Major League Baseball has a campaign asking fans to vote for the four “most impactful” players in their team’s history, with the winners being announced at the 2015 All-Star Game in Cincinnati. A panel of experts created an eight-man ballot for each team. This panel consists of MLB’s Official Historian John Thorn and representatives from MLB’s official statistician (the Elias Sports Bureau), MLB.com, MLB Network, and the Baseball Writers’ Association of America.

“Most impactful” is open to interpretation, which makes this an interesting exercise. It isn’t “best” or “most famous” or “most popular”, but “most impactful.” I decided to look at the eight players on the ballot for each franchise and where they rank in FanGraphs WAR during their time with that franchise.

For each franchise, I’ve listed their top 10 in FanGraphs WAR along with any players who are on the ballot who are below the top 10. The players in BOLD are those who are on the ballot and the years listed are the years in which they played for that team.

Los Angeles Angels (1961-2015)

(1) Nolan Ryan, 47.7 WAR (1972-1979)

(2) Chuck Finley, 44.7 WAR (1986-1999)

(3) Jim Fregosi, 42.6 WAR (1961-1971)

(4) Brian Downing, 36.5 WAR (1978-1990)

(5) Bobby Grich, 35.6 WAR

(6) Tim Salmon, 35.5 WAR (1992-2004, 2006)

(7) Mike Witt, 33.4 WAR

(8) Frank Tanana, 33.2 WAR

(9) Jered Weaver, 32.5 WAR

(10) Mike Trout, 30.3 WAR (2011-2015)

(13) Garret Anderson, 26.2 WAR (1994-2008)

(19) Vladimir Guerrero, 20.2 WAR (2004-2009)

On the ballot: Nolan Ryan played 27 years in the major leagues and eight of those years were with the Angels, during which he averaged almost six WAR per season and over 300 strikeouts per season. He was an All-Star five times with the Angels and is their team leader in career WAR. Ryan is also on the ballot for the Houston Astros and Texas Rangers, for whom he ranks 8^th and 17^th in WAR, respectively. He seems like a no-doubter for the Angels.

The number two player in career WAR for the Angels is Chuck Finley. While Ryan’s 47.7 WAR for the Angels came in just eight years with the team, it took Finley 14 years to accumulate 44.7 WAR, an average of 3.2 WAR per season. Finley’s best year was in 1993 when he was worth 5 WAR. Along with Ryan and Finley, Jim Fregosi is the only other Angels player with more than 40 WAR with the team, but his career was so long ago that he may not resonate with the voting fans like more recent players such as Tim Salmon, or Garret Anderson, who were teammates on the Angels in the late 1990s and early 2000s. They were both part of the Angels’ 2002 World Series championship team.

Brian Downing is the ultimate hipster—he was down with OBP before it became popular. He was also one of the first players to seriously embrace weight training and one of very few players who wore glasses while playing in the major leagues. He even had those tinted lenses that only the coolest dudes can pull off.

Even though he’s just in his fifth year in the big leagues, Mike Trout should get strong consideration for a spot on the Angels Franchise Four. In his three full seasons he averaged 9.6 WAR per season and had a good case to be AL MVP all three years (he won it last year and finished second the previous two years). He’s signed through 2020 and could replace Nolan Ryan at the top of the Angels’ WAR leaderboard within two or three years.

Finally, Vladimir Guerrero is the least-deserving player on the ballot based on career WAR with the Angels, as he only played six seasons with the team and had his three best seasons with the Expos earlier in his career. In his favor, he did win the 2004 AL MVP Award with the Angels and was a four-time All-Star with the team.

Notable snubs: Poor Bobby Grich. He got no love from Hall of Fame voters (just 2.6% of the vote in his only year on the ballot in 1992) despite being eighth all-time in WAR among second baseman (ahead of Hall of Famers Craig Biggio, Roberto Alomar, Ryne Sandberg, and others). Here, once again, he gets no love in this Franchise Four activity, not even a place on the ballot. Troy Glaus is pretty far down on the Angels’ all-time WAR list (18^th place, with 20.7 WAR), but I associate him more strongly with the Angels than I do Vladimir Guerrero.

My Franchise Four: Nolan Ryan, Mike Trout, Tim Salmon, Brian Downing

Houston Astros (1962-2015)

(1) Jeff Bagwell, 80.2 WAR (1991-2005)

(2) Craig Biggio, 65.8 WAR (1988-2007)

(3) Lance Berkman, 51.5 WAR (1999-2010)

(4) Jose Cruz, 47.8 WAR (1975-1987)

(5) Cesar Cedeno, 46.6 WAR

(6) Roy Oswalt, 46.3 WAR

(7) Jimmy Wynn, 38.7 WAR (1963-1973)

(8) Nolan Ryan, 36.4 WAR (1980-1988)

(9) J.R. Richard, 32.2 WAR (1971-1980)

(10) Larry Dierker, 31.8 WAR

(16) Mike Scott, 26.1 WAR (1983-1991) 

On the ballot: Jeff Bagwell and Craig Biggio are easy picks here and it’s hard to think of the two “Killer Bs” without the third “B”, Lance Berkman.

Bagwell played his entire 15 year career with the Astros and finished with 449 career homers and a .297/.408/.540 batting line. He was the 1991 NL Rookie of the Year and the NL MVP for the strike-shortened 1994 season in which he had 104 runs scored, 39 homers, and 116 RBI in just 110 games. He hit .368 that year and had a chance at 50 homers and 150 RBI if not for the labor dispute.

Craig Biggio was also an Astros’ lifer. He had a tremendous 1997 season worth 9.3 WAR when he hit .309/.415/.501 with good defense at second base. He had over 3000 hits in his career and led the league in getting hit by pitches five times.

Lance Berkman played the first 12 years of his career in Houston, then played for three other teams at the end of his career. His best days were with the Astros, though. He had six seasons with 6 or more WAR, including a 7.7 WAR season in 2008 when he hit .312/.420/.567 with 29 homers, 114 runs, 106 RBI, and 18 steals.

For a generation of fans in Houston, Jose Cruz WAS the Houston Astros. I don’t think you can have a Franchise Four without Jose Cruz on the Astros. His signature high front leg lift and those colorful uniforms of the 1970s just can’t be forgotten.

A player from the early years in Houston, “They Toy Cannon” Jimmy Winn, was able to hit for great power in the old Astrodome, a very tough park for hitters. He also posted very good on-base percentages when getting on base wasn’t as valued as it is today. He had six seasons with more than 100 walks.

Nolan Ryan spent more years with the Astros than he did with any other team during his long career and was on three Astros playoff teams in the 1980s. His 1987 season was very bizarre. He led the league in ERA at 2.76 and strikeouts with 270 but had a win-loss record of 8-16.

Sadly, J.R. Richard’s career was cut short when he suffered a stroke before a game in 1980. Richard was 30 years old at the time and was coming off a 1979 season during which he struck out 313 batters and finished third in the NL Cy Young voting. When he suffered the stroke in 1980, he was 10-4 with 1.90 ERA. He never again pitched in the major leagues.

The lowest ranking guy on the ballot is Mike Scott, who was the NL Cy Young winner in 1986, then was 2-0 with 2 complete games and a 0.50 ERA against the New York Mets in the NLCS. He was very good that year (8.6 WAR) and good again in 1987 (5.3 WAR), but his overall body of work with the Astros doesn’t compare to the others on the ballot.

Notable snubs: As good as Mike Scott was in 1986, his career contributions to the Houston Astros don’t stand up to what Roy Oswalt did during his career and I’m surprised that Oswalt didn’t make the ballot. Also, Cesar Cedeno was an All-Star four times in a five-year stretch for the Astros from 1972 to 1976.

My Franchise Four: Jeff Bagwell, Craig Biggio, Jose Cruz, Lance Berkman

Oakland Athletics (1901-2015)

(1) Rickey Henderson, 68.6 WAR (1979-1984, 1989-1995, 1998)

(2) Jimmie Foxx, 64.6 WAR (1925-1935)

(3) Eddie Plank, 57.8 WAR

(4) Eddie Collins, 55.9 WAR

(5) Lefty Grove, 54.3 WAR (1925-1933)

(6) Al Simmons, 51.6 WAR (1924-1932, 1940-1941, 1944)

(7) Sal Bando, 47.5 WAR

(8) Reggie Jackson, 45.2 WAR (1967-1975, 1987)

(9) Mark McGwire, 44.4 WAR

(10) Bob Johnson, 44.3 WAR

(26) Catfish Hunter, 27.2 WAR (1965-1974)

(45) Dennis Eckersley, 19.5 WAR (1987-1995)

(57) Rollie Fingers, 15.8 WAR (1968-1976)

On the ballot: The players on the ballot for the Athletics go as far back as Al Simmons to as recent as Rickey Henderson and Dennis Eckersley. Henderson last played for the A’s in 1998, so there’s a lack of very recent players for Athletics’ fans to choose from. This makes for a difficult ballot. Also, all eight players on the ballot had success with other teams along with their stints with the A’s.

