Archive for MLB Draft

Ever since the MLB draft was created in 1965, teams have been searching for any competitive edge to separate themselves from the rest of the league. After all, it is one of the best ways to acquire young affordable talent for your organization. Not picking the best players available is a huge missed opportunity for any club and can set the organization back for years. It can also exasperate even the most devoted fans. It is imperative to have successful drafts every year, but what constitutes a successful draft? How many major leaguers are available in a draft and where can you find these players? These are some of the questions I hope to answer.

Methodology

Much of my analysis in this article will include references to team-controlled WAR. I calculated each draftee’s WAR total by summing their pitching and hitting WAR totals for the first seven years of their career to estimate the amount of value they provided their clubs before the players were eligible for free agency. This method is not perfect, because it does not consider demotions to the minor leagues, and it incorrectly assumes that every team would keep their prospects down in the minors to gain an extra year of control. However, I believe that the first seven years of WAR in a player’s career is a valid estimation of the value a player provides his organization before he exhausts his team-controlled seasons.

The drafts being examined are the drafts that took place from 1965 to 2004. I chose to stop at 2004 because that was the last year that had every player in its draft class exhaust his team-controlled seasons. If I were to include more recent drafts that still have active players, I could draw erroneous conclusions, since these players still have time to make their major league debuts and accumulate more WAR in their team-controlled seasons. Read the rest of this entry »

My high-school-aged son sits at home yet again. Why? Because another of his baseball games has been canceled due to the wet and cold Ohio spring, and my thoughts turn again to our days playing baseball in Florida. Before we moved to this less-agreeable northern climate, it was a rarity to have a game canceled due to weather. Not only that, but games were scheduled year-round, which of course meant more baseball on the calendar. This situation reminded me of the familiar equation known to baseball fans:

Good weather leads to more playing.
More playing means better players.

But is this true? After all, it’s well-known that the best player in baseball, Mike Trout, is from cold-weather New Jersey. Many quickly point to the fact that California, Texas, and Florida are at the top of the list for states with the most MLB draftees, but they’re the three most populous states. Perhaps proportionally they don’t stack up to colder states after all.

I decided to look at the data from the last two drafts — 2017 and 2018 — to see if there is a relationship between a state’s average temperature and how well its players do in the draft. Do warmer-weather states really produce more MLB draftees than average?

To do this, I first gathered population data from each state to determine what percentage of the overall US population it contains. Then I did the same for each states’ MLB draft population. Finally, I compared those two figures and determined the percentage difference between their population proportion and their draft proportion. I call this figure the “Draft Difference”.

For example, let’s say State X makes up 10% of the US Population, but the State X’s draft class makes up only 8% of the overall class. Its Draft Difference is calculated as:

(Draft-Population)/Population = Draft Difference

In this case,

(8-10)/10 = -.20 = -20%

A state with 10% of the US population should, all things being equal, contribute 10% of all players in an MLB draft. But, in this case, State X did 20% worse than should be expected just from its population size. Read the rest of this entry »

With the NFL Draft having been on, it’s hard for us baseball nerds not to get excited about the MLB draft that’s a little over four weeks away. As many of you know, it is almost impossible to predict an MLB draft. In the NFL, teams are drafting to fill current needs and expect most prospects to be immediate impacts. We know this not to be the case in baseball. To keep it simple, the MLB draft is an absolute crapshoot. But that does not mean that we can’t have fun with it.

Without further ado, with the first overall pick in the 2016 MLB Draft, the Philadelphia Phillies select:

1. LHP Jason Groome – Barnegat HS (NJ)

Before Brady Aiken was taken in 2014 by the Houston Astros, the last high-school pitcher taken first overall was Brien Taylor in 1991 by the New York Yankees. We all know how that ended up. However, as of right now, it would seem that Groome, who goes to school roughly 60 miles from Citizens Bank Park, is the consensus top prospect heading into the draft. At 6’6′ 220 pounds, Groome touches 96 mph, but sits 90-94 mph with his fastball. Groome could be a great addition to the Phillies already improved rotation, as he has the makings of a future ace. He has committed to play college baseball at Vanderbilt.

2. Cincinnati Reds – 3B Nick Senzel (Tennessee)

It would appear that Walt Jocketty and Dick Williams have been targeting MLB-ready players through offseason trades, acquiring players such as Scott Schebler, Jose Peraza, Rookie Davis, Caleb Cotham, and Eric Jagielo. They also have a history of taking college players in the first round such as Drew Stubbs (Texas), Yonder Alonso (Miami), and Mike Leake (Arizona State). As the best college bat in this draft class, Senzel seems like a perfect fit to go to the Reds. His all-fields approach at the plate should enable him to hit for both average and power at the next level. Look for Senzel to be a big piece to the Reds’ “quick rebuild.”

3. Atlanta Braves – OF Kyle Lewis (Mercer)

The Braves have not selected a college position player in over two decades. With a plethora of young pitching throughout their system, look for the Braves to break that trend. The Braves are also known to draft players out of their backyard, such as Brian McCann and Jason Heyward. In fact, many have referred to Kyle Lewis as a right-handed Jason Heyward without the defense. Many scouts believe he will end up in right field and that he could become a serious home-run threat in the league. Lewis will be the first ever player taken in the first round out of Mercer.

4. Colorado Rockies – LHP AJ Puk (Florida)

The search for an ace continues in Colorado. Three of their last five first-round picks have been used on college arms. If Puk happens to fall to them at 4, I would be very surprised if they passed up on him. At 6’7″ 230 pounds, Puk can touch 99 mph with his fastball. It will be interesting to see how his control and command translate to the next level. He could be the frontline starter that Colorado has been looking for in the past few drafts.

5. Milwaukee Brewers – RHP Riley Pint (St Thomas Aquinas HS – KS)

One of my favorite prospects in this draft is the Kansas high-school pitcher Riley Pint. At 6’4″ 210 pounds, Pint sits in the mid- to high 90s with his fastball and touched 102 mph this spring. He also features a plus curveball and changeup. His fastball is what fascinates me though. With his lower arm slot, his fastball has lots of movement. Here is where you will notice that I am a baseball nerd. When I first watched a clip of Pint, I immediately thought of White Sox prospect Tyler Danish. Obviously, Danish does not have Pint’s fastball, but you will understand my logic if you watch the video. With that said, Pint could be the best prep arm ever to come out of Kansas and is committed to play at LSU next year.

6. Oakland Athletics – OF Corey Ray (Louisville)

Everyone knows about Oakland’s love for college position players in the draft. In the past 14 years, their first-round pick has been a prep player only three times. He is currently slashing .318/.390/.597 with 11 homers and 47 RBIs. Ray is an above-average hitter with plus speed and tremendous athletic ability overall. He could bring a lot of value to a team playing center field at the next level.

