Archive for Player Analysis

As one of the greatest pitchers of our generation, one might think that it is extremely unlikely that Clayton Kershaw would have what we would consider a ‘problem.’ As a seven-time All-Star, a three-time (potentially four-time) Cy Young winner, and an NL MVP, Kershaw has been the model of consistency over the past number of seasons, and as his career progressive ERA would dictate, he gets better each and every season. But if there were one knock on Kershaw, especially over the last season, he has been extremely prone to the long ball. His HR/9 rate in 2017 was 1.18, significantly higher than his previous high, which rang in at 0.92 in 2008. Between 2008 and 2017, the highest HR/9 during that span was 0.63 in 2012.

Also at a career high this season was his HR/FB rate. This season, he came in at 15.9%, compared to his previous career high, which also came in 2008, at 11.8%. So it wasn’t just an increased number of fly balls that led to his inflated HR/9, but as we can see with the high HR/FB rate, more of the fly balls hit left the yard.

Expanding on that even further, in his regular-season career, Kershaw has given up 128 home runs. Of those 128, 75 of them have been solo home runs (58.6%). This season, of the 23 home runs Kershaw surrendered, 15 of them were solo shots (65.2%). League-wide this season, of the 6105 home runs that were hit, 3495 were of the solo variety. This is 57.2%. Kershaw’s career average is on par with the major-league average, but this year, there is a significant spike in the percent of solo home runs that Kershaw gave up. Is this because Kershaw took it easy with the bases empty? Or because hitters have finally realized that stringing together three hits in an inning off of Kershaw can seem about as impossible as licking your elbow? (Real question is how many of you just tried to lick your elbow.)

Whether or not 2017 will turn out to be an outlier for Kershaw in terms of the home-run ball remains to be seen. Will hitters continue on the same trend, thinking that the long ball is the only way to beat Kershaw? Only time will tell. As for things we do know, while giving up the most home runs of his career, Kershaw still remained near the top of the list of best pitchers in the game. And while he missed six starts in July/August, he will still receive numerous Cy Young votes, although I predict he will come up short.

Kershaw, as proven last Thursday night in the Dodgers’ 11-1 rout of the Cubs to clinch the NL Pennant, remains terrific. The home run that Kershaw gave up to Kris Bryant was a cheap one. The ball was hit at 94mph, at a 32 degree launch angle. The expected average given that combination is an abysmal .136, and is a home run just 6% of the time (via Mike Petriello). Granted, not all home runs that Kershaw gives up are like that, but maybe Kershaw just ran into some bad luck this past season.

So given Kershaw’s resume, and the fact that he somehow finds a way to lower his career ERA each and every season, just how good could Kershaw be next year if he fixes his “problem?” The sky’s the limit, and if anyone could reach the sky, it would be Kershaw.

In the NLDS, Stephen Strasburg was absolutely brilliant for the Nationals in his two starts. Due to an injury to Max Scherzer, Strasburg got the ball for Game 1 and was dominant. He threw 5.2 innings of no-hit ball before giving up back-to-back RBI singles to Kris Bryant and Anthony Rizzo that allowed two unearned runs to score thanks to a rare error by Anthony Rendon. Strasburg finished with an impressive line of 7 IP 3 H 2 R 0 ER 1 BB and 10 K in a losing effort. Although his outing was ruined by the unearned runs and Kyle Hendricks’ outstanding start which shut down the Nationals offense, Strasburg made the Cubs hitters look foolish all night long. Getting the ball once again with his team down 2-1 in the series, Strasburg turned in another absolute gem in Game 4. In a 5-0 victory, Strasburg threw seven shutout innings, scattering three hits while walking two and striking out 12. In his two starts combined, Strasburg threw 14 innings without allowing an earned run, while only giving up six hits with three walks to go along with 22 strikeouts.

The dominance on display by Strasburg is nothing new. Despite being the second-best pitcher on his team, Strasburg is an ace and finished second (behind Scherzer) among NL pitchers with 5.6 WAR. When Strasburg come to mind, the immediate thought goes to his power fastball. It’s one of the main reasons why the Nationals selected him with the first overall pick in the 2009 draft. He throws the pitch with an average velocity of 95.6 MPH good for fifth among qualified pitchers. Yet, Strasburg also loves to throw changeups, especially to right-handed hitters. Throughout the course of the regular season, Strasburg threw 16.3% changeups to right-handed hitters. This is an absurdly high amount for a power pitcher like Strasburg. Typically right-on-right changeups are primarily thrown by low-velocity sinkerballers, since changeups typically have the same movement as their sinker despite being thrown 5-10 MPH slower. Conventional wisdom has dictated for years that power pitchers should throw fastballs and curveballs (or sliders) to the same-handed hitters while throwing fastballs and changeups to opposite-handed hitters. The idea behind this is to throw a breaking pitch with movement that breaks away from the hitter, making it harder to hit. Right-on-right changeups were regarded as a dangerous pitch since a mistake almost always ended up with the pitch being barreled.

In 2013, Ben Lindbergh wrote an article for Baseball Prospectus about the Tampa Bay Rays (because who else besides Joe Maddon and Andrew Friedman) and their increased usage of same-sided changeups (this article includes left-on-left changeups as well). However, the team refused to recognize this increased same-sided changeup usage as an intentional move, but rather tried to classify it as an increase in the emphasis on throwing changeups to all hitters regardless of handedness. As a team in 2013, the Rays led the league in percent of same-sided changeups, as 15.9% of all pitches thrown to same-sided hitters were changeups. The league average was 5.4%. This league average has held relatively constant over the last four years. Using Statcast data from 2017 for all right-on-right pitches thrown by starting pitchers, 6.6% of all right-on-right pitches were changeups.

