The 2018 Prospect Breakout Nobody Is Talking About

When I was first asked about Chavez Young, I honestly vaguely recognized the name. I knew he was a Blue Jays outfielder, but that’s about it (and I work with prospects!). Just looking at the stat line, I was impressed. And the deeper I looked, the more I began to think that this might be the most criminally underrated prospect in baseball. David Laurila also took note recently here at FanGraphs.

Quick question: Who was the only prospect in baseball to record 50 extra-base hits and steal 40 bases in 2018? You guessed it: Chavez Young. Which prospect is rated as having the best defensive arm in the Blue Jays system by Baseball America, with 98 mph from the outfield recorded in high school? You guessed it again, Chavez Young. So how does a player like this go so under-the-radar? How does a 20-year-old in full-season ball who plays plus defense, hits third in his lineup, and had 50 extra-base hits and 40 steals not even make MLB Pipeline’s top 30 for the organization?

Let’s start off by saying who Chavez Young is. Young was born in the Bahamas, an area that is starting to get more buzz as a baseball country after producing prospects like Kristian Robinson and Jazz Chisholm. But it is also an area that up until recently was rarely visited by baseball scouts. Since 1983, only one major league player has made the MLB from the Bahamas (Antoan Richardson). As a result, Chavez left the Bahamas in high school to pursue baseball in the prestigious Georgia prep ranks. Read the rest of this entry »


What to Make of Dallas Keuchel

Despite the generally slow free agent market and the continuing increase of bullpen usage, starting pitchers have done fairly well for themselves this winter. Patrick Corbin inked a nine-figure deal, blowing past most projections to get a guaranteed $140 million. The Rays shelled out their largest free agent contract ever, giving Charlie Morton $30 million over two years. Nathan Eovaldi parlayed a strong second half and postseason heroics into a four-year, $67.5 million pact to return to Boston, and J.A. Happ got half that from the Yankees for his age 36 and 37 seasons. Even past-their-prime options such as Lance Lynn, Anibal Sanchez, and Matt Harvey were given eight figures, the former two on multi-year guarantees.

Yet arguably the most accomplished hurler among this year’s crop of free agent starters remains unsigned – Dallas Keuchel. FanGraphs’ Crowd Source and MLB Trade Rumors projections both had the 2015 Cy Young winner in the neighborhood of four years and $80 million, which would exceed Eovaldi’s deal for the second-highest guarantee among starters.

Of available starters, Keuchel was worth the second-most WAR last year (3.6, behind only Corbin’s 6.3), and projects to be the second-most valuable next year (3.3 WAR, just behind Corbin’s 3.5). Much has been made of his decline in punchouts (his strikeout rate dipped to 17.5% in 2018, fourth-lowest among qualified pitchers), but his velocity has remained steady and he’s continued to limit both walks and homers while inducing lots of ground balls. In 2018, Keuchel topped 200 innings for the third time in five seasons, and he’s been an above-average starter in all of those years.

At 31, he’s not young, but he’s younger than Happ (36), Morton (35), Sanchez (35), and Lynn (32), all of whom received multi-year deals. It’s fair to say that Keuchel doesn’t have the upside of Corbin or Eovaldi (or maybe even that of Morton or Yusei Kikuchi), but his consistency and track record should appeal to plenty of teams in need of a rotation upgrade.

Happ, a southpaw with a similar reputation for durability and above-average-but-not-elite performance, and Keuchel have been almost identical over the past three years (518 innings and 9.1 fWAR for Happ, 518.1 and 8.6 for Keuchel). But Happ is four years older, so over the course of his next contract, Keuchel’s output could quite reasonably look a lot like Happ’s recent past – that is, a 170-inning, 3-win metronome.

However, there seems to be some concern or trepidation surrounding Keuchel, a pitcher whose raw stuff was never overpowering, and the sustainability of his results. And looking at some of his underlying metrics, it’s easy to see why. Read the rest of this entry »


Batter Performance vs. Pitcher Clusters

Managers are always attempting to optimize their lineups for success. Whether they make in-game decisions like double-switches and lefty-righty matchups, or choose to change things up based on recent or historical performances, every move is meant to give their team the competitive advantage. What if they also made alterations based on pitcher groupings? In this article, I will attempt to determine if batter performance is impacted by pitcher clusters that are organized by pitch speed and pitch proportion.