7. Miami Marlins – OF Blake Rutherford (Chaminade College Prep – CA)

Rutherford is considered the best prep bat in the class. Due to being a 19-year-old senior, scouts have their concerns as the track record for older high-school players speaks for itself. However, that may mean quicker stints in the minor leagues. Rutherford is considered a five-tool player who will eventually end up in right field. He comes from the same school that produced Blue Jays OF Kevin Pillar and is committed to play college ball at UCLA.

8. San Diego Padres – SS Delvin Perez (International Baseball Academy – Puerto Rico)

We all know what happened to the last shortstop to come out of Puerto Rico. Before anyone becomes enraged, I am only kidding. I am not comparing Perez to Carlos Correa. However, Perez has his own uniqueness as a ball player. He is the definition of a “glove-first” shortstop, who has plenty of potential with the bat. Right now, he profiles as an Andrelton Simmons. If his bat develops, he will easily be a perennial All-Star. With his ceiling, it would be hard for AJ Preller to pass him up.

9. Detroit Tigers – RHP Dakota Hudson (Mississippi State)

For some reason, I feel like Hudson has Detroit Tigers written all over him. The Tigers have drafted their fair share of players from the SEC (James McCann and Jonathon Crawford). They also love their big-velocity pitchers, such as Beau Burrows. Hudson’s fastball touches 97 with some run and sink and also features a nasty high-80s slider with solid break. As of right now, Hudson has the look of a future frontline starter.

10. White Sox – OF Mickey Moniak (La Costa Canyon HS – CA)

The White Sox have emerged as one of the best teams in baseball through the first month of play. If they can keep this up, having a top-10 pick in the draft will enable them to beef up their farm system. The White Sox aren’t known for taking prep pitchers in the first round and the best available on the board here could be Moniak. This Southern California kid has committed to play at UCLA with fellow draftee Blake Rutherford. He has an advanced hit tool with a more contact-oriented swing, but lacks power at the moment. With his plus speed and defense, Moniak would be a safe pick at 10.

11. Seattle Mariners – RHP Connor Jones (UVA)

Before anyone says anything, I know the first person that comes to mind is Danny Hultzen. UVA pitchers also have an interesting track record in the major leagues. However, Seattle’s depleted farm system could use a win in this year’s draft. Jones is one of the safest picks at the top of this class. He has stepped in for Nathan Kirby as the Friday night starter and has shown the ability to lead the Cavalier’s staff. Jones throws a low- to mid 90s fastball with plus sink and a solid slider and changeup. This pick makes a lot of sense for Jerry Dipoto and the Mariners, even though I could also see them going after a bat to eliminate any risk with a pitcher.

12. Boston Red Sox – RHP Forrest Whitley (Alamo Heights HS – TX)

At this spot, with an already strong farm system, I expect the Red Sox to take the best available on the board. At 6’7″ 225 pounds, Whitley throws a 92-97 mph fastball with movement and has an above average curveball with good depth. Many believe he’s the best prep pitcher behind Riley Pint. He is committed to play at Florida State next year.

13. Tampa Bay Rays – RHP Ian Anderson (Shenendehowa HS – NY)

Last year, the Rays took a prep star (Garrett Whitley) from Upstate New York with the 13th overall pick. Right down the road from where Whitley went to school is an impressive prep pitcher named Ian Anderson. Looking at their impressive rotation of Chris Archer, Jake Odorizzi, Drew Smyly, Matt Moore, and eventually Blake Snell, the Rays are getting the reputation of developing their pitchers. Mike Nikorak was a northeastern prep pitcher who slid into the first round last year to the Rockies. With a 6’3″ 170 pound projectable frame, Anderson throws his fastball 91-95 mph with good downhill angle. He is committed to play at Vanderbilt next year.

14. Cleveland Indians – OF Buddy Reed (Florida)

Cleveland has shown that it values upside earlier in the draft with picks such as Brady Aiken at 17th overall last year. Reed has above-average speed with above-average defensive skills, but his overall stock will be determined by the amount that he hits. At 6’4″ 185, he has a projectable build that should be able to stay in center field. His overall high ceiling will get him selected in the first round.

15. Minnesota Twins – LHP Joey Wentz (Shawnee Mission East HS – KS)

Wentz was originally being looked at as a first baseman as he blasted a 543ft shot at Great American Ballpark last summer. There is no question that his future as a pitcher looks more promising. With 6’5″ 210 pound frame, Wentz has a fastball that sits between 90-95 mph with a plus curveball and changeup. He has a clean delivery and athleticism to go along with his big frame. Wentz is committed to play at UVA next year.

16. Los Angeles Angels – LHP Braxton Garrett (Florence HS – AL)

With the current state of the Angels farm system, they are best off by taking the best available. They have a tendency to go with pitching at the top of their drafts. Garret is a 6’3″ 190 pound lefty prep star out of Alabama. Scouts claim he has one of the best curveballs in this class with a fastball that sits 90-94 mph and has late life. Many say that he has the ceiling of a future No. 2 starter. He is one of the many commitments to play at Vanderbilt next year.

17. Houston Astros – 3B Josh Lowe (Pope HS – GA)

The Astros’ farm system is loaded; therefore, they can afford to go with a high-ceiling pick. Lowe has raw power, as you see in that video, with his 6’4″ frame. With his plus speed and arm strength, he could play either third base or the outfield. If hitting does not work out, some scouts claim he’s the best prep pitcher to come out of Georgia since Zack Wheeler. Lowe can reach mid 90s with his fastball and is committed to play at Florida State next year.

18. New York Yankees – RHP Kevin Gowdy (Santa Barbara HS – CA)

The Yankees have been successful with their Southern California prospects and have also been targeting pitching in the top rounds. Gowdy comes from the same high school as former White Sox prospect Dylan Axelrod and Rockies outfielder Ryan Spilborghs. At 6’4″ 170 pounds, Gowdy has a projectable frame with three above-average pitches (fastball, slider, change). His fastball sits 92-93 mph, but it is easy to imagine increased velocity in his future. Gowdy is committed to play at UCLA next year.

19. New York Mets – RHP Matt Manning (Sheldon HS – CA)

The Mets have accumulated tons of pitching in the past few years with one of the best, if not THE best, rotation in baseball right now. I could see them targeting a prep pitcher with tons of upside like Matt Manning, son of former NBA player Rich Manning. His spring season has been cut short due to a deep playoff run for basketball. At 6’6″ 185 pounds, Manning uses every inch of his tall frame throwing his fastball 96-97 mph. He is committed to play at Loyola Marymount next year.

