In “Hardball Retrospective: Evaluating Scouting and Development Outcomes for the Modern-Era Franchises”, I placed every ballplayer in the modern era (from 1901-present) on their original team. Consequently, Frankie Frisch is listed on the Giants roster for the duration of his career while the Indians declare Rocky Colavito and the Mariners claim David Ortiz. I calculated revised standings for every season based entirely on the performance of each team’s “original” players. I discuss every team’s “original” players and seasons at length along with organizational performance with respect to the Amateur Draft (or First-Year Player Draft), amateur free agent signings and other methods of player acquisition.  Season standings, WAR and Win Shares totals for the “original” teams are compared against the “actual” team results to assess each franchise’s scouting, development and general management skills.

Expanding on my research for the book, the following series of articles will reveal the finest single-season rosters for every Major League organization based on overall rankings in OWAR and OWS along with the general managers and scouting directors that constructed the teams. “Hardball Retrospective” is available in digital format on Amazon, Barnes and Noble, GooglePlay, iTunes and KoboBooks. The paperback edition is available on Amazon, Barnes and Noble and CreateSpace. Supplemental Statistics, Charts and Graphs along with a discussion forum are offered at TuataraSoftware.com.

Don Daglow (Intellivision World Series Major League Baseball, Earl Weaver Baseball, Tony LaRussa Baseball) contributed the foreword for Hardball Retrospective. The foreword and preview of my book are accessible here.

Terminology

OWAR – Wins Above Replacement for players on “original” teams

OWS – Win Shares for players on “original” teams

OPW% – Pythagorean Won-Loss record for the “original” teams

Assessment

The 1969 Cincinnati Reds          OWAR: 58.1     OWS: 362     OPW%: .619

Based on the revised standings the “Original” 1969 Reds recorded 100 victories and claimed the National League Western Division by 14 games over the Giants. Cincinnati topped the circuit in OWS and OWAR. GM Gabe Paul acquired 27 of the 40 ballplayers (68%) on the 1969 Reds roster.

Pete Rose (.348/16/82) notched his second straight batting title and paced the League with 120 runs scored. “Charlie Hustle” rapped 218 base knocks including 33 doubles and 11 triples while establishing personal-bests in OBP (.428) and SLG (.512). Jim Wynn aka the “Toy Cannon” unleashed 33 bombs, nabbed 23 bags, tallied 113 runs and topped the circuit with 148 bases on balls. Frank “The Judge” Robinson (.308/32/100) registered 111 aces and finished third in the MVP balloting. Third-sacker Tony “Big Dog” Perez belted 37 round-trippers, knocked in 122 runs and merited his third consecutive All-Star invite. “The Little General” Johnny Bench swatted 26 big-flies and drove in 90 runs during his sophomore season. Lee “Big Bopper” May crushed 38 moon-shots and plated 110 baserunners to earn his first appearance in the Mid-Summer Classic.

Johnny Bench places runner-up to Yogi Berra in the All-Time Catcher rankings according to Bill James in “The New Bill James Historical Baseball Abstract.” Teammates listed in the “NBJHBA” top 100 rankings include Robinson (3^rd-RF), Rose (5^th-RF), Wynn (10^th-CF), Perez (13^th-1B), Vada Pinson (18^th-CF), Curt Flood (36^th-CF), May (47^th-1B), Leo Cardenas (50^th-SS), Johnny Edwards (53^rd-C), Tommy Harper (56^th-LF), Cookie Rojas (69^th-2B), Cesar Tovar (79^th-CF), Tony Gonzalez (82^nd-CF) and Tommy Helms (99^th-2B).

Mike Cuellar (23-11, 2.38) earned the Cy Young Award while fashioning the lowest WHIP (1.005) of his career. Claude Osteen (20-15, 2.66) delivered career-bests in victories, innings pitched (321), strikeouts (183) and WHIP (1.143). Jim Maloney contributed a 12-5 record with a 2.77 ERA and Casey Cox (12-7, 2.78) furnished strikingly similar statistics. Diego Segui anchored the bullpen with 12 wins, 12 saves and a 3.35 ERA.

The “Original” 1969 Cincinnati Reds roster

Honorable Mention

The “Original” 1974 Reds                 OWAR: 52.6     OWS: 336     OPW%: .557

Cincinnati scrapped with Atlanta in the final weeks of the season. The Braves emerged with the division crown by two games while the Reds paced the National League in OWAR and OWS. Johnny Bench (.280/33/129) scored a career-high 108 runs and topped the RBI charts. Jim Wynn walloped 32 circuit clouts, drove in 108 baserunners and amassed 104 tallies. Pete Rose’s batting average dipped below .300 for the first time in ten years. All the same, “Charlie Hustle” paced the circuit with 45 doubles and 110 runs scored. Dave Concepcion earned his first of five Gold Glove Awards and contributed a .281 BA with 14 wallops and 41 steals. Hal McRae (.310/15/88) responded with 36 doubles after earning a full-time role. Ross “Scuz” Grimsley furnished an 18-13 record with a 3.07 ERA.

On Deck

The “Original” 1939 Yankees

References and Resources

Baseball America – Executive Database

Baseball-Reference

James, Bill. The New Bill James Historical Baseball Abstract. New York, NY.: The Free Press, 2001. Print.

James, Bill, with Jim Henzler. Win Shares. Morton Grove, Ill.: STATS, 2002. Print.

Retrosheet – Transactions Database

Seamheads – Baseball Gauge

Sean Lahman Baseball Archive

This week we will be following up on our previous piece regarding Least Valuable Players. There we identified Hanley Ramirez and Pablo Sandoval as the two worst performers of the 2015 season. We are not fans of beating the proverbial dead horse, but given that this was just the first year of their respective contracts we were interested in figuring out just how bad these deals are shaping up for the Red Sox.  The short answer? It is bad. Like, Lucas Duda throwing to home in high-pressure situations bad.

As you might recall, during the 2015 season Sandoval accumulated a -2 WAR whilst Hanley finished up with a -1.8 WAR.  Even after that woeful start, the Red Sox are still on the hook for 5 more years and $89.4 million for Sandoval, and 4 years and a total $90.25 million for Hanley. Just let that sink in for a minute: 9 seasons of potentially below-replacement-level performance for $180 million. That makes the Barry Zito deal sound like a real steal.

For the sake of argument, they do not have to be that bad for the rest of the contract, do they? I mean, these guys were 3-win players just two seasons ago; maybe this was just a hiccup. Well, Steamer seems to partially agree with this logic and projects them to improve substantially. More precisely, it projects Sandoval to have 1.8 WAR and Hanley 2.2 WAR during 2016. Returning to these levels of performance is something, but is it enough to salvage these deals?

We replicate the player assessment analyses we used in our piece comparing offseason splurges in pitchers, just to figure out the net value of these deals.  We use Steamer’s 2016 projections as a starting point for WAR and then apply a player aging curve that goes as follows:  WAR increases annually by +0.25 for ages 18-27, stays flat for ages 28-30, decreases annually by -0.5 for ages 31-37 and lastly decreases annually by -0.75 for ages 38 and above. With regards to the market value of wins we start off at $8 million per win and we apply a 5% yearly inflation rate.

Even after considering the improvements suggested by Steamer, none of the 9 seasons controlled by the Red Sox would produce a net positive value, and overall the net loss of these deals comes at $79.4 million.

We ran the numbers, and in order for the Red Sox to recoup their investments, even after letting 2015 go down as a sunk cost, Sandoval would have to accrue 10.35 WAR for the rest of the contract (73% more than the projection), whilst Hanley would have to accumulate 10.56 WAR (82% more than the projection). This seems to be rather unlikely, especially when you consider that the Steamer projection already seems bullish, implying a 4 WAR improvement between seasons.

We wanted to test just how bullish this prediction is. We set out to find the past seasons most like the ones Sandoval and Hanley just endured and tried to identify how those players fared off the year after as well as for the rest of their careers.  We searched the last 30 seasons for players between the ages of 28 and 32, that produced a -1.5 WAR or worse in at least 400 PA, after accumulating at least 5 WAR in the previous two seasons. Namely, we were searching for players that had been performing at a high level, still in their prime or early phases of decline, which suddenly plummeted in performance.