I think Rickey Henderson is obvious. He’s the greatest leadoff hitter of all-time and had his most famous seasons with the A’s, like in 1982 when he stole a single-season record 130 bases. Henderson played 14 seasons for Oakland and led the league in steals eight times while with the team. He was also very good at getting on base and hit for surprising power for a leadoff hitter. He came up with the A’s at the young age of 20 in 1979 and played a little more than a half season, then averaged 6.6 WAR per season over the next five years. After spending 4 ½ seasons with the Yankees, Henderson rejoined the A’s in 1989 and had his best season in 1990 when he hit .325/.439/.577 with 119 runs, 28 homers, and 65 steals, good for 10.2 WAR. In his career, Henderson had over 3000 career hits, 2000 career walks, and a .401 lifetime on-base percentage.

Jimmie Foxx and Lefty Grove were both very good with the Athletics but also had good years with the Red Sox. They were teammates on the great A’s teams from 1929 to 1931 that went to three straight World Series and won two of them. Al Simmons was also part of those great A’s teams and had his best years with the Philadelphia Athletics but also played eight years with other teams.

Reggie Jackson was the “straw that stirs the drink” with the New York Yankees, after being part of three straight championship teams in Oakland in the early 1970s. He played more than twice as many games with the A’s as he did with the Yankees but it was his time in New York that earned him the nickname “Mr. October.” Still, it shouldn’t be forgotten that Reggie had five seasons with the A’s that were worth 5.7 or more WAR.

Catfish Hunter was also well-known for his play with the Yankees after being one of the first big free agent signings before the 1975 season, but he was much more successful (and healthy) with the A’s.

The two Athletics’ relievers on the ballot, Dennis Eckersley and Rollie Fingers, both had strong seasons with other teams. Eckersley pitched more years in Oakland but many more innings with the Red Sox because he was a starter early in his career and became a closer with the A’s. In 1992, Eck won the AL Cy Young Award and was the AL MVP. Over the three years from 1989 to 1991, Eckersley amazingly struck out 215 batters and walked just 16 in 207 innings (13.4 K/BB).

Notable snubs: Eddie Collins is fourth on the A’s all-time WAR leaderboard and third on the White Sox’ list. He made the White Sox ballot, but not the A’s. Collins played in four World Series for the A’s and they won three of them. Another old-timer, Eddie Plank, was also part of those four World Series squads and ranks third all-time in WAR for the franchise but is also absent from the ballot.

My Franchise Four: Rickey Henderson, Jimmie Foxx, Lefty Grove, Reggie Jackson

Seattle Mariners (1977-2015) 

(1) Ken Griffey, Jr., 67.6 WAR (1989-1999, 2009-2010)

(2) Edgar Martinez, 65.5 WAR (1987-2004)

(3) Ichiro!, 54.9 WAR (2001-2012)

(4) Felix Hernandez, 47.9 WAR (2005-2015)

(5) Randy Johnson, 45.5 WAR (1989-1998)

(6) Alex Rodriguez, 35.0 WAR

(7) Jamie Moyer, 30.2 WAR (1996-2006)

(8) Mike Moore, 23.5 WAR

(9) Jay Buhner, 22.4 WAR (1988-2001)

(10) Erik Hanson, 22.0 WAR

(11) Alvin Davis, 21.2 WAR (1984-1991)

On the ballot: You can’t argue with any of the eight players on the ballot for the Mariners. The top five should definitely be on the ballot and Jamie Moyer and Jay Buhner were on the first three teams in Mariners history to make the playoffs. Alvin Davis, even though he’s 11^th on the Mariners’ all-time WAR list, was “Mr. Mariner” in the 1980s. Those were bleak years and he was the one bright spot on the team at the time, even winning the Rookie of the Year award in 1984.

Ken Griffey, Jr. is automatic and I believe Edgar Martinez is also an easy pick for the Mariners Franchise Four. Griffeyput Seattle baseball on the map. Before he joined the Mariners, the team might as well have been in Siberia. Griffey started with the Mariners as a 19-year-old in 1989, then began a stretch of 10 straight season as an American League All-Star, along with 10 straight Gold Gloves and the 1997 AL MVP Award. He led the AL in home runs in each of his final three seasons with the team and averaged 52 homers and 142 RBI per year in his final four years with the M’s.

Edgar Martinez got a late start to his Major League career because the Mariners foolishly kept him in AAA in 1988 and 1989 while Jim Presley manned third base in Seattle. Edgar hit .363/.467/.517 in 1988 and .345/.457/.522 in 1989 in the Pacific Coast League. Meanwhile, Jim Presley combined to hit .232/.278/.367 with the Mariners over those two seasons. Looking back, it was quite ridiculous. Edgar became a full-time player in 1990 and hit .321/.429/.537 over the next twelve years, which included batting titles in 1992 and 1995. That 1995 season was his best in the bigs. He hit .356/.479/.628 and was worth 7 WAR. He then hit .571/.667/1.000 in the five game American League Divisional Series against the Yankees, which ended with Edgar’s game-winning double in the bottom of the 11^th that scored two runs and put the Mariners in the ALCS. It’s perhaps the signature moment in the history of the Seattle Mariners.

Griffey and Edgar may be automatic picks but choosing two out of Ichiro, King Felix, and Randy Johnson will be difficult for Mariners’ fans. Ichiro joined the M’s in 2001 and was the AL Rookie of the Year and AL MVP on a team that won 116 games. This was after the Mariners had lost Ken Griffey, Jr., Alex Rodriguez, and Randy Johnson. Also, Ichiro was an All-Star during his first ten seasons with the team with a .331 average and 224 hits per season from 2001 to 2010.

Randy Johnson (“The Big Unit”) was integral to the first two playoff teams in Mariners’ history when he went 18-2 in 1995 and 20-4 in 1997. In that 1995 season, the Big Unit won the one-game playoff against the Angels to put the Mariners in the post-season, then won two games against the Yankees in the ALDS, including one in relief while pitching on one day’s rest. He has the post-season narrative to promote his case for the Mariners Franchise Four.

King Felix, of course, has been the face of the Mariners for the better part of the last decade and is signed through the 2019 season. He won the AL Cy Young Award in 2010 and was second last year. It will be interesting to see what the fans do here with five very good players competing for four spots.

Most likely, Jamie Moyer, Jay Buhner, and Alvin Davis will be left out in the cold, as they just don’t compare to the top five. They all had great moments with the Mariners and are well remembered by the fans.

Notable snubs: He doesn’t really compare to the top five on this list and Mariner fans have no love for him, but A-Rod had five seasons with five or more WAR with the Mariners early in his career, so he was worth more to the team than Moyer, Buhner, or Davis.

My Franchise Four: Ken Griffey, Jr., Edgar Martinez, Ichiro Suzuki, Randy Johnson

Texas Rangers (1961-2015)

(1) Ivan Rodriguez, 49.4 WAR (1991-2002, 2009)

(2) Rafael Palmeiro, 42.3 WAR (1989-1993, 1999-2003)

(3) Buddy Bell, 34.6 WAR

(4) Jim Sundberg, 31.4 WAR

(5) Juan Gonzalez, 30.2 WAR (1989-1999, 2002-2003)

(6) Toby Harrah, 29.5 WAR

(7) Ian Kinsler, 29.1 WAR

(8) Frank Howard, 27.9 WAR (1965-1972)

(9) Alex Rodriguez, 27.0 WAR

(10) KennyRogers, 25.6 WAR

(11) Michael Young, 24.4 WAR (2000-2012)

(13) Adrian Beltre, 22.4 WAR (2011-2015)

(14) Josh Hamilton, 22.2 WAR (2008-2012)

(17) Nolan Ryan, 21.1 WAR (1989-1993)

On the ballot: Ivan Rodriguez looks like an easy pick for the Rangers Franchise Four. He spent 12 years with the Rangers at the beginning of his career and averaged over 4.0 WAR per season, including five seasons with 5.0 or more WAR. He was the face of the Rangers throughout the 1990s. Not only was he a very good-hitting catcher, he was terrific behind the plate with a rifle for an arm. With the Rangers, he was a 10-time All-Star, 10-time Gold Glove winner, and won the 1999 AL MVP Award when he hit .332/.356/.558 with 35 homers and 113 RBI.

Rafael Palmeiro is second all-time in WAR for the Rangers, but his case will be difficult for the voters. Some will choose him as one of the Rangers Franchise Four based solely on his numbers during two stints with the team, while others will consider other factors and not give him a vote. In 10 years with the Rangers, Palmeiro hit .290/.378/.519 with an average of 32 homers and 104 RBI per season.

Whether they were deserved or not, Juan Gonzalez won two MVP awards with the team. His first came in the 1996 season. He hit 47 home runs and had 144 RBI that year, but FanGraphs has him worth just 3.5 WAR. He won the AL MVP Award again in 1998 when he led the AL with 50 homers and 157 RBI, but even that year he was worth just 4.9 WAR, which was much less than many other players, including Alex Rodriguez, who was worth 7.9 WAR.

When Frank Howard was on the team that would become the Texas Rangers they were called the Washington Nationals. I don’t think he’ll resonate with fans as a Franchise Four candidate of a team whose uniform he barely wore (35 games as a Ranger in 1972).

Other than Nolan Ryan, the other players on the eight-man ballot are more recent. Josh Hamilton is unlikely to get much traction from fans but Michael Young and Adrian Beltre could get significant support, as could Nolan Ryan thanks to his post-playing-career role as team president. Young played 13 years with the Rangers, while Ryan played just five years with the team and Beltre is in the midst of his fifth season with Texas.

