The Oakland Athletics starting pitchers have posted a 106 xFIP-, and accumulated 9.5 WAR, figures that are 23rd and 19th in the MLB, respectively. As the below table shows, pitching independent stats do not show much love for the Athletics starting pitchers, with their walk rate being the only number not around the bottom third of the league.

However, the A’s starting pitchers fare better in terms of defense-dependent stats, and with the exception of Brett Anderson, they have managed to stay healthy.

Finally, to give you an idea of how pedestrian their staff has been (at least in terms of sabermetric numbers, more on that later), I prepared a table of the A’s starting pitchers this year.

The Coliseum is the 8th-most difficult park in terms of hitting home runs, and the A’s fly ball rate of 42.0% leads the MLB (no other team gets a higher percentage of fly balls than groundballs). Gray has been excellent in the six starts he has made, with a 53.7 GB%. Other than Anderson and Gray, no A’s starting pitcher has a GB% above 42.3%. Put a team full of fly ball pitchers in a big ballpark with a good outfield defense, and you have a recipe for overachieving peripherals. This helps explain how the A’s starting pitchers have managed to put together a 3.79 ERA despite a 4.25 xFIP, easily the biggest positive gap of any team.

Except for newcomer Gray (18th overall in 2011), the A’s have not used high draft picks to get these pitchers. In fact, since 2003, the A’s have only selected four pitchers out of their nineteen first round picks. Colon was an inexpensive free-agent signing. Parker and Anderson were acquired in trades with the Diamondbacks where the A’s gave up Haren and Trevor Cahill after getting some solid years out of those arms. Milone, a former 10th-round pick, was acquired as part of the Gio Gonzalez trade. Straily was a 24th-round pick in 2009. Griffin was a 13th-round pick in 2010. If you click on the links, (or just keep reading) you will find out that one other player from those two rounds has reached the majors. (Keith Butler, who managed a 5.44 xFIP in 20 innings with the Cardinals this year). Most players drafted in those rounds are no longer playing affiliated baseball, not starting games for a playoff-bound team.

As the A’s starting pitchers are currently 23rd in the MLB in xFIP- and CoolStandings puts their playoff odds at 98 percent, I thought it would be interesting to see how many teams had made the playoffs with their starting pitchers possessing a cumulative xFIP- of 106 or worse. As xFIP- only goes back to 2002, the search was restricted to the 2002-2013 era.

The 2011 Diamondbacks finished 94-68, winning the NL West.  Diamondbacks starting pitchers posted a 107 xFIP, good for 25th in MLB. Thanks to some innings eaters, they tallied 12.0 WAR, 15th in the MLB. Like the A’s, the Diamondbacks had a staff of fly ball pitchers, as they posted the lowest groundball percentage in the league. Despite playing at cozy Chase Field, their HR/FB ratio was only 9.8%, due in part to their rotation getting the fourth-highest infield-fly rate. They also had the third-lowest walk rate in the MLB. Featuring an outfield of Chris Young, Gerardo Parra, and Justin Upton, the Diamondbacks led the MLB in UZR. The rotation featured excellent seasons from Ian Kennedy and Daniel Hudson, with a side of Josh Collmenter. Nobody else reached +1 WAR. The Diamondbacks beat their Pythagorean record by +6 wins. Their 28-16 record in 1-run games was the best in the MLB.

Okay, so only one team has made the playoffs with an xFIP- of 106 or worse, and the 2011 Diamondbacks were knocked out in five games by the Brewers. So, to see if I could include some more teams, I expanded the search to include teams whose starting pitchers finished 23rd or worse in xFIP-.

The 2006 Mets won the NL East, going 97-65. Their starting rotation  featured a 104 xFIP-, which was 24th in the MLB. Like the A’s and Diamondbacks, this was a staff of flyball pitchers, which finished 28th in groundball percentage. Outfielders Carlos Beltran and Endy Chavez ran down many of those flyballs. Unlike the A’s and Diamondbacks, the 2006 Mets were heavy on strikeouts and walks. The staff finished 8th in strikeouts and 7th in walks. Overall, the starting rotation was 26th in WAR, with a 40-year-old Tom Glavine leading the team at +2.5, followed by 34 year-old Pedro Martinez and 36 year-old Orlando Hernandez at +2.0 and +1.7, respectively. Headed by Billy Wagner and Aaron Heilman, the Mets bullpen finished 2nd in WAR and xFIP, and 4th in innings. Mets hitters also finished 7th in wRC+. Furthermore, the Mets beat their Pythagorean record by +9 wins, going an MLB-best 31-16 in 1-run games.

The 2006 Oakland A’s won the AL west at 93-69 with a starting rotation that had a 104 xFIP, 23rd in the MLB. That staff featured strong years from Barry Zito and Dan Haren, who helped the A’s rotation throw the 4th most innings in the MLB, which allowed them to accumulate a more respectable 11.9 WAR, 17th in the MLB. Unlike this year’s version of the A’s, the 2006 staff was middle of the pack in groundball percentage. The bullpen featured contributions from a bevy of relievers, finishing 5th in relief WAR, despite throwing the 7th fewest innings. The hitters were patient but generally lacked power, as they finished 2nd in walk rate and 25th in ISO. An old Frank Thomas and a young Nick Swisher combined to hit over 40 percent of the team’s home runs. The fielding was solid but far from spectacular. Like the Diamondbacks and Mets, they beat their Pythagorean record by a substantial margin.  Their 32-22 record in 1-run games helped them finish with +8 wins.

And that’s it. No other team has made the playoffs since 2002 after having their starting pitchers finish 23rd or lower in xFIP-. To tally it up, that’s one team that has made the playoffs with a starting rotation that posted an xFIP- of 106 or worse, and only two more that made the playoffs while finishing 23rd or worse in xFIP-, one of those being the A’s. The A’s success this year isn’t quite unprecedented, but it’s close. Unlike the other teams mentioned, the A’s have played to their Pythagorean record. Rather than emphasizing velocity (A’s starters are 28th in fastball velocity) Billy Beane has sought out young strike throwers who can stay healthy (and Colon, an old strike thrower). By putting them in a big ballpark with good outfielders, the A’s have managed to make below-average starting pitchers look solid. Billy Beane and the A’s are finding a way to beat sabermetric pitching stats such as xFIP and FIP.  By drafting pitchers later and making the most out of less than electric arms they have managed to insure themselves against the risks associated with young pitchers.

