Archive for Player Analysis

While the Detroit Tigers’ decision to trade Prince Fielder to the Texas Rangers for Ian Kinsler prior to last season initially came as a shock to Tigers fans, the positive early returns on the trade seemed to provide a calming influence. As I wrote in late April 2014,

Kinsler has provided some real spark, though. Looking at the right side of this graph, you can see that, while he and Prince posted similar batting averages last season, Kinsler has kept the pace this year, but Prince has dropped off sharply with the Rangers.

While Fielder has the edge in on-base percentage, probably due to his ability to draw walks (of the intentional and unintentional varieties), Kinsler’s hitting for more power (.133 ISO vs. .121 ISO) and is posting a better wOBA— a catch-all offensive metric– than Fielder (.319 vs. .277). They also have the same number of home runs (two), with Kinsler driving in nearly twice as many runs as Fielder (14 vs. 8), while stealing three bases (to Fielder’s zero, obviously).

Less than a month later, Prince’s season would be over, a completely understandable side-effect of probably overdue neck surgery.

Kinsler powered right along, though, making 726 plate appearances in a career-high 161 games. His bat seemed to cool off in the second half of 2014 (.353 wOBA vs. .276), but he still managed to finish the season tied with Miguel Cabrera for the title of most valuable Tiger, as determined by fWAR (5.1 fWAR apiece), although much of that was due to Kinsler’s defense (and Cabrera’s lack thereof).

In reviewing last year’s statistics in anticipation of this season, Kinsler’s numbers jumped off the page for one main reason: his walks had disappeared. Read the rest of this entry »

As kind-of-requested in the comments section of a recent Mike Trout-centric article, here are some fun Mike Trout facts!

***all statistics, ages, etc., are as of May 13, 2015***

1. From May 21-24, 2013, Mike Trout had four consecutive multi-hit games. Over that stretch, he went 10-for-17 (.588) with a walk, double, two triples, and two home runs. In the first game of that stretch, Trout hit for the cycle. In this four-game multi-hit streak, Trout accumulated 19 total bases in 18 plate appearances. This was one of Trout’s two career streaks of four consecutive multi-hit games; the other was just a month earlier.

2. Mike Trout has 107 home runs in 526 games, and is still just 23 years old. But Mike Trout did not hit two home runs in the same game until homers #77 and #78.

3. Mike Trout has 107 home runs. If he plays in as many games as did all-time home runs leader Barry Bonds (2,986), and homers at his current rate the whole time, Trout will finish with 607 home runs, good for 9th all time.

4. Mike Trout has 109 steals. If he plays in as many games as did all-time steals leader Rickey Henderson (3,081), and steals at his current rate the whole time, Trout will finish with 638 steals, good for 15th all time.

5. Bearing in mind facts #3-4, this is a complete list of all the players in the top HUNDRED all-time for both home runs and steals: Barry Bonds.

6. Mike Trout has 607 hits in 526 games. If he plays in as many games as did all-time hits leader Pete Rose (3,562), and gets hits at his current rate the whole time, Trout will finish with 4,110 hits, good for 3rd place all time. Rose and Ty Cobb are the only players to ever get more than 4,000 hits.

7. Mike Trout is 23 years, 9 months, and 6 days old, and has 607 hits. At that exact age, Pete Rose had 309 hits.

8. After reaching an 0-2 count, Mike Trout reaches base successfully 27% of the time (career). This year, it’s 35%. Mike Trout’s on-base percentage in 0-2 counts this year is better than the on-base percentages, in all counts, of 29 entire major league teams.

9. Mike Trout has 8 bunt attempts in his career and reached base safely in 4 of 8.

10. In his last three months of regular-season play, the longest Mike Trout has gone without a hit is 2 games.

11. The longest Mike Trout has ever gone without a hit is 4 games. This has happened three times. Two of those three times were in Trout’s first full month in the major leagues, in 2011. He has only done it once in the last four seasons.

12. When he pulls the ball, Mike Trout has a career batting average of .488. When he hits the ball to center, Mike Trout has a career batting average of .443.

13. Give or take a few tenths of a percent, the percentage of balls hit by Mike Trout which are classified as “hard-hit” has increased every year of his career, to 2015’s 41.6%. (That ranks 9th in the MLB this year.)

14. Inside Edge classifies all defensive plays based on whether they are Impossible (0% chance of being made), Remote (1-10% chance of being made), Unlikely (10-40%), Even Odds (40-60%), Likely (60-90%), or Routine (90% chance). Since 2012, Mike Trout ranks 10th on converting Remote chances, 1st on making Unlikely plays, and 9th on converting Even chances.

15. Last year’s two Rookie of the Year winners were, respectively, three and four years older than Mike Trout. Only one of the four Rookies of the Year elected since Trout is younger than he is. (Of course, Bryce Harper, elected at the same time as Trout, is the youngest of all. Harper has yet to face a single MLB pitcher younger than he is. But this isn’t Bryce Harper Facts.)

16. Measured by Wins Above Replacement (WAR), Mike Trout is responsible for 95.8% of the offensive value of the 2015 Angels roster. This is partly because Matt Joyce, C.J. Cron, Drew Butera, and Chris Iannetta have provided negative value by hitting a combined 41-for-270 (.152).

17. Measuring again by Wins Above Replacement (WAR), and bearing in mind that hitters can give their team negative value: in 2013, Mike Trout was more valuable (10.5 WAR) than all the hitters on the Mariners, Marlins, White Sox, and Astros, COMBINED (10.4 WAR).

18. Over 2012-15, Mike Trout is in the top ten players for home runs (#6), triples (#1), hits (#6), stolen bases (#7), batting average (#8), on-base percentage (#2), weighted on-base average (wOBA) (#2), isolated power (#6), batting average on balls in play (#1), and plays made in the outfield (#2).

Rafael Montero is one of the New York Mets’ top pitching prospects, and he was given the spot start the other evening against the Mets’ division rival the Miami Marlins.  Montero got the loss after giving up three runs in the sixth but looked sharp striking out six and walking one over 5.2 innings.  Although Montero was sent back to the Mets’ Triple-A affiliate in Las Vegas, he will be back up later this season for bullpen help and will be the first called up to replace any starters that get injured during the long 162-game season.