Back to Strasburg. Throwing his changeup 16.3% of the time to right-handed hitters, he generated a whiff rate of 27.2% while only allowing five hits and 13 other balls in play, on 213 changeups. Four of those five hits were singles, while the other was a home run hooked down the line by Josh Harrison (hit probability of 13%). He used his changeup primarily as an out pitch, as most were thrown down and in with two strikes. It totally makes sense for Strasburg to use his changeup so much, as it is one of the best pitches in baseball, and it really is its own animal. It’s unique because he throws it really hard. It was the second-hardest changeup among qualified starters, coming in at an average of 88.7 MPH. Despite throwing it so hard, it was 7 MPH slower than his average fastball, right in the ideal range of velocity differential. It also has a decent amount of arm-side run to go along with late and sharp drop (as can be seen here). According to the Pitch Values assigned by FanGraphs, Strasburg’s changeup was fifth best among qualified starters in total value, and 10th best on a per-pitch basis.

In his Game 1 start, Strasburg threw six right-on-right changeups out of 45 pitches (13.3%) and generated four whiffs with zero balls in play. This was right in line with his season averages, which would’ve been expected to continue in Game 4. But this was not the case. It was reported on Tuesday that Strasburg was sick and would not pitch on Wednesday despite being on regular rest after the rainout. Yet, on Wednesday morning, plans changed and he was announced as the Game 4 starter with the Nationals season on the line. As mentioned earlier, he did his job by turning in a spectacular start, and the Nationals’ season lived to see another day. However, in Game 4 Strasburg decided to get funky. He threw 16 right-on-right changeups out of 45 pitches, equal to a whopping 35.6% of the time, and generated eight whiffs with one ball in play hit at 27.7 MPH. His changeup and its increased usage was no doubt a huge factor in shutting down the Cubs once again (as can be seen here, here, and here). Who knows why he decided to go to it so much more often. Maybe he saw the success he had with it in Game 1, or maybe that pitch was the most comfortable for him to throw while supposedly not feeling well (his average fastball velocity of 95.4 MPH suggests he was feeling just fine). No matter what it was, it doesn’t matter. Strasburg has proved that the right-on-right changeup can not only be an effective pitch, but an absolutely devastating one. A pitch that can even be used over a third of the time. Let’s see if hitters will be able to adjust.

Since the dawn of baseball, fans and coaches alike have debated whether or not pitch count and days of rest affect a pitcher’s health status and performance. This ongoing discussion has led to a close examination of how to best manage the health status of a pitcher. Should you give your starting pitcher that extra day of rest or can you pitch him in the big game today? The question of how to manage your starting pitcher can make or break a season, and, therefore, certainly merits the amount of attention and debate it has received.

Major League Baseball’s adjustment to the age of big data has reshaped the way in which we view these age-old debates. Nowadays, there are public databases that allow hobbyists and students of the game to query their own data and investigate their own theories. Baseball Savant and Baseball Reference are the two main public databases in use, and are the two databases that will be utilized for this study. The data being queried is rest days and runs scored per inning pitched for starting pitchers in Major League Baseball in the last five full seasons.

Problem Definition

In this study, I will look at the effect that the number of days of rest has on the performance and health of a starting pitcher in Major League Baseball. More specifically, I will investigate whether or not fewer rest days are correlated with poor performance and poor health status. Not only does this study have the potential to save millions of dollars for the baseball industry, but it could also provide starting pitchers with more knowledge on how rest days between starts affects their health and performance. The predictor “Runs Scored per Inning Pitched” will be evaluated to determine performance. Although there is a significant amount of noise (i.e. many factors contribute to the outcome) in the runs scored predictor, it seems like the best way to determine a pitcher’s performance on a game-by-game basis. Ultimately, the number of runs scored is the difference between winning and losing, and therefore should be the main criteria used to judge the performance of a starting pitcher.

Results

I determined that there is a significant difference between a pitcher’s performances on a specific number of rest days versus the others. However, there is no significant difference in starting a pitcher on “short rest” (1-3 days) versus “normal rest” (4-6 days) versus “extended rest” (7+ days).

This is an extremely important result considering that starting pitchers are usually employed on three, four, or five days of rest. Currently, starting pitchers are believed to perform at the highest level without the added possibility of injury with this amount of “normal rest.” However, this study shows that there is no significant difference in starting your pitcher on short rest vs. normal rest vs. extended rest. While there is a correlation in the specific number of rest days and performance of a pitcher, there is no significant difference in starting your pitcher on short rest vs. normal rest vs. extended rest.

This study shows that each of those extra off days could not only make a significant difference in pitching performance but also could make a difference in health status for pitchers. There is a fine line between getting the most out of your starting pitcher, and overusing him.

Data Analysis and Tests

In order to determine if there is a significant difference between runs scored per inning pitched and the number of rest days, a non-parametric ANOVA test is needed. The results are as follows:

Reject Ho at alpha=. 05, the Runs Scored per Inning Pitched rate is significantly different for at least one of the number of days of rest. The number of runs scored per inning pitched is significantly different for at least one of the numbers of rest days.