Notable snubs: For a generation of Ranger’s fans in the early 1980s, Buddy Bell was the team’s best player and regular All-Star representative. He only played six-and-a-half seasons with the team but had more than 4 WAR in all six full seasons and had three seasons with greater than 6 WAR, in large part due to terrific defense at third base.

My Franchise Four: Ivan Rodriguez, Rafael Palmeiro, Michael Young, Nolan Ryan

In “Hardball Retrospective: Evaluating Scouting and Development Outcomes for the Modern-Era Franchises”, I placed every ballplayer in the modern era (from 1901-present) on their original team. Therefore, John Smoltz is listed on the Tigers roster for the duration of his career while the Rockies declare Matt Holliday and the Royals claim Carlos Beltran and Johnny Damon. I calculated revised standings for every season based entirely on the performance of each team’s “original” players. I discuss every team’s “original” players and seasons at length along with organizational performance with respect to the Amateur Draft (or First-Year Player Draft), amateur free agent signings and other methods of player acquisition.  Season standings, WAR and Win Shares totals for the “original” teams are compared against the “actual” team results to assess each franchise’s scouting, development and general management skills.

Expanding on my research for the book, the following series of articles will reveal the finest single-season rosters for every Major League organization based on overall rankings in OWAR and OWS along with the general managers and scouting directors that constructed the teams. “Hardball Retrospective” is available in digital format on Amazon, Barnes and Noble, GooglePlay, iTunes and KoboBooks. The print edition is coming soon. Additional information and a discussion forum are available at TuataraSoftware.com.

Terminology

OWAR – Wins Above Replacement for players on “original” teams

OWS – Win Shares for players on “original” teams

OPW% – Pythagorean Won-Loss record for the “original” teams

Assessment

The 1992 Chicago White Sox         OWAR: 48.7     OWS: 278     OPW%: .547

GM Roland Hemond acquired 48% (12 of 25) of the ballplayers on the 1992 White Sox roster. Larry Himes’ brief term as the GM of the Pale Hose yielded a bumper crop of future stars including Frank E. Thomas, Robin Ventura, Jack McDowell and Alex Fernandez. 20 of the 25 team members were selected through the Amateur Draft process. Based on the revised standings the “Original” 1992 White Sox outpaced the Athletics by a five-game margin in the American League Western Division race.

Thomas (.323/24/115) paced the Junior Circuit with 46 doubles, 122 walks and a .439 OBP. The “Big Hurt” was inducted into the Baseball Hall of Fame in 2014 after posting a .301 lifetime batting average with 521 home runs and 1704 RBI. Ventura (.282/16/93) ripped 38 two-base hits and earned his second of six Gold Glove Awards. Brian Downing (.407 OBP) and Harold Baines platooned as the Sox’ designated hitter.

Thomas ranks tenth among first basemen in “The New Bill James Historical Baseball Abstract.” Ventura (22^nd-3B), Downing (38^th-LF) and Baines (42^nd-RF) also placed in the top 100 at their respective positions.

Doug Drabek (15-11, 2.77) fashioned a WHIP of 1.060 and whiffed a career-high 177 batsmen. Jack McDowell notched 20 victories with a 3.18 ERA and finished fifth in the 1992 American League Cy Young balloting. “Black Jack” claimed the award in the subsequent campaign with a 22-10 mark. Bobby Thigpen struggled in the closer’s role (22 SV, 4.75) and eventually relinquished the title to Scott Radinsky (15 SV, 2.73). Rich “Goose” Gossage rates 37th among pitchers in the “NBJHBA”.

The “Original” 1992 Chicago White Sox roster

Honorable Mention

The “Original” 2006 White Sox          OWAR: 45.0     OWS: 293     OPW%: .533

Chicago captured the American League Central division title by 5 games over Cleveland. “Big Hurt” rebounded from two sub-par campaigns to swat 39 big-flies and drive in 114 runs. Mike Cameron clubbed 22 round-trippers, pilfered 25 bags and claimed his third Gold Glove Award. Joe Crede established personal-bests with 30 jacks, 94 ribbies and a .283 BA. Likewise second baseman Ray Durham set career-highs in home runs (26) and RBI (93). Carlos “El Caballo” Lee slugged 37 circuit clouts and plated 116 baserunners. Magglio Ordonez contributed a .298 BA with 24 dingers and 104 ribbies.

On Deck

The “Original” 2012 Dodgers

References and Resources

Baseball America – Executive Database

Baseball-Reference

James, Bill. The New Bill James Historical Baseball Abstract. New York, NY.: The Free Press, 2001. Print.

James, Bill, with Jim Henzler. Win Shares. Morton Grove, Ill.: STATS, 2002. Print.

Retrosheet – Transactions Database

Seamheads – Baseball Gauge

Sean Lahman Baseball Archive

Rafael Montero is one of the New York Mets’ top pitching prospects, and he was given the spot start the other evening against the Mets’ division rival the Miami Marlins.  Montero got the loss after giving up three runs in the sixth but looked sharp striking out six and walking one over 5.2 innings.  Although Montero was sent back to the Mets’ Triple-A affiliate in Las Vegas, he will be back up later this season for bullpen help and will be the first called up to replace any starters that get injured during the long 162-game season.

Positives

Fastball movement and command

Although Montero’s fastball is not overpowering (90-93 mph, topping out at 94 mph), he placed it on both sides of the plate and kept it knee-high throughout his start.  This translated into Marlins hitters taking called strikes early in their at-bats, striking out looking (See first inning Dee Gordon and third inning Adeiny Hechavarria) and a good groundball rate of 48.1% for Montero (50%+ is considered an above-average groundball pitcher).  Montero’s fastball also showed strong arm-side run and sink at 90-93 mph, which projects a continued strong groundball rate in future outings.

Kept pitches down in the zone

Montero kept nearly all of his fastballs and off-speed pitches thigh high or below which resulted in very few hard-hit balls by Marlins hitters.  The only three pitches that were hard hit off of Montero were:

1. A Gordon fourth inning double on a four-seam fastball that was more a case of Gordon’s ability to hit rather than poor command by Montero.
2. A Giancarlo Stanton fourth inning line out to Mets third baseman Eric Campbell that was a product of a knee-high and inside two-seam fastball which showed the importance of keeping the ball down in the zone. If that fastball was a bit higher, it could have resulted in either a double down the third-base line or a two-run home run.
3. A Gordon sixth-inning single (advanced to second on Curtis Granderson fielding error) on a four-seam fastball that was left up in the strike zone. It was one of the few poor pitches left up and over the plate by Montero all night.

Use of slider

After a few appearances last year where Montero threw nearly 80% fastballs, the Mets have pushed him to throw his off-speed pitches more often.  Although Montero only threw 46% of his sliders for strikes last night, he did throw his slider for a strike when he needed to (see sixth inning Stanton 3-1 slider for called strike).  The 46% strike percentage can also be misleading because many of the times Montero threw his slider low and out of the strike zone in an attempt to cause a swing and miss.

Negatives

First-pitch strikes

Analyst that argue first-pitch strikes are overrated due to the small differences in 0-1 and 1-0 batting averages fail to understand that the first pitch of an at-bat will dictate which pitches will be thrown in the following pitches.  This is the reason that every pitching coach in America stresses the importance of first-pitch strikes to their pitchers.

Having said that, Montero did an average job getting ahead of hitters with first-pitch strikes or creating balls in play on the first pitch at a combined rate of 60%.  If Montero wants to become a second or third starter in a rotation, it will be imperative to get the first pitch of the at-bat into the strike zone closer to 75% to 80%.  When Montero does not get ahead of hitters, it is difficult for him to come back in an at-bat from 1-0, 2-0 and 2-1 counts because his off-speed pitches aren’t sharp enough to create many swing and misses.  This will force him to throw more predictable fastballs that will be hit into play harder.

Pitches up in the sixth inning

There were two notable pitches in the sixth inning that led to the Marlins go ahead runs:

1. The four-seam fastball noted earlier to Gordon that resulted in a line drive single to right field.
2. A 3-2 fastball to Stanton which resulted in a RBI single to left field.

On both of those fastballs, Montero didn’t get his hand on top of the baseball during his release or more commonly known as “finishing his pitch”.  This causes his four-seam fastball to stay up in the zone and allows his two-seam fastball to come back on a flat plane over the plate as opposed to a sinking plane left to right over the plate.  The reason Montero wasn’t able to finish his pitches well was most likely due to his small frame becoming tired on his 90^th pitch of the game.

Comparison

Montero’s body type is similar to Pedro Martinez with his six-foot, 185-pound frame but large enough hands to have the ability to manipulate movement on the baseball.  The one main difference is Martinez threw a consistent mid-90’s fastball and much sharper breaking off-speed pitches.  Montero’s repertoire of pitches can better be compared to Tim Hudson with his low-90’s two-seam sinker and the ability to locate an above-average slider.

So the seemingly inevitable came to fruition last week when the Colorado Rockies sent Wilin Rosario down to Triple-A Albuquerque after just 14 at-bats with the Rockies this year. According to the man himself, it was to allow another bullpen arm to join the big-league club. Fair enough you might say, the team’s immediate needs are a priority (try telling Kris Bryant that) and the Rockies needed another pitcher in the pen.