20. Los Angeles Dodgers – RHP Cal Quantrill (Stanford)

Dodgers are known to target high upside early in the draft. Last year, they drafted injury-prone pitcher Walker Buehler from Vanderbilt and the struggling Kyle Funkhouser from Louisville. If it wasn’t for Tommy John last spring, Quantrill would have been a top-10 pick this year. He is the son of former big league reliever Paul Quantrill and has an advanced feel for pitching, which should enable him to move quickly through the minors. Quantrill has four pitches that could be major-league average. This is a high-risk, high-reward pick that I would not be surprised seeing the Dodgers take at 20th overall.

21. Toronto Blue Jays – C Zack Collins (Miami)

Collins is the definition of a “bat-first” player. He is destroying the baseball this year in the ACC with a walk total that is double his strikeout total. Collins seems to be a better fit in the AL where he could potentially DH and he has drawn some comparisons to Evan Gattis/Kyle Schwarber type. Scouts aren’t sure if he will stick behind the dish, but he has to potential to put up 20-plus homers annually.

22. Pittsburgh Pirates – OF Alex Kirillof (Plum HS – PA)

In 2004, the Pirates selected local prep star Neil Walker with the 11th overall pick. Walker has now departed via an offseason trade to the Mets for LHP Jon Niese. I wouldn’t be surprised if Huntington and the gang select local star Kirillof if he falls to them at 22. Kirillof has explosive bat speed and power from the left side of the plate and is projected to be a corner outfielder. He is committed to play at Liberty next year, but signability should not be an issue.

23. St. Louis Cardinals – RHP Jordan Sheffield (Vanderbilt)

Sheffield’s brother Justus was a first round pick of the Indians in 2014. Out of all the pitchers in this draft class, Sheffield may have the best chance of developing his three plus offerings. His fastball touches 98 mph and sits 94-96 mph. However, like many power pitchers, he comes with injury concerns after having Tommy John surgery in 2013. His size and explosive stuff draws comparisons to the Blue Jays’ Marcus Stroman, but it also leads to concerns about his durability as a starter. If anyone can develop Sheffield, it’s the model team of major-league baseball.

24. San Diego Padres – 3B Will Craig (Wake Forest)

This pick is for free agent Justin Upton signing with the Detroit Tigers. Due to pick a prep bat early on in the draft, I can see the Padres going with a college bat here. Preller has a love for high-ceiling talent and could look to add a power bat like Will Craig. Do you know when the last time a Wake Forest player was drafted in the first round? In 2008, Allan Dykstra was drafted 23rd overall by the SAN DIEGO PADRES. Am I on to something here? Probably not. At 6’3″ 235 pounds, Craig draws comparisons to Billy Butler. Stay with me here Padres fans, I don’t mean to scare you off that quickly. Craig has impressive bat speed with his right-handed swing and many see him having 20-plus homer seasons with high OBPs due to his command of the strike zone.

25. San Diego Padres – RHP Jared Horn (Vintage HS – CA)

This pick is for free agent Ian Kennedy signing with the Kansas City Royals. After taking a college and prep bat, the Padres could go after a talented prep pitcher. The 6’3″ Northern California prep pitcher may be one of the more underrated arms on the board. His fastball is consistently 94-96 mph and many scouts love his competitiveness on the mound (starting quarterback for high school team). He is committed to play at the University of California-Berkeley next year.

26. Chicago White Sox – OF Bryan Reynolds (Vanderbilt)

This pick is for free agent Jeff Samardzija signing with the San Francisco Giants. After taking a prep bat, the White Sox could target a safe college bat with three years of consistent performance. Reynolds is one of the more well-rounded players with solid speed and defense, but his below-average arm has left field written all over it. Reynolds will not kill you with any one particular tool, but he could be a solid average major-league performer.

27. Baltimore Orioles – RHP Robert Tyler (Georgia)

This pick is for free agent Wei-Yin Chen signing with the Miami Marlins. The Orioles need to start stockpiling on pitching and I wouldn’t be surprised if they targeted a college arm with this pick. Their current MLB rotation is below average and they have not done a great job of developing top prospects Dylan Bundy and Hunter Harvey. Tyler was previously drafted by the Orioles in 2013 in the 28th round out of high school. However, he would have gone in the top five rounds if he were signable. He has one of the best fastballs in this draft, which sits 92-95 mph as a starter. Tyler is tough to hit due to his steep downward plane, but some scouts see him ending up in a bullpen.

28. Washington Nationals – SS Nolan Jones (Holy Ghost Prep – PA)

This pick is for free agent Jordan Zimmermann signing with the Detroit Tigers. This year, there could be two prep bats out of Pennsylvania taken in the first round. Jones has good bat speed and raw power from the left side. Currently, he plays shortstop in high school, but many scouts feel that his 6’4″ frame will profile better at third. He is committed to play at UVA next year.

29. Washington Nationals – LHP Kyle Muller (Jesuit College Prep – TX)

This pick is for free agent Ian Desmond signing with the Texas Rangers. Texas prep pitcher, Kyle Muller, is from the same school that produced Pirates top prospect Josh Bell. While he is more impressive on the mound, Muller has also battled for the national high-school lead in homers. His fastball sits in the low 90s, but can touch 95 mph. Muller has one of the best bodies in the draft at 6’5″ 230 pounds and is committed to play at the University of Texas next year.

30. Texas Rangers – RHP Cody Sedlock (Illinois)

This pick is for free agent Yovani Gallardo signing with the Baltimore Orioles. In the last three drafts, the Rangers have used their top pick on a pitcher. Last year, the Twins took Illinois left hander Tyler Jay with the sixth overall pick. Sedlock has done very well this year in his transition to the rotation with 90 strikeouts and 24 walks in 11 starts. He has all the tools of a starter with four solid pitches, command of the strike zone, and the ability to generate ground balls. Sedlock’s best pitcher is his sinker that sits 91-93 mph.

31. New York Mets – 3B Drew Mendoza (Lake Minneola HS – FL)

This pick is for free agent Daniel Murphy signing with the Washington Nationals. If they go after a pitcher with their first pick, look for them to target a prep bat. At 6’4″ 195 pounds, he has a tremendous feel for hitting which should generate some power at the next level. With his great arm strength, he projects better as a third baseman. Mendoza is committed to play at Florida State next year.