Positives

Fastball movement and command

Although Montero’s fastball is not overpowering (90-93 mph, topping out at 94 mph), he placed it on both sides of the plate and kept it knee-high throughout his start.  This translated into Marlins hitters taking called strikes early in their at-bats, striking out looking (See first inning Dee Gordon and third inning Adeiny Hechavarria) and a good groundball rate of 48.1% for Montero (50%+ is considered an above-average groundball pitcher).  Montero’s fastball also showed strong arm-side run and sink at 90-93 mph, which projects a continued strong groundball rate in future outings.

Kept pitches down in the zone

Montero kept nearly all of his fastballs and off-speed pitches thigh high or below which resulted in very few hard-hit balls by Marlins hitters.  The only three pitches that were hard hit off of Montero were:

1. A Gordon fourth inning double on a four-seam fastball that was more a case of Gordon’s ability to hit rather than poor command by Montero.
2. A Giancarlo Stanton fourth inning line out to Mets third baseman Eric Campbell that was a product of a knee-high and inside two-seam fastball which showed the importance of keeping the ball down in the zone. If that fastball was a bit higher, it could have resulted in either a double down the third-base line or a two-run home run.
3. A Gordon sixth-inning single (advanced to second on Curtis Granderson fielding error) on a four-seam fastball that was left up in the strike zone. It was one of the few poor pitches left up and over the plate by Montero all night.

Use of slider

After a few appearances last year where Montero threw nearly 80% fastballs, the Mets have pushed him to throw his off-speed pitches more often.  Although Montero only threw 46% of his sliders for strikes last night, he did throw his slider for a strike when he needed to (see sixth inning Stanton 3-1 slider for called strike).  The 46% strike percentage can also be misleading because many of the times Montero threw his slider low and out of the strike zone in an attempt to cause a swing and miss.

Negatives

First-pitch strikes

Analyst that argue first-pitch strikes are overrated due to the small differences in 0-1 and 1-0 batting averages fail to understand that the first pitch of an at-bat will dictate which pitches will be thrown in the following pitches.  This is the reason that every pitching coach in America stresses the importance of first-pitch strikes to their pitchers.

Having said that, Montero did an average job getting ahead of hitters with first-pitch strikes or creating balls in play on the first pitch at a combined rate of 60%.  If Montero wants to become a second or third starter in a rotation, it will be imperative to get the first pitch of the at-bat into the strike zone closer to 75% to 80%.  When Montero does not get ahead of hitters, it is difficult for him to come back in an at-bat from 1-0, 2-0 and 2-1 counts because his off-speed pitches aren’t sharp enough to create many swing and misses.  This will force him to throw more predictable fastballs that will be hit into play harder.

Pitches up in the sixth inning

There were two notable pitches in the sixth inning that led to the Marlins go ahead runs:

1. The four-seam fastball noted earlier to Gordon that resulted in a line drive single to right field.
2. A 3-2 fastball to Stanton which resulted in a RBI single to left field.

On both of those fastballs, Montero didn’t get his hand on top of the baseball during his release or more commonly known as “finishing his pitch”.  This causes his four-seam fastball to stay up in the zone and allows his two-seam fastball to come back on a flat plane over the plate as opposed to a sinking plane left to right over the plate.  The reason Montero wasn’t able to finish his pitches well was most likely due to his small frame becoming tired on his 90^th pitch of the game.

Comparison

Montero’s body type is similar to Pedro Martinez with his six-foot, 185-pound frame but large enough hands to have the ability to manipulate movement on the baseball.  The one main difference is Martinez threw a consistent mid-90’s fastball and much sharper breaking off-speed pitches.  Montero’s repertoire of pitches can better be compared to Tim Hudson with his low-90’s two-seam sinker and the ability to locate an above-average slider.

So the seemingly inevitable came to fruition last week when the Colorado Rockies sent Wilin Rosario down to Triple-A Albuquerque after just 14 at-bats with the Rockies this year. According to the man himself, it was to allow another bullpen arm to join the big-league club. Fair enough you might say, the team’s immediate needs are a priority (try telling Kris Bryant that) and the Rockies needed another pitcher in the pen.

Just a couple of years ago, Rosario posted a .270 batting average, tallying 28 home runs and an .843 OPS in 426 plate appearances in the most demanding of positions as a 23-year-old rookie.

What did he do for an encore? Well in 2013 Rosario managed a .292 batting average but launched only 21 home runs and his OPS dropped to a paltry .801 in 466 plate appearances. I jest. Still very productive for a young catcher, even if he gets the assistance of Coors field 50% of the time.

So how did it reach the point where this seemingly top prospect is now battling for a spot in the Majors aged 26?

Well, it begins with Rosario’s skills behind the plate. As a 23 year old, the Rockies knew Rosario had the bat to play but needed to improve defensively to become an everyday catcher in the Majors. Bumps and hiccups are to be expected and in 2012 he had 13 errors and 21 passed balls in 105 games.

This improved in 2013, when Rosario committed nine errors and cut passed balls to nine in 106 games.

But then in 2014, things began to fall apart again and in just 96 games, he had 12 passed balls and seven errors. Granted, a strained left wrist troubled him much of the season, and landed him on the disabled list. In May, a nasty bout with type-B influenza cost him 12 games and 11 pounds. All this culminated in a drop in production at the plate. The batting average dropped to .267, homers fell to 13 and his OPS to .739 whilst appearing at the plate 410 times.

On paper, the batting stats don’t look too bad for a catcher suffering illnesses and injuries. After two good years, one disappointing one couldn’t undo all the potential shown in the previous two seasons, surely?

Looking a little deeper then, there’s the issues Rosario has had with facing righties during his career. Below is a breakdown of his 2012, ’13 and ’14 seasons, showing his splits against RHP and LHP.

2012

2013

2014

Rosario is considered someone who cannot hit righties effectively and one highly-regarded publication even had written this about him heading into 2015. “If every opposing pitcher was a lefty, he’d win an MVP. Any hope for solving RHPs? “. Not exactly a ringing endorsement. But again, his stats against righties aren’t terrible for a young catcher in the National League, certainly serviceable.

However, you now have enough question marks to take stock at what you have; someone who had a bad year, who struggles against right handed pitching and is not performing defensively. So the Rockies had a solution, move him over to first base. His WAR had dropped from starter level in 2012 and 2013 (both years he sported a 2.1 WAR) to replacement level in 2014 (-0.1 WAR). So it seemed like a good idea. Rosario is yet to hit his peak, his bat has more than enough upside for long-term production and without the pressures of needing to improve at the immensely challenging catcher position anymore, things can only trend up.