Note: I have no idea if I’m the first to do this, but quite frankly I don’t care.

Wait, don’t go! I swear I’m not crazy! Seriously, though, Jonathan Papelbon is an interesting case, one which has fascinated me ever since his last pitch with the Red Sox¹, and since the Jewish community² has been so gracious as to allot me this day off from school, I don’t really have anything better to do; hence, this.

While there has been a lot of criticism directed at Papelbon recently, the fact that everyone seems to overlook is that he is still a pretty good pitcher. It’s true that his strikeout rate has decreased dramatically (“only” 23.3% compared to 29.2% for his career); however, he has compensated for this by reducing his walk rate (4.2% compared to 6.4% for his career) and having a lower HR/FB% (6.1%, compared to 7.1% for his career). Consequently, while his xFIP and SIERA are both higher than his career numbers (3.43 and 2.93 compared to 3.09 and 2.50, respectively), his ERA and FIP (2.35 and 2.70, respectively) are right around his career numbers of 2.34 and 2.65; these numbers rank him him 33rd and 27th, respectively, out of 140 qualified relievers. Combine that with pitching in one of the more offense-friendly parks in baseball, and his WAR is 25th-best out of all relievers.

Now, the obvious counterpoint is that Jonathan Papelbon is not being paid the highest salary of any relief pitcher in all of baseball to be the 25th best. Obviously, this is true, and this post could very easily devolve into the usual “it’s not his fault Amaro’s a dipshit” argument; however, that’s not what I want to write about today. No, I choose to follow a higher calling: to determine whether or not Mr. Papelbon shall be enshrined forevermore in Cooperstown.

To do this, I decided to get a historical perspective, keeping in mind that the Hall of Fame voters are not sabermetrically-inclined, though they are still rational people³. Looking at the FanGraphs all-time ERA leaderboard, we see that Papelbon’s career ERA is the third-best all-time of pitchers with at least 500 relief IP, behind only Mariano Rivera and Billy Wagner⁴. Looking at the Baseball-Reference all-time saves leaderboard⁵, we can see that Papelbon is 29th all-time in saves; establishing an arbitrary cutoff, we can see that 5 of the top 37 players in saves are in the Hall, and Rivera and Trevor Hoffman will obviously make that seven.

So, roughly 20% of the “elite” relief pitchers of all time are in Cooperstown. If Papelbon were to retire today, his chances would probably be slim, so the question becomes: how good can he be expected to be over the twilight of his career?

Papelbon is 32, and currently in the second year of a four-year contract. Since his birthday is conveniently located in the offseason⁶, we can identify the next two years as his age-33 and -34 seasons. Most reasonable people would say that the Phillies are several years away from being contenders, so a realistic assumption would be, say, 40 save opportunities over each season. This season, he’s converted 80% of his save opportunities (roughly league average); optimistically speaking, let’s say that rate holds up over the next two years. With Charlie Manuel now gone–and, hopefully, his attitude towards closers taken with him–Papelbon will also probably work some in tie games or games where the opponent has the lead. Let’s assume, again optimistically speaking, he pitches 70 innings each season, and continues to outperform his declining peripherals, allowing 20 earned runs in each season.

Now, the deal that he signed also had an option for a fifth year. Just a random speculation, but let’s say Ruben Amaro–being the genius that he is–decides to pay $10 million for a 35-year-old closer. At this point, there’s probably going to be a dropoff in Papelbon’s production; let’s say he converts 28 out of 40 save opportunities, and allows 24 earned runs in 60 innings.

What does all of this add up to?

That ERA would rank Papelbon as the 4th-best all-time among pitchers with at least 500 relief innings, and that save total would rank him 7th-best of all-time; in addition, this is assuming that he doesn’t pitch at all after the contract expires.

Another interesting angle: which active pitchers have similar cases to Papelbon? Aside from the Sandman, there are three active players ahead of Papelbon on the saves list; since one of them has probably ended his career (by pitching in a hot dog jersey, no less), that leaves but two: Joe Nathan and Francisco Rodriguez⁷.

All three of them have sub-3.00 career ERA’s and have never (as far as I know) been connected to PEDs; Nathan and K-Rod each have more than 300 saves (a feat only 25 pitchers have accomplished). Rodriguez has accepted a non-closer role with the Orioles, and he may never close again. Even if his exceptional start with the O’s (1.82 xFIP! 1.60 SIERA!) is no mirage, it’s hard to envision him being enshrined; plus, y’know, there’s the whole “assaulted his girlfriend’s dad” thing, though it’s not like the voters ever exclude people on moral grounds. Nathan, on the other hand, has never had any off-the-field problems; the biggest crutch holding him back may be his age. He debuted at 24–the same age as Papelbon when he debuted–but took a while to figure things out⁸, and only started pitching really well from age 29 on, when he was traded to the Twins in one of the more infamous trades of the decade. While his career relief ERA is quite good (2.35, the same as Papelbon) his overall ERA is a not-quite-as-spectacular 2.78, and he’s shown some signs of wear at age 38, with a 3.29 BB/9 rate that’s his highest since 2003.

Overall, I–the baseball expert–would say that Papelbon has the greatest chance of the three of heading to Cooperstown. Papelbon has some other notable achievements–the first pitcher ever with 25 saves in each of his first five full seasons, the fastest pitcher ever to reach 200 saves–which may help his case. Overall, this was a pretty good usage of a Jewish holiday. If you read this article in its entirety, I probably just wasted a lot of your time, although it’s not like you definitely didn’t come here for that.

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¹A pitch, I should add, that I will remember (and constantly remind Red Sox fans that I remember) until the day that I die.

²I tried to look up the It’s Always Sunny In Philadelphia clip where they talked about what to refer to Jewish people as, but I couldn’t find it. Does anyone know where that might be found? It’s from “The Gang Goes Jihad”, if that helps.

³Yes, I get that the tweet was sarcastic. The fact that he felt the need to joke about it proves that people with those archaic beliefs still exist.