32. Los Angeles Dodgers – OF William Benson (The Westminster School – GA)

This pick is for free agent Zack Greinke signing with the Arizona Diamondbacks. After taking a high-risk, high-upside college arm, look for them to roll the dice on a high-risk, high-ceiling prep bat in William Benson. Many scouts have referred to the Atlanta prep star as Jason Heyward 2.0. Both were high-school prospects in Atlanta, have similar builds, and tremendous athletes. Benson stands 6’6″ 220 and has tremendous bat speed which give him above-average power. At the next level, many project him to move from center to right field. Benson is committed to play at Duke next year.

33. St. Louis Cardinals – C Matt Thaiss (UVA)

This pick is for free agent John Lackey signing with the Chicago Cubs. After taking a college pitcher, I wouldn’t be surprised to see the Cardinals target a college or prep bat. At UVA, Thaiss has been consistent with the bat, but extremely raw behind the dish. Scouts are not sure if he will stick at catcher when he gets to the next level.

34. St. Louis Cardinals – OF Taylor Trammell (Mount Paran Christian School – GA)

This pick is for free agent Jason Heyward signing with the Chicago Cubs. At 6’2″ 195, the Cardinals would be getting an athlete to say the least with Taylor Trammell. He was the Georgia Class A Offensive Football Player of the Year after rushing for 2,479 yards and 36 touchdowns. When it comes to baseball, he is very raw offensively and defensively. As he is learning to recognize pitches and tap into his raw power, scouts give him a 70 grade for his speed. Trammell is committed to play at Georgia Tech next year.

There it is folks. That is my best or most educated guess on a mock draft about four weeks out. In the meantime, things can change. One of the pitchers in this group could go down with an injury or a prep star could announce that he will be attending school regardless of where he’s drafted. With that said, I hope you all enjoy this and have as much fun with this as I did.

Pop Quiz: What do Andrew Wiggins of the Minnesota Timberwolves (2014), Andrew Luck of the Indianapolis Colts (2012), and Connor McDavid of the Edmonton Oilers (2015) have in common? Answer: They are all recent household names that were chosen with the first overall pick in their respective draft class. Yet, unlike the National Basketball Association (NBA), the National Football League (NFL), and the National Hockey League (NHL), much less attention is paid to the first-year player draft by fans in the Major League Baseball. Correspondingly, not withstanding exceptions such as Stephen Strasburg and Bryce Harper of the Washington Nationals, there is also considerably less hype associated with the first overall selection in the Rule 4 draft on the whole. As America’s Pastime, how is it possible that the grand old game’s annual amateur drafts consistently fall behind the other three North American major professional sports when it comes to media exposure? Why is it that interests among fans on the top pick of MLB drafts pale in comparison to that of the NBA, NFL, and the NHL?

Several explanations have been presented by analysts, including the fact that:

1. the majority of potential top draftees, typically comprised of high school and college student athletes, were “unknowns” to the lay public because high school and college baseball are nowhere near as popular as college football, college basketball, and college/junior hockey;
2. high MLB selections would almost certainly be assigned to minor league-affiliated ballclubs (either Rookie or Class A) in order to refine their skill sets whereas top draft picks in the NHL, NBA, and NFL have a good chance of starring in their leagues right away in their draft year; and
3. the overwhelming majority of prospects taken in the first-year player draft, including numerous first-round picks, would end up never appearing in a single MLB game whereas significantly more drafted players in the NHL, NBA, and NFL, including some of those who are late-round selections, would reach their destiny in due course. Although these assumptions all have merits to various degree, I construe that the dual trends are the direct result of the more volatile nature of the first-year player draft (relatively speaking in comparison to the NBA Draft, the NFL Draft, and the NHL Entry Draft), which makes the process more difficult to yield a “can’t-miss” generational player when compared to the other three North American major professional sports.

All-Stars:

Dating back to the first Rule 4 Draft in 1965, there has been a total of fifty-one first overall selections. To this date, this short list has produced twenty-three All-Stars:

1. Rick Monday, drafted by the Kansas City Athletics in 1965;
2. Jeff Burroughs, chosen by the Washington Senators in 1969;
3. Floyd Bannister, selected by the Houston Astros in 1976;
4. Harold Baines, picked by the Chicago White Sox in 1977;
5. Bob Horner, drafted by the Atlanta Braves in 1978;
6. Darryl Strawberry, chosen by the New York Mets in 1980;
7. Mike Moore, selected by the Seattle Mariners in 1981;
8. Shawon Dunston, picked by the Chicago Cubs in 1982;
9. B.J. Surhoff, drafted by the Milwaukee Brewers in 1985;
10. Ken Griffey, Jr., chosen by the Seattle Mariners in 1987;
11. Andy Benes, selected by the San Diego Padres in 1988;
12. Chipper Jones, picked by the Atlanta Braves in 1990;
13. Phil Nevin, drafted by the Houston Astros in 1992;
14. Alex Rodriguez, chosen by the Seattle Mariners in 1993;
15. Darin Erstad, selected by the California Angels in 1995;
16. Josh Hamilton, picked by the Tampa Bay Devil Rays in 1999;
17. Adrian Gonzalez, drafted by the Florida Marlins in 2000;
18. Joe Mauer, chosen by the Minnesota Twins in 2001;
19. Justin Upton, selected by the Arizona Diamondbacks in 2005;
20. David Price, picked by the Tampa Bay Rays in 2007;
21. Stephen Strasburg, drafted by the Washington Nationals in 2009;
22. Bryce Harper, chosen by the Washington Nationals in 2010; and
23. Gerrit Cole, selected by the Pittsburgh Pirates in 2011.

By all accounts, the results are quite encouraging as the chance of landing a player who would go on to be named an All-Star at least once in their MLB career is a generous 45.10% (23/51).

Rookie of the Year Award Winners:

While All-Star selections are the benchmark of elite players, one question that we need to ask is how many of these players can actually make an immediate impact to their respective ballclubs? Historically, we should look to past American League and National League Rookie of the Year Award winners to answer this question seeing that the Rookie of the Year Award is the highest form of recognition to new players who are making contributions to their teams straight away in very meaningful ways.

Of the aforementioned fifty-one first overall picks, twenty-three of whom were named All-Stars at some point in their MLB career, only three of them were winners of the Rookie of the Year Award:

1. Horner, the National League winner in 1978;
2. Strawberry, the National League winner in 1983; and
3. Harper, the National League winner in 2012.

Sadly, this means that the probability of choosing an eventual Rookie of the Year Award winner with the first overall selection is only 6% (3/51). Although this phenomenon could be purely circumstantial, it is noteworthy that no first overall pick (as of 2015) have ever been named as the winner of the American League Rookie of the Year Award!

