One of the offseason’s most talked-about moves was the trade that sent Prince Fielder to the Texas Rangers in exchange for Ian Kinsler and gobs of cash. While universally (and rightfully so) viewed as primarily a salary dump for GM Dave Dombrowski and the Tigers camp, the Rangers have gained a strong bat to place in the middle of their batting order alongside Adrian Beltre and Alex Rios.

Yet unlike the much-theorized David Price trade, the Fielder deal was not a pure salary dump. Fielder stumbled mightily in his production in 2013. In 2012, he posted a robust .313/.412/.528 traditional slash line, with an impressive .940 OPS and 153 wRC+. According to Baseball-Reference’s oWAR calculations, 2012 was Fielder’s third-most valuable year at the plate with a 5.4 mark. All of this stands in stark contrast to Fielder’s 2013.

Last year Fielder posted a much more pedestrian .279/.362/.457, .819 OPS, 125 wRC+ and 2.9 oWAR. While of course those are still above-average numbers, when attached to the name Prince Fielder and his ubercontract, Dave Dombrowski clearly had reason for concern. However, off-the-field issues are widely believed to have contributed to the dip in Fielder’s production, and natural regression may have also contributed to the fall from Fielder’s career-high traditional slash line. Fielder also enjoyed a career-high .321 BABIP in 2012, with his 2013 mark of .307 more in line with his normal marks.

So, the question presents itself; what exactly does Texas GM Jon Daniels have on his hands in the 2014 model year Fielder? There are a number of factors contributing to this answer. Firstly, while the batters ahead of him do not contribute to his slash line, they certainly do help counting stats such as RBIs. While RBIs are naturally an utterly useless stat when evaluating individual performance, men getting on base allow a hitter to create runs, and as runs are ultimately what win games, putting men on ahead of big bats such as Fielder is part of what goes into good team creation. Therefore, I will examine the clip at which we can expect there to be runners on base when Fielder bats for Texas as opposed to his stint in Detroit.

Secondly, I will also examine the impact Arlington itself will have on Fielder’s bat. Arlington has traditionally been a much more hitter-friendly location than Detroit. But how much exactly will Texas raise Fielder’s numbers?

The top of the 2013 Tigers lineup consisted of Austin Jackson, Torii Hunter, Miguel Cabrera in front of Fielder. Those first three hitters posted OBP’s of .337, .334, and .442, respectively. That averages out to a .371 mark, albeit an imperfect one due to Cabrera’s significantly higher individual mark (also, Cabrera hit a lot of home runs last year, and while that counts towards his OBP, that means the bases were empty when Fielder came to bat). We’ll refer to this average of the top of the order as tOBP, or “Top OBP” for the rest of the article for the sake of saving space.

The top of the 2014 Rangers lineup will be made up of Shin-Soo Choo, and either Elvis Andrus or Jurickson Profar before Fielder, who will bat third. There are a number of different projection systems we can use to forecast the upcoming season, for this article we’ll be using Steamer. Choo is given a .391 OBP, Andrus a .340, and Profar a .321. With Andrus in the lineup the projected tOBP is .365, with Profar it’s .356. So despite throwing his wallet at Choo and his obscene .423 2013 OBP, Jon Daniels in fact is giving Fielder less to work with in front of him.

Or is he? Part of the smaller (projected) tOBP in Texas is that Fielder simply won’t have the best hitter in the game hitting in front of him anymore. Also, one has to expect Fielder to be better at the plate this year. Steamer awards Fielder a substantial .290/.390/.516 line with a 142 wRC+ and 3.4 WAR, a major uptick over last year’s production. If we factor him into the projected Texas tOBP, with Andrus it’s a .374, and with Profar it’s .367. That’s something you like to see if you’re Adrian Beltre, who lead the league in hits last year and launched 30 homers.

And speaking of homers, Fielder’s move to Arlington will help him in that department. The newly named Globe Life Park ranked seventh last year in home runs with a total of 107 being hit there. Comerica Park, where the Tigers play, ranked fourteenth with 99. This helps Steamer award Fielder 29 home runs, up from 25 last year.

However, can we possibly expect Fielder to exceed these projections? As mentioned earlier, Fielder’s down year was contributed to by a number of off-the-field issues according to Hunter. A change of scenery will definitely do Fielder well, and he also seems to have lost some weight if the pictures and video coming out of Spring Training are to be believed. For that reason I’m willing to bump up Fielder’s numbers by a few slots, and I expect him to be even better than what Steamer predicts. Because baseball is a fickle mistress I could easily be wrong, but call it a gut feeling. All in all, Jon Daniels may have caught lightning in a bottle here with his rather expensive gamble, and if Texas manages to overcome their pitching woes they should be a very dangerous team with Fielder anchoring their lineup.

Whenever one makes any conclusion based off of anything, a bunch of underlying assumptions get shepherded in to the high-level conclusion that they output. Now that’s a didactic opening sentence, but it has a point–because statistics are full of underlying assumptions. Statistics are also, perhaps not coincidentally, full of high-level conclusions. These conclusions can be pretty wrong, though. By about five-hundred runs each and every season, in this case.

Relative player value is likely the most important area of sports analysis, but it’s not always easy. For example, it’s pretty easy to get a decent idea of value in baseball while it’s pretty hard to do the same for football. No one really knows the value of a pro-bowl linebacker compared to a pro-bowl left guard, for one. People have rough ideas, but these ideas are based more on tradition and ego than advanced analysis. Which is why football is still kind of in the dark ages, and baseball isn’t. But just because baseball is out of the dark ages, it doesn’t mean that it’s figured out. It doesn’t even mean that it’s even close to figured out.

Because this question right here still exists: What’s the value of a starting pitcher compared to a relief pitcher? At first glance this a question we have a pretty good grasp on. We have WAR, which isn’t perfect, yeah, but a lot of the imperfections get filtered out when talking about a position as whole. You can just compare your average WAR for starters with your average WAR for relievers and get a decent answer. If you want to compare the top guys then just take the top quartile and compare them, etc. Except, well, no, because underlying assumptions are nasty.

FanGraphs uses FIP-WAR as its primary value measure for pitchers, and it’s based on the basic theory that pitchers only really control walks, strikeouts, and home runs–and that everything else is largely randomness and isn’t easily measurable skill. RA9 WAR isn’t a good measure of individual player skill because a lot of it depends upon factors like defense and the randomness of where the ball ends up, etc. This is correct, of course. But when comparing the relative value of entire positions against each other, RA9 WAR is the way to go. Because when you add up all the players on all of the teams and average them, factors like defense and batted balls get averaged together too. We get inherently perfect league average defense and luck, and so RA9 WAR loses its bias. It becomes (almost) as exact as possible.