⁴Wagner’s got an interesting Hall of Fame case as well–it’s outlined here.

⁵I used this instead of FanGraphs’ leaderboard because Baseball-Reference includes the “+” next to the player’s name if they’re a HOFer.

⁶I think a rule should be established saying only players with offseason birthdays can play baseball. That way, there won’t be any confusion with these midseason birthday guys–when people say “he’s in his age-__ season”, do they mean that was his age when he started the season, or that’s his age now?

⁷This could’ve been written about those two, but I chose to focus on Papelbon because cases for Nathan and for Rodriguez have already been outlined, and–as far as I could tell–none such actions had been taken for Papelbon.

⁸People really forget just how bad Nathan was in those early years. In 1999 and 2000, he pitched 183.2 innings, with a 4.70 ERA and a 5.70 FIP, due largely to a 5.34 BB/9 rate; to top it all off, he did it pitching in SAN FRANCISCO.

(Author’s note: This is the first of a series in nontraditional tactics that may be advantageous in a one-game playoff scenario)

It certainly wouldn’t be earth-shattering for me to tell you about baseball being heaped in tradition.  In fact, to most of us, that’s the appeal.  The tradition. The consistency. The ability to reconnect with old times, making the comparisons between Manny Machado and Brooks Robinson without fear of having to factor in the large changes of the game.  The traditionalists out there, the ones who surely disagree with interleague play, and maybe even the designated hitter, make up a large part of the viewing audience.  Unfortunately for them, this article is probably not for them.

With the way that sports have evolved in the past few years, the future seems to be innovation.  In football, there was the Wildcat Offense, which was only outlasted by the (similarly gimmicky) Spread Offense.  Of course, who can forget New Orleans opting to onside kick to begin the second half of the Super Bowl, something that “common sense” would dictate is a terrible idea?  Meanwhile in hockey, Uwe Krupp, coach of the German national team has decided that when on 5 on 3 power play, he will pull their goalie.  While football and hockey are more prone to innovation, it is surprising that, for the most part, baseball offense and defense is almost exactly the same as it was in 1950.  Or even 1900.  Sure, the traditionalists will cite the Designated Hitter, the rise of the relief pitcher who exists solely to get one out, the Joe Maddon-esque shifting that seems so prevalent.  However, the shifts that we’ve seen have assumed the traditional positioning of defensive elements.

It’s time to change that.

Now, like I have mentioned, what I’m about to propose is extremely radical. The reactions I’ve gotten from people I’ve told is twofold: one group telling me that I’m an idiot and it would never work; the other telling me that I should write a letter to the manager of my favorite MLB team to ensure success in a one-game playoff (likely the best venue for such a suggestion).

It’s simple.  Move the catcher.  For lack of a better name, we’ll call it the nine-man defense.

“What on Earth are you talking about, the catcher can’t move, he’s there to call pitches, position his glove, and of course catch the ball!”

Relax, traditionalists.  I realize the problems.  The passed third strike or fourth ball, the runners on base concerns.  This isn’t about that.

However, we’ve all surely seen the following: fewer than three balls or two strikes, the pitch is in the dirt, skipping past the catcher, and the ball is replaced by the umpire.

Did you see that sequence?  The catcher did nothing.  He sat there, providing marginal defensive benefit, while he could have been occupying valuable defensive space.

“Okay, but the rulebook says that’s how it has to be!”

Not exactly.  The rule book only has a couple of fleeting references to the role of the catcher, surprisingly.  The first is Rule 1.12 which cites that the catcher is allowed to have a different glove than most other positional players and section 1.16 which permits a protective mask.  You’ll note a complete absence of a mention requiring that a catcher be in the catcher’s position for every pitch.  Remove the mask and the glove, and your catcher is just your run of the mill positional player.  The chest protector and knee pads, according to the rules, may remain on.  The second section (rulebook owners or adept googlers, refer to section 4.03) references the requirement that only the catcher is permitted to be positioned in foul territory during an at-bat, and that the catcher must be positioned behind home plate.  However, that does not say that a catcher is a REQUIRED fielder. I’ll leave it up to the Joe Maddons of the world to determine the optimal position of the catcher, my initial suggestion would be to place him near first base, and shift the second baseman to directly behind the bag, while moving the first baseman to the previous position of the second baseman.  Perhaps there would be more value in a fourth outfielder,  that discussion is beyond the scope of this hypothetical discussion.

So that’s it.  That’s all the rules have to say about the catcher.  It’s almost silly how few references there are to the role of the catcher in the rulebook.

“Okay, Chris.  I acknowledge that there may be some value to this, but I just have to think there are entirely too many downfalls.”

As I see it, there are quite a few downfalls to the approach.  The balance of trade on these downfalls as compared to the opportunity will be left up  to you.

One: The associated hassle of moving the catcher from “behind the plate” to “in the field” and back (once a third ball or second strike has been thrown, or a baserunner has gotten on base.)  Of course, baseball has had to deal with the complaints about long games, this does absolutely nothing to rectify it.  In fact, every pitch flying to the backstop might frustrate everyone involved.  Which is why it would have to be done in a one-game playoff type scenario (or series deciding game), segueing us perfectly to downside number two.

Two: The rules committee  would come down hard on this loophole after the first application of the nine-man defense.  There’s no getting around this.  This is a nuclear defense.  It’s only to be used in the most critical of situations.  Indeed, even the on-field crew may have difficulty in permitting it, which brings us to point number three.

Three: The poor home-plate umpire is just left behind the plate to have to somehow deal with being directly thrown at with 90-100 MPH pitches.  I feel sorry for the umpires, and this may be why I’ve gotten a less-than-receptive response from the MLB umpires I have contacted. My only remedy to this issue is a simple one: the umpire move to the side…or work on his reflexes.

Four: The defending team is now susceptible to a bunt.  Now, this may seem the case, but with a fifth infielder, the corner players would be able to play a lot closer in on the infield without worrying about range as much.  The additional infielder perhaps discourages the practice of bunting by having true fielders located along the baselines in a position to better field bunts.  In fact, it may make the fielding of bunts simpler without the opportunity for the pitcher to collide with the catcher running out from behind the plate to field a ball.