However, we want to know if having your starting pitcher pitch on “short rest” is significantly different than having your starting pitcher on “normal rest.” In order to do this, the data was split into number of days of rest 1-3 and days of rest 4-6. Zero days of rest was eliminated, as these numbers typically only apply to relief pitchers. Then, a non-parametric rank sum test was conducted to determine if performance on “short rest” is significantly different than performance on “normal rest.” The results are as follows:

Do not reject Ho at alpha=. 05, the Runs Scored per Inning Pitched rate is not significantly different for “short rest” and “normal rest.” There is no significant difference in performance between pitchers on “short rest” and “normal rest.”

Last, “extended rest” was looked at to determine if runs scored per inning pitched was significantly different than “short rest” and “normal rest.” “Extended rest” includes all rest days of 7 and over. The results are as follows:

Do not reject Ho at alpha=. 05, the Runs Scored per Inning Pitched rate is not significantly different for short rest, normal rest, and extended rest. Therefore, there is no significant difference in performance between short rest, normal rest, and extended rest.

Recommendations

The first recommendation I would make would be to look at pitchers coming off the disabled list and starting. Starting pitchers can definitely be skipped in a rotation when a team has an off day. This causes there to be much more time between starts.

If possible, data that tracks rest time between pitcher’s starts up to the hour as a continuous variable would be ideal. This could provide more insight into the effect of rest on performance of starting pitchers, and it would provide more of a continuous variable for analysis instead of treating all rest days equally.

Another recommendation for the study would be to use a different predictor for performance. Finding a public database that included days of rest data for each start was tough, and finding one that had days of rest data for each start along with the predictors that were sought after was even tougher. Ideally, an advanced statistic like FIP or weighted On-Base Average would be used, but these predictors are very difficult to calculate for over 1300 data points.

As long as there are starting rotations in baseball, the question of how off-days affect the performance and health of starting pitchers will be studied. Another potential study would be to look at the pitch count of starting pitchers. This could have a similar effect as rest days when looking at performance. With the recommendations made in this study, a future study to determine if performance is affected by pitch count and days of rest would be extremely beneficial.

Now, with the 2017 MLB regular season behind us, the offseason frenzy is in full swing already for those teams that didn’t make the playoffs. The biggest glaring issue that was noticed by millions of fans nationwide, appears to be the inconsistency, and overall treachery of the St. Louis Cardinals’ bullpen arms. Now, coming out of this season, in which they missed the playoffs, questions are asked about the abilities of their bullpen arms, as well as the consistency of all of them. The acquisition of Brett Cecil at the beginning of the year had looked as if it could be a great signing; however, he was anything but that. Let that segue into today’s discussion, Trevor Rosenthal.

Being a Cardinals fan definitely has its ups and downs, and like most, I ride high with the ups, and fall hard with the downs. Trevor Rosenthal has always been a well-liked player of mine, and one that I not only love watching, but also feel is a vital piece to the Cardinals’ puzzle. After Trevor’s tumultuous 2016 season, and his bounce-back 2017 season, eyebrows are still raised over the 27-year-old’s future with the team. Rosenthal was placed in the bullpen, and used as a mid-innings guy, usually when the game was out of reach for either side in 2016. Again, he did not impress whatsoever, and the offseason that followed would be a “make it or break it” one for Trevor Rosenthal. 2017 was a different story for him, however. He was able to find himself, show his life and velocity on his fastball, clocking over 100 mph multiple times a game. Cutting his ERA down to a solid 3.40, with a 2.71 FIP. His K/9 rose from a 12.5 to a 14.3, and his BB/9 dropped from 6.5 to a 3.8. His abilities to strike out batters at an extremely efficient rate, and his cutting down on H/9, led him to regain the closer role on the team, especially with Oh’s horrendous season. Yet having to undergo Tommy John surgery ended Rosenthal’s season, and ultimately the Cardinals’ bullpen as a whole.

When Rosenthal was placed on the 10-Day DL, on August 16th, the Cardinals record stood at 61-59. They finished the season at 83-79, going 22-20 over their last two months of the season. Of those 20 losses, 13 of them were due to bullpen implosions. They clearly struggled mightily, and finished the year with a team bullpen record of 22-29, and a combined ERA of a 3.81, with the 12th-highest WAR (4.4). Although these stats may not seem out of line or too terrible, when watching the game itself, you could visibly see the struggles. Their starting pitching vastly outperformed that of their bullpen, and the tumultuous headlining of Oh among the others.

Now, my main debate here is to address the following question that is in the back of my mind, and one that I certainly feel is understandable in many ways, more so than most would think and see…

Is Trevor Rosenthal the Cardinals’ most valuable player?