But then a spanner is thrown into the works in the form of Justin Morneau and his $12.5 million two-year contract which runs through the 2015 season (with a mutual option for 2016). So the simplest short-term solution is to keep Rosario in Triple-A for the season, work out his issues against righties, develop his skills at first and decline the option on Morneau’s contract for 2016, freeing up monies to be used elsewhere. Rosario is arbitration-eligible the next two years and cannot become an unrestricted free agent until 2018 but a long stint in the minors could add an extra year of team control.

So let’s play a bit of devil’s advocate for a moment. If the Rockies extend Morneau through 2016, if the Rockies don’t see Rosario as an everyday first baseman going forward, if they think they can use Rosario to get better elsewhere it begs the question: Who could be Wilin to give Rosario a chance?

As things stand, the Rockies have a winning record and it’s still too early to say if they’ll be contending this year or whether they’ll try to rebuild a little. So let’s look at three possible trades the Rockies could target at the end of this season if they feel the need to move on from Rosario.

Boston Red Sox

Mike Napoli’s contract ends this year and the Red Sox won’t be renewing it. He’s having a bad year and injuries have caught up with him. Rosario on the other hand could be the perfect fit what with the Green Monster and its hitter friendly confines. So the Red Sox could do with getting Rosario. But who could they trade? The Rockies need pitching above all else (which hasn’t bothered the front office too much in the past) but the Red Sox don’t really have any pitching options to trade. If anything, they need the help too.

So let’s look at the outfield. The Red Sox will enter 2016 with Mookie Betts, Rusney Castillo, Jackie Bradley Jr, Daniel Nava and Allen Craig as outfield options, whilst the Rockies will have Corey Dickerson, Carlos Gonzalez and Charlie Blackmon (based on existing contracts and no renewals/trades). So there’s one name which may intrigue. Brock Holt.

Brock Holt is a bit of a utility guy the Red Sox are trying to find at-bats for so one could perceive a trade for an everyday first baseman as ideal. The Rockies don’t have the depth of the Red Sox so they can find ways to give Holt more regular playing time and keep an effective batting lineup.

The likelihood of this trade happening is slim, but it’s intriguing nonetheless.

Philadelphia Phillies

It’s no secret the Phillies are reluctantly rebuilding after prolonged efforts to bury their head in the sand. They still field a lineup containing Ryan Howard and Carlos Ruiz despite father time having caught up with them both (not forgetting Chase Utley).

Ryan Howard continues to be the Phillies everyday first baseman and while he’s still signed through 2016, sooner or later, they need to bite the bullet and accept whatever they can get for him. Carlos Ruiz is also signed through 2016 so maybe if at least one can be moved on, Rosario could fill in for twelve months, covering either spot with a view of an everyday first base role from 2016. He’s young enough to form a part of the rebuild and is a clear upside on both Ruiz and Howard’s bat so this makes sense.

Cole Hamels is the big star the Rockies would love, but the Phillies are looking for a big prospect haul so unless some form of Dickerson, Arenado and top prospects were sent the other way, this just isn’t happening. They don’t have any other starter who could conceivably be considered by the Rockies either. Their main pitching prospects of Aaron Nola, Yoel Mecias, Zach Eflin, Jesse Biddle and Ben Lively are all probably out of play if they get serious about rebuilding so maybe a lower level guy like Nefi Ogando is possible. But this would be a big risk for the Rockies, trading for a mid-tier (at best) pitching prospect.

So maybe some bullpen help to go with it? Ken Giles is the closer in waiting for the Phillies once Papelbon leaves behind the fans who adore him so. But he’s struggle early in 2015 but again, the likelihood of the Phillies losing a potential closer for the next few years to bring in Rosario is unlikely so at best a package of two or three decent arms could be conceived by both parties.

Although it’d be difficult to see a trade here, I think a big enough scratch beneath the service could see something done to benefit the long term goals of each side. Stranger things have happened so only time would tell if the Rockies and Phillies could get something done.

Seattle Mariners

Finally we reach the most intriguing possible destination. The Seattle Mariners have invested big to get to the World Series in recent years. Big name free agent acquisitions of Robinson Cano and Nelson Cruz on the last two off-seasons has added to their chances whilst tying up King Felix long term has given them the ace they need. They’ve constructed a good rotation and a solid batting lineup with one notable exception; first base.

Logan Morrison has been the Mariners starting first baseman so far in 2015, after they waived Justin Smoak last October. First base has become a position synonymous with power hitters in recent times, with offense on the decline throughout baseball it’s a focal position for contending teams batting lineups. I’m not disparaging Logan Morrison, I don’t know the guy and he’s a far better baseball player than I’ll ever be, but he’s not a starting first baseman for a Major League contending team. Last year was the first time since 2010 he posted a positive WAR. Even in 2011 when he hit 23 homers, his WAR was -0.6. 2011 also marked the last time he played at least 100 games in a Major League season.

So there’s clearly a need to upgrade here. Is Wilin Rosario a clear upgrade? Well he is enough of one to matter, especially considering Morrison bats leftie. Morrison actually has a better career batting average against lefties (.260 compared to .243 against righties) but that’s as far as it goes for hitting lefties. Just a glance at his over stats will show this. As a sample, he hits a homerun every 28.65 at-bats against righties and one every 42.36 at-bats against lefties. Below is Morrison’s career splits.

The Mariners also have the advantage of the DH. They can easily keep Morrison, form some kind of platoon between Rosario and Morrison whilst still giving Rosario at bats against righties with either of them DHing. Rosario would be a cheaper option at first than most alternatives so improving their lineup without breaking the bank is a good thing right? Things are starting to make sense all of a sudden.

But what could the Mariners give up in order to acquire Rosario. Although Rosario would make sense, they certainly aren’t going to overpay for him. This is where things could get interesting…….

Rockies still haven’t pinned everything on Tulowitzki. If they ever trade him away, it’ll be in the next year so heading into 2016, the Rockies may need a shortstop. I present to you, Mr. Bradley Miller. Before you start up, I’m in no way suggesting Miller is a direct replacement for Tulowitzki!