Five: The relatively minor concerns about pitch selection and positioning.  It may take some time for a pitcher to adjust, given a lifetime of throwing pitches to a target, but it is not unreasonable to think that pitches could be called from the dugout, or even the catcher positioned in the field.  As for targeting, I would hope that is something that the team would address with their pitching staff before implementing such a plan.

That’s it.  For many, even the non-traditionalists, I realize this is a quantum leap in the defensive mentality of baseball teams, normally limited to an infield shift, or the ever-so-rare 5-infielder-2-outfielder-hope-to-keep-the-ball-in-the-infield-to-save-the-game-in-the-ninth defense.  And sure, the rules committee may take exception, but in a one-game playoff, which MLB has tacitly admitted an affinity for (by forcing an annual one-game playoff), this seems like it would certainly cause a buzz about October baseball.  And after all, isn’t that the point?

Okay FanGraphs, what do you guys think?

On Friday the Cardinals acquired Brewers reliever John Axford for a player to be named later. While dominant in 2010 and 2011, Axford’s lackluster performance since 2012 has many Cardinals fans uninspired by the move. In fact, most of the media attention has centered around his public farewell to Milwaukee fans.

Bernie Miklasz of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch offered his own analysis of the deal, calling it a “smart gamble” for the Cardinals. In addition to acknowledging Axford’s well documented HR/FB% struggles, Miklasz highlighted that the former closer has been particularly challenged by an ineffective fastball and poor performance in high-leverage situations.

PITCHf/x data on Axford’s fastball:

Axford’s performance in high-leverage situations:

FanGraphs readers will know that Cardinals GM John Mozeliak and his organization’s pitching staff have developed a reputation in recent years for quietly acquiring mediocre pitchers and helping them reach previously unimagined levels of success on the mound. To the extent that Mozeliak and company have similar designs for Axford, one must ask how they plan to help him reclaim his once dominant form.

The Cardinals may suggest any number of tweaks to Axford’s approach, but smart money has them coaching him to focus on throwing more first-pitch strikes. Jeff Sullivan recently reminded us of the importance of pitching ahead, and its import is surely not lost on manager Mike Matheny and pitching coach Derek Lilliquist. Since 2012, Redbird pitchers rank tops in the majors in terms of throwing first-pitch strikes.

In the same piece, Sullivan also noted that since arriving in St. Louis in July 2012, Edward Mujica has established himself as the league leader in first-pitch strikes, increasing that figure from a pedestrian 60.9% in 2011 to an elite 75.6% in 2013. Doing so has no doubt played a large part in his improved performance in high-leverage innings.

Mujica in 2011 with the Marlins:

Mujica in 2013 with the Cardinals:

While Mujica’s 2011 performance in high-leverage situations was not nearly as poor as Axford’s has been in 2012 and 2013, there exists a similar opportunity for improvement.

Specifically, Axford is getting absolutely crushed when behind in the count this season.

Axford’s 2013 pitching splits:

As they did when acquiring Mujica last year, look for the Cardinals to initially deploy Axford into low-leverage situations in which he can regain his confidence and focus on getting ahead in the count. If successful, one would expect the club to move Axford into higher-leverage situations, particularly if Mujica or Trevor Rosenthal wears down or runs into trouble down the stretch.

The fastball is the holy grail of pitching. Listen to a baseball broadcast, particularly one that involves a former pitcher, and you are likely to hear something along the lines of “the fastball is the best pitch in baseball and always will be.” However, since 2002, fastball usage has been declining, and since 2007, runs scored have been declining as well. The strategy of pitching backwards has been cited as a reason for the strikeout increase and the decrease in runs scored. Also, as the below table shows, fastball velocity for starting pitchers has steadily increased since 2002, which has also been cited as a reason for the current offensive environment.

To investigate the idea of the fastball being the best pitch in baseball, I first sorted all qualified starting pitchers since 2002 by fastball usage. Then, I sorted all qualified starting pitchers by fastball velocity. The first table is sorted by fastball usage, going from the most fastball-heavy to least fastball-heavy in descending order. Not surprisingly, Bartolo Colon utilizes his fastball more than any other starting pitcher. I excluded knuckleballers Tim Wakefield and R.A. Dickey from the list.

The group that used their fastball the most had the least strikeouts, which should not be surprising for anyone who has seen Colon pitch. Several groundball, pitch-to-contact types such as Kirk Rueter and Aaron Cook populated the first group. The least effective groups were Group One which used their fastballs the most, and Group Four, which had the highest average fastball velocity. Interestingly enough, the walk rates are all over the board. Group Two had the highest walk rate. Group Ten, which was composed of pitchers who used their fastballs sparingly, had the lowest walk rate by a wide margin. Overall, there is not much of a connection with fastball usage and success. The average WAR/200 IP of the first five groups is the same as the last five groups. If the fastball is the best pitch in baseball, pitchers who throw it more often are not more effective.

The below table is a listing of all qualified starting pitchers, sorted in descending order by fastest average fastball velocity.

This chart lends more support to the assertion that the fastball is the best pitch in baseball. As you would expect, strikeout rates decrease with declining fastball velocity. Overall, there is a strong link between average fastball velocity and pitcher quality. There also appears to be a link between fastball velocity and HR/FB rate, though Group 10 messes things up.

Not surprisingly, it looks pretty clear that fastball velocity is a significant predictor of success. However, offspeed offerings have been emphasized more in later years, as overall fastball usage has steadily dropped. Justin Verlander, owner of the third fastest fastball for starting pitchers in the Pitch f/x era has thrown his fastball less than 60% of the time during that period. On the other hand, hard thrower Daniel Cabrera threw his fastball on nearly 75% of his pitches over the course of approximately 900 largely unproductive innings.