The parameters used to cluster pitchers are below:

  • Proportion of Pitch Thrown
  • Average Pitch Speed

These statistics were calculated for the following pitch types:

  • Changeup
  • Curveball
  • Eephus
  • Cutter
  • Four-seam fastball
  • Sinker
  • Two-seam fastball
  • Knuckle-curve
  • Knuckleball
  • Slider
  • Splitter

*All data in this study is from 2010-July 2017 (MLB Gameday). Read the rest of this entry »


Statcast, Scouting, and Statistics: An Objective Look at the 20-80 Scale for Hitters

The 20-to-80 scale is one of the core tenets of baseball scouting and allows evaluators to quickly interpret a player’s skillset. Kiley McDaniel wrote an excellent series of articles back in 2014 (and provided an update this past November) explaining the scale, and while the whole series is easily worth a read, one of the key notes is as follows:

The invention of the scale is credited to Branch Rickey and whether he intended it or not, it mirrors various scientific scales. 50 is major league average, then each 10 point increment represents a standard deviation better or worse than average.

On the surface, the scale is fairly easy to understand, but somewhat harder to conceptualize what each grade actually looks like. For example, how frequently does a hitter with a 45 power grade hit a home run? How does a 60 run grade translate to Sprint Speed? I decided to investigate, drawing inspiration from a 2013 article by Mark Smith. The idea of an objective 20-to-80 scale, while not a new concept, is worth revisiting at this time because of changes in the run environment and the development of new player evaluation techniques, most notably StatCast. We’ll begin with a brief rundown on methodology before looking at each tool: Read the rest of this entry »


Using Statcast Data to Estimate Minor League Home Run Distance

For a couple of years now, baseball fans have enjoyed publicly available Statcast data for the MLB level. This data allows us to examine the exit velocity, launch angle, estimated distance, and countless other aspects of every batted ball. This data has also resulted in “expected” stats, very useful additions to the toolbox of any baseball fanalyst. While this data is collected at the minor league level as well, it is not made publicly available, leaving us with a more limited toolbox when evaluating prospects via statistics.

Fortunately, one piece of Statcast-adjacent MiLB data is publicly-available. MLB’s Prospect site includes a search engine for MiLB statistics. For each batted ball, the site reports two “hit coordinates”: hc_x and hc_y. These coordinates appear to tell us the point on the field where the batted ball hit the ground or was caught. Using these hit coordinates, we can estimate (with some accuracy) the distance of home runs hit at the MiLB level.

Here are the hit coordinates of every batted ball by the Toronto Blue Jays in 2018 at the MLB level. The picture of a baseball diamond becomes even clearer if we multiply each hc_y by -1, flipping the image about the horizontal axis. Read the rest of this entry »


Are Analysts Affecting the Behavior They’re Observing?

Introduction and Hypothesis

One of the longest standing tenets of sabermetrics, stemming from Voros McCracken’s seminal 2001 work on DIPS (Defense Independent Pitching Stats) theory, is that pitchers ought to try for strikeouts rather than focusing on inducing weak contact. McCracken asserted that pitchers have little control over the quality of contact they allow. However, they do control if they strike the batter out (good) or walk him (bad) or allow a home run (even worse). Put another way, McCracken found a strong negative correlation between a pitcher’s strikeout rate (K%) and his runs allowed per nine innings (RA9). It is a simple logical step from here to conclude that pitchers ought to try to strike batters out.

Or is it?

Might McCracken’s DIPS observations only hold as long as pitchers are trying to generate weak contact? If they begin to focus solely on strikeouts, might this observed correlation weaken? Might we find more pitchers who are able to generate strikeouts but are not particularly successful at preventing runs?

As an analogy, consider a farmer whose goal is to get a big harvest of high-quality crops. To this end, he regularly waters and fertilizes his plants. He hires a consultant who does some studies and points out that fertilizing is closely correlated with the quality and quantity of the harvest. As a result, the farmer shifts all of his efforts to fertilizing and ignores watering altogether. Clearly this is not the best strategy. In the same way, might a pitcher be hurt by focusing on strikeouts and ignoring the quality of contact his pitches will generate if the batter does make contact?

With this in mind, might we, as analysts, in fact be affecting the very phenomena that we’re observing? Read the rest of this entry »


An Analysis of Pitch Movement at Coors Field

Since opening in 1999, Coors Field has provided the most offense-friendly environment in baseball. Despite the inherent volatility in park factors for single-season data, Coors has “won” the park factor title in 15 of the past 20 years, never finishing lower than third. The dramatic increase in home runs may be the most striking effect of the thin air about a mile above sea level, but all balls in flight, including pitches, are affected. Due to the lower air density, the spin-induced movement of a pitch thrown at high altitude will be lower than that of a comparable pitch closer to sea level.

Check out the average movement on Adam Ottavino’s pitches in 2017 and 2018 separated by home (purple) and away (black).