The Mariners looked like giving Chris Taylor the starting shortstop gig in 2015, until a broken wrist curtailed that idea, giving Brad Miller another chance to shine. He’s been pretty good so far this year, but Chris Taylor is back and Miller certainly hasn’t shown the promise the Mariners hoped he would. If Taylor can hit well in Triple-A (he’s already hitting .328 with 2 homers, 5 steals and an .894 OPS) he’ll be with the big league club sooner rather than later. It’d be a downgrade at shortstop for the Rockies I grant you, but would free up a lot of cap space to go out and get something resembling a decent rotation.

But even if the Rockies do keep hold of Tulowitzki (and why wouldn’t you?), we come back to their need for pitching. The Mariners aren’t exactly steeped with pitching but certainly have enough to trade a piece away. They’d be unlikely to want to lose one of their more established “prospects” in order to get Rosario (Taijuan Walker, Roenis Elias, and James Paxton).

But there’s also Danny Hultzen, who has started the year well in Triple-A after rotator cuff surgery (currently sporting a 2.05 ERA through 30+ innings). Tyler Olsen is currently in the Mariner bullpen but was considered a 4^th/5^th starter during his minor league career and Ryan Yarbrough is continuing to impress in low A ball and at age 23, could easily be in the Majors within a couple of years. So the Mariners have enough depth to make a trade without harming their rotation. Whether or not they value any of these guys on a par with Rosario however is a different matter.

Looking at the three possible destinations, the Mariners appear to be the best chance of getting something done, but I’d be more inclined to suggest Wilin Rosario starts 2016 as the Rockies first baseman. And who’s to say he won’t finish 2015 in the role. Just as it wouldn’t surprise me in the least if he gets traded tomorrow, but that’s baseball. Nothing is ever set in stone and should the Rockies look to move on, there are certainly enough options out there to get something done.

(All stats are current as of the end of April 24th.)

During the offseason, Jason Heyward and Troy Tulowitzki were two of the highest-profile players on the trade block. Heyward was ultimately dealt as the Braves gear up for the future and the Cardinals look to fortify RF after the passing of Oscar Taveras. Tulowitzki was not dealt, as the Rockies hope that they can make an improbable run to the playoffs. Both players could be looking for new homes within the next year, as Heyward hits free agency (barring an extension) and Tulowitzki would be a very tempting target at the trade deadline or in free agency.

However, both players have started the season slowly. While Tulowitzki has a 103 wRC+ (which is pretty darn good for a SS), that figure is far below his 2014 results (171 wRC+) and his career figure (125 wRC+). Much of the blame can be placed on his .197 ISO, which is far below both his 2014 and career ISO. Tulowitzki has been able to counteract the drop in power somewhat due to a .370 BABIP that is far above any BABIP he has recorded over a full season. Heyward’s drop has been even more severe, as he is the owner of a B.J. Upton-esque 64 wRC+. While much of that should be attributed to a paltry .235 BABIP, some blame also can be ascribed to a poor batted ball distribution. However, it is too early to say that either player won’t see these trends reverse as the season progresses.

On the other hand, both players are suffering a precipitous and concerning decline in their plate discipline. Tulowitzki’s K rate has shot up from between 15 and 16 percent to almost 24 percent. Likewise, his walk rate has fallen to a paltry 1.6 percent as he has drawn one walk over the season. That shift is being driven by an increase in his swings on pitches out of zone, which has grown to 35 percent from 27 percent in 2014 according to Pitch F/X data:

View post on imgur.com

In addition, Tulowitzki is making less contact as he swings, as his contact rate is below 80 percent – a percentage he has never had at the end of the season. He is also swinging and missing more and is over the league average for the first time since his disastrous cup of coffee in 2006. Tulowitzki’s also seen 8 percent more pitches in the zone (a higher figure than ever before), which indicates that pitchers are not as afraid of him as they once were. All of this comes directly after he had hip surgery, which suggests that he may not be fully recovered yet or that the injury may have eroded his skills slightly.

Heyward also has seen his plate discipline deteriorate but not to the same level that Tulowitzki has. First the good news: his strikeout rate, while slightly elevated from his totals in the past few years, is still in line with his career norms. However, the rest of his plate discipline numbers are worse than his career numbers. As noted by Bernie Miklasz, Heyward only has one walk, is swinging at far more pitches out of zone than ever before, and is seeing fewer pitches in the zone than ever before. Miklasz also notes that Heyward is pounding groundballs – he is currently putting 62 percent of his balls in play on the ground. This is far above his career averages (as shown in the chart below) and is a sign that chasing more pitches is not helping him generate power.

In addition to the points that Miklasz made, Heyward is also swinging far less at pitches in the zone. This season, he has swung at 58 percent of pitches in the zone, the lowest percentage since his rookie year. These diverging trends have allowed Heyward to set a personal record: for every pitch that Heyward swings at out of the strike zone, he only swings at 1.04 pitches in the strike zone.* This is far below his career ratio of 1.69.

Now, as loyal FanGraphs members (only the truly committed read the Community board!), I can hear your refrain of “Small Sample Size.” And I certainly agree that it is too early to completely believe in the magnitude of these changes. It is extremely unlikely that both players will walk less than 2 percent of the time this year. However, I believe that the magnitude and consistency of the changes is a clear sign that both players are suffering due to the erosion of their plate-discipline skills. Both players have reached the stabilization point for strikeout rate, are halfway to the stabilization point for walk rate, and Heyward is quickly approaching the stabilization point for groundball rate. In addition, per pitch metrics like O-Swing and Z-Swing stabilize quickly, with swing rate stabilizing at 50 PAs. While those stabilization points only denote the point at which the data is half noise and half signal, the changes are consistent enough across multiple measures of plate discipline that its extremely hard to argue that it could **all** be a fluke. While both of these players are plus defenders and have the power to still be plus hitters with poor plate discipline, their value will suffer unless they can find a way to turn around their plate discipline.

* This statistic can be calculated using the following formula: (Zone%*Z-Swing%)/((1-Zone%)*O-Swing%).