The rise in strikeouts and drop in runs scored has largely corresponded with increasing offspeed usage. Pitchers are throwing more offspeed pitches, and hitters sitting on the fastball are being caught off guard. As a way of adjusting to the current run of pitching dominance, I have to wonder if pitch recognition and plate-discipline skills will have a more prominent emphasis. Perhaps raw home-run power and bat speed have been overemphasized. (How often would Wily Mo Pena strike out if he played today?). With the way pitchers can control and command their offspeed pitches (walk rates have not risen with decreasing fastball usage), the old strategy of sitting on the fastball may need to be tweaked if hitters are going to catch up with pitchers. Strikeouts are not inherently bad, (a look at this year’s strikeout leaderboard confirms my statement) but today’s hitters are also walking less despite seeing less pitches in the strike zone. The Pitch f/x data in the table below illustrates this phenomenon.

Of course, pitch recognition is not nearly as exciting as raw power, and chicks probably don’t dig plate discipline like they dig the long ball. However, combating the recent run of strikeout-driven pitcher dominance by valuing pitch recognition and plate discipline is almost certainly a better approach than seeking out contact hitters in the way that Diamondbacks GM Kevin Towers has done. Despite his statements about valuing hitters with pitch recognition, his 2013 squad chases more pitches than the 2010 team which set the MLB strikeout record. While fastball velocity plays a crucial role in a pitcher’s success, even the hardest throwers are mixing in plenty of offspeed pitches to keep hitters off balance. Hitters without the ability to adjust are being exploited.

Dennis Eckersley filled in for Jerry Remy during the Red Sox road trip to play the Giants and Dodgers and has remained on board for the Orioles series. Eckersley’s analysis, cluttered with lingo like “cut the moss,” “throwing cheese,” and “Hello?!”, is also often insightful and informative. Such was the case when he praised Jarrod Saltalamacchia for his consistent season behind the plate for the Sox in 2013.

Saltalamacchia has seemingly overcome the developmental issues that persisted during the early part of his career on the defensive side of the plate. His swing has always provided power and, perhaps most importantly, he has become a trusted game-caller by Boston’s pitching staff. Salty is playing in a contract year in 2013. In this post, I’ll take a look at the market for catchers, analyze Salty’s true value to the Sox, and give a prediction for whether I see him re-upping with Boston this offseason.

The Numbers

Saltalamacchia was once a top prospect in the Braves system and was the center-piece in a 2007 trade for Mark Teixeira. Much of the promise scouts saw in Salty arose from the power he generated from his uppercut swing from the left side of the plate. Like most young players with a long powerful stroke, Salty struggled with strikeouts and inconsistencies in his approach. Salty’s status as a star prospect diminished during his time in Texas due to his inability to put the ball in play, and the Sox took a flier on him at the end of the 2010 campaign. The numbers show the type of hitter that he has been from 2011-2013 with the Sox, but also point to a fundamental change in his approach in his most recent campaign.

From 2011-2013, Salty hit the 6th-most homers amongst catchers in Major League Baseball with 51 (Mike Napoli leads all catchers with 69, despite playing his entire 2013 campaign at first base). Salty is also last among all Major League catchers with a 69.8% contact rate and leads the group with a 30.6% strikeout rate. These are numbers that reflect a hitter who swings to hit the ball out of the park for each and every swing he takes.

Despite the strikeouts (which have been prevalent throughout Salty’s career), it is clear that he has gone through a fundamental change in hitting philosophy during the 2013 campaign. The graph below helps us visualize Salty’s trend during his time with the Sox:

The graph breaks down Salty’s batted balls by fly balls, ground balls, or line drives. When he arrived with the Sox in 2010, Salty was in the worst spot, batted ball-wise, of his entire career. His line drive percentage hovered around 5%, whereas his fly ball (and pop up) percentage was at the highest of his career. Since he has been with the Sox, Salty has reversed this trend, culminating in the highest line-drive (and lowest fly-ball) percentages of his career in 2013. This is one reason for Salty’s apparent decrease in power, as ZiPS projects him to hit 14 dingers this year following seasons of 16 homers in 2011 and a career-high 25 in 2012. Despite the slight dip in power, the change in approach has made Salty a more productive overall hitter: his greater propensity to hit line drives has caused his BABIP to rise dramatically from .265 in 2012 to a whopping .379 in 2013. Moreover, it has caused his overall average and OBP to rise to .270 and .341, respectively (up from .222 and .288 in 2012). The only surprising stat after noticing Salty’s decrease in FB% and increase in LD% is that his slugging percentage has not changed at all from 2012 to 2013, even despite the fact that his homer rate is down. But a quick review of Salty’s counting stats reveals that this is due to the fact that he ranks eighth in the Major Leagues with 34 doubles. We can again attribute this to his greater propensity to hit line drives, as many of the long fly balls that stayed up for just too long may be dropping for Salty in 2013.

As his batted ball trends and overall stats suggest, Salty has been on an upward slope as a hitter during his time with the Red Sox.

The Intangibles

While we have just examined the ways in which Salty helps his club with the bat, he holds arguably even more value to the Sox has their primary backstop. This is where the intangibles come in to play, which might be the single biggest factor as to why Salty gets a major pay-day (or why he doesn’t) on the open market. Simply put, there is much more to calculating player value for a catcher than offensive and defensive stats alone.

Catchers can improve a pitching staff with their daily preparation and ability to call a game. In an effort to quantify Salty’s game-calling ability, I’ll reference an article called “Salty’s Defense/Game-Calling Impact” on the Pro Sports Daily forums. As of August 5th, the chart below gives pitcher’s ERA during Salty’s starts as compared to his back-up’s starts over the past three years:

While there is much more to calling a game than simply “pitcher ERA”, the trend is a bit alarming when estimating Salty’s value. Numbers don’t tell the whole picture, of course, but they certainly wouldn’t support a claim that Salty improves a pitching staff through his game-calling. One thing is clear: pitchers are doing better in 2013 while Salty is behind the plate, but it remains a mystery whether this is because he’s calling a better game or simply because the pitchers he’s catching are better.

Josh Beckett was one pitcher who spoke out about Salty’s inability to be on the same page as the starter, but many have spoken in defense of the backstop’s ability during the 2013 campaign. Jake Peavy, for one, has commended Salty’s approach to game-day: “I can’t say enough about his willingness. Salty has got some time here, some time in the big leagues. For him to be so humble in his approach, to not say, ‘This is how we do things here’; it was him saying, ‘Hey, man, what do you need to win tonight? What do you need me to do?” In any case, his familiarity with the Sox pitching staff likely makes Salty more immediately valuable to the Red Sox than any other team.

