats for so one could perceive a trade for an everyday first baseman as ideal. The Rockies don’t have the depth of the Red Sox so they can find ways to give Holt more regular playing time and keep an effective batting lineup.

The likelihood of this trade happening is slim, but it’s intriguing nonetheless.

Philadelphia Phillies

It’s no secret the Phillies are reluctantly rebuilding after prolonged efforts to bury their head in the sand. They still field a lineup containing Ryan Howard and Carlos Ruiz despite father time having caught up with them both (not forgetting Chase Utley).

Ryan Howard continues to be the Phillies everyday first baseman and while he’s still signed through 2016, sooner or later, they need to bite the bullet and accept whatever they can get for him. Carlos Ruiz is also signed through 2016 so maybe if at least one can be moved on, Rosario could fill in for twelve months, covering either spot with a view of an everyday first base role from 2016. He’s young enough to form a part of the rebuild and is a clear upside on both Ruiz and Howard’s bat so this makes sense.

Cole Hamels is the big star the Rockies would love, but the Phillies are looking for a big prospect haul so unless some form of Dickerson, Arenado and top prospects were sent the other way, this just isn’t happening. They don’t have any other starter who could conceivably be considered by the Rockies either. Their main pitching prospects of Aaron Nola, Yoel Mecias, Zach Eflin, Jesse Biddle and Ben Lively are all probably out of play if they get serious about rebuilding so maybe a lower level guy like Nefi Ogando is possible. But this would be a big risk for the Rockies, trading for a mid-tier (at best) pitching prospect.

So maybe some bullpen help to go with it? Ken Giles is the closer in waiting for the Phillies once Papelbon leaves behind the fans who adore him so. But he’s struggle early in 2015 but again, the likelihood of the Phillies losing a potential closer for the next few years to bring in Rosario is unlikely so at best a package of two or three decent arms could be conceived by both parties.

Although it’d be difficult to see a trade here, I think a big enough scratch beneath the service could see something done to benefit the long term goals of each side. Stranger things have happened so only time would tell if the Rockies and Phillies could get something done.

Seattle Mariners

Finally we reach the most intriguing possible destination. The Seattle Mariners have invested big to get to the World Series in recent years. Big name free agent acquisitions of Robinson Cano and Nelson Cruz on the last two off-seasons has added to their chances whilst tying up King Felix long term has given them the ace they need. They’ve constructed a good rotation and a solid batting lineup with one notable exception; first base.

Logan Morrison has been the Mariners starting first baseman so far in 2015, after they waived Justin Smoak last October. First base has become a position synonymous with power hitters in recent times, with offense on the decline throughout baseball it’s a focal position for contending teams batting lineups. I’m not disparaging Logan Morrison, I don’t know the guy and he’s a far better baseball player than I’ll ever be, but he’s not a starting first baseman for a Major League contending team. Last year was the first time since 2010 he posted a positive WAR. Even in 2011 when he hit 23 homers, his WAR was -0.6. 2011 also marked the last time he played at least 100 games in a Major League season.

So there’s clearly a need to upgrade here. Is Wilin Rosario a clear upgrade? Well he is enough of one to matter, especially considering Morrison bats leftie. Morrison actually has a better career batting average against lefties (.260 compared to .243 against righties) but that’s as far as it goes for hitting lefties. Just a glance at his over stats will show this. As a sample, he hits a homerun every 28.65 at-bats against righties and one every 42.36 at-bats against lefties. Below is Morrison’s career splits.

Split PA AB H 2B 3B HR BB SO BA OBP SLG OPS
vs RHP 1393 1232 299 67 15 43 148 219 .243 .326 .426 .752
vs LHP 522 466 121 26 1 11 44 113 .260 .333 .391 .724

The Mariners also have the advantage of the DH. They can easily keep Morrison, form some kind of platoon between Rosario and Morrison whilst still giving Rosario at bats against righties with either of them DHing. Rosario would be a cheaper option at first than most alternatives so improving their lineup without breaking the bank is a good thing right? Things are starting to make sense all of a sudden.

But what could the Mariners give up in order to acquire Rosario. Although Rosario would make sense, they certainly aren’t going to overpay for him. This is where things could get interesting…….

Rockies still haven’t pinned everything on Tulowitzki. If they ever trade him away, it’ll be in the next year so heading into 2016, the Rockies may need a shortstop. I present to you, Mr. Bradley Miller. Before you start up, I’m in no way suggesting Miller is a direct replacement for Tulowitzki!

The Mariners looked like giving Chris Taylor the starting shortstop gig in 2015, until a broken wrist curtailed that idea, giving Brad Miller another chance to shine. He’s been pretty good so far this year, but Chris Taylor is back and Miller certainly hasn’t shown the promise the Mariners hoped he would. If Taylor can hit well in Triple-A (he’s already hitting .328 with 2 homers, 5 steals and an .894 OPS) he’ll be with the big league club sooner rather than later. It’d be a downgrade at shortstop for the Rockies I grant you, but would free up a lot of cap space to go out and get something resembling a decent rotation.

But even if the Rockies do keep hold of Tulowitzki (and why wouldn’t you?), we come back to their need for pitching. The Mariners aren’t exactly steeped with pitching but certainly have enough to trade a piece away. They’d be unlikely to want to lose one of their more established “prospects” in order to get Rosario (Taijuan Walker, Roenis Elias, and James Paxton).

But there’s also Danny Hultzen, who has started the year well in Triple-A after rotator cuff surgery (currently sporting a 2.05 ERA through 30+ innings). Tyler Olsen is currently in the Mariner bullpen but was considered a 4th/5th starter during his minor league career and Ryan Yarbrough is continuing to impress in low A ball and at age 23, could easily be in the Majors within a couple of years. So the Mariners have enough depth to make a trade without harming their rotation. Whether or not they value any of these guys on a par with Rosario however is a different matter.

Looking at the three possible destinations, the Mariners appear to be the best chance of getting something done, but I’d be more inclined to suggest Wilin Rosario starts 2016 as the Rockies first baseman. And who’s to say he won’t finish 2015 in the role. Just as it wouldn’t surprise me in the least if he gets traded tomorrow, but that’s baseball. Nothing is ever set in stone and should the Rockies look to move on, there are certainly enough options out there to get something done.


When Do Stars Become Scrubs?

Baseball is a game driven by stars. They create the most exciting highlight reels that captivate audiences and leave us all in awe. However, eventually every star player loses their battle with Father Time. The purpose of this research was to try and determine when a star player’s production declines to the point where they can become easily replaceable. I decided to use a process called survival analysis to determine when this event occurs.

Methodology

Survival analysis attempts to determine the probability of when an event will occur. In any survival analysis problem, you need to determine three things. You need to determine the requirements for your population, the variables to predict the time of event, and the event.

For this problem, I decided that I would include any player that had their first season of 4 WAR or higher between 1920 and 1999 in my population. I decided to use for my variables: the age when they recorded their first star season, body mass index, offensive runs above average per 150 games, and defensive runs above average per 150 games as my variables. The event I chose to predict was when the player would have his first season below 1 WAR following their star season. The cutoffs for determining stars and scrubs were fairly arbitrary, but I chose these cutoffs because the FanGraphs glossary loosely defines an All-Star season as 4-5 WAR and a scrub season as 0-1 WAR.

Determining the variables was much more difficult. I wanted to pick variables that would represent a player’s performance, age, and overall health. The age was simple enough to find, but it was difficult to find any injury history for players so I decided to calculate a player’s BMI from their listed height and weight. Obviously this isn’t a perfect representation, because a player’s weight is constantly changing throughout his career, but it’s the best that I could do given my limited resources. In order to limit my performance variables, I thought it was best to settle for the offensive runs and defensive runs component of WAR. However, since these are accumulating statistics, I had to recreate them as rate statistics in order to avoid creating correlation issues with the age variable in the model. I would have liked to use more offensive variables, but I feared that adding more inputs would make the model too convoluted and affect the accuracy of the player predictions. Alright, that’s enough preparation; let’s dive into the actual data.

Survival Rate Data

As a jumping off point, I’ll start by presenting a table of the survival rates for my population. Each season indicates the percentage of players from the original population that had not yet recorded a scrub season.