One of the reasons for Archer’s success this year has been due to his ability to limit walks, which before had been a bit of a problem for him. Coming into the season he had a Zone% of 43.1 which is a tad below the league average. This year, that figure has increased to 54.4%. If you throw the ball in the zone more, you’re gonna get more strikes… more strikes means fewer times behind in the count… etc. You get the idea; good Zone% is good. But it’s not just that he’s throwing more pitches in the zone; Archer is allowing less contact on the pitches he throws there. Archer’s Z-contact rate has dropped by 4% from last year. So, to sum it up, Archer is throwing more pitches in the strike zone and hitters are making less contact when he does. This explains why Archer is getting more strikeouts and conceding fewer walks. What it doesn’t tell us is how he’s doing it. To figure that out, we have to look at his pitch selection.

According to the PITCH F/X data on FanGraphs, Archer was a two-seam-first pitcher last year – throwing the pitch nearly 47% of the time and his four-seamer only about 20%. The year, Archer’s increased the usage of his four-seamer by over 23%, dropping his two-seam rate to only 12%. This change is important because, thanks to work done by Jeff Zimmerman, we know that four-seam fastballs tend get strikeouts more often than their two-seamer cousins do. The four-seam isn’t the only pitch he’s increased usage for either: Archer’s slider rate has gone up to about 39% after sitting a little below 29% last year. Once again, this is good for strikeouts. Because, not only do sliders have the highest SwgStr% among pitch types after splitters, but the increase indicates Archer is more confident in his slider, which could imply that the slider has improved. You can say the same thing about the four-seam.

If you were looking for indicators that Chris Archer’s improved numbers have a level of sustainability, there they are. Those are real changes, from a real pitcher, playing real baseball. The Rays are gonna need an ace-level performance in their rotation this year to help alleviate the loss of David Price and the temporary one of Alex Cobb. It’s beginning to look like Chris Archer is the man for the job.

On July 30, 2014, the Seattle Mariners found themselves in the interesting position of being in playoff contention. The Mariners sported a 32-23 record, only 2.5 games back of the AL West-leading Los Angeles Angels, and owned the third-best Pythagorean record in the American League. Seattle’s newfound position as postseason hopefuls meant that they were suddenly buyers at the trade deadline – not drastically so, but in the sense that the Mariners were only a couple of upgrades away from assembling themselves a nicely well-rounded playoffs roster. Chief among these desired upgrades was a serviceable everyday center fielder, one who could replace a revolving door of below-average outfielders that included Abraham Almonte, James Jones, Stefen Romero, and Endy Chavez.

Jack Zduriencik sought to remedy the Mariners’ outfield issues with a pair of trade deadline deals. The first involved packaging Almonte and minor-league pitcher Stephen Kohlscheen to the Padres in return for Chris Denorfia, a rather unsexy deal to be sure, but one that was a success at the time in that the acquired player was not Almonte. The second deal, a three-way transaction between the Rays, Tigers, and Mariners, was collectively more sexy, but a large share of the sexy went to the Tigers, who landed Rays ace David Price. The other major components of the deal were the Rays’ acquisition of young Mariners middle infielder Nick Franklin and Tigers pitcher Drew Smyly, as well as Seattle’s prospective answer to its outfield problem: Detroit center fielder Austin Jackson.

Since his move to the Mariners, Jackson has racked up 277 plate appearances for Seattle, and the results have been fantastically underwhelming. Of the center fielders who amassed more than 100 plate appearances for the Mariners in 2014 – an uninspiring triumvirate of Jackson, Abraham Almonte, and James Jones – Jackson produced the worst offensive performance by wRC+. Jackson’s 2014 performance also disappointed even by more conventional measures:

• Jackson totaled 34 extra-base hits in 416 plate appearances for the Tigers in 2014. For the rest of the year, in 240 plate appearances for the Mariners, Jackson managed 6.
• Jackson’s ISO dropped from .127 to a paltry .031 with the move from Detroit to Seattle.
• Jackson’s 2014 OBP/SLG/wOBA with Detroit: .330/.397/.321. With Seattle: .271/.264/.243.

Not great for a player only two seasons removed from a 5-win campaign.

Ostensibly, something was fundamentally different with Jackson in 2014, something that can hopefully be determined by closely examining his recent performance. Looking first to Jackson’s approach, it seems that there hasn’t been too much change over the course of his career. His K/BB ratio has generally hovered around league average and his contact rates haven’t fluctuated all that much from year-to-year. If anything, Jackson’s approach metrics look like they’re trending positively – he actually posted career bests in Z-contact% and SwStr% in 2014. If we examine Jackson’s batted ball data, however, we begin to get a little closer to the root of Jackson’s troubles of late. The most easily identifiable aspect of Jackson’s game can be somewhat distilled in the following graphic:

Over the course of his career, Jackson’s BABIP has been way above league average. He managed an absolutely ridiculous .396 BABIP in his 2010 rookie season over 675 PA, and his career-best 2012 season, in which he posted a 134 wRC+, was bolstered by a BABIP of .371. That figure would predictably fall after 2012, but between 2013 & 2014, Jackson’s BABIP only declined by .008, whereas in the same period, his wOBA fell from a very good .332 to a mediocre .292. This might suggest that in 2014 specifically, it may not have been the frequency with which Jackson was able to put balls in play so much as the quality of those batted balls that limited Jackson’s production.

Unfortunately, batted ball data is out of the scope of my access. The closest I can get to Jackson’s batted-ball profile is  by pulling data from this pre-season piece on Jackson by Jake Mailhot over at Lookout Landing, and indirectly from Jeff Zimmerman’s work on hitter analytics at RotoGraphs (the relevant batted-ball spreadsheet now seems to be unavailable for some reason).

To quickly explain – this table charts batted-ball rates expressed as a percentage of league average. Batted balls are separated into three categories (line drive, groundball, fly ball) which are then further divided into subcategories of contact quality (Well-Hit, Medium, and Weakly-hit). These categories are ordered left-to-right from highest to lowest based on xBABIP.

Mailhot astutely notes an alarming drop in well-hit groundball rate – from 64% above league average in 2012 to 11% below league average in 2014. This is accompanied by a commensurate rise in weakly-hit groundballs. Jackson’s well-hit line-drive rate also drops by a sizable amount, hovering around league average in 2014, while his rate of medium-hit line drives balloons to 198% of league average in 2014. Mailhot also points out possibly the most substantial shift: an immense drop-off in well-hit fly-ball rate in 2014 to 56% of league average, a trend corroborated by data pulled from Baseball Heat Maps on Jackson’s average fly ball distance over his career:

Jackson’s high rate of well-hit line drives and ground balls prior to 2014 puts into perspective the aspects of his game that brought him success earlier on in his career, and his sharp decline in those metrics in 2014 even more so. To put it in exceedingly simple terms, Austin Jackson just didn’t really hit balls hard in 2014, something he was quite good at doing before that season. Judging by the splits, most of the not-hitting-balls-hard occurred after the move to Seattle.