National Baseball Hall of Fame:

On the other side of the spectrum, an equally interesting question is how many of the fifty-one previous first overall selections can make a long-lasting contribution to the ballclub(s) that he has played for over his MLB career. Here, we ought to look to the National Baseball Hall of Fame and Museum as being inducted into Cooperstown is the ultimate form of acknowledgment for a player in terms of honouring his sustained excellence and longevity in the big league.

Among the aforesaid fifty-one first overall selections, only one of them was ultimately enshrined into the Hall of Fame: Griffey, Jr. In other words, the odds of choosing an eventual Hall-of-Famer with the first overall pick is a minuscule 2% (1/51). That said, I gather that adjustments are needed as including first overall selections who are still active players into the computation would distort the outcomes. If we were to leave out these seventeen players who are still playing in MLB—(1) Rodriguez; (2) Hamilton; (3) Gonzalez; (4) Mauer;(5) Delmon Young, picked by the Tampa Bay Devil Rays in 2003; (6) Matt Bush, drafted by the San Diego Padres in 2004; (7) Upton; (8) Luke Hochevar, chosen by the Kansas City Royals in 2006; (9) Price; (10) Tim Beckham, selected by the Tampa Bay Rays in 2008; (11) Strasburg; (12) Harper; (13) Cole; (14) Carlos Correa, picked by the Houston Astros in 2012; (15) Mark Appel, drafted by the Houston Astros in 2013; (16) Brady Aiken, chosen by the Houston Astros in 2014 but did not sign; and (17) Dansby Swanson, selected by the Arizona Diamondbacks in 2015; out of the formula, then the possibility of being able to reap a future Hall-of-Famer utilizing the first overall pick would increase to an ever so slightly better 3% (1/34).

Cross-Sports Comparisons:

While the short-term outlook of getting an impact player who can pay immediate dividend in the form of a Rookie of the Year winner is bleak to say the least at 6%, the good news is that there is close to a coin flip (fifty-fifty) chance of drafting an All-Star player with the first overall selection of a first-year player draft at 45%. However, when it comes to the long-term outlook, the likelihood of obtaining a future Hall-of-Famer is highly improbable at 2% pre-adjusted and 3% post-adjusted.

For comparison’s sake, if we look to the left tail of the MLB and NHL distribution curves, the chance of an MLB ballclub landing a Rookie of the Year winner with the first overall pick in a Rule 4 Draft, at 6%, is a sizable 13% less (or more than three times worse) than an NHL team finding a Calder Memorial Trophy winner in an Entry Draft at 19%. Likewise, the probability of an MLB ballclub being able to draft an eventual Hall-of-Famer with the first overall selection of a first-year player draft, at 2% before adjustment and 3% after adjustment, is a considerable 11% (or nearly seven times worse) and 16% (or more than five-and-a-half times worse) less than an NHL team unearthing a Future Hall-of-Famer in an Entry Draft at 13% prior to adjustments and 19% after adjustments. Accordingly, the results seem to back up my hypothesis that the Rule 4 Draft is inherently more unpredictable when contrasted to the NBA Draft, the NFL Draft, and the NHL Entry Draft, which in turn renders the procedure of uncovering a “can’t-miss” generational player harder compared to the other three North American major professional sports.

Final Words:

Even though the likelihood of picking a player who fails to have at least a short stint in MLB is remarkably low at 4% (2/51), as only two players who were taken first overall in the first-year player draft failed to play a single MLB game — (1) Steve Chilcott, picked by the New York Mets in 1966 and (2) Brien Taylor, drafted by the New York Yankees in 1991 — the reality, much like the NHL, is that the likelihood of being able to discover that “can’t-miss” diamond in the rough appears to be an imperfect science regardless of how we break down the fifty-one first overall picks in past Rule 4 Drafts. Now do you want to choose heads or tails?

N.B. A more condensed version of this article was originally published on Obiter Dicta, 89(13), 20 and 23.

Here in Canada, the Toronto Blue Jays’ recent playoff run in 2015 gave us a reminder of how exciting postseason can be when management, players, and fans all share the same goal and vision. Yet, as thrilling as playoff baseball can be, the true definition of success for a team comes down to it being able to win the last postseason game. Why? All teams that bow out of the playoffs — be it the League Division Series, the League Championship Series, or the World Series, ultimately lose their last postseason game. Only one team — the World Series Champion — ends its season by winning its last game in the calendar year!

Before we get ahead of ourselves about winning the last game in October/November, however, we must be reminded that a team cannot participate in the playoffs — let alone advance — unless it wins its division or a wild-card spot. Even with the newly-expended postseason format that saw both leagues (American and National) having two (as opposed to one) wild cards, it remains a challenge to secure one of the 10 playoff berths. One only needs to see how much obstacles Toronto overcame in the 2015 season, aided by then-GM Alex Anthopoulos’ fury of trade deadline activities (acquiring Troy Tulowitzki, LaTroy Hawkins, David Price, and Ben Revere within a span of four days from July 28th to July 31st) to bring an end to the Blue Jays’ 22-year postseason drought. To this end, the first order of business for a team should be getting into the playoffs.

In the simplest form, there are arguably three ways to try to make the postseason. One way is to try to “buy” a championship by signing one or more (if not all) the elite unrestricted free agents on the open market. Of course, this approach requires an ownership that has deep pockets and is willing to spend (sometimes without limitations). Traditional big spenders that come to mind include but are not limited to the New York Yankees, the Boston Red Sox, and the Los Angeles Dodgers. An alternative approach, put on full display by Pat Gillick when he guided Toronto to four American League East Division titles, two American League pennants, and two World Series championships from 1989 to 1993, is to build the core of the 25-man roster through smart drafting and player development and then bolster the lineup, starting rotation, and/or bullpen through trade-deadline deals (including rentals if the cost of prospect capital is within reason). Perhaps the least popular method (at least from the fans’ perspective due to the long-term patience required) — albeit arguably just as effective as the other two means — is to rely on continuous and sustainable home-grown talents strictly, much like the Cleveland Indians (which managed to win an impressive six American League Central Division titles and two American League pennants from 1995 to 2001) and Tampa Bay Rays (which managed to win an American League pennant, two American League East Division titles, and two American League Wild Cards from 2008 to 2013 despite having a very modest payroll).

If money is no object, it would be logical to conclude that most baseball executives would opt for the first route given that it is the shortest avenue to get to the promised land, at least in theory. After all, the Yankees are the owner of 27 World Series championships, by far the most championships of any teams among the four North American major sports, i.e., Major League Baseball, National Baseball Association, National Football League, and National Football League. The greatest strength of “buying” a championship is two-fold. On one hand, by taking an elite talent off the unrestricted free-agent market and/or the trade market, you can prevent your rivals from acquiring that talent, meaning that you are strengthening yourself while simultaneously weakening your opponent. On the other hand, you can afford to “make mistakes” because if the player that you signed and/or traded for did not pan out as anticipated, you can always go out and sign and/or trade for another elite talent as a replacement until you find the right one!