Is this really a big deal, though? If all of the confounding factors of RA9 WAR get factored together, wouldn’t the confounding factors of FIP-WAR get factored together too? What’s so bad about using FIP-WAR to judge value? Well there’s this: From 1995 onward, starting pitchers have never outperformed their peripherals. Relievers? They’ve outperformed each and every time. And it’s not like the opposite happened in 1994–I just had to pick some date to start my analysis. Here’s a table of FIP-WAR compared to RA9-WAR compared to starters for the last 18 years, followed by the same table for relievers.

Starter RA9-WAR/FIP-WAR Comparisons

Reliever RA9-WAR/FIP-WAR Comparisons

Ok, so that’s a lot of numbers. The basis, though, is that FIP thinks that starters are better than they actually are, while it thinks relievers are the converse. And this is true year after year, by margins that rise well above negligible. Starters allow roughly 250 more runs than they should according to FIP every season, while relievers allow about 250 less than they should by FIP’s methodologies–in much fewer innings. In more reduced terms this means that starters are over-valued by about 10% as whole, while relievers are consistently under-valued by about 25% according to FIP-WAR. Now, this isn’t a completely new idea. We’ve known that relievers tend to outperform peripherals for a while, but the truth is this: relievers really outperform peripherals, pretty much all the time always.

Relievers almost get to play a different game than starters. They don’t have to face lineups twice, they don’t have to throw their third or fourth-best pitches, they don’t have to conserve any energy, etc. There’s probably a lot more reasons that relievers are better than starters, too, and these reasons can’t be thrown out as randomness, because they pretty much always happen. Not necessarily on an individual-by-individual basis, but when trying to find the relative value between positions, the advantages of being a reliever are too big to be ignored.

How much better are relievers than starters at getting “lucky”? Well, a few stats that have been widely considered luck stats (especially for pitchers) for a while are BABIP and LOB. FIP assumes that starters and relievers are on even ground, as far as these two numbers are concerned. But are they? Here’s a few tables for comparison, using the same range of years as before.

BABIP Comparisons

LOB Comparisons

With the exception of BABIP in ’96, relievers always had better luck than starters. Batters simply don’t get on base as often–upon contacting the ball fairly between two white lines–when they’re facing guys that didn’t throw out the first pitch of the game. And when batters do get on, they don’t get home as often. Relievers mean bad news, if good news means scoring more runs.

Which is why we have to be careful when we issue exemptions to the assumptions of our favorite tools. There are a lot of solid methodologies that go into the formulation of FIP, but FIP is handicapped by the forced assumption that everyone is the same at the things that they supposedly can’t control. Value is the big idea–the biggest idea, probably–and it’s entirely influenced by how one chooses to look at something. In this case it’s pitching, and what it means to be a guy that only pitches roughly one inning at a time. Or perhaps it’s about this: What it means to be a guy who looks at a guy that pitches roughly one inning at a time, and then decides the worth of the guy who pitches said innings, assuming that one wishes to win baseball games.

The A’s and Rays just spent a bunch of money on relievers, after all. And we’re pretty sure they’re not dumb, probably.

5. Alex Gonzalez

Friday morning, as I began the tedious process of combining all MLB schedules in one spreadsheet, I noticed that FanGraphs’ resident volcano expert and prolific content generator Jeff Sullivan posted one very similar article, and then another shortly thereafter. He focused on projected WAR, while I planned to look specifically at projected average ERA and wOBA a team must contend with over the 2014 season. So at the risk of writing a similar post, one with drier writing and less cool graphics, I submit to you the following simple table and graphs.

We often look at the strength of a division and make generalizations about the hardest place to pitch (AL East) and hit (NL East). Like park effects, we sometimes jump to conclusions about the effects of dream lineups and weak interdivision rivals. Chad Young’s analysis of Prince Fielder’s move to Arlington is a perfect example of how enthusiasm can be misplaced when we forget that 90 of a club’s 162 games take place outside of their division, with 20 games occurring in a different league.  The table below shows projected mean wOBA and ERA by team, which are weighted by expected plate appearances and innings pitched, respectively. As expected, AL teams generally have a DH-fueled high wOBA and inflated ERA when compared to their NL counterparts. All projections are courtesy of Steamer’s 2014 pre-season projections. Keep in mind that Steamer regresses stats like wOBA and ERA, so there is not as huge a gap between the Red and White Sox (0.332 vs. 0.317) compared to what you might see during the season. However, Steamer has been shown to be one of the best projection systems available when it comes to capturing player-to-player variation in performance (i.e. ranking players by production), which is sufficient for looking at the differences between teams.

*adjusted for PA and IP

I was surprised by the high ERA attributed to the San Diego Padres, poor enough for 6^th worst in the NL. The Reds’ Choo-less offense is also, somewhat surprisingly, projected as the 7^th worst in the majors. Let’s take a moment to silently reflect that the Minnesota Twins, despite having a spacious ballpark and a non piss-poor payroll, are still projected to give up more earned runs than the Colorado Rockies.

While the table displays projected wOBA and ERA by team, the charts below illustrate the mean wOBA and ERA faced by each team over 162 games.

Last September Dave Cameron presented a convincing argument that Chris Sale’s 2013 season was as good if not better than Max Scherzer’s, but was obscured in part because Sale routinely pitched against the Tigers and Scherzer routinely pitched against the White Sox. These projections reinforce the argument in favor of opponent-adjusted measurements—Detroit pitchers are projected to face a wOBA of 0.321 while Chicago pitchers play against teams with a projected wOBA of 0.324.

San Diego and San Francisco are home to some of the most pitching-friendly stadiums in the country. However, in part because they play 28 away games against the Rockies, Diamondbacks, and Dodgers, their opponent’s wOBA is higher than people might expect. However great it is that a flyball pitcher like Ian Kennedy has a home in spacious San Diego, it’s important to note that the Padres are slated to face some tougher-than-average lineups.

ERA drops off pretty sharply when we get to the NL. Surprisingly, hitters for the Nationals and Dodgers appear to have the easiest schedules in their league, despite being in divisions which are better known for their sharp pitching than strong offense. Not having to face the likes Clayton Kershaw or Stephen Strasburg can do wonders for a lineup.

The heavy-hitting Tigers are slated to face the worst pitching staff in the majors. While this is somewhat unfair considering they have the league’s best hitter, it is very unfair that the lowly Marlins will face the best pitchers in the league.

Projections are only predictions, and assuredly some teams will drastically outperform and others will underwhelm by season’s end. However, these data remind us that our preconceptions about who plays in an extreme park or which teams are in difficult divisions should not be overemphasized, nor should we discount the idea that some lineups or pitching staffs will have a significantly more difficult time than others. Over the course of the season, a single team will square off against almost 20 other teams in over a dozen different parks. Whatever the strength of their schedule, position players and pitchers face a wide variety of competition, and no doubt a good many will surprise us all.

Who will lead the Athletics in power statistics this year?