Lo and behold the mother of small samples. We found just 5 players that met these requirements, 4 of them are already retired and one of them, well, one of them also plays for the Red Sox.  Out of these five players four of them improved after their decline season, the other one was out of the game. Out of the ones that improved, only one, Joe Carter, was able to meet the 4 WAR improvement inherent to the Steamer prediction, actually he was the only one that was better than replacement level after the decline season. So far Joe Carter has also been the only one able to play more than one season in the majors after the decline, with the jury still out on Allen Craig.

Just how good were Joe Carter’s first five seasons after the decline? Well he won back-to-back World Series with the Blue Jays, starred in one of the most memorable moments of baseball history and amassed a total of 9.4 WAR; a figure similar to what would be required for either Hanley or Sandoval to break even in their contracts. Just how bad is the alternative? Another season of negative WAR (-1 is the average for those not named Joe Carter) and 0 WAR from then on; a scenario like this would produce net value losses for the Red Sox close to $200 million or 150% more than what emanates from the Steamer scenario.

I know that we are dealing with extremely small sample sizes, but entertain this thought for a second. Let’s imagine that the above players represent the universe of possibilities and hence Pablo and Hanley each have a 20% chance of becoming Joe Carter and returning a net value of 0, that means breaking even and getting fair value for investment, and 80% of teetering off and producing a net loss of around $100 million.  Under that scenario the expected value of keeping both players comes somewhere at a net loss of $160 million over the life of the contracts. That is not necessarily crippling as it translates roughly to 3-4 lost wins per year, but these bad decisions can find a way to add up quickly.

Based on this, the Red Sox would certainly welcome another Dodger bailout, however this time around they might have to add additional value for a deal to go through. Moving forward the Red Sox might want to pursue one of three alternatives. First off, they might use that $160 million expected net loss value as an upper bound of how much they would be willing to send (in either money or player value) to another team as compensation for taking these contracts off their hands. Secondly, they could settle on the Steamer projection and set that upper bound on $80 million. Lastly, they could try to make the other team believers of the Joe Carter dream, and try to get away with not sending anything else, and even hoping to get something of value back in return, but this seems rather unlikely.  In theory by sending something (money or players) of less value than those upper bound figures to facilitate the deals they would be effectively cutting their losses.

With regards to the debate between sending some money or a player with value to make the deal work, it should be noted that $160 million in net player value over 5 years is something like Xander Bogaerts and a Top 25-50 prospect. Despite all the good will that recent deals have gained Dombrowski, there is no way Red Sox Nation would look kindly into giving up that kind of talent just to undo a mistake. The Red Sox are looking to become consistently competitive for the years to come and it does not make much sense to mortgage the team’s present and future by giving up so much controllable high-end talent. It may be time for the Red Sox to leverage their financial fortitude, bite the bullet, subsidize part of the contracts if need be, and move on.

A question that tends to pop up around this time of year: “When does fantasy baseball season start?” Of course, we all know that fantasy-baseball season never ends, especially for those of us in keeper and dynasty leagues. To wit, Brad Johnson’s “Keeper Questions” thread posted just the other day is now sitting at 350 comments and growing. As we all collectively count the days ‘til spring training and opening day, one of the most oft-discussed and most subjectively-answered topics is “Who do I keep?” Fantasy baseball players intuitively understand the idea of aging, at least qualitatively. Older players are less valuable, given that their performance is more likely to decrease due to both injury and ineffectiveness. But how much is age worth, really?

Read the rest of this entry »

Say “John Hart” and many baseball fans will immediately think of a two-word phrase: “Cleveland Indians.” Hart made his name with the wider baseball public by skillfully transforming the perennial doormat into a juggernaut. From 1995 through 2001, the Indians finished first six times and second once. They went to the World Series (and lost) twice. The Indians last postseason appearance prior to 1995 was the 1954 World Series, when they got swept by the New York Baseball Giants.

Say “John Hart” and some baseball fans will think of another two-word phrase: “contract extensions.” Hart was a first-mover in employing the tactic of buying out a player’s arbitration and early free-agency years, paying a little more now in exchange for a lot less later. This was part of Hart’s broader strategy, useful anywhere and necessary in Cleveland, of squeezing the maximum value out of every dollar spent.

Say “John Hart” and almost no baseball fans will think of yet another two-word phrase: “senior citizens.” One of Hart’s less-heralded strategies was raiding the top end of the aging curve, signing players well past their born-on dates to patch the numerous holes in Cleveland’s roster that a decent but top-heavy farm system couldn’t fill. In 1995, Dennis Martinez tied for the second-best pitching season in baseball history by a 41-year-old.

In a coincidence proving that our lives are governed by powerful yet unseen forces far beyond our comprehension, Hart now finds himself in charge of the other Native American themed major-league franchise. (I strongly advocate renaming the Cleveland franchise thus, but that’s a topic for a different post.)  Hart’s experience in Cleveland will no doubt shape his approach to remaking the Braves into a contender, but the challenges he faces in Atlanta are in some ways more daunting, and the solutions he employed in Cleveland may be less effective today.

The Spiders team that Hart took over in 1991 already had most of the high-impact players that would power the team to its seven years of dominance. Here are the starting 8, the starting DH, and the rotation for the 1995 team, along with the player’s age and bWAR that year. A “+” indicates a player Hart obtained.

C      Tony Pena (38/0.3) +

1B    Paul Sorrento (29/0.4) +

2B    Carlos Baerga (26/2.6)

3B    Jim Thome (24/5.9)

SS    Omar Vizquel (28/1.4) +

LF    Albert Belle (28/6.9)

CF    Kenny Lofton (28/4.1) +

RF    MannyBeingManny (23/2.9)

DH   Eddie Murray (39/2.4) +

P       Dennis Martinez (41/5.7) +

P       Charles Nagy (28/2.4)

P       Orel Hershiser (36/3.7) +

P       Mark Clark (27/0.6) +

P       Chad Ogea (24/3.2)

Baerga, Belle, Ramirez, Thome: those Four Horseman of Lake Erie (ok, fine, you try making a metaphor) were already in the house when Hart took over. He added two critical pieces to the lineup, however. Quickly deciding that Alex Cole wasn’t the answer to any baseball question worth asking, in late 1991 Hart obtained Kenny Lofton from the Astros for … well, go ahead and click to find out. Lofton was traded six times in his career, and in five of those trades the team receiving Lofton committed larceny.

It took Hart longer to give up on shortstop (and former second overall pick) Mark Lewis, but after 800 ineffective plate appearances, Hart had seen enough. Recognizing that this guy has made Seattle’s Omar Vizquel redundant, Hart reeled him in for the low, low price of Felix Fermin and Reggie Jefferson.

That still left numerous vacancies on the major league roster, and Hart set about filling them by purchasing AARP’s mailing list for Northeast Ohio. Pena, Murray, El Presidente, and Hershiser were all old enough to know their way around the bingo parlor, and Hart got value from all of them except Pena.

Hart made two key additional moves, bringing in failed starters Jose Mesa and Eric Plunk and showing them immediately to the bullpen. The two combined for a whopping 6.0 bWAR in 1995.

And then those contract extensions!  Below are the player’s maximum salary with and after playing for the Indians, 2015 dollars (millions), as well as their ages during their last season in Cleveland:

________             Hart           Age                Hartless

Lofton                       5.3               29                    10.9

Ramirez                    6.2               28                   28.1

Baerga                       7.1               27                      7.0

Belle                          8.6               29                    17.6

Thome                      11.6              31                     17.1

Hart struck gold in four of the five cases – except for Baerga, these players’ salaries skyrocketed after they escaped the Cleveland contracts. Baerga was a misfire – he peaked very early and the first year under his new contract (1993) was the last year he would be dominant. In the other four cases, however, Hart got the players’ best years at a relative discount, and then allowed his competitors to overpay for the decline years.

Not that Hart avoided older players entirely – as we’ve seen, he prowled Sunset Acres with almost sinister determination. The years he didn’t want to pay for were the early to mid 30s; those were the years in which he seemed to think that market inefficiencies most significantly favored the players. Before that window he could get maximum performance, and after that window he could get veterans at discounts reflecting the players’ acute awareness of their own career mortality.

Vizquel is the obvious exception, though even here Hart got a bargain. Vizquel’s salary maxed out at $7.5 million  with the Spiders (in 2015 dollars), astonishingly low for a player who, while he probably doesn’t belong in the Hall of Fame, would hardly be an absurd choice. Vizquel played for Cleveland from age 27 through 37, thus encompassing many of the very years Hart avoided with others.