Jackson’s 2013 was much better than his 2014, but it is the beginning of a short trend of BABIP decline. From examining batted-ball data, we can infer that quality of contact has a significant bearing on BABIP, and this makes sense using conventional logic as well. Hard-hit line ground balls are more likely to find gaps between defenders, hard-hit line drives are more likely to drop in for hits, and hard-hit fly balls are more likely to turn into extra-base hits (although BABIP ignores home runs). The easy explanation is that Jackson lost some power in 2014. I don’t have enough film on Jackson to know for sure if there’s a visually concrete reason for this (if, for example, there’s something off in his swing mechanics), but data from 2014 indicates that Jackson just hasn’t been making good contact.

Jackson’s issues are probably best explained by his batted-ball troubles, but park factors likely play some part as well, with Comerica Park being relatively more hitter-friendly than Safeco Field. Safeco’s pitcher-friendly park factor and the ‘dead ball effect’ of Seattle’s marine air probably have something to do with Jackson’s decline in fly-ball distance, although Jackson is himself contributing to that same decline in some measure.

At the time of his acquisition, a merely average performance from Jackson would have been a significant upgrade over the convoluted mishmash that had previously taken the field for the Mariners. Unfortunately, he was unable to even provide replacement-value production after coming to Seattle, totaling -0.4 wins above replacement in 2014. The Mariners traded for an above-average player and received the production level of a player who theoretically wouldn’t cut it in the big leagues altogether.

The prospect of 2015 being a bounceback year for Jackson has not gone over too well in these first few weeks. ZiPS (R) and Steamer (R) still think Jackson could manage 1.7-2.1 WAR on the season, which is a bit below his peak, but I think the Mariners would take that statline in a heartbeat. I’ve gone this far without mentioning Jackson’s other tools, but as a 28-year-old without a concerning injury history, there’s not as much reason to worry about his defense and baserunning as there is to worry about his offensive output. Jackson was a below-average defender by UZR in 2013/2014 and has been worth approximately 4 baserunning runs above replacement in each of the past couple of years, neither of which have dictated his value nearly as much as his offense, or lack thereof. Using those numbers as a serious predictive measure from year-to-year is simply not very useful at this point.

Lloyd McClendon was Jackson’s hitting coach back in Detroit, and suffice it to say he probably has a better grasp on Jackson’s habits as a batter than most. If anyone’s able to get Jackson back on track this season, it’s probably McClendon. At time of writing (the 18th of April), Jackson managed a slightly encouraging 2-hit, 1-walk performance against the Rangers. It’s early yet in the season, and there’s time for Jackson to hopefully figure things out. Alternatively, if Jackson can’t find some of his pre-2014 form this season, the Mariners might once again find themselves in the same trade deadline predicament from last year – only this time, there’s not an obvious trade chip à la Nick Franklin. Then again, 2015 is Jackson’s last year under team control, so the Mariners may simply choose to let him walk after the year is over if they’re not satisfied with his performance. If that’s the case, it’s hard to imagine looking back on the 2014 Jackson trade with anything but the same tinge of regret and frustration that has colored so many other Mariners transactions of the last decade.

At the end of spring training, Buck Showalter banished Kevin Gausman from the rotation in favor of Ubaldo Jimenez, a pitcher with a much higher salary and much less talent.  Many assumed that Jimenez’ salary largely dictated the move. Yes, he outpitched Gausman in spring training (4.44 ERA to 7.04), but it’s hard to believe that Showalter invests very much in spring training stats, and in any case if you put “4.44” into Google Translator, “success” is unlikely to be one of the resulting character strings.

One Orioles fan of my acquaintance heard that Showalter’s decision had more forethought: Buck’s intent may be to use Gausman much as the fireman reliever of old, and bring him in to critical situations in ballgames regardless of today’s ossified reliever usage patterns. Bill James long ago established that this is the most effective way to use a top-flight reliever, but it is less clear that this is the best way to use a potential #1 starter. Gausman is the only pitcher on the Orioles 25-man roster who has even  a prayer of turning into an ace, and it seems unlikely he’ll do it from the pen.

Gausman’s had a somewhat unusual start to his career. In his first two years as a major leaguer, he started 25 games and made 15 relief appearances. There are a total of 15 active pitchers who had at least 25 starts and 15 relief appearances in their first two years:

(Table courtesy of the invaluable Baseball Reference Play Index)

It’s certainly an eclectic mix. Only Buehrle established himself as an ace, though Arroyo has had a good career as a mid-rotation workhorse, and Masterson and (to a lesser extent) I-Can’t-Believe-It’s-Not-Fausto-Carmona have made useful contributions. For other starters on this list (Wood, Kelly) it’s too soon to tell. Affeldt and Stammen wisely gave up starting and have become bullpen mainstays. More sobering, many of the names on this list have had their careers derailed by injuries. It’s hard to know whether the mixed usage contributed to injury problems for guys like Ogando, Billingsley, and Holland; it is equally possible that conserving these young arms early may have averted even more serious or earlier arm trouble.

Gausman sits uneasily here; he is by far the highest drafted pitcher on this list (fourth overall in 2012). It is unsurprising to see a club experiment with a 38th-round pick who struggles to break a pane of glass, like Buehrle. Such tinkering is less common with a player drafted to be a rotation anchor. Indeed, there are only two other first-rounders on this list, Billingsley and Lynn.

In his first season (2006), Billingsley started 16 games and came in from the bullpen twice. He put up a respectable 3.80 ERA, but with atrocious peripherals (5.8 BB/9, 5,9 K/9). The Dodgers understandably exiled him to the bullpen to start the 2007 season, but Dresden-like pyrotechnics from Proven Veterans Mark Hendrickson, Brett Tomko, and Jason Schmidt forced the Dodgers to put Billingsley back in the rotation in June, and he acquitted himself reasonably the well the rest of the way. He would go on to have uneven success over the next four seasons until diagnosed with a torn UCL in September 2012. He has pitched in two major league games since.