The Oakland Athletics are a very deep and very solid team. There are few holes on the team and they get contributions from most of the hitters in the lineup. The Athletics do lack one thing that some of the other competitors for the American League crown have: one power bat that pitchers have to plan for. This may not be a bad thing, as there could be as many as three guys in the Athletics lineup that could hit over 30 home runs.

Josh Reddick was an powerful force for the Athletics in 2012 after the team acquired him for Andrew Bailey. Reddick was a solid offensive prospect for the Red Sox coming up through the system but after a breakthrough 2008 season, never hitting more than 20 home runs again and seeing his average lower as he struck out more. He had a good 2011 season with Red Sox, but the team was looking to add bullpen depth after losing Jonathan Papelbon and Reddick was seen as disposable. Given a full time role in Oakland, Reddick hit 32 home runs, stole 11 bases, and exhibited his cannon of an arm; he finished 16th in the MVP race and, even with a lack of patience and rise in home runs, the Athletics had an answer for a power boost. In 2013, Reddick was injured a bit and when he was healthy some of his positive trends from 2012 regressed. The most obvious difference was that Reddick hit 5% less fly balls in 2013 than in 2012 and also averaged 5% less home runs per fly ball. Given those ratios, it should not be too much of a surprise that his home run total dropped from 32 to 12. Reddick was a bit more selective with his swings and if he is able to get some better contact, he may be able to get back to hitting 25 or more home runs. It is very important that he does not focus on hitting home runs as that could detract from his better strike zone recognition.

Yoenis Cespedes came over from Cuba as a big time power hitter and has done a pretty job of hitting for power thus far in the majors. He was a top 10 MVP finisher in 2012, with 23 home runs on top 16 steals and a .292 average. He struck out a bit too much, but nothing that was that much of a problem for the Athletics. In 2013, Cespedes was inconsistent and his free swinging ways really hurt him. He may have him 26 home runs, but he had a sub-.300 OBP and appeared to be hacking for the fences way too much. His fly ball rate rose as he hit more home runs, but almost everything else about his game was worse in 2013 than in 2012. The 28 year old Cespedes is in a similar place as Reddick in that he needs to make strides to become a better hitter rather than mash the ball out of the park. He does have extreme power, putting it to display by winning the Home Run Derby in 2013, but his downfall may be his aggression. He has the reputation of a free swinger and that can get him into a lot of trouble with strikeouts and a loss of good contact. Cespedes may be able to hit 30-35 home runs and has the most power potential on the team, but his power may be a detriment to his whole game. The Athletics acquired Cespedes for his power and the team will still rely on that power but it would help the Athletics if he would focus more on finding ways to get on base.

Brandon Moss came out of nowhere to be a very good player for the Athletics the past two years. After bouncing around the Red Sox, Phillies, and Pirates organizations and showing that he had some good power without results at the big league level, it finally clicked at the big league level in 2012 for Oakland. Moss had a .954 OPS with 21 home runs and was versatile in that he played first base and the outfield. The ugly thing for Moss is that he does not have a ton of patience at the plate, which held him up in his pursuit of a major league job, and that was an issue in 2012 and became a big reason for a regression in 2013. He was still very solid with a .859 OPS and 30 home runs in 145 games but his average was down from .291 to .256. He did walk a bit more and strikeout less and those are positive trends that could lead to Moss becoming an All-Star. He showed that he could withstand a full MLB season for the first time and was stronger in the second half of 2013 than the first half. He is having a good spring training thus far and it would not be insane to see Moss with 35-40 home runs this year. His average might only get to the low .270s, but if he builds on the good trends of less strikeouts and more walks, he will be the best offensive player for the Athletics.

When will Addison Russell take over at shortstop?

As this prediction will show, the Athletics should be the team that wins the American League West; this is even without a hitter that could be the number 2 hitter for the Athletics right now. Addison Russell is a very solid hitting, consistent shortstop and should be the shortstop for the Athletics for the better part of the next decade. Unfortunately for him, Carlos Correa, Javier Baez, and Francisco Lindor all play the same position as him, so he has been swept under the rug a bit. Soon this will not be the case and Russell will take over as the shortstop and the Athletics will be better off for it.

There is a very good chance that the 2012 draft will go down as one of the strongest drafts in recent history, as most of the top 20 picks in the draft have either aggressively moved up through their respective organizations or have had extreme success in the lower levels. In 659 at-bats since he was drafted, Russell has a .302 BA, 39 doubles, 19 triples, 24 home runs, and 37 steals. Those are extremely impressive numbers, but it is even more impressive when you consider that he was only 18 and 19 as he accumulated these numbers and that he has even had a short stint in Triple-A. He may not have the plate discipline of Francisco Lindor, but as a 19 year old in High-A, Russell still had a .369 OBP and 125 strikeouts compared to 61 walks. He was the best player in the California League for most of the season and did not look overmatched hitting against pitchers that were 2 or 3 years older than him. All of the hitting was impressive, but his fielding is what will make him a stalwart in the Athletics infield and move him up through the system quickly. His defense grades out as outstanding and when added to his solid hitting for a shortstop, Russell may be an All-Star for years to come.

If the Athletics wanted to move Russell aggressively through the system, they could. Alberto Callaspo is a serviceable player, but he is not going to add any value to an already solid Athletics team. He could play all over the diamond and Russell could easily take his spot in the starting lineup. Jed Lowrie is a super utility player at shortstop and could easily move to second base if Russell is going to move up to the majors. The Athletics are a very good team and have flexibility with both Lowrie and Callaspo so it might not be a bad idea if the Athletics move up the talented 20 year old shortstop to the majors. He needs to continue to work on his plate discipline and have his walk rate continue to trend in a positive way. He has had a decent start so far in major league camp in Spring Training, hitting .263 in his first 19 at-bats. It would be smart for the Athletics to let him develop in the minors a bit longer but a hot start should get Russell to Oakland as the starting shortstop.

How good exactly is the Athletics bullpen?

The Oakland Athletics had a very strong bullpen over the past couple years and they did something this offseason that most of the good teams do; they made it even stronger. Through the aggressive acquisitions of Jim Johnson, Luke Gregerson, and Eric O’Flaherty, Oakland may be in a position to end games once they get a lead in the 6th or 7th inning. This may be a very good thing as the rotation is very young and may not been able to get as deep in games as other rotations could.

Sean Doolittle was a good prospect out of the University of Virginia, in fact was a first round pick as a first baseman in 2007, but had two major knee injuries and a wrist injury that derailed his hitting career and he turned back to pitching. In 2012, Doolittle fully converted to pitching and was absolutely stellar in the bullpen in the minors, moving from High-A to the majors with only 25 innings; albeit 25 innings where he struck out 48 batters with 7 walks and allowed only 2 runs. Since getting up to the majors in June 2012, Doolittle has a 3.09 ERA, 1.006 WHIP, and 9.3 K/9 with a 5: 1 K: BB ratio. His true ERA is even lower, at 2.37 and Doolittle has been very reliable, pitching around 70 innings each of the past two years. He has had 51 shutdowns as compared to only 15 meltdowns over the past two seasons and his fastball has been a true weapon, rated as one of the best pitches in baseball. He was a bit worse in 2013 than 2012, seeing his ERA rise while striking out fewer batters, but it was also his first full season in the majors and everything would suggest that Doolittle will continue to be a lefty force out of the Athletics bullpen.