Yet, there is no guarantee that being a big spender would necessarily get you a championship. In the 2015 season, the eight ball clubs with the highest payrolls — and I purposely limited the scope of my coverage to eight teams because there are only eight “true” playoff spots — as of the 2015 season are as follow: (1) Los Angeles Dodgers at $ 301,735,080; (2) New York Yankees at $221,256,867; (3) Boston Red Sox at $214,789,749; (4) San Francisco Giants at $187,088,630; (5) Washington Nationals at $165,655,095; (6) Detroit Tigers at $162,218,297; (7) Texas Rangers at $152,445,607, and (8) Los Angeles Angels at $151,348,162. As we can observe, among the eight teams with highest payrolls, all of which have a payroll in excess of $150,000,000, only three (3/8 = 37.5%) of the ball clubs — the Dodgers, the Yankees, and Rangers — made the cut! In other words, even if you spend money without reservation, it does not necessarily mean that success is guaranteed! In fact, based on this small sample, there is a (5/8 = 62.5%) chance that your team will be watching (as opposed to playing) postseason baseball even if your ball club has one of the highest payrolls in all of Major League Baseball.

Conversely, having a modest or low payroll does not necessarily mean that your team is completely out of running for the grand prize. Even though the odds may stack against you, at least from the surface, recent history suggests that the probability of a low-budget ball club making it to the playoffs is actually not terrible. Below are the eight teams with the lowest payrolls — again, I deliberately limited the range of my coverage to eight ballclubs because there are only eight real playoff spots — in the 2015 season: (1) Miami Marlins at $63,590,525; (2) Tampa Bay Rays at $73,582,652; (3) Arizona Diamondbacks at $76,639,242; (4) Cleveland Indians at $77,404,413; (5) Oakland Athletics at $80,376,830; (6) Houston Astros at $81,450,835; (7) Milwaukee Brewers at $94,010,873; and (8) Pittsburgh Pirates at $99,435,606. As we can decipher, among the eight teams with lowest payrolls, all of which have a payroll south of $100,000,000, there are actually two (2/8 = 25%) ballclubs that managed to secure playoff berths. Indeed, the difference between the number of the “rich” teams from among the eight ballclubs with the highest payroll that made the postseason — three in total — and the number of “poor” teams from among the eight ballclubs with the lowest payroll that made the playoffs — two in total — is only one team.

Hence, in statistical terms, there is not a massive gap in the chances of making the postseason between being one of the “rich” teams from among the eight ballclubs with the highest payroll (37.5%) and being one of the “poor” teams from among the eight ballclubs with the lowest payroll (25%) as the difference is only a mere (3/8 – 2/8 = 1/8 or 12.5%). As a matter of fact, if we were to take the average payroll of the eight teams with the highest payroll [($301,735,080 + $221,256,867 + $214,789,749 + $187,088,630 + $165,655,095 + $162,218,297 + $152,445,607 + $151,348,162)/8 = $194,567,186] and subtract the average payroll of the eight teams with the lowest payroll [($63,590,525 + $73,582,652 + $76,639,242 + $77,404,413 + $80,376,830 + $81,450,835 + $94,010,873 + $99,435,606)/8 = $80,811,372], which yields ($194,567,186 – $80,811,372 = $113,755,814), and then divide this difference by 12.5, i.e., the chances of making the postseason between being one of the “rich” teams from among the eight ballclubs with the highest payroll and being one of the “poor” teams from among the eight ballclubs with the lowest payroll, we can deduce that for every additional one percent (1%) in which a team wants to augment its odds of making the playoffs, it would cost that ballclub just less than 10 million dollars ($9,100,465.11). While the math suggest that you are inching closer to the promised land (at a rather slow pace of one percent) for each additional nine million ($9,100,465.11 strictly speaking) that you are dishing out, I am not so sure that the trade-off makes sense from a value (or cost-benefit) perspective unless money is no object whatsoever.

If spending money blindly is not the way to go, then it seems logical that the second or third approach (perhaps even a combination of the two) is the preferred option. Recent trends in the baseball industry seem to back this rational strategy as more and more teams are demanding “value” for their investments, meaning that they want to get the most bang for their bucks. Below are the eight teams with the lowest average cost per win in Major League Baseball for the 2015 season, as calculated and ranked by dividing the total payroll of all 30 teams by the number of wins (“W”) they have in the 2015 season: (1) Miami Marlins at $895,641.20 per “W;” (2) Tampa Bay Rays at $919,783.15 per “W;” (3) Houston Astros at $947,102.73 per “W;” (4) Cleveland Indians at $955,610.04 per “W;” (5) Arizona Diamondbacks at $970,116.99 per “W;” (6) Pittsburgh Pirates at $1,014,649.04 per “W;” (7) Oakland Athletics at $1,182,012.21 per “W;” and Minnesota Twins at $1,282,311.06 per “W.”

Among the eight teams with the lowest average cost per win in Major League Baseball for the 2015 season, there are once again two (2/8 = 25%) ballclubs that managed to secure playoff berths. This means that the probability of teams that emphasize values for their spending making it to the postseason is the same as that of ballclubs with lowest payroll in Major League Baseball for the 2015 season. Better yet, the chances of teams that emphasize values for their spending and ballclubs with lowest payroll in Major League Baseball for the 2015 season making it to the playoffs are only slightly worse than teams with highest payroll in Major League Baseball for the 2015 season (3/8 – 2/8 = 1/8 or 12.5%).

All things taken into account, I would opt for smart drafting and player development rather going for the shortcut of “buying” a championship if I were a GM, unless my budget is a bottomless pit. Bottom line, not only is there no absolute certainty that having one of the eight highest payrolls would mean a ticket to the playoffs, but as we have witnessed, the odds of making it to the postseason are not really that different for the eight teams with the lowest payrolls and for the eight teams with the lowest average cost per win in Major League Baseball for the 2015 season. Coupled with the unattractive fact that it would cost me nearly 10 million dollars to increase my team’s chance of making the playoffs by a mere one additional percent (and each percent thereafter), it seems obvious that smart drafting and player development is by far the most optimal plan.

Last week Miles Wray examined an emerging spending pattern of the New York Yankees, suggesting that the club’s approach to free agent spending varies, depending possibly on how many dollars had recently come off their books: They appear to spend each offseason either signing seemingly every premium free agent available (2008-9, 2013-4) or they limit themselves to the bargain bin, focusing on late-offseason signings, reclamation projects, and trades.