Rosenthal is a guy who, as mentioned prior, was crucial to the Cardinals success. Yet saying the words “most valuable player” means that he was not literally their best player, but instead their most valuable. While their best player this season had to have been Tommy Pham on the offensive side (.306/.411/.520 slash with a 5.9 WAR and 148 wRC+), with their best on the pitching side being either Lance Lynn (11-8, 3.46 ERA, 7.39 K/9 over 186.1 IP) or Carlos Martinez (12-11, 3.64 ERA, 9.53 K/9 over 205 IP), it is still bold to say that none of them are the most valuable to the team. With Rosenthal, the Cardinals clearly relied heavily on him, as he appeared in 50 games, pitching 47.2 innings. With his fireball abilities, and fantastic strikeout ratio (again, 14.6 per nine), and his 1.6 WAR. Rosenthal’s importance cannot be simply stated with statistics. Watching him pitch, his demeanor and influence on the game is virtually unrivaled. When Rosenthal was brought on, the team and fans felt safer. He often came on, threw 12 to 18 pitches, and got the three outs needed. Despite this, his ERA was an inflated 3.40. His xFIP counters this at a more-than-respectable 2.55. When opponents got a hit off of him, it was most of the time lucky (.337 BABIP against a .206 BAA), and he rarely gave up the long ball (0.57 per nine, down from 0.67 the year before). So this leads you to believe that he was their savior, or their Andrew Miller even. Rosenthal’s value for the Cardinals will be truly tested come this offseason, as they gauge whether or not to gamble on their star bullpen arm, being that he is a free agent, or if they ride the roller coaster that is their current pen.

The reason behind Rosenthal’s team MVP claim is that despite Pham’s remarkable season, and even DeJong’s and Jose Martinez’s, they did not truly impact their team. The Cardinals offense ranked 13th in runs (761), 18th in home runs (196), and 9th in team offensive WAR (0.6). When it came down to it, their contributions weren’t enough to propel the Cardinals to a ton of runs per game, and they certainly did not do enough to lead the team to the playoffs. When Rosenthal was told he would miss the season, the whole fan base felt a seemingly sharp pain in their stomach. The Cardinals were still very much in the playoff picture, sitting only 4.5 games back of first in the NL Central, yet now the team and fans knew it was going to be a much rockier go at things. Rosenthal is the Cardinals’ hardest thrower, and has the best K/9 on the team. His contributions, and ability to get the team out of sticky situations, would no longer be usable, and his elbow is now going to be a question for the future. Yet, if you’re the St. Louis Cardinals, do you re-sign your clear-cut best bullpen arm, despite the TJ surgery? If not, who do you call upon or sign to replace him? Rosenthal is not a simple piece to replace, and his value is not matched by anyone else in the pen.

A few days ago, I read an article on FanGraphs that flew in the face of everything I wanted to believe. This article told me that Aaron Judge — the man who holds the record for the most home runs hit in a season as a rookie — was not clutch. As a lifelong Yankee fan, I immediately got defensive. It didn’t matter that I wasn’t really sure that I even believed that “clutch” existed. Or, at the very least, I wasn’t sure we were measuring it correctly.

I decided to go a different route. I decided to go back in time, and replace Aaron Judge with a completely league average player…in every situation he was in. I took every plate appearance, from every base-out situation from 2014 through 2017, and averaged some random samples to find out exactly how many runs a hitter was expected to generate (xRBI). How many more runs did Aaron Judge force across the plate than the average player (RBI – xRBI)? So I calculated some xRBIs…because I like to pluralize RBI. My distribution of dRBI was a bit skewed — so I adjusted for HRs (high HR rates would inflate your RBI over your xRBI…but solo shots are still valuable things), and SOs (because strikeouts provide essentially no opportunity to bring in a run). Now, my distribution looked more normal.

And here we have it! Aaron Judge’s 2017 ranks….879th out of 954 hitter-seasons with 350+ PAs?! Dammit. Apparently Aaron Judge, based on the base-out opportunities he’s been provided, drove in 10 fewer runs than we should have expected. Womp womp.

What does this tell us? You know…I’m not really sure. Here’s the top 15 player-seasons:

         name      Season  PA   OBP HR  K.rt RBI   xRBI  dRBI
1  Miguel Cabrera    2014 685 0.371 25 17.08 109  83.03 25.97
2  Nolan Arenado     2015 665 0.323 42 16.54 130 106.55 23.45
3  Mike Trout        2014 705 0.377 36 26.10 111  88.87 22.13
4  Robinson Cano     2014 665 0.382 14 10.23  82  61.04 20.96
5  Michael Taylor    2015 511 0.282 14 30.92  63  43.13 19.87
6  Devin Mesoraco    2014 440 0.359 25 23.41  80  60.15 19.85
7  Nolan Arenado     2017 654 0.369 35 15.90 126 107.23 18.77
8  Giancarlo Stanton 2014 638 0.395 37 26.65 105  86.28 18.72
9  Ryan Braun        2014 580 0.324 19 19.48  81  62.53 18.47
10 Justin Morneau    2014 550 0.364 17 10.91  82  64.13 17.87
11 Matt Kemp         2015 648 0.312 23 22.69 100  82.15 17.85
12 Paul Goldschmidt  2014 479 0.392 19 22.96  69  51.28 17.72
13 David Ortiz       2014 602 0.355 35 15.78 104  86.35 17.65
14 Yoenis Cespedes   2014 645 0.301 22 19.84 100  82.69 17.31
15 David Ortiz       2016 626 0.401 38 13.74 127 109.82 17.18

They’re all pretty good. Were these the most clutch guys? I’m not really sure where I’m going with this. I’m not even sure if I’m going anywhere with it. I guess it’s just a different way to think about clutch. My process doesn’t take the game score into consideration. It doesn’t take into consideration whether or not a player is playing at home, or any other context for that matter. But in trying to quantify a relatively subjective stat…should any of that matter?

Albert Pujols and Robinson Cano have a lot in common. They both play in the AL West. They both will one day have a plaque in Cooperstown. They’ve both played on World Series-winning teams. And they both signed 10-year, $240-million mega-contracts with their current teams.