Ryan Cook is another one of the strong young arms in the Oakland bullpen. A part of the trade that sent Trevor Cahill to Arizona and brought Jarrod Parker to Oakland, Cook has been the best pitcher out of the Athletics bullpen over the past two seasons. His ERA is sterling at 2.30 with a WHIP of 1.11 and has more than a strikeout an inning since coming over to Oakland. He walks a bit more batters than Oakland would like and was more dominant in 2012 than 2013; he threw more changeups in 2013 than 2012 in an effort to be more of a ground ball pitcher. His ground ball rate was similar in 2013 and 2012, but there were more line drives hit off of Cook in 2013, raise his GB: FB ratio. The biggest issue for Cook is that he throws a strong 95 mph fastball and that pitch was dominant in 2012 and saw a decrease in value in 2013. With such a strong fastball that is thrown 68% of the time, Cook needs to get his value back to that pitch; his slider and changeup can develop off of this pitch and make Cook even more value than he has been over the past two seasons. Cook will be relied upon in the 7th and 8th inning to get some tough outs for the Athletics and will give the Athletics a weapon out of the bullpen.

Luke Gregerson was added to the bullpen for the 2014 season and he should only strengthen a bullpen that was already strong. Over the past five seasons, Gregerson has been a strong reliever for the Padres and the Athletics looked to add some veteran leadership to the bullpen by adding the 30 year old. There is a lot of strength in the Athletics bullpen, but a lot of the pitchers are relatively unproven. Gregerson averages 73 appearances a season since 2009 and has a 1.09 WHIP and averages more than a strikeout an inning during that time period. He had a bit of a rough 2011 where he only had a 5.5 K/9 and 3.07 BB/9, but those ratios returned to their career baselines over 2012 and 2013. The biggest issue for Gregerson is that he had only 29 shutdowns and 15 meltdowns last year; those numbers were able to be contained on a Padres team that did not compete in 2013 but he is now on a competitor in Oakland. He averaged 31 shutdowns and 12 meltdowns in the seasons prior to 2013 and he should return to numbers close to that in 2014. He will a part of the new 8th/9th inning combination with the Athletics and should serve as a part of a good ending to a lot of Athletics’ games.

Jim Johnson has very big shoes to fill, as Grant Balfour was a great closer for the Athletics in the past two seasons. For a team like the Athletics who are ready to compete for a World Series title, it is important that they are able to close down the game, especially considering that the rest of the bullpen is so good. Johnson’s power sinker was devastating 2011 and 2012 as he was one of the best relievers in baseball and a part of a bullpen in 2012 that was 29-9 in one run games and had a streak of over 100 games won where they had the lead going into the 7th inning. He has saved 50 games in each of the two seasons, but in 2013 he had 12 meltdowns as compared to only 3 in 2012. He is not a strike out pitcher and that scares a lot of people. Also, his ground ball rate was down 4% in 2013 and that 4% moved to line drive rate. The eight more line drive hits between 2012 and 2013 may seem insignificant but in one inning spurts, this could be the difference that leads to the Athletics losing games. If Johnson is able to keep his sinker down and induce ground balls, the Athletics strong infield defense will allow him to have a great season as the new closer in Oakland.

The Athletics have a young rotation that will need a lot of assistance from a strong bullpen and that will probably be the case in 2014. With a strong bullpen like the Athletics have, most games that the Athletics lead in the 6th or 7th should be a win.

What will Josh Donaldson do to repeat his great 2013 season?

Josh Donaldson did not come out of nowhere entirely during the 2013 season, he was a first round pick in the 2007, but no one could have reasonably predicted that he would be as successful as he was in only his second full year in the majors. In fact, coming into the season, many assumed that it was his defense that would make him so valuable to the team and that was why he broke camp as the starting third baseman to begin with. After a 4th place finish in the MVP race, it will be important to see why Donaldson was so successful and how that success can translate to the 2014 season.

Donaldson was a first round pick by the Cubs out of Auburn in 2007 and was a part of the trade that sent Rich Harden to the Cubs in 2008. Donaldson was extremely attractive because he was a catcher that hit .346 in Low-A in 2007 with more walks than strikeouts, but was off to a slow start in Peoria in 2008, making him expendable for the Cubs. After he moved on to the California League with Stockton in the Athletics organization, he went back to having an outstanding walk to strikeout ratio and had a .381 OBP between the 2008 and 2009 seasons in High-A Stockton and Double-A Midland. Between the 2010 and 2012 seasons in the minors, Donaldson alternated between third base and catcher and his numbers in 2010 and 2011 were pedestrian in Triple-A Sacramento. A hot start in 2012 in Sacramento led to a promotion to Oakland.

Once in Oakland, Donaldson moved to third base for good and, although he was not a force offensively, was good enough to be in the running to be the starter at third in 2013. Nothing could have predicted that Donaldson would have the offensive season that he had in 2013, but his walk rate and strikeout rates were back to the solid ratios of the past and much better than the paltry numbers from 2012. In fact, most of Donaldson’s ratios returned to those that he had when he was taking his first try at A ball in 2007 or when he tore up Triple-A for 51 games in 2012. He had a .883 OPS with 24 home runs, 37 doubles, and 93 RBI. His defense continued to be elite, in fact he was the third best defensive third baseman in the American League, and he even had a higher WAR than MVP Miguel Cabrera.

For Donaldson to be as successful in 2014, he needs to continue to hit the ball hard. A ground ball hitter in 2013, Donaldson needs to make sure that those grounders find holes or his average will fall off a bit. He was a decent base runner in 2013 and had a jump in HR/FB ratio, two trends that will continue to give Donaldson value. He may not be nearly an 8 win player again in 2014, but his defense and solid walk and contact rates will keep Donaldson as a 5 win player; this is much more than the Athletics envisioned when they acquired him in 2007 and will keep him as a vital part of the Athletics’ success.

Why are the Athletics going to win 95 games?

The Oakland Athletics may be the best team in baseball. In fact, there were a couple different projection methods that were examined in these analyses and none of them had the A’s winning less than 93 games. Their bullpen is very solid, the rotation is young and deep, the lineup has great depth, and there is very good leadership with this team. Projections are great and math is not everything, though, and there are a couple things that may hurt the Athletics and could even keep them out of the playoffs. Brandon Moss has been very good in spurts over the past few years and the projections like him a lot more than his true talent, the same goes with Yoenis Cespedes. There has been enough written on Josh Donaldson and there are reasons to believe that his numbers from last year were an aberration. Moss needs to keep up with what he has done in the past, Cespedes needs to be less streaky, and Donaldson needs to show that last year was not a fluke. If those three things can happen, the A’s could quietly have the best lineup in baseball. There are many young, strong arms in the rotation and there is every reason to believe that their respective best seasons are coming soon.