Ottavino pitch chart

You may recall Ottavino said recently that he is confident Babe Ruth couldn’t hit any of this stuff. Read the rest of this entry »


James Paxton Is Not the “Next Sonny Gray”

The Yankees kicked off their offseason by acquiring LHP James Paxton from the Seattle Mariners to bolster their starting rotation. You won’t find anybody willing to deny Paxton’s immense talent, but it’s natural for people to scrutinize big acquisitions, especially when the big acquisition is on his way to New York. This scrutiny is best exemplified by a conversation I had with my mother on the day the trade was made. My mom followed the Mets of the mid-to-late 1980s when she lived in Brooklyn, went years without watching baseball, and has watched the Yankees for the past decade by product of my fandom. This leads to the amusing circumstance that she is very familiar with current broadcasters Keith Hernandez and David Cone, all of the recent Yankees players, and almost nobody in between. Our conversation on the day of the Paxton trade went something like this:

Me: The Yankees picked up a hell of a pitcher named James Paxton. I think he’s going to do big things for the Yankees next year!

Mom: Yeah, sure. Isn’t that what you said about Sonny Gray?

Okay — she got me there.

Read the rest of this entry »


We Were Wrong About the Home Run Derby Curse

The Home Run Derby (HRD) is one of the most popular MLB events of the year, seemingly as popular among the players as among the fans. Everyone enjoys watching the best players in baseball launch 450-foot home runs while the non-participating All Stars towel the hitters off and cheer wildly for the most spectacular hits as they head over the outfield seats. But it is also one of the most controversial events, since it rewards something that every little leaguer is warned not to do — swing for the fences with every pitch. Some commentators believe that there is a pattern of derby participants exhibiting declining production in the second half of the season, and they argue that participation in the derby is to blame, because, they say, it ruins the swing plane of the participants. If we can put this theory to bed, then, if nothing else, it would take a little bit of stress off of a really fun night. If an effect does exist, however, it would be useful for front offices to know this before sending their stars to their potential demise.

It has become commonplace in the statistically minded baseball community to view the “Home Run Derby Curse” — the decline in productivity for HRD participants — as an example of misguided traditionalist folklore. The statistically savvy point out that people are selected for the derby exactly because they are overperforming their “true” talent level and because they will perform closer to that true talent level in the second half. Considering that, it is reasonable to assume their second-half performance will be worse than their first-half performance — a rather pedestrian example of regression to the mean. However, the argument usually stops here, as if somehow the concept of regression alone is enough to prove the non-existence of a curse.

The fundamental challenge in rigorously exploring whether or not the Home Run Derby caused a decline in production for an individual player is the same as for many arguments about causality — in order to firmly establish (or dismiss) the claim, we would need to imagine a counterfactual world in which that player did not participate in the derby and then we could see the difference in second-half production. That, of course, is impossible. One approach to addressing this challenge is to consider a collection of players whose statistics are similar to the HRD participant but who did not compete in the derby and look at the difference in second-half production. If we do this with all HRD participants, we should be able to see any general effects, if they exist. Read the rest of this entry »


Prospecting for the Mookie Betts of Pitching

Over the past several years, we have watched a number of hitters in the minors display good contact skills with average or below-average power be labeled with 45s and 50s only to burst onto the scene with an explosion of power they never showed any hint of previous. Mookie Betts might be the best example, along with guys like Jose Ramirez, who show up to the big leagues and announce themselves by mashing.  Naturally, prospect hounds, analysts, and the baseball community investigated how these guys went so overlooked (unless you were Carson Cistulli). It was surmised that contact quality mixed with good exit velocity and appropriate launch angles allowed hitters to maximize their output even without Aaron Judge levels of thump.

This investigation, however, is not a hunt for the next minor leaguer who will smash his way onto the scene, but rather a search for the pitchers who will try to stop them. With modern conditioning and institutions (read: Driveline) making it more possible than ever to gain velocity, one no longer must be naturally gifted a 6-foot-5 frame with easy 95 to be considered a prospect. Furthermore, with openers, bulk guys, firemen, and more, traditional pitching roles are going by the wayside.

This analysis attempts to seek out pitchers who possess above-average command or secondary offerings but lack the prototypical velocity grades we are seeing in today’s game. Identifying these pitchers would make them intriguing candidates for these high-intensity velocity training plans. While you may not find the next Luis Severino, you could uncover an explosive fireman reliever, matchup guy, or high-octane backend starter that pushes you closer to October glory.

The process for this analysis involved using the 2018 updated prospects list from THE BOARD, developed by Kiley McDaniel, Eric Longenhagen, and Sean Dolinar at this very site. I started by sorting for prospects who either currently have > 55 command or project for the same. This brought the sample to 85 pitchers. Next, I sorted out pitchers who have a present FB grade of > 55. Our sample now sits at 38 pitchers who have or project to have above-average command and an average-to-below-average fastball. Before diving into the next set of data, I wanted to provide some broader notes about this group. Notable pitchers with top 100–130 considerations on this list include Atlanta’s Kolby Allard and Joey Wentz, Miami’s Braxton Garrett, and the Angels’ Griffin Canning. There are 16 lefties and 22 righties. The Phillies lead the way with five of these guys, the Cubs and Rockies are tied with three each, and then the rest of the league has one or two on this list. Additionally, the average age of this group is 22.8 years old.