On another note, Salty has been very durable during his time in Boston. He has missed just 4 games due to injury from 2011-2013 and has not been placed on the disabled list once. While durability is always valuable, it is especially valuable in a catcher, in which the day-to-day bumps and bruises are far more prevalent. This should make teams more comfortable offering him a long-term deal.

The Market

Of the 18 catchers on open market following the season, Salty is the youngest at age 29. He will likely be the second-most coveted free agent catcher (behind Atlanta backstop Brian McCann), though that could change if Salty gets hot or McCann gets hurt again (he missed time in 2011 due to an oblique injury and missed time in 2013 due to offseason shoulder surgery). There have been very few free agent catchers over the past 3 years, likely due to the fact that familiarity with a team’s pitchers is very important to front offices. Thus, we notice that there have been many contract extensions for catchers, but very few catchers who actually hit the open market. Salty is, in fact, in a very unique position as a productive free agent catcher who will likely fetch a deal for more than 3 years. In any case, here is how the free agent/extension market has looked over the past two years:

Miguel Montero seems to be the most similar comparable by age (29) and overall production (using ZiPS projections, Salty will have a 2.1 average fWAR over the past 3 seasons when he hits the open market). Montero’s signing was actually an extension, so even though his overall production was a bit higher when he signed, it’s certainly not far-fetched to believe that Salty will get a 5-year, $60 million contract when teams are bidding for his services.

The Suitors

I expect the White Sox, Angels, Athletics, Yankees, Braves, Rangers, Rays, and the Red Sox to be in the running for Salty’s services based on their need behind the plate for next season. I doubt the Rays or the White Sox would spend the money on the current Sox backstop, and a signing by the Angels and Athletics seems equally unlikely due to the Angels’ payroll and Oakland’s frugality. This leaves the Red Sox, Yankees, Braves, and Rangers as Salty’s primary suitors, and their free-spending tendencies should make Salty’s eyes light up in free agency.

Prediction

This is a really tough call. I think that if Atlanta does sign a catcher to a long-term deal, they will simply retain Brian McCann (familiarity, as discussed previously, is likely very important to teams when evaluating catchers). A look at the remaining teams’ organizational depth charts could provide insight into Salty’s destination. According to mlb.com, catcher Gary Sanchez is the Yankees’ top prospect with an ETA of 2015. He’s also the second-highest ranked catching prospect in baseball behind Travis d’Arnaud. I expect the Yankees to hold off on signing Salty. While the Rangers’ top prospect is also a catcher, Jorge Alfaro is not expected to arrive until at least 2016 and their 40-man catching depth is weak. The Red Sox have multiple catching prospects in their system (#10 Blake Swihart, #13 Jon Denney, and #15 Christian Vazquez) and have depth on their 40-man roster with Dan Butler and Ryan Lavarnway. If the price does indeed use to my predicted contract of 5 years and $60 million, it’s hard to see Salty re-upping with Sox GM Ben Cherington. Instead, I see him jumping town for Texas, an organization where his prospects once faded, but one that now might make him a very rich man.

Vince D’Andrea is a rising senior at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. His blog, Dave Roberts’ Dive, can be found here.

Despite leading the AL in saves,  Orioles closer Jim Johnson is having a rough year compared to 2012 when he posted a 2.51 ERA and saved 51 games in 54 opportunities. Early in 2013, an enthusiastic Orioles sportswriter named Johnson the best closer in baseball, a statement that doesn’t look quite so good a few months later. As a closer who relies on the groundball, Johnson is something of an odd bird (pun intended). In 2012 his 15.2 K% ranked 130th out of 136 qualified relievers and his Zone-Contact% was 2nd highest. This year his 18.0 K% ranks 111th out of 140 qualified relievers and his Zone-Contact% is 9th highest. While Johnson has struck out a few more hitters, he has also walked slightly more, from 5.6% to 7.1%, and his groundball rate is down. Overall, his fielding-independent numbers are basically the same as last year. Various explanations have been offered for Johnson’s lack of success in 2013 compared to 2012. Bill Castro, the Orioles interim pitching coach (check out his 1979 season) attributes Johnson’s struggles to overthrowing, and a failure to locate down in the zone which has resulted in less early contact outs. I prepared the following chart to check up on these explanations.

So Johnson is throwing slightly more pitches in the lower third of the zone, and actually getting more swings and misses on pitches in the zone. The overthrowing statement seems faulty, as Johnson’s velocity on his sinker is actually down. A look at the Pitch f/x data shows that his sinker has flattened out slightly from last year, though the difference is slight overall. The following chart shows what kind of contact batters are making off Johnson compared to last year.

And to go in even more detail the following two charts show BABIP by zone and then the slugging by zone for Johnson.

So balls put in play against Johnson have been falling for hits more frequently this year and those hits have been more damaging in each third of the strike zone. In particular, the pitches Johnson has thrown over the middle have been getting hammered. Last year, the results on those pitches were quite tame. Granted, this is a pretty small sample size of balls in play, and nowhere near the point where BABIP is expected to stabilize, but it goes to show that Johnson has not fared nearly as well when hitters are making contact in 2013. But, this is not an uncommon issue for high-contact, groundball pitchers. David Robertson can suffer through a .335 BABIP in 2012 and still post a 2.67 ERA on the strength of a 32.7 K%. Pitchers like Johnson who cannot strike out hitters regularly are subject to variance on batted balls. Take a look at most groundball, contact-type pitchers, and you’ll find years where BABIP and ERA go through the roof. With the 60-70 inning seasons relievers work, the results can get skewed very badly. To get a sense for where Johnson stands relative to other groundball relievers, I did an analysis of all qualified relievers since 2002 and separated the 30 highest and 30 lowest groundball rates (Johnson was 24th).