5 You Know:

1. AJ Griffin

2. Josh Donaldson

3. Jed Lowrie

4. Brandon Moss

5. Yoenis Cespedes

5 You Will Know:

1. Addison Russell

2. Sonny Gray

3. Raul Alcantra

4. Michael Ynoa

5. Billy Burns

5 You Should Remember:

1. Billy McKinney

2. Bobby Wahl

3. Daniel Robertson

4. Renato Nunez

5. Dylan Covey

By far, the hardest thing about fantasy baseball is the fact that you can’t predict the future. Every year, a Matt Carpenter or a Chris Davis vastly outperforms expectations and wins a fantasy league for somebody, and a Matt Kemp battles injuries all year and makes somebody else tear their hair out. But you learn to deal with that sort of thing, or you take up a less stressful hobby, like Russian roulette. C’est la vie, and all that.

What this article is about, however, is that the second-hardest thing about fantasy baseball is trying to juggle categories. Which is better, Mike Trout’s five-category production, or Miguel Cabrera’s dominance in four categories? How much is it worth to have Billy Hamilton singlehandedly win stolen bases for you while contributing nothing in the other categories? Can you absorb Pedro Alvarez’s batting average hit for the home runs he gives you? Over the years, people have come up with a few different ways to try to answer those questions. Standing Gain Points (SGP) is one popular method. Z-scores are another. There are others, but those are the two I see the most, so they’re the two I’m going to talk about. The point of this article isn’t to compare all of the ranking systems out there and figure out which one is “right.” The point of this article is to call attention to the fact that your choice of ranking system matters, probably more than you think.

Of course, most fantasy ranking systems start with projections. Personally, I like to use composite projections, because I think there’s value in combining projections and smoothing out spots where one system might be exceptionally high or low on a player. You can disagree with the projections – that’s not the point. The point is, you (or your fantasy expert of choice, if you use published rankings) can take the same projections, plug them into different ranking systems, and get substantially different results.

For the purposes of this article, I’m keeping things very simple, perhaps a little too simple. I don’t care about volatility, risk, upside, injuries, etc. I’m assuming that these projections are accurate. And I’m not going to bother with positional adjustment, because I’m lazy and these aren’t the rankings I’m drafting from, and it doesn’t matter anyway. I’m concerned with how using different methods changes players’ rankings relative to each other, not how much to bump Buster Posey up my draft board because I need a catcher. And I’m looking at rankings, not auction values, because that’s another step that I don’t feel like taking right now.

I’m going to look at the shortstop position (specifically the top 14, because I play in a 14-team league) for this article, because I need to narrow things down to a manageable number of players. I’m assuming a standard 5×5 league. And what I’m looking at is SGP (using the formula here), compared to two slightly different ways of calculating z-scores. In all cases, I’m looking at the rankings of each player among shortstops and among all hitters.  Really, though, I’m concerned with the overall rankings because I want to see how players move around – the choice to focus on shortstops is just a convenient way to select a handful of players to look at.

Anyway, on to the fun stuff:

SGP shortstop rankings:

Looks reasonable. I don’t know. We don’t have anything to compare it to yet. So let’s compare it to z-scores. For this example, I’m going to calculate my average and standard deviation for each category using all players projected for over 300 at bats.

Z-score shortstop rankings using all players with >300 AB:

Comparing those two tables, the methods agree on the top 14 shortstops. For the most part, these rankings are pretty similar. But Tulowitzki moves up a few spots in the overall rankings, which isn’t insignificant that early in the draft. Segura drops a round or two, and swaps spots with Desmond in the shortstop rankings. Andrus moves down the overall rankings a bit. Everth Cabrera moves down the overall rankings quite a lot, going from a mid-round steal to a guy who’s probably merely a decent value at his ADP.

So we learned a few things there, maybe. But when I use z-scores, I don’t think it makes sense to calculate them using every player who sees significant playing time – most of those will probably never be rostered in your fantasy league. I want to compare fantasy-relevant players to other fantasy-relevant players, not waiver wire fodder. So let’s take the top 200 hitters, as determined by the initial z-score rankings, recalculate the average and standard deviation for each category using only those players, and try again.

Z-score shortstop rankings using the top 200 players:

Again, everything looks pretty similar at first glance. Alexei Ramirez drops off the list in favor of Jed Lowrie, but that’s no big deal. But Tulowitzki moves up another couple spots – he’s pushing first-round value now, even before positional adjustments. Segura and Andrus drop a little further in the overall rankings. Cabrera, who was already worth less using z-scores, is even worse with a smaller player pool. Remember, that rank of 93 is only among hitters – factor in pitchers, and Cabrera, a mid-round steal using SGP, now looks overvalued at his ADP of 106 (though we can’t say that for sure without applying positional adjustments). All things considered, simply changing the size of the player pool had as much of an effect as changing from SGP to z-scores in the first place.

Depending on which ranking method you use, you’re going to place a pretty different value on some of these players (again, with the caveat that I didn’t do positional adjustments). At the top of the shortstop rankings, Tulowitzki could be anywhere from a late second round pick to a borderline first-rounder. Cabrera’s value swings wildly depending on what system you use – he’s either a player to target fairly early, or borderline undraftable where you’d have to take him. Other players, like Hanley Ramirez or Brad Miller, are remarkably consistent across all three methods, but there’s no way to know how much of that is chance.

The natural thing now is to wonder is which of these systems is right. This seems like it should be solvable. I really want there to be an answer to this, a clear way to combine five categories of production into a single overall rank. Unfortunately, I’m not convinced that exists. People smarter than me have come up with a few different ways to reach that goal, and the results don’t agree with each other. Even if they did, the needs of your team are going to evolve as the draft goes on. When you pick whatever method you prefer and compile your pre-draft rankings, the numbers you get are going to look pretty absolute, there in black and white in your spreadsheet. But really, they’re more like ballpark estimates, and they could easily be totally different.

Predicting pitcher wins is a capricious exercise, and few factors have been shown to have any correlation whatsoever with win percentage (W%). To predict wins, one should consider a pitcher’s ERA, offensive support, strength of bullpen, quality of defense behind the mound, and, innings pitched (IP) in a season.

In fact, research has shown that IP and ERA are the only two factors that have a correlation above .30, and the two are very close. In a sample of pitchers from 2003-2013, the correlation for both eclipsed .40.

Obviously, pitching more games leads to more wins in a season, but many fantasy experts insist that pitching deep into games is an important part of earning a win as well. The theory, which I’ve seen taken for granted by experts at ESPN, CBS, Baseball Prospectus, and Rotographs, is that a starting pitcher who pitches into the 8th or 9th inning and leaves with a lead intact is more likely be credited with the W.