Now that we have our assorted pool, it is time to sort through this group’s off-speed arsenal. This part of the analysis was more subjective. I have attempted to group pitchers with similar traits that could fill a variety of roles. What follows is three tables of guys who could benefit most from additional velocity.

Elite Pitch Guys (70 Grade Pitch)
Name Pos Tm Age FB SL CH CMD
Eli Morgan RHP CLE 22.5 45 / 45 50 / 55 60 / 70 45 / 55
Logan Shore RHP DET 23.9 40 / 45 40 / 45 60 / 70 50 / 60

This first group features two right-handers with a current 60-grade pitch that projects for 70. Of the 38, these two are the lone members who feature a current 60 pitch. Of the two, Morgan has the higher upside based on his slider. Both have fastballs that sit around 90 mph, but additional velo training could push the value of these guys up a tier. Guys from this tier could be featured as openers or one-time-through-the-order relievers that rely on one elite pitch. The selling point of this group is that they have that elite pitch to lean on even without elite velocity.

Mid-to-Backend Starter Type (One 60 and 55)
Name Pos Tm Age FB CB CH CMD
Pedro Avila RHP SDP 21.8 50 / 50 55 / 60 55 / 60 45 / 55
Joey Wentz LHP ATL 21.1 45 / 50 45 / 55 60 / 60 45 / 55
Braxton Garrett LHP MIA 21.3 50 / 50 55 / 60 40 / 55 45 / 55
Foster Griffin LHP KCR 23.3 45 / 45 55 / 60 50 / 55 50 / 55

The next group features players with multiple 55-or-better future offerings, led by Padres righty Pedro Avila, who is rocking two future 60-grade pitches. Previously mentioned notables Garrett and Wentz also fall into this category. This group represents backend starter types who are useful during the season but less useful during the postseason. Additional velo here could push these guys into strong No. 3 starters or high-leverage multi-inning guys.

Kitchen Sinkers (High Secondary Scores)
Name Pos Tm Age FB SL CB CH CMD ARS
Griffin Canning RHP LAA 22.5 50 / 50 50 / 50 50 / 50 45 / 55 45 / 55 155
Peter Lambert RHP COL 21.6 50 / 50 45 / 50 50 / 55 55 / 60 45 / 55 155
Jose Lopez RHP CIN 25.2 50 / 50 50 / 50 50 / 50 40 / 50 50 / 55 150
Aaron Civale RHP CLE 23.4 45 / 50 55 / 60 40 / 45 45 / 50 50 / 60 155
Cole Irvin LHP PHI 24.8 40 / 40 45 / 50 50 / 50 40 / 45 45 / 55 145
Alec Mills RHP CHC 26.9 45 / 45 50 / 50 40 / 40 55 / 55 55 / 60 145
Cory Abbott RHP CHC 23.1 45 / 45 50 / 55 45 / 45 40 / 45 45 / 55 145

The last group of guys profile as backend starter types who live on off-speed stuff and have no margin for error with their fastballs. I identified these players by adding their FV non-fastball pitch grades together, noted as ARS in table (ARS = FCH+FSL+FCB). These guys walk the command and off-speed tightrope to end up as backend starters in the best case, or just middle-relief guys or up-and-down starters. Occasionally these guys become Kyle Hendricks, Tanner Roark, or Doug Fister, but these are exceptions and not the rule. Almost everyone in this group is older for a prospect, so the ceiling is limited, however, additional velo for these guys could turn them into more dynamic multi-inning relivers, bulk guys, or high-end No. 4-5 starters.

I should also note that all these guys fall into different buckets of age, level, and body types. Arguably, the most critical component of a prospect on this list would be targeting high-makeup guys who would be willing to experiment and acknowledge that they could use more gas to ascend to the next level. Some of these pitchers may be maxed out physically or unwilling to change what already seems to work. This analysis also looks past statistical performance, level, and even present pitch value a bit. What this analysis does do is identify guys who could rapidly improve with additional velocity due to advanced command and secondary. The margin for error is incredibly slim for this type of pitcher, but through intense training and velocity gains, pitcher X throwing 90-92 bumping to 94-96 with already above-average command and secondaries would vault them into a new tier of player. For teams looking to squeeze every ounce of value out of their farm system, this could be another way to target undervalued talent that has yet to be unlocked and developed.