Just a couple of years ago, Rosario posted a .270 batting average, tallying 28 home runs and an .843 OPS in 426 plate appearances in the most demanding of positions as a 23-year-old rookie.

What did he do for an encore? Well in 2013 Rosario managed a .292 batting average but launched only 21 home runs and his OPS dropped to a paltry .801 in 466 plate appearances. I jest. Still very productive for a young catcher, even if he gets the assistance of Coors field 50% of the time.

So how did it reach the point where this seemingly top prospect is now battling for a spot in the Majors aged 26?

Well, it begins with Rosario’s skills behind the plate. As a 23 year old, the Rockies knew Rosario had the bat to play but needed to improve defensively to become an everyday catcher in the Majors. Bumps and hiccups are to be expected and in 2012 he had 13 errors and 21 passed balls in 105 games.

This improved in 2013, when Rosario committed nine errors and cut passed balls to nine in 106 games.

But then in 2014, things began to fall apart again and in just 96 games, he had 12 passed balls and seven errors. Granted, a strained left wrist troubled him much of the season, and landed him on the disabled list. In May, a nasty bout with type-B influenza cost him 12 games and 11 pounds. All this culminated in a drop in production at the plate. The batting average dropped to .267, homers fell to 13 and his OPS to .739 whilst appearing at the plate 410 times.

On paper, the batting stats don’t look too bad for a catcher suffering illnesses and injuries. After two good years, one disappointing one couldn’t undo all the potential shown in the previous two seasons, surely?

Looking a little deeper then, there’s the issues Rosario has had with facing righties during his career. Below is a breakdown of his 2012, ’13 and ’14 seasons, showing his splits against RHP and LHP.

2012

2013

2014

Rosario is considered someone who cannot hit righties effectively and one highly-regarded publication even had written this about him heading into 2015. “If every opposing pitcher was a lefty, he’d win an MVP. Any hope for solving RHPs? “. Not exactly a ringing endorsement. But again, his stats against righties aren’t terrible for a young catcher in the National League, certainly serviceable.

However, you now have enough question marks to take stock at what you have; someone who had a bad year, who struggles against right handed pitching and is not performing defensively. So the Rockies had a solution, move him over to first base. His WAR had dropped from starter level in 2012 and 2013 (both years he sported a 2.1 WAR) to replacement level in 2014 (-0.1 WAR). So it seemed like a good idea. Rosario is yet to hit his peak, his bat has more than enough upside for long-term production and without the pressures of needing to improve at the immensely challenging catcher position anymore, things can only trend up.

But then a spanner is thrown into the works in the form of Justin Morneau and his $12.5 million two-year contract which runs through the 2015 season (with a mutual option for 2016). So the simplest short-term solution is to keep Rosario in Triple-A for the season, work out his issues against righties, develop his skills at first and decline the option on Morneau’s contract for 2016, freeing up monies to be used elsewhere. Rosario is arbitration-eligible the next two years and cannot become an unrestricted free agent until 2018 but a long stint in the minors could add an extra year of team control.

So let’s play a bit of devil’s advocate for a moment. If the Rockies extend Morneau through 2016, if the Rockies don’t see Rosario as an everyday first baseman going forward, if they think they can use Rosario to get better elsewhere it begs the question: Who could be Wilin to give Rosario a chance?

As things stand, the Rockies have a winning record and it’s still too early to say if they’ll be contending this year or whether they’ll try to rebuild a little. So let’s look at three possible trades the Rockies could target at the end of this season if they feel the need to move on from Rosario.

Boston Red Sox

Mike Napoli’s contract ends this year and the Red Sox won’t be renewing it. He’s having a bad year and injuries have caught up with him. Rosario on the other hand could be the perfect fit what with the Green Monster and its hitter friendly confines. So the Red Sox could do with getting Rosario. But who could they trade? The Rockies need pitching above all else (which hasn’t bothered the front office too much in the past) but the Red Sox don’t really have any pitching options to trade. If anything, they need the help too.

So let’s look at the outfield. The Red Sox will enter 2016 with Mookie Betts, Rusney Castillo, Jackie Bradley Jr, Daniel Nava and Allen Craig as outfield options, whilst the Rockies will have Corey Dickerson, Carlos Gonzalez and Charlie Blackmon (based on existing contracts and no renewals/trades). So there’s one name which may intrigue. Brock Holt.

Brock Holt is a bit of a utility guy the Red Sox are trying to find at-bats for so one could perceive a trade for an everyday first baseman as ideal. The Rockies don’t have the depth of the Red Sox so they can find ways to give Holt more regular playing time and keep an effective batting lineup.

The likelihood of this trade happening is slim, but it’s intriguing nonetheless.

Philadelphia Phillies

It’s no secret the Phillies are reluctantly rebuilding after prolonged efforts to bury their head in the sand. They still field a lineup containing Ryan Howard and Carlos Ruiz despite father time having caught up with them both (not forgetting Chase Utley).

Ryan Howard continues to be the Phillies everyday first baseman and while he’s still signed through 2016, sooner or later, they need to bite the bullet and accept whatever they can get for him. Carlos Ruiz is also signed through 2016 so maybe if at least one can be moved on, Rosario could fill in for twelve months, covering either spot with a view of an everyday first base role from 2016. He’s young enough to form a part of the rebuild and is a clear upside on both Ruiz and Howard’s bat so this makes sense.

Cole Hamels is the big star the Rockies would love, but the Phillies are looking for a big prospect haul so unless some form of Dickerson, Arenado and top prospects were sent the other way, this just isn’t happening. They don’t have any other starter who could conceivably be considered by the Rockies either. Their main pitching prospects of Aaron Nola, Yoel Mecias, Zach Eflin, Jesse Biddle and Ben Lively are all probably out of play if they get serious about rebuilding so maybe a lower level guy like Nefi Ogando is possible. But this would be a big risk for the Rockies, trading for a mid-tier (at best) pitching prospect.

So maybe some bullpen help to go with it? Ken Giles is the closer in waiting for the Phillies once Papelbon leaves behind the fans who adore him so. But he’s struggle early in 2015 but again, the likelihood of the Phillies losing a potential closer for the next few years to bring in Rosario is unlikely so at best a package of two or three decent arms could be conceived by both parties.

Although it’d be difficult to see a trade here, I think a big enough scratch beneath the service could see something done to benefit the long term goals of each side. Stranger things have happened so only time would tell if the Rockies and Phillies could get something done.

Seattle Mariners

Finally we reach the most intriguing possible destination. The Seattle Mariners have invested big to get to the World Series in recent years. Big name free agent acquisitions of Robinson Cano and Nelson Cruz on the last two off-seasons has added to their chances whilst tying up King Felix long term has given them the ace they need. They’ve constructed a good rotation and a solid batting lineup with one notable exception; first base.

Logan Morrison has been the Mariners starting first baseman so far in 2015, after they waived Justin Smoak last October. First base has become a position synonymous with power hitters in recent times, with offense on the decline throughout baseball it’s a focal position for contending teams batting lineups. I’m not disparaging Logan Morrison, I don’t know the guy and he’s a far better baseball player than I’ll ever be, but he’s not a starting first baseman for a Major League contending team. Last year was the first time since 2010 he posted a positive WAR. Even in 2011 when he hit 23 homers, his WAR was -0.6. 2011 also marked the last time he played at least 100 games in a Major League season.

So there’s clearly a need to upgrade here. Is Wilin Rosario a clear upgrade? Well he is enough of one to matter, especially considering Morrison bats leftie. Morrison actually has a better career batting average against lefties (.260 compared to .243 against righties) but that’s as far as it goes for hitting lefties. Just a glance at his over stats will show this. As a sample, he hits a homerun every 28.65 at-bats against righties and one every 42.36 at-bats against lefties. Below is Morrison’s career splits.

The Mariners also have the advantage of the DH. They can easily keep Morrison, form some kind of platoon between Rosario and Morrison whilst still giving Rosario at bats against righties with either of them DHing. Rosario would be a cheaper option at first than most alternatives so improving their lineup without breaking the bank is a good thing right? Things are starting to make sense all of a sudden.

But what could the Mariners give up in order to acquire Rosario. Although Rosario would make sense, they certainly aren’t going to overpay for him. This is where things could get interesting…….

Rockies still haven’t pinned everything on Tulowitzki. If they ever trade him away, it’ll be in the next year so heading into 2016, the Rockies may need a shortstop. I present to you, Mr. Bradley Miller. Before you start up, I’m in no way suggesting Miller is a direct replacement for Tulowitzki!

The Mariners looked like giving Chris Taylor the starting shortstop gig in 2015, until a broken wrist curtailed that idea, giving Brad Miller another chance to shine. He’s been pretty good so far this year, but Chris Taylor is back and Miller certainly hasn’t shown the promise the Mariners hoped he would. If Taylor can hit well in Triple-A (he’s already hitting .328 with 2 homers, 5 steals and an .894 OPS) he’ll be with the big league club sooner rather than later. It’d be a downgrade at shortstop for the Rockies I grant you, but would free up a lot of cap space to go out and get something resembling a decent rotation.

