Heading into the season, the NL Central was expected to be a one horse race. The Chicago Cubs were projected to win 96 games, nine games better than the second-place-projected Cardinals. The Cardinals, for their part, were projected seven games better than the Brewers (79 wins) and eleven better than the Pirates (76 wins).

Fast forward to this writing and the NL Central mix is much cloudier. The Brewers sit atop the division at 37-24. If we only knew about the projections, they’d be the biggest surprise in the division. However, we do know more about the Brewers than the projections, such as the fact that they won 86 games in 2017 before adding very good players in Christian Yelich and Lorenzo Cain. The projection algorithms didn’t buy the Brewers as a threat, but I’d bet most people did.

The Pirates, on the other hand, won only 75 games last year. Then they got rid of staff ace Gerrit Cole and best-player Andrew McCutchen. They didn’t sign a single major league free agent. The only established major league player they acquired was Corey Dickerson after he was DFA’ed by the Rays following a dismal second half of 2017. Frankly, the Pirates were supposed to suck. Instead, their playoff odds have thus far peaked at 30% and currently sit at 11%. The Pirates were  the NL Central’s biggest early surprise before a recent cold spell.

During their 2013 to 2015 run as one of the NL’s best teams, the Pirates ranked fourth in the majors by ERA- while giving up the third fewest total runs. This time around, the Pirates staff is basically OK, with a slightly better-than-average FIP- and a below average ERA-.

Instead, the Pirates are riding an offense (excluding pitchers) that ranks eighth in the MLB by wRC+. Not unrelated, here is the Pirates ground ball rate by year since 2013:

That’s a drop-off-a-cliff drop. In 2017, the Pirates had the fifth-highest ground ball rate in the Majors. In 2018, they have the second-lowest. The Pirates have a chance to hit more fly balls than ground balls, which they’ve never done this century. It was a trend that Alex Stumpf noted a month ago for the Point of Pittsburgh and revisited again last month. For a team whose manager told his players that their OPS is in the air, the Pirates were late to the fly ball revolution. And yet, here they are.

At risk of oversimplifying Alex’s findings, nearly everyone on the Pirates is hitting less grounders, and nearly everyone on the Pirates is putting more of their hard contact in the air. Hard hit balls in the air are good. Trying to lift the ball more often is a tradeoff that can lead to more strikeouts, but the Pirates are doing it without striking out more than before. The Pirates have a recipe for success.

The change in approach hasn’t benefitted anyone more than Francisco Cervelli. Looking at the 240 players with at least 100 plate appearances in both 2017 and 2018, Cervelli has the second largest decrease in ground ball rate, down to 31.3% from 52.3%, and he’s also decreased his strikeout rate by several points. The Pittsburgh catcher owns a 152 wRC+, which represents a 59 point increase over last year, the eighth largest gain, and more than doubled his isolated slugging. And he’s doing it with a .308 BABIP, which is both perfectly normal and below his .333 career BABIP.

Francisco Cervelli is driving the ball in the air, and he’s doing it without making less contact. There isn’t one right way to accomplish that goal, and Cervelli’s success is probably a combination of several factors. Alex suggested to me that Cervelli appears to have lowered his hands, and it does look like he starts them lower in 2018 than he did in 2017. Lower hands often puts a hitter in a better position to drive the ball in the air, and Cervelli has gained 3.2 mph of exit velocity on line drives and fly balls – the 11^th biggest gain in baseball (min. 50 LD/FB in 2017 and 2018).

Cervelli has improved his plate discipline, too. According to Pitch Info, Cervelli’s chase rate of 24.9% last season was his highest since 2013. This year, he’s lowered it to a career low 19.2% while continuing to swing at strikes at approximately his career rate.

While it’s good to know Cervelli is swinging at the same rate of strikes, we also know all strikes aren’t created equal. It’s just as important, and perhaps more so, to know what kind of strikes a player is swinging at. Here, we see significant change through late May:

Last year, Cervelli’s swing core is toward the low-outside corner. This year, he’s swinging at pitches up and over the heart of the plate. According to Statcast, the vertical pitch location when Cervelli swings is up from 2.20 feet to 2.40 feet – that’s the largest height increase among 226 players with 200+ swings in 2017 and 2018. Jason Heyward is second at an increase of 0.19 feet, and Alex Bregman is third at 0.13 feet. Cervelli is identifying better pitches to hit and he’s now driving them with authority.