However, to earn a win a starter must pitch only 5 innings. Since we know that starters are often less effective after 75 pitches or so, pulling a pitcher early and relying a fresh bullpen that is at least league average should, in theory, be more effective than keeping a starter in the game. Dave Cameron articulated this point when creating a gameplan for the Pirates’ all-important play-in game in October 2013 when he suggested Liriano be pulled after only 3 innings. The chart below reinforces the obvious point that, except for walk rate, relievers generally eclipse starters in most skill metrics.

In 2013 Shelby Miller started 31 games and came away with the W a total of 15 times, earning a W% that ranked 22^nd in the majors right behind Clayton Kershaw and Anibal Sanchez. That’s impressive, but also consider that the innings-limited rookie pitched an average of 5.5 innings per start—he only racked up 13 quality starts (QS), ranked 86^th in the league. QS, after all, require putting in 6 innings of work with at least a 4.50 ERA.

Why, then, are innings pitched per start (IP/GS) so important, relatively, when considering W%? I hypothesized that pitchers who are given the leeway to pitch deep into games, and hence give their bullpen a rest, were generally better at run prevention than their peers, i.e. sported a lower ERA.

In healthcare research, where we don’t write particularly well, we love simple diagrams to explain hypothesized effects. Below is a diagram showing how one might view the relationship between various factors like ERA, IP, defense, offensive support and bullpen ERA. The perceived link between IP/GS and Pitcher Wins is confounded by ERA, which has an effect on both factors.

Pitch Efficiency

Before examining the theory that ERA accounts for the correlation between IP and W%, lets look at another possible explanation. Perhaps pitch efficiency is the key. Jordan Zimmermann was the 3^rd most efficient starter (14.5 P/IP) in the majors last year, and was tied for the 8^th highest W% (.68). However, the table below shows the correlation between W per game started (GS) and P/IP, ERA, and IP/GS among starters between 2009-2013:

While ERA and IP/GS appear to be almost equally correlated, the squared correlation coefficient for P/IP was negligible at .08. Variance in pitch efficiency has little to do with variance in W%.

IP/GS: How to Measure a Confounder

There are 2 straightforward ways to determine if the relationship between 2 variables is actually being skewed by a third factor, in this case ERA. The first is to stratify the sample by ERA and see if the relationship between IP/GS and W% still stands. If ERA is not a confounder, we would expect the correlation between each tier to remain relatively stable. As we can see in the chart below, it follows no clear trend.

Interestingly, only the best tier of pitchers, those with an ERA less than 3.65, show any discernible relationship between W% and IP/GS, supporting the theory that those starters who have demonstrated a strong ability to prevent runs are given the chance to pitch more innings.  Among more middling pitchers, the relationship between pitching deep into games and W% is negligible.

The second way to measure confounding is using a regression model. If you create a model examining how factor X predicts factor Y, introducing factor Z should not change the coefficient for X by more than 10% if Z does not have a strong pull on the relationship. For example, if we run a model that shows that smoking doubles your chance of getting lung cancer, then introducing tea drinking into the equation should not really change that smoking-lung cancer connection by more than 10%, unless we believe that drinking tea can also affect lung cancer and/or smoking.

I’m with MGL that regression is often unnecessary in baseball research, as its results can be difficult to interpret and unnecessarily complicated. I might add that even simple linear regression rests on a series of assumptions that are not always met. With that caveat, the data in this sample are normally distributed and I kept the model as simple as possible. Model 1 examines the relationship between W% and IP/GS. Model 2 adds a third variable, ERA.

All results are statistically significant. Model 1 indicates that for each 1-inning increase in IP/GS, we would expect an 11% increase in W%. Once we control for ERA, we see that each 1-inning increase would result in an even weaker relationship— we would expect a 6% increase in W%. The new coefficient, .057, is more than 10% different from .111 and we can safely conclude that ERA is confounding this relationship, just as we found in the stratified analysis above.

Predicting Wins?

Here at FanGraphs we might mock the idea of pitcher wins, since they are mostly a byproduct of an era when pitchers did pitch deep into games and bullpens were not utilized as often or as effectively. However, when it comes to predicting wins, Will Larson has shown that projection systems like Steamer and CAIRO do a pretty good job, and are on average within 3.5-4 wins of the actual end-of-season results.

In fact, projection systems across the board are better at capturing player-to-player variation (ranking players) in counting statistics like W and strikeouts than rate stats ERA and WHIP.

While I have previously shown that QS correlate much better than W with pretty much every measure of pitcher skill we have, W% is still somewhat predictable. As long as we have yet to #killthewin, we might as well keep trying to forecast the future. 

This is part three of a three-part series detailing a method of judging pitch framing based on the prior probability of the pitch being called a strike.  In part 1, we motivated the method.  In part 2, we formalized it. Here in part 3, we look at the hitter’s effect on ball and strike calls.

The formula we’ve been using for judging catcher framing is the very simple

IsCalledStrike - prob(CalledStrike)

where IsCalledStrike is simply 1 if the pitch is called a strike, and 0 otherwise.  The second term is the probability that the pitch would have been called a strike, absent any information about any given party’s involvement. We add up these values for every called ball or strike that a catcher receives, and report the resulting number.  In this article we could go ahead and do this for all catchers over the past two years, except (a) Matthew Carruth is already doing this exact thing and (b) I can’t figure out how to match Retrosheet data to my Pitch F/X data to get catcher information anyway.  So instead we’ll look at hitter involvement.  How much can a hitter influence whether a pitch is called a ball or strike?

Read the rest of this entry »

Who is  Jose Dariel Abreu?

The 2013 White Sox were bereft of offense and GM Ken Williams looked this offseason to add top offensive talent without breaking the bank too much. Also, since the team is rebuilding, they wanted to add a player that was younger. Jose Dariel Abreu hit on all of those criteria and the White Sox are looking towards Abreu to have the same impact as Cuban hitting stars Yoenis Cespedes and Yasiel Puig.

The massive Abreu has been a power threat in Cuba since he broke into the Serie Nacional at 21. He has been a force since 2010; three times going over 30 home runs in a shorter Cuban season and has exhibited a very good eye. There are a lot of comparisons to Ryan Howard because of his 6’2 260 build and that comparison is a very apt one. Howard walked a good amount and hit for a lot of power, but also struck out a lot, something that Abreu will probably be a victim of as well. That is why it would be smart if the White Sox find some way to construct the lineup as to not have Abreu and Dunn directly next to each other as there would be two strikeout threats in a row.