But even if the Rockies do keep hold of Tulowitzki (and why wouldn’t you?), we come back to their need for pitching. The Mariners aren’t exactly steeped with pitching but certainly have enough to trade a piece away. They’d be unlikely to want to lose one of their more established “prospects” in order to get Rosario (Taijuan Walker, Roenis Elias, and James Paxton).

But there’s also Danny Hultzen, who has started the year well in Triple-A after rotator cuff surgery (currently sporting a 2.05 ERA through 30+ innings). Tyler Olsen is currently in the Mariner bullpen but was considered a 4^th/5^th starter during his minor league career and Ryan Yarbrough is continuing to impress in low A ball and at age 23, could easily be in the Majors within a couple of years. So the Mariners have enough depth to make a trade without harming their rotation. Whether or not they value any of these guys on a par with Rosario however is a different matter.

Looking at the three possible destinations, the Mariners appear to be the best chance of getting something done, but I’d be more inclined to suggest Wilin Rosario starts 2016 as the Rockies first baseman. And who’s to say he won’t finish 2015 in the role. Just as it wouldn’t surprise me in the least if he gets traded tomorrow, but that’s baseball. Nothing is ever set in stone and should the Rockies look to move on, there are certainly enough options out there to get something done.

Baseball is a game driven by stars. They create the most exciting highlight reels that captivate audiences and leave us all in awe. However, eventually every star player loses their battle with Father Time. The purpose of this research was to try and determine when a star player’s production declines to the point where they can become easily replaceable. I decided to use a process called survival analysis to determine when this event occurs.

Methodology

Survival analysis attempts to determine the probability of when an event will occur. In any survival analysis problem, you need to determine three things. You need to determine the requirements for your population, the variables to predict the time of event, and the event.

For this problem, I decided that I would include any player that had their first season of 4 WAR or higher between 1920 and 1999 in my population. I decided to use for my variables: the age when they recorded their first star season, body mass index, offensive runs above average per 150 games, and defensive runs above average per 150 games as my variables. The event I chose to predict was when the player would have his first season below 1 WAR following their star season. The cutoffs for determining stars and scrubs were fairly arbitrary, but I chose these cutoffs because the FanGraphs glossary loosely defines an All-Star season as 4-5 WAR and a scrub season as 0-1 WAR.

Determining the variables was much more difficult. I wanted to pick variables that would represent a player’s performance, age, and overall health. The age was simple enough to find, but it was difficult to find any injury history for players so I decided to calculate a player’s BMI from their listed height and weight. Obviously this isn’t a perfect representation, because a player’s weight is constantly changing throughout his career, but it’s the best that I could do given my limited resources. In order to limit my performance variables, I thought it was best to settle for the offensive runs and defensive runs component of WAR. However, since these are accumulating statistics, I had to recreate them as rate statistics in order to avoid creating correlation issues with the age variable in the model. I would have liked to use more offensive variables, but I feared that adding more inputs would make the model too convoluted and affect the accuracy of the player predictions. Alright, that’s enough preparation; let’s dive into the actual data.

Survival Rate Data

As a jumping off point, I’ll start by presenting a table of the survival rates for my population. Each season indicates the percentage of players from the original population that had not yet recorded a scrub season.

Let’s make some quick observations. The data shows that no star player has gone more than 20 seasons without recording a season below 1 WAR. It also appears that the survival function decays exponentially.  I also found it interesting that over 50% of stars turn into scrubs by their fifth season and that only 17% of star players survive 10 years in the majors before they register a scrub season. Looking at this data really helps to appreciate how rare it is when players like Derek Jeter and Adrian Beltre perform at a consistent level on a year to year basis.

Hazard Rate Data

Next, we will look at the hazard rate of the players in the population. One of the purposes of examining the hazard rate is to see how the rate of failure changes in a population over time. To find the hazard rate for each time period, you divide the amount of events recorded during a time period by the amount of players that have not yet registered a scrub season. Below is the following calculation for each time period in table format.

As you can see by the table above, the hazard rate generally increases with each passing season. This makes sense, because as players age, their skill level decreases and their odds of registering a scrub season will increase. However, the hazard rates are fairly constant for the first ten years and then rapidly increase from then on. I’m rather surprised that the hazard rates stayed so consistent for the first ten or so years. I would have guessed that the hazard function would have increased much more rapidly with each passing season.

Determining the Model

It is important to identify the trend of the hazard function, because it helps determine which distribution to use when creating a parametric model. If the hazard rate increases exponentially, you are supposed to use a Weibull distribution. If the hazard rate is constant, you are supposed to use an exponential distribution. Since the hazard function was increasing, I originally attempted to the use the Weibull distribution for the model but I found that the model was predicting too many players to fail in the first few seasons, so I decided to try an exponential distribution instead.

I found that the exponential distribution model was more accurate at predicting survival rates in the first ten years, but severely under predicted the amount of players that would record a scrub season after ten years. I decided to use the exponential distribution, because I believe that it would be far more useful to accurately predict the first ten years instead of the last ten years, since only 17% of players survive ten years. I also believe that any franchise would be thrilled to obtain ten years of stardom from a player and anymore production is just an added bonus.

Survival Rate Estimates

Below is a table of each star player from 2000 to 2014 with the year they entered the population, the time until they became a scrub, every variable included in the model and their predicted survival rate for each of their first ten seasons since becoming a star.

Conclusions

After looking at this table, we can draw several conclusions. First, this Mike Trout guy is really good at baseball. Secondly, age is the main variable in determining the time until failure. The players with the highest survival rates are all under twenty-five and all the lowest survival rates are over thirty. This makes sense, because it is much easier for a twenty-year-old star to remain effective until he is thirty compared to a thirty-year-old star attempting to remain effective until he is forty. This is because older players face more challenges such as eroding skills, an increased chance of sustaining injuries and having their playing time reduced to prevent injuries.

It also appears that offensive stars survive longer than defensive stars. This is probably due to the fact that defensive skills usually deteriorate faster than offensive skills. I also believe that since defensive statistics are more volatile than offensive statistics, that players that derive much of their value from their defense are more likely to have their WAR fluctuate from year to year. This makes it more likely that a defensive star could register a scrub season one year and then become a star again the next year. And this brings me to my next point.

Things to Keep in Mind

If a player records a scrub season that does not necessarily mean that he is finished.  If this were the case, players like Aramis Ramirez, Robinson Cano and Troy Tulowitzki would have had much less productive careers. It is also important to remember that a player enters the population as soon as they record their first star season, so it is quite possible that a player could improve after their first star season and make it more likely that they can outlast their projected survival rate. The main thing to remember is that no model is perfect and no model is meant to replace the human decision-making process. Models are only meant to improve the decision-making process and it is my hope that this model has accomplished that goal.

They are TERRIBLE hitters. They are not comparable to even the worst real hitters.

Max Scherzer said he enjoys hitting, but after getting hurt doing it, he thinks the DH might not be the worst idea.

The designated hitter is always a touchy subject, even though the National League is, if not the only league anywhere in the world, amateur or professional, that continues to employ it, then one of the few leagues to do so.

Yet I am not fully in one camp or the other. However, bringing the DH to the NL would not be a disaster of gargantuan proportions, as many a diehard NL fan might tell you. In fact, in an era of dying offenses, perhaps getting the worst hitters out of the batter’s box is an acceptable idea.

In 5519 PA in 2014, pitchers hit .122/.153/.153, for a minus-19 wRC+. The absolute worst hitter with at least 100 PA was JB Shuck, with a .145/.168/.209 line for a wRC+ of 2, or 21 points higher than the average pitcher. 21 points of wRC+ was also the 2014 gap between Nelson Cruz and Yan Gomes, or pick any of a number of great offensive seasons from merely good ones. Except here you are starting at terrible and ending up at abysmally awful. I would have created a “wRC+ X was Y times higher than wRC+ Z” construct instead, but it’s hard to do that when dealing with MINUS-19 and a positive number.

Meanwhile, the 30 worst hitters with 100+ PA last year, who combined for 5544 PA, comparable to the number of pitcher PA, posted a triple slash of .184/.247/.261. Their median wRC+ was 44; the mean, 38. (Note: Not -19.)

Bill Bergen, the poster boy for awful hitters, had a career wRC+ of 22 — 41 points higher than your typical 2014 pitcher.

Pitchers are terrible at hitting because it’s barely part of their job as it stands. And then they get hurt, like Chien-Ming Wang (running the bases) or Max Scherzer, doing this part of their job that is nearly irrelevant to the rest of it. It’s like asking the janitor to file a TPS report, and then he gets a really nasty paper cut and can’t go back to work for some time. (Terrible analogy, I know.)

I know the arguments in favor of the National League system as well, but won’t rehash them here, for fear of convincing myself to completely accept the DH, and thus further upsetting any number of fans. For example, did you know (and other people have basically written this already) the pitcher’s turn in the order is actually a helpful hint, not a complicating factor, in deciding when to remove a pitcher from a game? Not pinch-hitting means that you are allowing someone who can’t hit to hit, in exchange for the least effective parts of his real job, the mid- to late innings. The gap between a fresh reliever and a starter multiple times through the order on the mound *and* the gap between even a pinch-hitter and the pitcher at the plate are almost always both going to be in favor of removing the pitcher.

See, that’s what I meant. I’ll cut my losses and avoid trying to devise another lame analogy to conclude with.