Francisco Cervelli spent most of his career behind the dish as an unspectacular, solid hitting catcher. By reinventing himself in his age-32 season, he’s become a force at the dish for the surprise Pirates.

A big thank you to Fangraphs, Baseball Reference, and Baseball Savant for the data used in this post.

The Angels are an odd team. They are perennially competing for a spot in the playoffs and in 2014 they had the best record in the AL, but each year it seems that they are out-performing their talent.

The simplest explanation is that the team is buoyed by Mike Trout, which is true. A team with the best player in baseball, and always one of the highest payrolls in baseball, should not be lagging this much. The Angels should be more than a perennial playoff contender. They should be World Series contenders. So, if there ever was a time for Arte Moreno to hand out his money, it’s this off-season which provides the Halos with everything they need to resolve the biggest issues the team faces.

They currently have $130,278,770 in payroll obligations, excluding pre-arbitration and arbitration-eligible players. The Angels carried payrolls of $168,299,326 and $151,298,162 in 2014 and 2015, respectively. MLB Trade Rumors projects $20,100,000 in arbitration salaries for six players, which brings the Angels 2016 payroll for 14 players to $150,278,770. If you leave three spots open on the 40-man roster, giving the Angels three players to add through free agency, and estimate that the remaining 23 players will cost the Angels $500,000 each, or $11,500,000 total, it would bring the payroll to a best-case scenario of $161,728,770.

Arte Moreno has said he would cross the luxury tax threshold, but that seems more like PR than an actual possibility, so I’ll cap the potential payroll at $189,000,000. That leaves the Angels with $27,271,230 of money to spend before surpassing the luxury tax threshold.

The Angels could use an upgrade to their DH/1B depth and a player like Mike Napoli would fit well with them, but that’s not a pressing need. The bullpen is also an area that could improve, however it’s not really a dire situation.

The most glaring holes on the Angels roster are the third base position and a corner outfield spot. Technically, it’s left field, but Kole Calhoun can play in any corner, so someone who plays either right or left field would work. For that matter, they would be fine with a center fielder because Trout could probably flex out of center field if needed.

A trade, at least a meaningful one, is out of the question because the Angels gave up their only valuable assets in the Andrelton Simmons deal. That may have been a pretty big mistake depending on how much money they plan to spend this offseason.

There does not seem to be a better fit for the Angels than Daniel Murphy. He could be the solution they have been seeking in their search for a left handed bat to slide in the middle of the order. Murphy’s defensive ability, or lack thereof, is somewhat overblown. Metrics tend to be fairly neutral on him, and some of his misadventures at second base overshadow the fact that he’s a competent third baseman. That is where he would best serve the Angels. FanGraphs’ contract crowdsource pegs Murphy for a contract with a $12,000,000 average annual value. I think Murphy could end up getting more than that, but let’s roll with that. The Angels are now down to $15.3 million.

That brings us to the outfield. Jason Heyward, Yoenis Cespedes, and Justin Upton would all fit in Anaheim. However, the Angels could only afford one of them if they backload the contract, which is possible, but set that possibility aside for the moment.

The other options would be Denard Span, Gerardo Parra, Nori Aoki, and Rajai Davis.

Span would seem to be an unnecessary injury risk for a team that would need him on the field to compete for a World Series and does not have a great backup option for the position. However, a healthy Span is a good fit with the Angels. He would add some much needed speed to that lineup and would probably fit in their budget, costing around $12,000,000 on a three-year contract.

Alternatively, a platoon of Nori Aoki or Gerardo Parra with Rajai Davis would probably cost the team around $10,000,000 combined and would provide competent left field options.

The issue with Span or an Aoki or Parra/Davis platoon is that it just puts the Angels back where they were: in the mix. It doesn’t distinguish them, and it doesn’t make them World Series contenders. It’s not improbable that a team with Murphy and one of the lesser outfield options could make a World Series run, it’s just also not improbable they would be sitting at home in October.

And that’s my potential issue with the Andrelton Simmons trade.