On the other hand, like with Howard and Dunn, Abreu has elite power. The White Sox would love to see that kind of power in the lineup, as Abreu will be tasked to take the offensive load that was once given to Paul Konerko. He is very raw, but against top talent in the World Baseball Classic, Abreu was very good in 2013, with three home runs and a .360 batting average. Abreu is not your typical rookie at 27 so the White Sox should be ready to plug him in at first base and he should be very successful. A .270 average with 25 home runs is a good starting point for Abreu, with a good chance that he is closer to 30 or 35 home runs. For a team that was offensively lackluster and devoid of power last year, the White Sox would be thrilled with those numbers from the big Cuban Abreu.

When do the White Sox make a move to get some starting pitching?

The White Sox had veteran, yet shaky, starting pitching last year and that did not work out for them as well as they hoped, as they were a statistically average pitching staff. For the 2014 season, the White Sox are taking another angle and trying to go a bit younger with the pitching staff to see if there is depth in the lower parts of the organization. The White Sox already have an excellent starting pitcher in Chris Sale, but if they are going to compete in the American League, they really need to find at least one more starter that they can really trust.

There are not a lot of good pieces for the White Sox to trade and there is not much in the minor leagues for the White Sox to develop, so the White Sox may need to get creative in the way that they find more pitching. Chris Sale is a true ace and Jose Quintana has looked good in his time in the major leagues, but John Danks’ injuries and a lack of development from such pitchers as Charlie Leesman has left the White Sox with Felipe Paulino and Erik Johnson at the back of the rotation. Johnson is a building piece for the future and may be the best player to come out of the improving White Sox farm system, but Paulino is just an arm to throw out there every five days and should not be relied upon for major contributions. The White Sox should start in their minor leagues to find guys to add to the rotation and two guys that should get the first look are Eric Surkamp and Nestor Molina.

Eric Surkamp was a sixth round pick in the 2008 by the Giants out of NC State and was successful coming up through the system for the Giants, posting a 2.73 ERA in 467 1/3 innings between High-A and Triple-A. After a 2011 where Surkamp had a sub-2 ERA between High-A San Jose and Double-A Richmond, he had some elbow troubles, resulting in Tommy John surgery. Before the surgery, Surkamp posted a K/9 of 10.6 and between Triple A and the majors this year; his K/9 was 6.6. Surkamp was already not in the favor of the Giants as he struggled with the strike zone in a brief audition in 2011 and after getting injured in 2012 and not regaining his sharpness in 2013, the Giants cut him loose for the White Sox to sign.

Unfortunately for Surkamp, his first appearance with the White Sox in Spring Training was not good, as he allowed 5 hits and 3 runs in 2 innings of work. The White Sox need to send him back down to Charlotte this season and allow him to regain some of his sharpness before they give him a chance in the majors. The Giants have had a very good track record of promoting young pitchers that have shown success in the minor leagues and they may have rushed Surkamp a bit considering that success. A change of scenery and more of a focus on the process than results will be critical for Surkamp to regain the success that he had in the past.

Nestor Molina was received by the White Sox in the Sergio Santos and in his two years in the White Sox system has been a bit hit or miss. Originally a super utility player in the Twins and Blue Jays systems, Molina moved to pitcher for good in 2008 and was a good reliever in 2008, 2009, and 2010 when in 2011 he moved to being a starter. He tore up the Florida State League with Dunedin and the Eastern League with New Hampshire, accumulating a 2.21 ERA between the two leagues with a sub-1 WHIP and more than 10 K/9. When the Blue Jays looked to add a bullpen arm, the White Sox asked for the hot Molina. He was only decent in his 2012 season with the White Sox after coming in as one of the top White Sox prospects for the season and had a bit of a lost season in 2013, as lingering shoulder issues led to only 36 1/3 innings.

Looking for a better start at 25, Molina should also get a chance in the Charlotte rotation and needs to play up his decent stuff. He is not able to blow batters away and he gets by more with guile and craftiness than skill; Molina needs to play that up as he did in his developmental years. His ERA was a run worse than his FIP over the past two years in the White Sox system which shows that he needs to cut down on his balls in play. The quick analysis would say that Molina minimized his walks and struck out many more batters while in the Blue Jays organization and he needs to get back to that. He needs to get that elite control that he displayed in 2011 and that will improve his results by leaps and bounds.

There may be a chance for the White Sox to have a solid rotation with Molina and Surkamp at the back end, but each have their own issues that they need to fix in the minor leagues first.

How did the White Sox fix their minor leagues?

Amongst all of the issues with the White Sox, there is one good thing: the minor league system was pretty good last year and there are now a couple minor league prospects that may be on the way to Chicago. Coming into the 2013 season, the White Sox had one of the worst farm systems and there were very little, if any players, who would make it to the majors. The system is not going to be a top system going into 2014, but there were some good things that happened during the 2013 season that have made people more bearish on the White Sox minor league system.

In the draft the White Sox addressed a lot of their biggest issues and will be better for it in the long run. As reported earlier, the White Sox do not have a lot of upper level pitching talent, so the White Sox drafted eleven pitchers in the first 20 rounds with a good mix of high school, junior college, and college talent. With the 17th pick of the first round, the team selected shortstop Tim Anderson out of junior college to take over for Alexi Ramirez. Anderson signed right away and was aggressively placed in the South Atlantic League- this will be discussed a bit later. Second round pick Tyler Danish also made it to Kannapolis last year, a good sign for the White Sox that their top picks were able to get into full season minor league baseball in their introductory seasons.

Kannapolis had some very strong prospects last year, a true indicator that Chicago may have a brighter future. As alluded to earlier, Tim Anderson was drafted and sent to Kannapolis, where he had an OBP of nearly .350 and had 5 triples while stealing 24 bases at a 86% success rate. Anderson’s season in the South Atlantic League was great but Micah Johnson was even better. An SAL All-Star at second base, Johnson stole 61 bases in 77 games with a .422 OBP and 11 triples; he made it all the way up to Double-A Birmingham for a bit at the end of the season, maintaining his speed at every level. It is quite easy to see the White Sox imagining Anderson and Johnson in the middle of their infield and top of their lineup for the future. There were some other impressive performances by some other White Sox hitters in Low-A as well, as Jason Coats had 38 doubles and Michael Johnson had a .388 OBP. A couple pitchers were also solid for the 2013 Intimidators as they had four starting pitchers — Mike Recchia, Jake Cose, Myles Jaye, and Tony Buccifero — that had sub-2.50 ERAs in their stints in the South Atlantic league. Stew Brase was solid out of the bullpen as well with a 2.13 ERA.

Winston Salem had an interesting year for developing prospects. Four of the five pitchers that were mentioned above spent varying amounts of time in Winston Salem and they were not nearly as successful; the quartet of Recchia, Jaye, Cose, and Brase had a 4.25 ERA in 256 1/3 innings in High-A. The big pitching prospect in Winston Salem was former second round pick Chris Beck, who had a 3.11 ERA in the Carolina League before he was promoted to Birmingham for the end of the season. The ERA was solid but Beck did not have a good K: BB ratio (1.36) or a good WHIP (1.34); fortunately he was a bit better in Birmingham to finish up the season, but Beck’s low strikeout rate is a bit alarming.