 

Season 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Survival Function 87.62% 74.28% 65.20% 54.88% 45.80% 39.06% 32.32% 26.96% 22.15% 17.19%
Season 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Survival Function 13.76% 10.73% 7.57% 5.50% 3.44% 2.06% 1.24% 0.69% 0.28% 0.00%

Let’s make some quick observations. The data shows that no star player has gone more than 20 seasons without recording a season below 1 WAR. It also appears that the survival function decays exponentially.  I also found it interesting that over 50% of stars turn into scrubs by their fifth season and that only 17% of star players survive 10 years in the majors before they register a scrub season. Looking at this data really helps to appreciate how rare it is when players like Derek Jeter and Adrian Beltre perform at a consistent level on a year to year basis.

Hazard Rate Data

Next, we will look at the hazard rate of the players in the population. One of the purposes of examining the hazard rate is to see how the rate of failure changes in a population over time. To find the hazard rate for each time period, you divide the amount of events recorded during a time period by the amount of players that have not yet registered a scrub season. Below is the following calculation for each time period in table format.

Season 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Hazard Function 12.38% 15.23% 12.22% 15.82% 16.54% 14.71% 17.25% 16.60% 17.86% 22.36%
Season 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Hazard Function 20.00% 22.00% 29.49% 27.27% 37.50% 40.00% 40.00% 44.44% 60.00% 100.00%

As you can see by the table above, the hazard rate generally increases with each passing season. This makes sense, because as players age, their skill level decreases and their odds of registering a scrub season will increase. However, the hazard rates are fairly constant for the first ten years and then rapidly increase from then on. I’m rather surprised that the hazard rates stayed so consistent for the first ten or so years. I would have guessed that the hazard function would have increased much more rapidly with each passing season.

Determining the Model

It is important to identify the trend of the hazard function, because it helps determine which distribution to use when creating a parametric model. If the hazard rate increases exponentially, you are supposed to use a Weibull distribution. If the hazard rate is constant, you are supposed to use an exponential distribution. Since the hazard function was increasing, I originally attempted to the use the Weibull distribution for the model but I found that the model was predicting too many players to fail in the first few seasons, so I decided to try an exponential distribution instead.

I found that the exponential distribution model was more accurate at predicting survival rates in the first ten years, but severely under predicted the amount of players that would record a scrub season after ten years. I decided to use the exponential distribution, because I believe that it would be far more useful to accurately predict the first ten years instead of the last ten years, since only 17% of players survive ten years. I also believe that any franchise would be thrilled to obtain ten years of stardom from a player and anymore production is just an added bonus.

Survival Rate Estimates

Below is a table of each star player from 2000 to 2014 with the year they entered the population, the time until they became a scrub, every variable included in the model and their predicted survival rate for each of their first ten seasons since becoming a star.