In my office, we had a short debate about which player has come closer to justifying the cost of their deal, and it wasn’t hard to sell even the most ardent defenders of home runs and RBI that the answer was Robinson Cano. Still, one co-worker encouraged me to do a year-by-year comparison of these two players. Mostly to see just how badly Cano has outclassed Pujols since signing said mega-deals. Still, I was quite surprised at just how stark the difference has been.

So let us embark, then, on to the battle of $240-million men! For the players’ dollar-value figure, I’m using FanGraphs valuations. We’ll start off by comparing Pujols’ first four years with the Angels to Robbie’s first four with the Mariners.

Pujols year 1: .285 AVG/.343 OBP/.516 SLG, 133 wRC+, 30 HR, 3.6 WAR, $23.4m
Cano year 1: .314 AVG/.382 OBP/.454 SLG, 137 wRC+ 14 HR, 5.2 WAR, $39.3m

Pujols year 2: .258/.330/.437, 112 wRC+, 17 HR, 0.6 WAR, $4.1m
Cano year 2: .287/.334/.446, 116 wRC+ 21 HR, 2.1 WAR, $16.7m

Pujols year 3: .272/.324/.466, 123 wRC+, 28 HR, 2.8 WAR, $21.4m
Cano year 3: .298/.350/.533, 137 wRC+ 39 HR, 5.9 WAR, $47.5m

Pujols year 4: .244/.307/.480, 114 wRC+, 40 HR, 1.8 WAR, $14.7m
Cano year 4: .282/.341/.455, 113 wRC+ 22 HR, 3.3 WAR, $26.0m

Of course, Pujols came to the division two years before Cano. With just a few days left in the season, each player’s 2017 numbers are unlikely to change much — their total season numbers will be pretty close to where they are today on September 26^th.

Pujols 2014: .272/.324/.466, 123 wRC+, 28 HR, 2.8 WAR, $21.2m
Cano 2014: .314/.382/.454, 137 wRC+ 14 HR, 5.2 WAR, $39.3m

Pujols 2015: .244/.307/.480, 114 wRC+, 40 HR, 1.8 WAR, $14.7m
Cano 2015: .287/.334/.446, 116 wRC+ 21 HR, 2.1 WAR, $16.7m

Pujols 2016: .268/.323/.457, 110 wRC+, 31 HR, 0.8 WAR $6.3m
Cano 2016: .298/.350/.533, 137 wRC+ 39 HR, 5.9 WAR, $47.5m

Pujols 2017: .240/.287/.388, 79 wRC+ 23 HR, -1.8 WAR, $-14.3m
Cano 2017: .282/.341/.455, 113 wRC+ 22 HR, 3.3 WAR, $26.0m

Basically, Cano has won in almost every category except for home runs every single year. Even without doing the math (which I’m going to do in a second, don’t worry), it’s pretty obvious that no matter which way you compare these contacts, Cano’s looks better.

However, even though both players are making $240 million over 10 years, they’re making it differently. I wondered if that might tip the scales a little more in Pujols’ favor. Cot’s Contracts shows Cano making exactly $24 million annually, while Pujols has a backloaded deal. According to Cot’s, after this season Pujols is owed $114 million over four seasons ($28.5m per season). At $24 million a pop over six seasons, Cano is still owed $144 million.

Using these numbers, I compared their total value since signing with their new teams against how much they’ve actually been paid:

Pujols: $55.6m (actually paid $126m, -$73.6m in surplus value)
Cano: $129.5m (actually paid $96m, $33.5m in surplus value)

Since we’re comparing two guys who are currently division rivals, it’s also fun to look at their value compared to their pay just since Cano signed with the Mariners:

Pujols: $28.1m (actually paid $98m, -$69.9 in surplus value)
Cano: $129.5m (actually paid $96m, $33.5m in surplus value)

So pretty much any way you slice it, Cano has totally dominated Pujols in the battle of 10-year, $240-million men. For the most part, even, Cano has been better even if you limit your criteria to just offensive production. The fact he plays second base while Pujols has spent about half of that contract DHing is just gravy for the Mariners, even if Cano is just average or a little worse than that at second now.

The Angels do have one advantage, though: Pujols has four years left on his deal after this season, and Cano has six. Cano would probably still be lucky to break even on the $240 million he’s actually being paid, considering his second-half slump and his age (he will be 35 in 2018). Still, largely because he had a huge head start, Cano could end up actually earning the total value of his contract.

It’s probably likely that Cano will have some negative-value seasons in his future, though. If he’s moved off of second base, his bat becomes less valuable; if he doesn’t, his defense may erode much of his offensive value at second base. But by then, he will have likely come close to putting up $240 million in value. It would take a miracle for Pujols to end up being worth even half of his contract.

Whenever a team signs a player to that big of a deal, they know they’re likely going to suffer at the end of it — most people assumed the instant they were signed that both of these contracts would look bad at the end. Unfortunately for the Angels, Pujols’ has looked pretty bad from the beginning. Cano, on the other hand, has given the Mariners perhaps even a little more than what they expected at the time.

So, the Mariners finally won something! They won the battle of $240-million men! Now, if only that translated to winning games…

How many teams are looking for a cheap starting pitcher to be a veteran presence for a young rotation? Looking for an upgrade over what they currently have for starting pitching? Or just need a warm body to fill the hole left by Joe Ross with someone not named Edwin Jackson? As far as I can tell, 10 teams are looking for a 3/4 starter such as Merrill Kelly, especially considering his stats that he has accumulated in this season (maybe he’ll get one more start to add to his excellent season so far) have been particularly impressive. All this when the Rays thought that Merrill Kelly was just a “AAA starter” who could be a bullpen guy in the big leagues.