The Washington Nationals, FanGraphs staff unanimous picks to be NL East champions, are off to a rough 7-12 start. Whether those struggles will continue is a matter for another post.

We are not here to talk about what ails the Nationals, or how to fix it. We’re here for a curious hypothetical: what if the Nats’ collapse continues? What if they are below .500 at the All-Star break and become trade deadline sellers?

We’re going to examine four questions. Who would the Nationals sell, how much would the team’s core change, how much money does this save them in 2016, and when would the team contend?

1. Who would the Nationals sell?

Jordan Zimmermann, Doug Fister, Ian Desmond, and Denard Span are impending free agents. Those are four very big names. The Nationals would be poised to offer two of the most valuable starting pitchers on the summer market; Zimmermann and Fister might be rentals, but they also don’t come with Cole Hamels’ massive contract. I think the team could also deal two players who will be free agents after 2016: Stephen Strasburg and Drew Storen.

The potential return here is, obviously, massive. We’re talking about trading away three members of a pitching rotation some analysts thought would be historically great. Strasburg clocked in at #23 on Dave Cameron’s offseason trade value rankings, just behind now-injured Yu Darvish. Although it would be frivolous to speculate on trading partners, given that our scenario is already far-fetched to start with, Ian Desmond and a starting pitcher could go a long way toward solving the Padres’ roster issues.

There are probably only two or three teams in the league that could meet an asking price for Strasburg. Maybe one of them gets desperate. If so, the Nationals probably gain at least one long-term core player. It won’t be Mookie Betts, but then, most good major league regulars aren’t Mookie Betts.

2. How much would the team’s core change?

They would still have Bryce Harper, Anthony Rendon, and Ryan Zimmerman batting, and Gio Gonzalez, Tanner Roark, and Max Scherzer on the mound. You can do worse. 2016-17 will bring Michael Taylor to the outfield, Trea Turner to shortstop, and a number of pitchers into the majors, perhaps including Lucas Giolito, Reynaldo Lopez, Joe Ross, and/or A.J. Cole.

That does not a championship 2016 roster make, but GM Mike Rizzo can demand near-league-ready talent in exchange for half his rotation, his center fielder, his shortstop, and his closer. That’s a lot of bargaining chips, and Rizzo is historically good at extracting trade value. (Wilson Ramos, Tanner Roark, and Doug Fister were acquired for players who contributed a combined -1.6 WAR to their new teams. I am not making that up. Negative 1.6. This excludes Steve Lombardozzi, who never played for Detroit, but posted -0.3 WAR for Baltimore.)

Funnily enough, if this is an imaginary July 2015 where the Nationals are already struggling to reach .500, I don’t think trading everyone away would make the team much worse. The infield can limp to the offseason with Danny Espinosa and Dan Uggla; Michael Taylor can return to center field; and Tanner Roark would step back into the rotation. It’s clearly a less talented roster with less awe-inspiring pitching, but they won’t fall to the cellar, either.

3. How much money does this save in 2016?

Stephen Strasburg and Drew Storen are both entering arbitration, after earning a combined $13.1M in 2015. With Zimmermann, Fister, Desmond, and Span coming off the books, the team doesn’t exactly need to worry about money. Those six players represent $61M of the 2015 payroll. They can also buy out Nate McLouth.

Remember, though, that Rendon enters arbitration in 2016, and Harper a year later.

The only long, potentially burdensome contracts on the club belong to Scherzer (not yet a problem), Ryan Zimmerman (a few years of on-field value remain), and Jayson Werth (ditto). That could be a lot worse. The team does not have an albatross yet.

4. When would the team contend?

With the new wild-card game, the imaginary blown-up Nationals would be contending again in 2016. You still have the core talents of Scherzer, Harper, and Rendon; Gio Gonzalez and Tanner Roark eating innings; and several useful prospects for the outfield and rotation. Surround them with a raft of young talent acquired at the deadline, cross your fingers Lucas Giolito doesn’t blow out his shoulder, and the team would have playoff upside in 2016, with a chance at a division title in 2017.

Conclusion

The Nationals should be fine for 2015. This is still the best and most talented club in the NL East.

But if the Nationals implode? They have a real chance to rebuild very quickly indeed. The Red Sox just went worst-to-first, then back to worst, and now they’re bidding for first again. The “to first” part of that trajectory will be the Nats’ inspiration. If 2015 does become a nightmare in D.C., the Washington front office can use speedy recognition, honest self-assessment, and savvy trading to rebuild a new contending team, and quickly.

(All stats are current as of the end of April 24th.)

During the offseason, Jason Heyward and Troy Tulowitzki were two of the highest-profile players on the trade block. Heyward was ultimately dealt as the Braves gear up for the future and the Cardinals look to fortify RF after the passing of Oscar Taveras. Tulowitzki was not dealt, as the Rockies hope that they can make an improbable run to the playoffs. Both players could be looking for new homes within the next year, as Heyward hits free agency (barring an extension) and Tulowitzki would be a very tempting target at the trade deadline or in free agency.

However, both players have started the season slowly. While Tulowitzki has a 103 wRC+ (which is pretty darn good for a SS), that figure is far below his 2014 results (171 wRC+) and his career figure (125 wRC+). Much of the blame can be placed on his .197 ISO, which is far below both his 2014 and career ISO. Tulowitzki has been able to counteract the drop in power somewhat due to a .370 BABIP that is far above any BABIP he has recorded over a full season. Heyward’s drop has been even more severe, as he is the owner of a B.J. Upton-esque 64 wRC+. While much of that should be attributed to a paltry .235 BABIP, some blame also can be ascribed to a poor batted ball distribution. However, it is too early to say that either player won’t see these trends reverse as the season progresses.

On the other hand, both players are suffering a precipitous and concerning decline in their plate discipline. Tulowitzki’s K rate has shot up from between 15 and 16 percent to almost 24 percent. Likewise, his walk rate has fallen to a paltry 1.6 percent as he has drawn one walk over the season. That shift is being driven by an increase in his swings on pitches out of zone, which has grown to 35 percent from 27 percent in 2014 according to Pitch F/X data:

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In addition, Tulowitzki is making less contact as he swings, as his contact rate is below 80 percent – a percentage he has never had at the end of the season. He is also swinging and missing more and is over the league average for the first time since his disastrous cup of coffee in 2006. Tulowitzki’s also seen 8 percent more pitches in the zone (a higher figure than ever before), which indicates that pitchers are not as afraid of him as they once were. All of this comes directly after he had hip surgery, which suggests that he may not be fully recovered yet or that the injury may have eroded his skills slightly.

Heyward also has seen his plate discipline deteriorate but not to the same level that Tulowitzki has. First the good news: his strikeout rate, while slightly elevated from his totals in the past few years, is still in line with his career norms. However, the rest of his plate discipline numbers are worse than his career numbers. As noted by Bernie Miklasz, Heyward only has one walk, is swinging at far more pitches out of zone than ever before, and is seeing fewer pitches in the zone than ever before. Miklasz also notes that Heyward is pounding groundballs – he is currently putting 62 percent of his balls in play on the ground. This is far above his career averages (as shown in the chart below) and is a sign that chasing more pitches is not helping him generate power.

In addition to the points that Miklasz made, Heyward is also swinging far less at pitches in the zone. This season, he has swung at 58 percent of pitches in the zone, the lowest percentage since his rookie year. These diverging trends have allowed Heyward to set a personal record: for every pitch that Heyward swings at out of the strike zone, he only swings at 1.04 pitches in the strike zone.* This is far below his career ratio of 1.69.

Now, as loyal FanGraphs members (only the truly committed read the Community board!), I can hear your refrain of “Small Sample Size.” And I certainly agree that it is too early to completely believe in the magnitude of these changes. It is extremely unlikely that both players will walk less than 2 percent of the time this year. However, I believe that the magnitude and consistency of the changes is a clear sign that both players are suffering due to the erosion of their plate-discipline skills. Both players have reached the stabilization point for strikeout rate, are halfway to the stabilization point for walk rate, and Heyward is quickly approaching the stabilization point for groundball rate. In addition, per pitch metrics like O-Swing and Z-Swing stabilize quickly, with swing rate stabilizing at 50 PAs. While those stabilization points only denote the point at which the data is half noise and half signal, the changes are consistent enough across multiple measures of plate discipline that its extremely hard to argue that it could **all** be a fluke. While both of these players are plus defenders and have the power to still be plus hitters with poor plate discipline, their value will suffer unless they can find a way to turn around their plate discipline.

* This statistic can be calculated using the following formula: (Zone%*Z-Swing%)/((1-Zone%)*O-Swing%).

So here’s the deal. I’ve seen loads of articles with great analysis and research and truthfully, I’d love to be all up in that. I love the nerdy side of the game and wish I could quote and analyse the tiniest statistics. I have great admiration for those who do. But the simple fact is I’m not that type of guy. Maybe I can’t comprehend certain stats and figures bounded about in modern baseball society. It could be I don’t have enough time to commit to breaking through in this field. Or simply it’s a case that I lack the “get up and go” as my old teachers used to say. I like to think it’s a combination of factors which contribute to me having never published an article of any kind, anywhere, ever. But here we are, I’m ready to do it, just not in the traditional sense some of you more avid fans would have become accustomed to…….