Here Hart was perhaps exploiting yet another market inefficiency, the bat bias. Vizquel never really hit – he had just two years with a wRC+ over 100, and his career number is 83, which isn’t that great even for a middle infielder. But oh, could he field. Only four active shortstops have played more than 2000 innings and have a better UZR/150 than Vizquel’s career 8.7. Vizquel’s glove was solid gold, and his relative weakness at the plate meant that Hart could buy that gold at a discount.

The system Hart inherited in Atlanta had less talent than Cleveland’s in 1991, though Hart has set about remedying the situation. From last year’s regulars, only Freddie Freeman figures to be on Atlanta’s next postseason team. Atlanta’s system has three prospects in the top 10 of their respective positions, according to MLB Pipeline: Dansby Swanson and Ozhaino Albies (both shortstops) and Sean Newcomb (LHP), with Swanson and Newcomb being Hart imports. Indeed, Newcomb came over in exchange for one of those better-than-Vizquel shortstops, Andrelton Simmons, he of the career 21.4 UZR/150; a phenomenal figure but one of arguably less relevance since Omar’s day thanks aggressive defensive shifting. (This isn’t necessarily to say Simmons’ number is inflated by shifting, but rather that less range-y guys might provide relatively more defensive value than previously thanks to the shifts.)

Assuming Hart keeps them both, Swanson will move to third or (less likely) Albies will move to center; his bat is unlikely to carry any other position. Atlanta’s upper levels have little obvious offensive potential, with center fielder Mallex Smith being a conspicuous exception. Though still largely a stranger to top-100 prospect lists, Smith has a career .768 OPS in the minors, unaided by the PCL, and will be just 23 this year. He struggled in AAA last season, but overall looks like he could be a useful speed-oriented center fielder. And he got a big up here.

So the outlines of a playoff core are in place: Freeman, Albies, Swanson, Smith (or perhaps Ender Inciarte, another recent Braves acquisition), and Newcomb. Long-term extensions, anyone? Well, let’s see, Freeman already got his: he’ll be pulling in $22 million in 2021 in a backloaded deal that looks somewhat risky, though it ends at age 31. Swanson, Albies, and Smith will have to wait until they demonstrate some ability in the majors, but the chances that Hart can get away with low AAV contracts through the players’ late 20s seem slim.

In 1994 Hart’s contract extensions seemed like a gamble, but today they look like bargains for the team. Few agents would want to be associated with these kinds of contracts unless the player needs to give a character discount (paging Aroldis Chapman). Indeed, Freeman’s contract may be the model here – a great deal for the team in the early years, while the player claws some of it back toward the end.

With the Indians Hart seemed to generally eschew long-term contracts for pitchers – the limited information I’ve found suggests that he never went beyond four years, though often with a salary-boosting club option (see, e.g., CC Sabathia and Bartolo Colon). So perhaps Newcomb can look forward to one relatively team-friendly 4-year deal to be followed by truckloads of cash from another team. One of Julio Teheran, Aaron Blair, and Touki Toussaint will probably fill the two spot.

As for the rest of the rotation, there are a lot of guys competing for probably two spots (the guys just mentioned, plus Manny Banuelos, Mike Minor, Matt Wisler, Mike Foltynewicz, and maybe three or four guys in the minors). Again, some of these guys may get one 4-ish year deal before moving on. On the other hand, good pitchers today will probably seek at least 5 or 6 years unless, again, there are character or injury issues militating in favor of a discount.

You know his methods, Watson – Hart may attempt to fill any remaining rotation holes with old but talented pitchers. Expect the same for the lineup, but using the young players’ sweet contracts to subsidize those of the veteran imports may be more difficult now than it was in the 90s, since the youngsters are going to leave less money on the table than the old (young) Indians did.

Hart enjoys one modest but rapidly deteriorating advantage: the NL East is a tire fire right now. The purported contending teams (Mets, Nats, maybe the Marlins) are more dysfunctional than Springfield’s nuclear plant. The Phillies have done an admirable job of remaking the front office and the farm system, but the team is still a few years from contention. This sorry window is closing, though. All of Atlanta’s competitors (except the Marlins) have more money to spend than Atlanta does; their dysfunction won’t last forever (except the Marlins). And yes, the Mets have, or should have, money.

Say “John Hart” to Atlanta fans in 2019 and maybe they’ll say “World Series!” But the mountain is steep – today he faces better-informed players and more uniformly competent GM competitors, all armed with big data that was only beginning to come into view in the mid 1990s. Perhaps Hart will lead his troops to fight like Scotsmen; to succeed, they’ll probably need to.

As I noted a few weeks ago, batters who were at least semi-regulars in both 2014 and 2015 were less effective in 2015 than in 2014, as measured by wRC+. That seemed directionally unsurprising — after all, players are subject to aging and regression every year — though the magnitude (an average decline of over five wRC+ points, or over four weighted by plate appearances) was a little higher than I’d expected. Was that decline, I wondered, unusual?

To answer, I calculated the change in wRC+ from one season to the next for players with at least 350 plate appearances in each season. I looked at every year from 1969 (four-team expansion, beginning of divisional play) to the present. (Fine print: I didn’t prorate my results for strike-shortened seasons, and I combined both leagues, with their different DH rules for most of the seasons, in the study. We’re looking at over 10,000 player-seasons, so small variations like the 1994 season and the four years in which the AL didn’t have a DH don’t amount to a lot.) Here are the results, with the second year of the pair of the x axis:

This graph should elicit two responses: (1) it looks as if year-on-year performance is declining, and (2) that is one noisy graph.

So I did another graph, taking the rolling three-year average change instead of the single-year change. Again, the second year of the pair is on the x axis, so 1972 refers to the average change for 1969-70, 1970-71, and 1971-72:

That’s less noisy, but it doesn’t change the conclusion: the year-over-year decline in offensive performance is the steepest it’s been in the nearly 50 years since divisional play began. I’ll use rolling average graphs for the remainder of this article.

The obvious question is: Why? What has changed that’s caused players to be nearly four points worse in terms of wRC+ in recent years when the long-term average decline is less than two, and hovered in a range of 0-2 in most years?

The first possibility that came to mind: Is it an age thing? Are players exhibiting different characteristics based on their year of birth? I divided the batters in my sample into four categories: Young (younger than 25 in the first season of the pair), Prime (25-29), Late Prime (30-34), and Old (35 or older). Here’s the decline in wRC+ for Young players. I used five-year moving averages, since limited sample sizes made the three-year moving averages pretty noisy.

Young players have been getting better, not worse, in consecutive years. That makes intuitive sense: we’d expect batters to improve a bit every year up to their peak in their late 20s. So youngsters aren’t the reason batters appear to be falling off more, year over year.

How about Prime years:

That’s the same scale as the last graph. This is a classic “You can go about your business, move along” graph. There’s been no notable change here. Batters entering their prime years have improved by about 1.5 wRC+ points in consecutive years, year-in, year-out.

Late Prime players:

Now we’re seeing declines, along with more noise. Players under 30, on average, improved their wRC+ from one year to the next. On the other side of 30, we see decline start to set in, to the tune of about a 3.8-point wRC+ average. And it’s gotten worse over the last ten years, rising from an average of about 3.1 in 1986-2005 to 4.1 in 2006-2015.

But we haven’t explained the problem yet. There’s nothing in the prior three graphs that would explain why the decline in wRC+ from one season to the next for semi-regular players has risen by over two points, because none of the prior three age groups has fallen off sharply. One more group left; let’s look at the Old players, 35 and up:

Whoa. That’s pretty dramatic. Year-over year, old players who are semi-regulars are declining a lot more now than they have been at any time since the mid-1970s, when trotting out the fossilized remains of Henry Aaron, Deron Johnson, and Billy Williams to play DH seemed like a good idea. This is the noisiest graph I’ve showed you so far, due to the limited number of older players in the game each year, but the marked climb since the 1990s is unmistakable.

Why is that? What’s happening to guys 35 and older? Nothing exactly leaps out, so here are some possible explanations:

Steroids. Admit it — that’s the first thing you thought. Same here. Fifteen or so years ago, you had all these guys in their late 30s putting up .300/.400/.500 lines with a couple dozen (or more, a lot more) bombs. Or at least it seemed that way. And sure enough, the five-year moving average decline in wRC+ for players aged 35 years or older was below the long-term average decline of about five wRC+ points for all but two years between 1989 and 2004. I think this points to a possibility of chemically-delayed aging patterns that have returned to normal, or perhaps even gotten worse.