While this description is certainly accurate, at least since 2008-9 when this pattern began to emerge, there’s little discussion of why a team would choose to invest in free agency this way.  Presumably, teams like the Yankees, the Dodgers, or the Red Sox, which are capable of fielding significantly higher payrolls than any other team in the league, would prefer to do the opposite: Selecting from a much more limited subset of free agents would limit the advantage gained over other teams.  It’s also not inconceivable that a team with as much money as the Yankees might have concerns that they’d be driving up the entire market, increasing their own cost of acquiring talent.  This approach also has very real impacts on team age and roster flexibility as an entire free agent crop begins to enter their decline years together.

Moreover, the Yankees may very well not be the only team taking this approach.  An argument can be made that the Boston Red Sox are following a similar strategy, albeit at a pace accelerated by their shorter duration contracts they signed in the 2012-3 offseason and their salary-dump trade with the Dodgers four months earlier.  The team signed both Hanley Ramirez and Pablo Sandoval, arguably the two top hitters available in free agency, only a year after they signed precisely one free agent, Mike Napoli, who was their own.

So what does a team gain by going on spending sprees followed by (relative) austerity?  I submit they pursue this approach to gain one thing: draft picks.

Consider for the moment what happens in the case where the Yankees are not following this feast/famine strategy in free agency, and instead they sign a premium free agent each year.  In 2009-10 they might’ve signed Matt Holliday or Jason Bay.  2010-1, Carl Crawford or Jason Werth.  In 2011-2, Fielder/Pujols/Reyes.  In 2012-3 Upton/Hamilton/Bourne/Grienke.  All were free agents tied to compensation, meaning in addition to the dollar-cost of signing that player, the signing team also forfeited a draft pick.  (It’s probably also worth noting how godawful most of those signings look today, but that’s the nature of free agency – The last couple of years are almost always ugly.)  The mechanics of where those picks go have changed since the 2012-3 offseason but the cost to the signing team remains the same: A first round draft pick, or a later round pick if the first round pick is already spoken for.

Instead of signing those players, over that span the New York Yankees signed only a single draft-pick-compensation free agent, Rafael Soriano, 2010-11, and it was over the objections of Brian Cashman.  They kept their first-round draft picks in 2010, 2012, and 2013, and picked up a few compensation picks from departing free agents like Nick Swisher, Javier Vázquez and Soriano.

As Miles points out, however, the Yankees simply can’t stockpile picks and rebuild like a normal team.  This restraint is made possible by lavish spending in the 2008-9 offseason, where the Yankees signed pretty much everybody and then went out and won the World Series.  Signing Teixeira, Sabathia, and Burnett means the Yankees not only forfeited their first round draft pick, but their second and third round draft picks as well.

When viewed in the whole, however, this doesn’t appear to be that bad of a deal for the Yankees.  By moving their spending forward into the 2008-9 offseason instead of spreading it out over four years, they essentially traded their second and third round draft picks in 2009 for first-round draft picks in 2010, 2012, and 2013.  They repeated this approach 2013-4, signing Brian McCann, Jacoby Ellsbury, and Carlos Beltran, and while the early returns from those transactions are not promising, it should be noted that the McCann and Ellsbury deals, at least, were considered sound at the time they were signed.  Beltran?  Not so much.  With the last free agent with draft pick compensation attached off the board, they’re keeping their 2015 first round pick as well.

At a time when the aging curve for older players have suddenly become unforgiving, the value of young players is certainly up, and the Yankees appear to be maximizing their chances of acquiring young talent in the draft by minimizing the draft pick cost of signing free agents.  This approach is remarkably similar to their strategy in the international market, where they’ve determined the best way to acquire talent is not to stick to a limited bonus pool each year, but to sign ten or eleven of the top thirty international free agents, (and possibly one more.)  This approach costs them a great deal of money in luxury tax and international bonus pool “overage” tax, but may make sense given how much surplus value an above-average, cost-controlled young player generates.  Now, if only they could do something with all those draft picks…

The Cubs and Red Sox are doing interesting things for their ambitions. Boston overhauled their young and unpredictable club with two of the top free agents on the board while the Cubs’ rotation makeover coincides with a slew of young offensive talent already in place. Neither team is yet finished as the outcomes of Scherzer, Shields and whatever we’re calling San Diego still loom toward the New Year. Regardless, their intent for 2015 and beyond is the same: win.

But these two teams are interesting for another reason. It’s not often that clubs expected to contend in one year also happen to have top 10-selections of that year’s amateur draft, but that’s exactly what will happen this coming June. The former club of Epstein and Hoyer will select 7^th overall. Their current club will select 9^th and if all goes according to plan, each club’s 2016 selections figure to fall well out of protection.

But rising from this is a fascinating opportunity. It’s a very rare opportunity requiring the unique but exact convergence of factors surrounding these two teams, swinging the cost/benefit ratio to an extreme. The Red Sox intend to be at the top of the standings this season and based on what they’ve done, chances are good that they will. The Cubs are not far behind and as opined by Dave Cameron may be just a leap or two from the same goal. Whatever happens, each of the next two seasons project to be followed by two of the strongest free agent classes in history. 2015 should include Justin Upton, Jordan Zimmermann, Jason Heyward and more. The 2016 elite is likely to be headlined by Stephen Strasburg. There is going to be a hefty number of qualifying offers and little reason to care.

Focusing upon the next two years is important. The current collective bargaining agreement is in effect until December 1^st, 2016, specifying the rules that govern draft bonus allotments and the penalties for their violation. Summarized below:

–        0-5% overage: 75% tax on the overage

–        5-10%: 75% tax on the overage and loss of 1^st round pick in subsequent draft

–        10-15%: 100% tax on the overage and loss of 1^st and 2^nd round picks in subsequent draft

–        15% or higher: 100% tax on the overage and loss of 1^st round picks in subsequent two drafts

o   Note: If a team lacks the selection subject to penalty due to a prior penalty levied from draft overages, the team will be penalized in the next draft in which said selection is conveyed.

To date, no team has spent beyond the 5% threshold and thus no team has been penalized a selection.

But then no team has been in this particular position before, a situation perhaps too unlikely to have been considered during CBA negotiations. Under the rules above, teams are pressured either to adhere to slot value or to strategize by shifting their allotments in favor of two or three top talents. The Cubs and Red Sox will have no such limitations this June. They can spend with complete and utter impunity.