A little background first. I’m 31, born and raised in London, England and have been a big baseball fan for well over a decade. I like to think I have read and watched enough about the history of the sport and the current state of the game to be able to hold my own in any conversation with more baseball educated fellows. I started playing fantasy baseball 3 years ago after being randomly invited to join a long standing league by someone in a mock draft and have been hooked ever since. My winters are spent plotting my draft tactic and reading countless articles to help me draft my dream team. My rankings are done by Christmas and altered ad-nauseam until spring commences before the draft day hits the day the season starts. And here we are, at the reason I have taken time out of my working day private life to write this article. What on Earth was I thinking during the draft?!?!?!

Our league is standard scoring categories, snake re-draft with standard 25 man rosters and is Head-to-Head (which I know some experts detest but for the more casual yet serious player, I like it). And this year expanded to twelve teams from the usual ten. I was sat there with my rankings, myriad spreadsheets and utilities ready to complete the perfect draft. I set myself three clear and concise rules;

1. Do not draft too many players from one team. Reasoning is quite personal but I feel if there’s a team wide issue causing a slump and you have three or four guys from that team, the impact could be huge. I carried this over from my Chicago Bears Fantasy Football disaster a year ago.

2. Do not draft a pitcher in the first 6 rounds. I had spent a massive portion of my research looking at guys I can get pretty late to form a strong pitching core and had enough confidence in myself to execute this successfully.

3. Only draft closers guaranteed the role. This league has a stronger emphasis on closers as one or two teams will only draft relievers, nearly guaranteeing them WHIP, ERA and Saves whilst punting Wins and K’s which means relievers are generally drafted way too early (I’ll maybe do a write up on this one day but one step at a time huh).

With all this in mind, I logged on, found I was the 10^th pick and wasn’t too bothered. Hey, I was that confident I could have missed the first round pick altogether and still put together a title winning team. Thirty minutes and three picks into the draft, I had Edwin Encarnacion, Jose Bautista and Stephen Strasburg. A couple more hours had passed, and I owned Dellin Betances in the 9^th round and Ken Giles in the 17^th. Well done dude, that’s two of the three rules out the window but as long as you don’t draft any more Blue Jays, this is salvageable. By the end of round 22, I had Dalton Pompey and Drew Hutchison rostered. I sit here now as a Devon Travis and Miguel Castro owner to boot.

So how did it come to this I now ask myself? Why do I have 6 Blue Jays, a 3^rd round pitcher and two relievers who don’t close, one of which came to me in the 9^th round?!?!?! AAARRRRRGGGGGGHHHHHHHH

Well it’s pretty simple really; something I like to call Fantasy Dynamics. No doubt this phrase has been used the world over, but I think it’s apt here. This is the part of the article where I try to put over some wisdom and insight. Why have I put these self-imposed rules in place and why have I proceeded to break them with no more than a “how do you do”?

Best place to start is Rule 1; Do not draft too many players from one team; I wanted power early in the draft, get power guys early and cheap speed later, so with Encarnacion still out there after the first 9 picks, he kinda just fell into my lap. It was either him, Abreu or Rizzo and his back injury in spring aside, I felt Encarnacion was the safest bet with his track record for continued elite power. Abreu and Rizzo actually went in the next two picks and so onto my second pick, 15^th overall. More power I cried, I NEED MORE POWER. Ah look, Jose Bautista is still out there, he’ll do.

So without even fathoming my rules, within two minutes I had two Blue Jays. But I wasn’t bothered at this point. They served my purpose of getting elite power early. Granted, there was a couple of question marks over them but I’m not one for overpaying for the shiny new toy when there’s a perfectly good product on the shelf which does the same thing year in, year out for less. Neither player has much in the way of competition for their place this year and I actually believe the Blue Jays are a very good shout for the AL East so why shouldn’t I own their two best hitters?

As the draft went on, I needed an outfielder and lacked some speed. Ben Revere had been drafted too soon for my taste (152^nd overall pick) and by the late teen rounds there wasn’t much in the way of cheap speed. I considered Marisnick, but his playing time concerned me more than Pompey’s, so I plumped for the Toronto native especially given his propensity to run in the Minors.

Then we head into the 22^nd round and where I’m looking to pick up some low end starting pitching with upside. As mentioned before, this is a league where two teams ended up drafting only relievers which meant some SPs were going a lot later than expected. None more so than Drew Hutchison, someone I’d looked at in detail over the Winter and had warmed to considerably to fill the role of a low price, high upside pitcher. The fact his ADP was around the 220 mark and this was the 255^th pick overall, I had to pull the trigger. His upside at this price to too high to ignore, especially considering Bud Norris went in the same round. And then there were 4 Blue Jays!

So the end of the draft, I have 4 guys rostered who play north of the border. That’s cool, not the end of the world. And then the season begins and who do I have as my middle infielder on opening day…….Danny Santana. Now I really hated this guy going into the draft and was raging at the fact it was me who drafted him, but middle infielders were going way sooner than expected and some too soon for my liking (some examples below) so I had to get him to fill a spot if nothing else. So the season starts and I figured, “hey, why not take a chance on Devon Travis”. He’d been named as Toronto’s starting second baseman and in this side, could be productive so why not. That makes it 5 Blue Jays.

Jimmy Rollins             ADP 131         Selected 71^st overall      -60

Alcides Escobar          ADP 176         Selected 132^nd overall  -44

Daniel Murphy            ADP 142         Selected 109^th overall -33

Scooter Gennett         ADP 220         Selected 187^th overall -33

Closing the end of the season’s first week, the news breaks that Brett Cecil is out as Toronto’s closer and John Gibbons’ faith is being thrust onto Miguel Castro, a 20 year old upstart who was so under the radar, I couldn’t even find any information about him pre-season. But this is a league where closers are gold-dust and I was first to find this information out (thanks Twitter). So there I was, 6 Blue Jays just one week into the season. Rule 1, thanks for playing but goodbye.

But I could justify it to myself, I went power early, needed a speedy outfielder late, really liked Drew Hutchison, hated Danny Santana and had the chance for another bit of gold closer. So it’s not all bad, right. Granted a couple of the picks haven’t worked out early doors (I’m looking at you Drew and Jose’s shoulder) but looking back, I’m not sure there’s a whole lot I would have done differently given the same set of circumstances. With hindsight, maybe, but as Helen Reddy once said “Hindsight is wonderful. It’s always very easy to second guess after the fact”.

Then Rule 2; Do not draft a pitcher in the first 6 rounds. I had no need to, I’ll load up power early, get a couple of SP2 types around the 7^th and 8^th rounds and then draft the best player in the need I had. Simple. Until I got to my 3^rd round pick (no 34 overall). I had already seen 6 SPs drafted at this point (Kershaw, Felix, Scherzer, Sale, Bumgarner and Price) but no one seemed to want Stephen Strasburg to this point.  Why? I thought he’d take another step this year to being the ace he is already and would have been snapped up by now. But he wasn’t. I couldn’t chance he’d still be there by my next pick so why risk the wait? I had to do it, I just had to. And I did. Ta-Da, Rule 2 is outta here.

So why did I do it, what possible justification could I give myself for doing it? Well, it’s simple. I thought he was undervalued and was the best player available at the time of my pick. I could still achieve my target of stocking up with power early and now had an ace. I wouldn’t need two SP2 types, I’d only need the one and could easily bag some decent pop around the 6^th, 7^th and 8^th rounds so this is a good thing. I’ve done something I didn’t want to and it should actually make my team better now, so yay me!

And then Rule 3; Only draft closers guaranteed the role. By the time of my 9^th round pick (106^th overall) I had the power I needed, had the two starters I wanted and only had a gap at shortstop which at the time, I figured I could fill in easily (hindsight again). Nine (count ‘em NINE) closers had been drafted at this point. I couldn’t sit on the fence any longer, knowing closers were disappearing faster than donuts at Homer Simpson’s house. So who could I get? The elite ones had gone; the next tier of guys had been drained. Or had they? Dellin Betances was still waiting for a roster spot. All the talk from the Yankees was a committee, Andrew Miller could be taking saves away but Betances was so good last year, is a righty with great stuff. He’d get the job sooner rather than later all to himself. Let’s do this.

I had no regrets, of course Betances will be closing, its a shoe-in. So by the time my 17^th round pick arrives (202 overall), I figured it’s a good time to pick up another guy who can get me saves. By now, 31 relievers had been drafted, but Ken Giles was not one of them. The Phillies are desperate to cut ties with Papelbon and Giles is next up. They’ll find a buyer for Papelbon within the first week of the season. Papelbon doesn’t want to be in Philadelphia anymore. Papelbon will be gone within a week. Papelbon, PAPELBON, PAPELBONNNNNNNN………………

I was sure I had now got two guys, undervalued in this league that will close, give me plenty of strikeouts and be big factors in my triumph. At the end of the draft, I grinned to myself and was satisfied with my evening’s work. I looked at my “closers” and my grin subsided a little. What about Rule 3? Why have I now got 2 relievers not guaranteed to close?

Well as I mentioned in Betances case, I was so sure of his stuff and makeup, he’d be the full time closer within a couple of weeks. Maybe he’d lose a few saves to Miller during the season but so be it. I’m a Yankee fan (noticed I’ve waited this long to out myself in case any of you stopped reading as soon as I uttered those words). I know Betances will close, Girardi talking about a committee is pre-season bluster. D’oh.