More old guys. It’s not a secret that baseball players are better when they’re young than when they’re older. But, as noted above, the Steroid Era featured a lot of old guys hitting the crap out of the ball. Maybe that changed the thinking regarding roster construction, and teams are still carrying a lot of older hitters, even though they’re no longer as effective. Well, here’s a graph showing the percentage of players with 350+ plate appearances per season who were 35 or older.

No, GMs aren’t nostalgic for baseball in the late 1990s and early 2000s. There are fewer older players with regular or semi-regular roles today now than at any time over the past 20 years.

Worse old guys. Maybe the problem is just one of quality. Maybe older players today just aren’t as good as they were in years past. Maybe there was something about babies born in the 1970s. (Disco? The clothes? Watergate?) Here’s a chart showing players who were at least semi-regulars in consecutive seasons, aged 35 or older in their first season, and their wRC+ in their first and second seasons.

Nope, the older guys who’re good enough to get at least 350 plate appearances are still good players. They’re just getting worse faster, as evidenced by the widening gap between the red and yellow lines above.

Amphetamines. In baseball, the term performance-enhancing drugs is synonymous with steroids (and, to a lesser degree, HGH) in the public mind. But the list of banned substances is long, including all manner of illegal recreational drugs and, of relevance here, stimulants. Amphetamines — greenies, in baseball vernacular — have been associated with the game dating back to at least the 1960s. Baseball, of course, has a long season, with many more games than any other North American sport. Amphetamines help players improve reaction time, focus, and ward off fatigue. Those benefits accrue to everyone, of course, but they seem particularly relevant to older athletes, who face the inevitability of the aging process, mentally and physically. The amphetamine ban, which began in 2006, has likely had a larger impact on older players than younger ones. Of course, we’re talking about ten years of amphetamine testing, while the decline in older hitter year-on-year performance has lasted longer, so this can be only a partial explanation.

Sunk costs. Regular readers of FanGraphs are well acquainted with the concept of sunk costs; Dave Cameron has written about it repeatedly. Basically, a team should look at its total payroll as a cost of doing business, then allocate playing time in a manner that optimizes its chances of winning ballgames. That’s theoretical, of course. What actually happens is that teams are often reluctant to put high-salaried players into supporting roles. Take the 2016 Yankees, for example. They have a projected 2016 payroll of $230 million. They’ll spend about three quarters of that amount on nine players, all but one older than 30. Ideally, they should be willing to put CC Sabathia ($25 million in 2016, his age-35 season) in the bullpen, or make a DH platoon out of Mark Teixeira ($22.5 million, 36) and Alex Rodriguez ($20 million in each of 2016 and 2017, 40), or release Carlos Beltran ($15 million, 39) if any of them start particularly slowly. That’s what they might do with a 25-year-old making the major-league minimum. But the payroll obligation makes that move harder, even though that obligation’s a sunk cost — the team has to pay it regardless of how much the player plays. Here are the eight players aged 35 or older who, over the past two years, have suffered a wRC+ decline of 25 or more while retaining at least a semi-regular role, along with their contract status beyond the decline season:

All but Beltre and Byrd were below-average hitters in the second year, arguably not deserving of the plate appearances they received. But all but Suzuki, Utley, and Byrd were due at least eight figures after the year of their large decline. By contrast, a decade earlier, in 2004-2005, there were eleven semi-regular batters who, aged 35 or older, who had a wRC+ decline of 25 or more. Of them, only three — Luis Gonzalez and Jim Edmonds in 2005 and Bret Boone in 2004 — were in the midst of unexpired long-term multi-million-dollar contracts. Small sample size warnings and all, but there was a lot more future money committed to declining old batters in 2014-15 than 2004-05. Maybe those players wouldn’t be getting the plate appearances to meet the 350 threshold if it weren’t for the money that’s owed them.

Fastballs. One of the notable changes in baseball in recent years has been that pitchers throw harder. From 2007 to 2015, per PITCHf/x, the average fastball velocity increased from 91.1 mph to 92.4 mph. The increase was 1.3 mph, to 91.9 mph, for starters and 1.5 mph, to 93.2 mph, for relievers. Older batters can take advantage of their knowledge of the strike zone and pitch sequencing, but maybe they just can’t catch up to some pitches.

Granted, I’m guessing here. I’m leaning towards PEDs, both strength-enhancing and amphetamines, faster fastballs, and a tendency to put high-paid players in the lineup regardless of performance as the key drivers. But I’m not sure. This is an interesting trend, and sufficiently well-established that I don’t think we can write it off as a recent fluke. Something’s going on with players in the second half of their fourth decade that hasn’t happened in a long time.

As a Pittsburgh native and a lifelong “yinzer,” it feels quite awkward writing about future success up in that city on the lake that they call Cleveland. While there are certainly some question marks about the current roster, there is also a lot to be excited about. As I was looking through the 2016 Steamer projections the other day, I thought it would be fun to compare the Indians 2016 rotation to the New York Mets 2016 rotation. Before I go into my findings, I would like to add that I am not declaring the Indians’ rotation to be on the same elite level as the Mets’ rotation right now. I am merely comparing some advanced statistics and showing the great potential of this young rotation.

If the season were to start tomorrow, the Indians would have this 5-man rotation:

1. Corey Kluber
2. Carlos Carrasco
3. Danny Salazar
4. Trevor Bauer
5. Josh Tomlin

The “KluBot” has been a strikeout machine since becoming a regular in the Indians rotation in 2013. He is known for his cutter, fastball, and changeup that produce a high number of swing and misses. His sinker has above-average velocity and produces a lot of groundballs. We also can’t forget that slider that has outstanding depth. That gives him a five-pitch repertoire, which makes him incredibly effective. The 2016 Steamer projections have Kluber producing a 3.04 FIP, 5.3 WAR, and a 9.5 K/9. These numbers represent a true ace and that’s what we should expect from the former Cy Young Award winner.

After spending most of 2014 as a reliever, Carrasco emerged as a starter this past season and made a strong 30 starts for the Indians. Carrasco has been effective by throwing all five of his pitches with the same intensity and producing a lot of whiffs. He has a fastball that sits around 96 mph, a changeup and slider that sits around 89 mph, a curve that sits in the mid 80’s, and a sinker that is thrown around the same speed as his four-seam. Steamer projects Carrasco to produce an excellent 2.96 FIP with a 4.8 WAR and 9.7 K/9. Carrasco should continue to be a valuable workhorse for the Indians in 2016.

At only 25 years old, Danny Salazar was able to make 30 starts for the Indians in 2016 along with Carrasco. Salazar has the ability to throw six solid pitches, which includes his four-seam, cutter, splitter, sinker, slider, and curve. His cutter, four-seam, and sinker all show above-average velocity and generate a large number of groundballs. Steamer projects Salazar to generate a 3.53 FIP, 3.2 WAR, and 9.4 K/9. As a spectator, it is easy to be fascinated by high velocity numbers. However, I have always been a huge fan of a pitcher that can put the ball on the ground and get quick outs. These three pitchers have done that very well early in their career, which should benefit the Indians in the long run.

Trevor Bauer has been an interesting player up to this point in his career. Unlike the first three pitchers, Bauer produces a lot more fly balls on the mound. The Indians will most likely start him in the rotation in 2016, but I think a move to the bullpen is inevitable. We have seen a few unsuccessful starters rejuvenate their careers in the pen, such as Wade Davis and Andrew Miller. For now, I believe that Bauer can still be a workhorse number 4 starter and give the Indians some good innings. Steamers projects Bauer to produce a 4.39 FIP, 1.2 WAR, and 8.3 K/9.

Like Bauer, Josh Tomlin has been known to produce more fly balls that most. However, he is a solid number five starter with below-average velocity on his four-seam and sharp 12-6 curve. Last year, Tomlin put up a 7-2 record with a 3.02 ERA and 0.84 WHIP in just ten starts. Steamer projects Tomlin to generate a 4.07 FIP, 1.5 WAR, and 7.2 K/9 in 2016. Tomlin is not going to overpower anybody, but will provide a good amount of innings at the back end of the rotation.

Below, I have listed the projected Mets rotation for opening day 2016 along with steamers projections.