Year Entered Name Time of Event Age BMI Off Def Season 1 Season 2 Season 3 Season 4 Season 5 Season 6 Season 7 Season 8 Season 9 Season 10
2000 Bobby Higginson 2 29 25.1 14.7 -11.0 77.83% 60.58% 47.15% 36.70% 28.56% 22.23% 17.30% 13.47% 10.48% 8.16%
2000 Darin Erstad 6 26 25.0 8.2 8.0 83.94% 70.46% 59.14% 49.64% 41.67% 34.98% 29.36% 24.64% 20.68% 17.36%
2000 Jorge Posada 8 28 27.6 11.2 7.1 80.94% 65.51% 53.02% 42.91% 34.73% 28.11% 22.75% 18.41% 14.90% 12.06%
2000 Jose Vidro 4 25 24.4 3.1 -4.9 83.43% 69.61% 58.07% 48.45% 40.42% 33.72% 28.14% 23.47% 19.58% 16.34%
2000 Phil Nevin 2 29 23.1 5.1 -2.8 76.52% 58.55% 44.80% 34.28% 26.23% 20.07% 15.36% 11.75% 8.99% 6.88%
2000 Richard Hidalgo 2 25 27.5 19.6 9.5 87.32% 76.24% 66.57% 58.13% 50.75% 44.32% 38.69% 33.79% 29.50% 25.76%
2000 Shannon Stewart 5 26 23.7 9.9 -3.2 83.26% 69.33% 57.73% 48.07% 40.02% 33.32% 27.75% 23.10% 19.24% 16.02%
2000 Todd Helton 8 26 28.2 25.4 -1.4 86.03% 74.01% 63.67% 54.77% 47.12% 40.53% 34.87% 30.00% 25.81% 22.20%
2000 Troy Glaus 3 23 26.1 12.2 9.0 88.69% 78.66% 69.76% 61.87% 54.87% 48.66% 43.16% 38.28% 33.95% 30.11%
2001 Albert Pujols 12 21 28.7 47.2 0.8 93.62% 87.66% 82.07% 76.84% 71.94% 67.35% 63.06% 59.04% 55.27% 51.75%
2001 Aramis Ramirez 1 23 27.0 -3.7 -2.3 85.43% 72.99% 62.35% 53.27% 45.51% 38.88% 33.22% 28.38% 24.24% 20.71%
2001 Bret Boone 3 32 25.8 -4.0 -0.5 66.26% 43.91% 29.09% 19.28% 12.77% 8.46% 5.61% 3.72% 2.46% 1.63%
2001 Cliff Floyd 5 28 26.1 13.4 -6.7 79.99% 63.98% 51.18% 40.94% 32.75% 26.19% 20.95% 16.76% 13.41% 10.72%
2001 Corey Koskie 6 28 26.9 11.2 7.7 81.02% 65.64% 53.18% 43.08% 34.90% 28.28% 22.91% 18.56% 15.04% 12.18%
2001 Eric Chavez 6 23 28.4 8.8 3.4 87.79% 77.06% 67.65% 59.39% 52.13% 45.77% 40.18% 35.27% 30.96% 27.18%
2001 Ichiro Suzuki 10 27 23.7 26.6 7.5 85.65% 73.36% 62.83% 53.82% 46.10% 39.48% 33.82% 28.96% 24.81% 21.25%
2001 J.D. Drew 10 25 26.4 25.6 10.8 88.29% 77.95% 68.82% 60.76% 53.65% 47.37% 41.82% 36.92% 32.60% 28.78%
2001 Lance Berkman 11 25 29.0 35.8 -6.9 88.44% 78.21% 69.17% 61.17% 54.10% 47.84% 42.31% 37.42% 33.09% 29.27%
2001 Mike Sweeney 3 27 25.7 12.9 -7.4 81.67% 66.70% 54.48% 44.49% 36.34% 29.68% 24.24% 19.80% 16.17% 13.21%
2001 Paul Lo Duca 6 29 27.7 11.2 14.7 79.86% 63.78% 50.94% 40.68% 32.49% 25.95% 20.72% 16.55% 13.22% 10.56%
2001 Placido Polanco 5 25 28.1 -9.1 12.1 82.55% 68.14% 56.25% 46.43% 38.33% 31.64% 26.12% 21.56% 17.80% 14.69%
2001 Rich Aurilia 6 29 23.1 4.1 10.1 77.86% 60.63% 47.21% 36.76% 28.62% 22.28% 17.35% 13.51% 10.52% 8.19%
2001 Ryan Klesko 5 30 27.5 21.8 -10.8 77.39% 59.89% 46.35% 35.87% 27.76% 21.48% 16.63% 12.87% 9.96% 7.71%
2001 Torii Hunter 13 25 28.9 -11.5 7.3 81.57% 66.53% 54.27% 44.26% 36.10% 29.45% 24.02% 19.59% 15.98% 13.03%
2002 Adam Dunn 6 22 32.9 25.5 -4.2 90.45% 81.82% 74.01% 66.94% 60.55% 54.77% 49.54% 44.81% 40.54% 36.67%
2002 Adrian Beltre N/A 23 30.7 -0.8 10.8 86.84% 75.41% 65.49% 56.87% 49.39% 42.89% 37.24% 32.34% 28.09% 24.39%
2002 Alfonso Soriano 7 26 25.7 11.8 -11.3 82.81% 68.57% 56.78% 47.02% 38.93% 32.24% 26.70% 22.11% 18.31% 15.16%
2002 Austin Kearns 2 22 30.0 31.7 17.8 92.26% 85.12% 78.53% 72.45% 66.84% 61.67% 56.89% 52.49% 48.43% 44.68%
2002 David Eckstein 5 27 27.4 4.8 5.3 81.22% 65.97% 53.58% 43.52% 35.34% 28.71% 23.31% 18.94% 15.38% 12.49%
2002 Edgar Renteria 7 25 26.4 -6.1 8.4 82.83% 68.61% 56.83% 47.08% 38.99% 32.30% 26.76% 22.16% 18.36% 15.21%
2002 Eric Hinske 2 24 30.2 21.6 4.6 88.41% 78.16% 69.10% 61.09% 54.00% 47.74% 42.21% 37.31% 32.99% 29.16%
2002 Jacque Jones 2 27 25.1 0.5 4.9 80.34% 64.54% 51.85% 41.66% 33.47% 26.89% 21.60% 17.35% 13.94% 11.20%
2002 Jose Hernandez 1 32 23.7 -8.5 8.1 66.31% 43.97% 29.16% 19.34% 12.82% 8.50% 5.64% 3.74% 2.48% 1.64%
2002 Junior Spivey 1 27 25.1 15.0 0.7 82.92% 68.76% 57.01% 47.28% 39.20% 32.50% 26.95% 22.35% 18.53% 15.37%
2002 Mark Kotsay 4 26 29.8 -0.1 11.5 82.51% 68.08% 56.18% 46.35% 38.25% 31.56% 26.04% 21.49% 17.73% 14.63%
2002 Miguel Tejada 8 28 32.5 3.5 1.8 78.40% 61.46% 48.19% 37.78% 29.62% 23.22% 18.20% 14.27% 11.19% 8.77%
2002 Pat Burrell 1 25 28.6 16.1 -15.1 84.76% 71.84% 60.90% 51.62% 43.75% 37.08% 31.43% 26.64% 22.58% 19.14%
2002 Randy Winn 8 28 22.5 -3.9 -0.8 76.68% 58.80% 45.09% 34.57% 26.51% 20.33% 15.59% 11.95% 9.17% 7.03%
2003 Bill Mueller 3 32 24.4 9.6 2.9 71.27% 50.80% 36.20% 25.80% 18.39% 13.11% 9.34% 6.66% 4.75% 3.38%
2003 Garret Anderson 1 31 23.7 2.7 0.7 71.50% 51.13% 36.56% 26.14% 18.69% 13.37% 9.56% 6.83% 4.89% 3.49%
2003 Hank Blalock 2 22 25.3 2.4 12.3 88.77% 78.80% 69.94% 62.09% 55.11% 48.92% 43.43% 38.55% 34.22% 30.37%
2003 Javy Lopez 3 32 23.1 8.8 7.8 71.83% 51.59% 37.06% 26.62% 19.12% 13.73% 9.87% 7.09% 5.09% 3.66%
2003 Jeff DaVanon 2 29 25.1 3.7 9.6 77.61% 60.23% 46.75% 36.28% 28.16% 21.85% 16.96% 13.16% 10.21% 7.93%
2003 Juan Pierre 5 25 25.8 -9.8 10.9 82.36% 67.84% 55.87% 46.02% 37.90% 31.22% 25.71% 21.18% 17.44% 14.37%
2003 Luis Castillo 5 27 20.2 0.5 3.3 80.34% 64.55% 51.86% 41.67% 33.48% 26.89% 21.61% 17.36% 13.95% 11.21%
2003 Marcus Giles 4 25 27.4 17.2 9.8 86.98% 75.66% 65.81% 57.24% 49.79% 43.31% 37.67% 32.77% 28.50% 24.79%
2003 Mark Loretta 2 31 23.7 -1.0 -1.9 69.97% 48.96% 34.25% 23.97% 16.77% 11.73% 8.21% 5.74% 4.02% 2.81%
2003 Melvin Mora 6 31 27.9 4.1 5.8 72.44% 52.48% 38.01% 27.54% 19.95% 14.45% 10.47% 7.58% 5.49% 3.98%
2003 Mike Lowell 2 29 23.7 7.4 2.3 77.70% 60.37% 46.90% 36.44% 28.31% 22.00% 17.09% 13.28% 10.32% 8.02%
2003 Milton Bradley 6 25 29.2 -2.7 7.1 83.29% 69.36% 57.77% 48.11% 40.07% 33.37% 27.80% 23.15% 19.28% 16.06%
2003 Morgan Ensberg 1 27 27.0 14.4 10.3 83.64% 69.96% 58.52% 48.95% 40.94% 34.25% 28.64% 23.96% 20.04% 16.76%
2003 Orlando Cabrera 1 28 28.0 -10.3 10.2 76.18% 58.04% 44.21% 33.68% 25.66% 19.55% 14.89% 11.34% 8.64% 6.58%
2003 Rafael Furcal 8 25 29.6 2.7 6.5 84.23% 70.94% 59.75% 50.33% 42.39% 35.70% 30.07% 25.33% 21.33% 17.97%
2003 Trot Nixon 4 29 25.7 16.8 -0.3 79.54% 63.27% 50.33% 40.04% 31.85% 25.33% 20.15% 16.03% 12.75% 10.14%