And Ken Giles……well that I’m finding it harder to justify. There’s nothing guaranteed about Papelbon leaving the Phillies any time soon. Any potential buyer has gone silent and until trade deadline day looms, I think he stays put (maybe even beyond). Earlier this week I actually dropped Giles and he’s still sat in free agency which in this league, shows how limited his value has been so far. He’s been nowhere near last season’s level and is pretty much valueless in this league’s format. So well done to me for drafting him.

So that’s my draft day story, 3 simple rules, all of which have been broken. Why have I felt the need to write this? Is it somewhat cathartic? Well yes. But I’m not going to end on a big epiphany. People can take this for what they want it to be. Some of you will come out of this taking nothing away and that’s cool too. But the one thing it’s got me thinking about, is how much more flexible I need to be. When I first started to play, I almost had my team written down before the draft and barring one or two players, I wasn’t far wrong. It was as near to set in stone as could be. All because of my rigid nature in the draft. I’ve gotten better at that, I’m more open to making changes before, during and after the draft, seeking value rather than my overriding desire to own a particular player.

But this year I set myself three rules, based on my own experience, other people’s experience and every bit of research I had done. And yet all 3 still went out the window. Simple rules which won’t impact my plans and ideas, won’t hinder myself in the draft and should guide me to glory. And all I can muster is that flexibility is vital in drafts and during the season, keeping an open mind helps you as much as all the research you do. Don’t make rules you’re willing to break people!

No doubt, there’s much more seasoned Fantasy Baseball players who have read this and thought “what’s the point in this? I know what I’m doing, why should I listen to anything this guy has to say”. Some of you fellow newbies might also think the same, “How dumb is this guy?” But everyone who has ventured into this wonderful world we call Fantasy Baseball can take some sustenance from this, whether you learnt this lesson long ago, or simply don’t care about this and it’s given you something to gripe about, it’s done something.

Despite all of my rule breaking, I’m still happy with my team. It’s pretty much got the same MO as the team I had planned to have and there’s very little I would have done differently without hindsight. I think I can contend this year if I get that essential bit of luck everyone needs to succeed. I think this year could be my year. So let me close with a relevant quote which has some relevance, from my all-time favourite wordsmith; Mr Yogi Berra.

“If you don’t know where you are going, you’ll end up someplace else.”

What follows will look at aging curves as they relate to players with specific strikeout profiles. Specifically, we will look at how wOBA ages for players that strikeout more than the league-average strikeout rate and less than the league-average strikeout rate.

Through the research that is presented in this post, two points will be proven:

1. Players of different strikeout profiles age—their wOBAs change—at different rates.
2. The aging curve for players of different strikeout profiles has changed over time.

Before I present the methodology, the research that was conducted, and their conclusions, I want to give a big thank you to Jeff Zimmerman, who has not only done a lot of research around aging curves, but has also helped me throughout this process and pushed me in the right direction several times when I was stuck. Thank you.

Population

In order to give a non insignificant amount of time for a player’s wOBA to stabilize, but not place the playing time threshold for plate appearances so high that we artificially limit the population even more than it naturally is at the ends of the age spectrum, I looked at all player season from 1950 to 2014 where a player had a minimum of 600 plate appearances for the first aging curve in this post. The second aging curve in this post looks at all player seasons from 1990 to 2014 with a minimum of 600 plate appearances.

Now that we have our population, we need to split our population into two groups: players that strikeout more than league average and players that strikeout less than league average.

Because the league average strikeout rate of today is very different than it was 65 years ago, we can’t look at a player’s strikeout rate from 1950 and compare it to the league average strikeout rate of today.

In order to divide the population into two groups, I created a stat that weighs a player’s strikeout rate against the league average strikeout rate for the years that they played. For example, if a player played from 1970 to 1975, their adjusted strikeout rate would reflect how their strikeout rate compares to the league average strikeout rate from 1970 to 1975.

Players were then placed into two buckets based on their adjusted strikeout rate: players that struck out more than league average and players that struck out less than league average.

Methodology

There has been a lot of discussion over the years about the correct methodology to use for aging curves. This conversation has had altruistic intentions in the sense that it’s aim has been to minimize the survivorship bias that is inherent in the process, and, through the progress that has been made over the years, this study uses what the author has found to his knowledge to be the best technique to date. This article by Mitchell Lichtman summarizes a lot of the opinions.

While there is a survivorship bias inherent in any aging curve, the purpose of the different techniques used to create aging curves is to minimize the survivorship bias wherever possible.

What We Don’t Want In an Aging Curve 

An aging curve is not the average of all performances by players of specific ages. For example, say you have a group of 30-year-old players that have an average of a .320 wOBA and group of 29-year-old players that have an average of a .300 wOBA.

The point of an aging curve is to see how a player aged, not how they played. The group of 30-year-old players has a high wOBA because they are a talented group of players; they lasted long enough to play until they are 30. As they aged from the previous year, when they were 29 to their current age 30 season, they lost the bottom portion of players from their player pool. These are the players that couldn’t hang on any longer, whether it be because of a decline in defense, offense, or a combination of both. This bottom portion of players lower the wOBA of the current 29-year-old population through their presence and raise the wOBA of the 30-year-old population through their absence.

At the same time, the current 30-year-olds aged from their age-29 season to their age-30 season. Sure, there may be players who had a better age-30 season than age-29 season, but the current group of 30-year-olds, as a whole, still played worse at 30 than they did at 29.

When you look at the average of a particular age group, in this case 30-year-olds, you only see the players that survived, and, because they no longer play, you leave behind the players that are hidden from you sample. The method that follows resolves this issue to an extent.

What We Do Want In an Aging Curve

This study uses the delta method which looks at the differences of player seasons (i.e. a players age 29 wOBA minus their age 28 wOBA) and weighs those differences by the harmonic mean of the plate appearances for each pair seasons in question.

I would explain this further, but Jeff Zimmerman does an excellent job of this in a post on hitter aging curves that he did several years ago. While Jeff Zimmerman looked at RAA, which is a counting state, the methodology is basically the same for our purposes and wOBA, which is a rate stat:

In a nutshell, to do accurate work on this, I needed to go through all the hitters who ever played two consecutive seasons. If a player played back-to-back seasons, the RAA values were compared. The RAA values were adjusted to the harmonic mean of that player’s plate appearances.

Consider this fictional player:

Year1: RAA = 40 in 600 PA age 25
Year2: RAA = 30 in 300 PA age 26

Adjusting to harmonic mean: 2/((1/PA_y1)+(1/PA_y2)) = PA_hm
/((1/600)+(1/300)) = 400

Adjust RAA to PA_hm: (PA_hm/PA_y1)*RAA_y1 = RAA_y1_hm
(400/600)*40 = 26.7 RAA for Year1
(400/300)*30 = 40 RAA for Year2

This player would have gained 13.3 RAR (40 RAA – 26.7 RAA) in 400 PA from ages 25 to 26. From then, I then would add all the changes in RAA and PA together and adjust the values to 600 PA to see how much a player improved as he aged.

Findings

Below is an aging curve by strikeout profile for all player seasons with over 600 plate appearances in a season from 1950 until 2015.

We can see several findings immediately:

1. Players do age differently based on their strikeout profile.
2. Players that strikeout more than league average peak at 23.
3. Players that strikeout less than league average take longer to hit their peak—their age 26 season.
4. Players that strikeout more than league average age better than players that strikeout less than league average.

From a historical perspective, this graph is fun to look at, but the way the game was played over half a century ago is eclipsed by societal evolutions that today’s players benefit from.

To give us a more realistic idea of how today’s players age relative to their strikeout rate, I made another graph the at looks at player seasons from 1990 to 2014.

What we find in this graph, which is more current with today’s style of play, is that players still age differently dependent on their strikeout profile, but not in the same way that they did in the previous sample.

Players that strikeout more than league average still peak earlier than players that strike out less than league average, but in this more current population of players, players that strikeout more than league average peak very early—their age 21 season. This information would reciprocate the sentiment that has been conveyed through recent work that suggests that the aging curve has changed to the point that players peak almost as soon as when they enter the league.

The peak age for players that strikeout at below league average rates is still 26, but whereas this group aged more poorly than the strikeout heavy group in our previous population, players that strikeout at below league average rates now age better than their counterparts.

Conclusions

This information can make material differences for our overall expectations and outlooks on players.

Previous knowledge would suggest that players like George Springer and Kris Bryant—players who have exorbitant strikeout rates—are still on the climb as far as their talent goes, but this information shows that these players may already be at/close to their peaks or on the decline as far a their wOBA is concerned.

This information also shows that we should be patient with prospects that have a penchant to put balls is play; while they peak more quickly than they did in the previous population, they take longer to develop than players with more swing and miss in their game, and when they do start to decline, there isn’t much need to worry, because their climb from their peaks will be gradual.

Like many other studies that have looked at new aging curves, this study confirms that players/prospects peak earlier now than at any other point throughout history, but it also shows that a player’s trajectory upward and downward is dependent on characteristics specific to their approaches at the plate.

Devon Jordan is obsessed with statistical analysis, non-fiction literature, and electronic music. If you enjoyed reading him, follow him on Twitter @devonjjordan.