1. Jacob deGrom – 3.18 FIP, 4.4 WAR, 9.3 K/9
2. Matt Harvey – 3.11 FIP, 4.6 WAR, 9.2 K/9
3. Noah Syndergaard – 3.07 FIP, 4.1 WAR, 9.9 K/9
4. Steven Matz – 3.66 FIP, 2.3 WAR, 8.8 K/9
5. Bartolo Colon – 3.90 FIP, 1.3 WAR, 6.4 K/9

There is no doubt that the Mets have the best rotation in the league right now. It will only get better in June once Zack Wheeler makes his return from Tommy John and Bartolo moves to the bullpen. When comparing these two rotations, I found that the Indians have a slightly higher FIP of 3.59 compared to the Mets FIP of 3.38. However, compared to league average, both of these FIPs would be considered above average. When comparing the WAR of both rotations, the Mets are projected at 16.7 and the Indians are at 16 (just a 0.7 win difference). Last but not least, the Indians rotation projects to sit around an 8.8 K/9, while the Mets rotation projects to be at an 8.7 K/9. While this is not a huge difference, I found it eye-catching that the Indians rotation were projected at a higher K/9 than the likes of deGrom, Harvey, Syndergaard, and Matz. This is one of many reasons to be excited about this young Indians rotation going into the 2016 season.

After looking at the rotations, I took a sneak peek at the projected bullpens for each team. Before even looking at the steamer projections, I saw more promise in the Indians bullpen. With Cody Allen, Bryan Shaw, and Zach McAllister in the later innings and Jeff Manship, Shawn Armstrong, Kyle Crockett, and Austin Adams in middle relief, the Indians bullpen is by no means excellent. However, there is some potential with the young hard-throwers of Allen, McAllister, and Armstrong. The Mets are projected to have Jeurys Familia, Addison Reed, and Hansel Robles in the later innings along with Carlos Torres, Sean Gilmartin, Erik Goeddel, and Logan Verrett in middle relief. The Indians pen is projected to have better numbers across the board in FIP, WAR, K/9, and many other key statistics. However, both teams will be relying on their great starters to go the distance in many games.

Offensively, I have been hearing many Indians fans getting frustrated over a lack of big offseason moves by Chernoff and Antonetti to improve their lineup. Personally, I do not see a reason to worry just yet. Michael Brantley is expected to be back early in the season and Rajai Davis will play his role of a fourth outfielder for most of the season. I would be content with Rajai Davis being my fourth outfielder, even though he’s mostly limited to the corners. Abraham Almonte is not the most exciting player, but it could be a lot worse (Michael Bourn) and he should provide some defensive value. If anything, the Indians should look to add a third basemen. One person that comes to mind is David Freese, who is projected at a .320 wOBA, 101 wRC+, and a 1.2 WAR. Even though we have seen a small sample of Urshela, those numbers would provide a huge upgrade at third base. Also, a healthy Yan Gomes should provide some value behind the dish for this young staff. Entering the 2015 season, many were skeptical about the Mets offense and they were projected to produce around the same WAR as the season before (18.2). Steamers projects the Indians’ batters to produce a WAR of 18.4 in 2016.

The hard truth is that we don’t know who will underperform or over perform their projections before the season starts. Lindor could end up being a 5-WAR player rather than a 3-WAR player and Kipnis could be a 1-WAR player rather than a 3-WAR player. These are purely just projections based off past performances and league averages. I chose to compare these teams because I see a lot of similarities. Until adding Yoenis Cespedes during the trade deadline this past season, the Mets offense looked underwhelming, but survived with a strong staff. Going into the 2016 season most likely without Cespedes, the Mets offense still has question marks. However, with their strong rotation, they should be right at the top of the NL East along with the Washington Nationals once again. With Kluber, Carrasco, and Salazar, I see three powerful and healthy arms that produce a ton of groundballs and strikeouts. The offense will survive with this powerful rotation and decent bullpen. Therefore, as a Pittsburgh native, I urge my fellow Believelanders to get excited about this young team in 2016 as I believe they have the potential to be something special.

Hope you enjoy and had a happy New Years!

Introduction

Muscle fatigue is a process that results in decreased force generating capacity, and impaired performance [1]. Reduced force due to muscle fatigue may result in less stable joints, which can increase the risk of injury [2].  Furthermore, muscle fatigue is known to reduce joint proprioception  [3]–[6], which can result in further compromised joint stability and increased injury risk. Baseball pitchers have been shown to alter their kinematics (joint angles) when fatigued, which may strain different tissues when compared to pitching without fatigue [7].  Repetitive strain on these tissues can result in injury, and in baseball pitchers, injuries such as Ulnar Collateral Ligament tear.

Fatigue has been named the number one cause of injuries in baseball pitchers, leading to a 500% increase in injury likelihood [8]. Handgrip strength has decreased by up to 5% after simulated baseball games [9], and pitch velocity decreases over the the course of a game [10]. Pitcher kinematics also change with fatigue, with the elbow dropping lower, and the stride getting shorter.

The PITCHf/x system was created by Sportvision, and installed in every MLB stadium since 2006. The system allows for tracking of pitch movement, velocity and release point for every pitch thrown at the major league level. Two cameras are mounted in each stadium, and are used to track each pitch and display data during live broadcasts and websites. With the use of free software, like the programming package R, and database software MySQL, anyone can download gigabytes of data within hours, allowing for detailed analyses of pitching and hitting. With this detailed data, it would theoretically be possible to track changes associated with muscle fatigue. The purpose of this study was to examine how pitch velocity and release point changed in starting pitchers during the 2015 season.

Methods

Data Acquisition

I queried the pitchFX data from the 2015 season, grouping pitches by pitch type, pitcher, and inning. A pitch had to be thrown 20 times in an inning to be included for further analysis. The pitchers included in this analysis were those who pitched a minimum of 100 innings as a starting pitcher. The main focus of this analysis was to examine peak velocity changes, so only fastball type pitches were included in the analysis (four-seam, two-seam, split finger, sinking, cut, and general fastball).

I calculated the average velocity for each pitcher during their first inning of pitching. I then calculated the minimum average velocity for these pitches during either the 5^th, or 6^th inning – which ever value was the lowest.

For release point, I calculated the resultant distance of the release point (at z0, x0), from 0,0 (Figure 1). I also examined the change in vertical release point (z0) between the first inning, and the minimum of the 5^th and 6^th innings. Using the horizontal release point, and the vertical release point, I also calculated the absolute release angle (normalizing for left-handed and right-handed pitchers).

Statistics

For this analysis, the independent variable was inning (first inning, minimum of 5^th/6^th inning).

To examine the effect of inning, I performed a dependent samples t-test on variables of peak velocity, resultant release point, vertical release point, and release angle, with p < 0.05. I also calculated Cohen’s D to determine the effect size of the inning.

Results

Peak velocity significantly decreased between the first inning (91.19 ± 2.91 mph) and 5^th/6^th inning of the start (90.61 ± 3.01 mph, p< 0.05; d=0.20) (Figure 2). Vertical release point significantly decreased from 5.9 ± 0.35 feet to 5.84 ± 0.36 feet (p < 0.05, d=0.17)(Figure 3a). Resultant release point also decreased from 6.15 ± 0.35 feet to 6.09 ± 0.35 feet (p < 0.05, d=0.18) (Figure 3b). All of these changes were statistically significant, however, represented small effect sizes.

Release angle was significantly different between the first and final inning, moving from 74.9 ± 6.17 degrees to 75.1 ± 6.31 degrees. This represents a release angle that is closer to the vertical plane, or, closer to the midline of the body. While this change was statistically significant, the effect size was negligible (d=-0.04) (figure 4).

Discussion

In line with previous research on baseball pitching and fatigue, fastball velocity decreased between the beginning and the end of the average game. A decrease in release point distance and height also indicates that kinematics have changed during the course of a baseball game.

The following examples are from pitchers in the top ten for fatigue-related changes between innings. Andrew Heaney has a nearly 2mph decline between the 1^st and the 6^th inning (Figure 5a), and Ervin Santana has his resultant release point decrease by 2.21% (Figure 5b). In both cases, it could be expected that performance would be impaired by these fatigue-related changes. Conversely, Jacob deGrom actually increases his release point by 0.58% (Figure 5d), and Max Scherzer increases fastball velocity by 0.38% between the 1^st and 6^th inning (figure 5c). In general, 70% of pitchers experience a decreased velocity between the first and final inning, 85% of pitchers have a decrease in their resultant release point, and 83% of pitchers have a decrease in their vertical release point.