2004 Aaron Rowand 4 26 28.5 8.6 10.6 84.15% 70.81% 59.58% 50.14% 42.19% 35.50% 29.87% 25.14% 21.15% 17.80%
2004 Aubrey Huff 1 27 27.4 12.5 -11.3 81.13% 65.82% 53.40% 43.32% 35.15% 28.52% 23.14% 18.77% 15.23% 12.35%
2004 Brad Wilkerson 2 27 27.1 13.8 -3.1 82.23% 67.62% 55.61% 45.73% 37.61% 30.93% 25.43% 20.91% 17.20% 14.14%
2004 Carl Crawford 7 22 28.9 -3.4 13.0 87.93% 77.31% 67.98% 59.77% 52.56% 46.21% 40.63% 35.73% 31.41% 27.62%
2004 Carlos Guillen 5 28 28.4 4.7 5.7 79.30% 62.89% 49.87% 39.55% 31.36% 24.87% 19.72% 15.64% 12.40% 9.84%
2004 Carlos Lee 5 28 34.7 9.9 -3.6 79.19% 62.71% 49.66% 39.32% 31.14% 24.66% 19.53% 15.46% 12.25% 9.70%
2004 Coco Crisp 2 24 26.5 -4.6 9.9 84.85% 72.00% 61.09% 51.83% 43.98% 37.32% 31.67% 26.87% 22.80% 19.34%
2004 Corey Patterson 1 24 25.8 -5.1 8.8 84.68% 71.71% 60.73% 51.43% 43.55% 36.88% 31.23% 26.45% 22.40% 18.97%
2004 David Ortiz 5 28 28.0 14.6 -14.8 79.28% 62.85% 49.82% 39.50% 31.31% 24.82% 19.68% 15.60% 12.37% 9.80%
2004 Jack Wilson 2 26 27.1 -18.0 11.7 78.73% 61.99% 48.80% 38.42% 30.25% 23.82% 18.75% 14.76% 11.62% 9.15%
2004 Jason Varitek 2 32 29.5 1.4 8.6 69.34% 48.08% 33.34% 23.12% 16.03% 11.11% 7.71% 5.34% 3.70% 2.57%
2004 Jimmy Rollins N/A 25 27.4 -3.1 6.4 83.21% 69.24% 57.61% 47.94% 39.89% 33.19% 27.62% 22.98% 19.12% 15.91%
2004 Mark Teixeira 9 24 26.9 11.9 -1.9 86.61% 75.01% 64.96% 56.26% 48.72% 42.20% 36.55% 31.65% 27.41% 23.74%
2004 Travis Hafner 4 27 30.0 26.7 -17.1 83.33% 69.44% 57.86% 48.22% 40.18% 33.48% 27.90% 23.25% 19.37% 16.14%
2004 Vernon Wells 5 25 30.3 9.2 -2.8 84.56% 71.50% 60.46% 51.12% 43.23% 36.56% 30.91% 26.14% 22.10% 18.69%
2005 Brian Roberts 6 27 25.8 4.8 6.0 81.34% 66.16% 53.82% 43.78% 35.61% 28.96% 23.56% 19.16% 15.59% 12.68%
2005 Chase Utley N/A 26 26.4 15.7 13.2 85.66% 73.37% 62.85% 53.83% 46.11% 39.50% 33.83% 28.98% 24.82% 21.26%
2005 David DeJesus 9 25 26.5 6.8 2.8 84.73% 71.79% 60.82% 51.53% 43.66% 36.99% 31.34% 26.56% 22.50% 19.06%
2005 David Wright N/A 22 27.8 31.4 1.5 91.48% 83.69% 76.57% 70.04% 64.08% 58.62% 53.63% 49.06% 44.88% 41.06%
2005 Derrek Lee 1 29 28.5 18.4 -11.5 78.52% 61.66% 48.42% 38.02% 29.85% 23.44% 18.41% 14.45% 11.35% 8.91%
2005 Felipe Lopez 2 25 27.8 -3.9 1.5 82.57% 68.17% 56.29% 46.47% 38.37% 31.68% 26.16% 21.60% 17.83% 14.72%
2005 Grady Sizemore 5 22 25.7 16.2 11.2 90.39% 81.71% 73.86% 66.76% 60.35% 54.55% 49.31% 44.57% 40.29% 36.42%
2005 Jason Bay 2 26 27.0 37.1 -15.6 86.82% 75.37% 65.44% 56.81% 49.32% 42.82% 37.17% 32.27% 28.02% 24.32%
2005 Jhonny Peralta 1 23 27.6 6.0 2.9 87.36% 76.33% 66.68% 58.26% 50.90% 44.46% 38.85% 33.94% 29.65% 25.90%
2005 Julio Lugo 2 29 23.1 -3.3 6.7 75.53% 57.05% 43.09% 32.55% 24.58% 18.57% 14.03% 10.59% 8.00% 6.04%
2005 Mark Ellis 9 28 27.3 6.3 8.1 79.97% 63.95% 51.14% 40.89% 32.70% 26.15% 20.91% 16.72% 13.37% 10.69%
2005 Michael Young 7 28 26.4 3.9 -4.8 77.96% 60.77% 47.37% 36.93% 28.79% 22.44% 17.50% 13.64% 10.63% 8.29%
2005 Miguel Cabrera N/A 22 29.2 23.8 -13.8 89.77% 80.58% 72.33% 64.93% 58.28% 52.32% 46.96% 42.16% 37.84% 33.97%
2005 Nick Johnson 3 26 29.4 12.9 -7.3 83.28% 69.35% 57.75% 48.09% 40.05% 33.35% 27.77% 23.13% 19.26% 16.04%
2005 Richie Sexson 2 30 23.7 18.2 -12.9 76.37% 58.32% 44.54% 34.01% 25.98% 19.84% 15.15% 11.57% 8.84% 6.75%
2005 Victor Martinez 3 26 27.0 7.3 7.4 83.66% 70.00% 58.56% 49.00% 40.99% 34.30% 28.69% 24.01% 20.08% 16.80%
2006 Bill Hall 2 26 28.5 2.4 5.5 82.47% 68.01% 56.08% 46.25% 38.14% 31.45% 25.94% 21.39% 17.64% 14.55%
2006 Brandon Inge 2 29 26.5 -11.3 12.0 73.90% 54.62% 40.37% 29.83% 22.05% 16.29% 12.04% 8.90% 6.58% 4.86%
2006 Brian McCann N/A 22 28.7 12.3 8.4 89.71% 80.47% 72.19% 64.76% 58.09% 52.11% 46.75% 41.94% 37.62% 33.75%
2006 Curtis Granderson N/A 25 26.4 3.3 12.5 84.96% 72.18% 61.33% 52.11% 44.27% 37.61% 31.96% 27.15% 23.07% 19.60%
2006 Dan Uggla 7 26 29.3 13.1 7.2 84.62% 71.60% 60.58% 51.26% 43.38% 36.70% 31.06% 26.28% 22.24% 18.81%
2006 Freddy Sanchez 2 28 27.1 3.1 11.9 79.68% 63.49% 50.58% 40.31% 32.11% 25.59% 20.39% 16.25% 12.94% 10.31%
2006 Garrett Atkins 2 26 24.4 7.3 1.9 83.22% 69.26% 57.64% 47.97% 39.93% 33.23% 27.65% 23.02% 19.15% 15.94%
2006 Hanley Ramirez 5 22 28.9 22.4 -2.3 90.28% 81.50% 73.58% 66.43% 59.97% 54.14% 48.88% 44.12% 39.84% 35.96%
2006 Joe Mauer N/A 23 27.3 23.2 7.6 89.97% 80.94% 72.82% 65.52% 58.94% 53.03% 47.71% 42.92% 38.62% 34.74%
2006 Jose Reyes 3 23 26.4 3.8 9.7 87.55% 76.66% 67.12% 58.76% 51.45% 45.05% 39.44% 34.53% 30.24% 26.47%
2006 Ramon Hernandez 2 30 29.8 -2.7 14.1 74.04% 54.81% 40.58% 30.05% 22.24% 16.47% 12.19% 9.03% 6.68% 4.95%
2006 Reed Johnson 1 29 27.3 1.8 -0.3 75.78% 57.43% 43.52% 32.98% 25.00% 18.94% 14.36% 10.88% 8.24% 6.25%
2006 Ryan Howard 6 26 30.4 39.3 -11.0 87.40% 76.38% 66.76% 58.34% 50.99% 44.56% 38.95% 34.04% 29.75% 26.00%
2007 Alex Rios 2 26 24.9 6.4 5.2 83.34% 69.46% 57.89% 48.25% 40.21% 33.51% 27.93% 23.28% 19.40% 16.17%
2007 B.J. Upton 6 22 23.1 14.7 -5.7 89.26% 79.67% 71.11% 63.47% 56.65% 50.57% 45.14% 40.29% 35.96% 32.10%
2007 Brandon Phillips N/A 26 27.1 -11.3 7.9 79.86% 63.78% 50.93% 40.67% 32.48% 25.94% 20.72% 16.54% 13.21% 10.55%
2007 Carlos Pena 5 29 28.9 18.1 -16.3 77.86% 60.61% 47.19% 36.74% 28.61% 22.27% 17.34% 13.50% 10.51% 8.18%
2007 Chone Figgins 4 29 27.4 9.7 -3.0 77.46% 59.99% 46.47% 35.99% 27.88% 21.59% 16.73% 12.95% 10.03% 7.77%
2007 Corey Hart 1 25 26.6 10.8 -2.5 84.98% 72.21% 61.36% 52.14% 44.31% 37.65% 32.00% 27.19% 23.10% 19.63%
2007 Kevin Youkilis 6 28 29.0 12.3 0.3 80.40% 64.65% 51.98% 41.79% 33.60% 27.02% 21.72% 17.47% 14.04% 11.29%
2007 Matt Holliday N/A 27 30.4 26.0 -7.6 84.05% 70.65% 59.38% 49.91% 41.95% 35.26% 29.64% 24.91% 20.94% 17.60%
2007 Nick Markakis 6 23 25.1 11.1 -2.0 87.81% 77.11% 67.71% 59.46% 52.21% 45.85% 40.26% 35.35% 31.04% 27.26%
2007 Nick Swisher 7 26 27.1 16.7 -4.8 84.28% 71.02% 59.86% 50.44% 42.51% 35.83% 30.19% 25.45% 21.44% 18.07%
2007 Prince Fielder 7 23 38.4 22.1 -17.8 87.95% 77.35% 68.03% 59.83% 52.62% 46.28% 40.71% 35.80% 31.49% 27.69%