So not a whole lot of good things to say about the groundball heavy group. Jonny Venters was the only member of the group with a strikeout rate above 20%. They limit home runs pretty well, which is to be expected with so few fly balls. However, many of those groundballs are going for hits, while fly balls that aren’t leaving the yard are twice as likely to be outs.  That 30 point difference in BABIP is pretty huge, and that’s over a sample of more than 20,000 balls in play for each group. Overall, the decrease in home runs isn’t worth the extra hits and walks. With guys like Kenley Jansen and Rafael Soriano, it’s not surprising that the fly ball group features a much better ratio of shutdowns to meltdowns. For the most part, the groundball group is filled with situational guys that have bounced around with sporadic success. While relievers of all types tend to be unreliable, groundball and contact types are subject to the additional randomness of batted ball variance.

Seasons with inflated BABIP and ERA should be an expected consequence for a contact pitcher like Johnson. Of course, it would have been very difficult for the Orioles to demote Johnson to a lower-leverage bullpen role after the success he had in 2012. However, all signs indicate that Johnson is an average bullpen arm whose performance last season far outweighed his ability. He is better suited for the role he played in 2010 as a mid-leverage arm who was not limited to one inning. The Orioles should look for a strikeout arm for high-leverage situations. While Buck Showalter has consistently defended Johnson, not too many managers will bring back a closer after a season leading the league in blown saves.

Typically when people think of five-tool players they think of guys like Mike Trout, Andrew McCutchen or Carlos Gonzalez. Basically up-the-middle players who do everything well. Paul Goldschmidt however is not an up-the-middle player but I believe he does have the five tools.

For those who don’t know the five tools are what scouts use (among other things) to evaluate a player. The five tools are hitting for power, hitting for average or contact ability, defense, arm and finally speed.

When looking at Goldschmidt the one tool that stands out is his power. He put up at least a .600 slugging percentage (SLG) and at least a .290 isolated power (ISO) and 2 seasons of 30 home runs in his 3 minor league seasons. His power has showed in the majors as well. In 2012 his first full season in the majors he hit 20 home runs, had a .490 SLG and a .204 ISO. This season his power has taken another step forward. He currently has 31 home runs, .548 SLG and a .251 ISO, all of which currently lead National League first basemen. I specify National League here because that Chris Davis guy has been pretty darn good this season.

Goldschmidt’s hit tool is solid but not close to as good as his power tool. With that being said Goldschmidt is still coming into his own in terms of contact rate. His contact rate has improved each season he has been in the big leagues as per pitch f/x, it rose from 70.7% in 2011, to 77.1 in 2012 and to 78.7% this season. With that contact rate increasing his strikeout rate, as to be expected, has decreased at roughly the same rate. His strikeout percentage has dropped from 29.9% in 2011, to 22.1% in 2012 and to 20.6% this season. Batting average is never the best way to evaluate a player but it does judge a players’ hit tool. His BA has risen from .250 in 2011 to.286 in 2012 to .298 this season. His BABIP is high this season at .333 but it is actually down from last season’s .340.  He had very high BABIPs in the minors and from his batted-ball profile looks like he may be a guy who consistently posts BAPIPs above .300.

His defense is again a work in progress. Defensive numbers take about three seasons to become relevant and we don’t quite have that yet but we do have 2695.2 innings for Goldschmidt at 1B. In those innings he has shown to be an above average defender. This season Goldschmidt has an ultimate zone rating of 4.9 which is fifth among qualified first-basemen. Over the last three seasons Goldy’s UZR is 2.9 which among first basemen with a minimum of 2500 innings ranks 7th out of 13. Essentially an average defender. DRS however tells a different story, this season anyway. Per DRS Goldy has been among the best fielding first basemen. He has saved 11 runs, which is tied for the lead with Adrian Gonzalez and Anthony Rizzo.

A first baseman’s arm is very difficult to judge as it is hardly ever needed. To my knowledge  there are not yet stats that judge a player’s arm. So the only way to evaluate a player’s arm is by scouting the player. I did a quick Google search trying to find a scouting report on Goldschmidt’s arm and I found nothing. Thankfully FanGraphs has a feature where fans can submit their reports on players. Of course this isn’t the most accurate analysis, but it will do. The fans gave Goldschmidt a 48 (0-100 scale) in arm strength in 2011 and a 44 arm strength in 2012. His accuracy was given a 53 and 41 in 2011 and 2012 respectively. We can conclude from this that Goldschmidt has about an average arm.

Finally the last tool to look at is arguably Goldy’s second-best tool, his speed.  Goldy stole 18 bases last season which was tops among qualified first basemen. This season he has 13 which again is tops among qualified first basemen. There is more to speed than just pure stolen bases, the ability to go first to third or score from second on a single.  There is a stat that measures this, called base-running runs above average (BsR). It takes all base-running into account including steals and caught stealing. Goldschmidt has again been elite in this category. This season he has been worth 1.2 runs above average which is 4th among first basemen. Last season he was worth 3.2 runs above average which was tops in the National League and second to only Eric Hosmer.

To conclude, perhaps Goldschmidt is not the five-tool player I had anticipated. He does however have 2 very elite tools in his power and speed. He has 2 average tools in his contact rate and defense. His arm is average to below average but for a first basemen that’s not too important. He isn’t quite a five-tool first baseman but 4 average to elite tools with only 1 below average tool make him about as close to a complete-package first baseman as you’re going to find in the game today.

Since 2002 (the batted ball era), the Colorado Rockies pitchers have the 4th highest groundball percentage in the MLB. On its face, this seems like a good strategy, as Coors Field has an effect on batted and thrown baseballs that is not pitcher-friendly. Rockies’ pitching coach Jim Wright emphasizes pitching down as key to the success of the staff. However, the emphasis on groundballs has caused the Rockies to get into relationships with pitchers such as Shawn Estes, Aaron Cook and Jeff Francis, hurlers that lack strikeout stuff. And lest we forget, this same club famously gave Mike Hampton, a groundball pitcher who never averaged more than 6.9 K/9, what was then the richest contract in sports history. As a consequence, Rockies pitchers have the 5th lowest strikeout rate in the MLB since 2002. Compounding this problem is the fact that the Rockies have the 6th highest walk rate. Of course, there is the counter-argument that it is harder for pitchers to get strikeouts at Coors Field due to the effect that the altitude has on offspeed pitches. Additionally, it would seem that a pitcher could be forgiven for nibbling a little at the high altitude. I did a little research to determine how much of the poor strikeout and walk rates are due to Coors Field and how much could be attributed to the pitching style the Rockies advocate. I found that only three teams have higher walk rates in road games, and only four teams have lower strikeout rates. So Coors Field is not entirely at fault for the lack of strikeouts and proliferation of walks.