There’s been some discussion on the best way to use minor league resources in light of the Red Sox’s trade for Craig Kimbrel. However, I think it’s much more interesting to examine the issue by looking at the Angels and what they gave up in their trade for Andrelton Simmons.

Sean Newcomb was one, and maybe the only, valuable asset that the Angels possessed that they could move in an attempt to improve the team. They undoubtedly did that by getting Andrelton Simmons, but Simmons didn’t solve any immediate issues. He’s an improvement over Erick Aybar, but Erick Aybar really wasn’t an issue. And the trade begs the question, are the Angels looking past this year? The main benefit of Simmons is what he brings the team in 2017 and 2018, being a very good shortstop under a reasonable contract.

I don’t know if Billy Eppler shopped Newcomb around for a player like Carlos Gonzalez or any other available outfielders. Maybe Newcomb wasn’t enough. And Jay Bruce seems like a good fit, but Jay Bruce is a bet; he’s one of those players whose reputation of past performance seems to outpace his recent performance (Bruce had -.9 WAR in 2014 and .1 in 2015. Steamer projects him to have a .6 WAR in 2016).

Maybe Billy Eppler has all the money he needs to add Heyward, Cespedes, or Upton, or maybe he’s convinced he has the ability to add one of them on a back-loaded contract. Jeff Weaver and C.J. Wilson are off the payroll next year and all payroll obligations owed to Josh Hamilton will be off the books after 2017, so the financial situation looks better in the future.

And there are a lot of alternatives here. The Angels could band-aid third base by bringing back David Freese, or adding Juan Uribe. That may leave them with enough money to bring in one of the marquee free agents, but it still leaves them short of being a baseball powerhouse. It just makes them another good team with a shot at making the playoffs.

All of this is to say that the Angels are an interesting team. Mike Trout keeps them on the brink of being very good each year, but if Arte Moreno is willing to spend like the Dodgers and Yankees the Angels could be great. If they added Daniel Murphy and Jason Heyward they would have to be considered one of the best teams in the league. However, if they added Simmons at the cost of only being able to address either their third base or corner outfield issue instead of addressing both, then it seems like a misuse of their only minor league asset, and of Mike Trout’s greatness.

(All stats are current as of the end of April 24th.)

During the offseason, Jason Heyward and Troy Tulowitzki were two of the highest-profile players on the trade block. Heyward was ultimately dealt as the Braves gear up for the future and the Cardinals look to fortify RF after the passing of Oscar Taveras. Tulowitzki was not dealt, as the Rockies hope that they can make an improbable run to the playoffs. Both players could be looking for new homes within the next year, as Heyward hits free agency (barring an extension) and Tulowitzki would be a very tempting target at the trade deadline or in free agency.

However, both players have started the season slowly. While Tulowitzki has a 103 wRC+ (which is pretty darn good for a SS), that figure is far below his 2014 results (171 wRC+) and his career figure (125 wRC+). Much of the blame can be placed on his .197 ISO, which is far below both his 2014 and career ISO. Tulowitzki has been able to counteract the drop in power somewhat due to a .370 BABIP that is far above any BABIP he has recorded over a full season. Heyward’s drop has been even more severe, as he is the owner of a B.J. Upton-esque 64 wRC+. While much of that should be attributed to a paltry .235 BABIP, some blame also can be ascribed to a poor batted ball distribution. However, it is too early to say that either player won’t see these trends reverse as the season progresses.

On the other hand, both players are suffering a precipitous and concerning decline in their plate discipline. Tulowitzki’s K rate has shot up from between 15 and 16 percent to almost 24 percent. Likewise, his walk rate has fallen to a paltry 1.6 percent as he has drawn one walk over the season. That shift is being driven by an increase in his swings on pitches out of zone, which has grown to 35 percent from 27 percent in 2014 according to Pitch F/X data:

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In addition, Tulowitzki is making less contact as he swings, as his contact rate is below 80 percent – a percentage he has never had at the end of the season. He is also swinging and missing more and is over the league average for the first time since his disastrous cup of coffee in 2006. Tulowitzki’s also seen 8 percent more pitches in the zone (a higher figure than ever before), which indicates that pitchers are not as afraid of him as they once were. All of this comes directly after he had hip surgery, which suggests that he may not be fully recovered yet or that the injury may have eroded his skills slightly.