2007 Robinson Cano 1 24 28.5 11.7 -6.1 86.21% 74.31% 64.06% 55.22% 47.61% 41.04% 35.38% 30.50% 26.29% 22.66%
2007 Russell Martin N/A 24 30.8 10.5 14.4 87.50% 76.57% 67.00% 58.62% 51.30% 44.89% 39.28% 34.37% 30.07% 26.31%
2007 Ryan Zimmerman N/A 22 27.5 9.1 10.4 89.46% 80.03% 71.60% 64.05% 57.30% 51.27% 45.86% 41.03% 36.71% 32.84%
2007 Troy Tulowitzki 1 22 26.9 2.2 15.8 88.92% 79.07% 70.32% 62.53% 55.60% 49.44% 43.97% 39.10% 34.77% 30.92%
2008 Carlos Quentin 1 25 31.0 14.5 -2.6 85.47% 73.05% 62.43% 53.36% 45.60% 38.98% 33.31% 28.47% 24.33% 20.80%
2008 Dustin Pedroia N/A 24 25.1 13.5 6.3 87.51% 76.58% 67.01% 58.64% 51.32% 44.91% 39.30% 34.39% 30.09% 26.33%
2008 Evan Longoria N/A 22 27.0 25.9 21.9 91.95% 84.55% 77.75% 71.49% 65.74% 60.45% 55.59% 51.11% 47.00% 43.22%
2008 Ian Kinsler N/A 26 27.1 18.2 -6.5 84.40% 71.24% 60.13% 50.75% 42.84% 36.16% 30.52% 25.76% 21.74% 18.35%
2008 J.J. Hardy N/A 25 25.1 -2.1 15.9 84.34% 71.13% 59.98% 50.59% 42.66% 35.98% 30.35% 25.59% 21.58% 18.20%
2008 Jacoby Ellsbury 2 24 25.7 7.4 16.9 87.36% 76.32% 66.67% 58.24% 50.88% 44.45% 38.83% 33.92% 29.63% 25.89%
2008 Jayson Werth 4 29 28.5 12.8 10.6 79.75% 63.60% 50.72% 40.45% 32.26% 25.73% 20.52% 16.36% 13.05% 10.41%
2008 Josh Hamilton N/A 27 29.2 28.3 -9.6 84.33% 71.12% 59.97% 50.58% 42.65% 35.97% 30.33% 25.58% 21.57% 18.19%
2008 Mark DeRosa 2 33 28.4 -1.6 0.9 64.22% 41.24% 26.48% 17.01% 10.92% 7.01% 4.50% 2.89% 1.86% 1.19%
2008 Mike Aviles 1 27 29.4 20.3 21.5 85.59% 73.26% 62.70% 53.66% 45.93% 39.31% 33.65% 28.80% 24.65% 21.10%
2008 Ryan Braun 6 24 25.7 36.6 -17.5 89.07% 79.33% 70.66% 62.94% 56.06% 49.93% 44.47% 39.61% 35.28% 31.43%
2008 Ryan Ludwick 3 29 27.6 16.6 0.2 79.47% 63.15% 50.19% 39.88% 31.69% 25.19% 20.02% 15.91% 12.64% 10.04%
2008 Shane Victorino 6 27 28.1 4.0 9.1 81.43% 66.31% 53.99% 43.96% 35.80% 29.15% 23.74% 19.33% 15.74% 12.82%
2009 Aaron Hill 2 27 28.6 3.3 4.0 80.72% 65.16% 52.60% 42.46% 34.27% 27.67% 22.33% 18.03% 14.55% 11.75%
2009 Adrian Gonzalez N/A 27 28.9 19.8 -10.1 82.68% 68.37% 56.53% 46.74% 38.65% 31.96% 26.42% 21.85% 18.07% 14.94%
2009 Ben Zobrist N/A 28 26.2 11.9 9.9 81.42% 66.29% 53.98% 43.95% 35.78% 29.14% 23.72% 19.32% 15.73% 12.81%
2009 Casey Blake 3 35 26.3 5.8 0.1 60.57% 36.69% 22.23% 13.46% 8.15% 4.94% 2.99% 1.81% 1.10% 0.66%
2009 Denard Span N/A 25 28.5 23.8 -1.6 87.10% 75.87% 66.08% 57.56% 50.13% 43.67% 38.03% 33.13% 28.86% 25.13%
2009 Franklin Gutierrez 3 26 25.0 -1.8 18.8 83.05% 68.97% 57.28% 47.57% 39.50% 32.81% 27.25% 22.63% 18.79% 15.61%
2009 Jason Bartlett 3 29 25.8 5.9 13.7 78.61% 61.79% 48.58% 38.19% 30.02% 23.60% 18.55% 14.58% 11.46% 9.01%
2009 Joey Votto N/A 25 28.2 28.7 -8.1 87.36% 76.32% 66.67% 58.24% 50.88% 44.45% 38.83% 33.92% 29.64% 25.89%
2009 Justin Upton N/A 21 26.3 13.3 -6.9 90.00% 81.01% 72.91% 65.62% 59.06% 53.16% 47.84% 43.06% 38.76% 34.88%
2009 Marco Scutaro 5 33 26.5 -5.2 3.3 63.45% 40.26% 25.55% 16.21% 10.29% 6.53% 4.14% 2.63% 1.67% 1.06%
2009 Matt Kemp 1 24 26.2 16.9 -4.8 87.18% 76.00% 66.26% 57.76% 50.36% 43.90% 38.27% 33.37% 29.09% 25.36%
2009 Michael Bourn 5 26 25.8 -2.5 7.8 81.80% 66.92% 54.74% 44.78% 36.63% 29.96% 24.51% 20.05% 16.40% 13.42%
2009 Nyjer Morgan 1 28 25.8 3.4 27.3 81.46% 66.35% 54.05% 44.03% 35.86% 29.21% 23.80% 19.38% 15.79% 12.86%
2009 Pablo Sandoval N/A 22 34.2 29.1 -1.6 90.97% 82.76% 75.29% 68.49% 62.31% 56.68% 51.56% 46.91% 42.67% 38.82%
2009 Shin-Soo Choo 5 26 28.6 28.4 -5.3 86.20% 74.30% 64.05% 55.21% 47.59% 41.02% 35.36% 30.48% 26.28% 22.65%
2010 Alexei Ramirez N/A 28 23.1 -3.3 6.6 77.71% 60.39% 46.93% 36.47% 28.34% 22.03% 17.12% 13.30% 10.34% 8.03%
2010 Andres Torres 3 32 28.0 6.1 14.2 71.73% 51.45% 36.90% 26.47% 18.99% 13.62% 9.77% 7.01% 5.03% 3.61%
2010 Angel Pagan 1 28 25.7 6.4 8.6 80.12% 64.20% 51.43% 41.21% 33.02% 26.46% 21.20% 16.98% 13.61% 10.90%
2010 Austin Jackson 4 23 24.4 8.2 7.5 88.08% 77.59% 68.34% 60.20% 53.02% 46.71% 41.14% 36.24% 31.92% 28.12%
2010 Brett Gardner 2 26 26.5 8.2 21.3 85.05% 72.34% 61.52% 52.33% 44.51% 37.85% 32.19% 27.38% 23.29% 19.81%
2010 Buster Posey N/A 23 28.4 18.0 10.6 89.49% 80.08% 71.67% 64.13% 57.39% 51.36% 45.96% 41.13% 36.81% 32.94%
2010 Carlos Gonzalez 4 24 29.0 17.4 3.5 87.78% 77.06% 67.64% 59.38% 52.12% 45.75% 40.16% 35.26% 30.95% 27.17%
2010 Carlos Ruiz N/A 31 29.4 -5.0 14.6 70.92% 50.30% 35.68% 25.30% 17.95% 12.73% 9.03% 6.40% 4.54% 3.22%
2010 Chase Headley N/A 26 28.2 1.9 -2.1 81.63% 66.64% 54.40% 44.40% 36.25% 29.59% 24.15% 19.72% 16.09% 13.14%
2010 Chris Young 3 26 25.7 -1.1 0.5 81.34% 66.17% 53.82% 43.78% 35.61% 28.97% 23.56% 19.17% 15.59% 12.68%
2010 Colby Rasmus 1 23 25.0 12.8 3.8 88.46% 78.25% 69.21% 61.23% 54.16% 47.91% 42.38% 37.49% 33.16% 29.33%
2010 Daric Barton 1 24 27.8 11.8 -2.8 86.51% 74.84% 64.74% 56.00% 48.45% 41.91% 36.25% 31.36% 27.13% 23.47%
2010 Jason Heyward N/A 20 29.0 28.5 -1.1 92.70% 85.94% 79.67% 73.86% 68.47% 63.47% 58.84% 54.55% 50.57% 46.88%
2010 Jay Bruce 4 23 26.9 7.5 5.6 87.79% 77.07% 67.66% 59.40% 52.15% 45.78% 40.19% 35.28% 30.98% 27.19%
2010 Jose Bautista N/A 29 27.8 3.5 -9.0 75.07% 56.35% 42.30% 31.76% 23.84% 17.90% 13.43% 10.08% 7.57% 5.68%
2010 Justin Morneau 1 29 26.8 17.0 -7.5 78.72% 61.96% 48.78% 38.39% 30.22% 23.79% 18.73% 14.74% 11.60% 9.13%
2010 Kelly Johnson 2 28 26.4 9.5 2.2 80.07% 64.12% 51.34% 41.11% 32.92% 26.36% 21.11% 16.90% 13.53% 10.84%
2010 Marlon Byrd 2 32 33.2 0.9 1.7 67.87% 46.07% 31.27% 21.22% 14.41% 9.78% 6.64% 4.50% 3.06% 2.08%
2010 Nelson Cruz N/A 29 29.5 10.2 4.0 78.35% 61.38% 48.09% 37.68% 29.52% 23.13% 18.12% 14.20% 11.12% 8.71%
2010 Rickie Weeks 3 27 31.6 12.0 -3.6 81.66% 66.68% 54.45% 44.47% 36.31% 29.65% 24.21% 19.77% 16.15% 13.18%
2010 Stephen Drew 2 27 25.8 -0.7 1.5 79.66% 63.46% 50.55% 40.27% 32.08% 25.56% 20.36% 16.22% 12.92% 10.29%
2011 Alex Avila 2 24 29.3 9.9 1.4 86.49% 74.80% 64.69% 55.95% 48.39% 41.85% 36.20% 31.31% 27.08% 23.42%