Since 2002,  Coors Field has the second-highest HR/FB ratio behind only the Reds’ Great American Ballpark. I took a look at the Home/Away splits of the five parks with the highest HR/FB ratios since 2002 to see if they tried to combat the longball in a style similar to the Rockies.

So the Rockies strategy of pitching to groundballs has led to some success in limiting longballs. Among these teams, only the Blue Jays can match the Rockies HR Per Contact rate for home games. The Rockies overall HR rate and HR Per Contact rate is league average, thanks to a road HR rate that only two teams can best. Unfortunately for the Rockies, home runs are not the whole story, and their team xFIP and ERA are 7th and 11th worst on the road. Overall, their team xFIP and ERA are 8th and 2nd worst. The Phillies, Blue Jays, and Reds all have strikeout rates at or above league average. Since 2008, the Blue Jays and Reds have stepped up their strikeout efforts. Meanwhile, the Rockies are 29th in strikeout rate in 2013.

Don’t be fooled by the recent success of Jhoulys Chacin and his HR/FB ratio of 4.9%, the Rockies need to focus more on strikeouts than groundballs. While groundballs have helped limit home runs, the Rockies are still giving up plenty of hits, walks, and runs. Strikeouts need to enter the equation for the Rockies staff to be successful. For a couple of years they had the perfect marriage of both with Ubaldo Jimenez, but none of the three pitchers obtained in the trade with the Indians (a well-timed one) has panned out. Perhaps if the Rockies acquired strikeout pitchers, they could configure their rotation so that those pitchers threw more innings on the road. It’s not as if they haven’t utilized a non-traditional approach with their pitching staff before. The Rockies probably shouldn’t spend 250 million to acquire strikeout pitchers like the Yankees did with C.C. Sabathia and A.J. Burnett when they moved into the cozy confines of the new Yankee Stadium. More than twelve years later, the Mike Hampton signing still has a bad taste in their mouth.  However, there is precedent for developing and acquiring strikeout arms at an affordable cost.

Look at the Reds. Since Walt Jocketty took over as GM in 2008, the Reds have managed to develop and acquire strikeout arms as a means to limit runs in homer-happy Great American Ballpark. The 2013 Reds are 4th in K/9 and 4th in xFIP and ERA. Aaron Harang’s contract was bought out once his strikeout stuff diminished. Homegrown product Tony Cingrani has been striking out hitters at an incredible rate in his first 100 innings with the big league club. The organization’s patience with Homer Bailey has been rewarded. Edinson Volquez posted excellent strikeout rates before being used to acquire Mat Latos and his devastating slider. And of course, they signed the flamethrowing international free agent Aroldis Chapman. While rotation mainstays Mike Leake and Bronson Arroyo are never going to blow anybody away with their stuff their ability to limit walks has allowed the Reds to rely on them as back-end innings eaters. Chapman’s 6 years/30 million is the biggest commitment to any of the above pitchers.

Currently, the Rockies farm system is not loaded with strikeout pitchers. Tyler Matzek is intriguing, but his strikeouts are way down this year as he has moved up a level and attempted to improve his control, and he is far from a sure thing. Tyler Chatwood has shown some promise at the big-league level, but his secondary pitches will have to be refined for him to have long-term success. Chad Bettis was blowing away Double-A hitters before a recent callup, but his innings against MLB competition have been predictably average. Most likely, this is not a quick fix, but more of a long-term strategy which will have to be implemented across several drafts.

Introduction

After reading Jeff Sullivan’s piece entitled “Identifying Baseball’s Most Unhittable Pitches, So Far” on August 21, I found his methodology to be quite interesting.  It was suggested in the comments rather than looking at whiff rate we should consider who has allowed the weakest contact.  Now, there are a couple of different ways to look at weakest contact.  First, you could look at batted ball velocity.  You could also look at batted ball distance as well.  Both of these techniques would provide some measure of the severity of contact allowed by a pitcher.  At the end of the day though, a warning track fly ball is still as effective for a pitcher as a pop up.  I thought it would be better to look at who got hurt the least with their pitches.

In saying that, I mean to look at what pitchers are theoretically giving up nothing but singles on a pitch versus what pitchers are theoretically giving up nothing but home runs.  A quick calculation to quantify this value is total bases per hit allowed (TB/H).  This is the same as the ratio between slugging percentage and batting average (SLG/AVG).  Values have to be between one and four.  A value of 1.00 corresponds to only singles.  A value of 4.00 corresponds to only home runs.  Any value in between could represent a combination of all hit types.

Baseball Prospectus provides PitchF/X leaderboards for eight different pitch types: four-seam fastball, sinker, cutter, splitter, changeup, curveball, slider, and knuckleball.  I chose to look at only starting pitchers in this study.  Also, to be considered, a pitcher had to have thrown at least 200 of the pitch of interest.  The league leaders in games started are just above 25.  If we are conservative and estimate 80 pitches per start, that allows for 2000 pitches thrown, so 200 would represent roughly 10% of the pitcher’s arsenal.  With that background information now covered, let’s look at the best and worst pitchers in each pitch type.  All data is accurate through August 22.

Data

Four-Seam Fastball

Sinker

Cutter

Splitter

Changeup

Curveball

Slider

And for completeness,

Knuckleball

Combining all that data together, we get the following five pitches as the best in baseball so far.

Also, to complete the picture, here are the worst five pitches in baseball so far.

TB/H

Analysis

As you can see, there are a lot of “good” pitchers that throw “lousy” pitches.  This metric is far from perfect.  For example, Yu Darvish appears in the bottom five in two different categories.  Does that mean Darvish should stop throwing his sinker and cutter?  No, it most certainly does not.  It just shows that when Darvish makes a (albeit rare) mistake with either pitch hitters are mashing it.  I found this a fun exercise that yielded results that may not be the most meaningful but that are interesting for discussion nonetheless.