Merrill Kelly in the minor leagues was a solid minor leaguer who would become a swingman with the Durham Bulls. In his age-25 season, he went 9-4 in 114 IP with a 2.76 ERA, a 3.74 FIP, and a 3.57 xFIP. Which looked good with his 8.53 K/9 and 2.92 BB/9, a .298 BABIP, and a 47.9% ground-ball rate as well. Perhaps he could a solid swingman/fifth starter in the big leagues. The Rays apparently thought otherwise and said either he’d be a bullpen pitcher for the MLB team or a starter in AAA. Merrill Kelly thought otherwise and went to South Korea to play for the SK Wyverns.

Merrill Kelly in South Korea was all right in his first season, with an 11-10 record in 30 games (29 starts), 181 IP, and an ERA of 4.13. With peripheral rates that weren’t as good (6.91 K/9 and 2.69 BB/9). His next season was similar, with a 9-8 record in 31 games, but a great 200 1/3 IP with similar rate stats: 3.68 ERA, 6.83 K/9, and 2.70 BB/9. This year has been very different for him, with a 15-7 record in 29 games and 185 IP with a 3.65 ERA; his rate stats are much more improved, at 8.90 K/9 and 2.14 BB/9.

What is he doing differently to get these improved stats? Why is his ERA as high as it is, despite getting more strikeouts and walking fewer batters? He is allowing more pesky little hits: that is, his defense is not getting as many outs made as it should (1.08 hits per inning this year, vs 1.03 hits per inning in 2015-2016 combined). He has also allowed one more homer and two more doubles than last year, in 15 1/3 fewer IP.

His repertoire:

-4 Seam Fastball – 92-94 MPH (back in 2015, he was throwing 88-91 MPH)

-2 Seam Fastball – couple of miles slower and has slight sink, and runs in an opposite direction. He mixes this pitch well with his fastball

-Cutter – He started to throw this pitch more once he got to Korea and has mixed it well with his other fastballs and change

-Slider – Has a good slider that can break sharply when he’s pitching well. About 83-87 MPH

-Curveball – Decent enough curve but probably not his best pitch. Up 78-80 MPH

-Circle Changeup – Good sinking and running movement. He throws it about 85 MPH. One of his top pitches

What has he improved? Velocity on his pitches, sharper movement to his fastballs and changeup, getting better with the cutter, and improving his control. (This quoted from this article on Reddit: Merrill Kelly scouting report and info, which I think explains his improvements, but I disagree with his assessment of Merrill Kelly’s talent.) Given the talent level of the average hitter in the KBO is around AAA level, he should be able to perform as around a low-3/high-4 starter, as I’d say he is better than the average starter. A funny thing of note is that the Rays have another version of Merrill Kelly named Ryan Yarbrough, who has pitched better than Kelly did at a similar age; hopefully they’ll give him a chance to prove the Rays wrong for letting Merrill Kelly go.

Since he is on the right side of 30 and will pitch the 2018 season at age 29, I’d offer him a three-year deal worth $6 million per year with incentives that could boost the value of the deal to around $24 million over three years, with an option for a fourth season at $7 million (buyout of $2 million) with incentives to boost the option value to $10 million. This is due to his risk, and likely lower than what Phil Hughes was offered after the 2013 season from the Twins.

Who are the 10 teams that could use Merrill Kelly as a starting pitcher? The answers might be more surprising at first glance than other answers. The best choice would be the Miami Marlins for the same reasons listed, but it could become a wild-card contender taking a chance for Kelly to make more money in a playoff cut. The second-best choice is one that is pretty questionable, depending on whether the Nationals are willing to take a risk on a player from the KBO and whether they want someone better than him. But he’d be great for them in place of Joe Ross, and would be an upgrade over their current options; plus he would be cheap enough to fit in their payroll. One issue is that the Nationals have a hitter-friendly park, but not having to face the Nationals would mitigate some of those concerns. The San Diego Padres would be the third-best choice due to the non-DH league, an extremely pitcher-friendly park according to MLB park factors, and multiple available rotation spots, but they are in a tough NL West and aren’t likely to be a playoff team.

The next one is questionable but they would certainly be able to make room for him — the Oakland A’s have always been unconventional, and the park is usually known for being pitcher-friendly. The Twins would be similar to the A’s in those respects and are in fact a playoff threat (I didn’t expect to be saying this about the Twins this year at all). The Royals are practically in a tie with the Twins and A’s due to a pitcher-friendly park, although their team is going to be worse due to many key players leaving (Cain, Hosmer, and Moustakas).

Despite the Rangers having a definite hole in the rotation (who would let Nick Martinez or A.J. Griffin start in an extreme hitter-friendly park?), they are the seventh-best option due to that park, the DH league, and just not having a great team in general. The White Sox are an even more extreme version of the Rangers, and are extremely bad as well; I doubt he’d want to play for such a poor team. Same with the Reds, except there is no DH, but the Reds might want to give younger options a try first. The Orioles have almost all the bad factors: A league with a DH, a hitter-friendly park, a tough division, a bad defensive team, and generally bad development staff that has done more harm than good for its pitchers.