2011 Alex Gordon N/A 27 29.0 7.0 1.0 81.18% 65.90% 53.49% 43.43% 35.25% 28.62% 23.23% 18.86% 15.31% 12.43%
2011 Andrew McCutchen N/A 24 27.3 24.1 -1.9 88.39% 78.12% 69.05% 61.03% 53.95% 47.68% 42.14% 37.25% 32.92% 29.10%
2011 Cameron Maybin 2 24 25.6 4.7 6.9 86.19% 74.29% 64.03% 55.19% 47.57% 41.00% 35.34% 30.46% 26.26% 22.63%
2011 Elvis Andrus N/A 22 27.1 -4.6 13.7 87.84% 77.16% 67.78% 59.53% 52.30% 45.94% 40.35% 35.44% 31.13% 27.35%
2011 Giancarlo Stanton N/A 21 27.7 20.6 0.6 91.21% 83.19% 75.87% 69.20% 63.12% 57.57% 52.51% 47.89% 43.68% 39.84%
2011 Howie Kendrick N/A 27 30.1 4.5 6.1 81.14% 65.84% 53.42% 43.34% 35.17% 28.54% 23.15% 18.79% 15.24% 12.37%
2011 Hunter Pence N/A 28 26.8 15.2 -1.6 80.92% 65.47% 52.98% 42.87% 34.69% 28.07% 22.71% 18.38% 14.87% 12.03%
2011 Matt Wieters 3 25 28.5 -7.6 18.4 83.43% 69.60% 58.07% 48.45% 40.42% 33.72% 28.13% 23.47% 19.58% 16.34%
2011 Mike Napoli N/A 29 29.8 20.5 2.3 80.50% 64.81% 52.17% 42.00% 33.81% 27.22% 21.91% 17.64% 14.20% 11.43%
2011 Peter Bourjos 2 24 24.4 4.6 20.5 87.24% 76.11% 66.40% 57.92% 50.53% 44.09% 38.46% 33.55% 29.27% 25.54%
2011 Yadier Molina N/A 28 30.7 -14.6 20.1 76.20% 58.06% 44.24% 33.71% 25.69% 19.58% 14.92% 11.37% 8.66% 6.60%
2012 Adam Jones N/A 26 28.1 4.2 -1.8 82.13% 67.46% 55.41% 45.51% 37.38% 30.70% 25.22% 20.71% 17.01% 13.97%
2012 Bryce Harper N/A 19 28.1 18.0 9.0 92.98% 86.45% 80.38% 74.73% 69.48% 64.60% 60.07% 55.85% 51.93% 48.28%
2012 Edwin Encarnacion N/A 29 30.3 10.1 -11.4 76.39% 58.36% 44.58% 34.06% 26.02% 19.88% 15.19% 11.60% 8.86% 6.77%
2012 Ian Desmond N/A 26 26.9 0.3 2.6 81.81% 66.93% 54.75% 44.79% 36.65% 29.98% 24.53% 20.06% 16.41% 13.43%
2012 Josh Reddick N/A 25 23.1 2.2 10.1 84.65% 71.66% 60.66% 51.35% 43.47% 36.80% 31.15% 26.37% 22.32% 18.90%
2012 Martin Prado N/A 28 25.1 7.8 1.7 79.70% 63.52% 50.63% 40.35% 32.16% 25.63% 20.43% 16.28% 12.98% 10.34%
2012 Melky Cabrera 1 27 30.1 0.9 -5.4 79.08% 62.54% 49.46% 39.11% 30.93% 24.46% 19.35% 15.30% 12.10% 9.57%
2012 Miguel Montero 1 28 29.3 1.7 8.2 78.85% 62.17% 49.02% 38.65% 30.48% 24.03% 18.95% 14.94% 11.78% 9.29%
2012 Mike Trout N/A 20 29.5 53.6 13.0 95.05% 90.35% 85.89% 81.64% 77.60% 73.76% 70.12% 66.65% 63.35% 60.22%
2013 Andrelton Simmons N/A 23 25.0 -5.9 32.5 87.81% 77.10% 67.71% 59.45% 52.20% 45.84% 40.25% 35.35% 31.04% 27.25%
2013 Brandon Belt 1 25 26.1 16.7 -6.5 85.66% 73.37% 62.85% 53.83% 46.11% 39.50% 33.83% 28.98% 24.82% 21.26%
2013 Carlos Gomez N/A 27 27.5 -1.4 15.1 80.92% 65.48% 52.98% 42.87% 34.69% 28.07% 22.72% 18.38% 14.87% 12.04%
2013 Chris Davis 1 27 28.7 13.6 -13.9 81.04% 65.67% 53.22% 43.13% 34.95% 28.33% 22.96% 18.60% 15.08% 12.22%
2013 Freddie Freeman N/A 23 26.7 17.3 -14.6 87.77% 77.04% 67.62% 59.36% 52.10% 45.73% 40.14% 35.23% 30.92% 27.14%
2013 Gerardo Parra 1 26 27.9 -6.2 9.2 81.11% 65.78% 53.35% 43.27% 35.09% 28.46% 23.09% 18.72% 15.19% 12.32%
2013 Jason Castro N/A 26 26.9 2.9 4.5 82.54% 68.12% 56.23% 46.41% 38.30% 31.61% 26.09% 21.54% 17.78% 14.67%
2013 Jason Kipnis 1 26 26.5 17.6 -2.3 84.69% 71.72% 60.74% 51.44% 43.56% 36.89% 31.24% 26.46% 22.41% 18.97%
2013 Josh Donaldson N/A 27 29.8 19.0 10.9 84.45% 71.32% 60.23% 50.87% 42.96% 36.28% 30.64% 25.87% 21.85% 18.45%
2013 Juan Uribe N/A 34 31.9 -12.1 12.1 58.89% 34.68% 20.42% 12.03% 7.08% 4.17% 2.46% 1.45% 0.85% 0.50%
2013 Kyle Seager N/A 25 28.5 8.3 2.2 84.87% 72.03% 61.14% 51.89% 44.04% 37.38% 31.72% 26.92% 22.85% 19.39%
2013 Manny Machado N/A 20 23.1 0.2 28.8 91.50% 83.73% 76.61% 70.10% 64.15% 58.69% 53.71% 49.14% 44.97% 41.15%
2013 Matt Carpenter N/A 27 26.9 27.7 -3.7 84.82% 71.95% 61.03% 51.77% 43.91% 37.25% 31.60% 26.80% 22.73% 19.28%
2013 Paul Goldschmidt N/A 25 30.6 30.0 -9.6 87.39% 76.38% 66.75% 58.34% 50.98% 44.56% 38.94% 34.03% 29.74% 25.99%
2013 Starling Marte N/A 24 24.4 17.9 7.8 88.26% 77.90% 68.75% 60.68% 53.55% 47.26% 41.71% 36.82% 32.49% 28.68%
2013 Yasiel Puig N/A 22 29.4 37.6 -0.9 91.96% 84.58% 77.78% 71.53% 65.78% 60.50% 55.64% 51.17% 47.05% 43.27%
2014 Anthony Rendon N/A 24 26.4 18.4 6.2 88.17% 77.74% 68.55% 60.44% 53.29% 46.99% 41.43% 36.53% 32.21% 28.40%
2014 Anthony Rizzo N/A 24 30.0 11.5 -3.0 86.37% 74.60% 64.44% 55.65% 48.07% 41.52% 35.86% 30.97% 26.75% 23.11%
2014 Brian Dozier N/A 27 26.5 3.4 -0.5 80.33% 64.53% 51.84% 41.64% 33.45% 26.87% 21.59% 17.34% 13.93% 11.19%
2014 Christian Yelich N/A 22 25.0 17.7 -0.7 89.89% 80.81% 72.64% 65.30% 58.70% 52.77% 47.44% 42.65% 38.34% 34.46%
2014 Devin Mesoraco N/A 26 29.0 -2.0 7.8 81.78% 66.89% 54.70% 44.74% 36.59% 29.93% 24.47% 20.02% 16.37% 13.39%
2014 Erick Aybar N/A 30 25.8 -1.6 7.6 73.64% 54.22% 39.93% 29.40% 21.65% 15.94% 11.74% 8.64% 6.37% 4.69%
2014 J.D. Martinez N/A 26 27.5 1.8 -9.8 80.83% 65.33% 52.81% 42.68% 34.50% 27.89% 22.54% 18.22% 14.73% 11.90%
2014 Jonathan Lucroy N/A 28 26.4 6.4 11.2 80.37% 64.60% 51.92% 41.73% 33.54% 26.96% 21.66% 17.41% 13.99% 11.25%
2014 Jose Abreu N/A 27 31.9 42.9 -14.9 86.30% 74.48% 64.28% 55.48% 47.88% 41.32% 35.66% 30.77% 26.56% 22.92%
2014 Jose Altuve N/A 24 28.2 5.0 -6.4 85.08% 72.39% 61.59% 52.40% 44.58% 37.93% 32.27% 27.46% 23.36% 19.87%
2014 Josh Harrison N/A 26 30.4 5.4 3.4 82.79% 68.54% 56.75% 46.98% 38.90% 32.20% 26.66% 22.07% 18.27% 15.13%
2014 Juan Lagares N/A 25 28.4 -5.1 28.9 84.82% 71.95% 61.03% 51.77% 43.91% 37.25% 31.60% 26.80% 22.74% 19.28%
2014 Kevin Kiermaier N/A 24 25.7 13.1 21.3 88.48% 78.28% 69.26% 61.28% 54.22% 47.97% 42.44% 37.55% 33.22% 29.39%
2014 Lorenzo Cain N/A 28 26.3 2.8 19.4 80.49% 64.78% 52.14% 41.97% 33.78% 27.19% 21.88% 17.61% 14.18% 11.41%
2014 Michael Brantley N/A 27 25.7 10.0 -8.4 80.96% 65.55% 53.07% 42.97% 34.79% 28.17% 22.80% 18.46% 14.95% 12.10%
2014 Steve Pearce N/A 31 29.3 6.6 -3.1 71.82% 51.58% 37.04% 26.60% 19.11% 13.72% 9.85% 7.08% 5.08% 3.65%
2014 Todd Frazier N/A 28 27.5 11.0 4.4 80.61% 64.98% 52.38% 42.22% 34.03% 27.43% 22.11% 17.82% 14.37% 11.58%
2014 Yan Gomes N/A 26 27.6 9.4 13.6 84.58% 71.54% 60.51% 51.18% 43.29% 36.62% 30.97% 26.20% 22.16% 18.74%