The velocity change demonstrated in this analysis represents a decrease of only 0.5 mph from the 1^st to the 6^th inning. This represents approximately a 1% change in velocity. Previous research has shown up to a 5mph decrease in velocity, decreasing from 90 mph to 85 mph during spring training games [10]. This greater decrease in velocity may represent decreased conditioning from the pitchers at this time of the season. Crotin, et al., [11] found that fastball velocity increased during a season, as a result of conditioning and improved strength. These factors may wash out some of the differences that could be seen throughout the course of a game, when average velocities are calculated over the course of an entire season and by inning, like in this analysis.

The pitchers included in this analysis represent a highly elite subset of the population. Previous research that has examined fatigue in baseball pitchers has included pitchers in spring training [10], college [9], or even Japanese high school players [12]. The fatigue effects for the elite population may not be as severe, as elite athletes are able to moderate the detrimental effects of fatigue when performing their sport specific task [13].

Limitations

Despite the easy access to PitchFX data, there are concerns with the accuracy and reliability of the system. For one, the release point displayed by the PitchFX system is at a distance of 50 feet from the plate. Typically, pitchers release the ball at 54-55 feet from the plate, so the true release point is not exactly known [14] Additionally, inter-stadium differences may also contribute to inaccurate PitchFX data – as cameras are not always in the exact same place in all stadiums.

Conclusions

Examining PitchFX data for fastball velocities and release points, averaged by inning for qualifying starters in the 2015 season, have produced results comparable to more controlled, lab based studies, on fatigue during pitching. However, limitations with the PitchFX system, and averaging data throughout the entire season can possibly remove some of the differences that could possible be seen as a pitcher fatigues. Additional research should be performed to examine in-game changes in velocity for both good, and bad starts, to see if fatigue effects are more prominent as a pitcher becomes less effective.

References

[1]       R. M. Enoka and J. Duchateau, “Muscle fatigue: what, why and how it influences muscle function.,” J. Physiol., vol. 586, no. 1, pp. 11–23, Jan. 2008.

[2]       G. S. Fleisig, J. R. Andrews, C. J. Dillman, and R. F. Escamilla, “Kinetics of baseball pitching with implications about injury mechanisms,” Am. J. Sports Med., vol. 23, no. 2, 1995.

[3]       L. A. Hiemstra, I. K. Lo, and P. J. Fowler, “Effect of fatigue on knee proprioception: implications for dynamic stabilization.,” J. Orthop. Sports Phys. Ther., vol. 31, no. 10, pp. 598–605, Oct. 2001.

[4]       F. Ribeiro, J. Mota, and J. Oliveira, “Effect of exercise-induced fatigue on position sense of the knee in the elderly,” Eur. J. Appl. Physiol., vol. 99, no. 4, pp. 379–385, 2007.

[5]       M. Sharpe and T. Miles, “Position sense at the elbow after fatiguing contractions,” Exp. Brain Res., vol. 94, no. 1, May 1993.

[6]       H. B. Skinner, M. P. Wyatt, J. A. Hodgdon, D. W. Conrad, and R. . Barrack, “Effect of fatigue on joint position sense of the knee,” J. Orthop. Res., vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 112 – 118, 1986.

[7]       R. F. Escamilla, S. W. Barrentine, G. S. Fleisig, N. Zheng, Y. Takada, D. Kingsley, and J. R. Andrews, “Pitching biomechanics as a pitcher approaches muscular fatigue during a simulated baseball game.,” Am. J. Sports Med., vol. 35, no. 1, pp. 23–33, Jan. 2007.

[8]       J. Lemire, “Preventing Athlete Injuries With Data-Driven Tech – Athletic Business,” Athletic Business, 2015. [Online]. Available: http://www.athleticbusiness.com/athlete-safety/preventing-athlete-injuries-with-data-driven-tech.html. [Accessed: 21-Dec-2015].

[9]       M. J. Mullaney, “Upper and Lower Extremity Muscle Fatigue After a Baseball Pitching Performance,” Am. J. Sports Med., vol. 33, no. 1, pp. 108–113, Jan. 2005.

[10]     T. a Murray, T. D. Cook, S. L. Werner, T. F. Schlegel, and R. J. Hawkins, “The effects of extended play on professional baseball pitchers.,” Am. J. Sports Med., vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 137–42, 2001.

[11]     R. L. Crotin, S. Bhan, T. Karakolis, and D. K. Ramsey, “Fastball velocity trends in short-season minor league baseball.,” J. Strength Cond. Res., vol. 27, no. 8, pp. 2206–12, Aug. 2013.

[12]     L.-H. Wang, K.-C. Lo, I.-M. Jou, L.-C. Kuo, T.-W. Tai, and F.-C. Su, “The effects of forearm fatigue on baseball fastball pitching, with implications about elbow injury.,” J. Sports Sci., pp. 1–8, Oct. 2015.

[13]     M. Lyons, Y. Al-Nakeeb, and A. Nevill, “The impact of moderate and high intensity total body fatigue on passing accuracy in expert and novice basketball players.,” J. Sports Sci. Med., vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 215–27, Jan. 2006.

[14]     M. Fast, “The Internet cried a little when you wrote that on it – The Hardball Times,” The Hardball Times, 2010. [Online]. Available: http://www.hardballtimes.com/the-internet-cried-a-little-when-you-wrote-that-on-it/. [Accessed: 21-Dec-2015].

For the first six years of his career, Evan Longoria was the best position player in baseball based on WAR (as FanGraphs calculates it). Despite losing over a season’s worth of games to various injuries during that time, his combination of tremendous hitting and elite defense at the hot corner made him a superstar when healthy.

Then 2014 happened. Injuries weren’t the issue, as Longoria played all 162 games for the first time, but his production cratered. He batted .253/.320/.404—well below his career averages of .275/.357/.512 coming into the season. He’d been so good up to that point, though, and he was only 28, so his off year appeared to be nothing more than a fluke. Surely Tampa Bay’s $100-million third baseman would bounce back.

He didn’t. His numbers improved slightly, to .270/.328/.435, but his 2015 was essentially the same as his 2014. Once again he was healthy, appearing in all but two games, making his struggles even more mystifying. That made two down years in a row for Longoria, in what were supposed to be his prime years.

Unless there’s a career-altering injury involved, great athletes typically don’t fall off a cliff in their late 20s. Oftentimes, they get better. They’re still young enough to be at their physical peaks, but also experienced enough to have acclimated to major-league competition. These are supposed to be an athlete’s greatest seasons.

For Longoria, they have been his worst.

Over the last couple years, Longoria has slipped from a great player to a merely good one, declining in all facets of the game. It’s been five years since he won his last Gold Glove, with defensive metrics suggesting he’s now closer to an average fielder than the vacuum cleaner he was previously. His baserunning has also fallen off considerably. Once an asset with his legs, he’s managed just 14 steals and provided negative value on the basepaths over the past five years.

Defense and speed peak early, however, so it’s not surprising that Longoria lost some of both as he approached 30. What’s concerning is how he’s become a league-average hitter after previously producing like David Ortiz.

A major red flag is Longoria’s plummeting walk rate, which has declined every year since 2011. Once a very patient hitter, he’s now drawing free passes at a league-average rate. Longoria’s chasing, and hitting, more pitches outside the zone than ever before, which explains both his eroding walk rates and hard-hit frequencies. When batters expand the strike zone, their swings become longer and generate weaker contact. After swinging at just a quarter of pitches outside the strike zone in 2013–tied for 20th out of 140 qualified batters–he’s chased over 31 percent of non-strikes each of the last two years, falling back to the pack in this department.

It’s no secret that older players become more aggressive to compensate for diminished bat speed, as they have to guess more often and start their swing earlier to catch up with fastballs. It could also be that Longoria is responding to an increase in first-pitch strikes. Whereas his first-pitch-strike percentage was below the league average every year from 2009-2013, he’s seen more first-pitch strikes than average over the past two seasons combined. When batters fall behind early, they can’t afford to be patient and are at the pitcher’s mercy. In 2015 the league hit just .225/.265/.344 after going down 0-1. Longoria isn’t much better, batting .234/.277/.388 for his career after first-pitch strikes. Since he’s seeing more of those, it follows that his numbers have nosedived. As for why Longoria’s seeing more first-pitch strikes, the larger strike zone is likely to blame, but pitchers also appear to be challenging him more often.

What’s really troubling, though, is Longoria’s evaporating power. After averaging 33 home runs per 162 games with a .237 ISO through his first six seasons, he’s averaged just 22 long balls with a .158 ISO over the past two. His doubles were down too, from 41 per 162 games to 31, so it’s not like he was just getting unlucky with his HR/FB rates (though he did post the lowest one of his career–10.8 percent–in both 2014 and 2015). He’s not trading contact for power, either, as his strikeout rates and contact rates have held steady.