I would love to see one of the top six teams sign Kelly to a contract, since those would be best for him getting another contract after the first one expires. Can’t wait for him to get his shot in the big leagues, to prove his previous doubters wrong, and to have a long and successful career in the MLB.

All stats are owned by their respective owners (ESPN, FanGraphs, KBO, Reddit), I own none of the stats used. All stats are as of 9-23-2017.

We’ve seen names like Francisco Lindor, Yonder Alonso, and, of course, Josh Donaldson associated with the fly-ball revolution constantly. But one of the most underrated breakouts of 2017 has come from the launch-angle craze: Marwin Gonzalez.

If you were familiar with him before 2017, it was almost certainly because of his defensive versatility. Gonzalez has never been much of a force, but the ability to play the entire infield and outfield corner spots earned him consistent playing time in the past. He’s no longer lacking in the offensive department.

Gonzalez is slashing .302/.371/.531 and has more than doubled his 2016 walk rate, while keeping his strikeout rates steady, en route to a 142 wRC+. Names like Jose Altuve, Carlos Correa, George Springer, and Josh Reddick are the first that come to mind with the Astros. But Gonzalez ranks 3rd in batting average, 2nd in wOBA, and 2nd in wRC+. He leads one of the best offenses in major-league history in runs batted in, despite six players having more plate appearances.

Here is his exit velocity and launch angle by year, stretching back to 2015 (when Statcast started measuring):

Gonzalez has seen a massive uptick in his launch angle this season, and, like the other successful members of the launch-angle increase, has seen a massive uptick in power. With 23 home runs, he has ten more than last season.

Interestingly, with the home-run increase, Gonzalez has increased his use of all fields. His Oppo% is up to 25% from 18% in 2016. But only two home runs have been to the opposite field (he’s a switch hitter, so a basic spray chart won’t show this). He’s displaying the ability to turn on the balls he can crush and adapting better to the ones he cannot.

Just Monday night, September 25th, Gonzalez put this on full display in a four-hit night against the Texas Rangers. Here’s a two-run single:

Gonzalez gets low and adapts to the pitch location, sending it straight back up the middle. Now here he is, a couple at-bats later:

Gonzalez sees a pitch he can hit hard, and does just that, obliterating this ball (sending it 443 feet at 108.1 mph, exactly).

Using all fields while maintaining pull power is a hard skill to master, but one Gonzalez has mastered no less. He has mastered hitting the balls well that he can hit well. His 19 line-drive base hits are tied for 24th in the league, but his 19.8% LD% ranks 98th. He is 287th in average ground-ball exit velocity at 82.3, but 110th in average line-drive/fly-ball exit velocity at 93.9 mph. This is likely what skews his xwOBA-wOBA numbers, which peg him for a much less impressive performance. He’s not hitting everything harder, but he is hitting what he should hit hard harder. And with the increased launch angle, he’s only hitting more and more line drives and fly balls.

Gonzalez has stayed out of the national spotlight despite being one of the most consistent and best players on the league’s best offense. Don’t be surprised to see him explode in the national spotlight.

It’s no secret that Jonathan Lucroy is having a subpar season.

The two-time NL All Star was projected to be a top-three catcher in 2017.  Before the start of the season, Steamer pegged his value at 3.6 wins above replacement, while ZiPS had him at 3.2.  His .242/.297/.338 line and 66 wRC+ in 306 plate appearances as a member of the Texas Rangers produced 0.2 WAR.  No one really expected that.

Lucroy was eventually traded to the Colorado Rockies.  The Rockies, who had the worst catching tandem in baseball, instantly viewed Lucroy as an upgrade, while many other playoff-bound teams would have viewed him as a liability.  With the hitter-friendly environment of Coors Field and poor pitching staffs among the San Francisco Giants and San Diego Padres, the team figured that Lucroy would return to his All-Star form once again.  Although he has not returned to being the power threat that he once was, he has changed his game ever so slightly, such that he might have become the game’s best-hitting catcher.

His basic stat line is not reflective of his plate discipline as a member of the Rockies.  His slash line has gone back up to near his career average (.279/.384/.377), but what is most impressive about him is his actual hitting ability.  Always a good contact hitter, he has changed his game to be more selective, get more contact, and put the ball in play.  His 92 percent contact percentage ranks first in baseball since the trade, and his 88 percent contact percentage of pitches outside the strike zone also ranks first.  The result: a high walk rate (12.3 percent) and fewer swinging strikeouts (6.3 percent of plate appearances resulting in a strikeout).  All of this while swinging at fewer pitches outside the strike zone (18.6 percent) and fewer swings in general (38 percent).  You may be asking “Why isn’t he leading the league in hitting with numbers like that?”  Well, the answer is rather simple.

While he is making more contact than anyone in baseball, most of the balls in play are hit to the defense.  This season, he is hitting more ground balls than ever before.  As a Rockie, 50 percent of the balls he has hit in play have been ground balls, well above his career average of 42.8 percent.  As a result, he has hit fewer fly balls (28.7 percent) which has led to fewer home runs (3.2 percent HR/FB).  This explains his lack of power this year.