Part of how this is possible is due to the language of the CBA and the impending sequence of events. A theoretical chronology:

1)     The 2015 draft begins

2)     Boston or Chicago picks who it wants and spends as much as it wants

3)     Boston or Chicago receives the maximum penalty, including tax and forfeiture of 2016 and 2017 1^st-round selections

4)     2015 free agent class – Either team signing a QO free agent forfeits its next highest 2016 selection (2^nd round)

5)     2016 free agent class – Either team signing a QO free agent forfeits its next highest 2017 selection (2^nd round)

6)     Draft Penalty completed

Why would they do this? Because of who they are and because there is every incentive for doing so. Consider the maximum penalty – forfeiture of 2016 and 2017 first round picks – only for these two clubs, it’s entirely probable that none of these picks project to exist. Notice I said project, which is a critical distinction, because at the time of the 2015 draft their 2016-17 selections are officially still in place.

Implying, what if they can be sacrificed? The Cubs and Red Sox each operate at the highest levels of revenue and at their current win-curve trajectory are virtually guaranteed to be major players on the free agent market in each of the next two years. As a demonstration, both have already signed major targets this off-season. It’s easy then to imagine either team having to relinquish their top selections anyway, except either club can decide that in June as opposed to November. Given enough information by then, they’d have to ask themselves: What do they have to lose?

Lets assume each team performs toward the fringe of the playoffs and we assign them the 23^rd selection in 2016 and 2017. In Boston’s case we could argue this will be even lower, or a few spots higher for the Cubs if you think they aren’t quite playoff ready, but as a middle ground the 23^rd selection is a good place to start. Keep in mind by June, enough games will have been played to know this with some certainty. Let’s also assume that the first-round selections in each year will be lost to FA compensation. This isn’t an exact process since picks will be added or removed to a varying degree, but using 2014’s values will give us a rough estimate going from one year to the next:

*Boston forfeits 2^nd round selection (Hanley Ramirez)

In addition to forgoing the top 30 prospects, dwindling bonus pools severely damage teams’ ability to pay for any talent at all. By employing this strategy, Boston and Chicago can essentially punt drafts in which they might have expected to extract little value in the first place. In exchange, they take full reign to obtain as much talent as they wish in the coming draft – and the talent will be there. Even as restrictions pressure draftees to sign close to slot nevertheless talent falls due to signability, particularly when coming from high school. In the scenario above, a team is looking at one 7-figure talent, maybe two if slots can be shifted. Compare that to what they might obtain with 40 limit free selections.

Just as important, where these teams select has a significant influence on realistic return. Where top ten selections can result in impact talents, selecting early in each round is an opportunity to grab a falling talent well before other teams consider themselves able. Within current strategies, teams have to be cautious of the round in which they decide to risk on higher prospects as the ability to pay is tied directly to their selections in other rounds. But if money is no object, the Cubs and Red Sox can simply pick whomever they want whenever they want, in which case having the higher position becomes a huge advantage.

This isn’t foolproof. It would have to be a “calculated risk” decided upon almost the day-of. For one thing, it’s impossible to predict exactly what a free agent class will have to offer. If several projected free agents instead sign extensions, it becomes more difficult to justify devaluing your top selection. By June, teams should have a better sense of the picture ahead but it won’t be crystal clear. These teams will have to be reasonably confident not only that targets will exist, but that they’ll have a reasonable desire to sign them.

For another thing, at a certain point the cost in payable tax becomes a bit unwieldy. Perhaps the key then isn’t to sign as many top prospects as possible but rather enough to make up for impending losses in the two subsequent drafts. Because their pools are relatively large both teams will be partly insulated, but past that you’re paying double what you normally would per prospect. That requires confidence that the talent available is worth the additional costs, something not often expressed by teams prior to the current CBA.

That’s an argument to be made however, simply because the successful development of a few can exponentially result in surplus value. Should you prefer a direct measure of dollars, studies such as this one routinely demonstrate the windfalls in appropriately identifying and obtaining draft talent regardless of where they’re picked. In today’s league with today’s prices, that’s as tempting an idea as ever and if you wonder whether teams still place premiums on potential, look no further than the international market. Furthermore, the value of a prospect is predicated not on “Will he produce major-league value?” but rather “Can he?” The extractable value of potential in trades should be evident as I write this.

But the third and perhaps the most critical obstacle is the league itself and whether it takes the power to reject bonus agreements. This is suggested in the CBA document linked above, where the “uniform player contract” specifies required-approval by the Office of the Commissioner. Whether this suggests the Office would actually exercise its right of refusal isn’t clear. The only precedent as far as I know is MLB’s refusal to allow a $6M bonus to Matt Purke, a unique situation in which MLB had control of the Rangers’ finances. Particularly controversial deals have drawn little more than ire. Strict stipulation of penalties in the current CBA implies a team’s right to accept said penalties should it choose to do so. For the Commissioner to explicitly prevent a team from exercising this right is bordering on breach and may be actionable or subject to a grievance by the club or by the MLBPA. This is where the issue gets a little messy and comes down to debates beyond the scope of this article.

I won’t hesitate to call this what it is: a gambit. Strategies like this enliven the game and introduce an element of danger that can either pay off or egg face. Regardless, it highlights yet another flaw to the system in place. In one sense, this strategy is a novel way of playing within the rules, which is at the very heart of high competition. In another sense, it goes against sportsmanship in that this strategy is available only to teams who can realistically devalue their top selections, i.e. teams operating with enough capital to consistently invest at the top of the open market.

But rules are rules. The Cubs and Red Sox have the chance to align their playoff ambitions with a prospect bonanza not yet seen. They’ll have their pick among the elite and after that, should the dominoes fall along the way, they can – and should – take full advantage.

Jonathan Aicardi is a researcher with UCSF in the study of glioblastoma and the proprietor of Another Mariners Blog! Because apparently the world needed another one.

With the 2010 MLB Draft just around the corner, and excitement in the air, many writers have been cautioning optimistic fans.  Throughout the 1990’s, very few first rounders contributed anything meaningful in the big leagues. However, I believe times have changed, and improved scouting and statistical analysis have lead to better draft choices across the board.  To see this theory in action, we have to look no further than the stacked first round of the 2005 MLB Draft.  Only five years after the fact, 18 of the 30 draft choices have posted a positive WAR in the big leagues.  All statistics courtesy of FanGraphs and MiLB.com.

1. Justin Upton:  5.7 WAR

Drafted out of high school, Upton has already made a big impact at the Major League Level, posting a .388 wOBA for the Diamondbacks in 2009.  The team has locked him up, and he appears to be a superstar in the making.

2. Alex Gordon: 4.3 WAR

After strong showings in 2007 and 2008, Gordon has struggled in recent years, and the Royals have sent him down to AAA to learn how to play left field, where he is currently mashing minor league pitching (1.207 OPS).

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