The reason for Longoria’s diminished power is simple and one I alluded to earlier; he’s not hitting the ball as hard as he used to. After reaching a high of 41.5 percent in 2013, his hard-hit rate crashed to 32.1 percent in 2014 and 30.6 percent last year. Meanwhile, his soft-contact rate nearly doubled from 2013 to 2015. This data, along with his rising infield-fly rates (he popped up as often as he homered last year) and shrinking fly-ball distances, suggests he’s not squaring up the ball as well as he used to. That’s a side effect of hacking, to be sure, but also reflects his waning bat speed and exit velocity.

Recent studies have shown that position players are peaking earlier than they used to, closer to age 26, and it appears that’s what happened with Longoria. His seemingly premature decline has likely been accelerated by injuries suffered early in his career as well as the rigors of playing a demanding defensive position. On that note,  his career seems to be following the same path as David Wright’s. Both peaked early and were at their best in their mid-20s, looking like future Hall of Famers. Then their performance started suffering in their late 20s, because of injuries with Wright and the reasons outlined above with Longoria (both were hurt by their home parks as well). Wright has yet to recapture the consistent greatness he exhibited through his first five seasons and, should Longoria continue on his current trajectory, neither will he.

After the announcement of the Cy Young and MVP winners, the award season is officially over and the offseason is in full stride. Most, except perhaps Royals and Mets fans, have moved on from the 2015 season and are focused on the year ahead. However, before doing so, I wanted to answer one final question about the past season: Who were the league’s Least Valuable Players (LVPs)?

Inspired by Neil Paine’s piece on Bryce Harper and the MVP I define the LVPs as position players (with at least 400 plate appearances) that not only had a bad year in terms of performance, but had an even worse performance relative to the salary they were being paid.

Why the distinction?  First off, most teams, with a few apparent exceptions (I’m looking at you Dodgers) have some sort of payroll limitation. Therefore having an expensive player stink up the place limits the opportunity that teams have to replace them via free agency or trade.

Secondly, it is my initial assumption, that underperforming players with large contracts may get disproportionally more playing time than similarly underperforming players with cheap contracts. This might be because teams hope that by giving players a chance to work things out at the plate they may salvage their initial investment or even entice another team to take a flyer with them. This, in the end, might be compounding the issue in the long-term as it robs the team the opportunity to try out existing farm-level talent at the position for instance.

It should be noted that it is possible that unlike most replacement-level players, underperforming players with big contracts were at some point actually good players and might have some other intrinsic value for their teams (i.e.: leadership, tradition, marketing, etc.) that justifies playing time; think of Ken Griffey Jr during his last few seasons or Derek Jeter’s farewell tour. However, for the intents and purposes of this article we will not be discounting player’s terribleness by any of these measures.

As far as methodology goes we will be replicating Paine’s approach from the previously mentioned article. FanGraphs calculates the monetary value of a player by estimating how much teams spent during the preceding offseason per projected WAR and then multiplying this value by accrued WAR during the season to get a sense of how much those wins above replacement would’ve cost in the “open market”. Then, from this “open market” value we subtract the actual salary (or rather salary cap hit from spotrac) of the players to get a grasp for their relative value or net value. In the case of over performing players this would turn into a value surplus for the team, whilst for underperforming players this would represent an additional cost for the team.

For example, per FanGraphs, the cost of a win in the 2015 offseason was approximately $8 million. Mike Trout accumulated WAR of 9.0 during the year, which means that the value his 2015 season was around $72 million. Meanwhile, his salary was a “mere” $6.1 million, which makes the surplus for the Angels somewhere around $66 million. In other words, the Angels paid $6.1 million in salary to get $72 million worth in production, which is a bargain of historic proportions.  Conversely, during the 2015 season Ryan Howard accumulated a WAR of -0.4, which translates into a -$3.2 million value. Not only that, but Howard was paid a cool $25 million for his services, which means that the true cost to the Phillies was of $28.2 million. In other words Philadelphia invested $25 million to get -$3.2 million in production, which over time is the kind of decision that leads to this.

So without further ado here are our Top 50 LVPs from the 2015 season:

The American League LVP is a tight race between two teammates in which Hanley Ramirez narrowly beats out Pablo Sandoval, even after failing to accumulate enough plate appearances to qualify for the batting title. Meanwhile, Ryan Howard stands head and shoulders above the competition in the National League specially after considering that the Dodgers heavily subsidized Matt Kemp’s salary.

When considering teams most affected by this subset of underperforming stars we can highlight the Red Sox and White Sox leading the way with over $60 million of net value lost each seriously shooting themselves in the foot as both had aspired to contend in 2015.  This was particularly damning for Boston; had they not had these terrible contracts on hand, and holding all else constant, the Red Sox would have finished with the 6th best positional net value in the AL, ahead of playoff teams like the Astros, Rangers and Yankees and with sufficient cash to spend to shore up their well-documented starting rotation deficiencies.

Lastly, it’s worth noting the vast number of players on the list that were signed as free agents, extended or traded for during the past year. All in all roughly half of the players on this list fit that description, which is something to keep in mind when your team announces its next big move during the coming offseason (uh-oh).

Note: This analysis is also featured in our emerging blog www.theimperfectgame.com

The idea for the graphs in this article started with a post I read at Tom Tango’s website, which linked to this article. That article gave further credit to Sky Kalkman. Jeff Zimmerman also had a post in 2009 with this graphical representation, so be aware that I’m building off of the work of others, with some changes.

The methodology:

• I used only BBWAA-elected Hall of Fame players. Since I’m looking at players currently up for election by the BBWAA, I thought it would be best to look at players previously voted in by the BBWAA. The BBWAA has a higher standard for entry than the various Veterans Committees. Many of the Hall of Fame players with the lowest WAR totals were put in by Veterans or Old Timers Committees.
• I separated catchers from the rest of the hitters. I also created two graphs for relief pitchers. One compares relievers to all pitchers. The other compares relievers to just BBWAA-elected relievers.
• I used FanGraphs WAR. The articles I linked to above used Sean Smith’s WAR database, which uses Baseball-Reference WAR.
• BBWAA-elected Hall of Fame players are ranked by their highest WAR season to lowest WAR season.
• All of the highest season values for the Hall of Famers were grouped together, then the second highest seasons, then the third highest seasons, etc.
• When the WAR values went negative, they were zeroed out from that point forward.
• I found the 75^th, 50^th, and 25^th percentile for each season. This band is shaded in gray, with the black line representing the 50^th

The “No-Doubters” Tier

Barry Bonds (164.4 WAR, seasons above the median: all)—Setting aside the PED issue and focusing on just what he did on the field, Barry Bonds could be in a two-man Hall of Fame with Babe Ruth (168.4 hitting WAR). They are both nearly 15 WAR ahead of the next player, Willie Mays (149.9 WAR). Then again, if you add in the 12.4 WAR Babe Ruth earned for his pitching, the gap between Ruth and Bonds is greater than the gap between Bonds and Mays. Babe Ruth could be in his own personal Hall of Fame, where the hot dogs are always cooked to perfection and the beer flows freely.

Pre-1999 Barry Bonds (99.2 WAR)—The purple line on the graph represents the best 13 years of Barry Bonds career before the 1999 season, which is when it is commonly thought Bonds started using PEDs. Even if Bonds had retired before his incredible stretch of seasons from 2001 to 2004, he looks like an easy Hall of Famer.

Jeff Bagwell (80.2 WAR, seasons above the median: 13)—Bagwell compares favorably to Ken Griffey, Jr. His best three years are surpassed by Griffey’s best three years, but Bagwell had a longer stretch of seasons well above the Hall of Fame median. On the MLB Network recently, I heard Ken Rosenthal discussing Bagwell and Piazza’s Hall of Fame case with regard to the voters. Rosenthal suggested that some voters have hesitated to vote for Bagwell and Piazza because of the possibility they used PEDs and the fear that if they are elected and we find out down the road that they used PEDs, this would have implications for Bonds and Clemens. Essentially, if they find out there is a player in the Hall of Fame who has used PEDs, then how do they then justify not voting for Bonds or Clemens? To be clear, Rosenthal doesn’t feel this way himself; he was just explaining how other voters may feel.