Lance Lynn offers a happier comp for Gausman. He appeared largely in relief (2 starts in 18 games) in 2011. Despite Kyle McClellan’s runtastic performance as the Cardinals’ fifth starter, LaRussa elected not to insert Lynn into the rotation; the Cardinals instead traded for Edwin Jackson, who stabilized the fifth spot.  This seems similar to Showalter’s choice: go with the established if not necessarily dominant veteran in lieu of the risky young flamethrower. Lynn had put good numbers in 2011 at AAA, but not in 2010. The Cards’ reluctance to turn over a rotation spot to him in the midst of a playoff run was understandable. Lynn has been in the rotation since 2012, and has consistently produced very close to his career marks of 3.32 FIP and 2.71 K/BB, despite some jumpiness in his ERA.

Both these examples tend to suggest Showalter is making a mistake. The Dodgers finally ran out of Jason Schmidts, while the Cards went with the good-enough E-Jax (and, to  be fair, won the World Series). But in each case the young replacement would quickly prove himself superior to the older and supposedly safer option when finally given the chance. There are very few who would predict that, over the course of 30 starts, Jimenez will outperform Gausman in any significant statistical category.

But Showalter has other things on his mind. Specifically, this:

#27 Orioles

Yep, this is the FanGraphs Depth Chart projection for the Orioles starting rotation, with the O’s ranked 27th out of 30. Not a single starter checks in with a FIP under 4.00. This is a shaky rotation, and the Orioles have no quick way of making it better. Eventually, perhaps as early as next year Gausman, Bundy, and Hunter Harvey will form an enviable top 3, but there’s another problem on Buck’s plate. Next year, much of the current roster may be lost to free agency, including Chris Davis, Matt Wieters, Chen, and Norris. The Orioles are under enormous pressure to win now.

And Gausman can help! Because at this stage of his career, he is a much better reliever than starter. The big difference is in strikeouts:

AL average starter K/9: 7.1

AL average reliever K/9: 8.3

Gausman as starter K/9: 7.0

Gausman as reliever K/9: 11.7

That there is some major whiffage for a staff in dire need of it. Put Gausman together with Zach Britton, Darren O’Day, and Tommy “Big Game” Hunter, and the Orioles have a fully weaponized bullpen.  Buck’s plan is to hold on for the first five or six innings, and them shut down the opponent’s offense while the Orioles bats bludgeon their way to victory. And with Gausman acting as a mobile reserve, Showalter can shrink the innings for which the starters are responsible, but do so on a game-to-game basis. On those days when the starters happen to be effective they can go longer, and on those days (more often than not, one suspects) that they get into trouble, Showalter will be able to address some of that trouble with the best arm on the roster.

This isn’t the way I would ordinarily do it, but then again, this isn’t the roster I would have assembled. Showalter has repeatedly shown an ability to work with the tools he has rather than impose some prefabricated tactical rule set that disregards the strengths and weaknesses of his players. Baltimore’s road to the playoffs is neither straight nor sure, but at least it’s Showalter behind the wheel.

As a Red Sox fan, I got very excited opening day when Dustin Pedroia hit two home runs. One of the big questions of this offseason is whether he has upper-single-digit homer power, or upper-teens homer power. Of course, as a thinking baseball fan, my head tells me to avoid getting overly excited about a small sample size. But does the two-HR outbreak actually tell us nothing? I think the expectations going into the season combined with Pedroia’s performance in his first game is a perfect situation to use Bayes’ Theorem.

To elaborate, I think Pedroia’s expectations going into this season have a bimodal distribution. If you look at his 2008-2012 seasons, he averaged 16 HR per year. His last two seasons averaged 8 HR per year. Was this due to a real decline, or due to injuries that sapped his power? While someone like Mike Trout might have a nice normally-distributed expectation around 35 HR, I expected Pedroia to have an either/or season: he’d either get back to 2008-2012 production, or continue as a 8-HR guy.

Now for a review of Bayes’ Theorem: it tells you how to update your prior beliefs given an observation. The formula for this is P(A|B) = P(B|A)*P(A)/P(B), where A and B are events, P(A) and P(B) are the probabilities of those events, and P(A|B) or P(B|A) should be read as “Probability of A given B,” or “Probability of B given A,” respectively. Specifically, in this case, A is “Dustin Pedroia is a 16-HR guy”, and B is “Dustin Pedroia hit 2 HR in his first game of the season”. I had a preseason belief about P(A), but I want to update it given that event B has occurred.

As implied above, I’m going to simplify Pedroia’s season outcomes into two possible outcomes: He is an 8-HR guy, or a 16-HR guy. Before the season, I’m going to guess that I had about a 50-50 belief that he was either one. Another assumption I’m going to make, to make the math easier, is that a season will see 640 plate appearances. You can make your own assumptions, but this is a demonstration of how much Bayes’ Theorem helps us update beliefs based on just one observation.

We need to determine three quantities to do our calculation now:
1. P(A)—probability that Pedroia is a 16-HR guy
2. P(B|A)—probability that we would see Pedroia hit 2 HR in his first 5 plate appearances, given that he is a 16-HR guy
3. P(B)—probability that we would see Pedroia hit 2 HR in his first 5 plate appearances (taking our 50-50 chance that he’s a 16 or 8-HR guy as a given)

1. Probability that Pedroia is a 16-HR guy

Easy. By assumption, P(A) is 50%.

2. Probability that we would see Pedroia hit 2 HR in his first 5 plate appearances, given that he’s a 16-HR guy

Tougher, but we can use a binomial probability model. That is 5C2*P(HR)^2*(1-P(HR))^3. When we have 16 HR in 640 plate appearances, P(HR) is 1/40, and 1-P(HR) is 39/40. This turns out to be .00579. P(B|A)= 0.579%.

3. Probability that we would see Pedroia hit 2 HR in his first 5 plate appearances, with preseason assumptions

This is the weighted average of all his possible season outcomes—so probability of 2HR in 5PA, given that he is a 16-HR guy, times the chance that he’s a 16-HR guy, PLUS, probability of 2HR in 5PA, times the chance that he’s an 8-HR guy. The same calculation as in number 2 can be done for if he’s an 8-HR guy, yielding an answer that the chance that he’d hit 2HR in 5PA is 0.151%. Given our calculation in the above paragraph, and our preseason assumption that it’s 50-50 that he’s an 8 or 16-HR guy, that gives us a weighted average P(B) = 0.365%.