He has hit the ball in the wrong place more this season than any other.  For his career, Lucroy has had a tendency to drive the ball up the middle — that has not changed much this season — but this season he has hit the ball softer than in any previous season.  His average exit velocity (85.0 miles per hour) is more in line with middle infielders and outfielders than catchers.  In fact, he has the fourth-slowest average exit velocity among all qualified catchers.  His average exit velocity last season was 87.6 miles per hour, and it was 88.6 in 2015.  Without the wheels of a speedy outfielder or infielder capable of beating out a ground ball (or at the very least forcing the defense to rush the throw), a ground ball for Lucroy is as good as an out.  Just as the saying “baseball is a game of inches,” it’s a game of miles per hour, too.

Fewer ground balls are going through the holes in the infield, and fewer ground balls are becoming hits.  His batting average of balls in play as a Rockie is similar to his career average (.308 as a Rockie and .306 for his career), but his RBBIP — percentage of balls in play that go for a hit or an error — is .318.  While it is above league average, it is well below his RBBIP numbers of both his All Star seasons and 2012, when he hit .320.  Has Lucroy been entirely unlucky with his balls in play?  No; pitchers have pitched to him largely down and away, which has resulted in a horrible contact percentage on those pitches, and he has also regressed slightly in every season since 2015.  But if Lucroy can keep his contact percentage up, hit fewer ground balls, and stay selective at the plate, then he could be one of the best-hitting catchers in the game again.

Thor’s lat tear was the team’s biggest disappointment in 2017, a season that’s been chock-full of frustration and futility.

It was more demoralizing than the poor winning percentage. More displeasing than a certain player’s disappearance. And even more disheartening than the injuries en masse.

The fall of the Mets’ burgeoning ace is so distressing because it raised alarms about the future of their starting rotation. It’s now uncertain whether Noah Syndergaard, the pitcher once dubbed the second coming of Nolan Ryan, can play a significant role – let alone become the successor to Tom Seaver and Dwight Gooden.

How should the Mets deal with this situation? Though unpopular, there’s only one pragmatic solution: hope for a full recovery, let him recoup value, and trade him before future injuries occur.

Wait – trade him? Wouldn’t it make more sense if they gave such a tremendous talent the opportunity to fix his problems before they press panic button?

Sadly, it’s not quite that simple.

Syndergaard’s issues are so deeply rooted that he’s probably going to get hurt again.

And again.

And again.

Two core components of his skill set are the likely culprits of these injuries, and both are difficult to cure – at least without harming his effectiveness.

The first is Thor’s throwing motion. In the GIF below, you can see how he relies heavily on his golden arm when delivering a pitch:

At first glance, these mechanics appear quick, straightforward, and minimalistic. But also arm-dependent. If you look more closely, you won’t spot a single movement that attempts to alleviate the immense stress placed on his right wing. Not one.

You don’t see Syndergaard use a high leg kick or take a long stride. Nor do you notice him place substantial weight on his right leg when pushing off the rubber. You can’t observe him rotate his hips fully. And you won’t find too much torque in his upper body.

In short, he utilizes none of the mechanics that generate substantial velocity from his legs, hips, and core. Instead, you witness Thor gain most of his power from a sudden, violent contortion of his back and a quick snap of his almighty arm.

Needless to say, this delivery taxes his right wing…exorbitantly. On every single pitch.

But that’s not all. You also glimpse a slight timing problem that’s already become a ticking time bomb:

Syndergaard’s throwing arm is practically parallel to the ground when he plants his left foot. Then – before raising it to the cocked position – he rotates his hips and accelerates all components of his upper body, actions that place additional stress on his elbow and shoulder.

Mechanics of this sort, both arm-dependent and off-time, significantly increase his chances of getting hurt in the future…and that his afflictions will be far more severe than a torn lat.

The second cause of Thor’s injuries tilts those odds even further. That’s his max-effort pitching style. He looks to dominate batters with a repertoire of five overpowering pitches and, as you can see, holds nothing back:

Both fastballs routinely register around 98 MPH, and his slider and changeup hover about or above 90 MPH. Each one is at least 5 MPH faster than league average and is among the hardest thrown by any starting pitcher. Even his curveball, the “slowest” of the group, is well above the 78.14 MPH mean.

But something sinister lurks beneath these awe-inspiring averages. And that’s the not-so-subtle implication that Thor competes on stuff alone.

There’s neither an inkling that he paces himself nor an indication that he uses complex pitching strategies – at least not to any meaningful degree. Au contraire. From the looks of it, he throws as hard as physically possible all game long. Nothing more, nothing less.

Such an explosive approach requires Thor to exert himself fully on every single pitch he throws. This places additional strain on his elbow and shoulder, accelerates the damage inflicted by his delivery, and dramatically increases his chances of developing major arm problems.

Making matters worse, the two reasons for his injury are incredibly difficult to fix without breaking something else, namely his dominating performance.

Which is exactly why the Mets should move their star pitcher.

Noah Syndergaard is still a blue-chip asset with great trade value. You’d be hard-pressed to find another starter whose repertoire resembles that of an elite closer…let alone one who just turned 25 and won’t be a free agent until 2022.

That combination of unique ability, extraordinary upside, and relatively low financial risk makes him an attractive target despite his injury and its causes. As such, the team would probably acquire several top prospects in return for their ace.

If he’s able to put together a healthy season (or half-season), they should shop him around and pull the trigger on the best deal they find. Otherwise, it’s likely that a catastrophic arm injury will compromise his value; they’d never be able to swap him for anything meaningful again.

Should that day of reckoning arrive, the Mets will be forced to admit that they have another Matt Harvey on their hands: a supremely talented, though fundamentally flawed pitcher whom they should have traded before it was too late.