Conclusions

After looking at this table, we can draw several conclusions. First, this Mike Trout guy is really good at baseball. Secondly, age is the main variable in determining the time until failure. The players with the highest survival rates are all under twenty-five and all the lowest survival rates are over thirty. This makes sense, because it is much easier for a twenty-year-old star to remain effective until he is thirty compared to a thirty-year-old star attempting to remain effective until he is forty. This is because older players face more challenges such as eroding skills, an increased chance of sustaining injuries and having their playing time reduced to prevent injuries.

It also appears that offensive stars survive longer than defensive stars. This is probably due to the fact that defensive skills usually deteriorate faster than offensive skills. I also believe that since defensive statistics are more volatile than offensive statistics, that players that derive much of their value from their defense are more likely to have their WAR fluctuate from year to year. This makes it more likely that a defensive star could register a scrub season one year and then become a star again the next year. And this brings me to my next point.

Things to Keep in Mind

If a player records a scrub season that does not necessarily mean that he is finished.  If this were the case, players like Aramis Ramirez, Robinson Cano and Troy Tulowitzki would have had much less productive careers. It is also important to remember that a player enters the population as soon as they record their first star season, so it is quite possible that a player could improve after their first star season and make it more likely that they can outlast their projected survival rate. The main thing to remember is that no model is perfect and no model is meant to replace the human decision-making process. Models are only meant to improve the decision-making process and it is my hope that this model has accomplished that goal.


Pitchers Aren’t Just Bad Hitters

They are TERRIBLE hitters. They are not comparable to even the worst real hitters.

Max Scherzer said he enjoys hitting, but after getting hurt doing it, he thinks the DH might not be the worst idea.

The designated hitter is always a touchy subject, even though the National League is, if not the only league anywhere in the world, amateur or professional, that continues to employ it, then one of the few leagues to do so.

Yet I am not fully in one camp or the other. However, bringing the DH to the NL would not be a disaster of gargantuan proportions, as many a diehard NL fan might tell you. In fact, in an era of dying offenses, perhaps getting the worst hitters out of the batter’s box is an acceptable idea.

In 5519 PA in 2014, pitchers hit .122/.153/.153, for a minus-19 wRC+. The absolute worst hitter with at least 100 PA was JB Shuck, with a .145/.168/.209 line for a wRC+ of 2, or 21 points higher than the average pitcher. 21 points of wRC+ was also the 2014 gap between Nelson Cruz and Yan Gomes, or pick any of a number of great offensive seasons from merely good ones. Except here you are starting at terrible and ending up at abysmally awful. I would have created a “wRC+ X was Y times higher than wRC+ Z” construct instead, but it’s hard to do that when dealing with MINUS-19 and a positive number.

Meanwhile, the 30 worst hitters with 100+ PA last year, who combined for 5544 PA, comparable to the number of pitcher PA, posted a triple slash of .184/.247/.261. Their median wRC+ was 44; the mean, 38. (Note: Not -19.)

Bill Bergen, the poster boy for awful hitters, had a career wRC+ of 22 — 41 points higher than your typical 2014 pitcher.

Pitchers are terrible at hitting because it’s barely part of their job as it stands. And then they get hurt, like Chien-Ming Wang (running the bases) or Max Scherzer, doing this part of their job that is nearly irrelevant to the rest of it. It’s like asking the janitor to file a TPS report, and then he gets a really nasty paper cut and can’t go back to work for some time. (Terrible analogy, I know.)

I know the arguments in favor of the National League system as well, but won’t rehash them here, for fear of convincing myself to completely accept the DH, and thus further upsetting any number of fans. For example, did you know (and other people have basically written this already) the pitcher’s turn in the order is actually a helpful hint, not a complicating factor, in deciding when to remove a pitcher from a game? Not pinch-hitting means that you are allowing someone who can’t hit to hit, in exchange for the least effective parts of his real job, the mid- to late innings. The gap between a fresh reliever and a starter multiple times through the order on the mound *and* the gap between even a pinch-hitter and the pitcher at the plate are almost always both going to be in favor of removing the pitcher.

See, that’s what I meant. I’ll cut my losses and avoid trying to devise another lame analogy to conclude with.


Thought Experiment: What If the Nationals Sell?

The Washington Nationals, FanGraphs staff unanimous picks to be NL East champions, are off to a rough 7-12 start. Whether those struggles will continue is a matter for another post.

We are not here to talk about what ails the Nationals, or how to fix it. We’re here for a curious hypothetical: what if the Nats’ collapse continues? What if they are below .500 at the All-Star break and become trade deadline sellers?

We’re going to examine four questions. Who would the Nationals sell, how much would the team’s core change, how much money does this save them in 2016, and when would the team contend?