So now we can mash all of those numbers into Bayes’ equation, and we find that .50*.00579/.00365 = .794, or 79.4%! Turns out that my Red Sox-loving lizard brain was not wrong! If you believed preseason that there was a 50%-50% chance that Pedroia would return to his 2008-2012 form, you should rationally update your beliefs to 80%-20% on the minuscule sample size of just two home runs in five plate appearances! Another note is that we should be forward-looking: since he has nearly a full season of plate appearances remaining, it might be rational to think that he’s likely to be an 18-HR guy, now that he has 2 in the bag.

This method could be adapted to a continuous expectation of outcomes, allowing a chance that Pedroia might be something besides an 8HR guy or a 16HR guy (although you and I know that that is clearly absurd).

This is part 3 of the Player Evaluator and Calculated Expectancy (PEACE) model, which is an alternative to Wins Above Replacement.  This article will introduce evidence that z-scores can be converted into runs (or points in other sports) with accuracy and reliability, as well as analyze the results that zDefense has produced.

Recall that zDefense is broken down into 4 components: zFielding, zRange, zOuts, and zDoublePlays.  The fielding and range components depend on the accuracy of Calculated Runs Expectancy, which I introduced in Part 1.  Outs and double plays, though, use a different technique: they take z-scores for the relevant rate statistics, then multiply by factors of playing time.  Here were the equations:

• zOuts = [(Player O/BIZ – Positional O/BIZ) / Positional O/BIZ Standard Deviation] * (Player Innings / Team Innings) * (√ Player BIZ / 2)

• zDoublePlays = [(Player DP/BIZ – Positional DP/BIZ) / Positional DP/BIZ Standard Deviation] * (Player Innings / Team Innings) * (√ Player BIZ / 2) * Positional DP/BIZ

We can set up models in other sports that estimate point differentials using very similar techniques.  I’ve developed one for college football and another for the NBA.

For the first model, I’ve used the data for every Division I FBS football team from 2000-2014 (1,802 teams), and I defined the relevant statistics and their “weights” as such:

• zPassing = [[Completion Percentage z-score * Completions per Game] + [Passing Yards per Attempt z-score * Passing Attempts per Game]] / 10
• zRushing = [Rushing Yards per Attempt z-score * Rushing Attempts per Game] / 10
• zTurnovers = [Turnovers per Game z-score]
• zPlays = [Number of Offensive Plays per Game z-score] 

These 4 components summed make up zOffense, while taking each team’s opponents’ calculations results in zDefense.

What I found after summing the different components was that the resulting number, when divided by the number of games played, was a very accurate estimator for a team’s average point differential.

Among the nearly 2,000 college football teams, the average difference between zPoints (calculated margin of victory) and actual MOV was just 3.21 points, with a median of 2.77, and a max difference of 13.97 points.  About 20% of teams’ MOV were calculated to within 1 point or less, 53% were accurate to 3 points or less, 79% to 5 points or less, and 99% to 10 points or less.  The regression model for this dataset can be seen below:

http://imgur.com/kUDwbA7

The NBA model has similar results using 6 parts:

• z3P (3-point shots) = [[3P FG% z-score * 3-point attempts * 3] / 10
• z2P (2-point shots) = [2P FG% z-score * 2-point attempts * 2] / 10
• zFreeThrows = [FT% z-score * free throw attempts] / 10
• zTurnovers = [Turnovers per Minute z-score * League Average Points per Possession] * 2
• zORB (offensive rebounds) = [Offensive Rebounds per Minute z-score * League Average Points per Possession]
• zDRB (defensive rebounds) = [Defensive Rebounds per Minute z-score * League Average Points per Possession] 

Similar to the football model, these 6 components make up zOffense, while each team’s opponents’ calculations make zDefense.  I particularly like z3P, z2P, and zFT because they multiply the z-score by the “weight”: 1, 2, or 3 points.  Recall that zRange is multiplied by the IF/OF Constant, which is just the difference, on average, in runs between balls hit to the outfield vs. balls that remain in the infield.

I’ve only done the calculations for the 2013-2014 season, where teams averaged 1.033 points per possession.  To convert to zPoints in this model, add zOffense and zDefense, then divide by 5.

In most seasons, elite teams will have an average point differential of +10, while terrible ones will hover around -10.  On average, the NBA model had an average difference between the calculated and actual differential of just 1.331 points, with a median of 0.800.  17 out of 30 teams were calculated within 1 point, 25 within 2, and 29 out of 30 were accurate to within 5 points per game.

The fact that these models can be created using the same general principle (rate statistic z-scores multiplied by a factor of playing time equates relative points) provides some evidence that similar results are calculable in baseball.  This is the basis for zDefense in PEACE.  Let’s look at the results.

Most sabermetricians would turn to the Fielding Bible Awards for a list of the best fielders by position in any given year, so we’ll use those results to compare.  If we assume that the Fielding Bible is accurate, then we would expect zDefense to produce similar conclusions.  Comparing the 2014 winners to the players ranked as the best at their position by zDefense, we can see some overlap.  The number in parentheses is the positional ranking of the Fielding Bible Award winner by zDefense.

• Position: Fielding Bible Winner (#)…zDefense Winner

• C: Jonathan Lucroy (12)…Yadier Molina
• 1B: Adrian Gonzalez (1)…Adrian Gonzalez
• 2B: Dustin Pedroia (2)…Ian Kinsler
• 3B: Josh Donaldson (2)…Kyle Seager
• SS: Andrelton Simmons (8)…Zack Cozart
• LF:Alex Gordon (1)…Alex Gordon
• CF: Juan Lagares (3)…Jacoby Ellsbury
• RF: Jason Heyward (1)…Jason Heyward
• P: Dallas Keuchel (5)…Hisashi Iwakuma

The multi-position winner, Lorenzo Cain, was also rated very favorably by zDefense.  While most positions don’t have a perfect match, every single Fielding Bible winner was near the very top of their position for zDefense.  This is the case for almost every instance, which isn’t surprising: if there were drastic disagreements about who is truly elite, then we would suspect one of the metrics to be egregiously inaccurate.  Instead, we see many similarities at the top, which provides some solid evidence that zDefense is a valid measure.

As always, feel free to comment with any questions, thoughts, or concerns.