Heyward also has seen his plate discipline deteriorate but not to the same level that Tulowitzki has. First the good news: his strikeout rate, while slightly elevated from his totals in the past few years, is still in line with his career norms. However, the rest of his plate discipline numbers are worse than his career numbers. As noted by Bernie Miklasz, Heyward only has one walk, is swinging at far more pitches out of zone than ever before, and is seeing fewer pitches in the zone than ever before. Miklasz also notes that Heyward is pounding groundballs – he is currently putting 62 percent of his balls in play on the ground. This is far above his career averages (as shown in the chart below) and is a sign that chasing more pitches is not helping him generate power.

In addition to the points that Miklasz made, Heyward is also swinging far less at pitches in the zone. This season, he has swung at 58 percent of pitches in the zone, the lowest percentage since his rookie year. These diverging trends have allowed Heyward to set a personal record: for every pitch that Heyward swings at out of the strike zone, he only swings at 1.04 pitches in the strike zone.* This is far below his career ratio of 1.69.

Now, as loyal FanGraphs members (only the truly committed read the Community board!), I can hear your refrain of “Small Sample Size.” And I certainly agree that it is too early to completely believe in the magnitude of these changes. It is extremely unlikely that both players will walk less than 2 percent of the time this year. However, I believe that the magnitude and consistency of the changes is a clear sign that both players are suffering due to the erosion of their plate-discipline skills. Both players have reached the stabilization point for strikeout rate, are halfway to the stabilization point for walk rate, and Heyward is quickly approaching the stabilization point for groundball rate. In addition, per pitch metrics like O-Swing and Z-Swing stabilize quickly, with swing rate stabilizing at 50 PAs. While those stabilization points only denote the point at which the data is half noise and half signal, the changes are consistent enough across multiple measures of plate discipline that its extremely hard to argue that it could **all** be a fluke. While both of these players are plus defenders and have the power to still be plus hitters with poor plate discipline, their value will suffer unless they can find a way to turn around their plate discipline.

* This statistic can be calculated using the following formula: (Zone%*Z-Swing%)/((1-Zone%)*O-Swing%).

Let’s start with the surprising conclusion: Batters are getting hit by pitches at near-historic rates. For all that you hear about pitchers who won’t pitch inside, and umpires issuing warnings that make it impossible to throw at hitters, and batters being unwilling to take one for the team, we’re seeing batters get hit by pitches at the highest rate since the turn of the last century.

I looked at each decade since 1901, the first year there were two leagues. Using FanGraphs’ Leaders page, I calculated the number of hit batsmen per 100 games played:

   1901-1910  6.5

   1911-1920  4.9

   1921-1930  3.6

   1931-1940  2.6

   1941-1950  2.4

   1951-1960  3.1

   1961-1970  3.4

   1971-1980  3.1

   1981-1990  3.0

   1991-2000  4.7

   2001-2010  5.8

   2011-2014  5.3

Baseball was kind of a wild game in the early days, with all sorts of shenanigans on the ball field, including throwing at batters. Hit batsmen were already in decline when, on August 16, 1920, Carl Mays hit Ray Chapman in the head with a pitch, killing him. Hit batters declined through the next three decades, bottoming out at 2.14 per 100 games in 1946. They stayed around 3 or so per 100 games through the 1980s, and then they took off. Here are the 30 years with the most batters hit by a pitch per 100 games:

    1. 1901  8.0       11. 1907  6.1       21. 2008  5.5

    2. 1903  6.9       12. 2004  6.1       22. 2011  5.3

    3. 1905  6.9       13. 1909  6.0       23. 2009  5.3

    4. 1902  6.8       14. 2003  6.0       24. 2013  5.2

    5. 1904  6.6       15. 2006  6.0       25. 1913  5.2

    6. 1911  6.5       16. 2005  6.0       26. 2010  5.2

    7. 2001  6.2       17. 2007  5.8       27. 1999  5.1

    8. 1908  6.1       18. 2014  5.7       28. 1998  5.1

    9. 1910  6.1       19. 2001  5.7       29. 2000  5.1

   10. 1906  6.1       20. 1912  5.5       30. 2012  5.1