1. Who would the Nationals sell?

Jordan Zimmermann, Doug Fister, Ian Desmond, and Denard Span are impending free agents. Those are four very big names. The Nationals would be poised to offer two of the most valuable starting pitchers on the summer market; Zimmermann and Fister might be rentals, but they also don’t come with Cole Hamels’ massive contract. I think the team could also deal two players who will be free agents after 2016: Stephen Strasburg and Drew Storen.

The potential return here is, obviously, massive. We’re talking about trading away three members of a pitching rotation some analysts thought would be historically great. Strasburg clocked in at #23 on Dave Cameron’s offseason trade value rankings, just behind now-injured Yu Darvish. Although it would be frivolous to speculate on trading partners, given that our scenario is already far-fetched to start with, Ian Desmond and a starting pitcher could go a long way toward solving the Padres’ roster issues.

There are probably only two or three teams in the league that could meet an asking price for Strasburg. Maybe one of them gets desperate. If so, the Nationals probably gain at least one long-term core player. It won’t be Mookie Betts, but then, most good major league regulars aren’t Mookie Betts.

2. How much would the team’s core change?

They would still have Bryce Harper, Anthony Rendon, and Ryan Zimmerman batting, and Gio Gonzalez, Tanner Roark, and Max Scherzer on the mound. You can do worse. 2016-17 will bring Michael Taylor to the outfield, Trea Turner to shortstop, and a number of pitchers into the majors, perhaps including Lucas Giolito, Reynaldo Lopez, Joe Ross, and/or A.J. Cole.

That does not a championship 2016 roster make, but GM Mike Rizzo can demand near-league-ready talent in exchange for half his rotation, his center fielder, his shortstop, and his closer. That’s a lot of bargaining chips, and Rizzo is historically good at extracting trade value. (Wilson Ramos, Tanner Roark, and Doug Fister were acquired for players who contributed a combined -1.6 WAR to their new teams. I am not making that up. Negative 1.6. This excludes Steve Lombardozzi, who never played for Detroit, but posted -0.3 WAR for Baltimore.)

Funnily enough, if this is an imaginary July 2015 where the Nationals are already struggling to reach .500, I don’t think trading everyone away would make the team much worse. The infield can limp to the offseason with Danny Espinosa and Dan Uggla; Michael Taylor can return to center field; and Tanner Roark would step back into the rotation. It’s clearly a less talented roster with less awe-inspiring pitching, but they won’t fall to the cellar, either.

3. How much money does this save in 2016?

Stephen Strasburg and Drew Storen are both entering arbitration, after earning a combined $13.1M in 2015. With Zimmermann, Fister, Desmond, and Span coming off the books, the team doesn’t exactly need to worry about money. Those six players represent $61M of the 2015 payroll. They can also buy out Nate McLouth.

Remember, though, that Rendon enters arbitration in 2016, and Harper a year later.

The only long, potentially burdensome contracts on the club belong to Scherzer (not yet a problem), Ryan Zimmerman (a few years of on-field value remain), and Jayson Werth (ditto). That could be a lot worse. The team does not have an albatross yet.

4. When would the team contend?

With the new wild-card game, the imaginary blown-up Nationals would be contending again in 2016. You still have the core talents of Scherzer, Harper, and Rendon; Gio Gonzalez and Tanner Roark eating innings; and several useful prospects for the outfield and rotation. Surround them with a raft of young talent acquired at the deadline, cross your fingers Lucas Giolito doesn’t blow out his shoulder, and the team would have playoff upside in 2016, with a chance at a division title in 2017.

Conclusion

The Nationals should be fine for 2015. This is still the best and most talented club in the NL East.

But if the Nationals implode? They have a real chance to rebuild very quickly indeed. The Red Sox just went worst-to-first, then back to worst, and now they’re bidding for first again. The “to first” part of that trajectory will be the Nats’ inspiration. If 2015 does become a nightmare in D.C., the Washington front office can use speedy recognition, honest self-assessment, and savvy trading to rebuild a new contending team, and quickly.


Jason Heyward and Troy Tulowitzki’s Eroding Command of the Strike Zone

(All stats are current as of the end of April 24th.)

During the offseason, Jason Heyward and Troy Tulowitzki were two of the highest-profile players on the trade block. Heyward was ultimately dealt as the Braves gear up for the future and the Cardinals look to fortify RF after the passing of Oscar Taveras. Tulowitzki was not dealt, as the Rockies hope that they can make an improbable run to the playoffs. Both players could be looking for new homes within the next year, as Heyward hits free agency (barring an extension) and Tulowitzki would be a very tempting target at the trade deadline or in free agency.

However, both players have started the season slowly. While Tulowitzki has a 103 wRC+ (which is pretty darn good for a SS), that figure is far below his 2014 results (171 wRC+) and his career figure (125 wRC+). Much of the blame can be placed on his .197 ISO, which is far below both his 2014 and career ISO. Tulowitzki has been able to counteract the drop in power somewhat due to a .370 BABIP that is far above any BABIP he has recorded over a full season. Heyward’s drop has been even more severe, as he is the owner of a B.J. Upton-esque 64 wRC+. While much of that should be attributed to a paltry .235 BABIP, some blame also can be ascribed to a poor batted ball distribution. However, it is too early to say that either player won’t see these trends reverse as the season progresses.

On the other hand, both players are suffering a precipitous and concerning decline in their plate discipline. Tulowitzki’s K rate has shot up from between 15 and 16 percent to almost 24 percent. Likewise, his walk rate has fallen to a paltry 1.6 percent as he has drawn one walk over the season. That shift is being driven by an increase in his swings on pitches out of zone, which has grown to 35 percent from 27 percent in 2014 according to Pitch F/X data:

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In addition, Tulowitzki is making less contact as he swings, as his contact rate is below 80 percent – a percentage he has never had at the end of the season. He is also swinging and missing more and is over the league average for the first time since his disastrous cup of coffee in 2006. Tulowitzki’s also seen 8 percent more pitches in the zone (a higher figure than ever before), which indicates that pitchers are not as afraid of him as they once were. All of this comes directly after he had hip surgery, which suggests that he may not be fully recovered yet or that the injury may have eroded his skills slightly.

Heyward also has seen his plate discipline deteriorate but not to the same level that Tulowitzki has. First the good news: his strikeout rate, while slightly elevated from his totals in the past few years, is still in line with his career norms. However, the rest of his plate discipline numbers are worse than his career numbers. As noted by Bernie Miklasz, Heyward only has one walk, is swinging at far more pitches out of zone than ever before, and is seeing fewer pitches in the zone than ever before. Miklasz also notes that Heyward is pounding groundballs – he is currently putting 62 percent of his balls in play on the ground. This is far above his career averages (as shown in the chart below) and is a sign that chasing more pitches is not helping him generate power.

In addition to the points that Miklasz made, Heyward is also swinging far less at pitches in the zone. This season, he has swung at 58 percent of pitches in the zone, the lowest percentage since his rookie year. These diverging trends have allowed Heyward to set a personal record: for every pitch that Heyward swings at out of the strike zone, he only swings at 1.04 pitches in the strike zone.* This is far below his career ratio of 1.69.

Now, as loyal FanGraphs members (only the truly committed read the Community board!), I can hear your refrain of “Small Sample Size.” And I certainly agree that it is too early to completely believe in the magnitude of these changes. It is extremely unlikely that both players will walk less than 2 percent of the time this year. However, I believe that the magnitude and consistency of the changes is a clear sign that both players are suffering due to the erosion of their plate-discipline skills. Both players have reached the stabilization point for strikeout rate, are halfway to the stabilization point for walk rate, and Heyward is quickly approaching the stabilization point for groundball rate. In addition, per pitch metrics like O-Swing and Z-Swing stabilize quickly, with swing rate stabilizing at 50 PAs. While those stabilization points only denote the point at which the data is half noise and half signal, the changes are consistent enough across multiple measures of plate discipline that its extremely hard to argue that it could **all** be a fluke. While both of these players are plus defenders and have the power to still be plus hitters with poor plate discipline, their value will suffer unless they can find a way to turn around their plate discipline.

* This statistic can be calculated using the following formula: (Zone%*Z-Swing%)/((1-Zone%)*O-Swing%).