Ken Griffey, Jr. (77.7 WAR, seasons above the median: 10)—He’ll go in easily. Like Frank Thomas before him, the writers feel Griffey was clean. Whether that’s true or not, we don’t really know. His best 10 seasons were at or above the median Hall of Fame level and he has five other seasons in the gray zone.

The “In the Conversation” Tier

Larry Walker (68.7 WAR, seasons above the median: 6)—Remember, these are BBWAA-elected Hall of Fame players and the gray zone represents the 25^th to 75^th percentile seasons for those players. Larry Walker has an interesting line. His two best seasons were at or above the two best seasons of the Hall of Fame median but his third through sixth best seasons drop below that level. His remaining seasons in descending order are generally close to the median. Other factors that likely hurt him with the BBWAA voters are his games played in Coors Field and that he always seemed to miss 20 or more games each year. In his 17-year career, Walker only played 150 or more games one time.

Mark McGwire (66.3 WAR, seasons above the median: 5)—McGwire’s line is similar to Walker’s, but with fewer seasons below the 25^th percentile level early in his career. McGwire’s sixth-best through tenth-best seasons are above the median, but he drops off quickly after his best 11 seasons.

Alan Trammell (63.7 WAR, seasons above the median: 1)—Trammell is consistently in the range between the 25^th and 50^th percentiles, but it isn’t until his 14^th best season where he is above the median for the Hall of Fame groups’ 14^th best season. More than half of the shortstops in the Hall of Fame were non-BBWAA selections. Trammell has more career WAR than many of those players, but beats out only one BBWAA-elected shortstop, Luis Aparicio. Trammell has been on the ballot for 14 years. His high total in voting was 36.8% in 2012, but he dropped to 25.1% last year. This is his final chance with the BBWAA.

Edgar Martinez (65.5 WAR, seasons above the median: 5)—Edgar has some things going against him. First off, playing primarily as a DH hurts him in the eyes of many voters. Second, based on the chart above, Edgar didn’t have the peak that many BBWAA-elected Hall of Famers had, as his five best seasons are in the gray zone between the 25^th and 50^th percentile. His sixth through tenth best seasons are above the zone and he does have 10 seasons with 4.7 or more WAR. That hasn’t been enough for the voters so far. His vote totals have dropped in each of the last three years.

The “Another Tier, Much Like the Previous Tier” Tier

Tim Raines (66.4 WAR, seasons above the median: 3)—Raines is a favorite candidate of many who is thought to be underrated and under-appreciated by Hall of Fame voters. He has gained support over the years, though, moving from 24.3% in his first year on the ballot to a peak of 55.0% last year. His place on the chart above shows that he’s similar to Alan Trammell. They both had long careers consistently in the gray zone below the median. Compared to the other BBWAA-elected hitters, Raines is a borderline candidate. He wouldn’t raise the level of BBWAA-elected hitters, but he’s better than some recent inductees. That being said, I added Tony Gwynn to this graph and it’s easy to see how similar Gwynn and Raines were in WAR. Gwynn made the Hall of Fame in his first year on the ballot. The key difference for voters may have been their distribution of hits and walks. Gwynn had 3,141 hits and 790 walks, for a total of hits plus walks of 3,931. Raines had 2,605 hits and 1,330 walks, for a total of hits plus walks of 3,935. Those 3,000 hits go a long way. Despite that, there isn’t enough of a separation between them that one should sail right in on his first ballot (97.6%) and the other gets 24.3% on his first ballot.

Jim Edmonds (64.5 WAR, seasons above the median: 5)—Half of Edmonds’ ten best 10 seasons were above the median Hall of Fame level and the other five were in the gray zone. His 11^th best and beyond seasons fall short.

Gary Sheffield (62.1 WAR, seasons above the median: 2)—Despite being such different players, Sheffield’s line is very similar to Tony Gwynn’s line, with a similar pattern of highs and lows. It’s uncanny.

The “It’s Not the Hall of Good” Tier

Fred McGriff (56.9 WAR), Jeff Kent (56.1 WAR)—Jeff Kent and The Crime Dog were good players with long careers, but they don’t compare favorably with other BBWAA-elected Hall of Fame hitters.

Nomar Garciaparra (41.4 WAR)—Six of Nomar’s first seven seasons were worth 4.8 WAR or more, but it was a steep drop-off from there. He played 14 seasons and those six seasons accounted for 92% of his career WAR.

The “New Guys Who Don’t Have a Chance” Tier

The eight players on the above two charts are unlikely to get the 5% needed to stay on the ballot, but they may get some scattered votes here and there. In case you were wondering, that 8-win season for Troy Glaus came in 2000 when he hit .284/.404/.604, with 120 runs, 47 home runs, 102 RBI, and 14 steals. He was fourth in the AL in WAR but didn’t receive a single MVP vote. The winner that year was Jason Giambi (with 7.7 WAR).

The Catchers

Mike Piazza (62.5 WAR, seasons above the median: 10)—Piazza is on the cusp of entry into the Hall of Fame. His voting totals have gone from 57.8% to 62.2% to 69.9%. Based on his numbers, he should have been voted in three years ago. Hopefully, he’ll get the 75% needed for induction this time around.

Jason Kendall (39.8 WAR)—Kendall has more career WAR than a couple of Veterans Committee inductees (Rick Ferrell and Ray Schalk) and more WAR than Roy Campanella, who had his career start late and end early. Kendall had six seasons with 3.9 WAR or more, which is impressive, but he doesn’t compare to the BBWAA-elected Hall of Fame catchers.

Brad Ausmus (17.2 WAR)—Ausmus hit .251/.325/.344 in one of the best eras for hitting in the history of the game. Imagine how poorly he would have hit had he played in the 1960s.

Starting Pitchers

Roger Clemens (133.7 WAR, season above the median: all)—Roger Clemens is the Barry Bonds of pitchers. They were both well above the median of BBWAA-elected Hall of Fame players and they are trapped in Hall of Fame voter purgatory for the time being, both with roughly 37% of the vote on last year’s ballot. They have seven more years on the ballot.

Mike Mussina (82.2 WAR, season above the median: 12)—Mussina and Schilling are an interesting comparison. Schilling’s six best seasons are better than Mussina’s six best seasons. From their sixth-best seasons and beyond, Mussina was better. Mussina has been on the ballot two years and saw his vote total go from 20.3% to 24.6%. Compared to other BBWAA-elected Hall of Fame starting pitchers, both seem worthy of induction.

Curt Schilling (79.7 WAR, season above the median: 12)—Schilling and Mussina both had 12 seasons above the median and similar WAR totals, but Schilling has the edge in voting so far. Schilling has been on the ballot three years, going from 38.8% to 29.2% to 39.2% in the voting.

Mike Hampton (28.0 WAR, season above the median: 0)—He doesn’t compare to the other pitchers on this ballot, but Hampton did hit .315/.329/.552 in 152 plate appearances with the Rockies in 2001-2002, which is pretty cool.

Relief Pitchers

Lee Smith (26.6 WAR, season above the median: 12)—The top graph shows how these three relievers compare to all pitchers elected by the BBWAA. In short, they don’t compare favorably. The difference in innings pitched is just so great between starters and relievers that it’s hard for a reliever to be as valuable. The bottom graph includes just relief pitchers elected by the BBWAA, but without John Smoltz or Dennis Eckersley, who each had more than 350 starts and around 200 wins. The four “true” relievers are Hoyt Wilhelm, Goose Gossage, Rollie Fingers, and Bruce Sutter. Lee Smith didn’t reach the heights of those four, but did have 12 seasons above the median, starting with his third-best season. He’s been on the ballot for 13 years and peaked with 50.6% of the vote in 2012. Last year, he was down to 30.2%.

Trevor Hoffman (26.1, season above the median: 9)—For what it’s worth, Harold Reynolds thinks Trevor Hoffman is a “slam-dunk” Hall of Famer. Of course, that’s worth exactly nothing because it’s coming from Harold Reynolds and he doesn’t have a vote. Hoffman does have those 601 saves, but he doesn’t stand out here as being much better than Smith or Wagner.

Billy Wagner (24.2 WAR, season above the median: 6)—It wouldn’t surprise me to see Hoffman get considerable support and Wagner be a “one and done” candidate, despite how comparable they actually were.

If I Had a Ballot:

Barry Bonds

Roger Clemens

Mike Piazza

Jeff Bagwell

Ken Griffey, Jr.

Mike Mussina

Curt Schilling

Edgar Martinez

Larry Walker

Alan Trammell