There were two big hitting prospects in Winston Salem and each had odd seasons. Rangel Ravelo was a Low-A all-star in 2012 and started the season there in 2013, struggling through his first 17 games. After that, Ravelo was moved up to Winston Salem and put together a solid season with a .312 average and nearly as many walks (40) as strikeouts (46); a tall and projectable frame might make the 22 year old Ravelo the biggest player to watch in the White Sox organization.

The other big prospect in Winston Salem, in fact the biggest prospect in the system, was 2012 first round pick, outfielder Courtney Hawkins. There were good things that Hawkins did, like having 19 home runs and 10 steals while playing a good centerfield, but there were a couple of things holding the 19 year old athlete back. The two huge issues for Hawkins were the .178 batting average and 160 strikeouts in only 425 plate appearances. There is not a good history for players that have a 37.6% strikeout rate and a 6.8% walk rate — unless they are hitting 45 home runs — but Hawkins was aggressively moved to High-A as an 18 year old in 2012 and the White Sox gave him a full season there at 19 when a lot of his fellow draftees were either in Rookie ball or Low-A. Hawkins should start the season in Double-A, but because he is so young, if he struggles he will not lose any development by moving back to Winston Salem.

Birmingham was the Southern League champions in 2013 and there were a lot of very interesting prospects there. The aforementioned Micah Johnson and Chris Beck were very solid for the team and showed that they could deal with upper level talent. Beck struggled at times in Winston Salem and it was a good thing coming into 2014 that he had a good end to the season in Double-A. Johnson had such success in A-ball that it was great that he was able to get in Double-A and show that his numbers were not a fluke.

There were a couple of players that were very successful for Birmingham because they were a bit too old for the league but they could provide organizational depth. David Cales had a 1.82 ERA in 24.2 innings pitched while in Birmingham; Dan Black had a .881 OPS and 91:98 walk to strikeout ratio; Jake Petricka had a 2.06 ERA in 39.1 innings (which he bested in Charlotte with a 1.17 ERA); and Taylor Thompson was solid in the bullpen with a 2.15 ERA and a 8.2 K/9 (although he was hit very hard in Charlotte).

There were two players in Birmingham that were prospects coming in that fulfilled their expectations and another that developed into being a prospect. Chris Bassitt was a pretty good pitcher in A-ball, but while in Double-A he cut his walks by a bit, worked a bit deeper into the game, and lowered his ERA to 2.27. Erik Johnson came into the Southern League as a big time prospect but no one expected that he would have the season that he did in 2013. After ringing up a 2.23 ERA in Birmingham, Johnson turned it up in Charlotte with a 1.57 ERA. A sub 2 ERA and a sub 1 WHIP with 8.3 K/9 during the 2013 should make Johnson a part of the 2014 White Sox rotation. The Sox hope that Johnson is able to take a place next to Chris Sale at the top of the big league rotation. Marcus Semien played in three different levels in 2013 and there was a reason that he made it to the majors. Semien is a do everything type of player; he plays second, third, and short and hit .290 with more walks (84) than strikeouts (66) and 15 home runs and 20 steals. Semien should also be a part of the 2014 White Sox, using that versatility to fill in for Gordon Beckham, Alexi Ramirez, or Matt Davidson.

For everything good that happened in Birmingham, though, Trayce Thompson disappointed a bit. Thompson was supposed to be the big draw for the Barons, particularly considering that he finished 2012 in Charlotte after having a .899 OPS in Birmingham in 14 games, but he only had a .704 OPS for the season and struck out 139 times. He did have 15 home runs and 25 steals, but his stock may have cooled a bit given his relatively weak season.

Since there was not a lot of upper level talent in the Chicago system, Charlotte did not really have any big prospects other than those that were promoted from Birmingham. Carlos Sanchez is not a horrible prospect, but a .241 average in Charlotte and only 16 steals may have slowed a bit of expectations on Sanchez. He did have a solid winter ball appearance in Venezuela and hopefully he can build on that in 2014.

There is still a long way for the White Sox to go in developing a good farm system but there were some things that happened in 2013 that show that help is coming.

What will the White Sox do about their bullpen?

For the past couple seasons the White Sox have struggled and they have been changing up their bullpen frequently. (In fact, one may say that because the White Sox have been changing up their bullpen frequently, they have struggled.) Coming into 2014, there are a lot questions since the team traded away young and mostly reliable closer Addison Reed and starter Hector Santiago to the Diamondbacks for Matt Davidson and Adam Eaton. For the whole scope of the team, this was a great move as Davidson and Eaton should be solid pillars for the future, but the bullpen is now left without a closer. Through a couple of trades and veteran free agent signings, the team has put together what constitutes a makeshift group. When you look through major and minor league bullpens, the one thing that usually survives is hard throwing pitchers; the White Sox have embraced this and have bred very hard throwing pitchers. The next two “young guns” for the White Sox are Nate Jones and Daniel Webb.

Daniel Webb was picked up by the White Sox in the trade that sent Jason Frasor to Toronto in early 2012 and, after a rough 2012 with Kannapolis in the South Atlantic League, Webb quickly rose from High-A to the major leagues in 2013 with a 2.07 ERA and 10.7 K/9. Once in the majors, Webb flashed a fastball that averaged 96 mph and a slider and changeup that played very well off of his hard fastball. He has had some issues with walks thus far during his young career and those need to be fixed before he is able to sustain that success for a long time. He did a good job of not becoming too reliant on his fastball and that needs to continue as he grows. Although he is not currently listed on the White Sox depth chart, it would be a shock if Webb does not break camp with the team and should be the set man by the middle of the season. There have actually been some that say that he will take over at closer for the next player to be analyzed.

Nate Jones alternated between starting and relieving in the minor leagues before he came up to the majors in 2012 as a reliever. His rookie year was a huge success; in 71 innings, Jones had a 2.39 and featured a 98 mph fastball that was electric. This past season, Jones had a mixed bag of a season. He struck out two more batters per nine, walked one less per nine, cut his WHIP 17 points, and, even though he only allowed 2 more hits, saw his ERA jump to 4.15. The answer to why his numbers looked better but he allowed more runs is quite simple: batters had an .879 OPS with runners in scoring position against Jones. Also, there was a 1.51 difference between his FIP and his ERA in 2013; showing that Jones needs to finish off hitters when runners are in scoring position. If Jones is able to keep advancing in his control and becoming more of a strikeout pitcher there will be fewer runners in scoring position. This is easier said than done but Jones had a lot of good indicators of progress last year and he could be a breakout player for the White Sox this year.

Why are the White Sox going to win 70 games?

The White Sox are in a bad place but they are getting better. The minor league system for the White Sox was disastrous and there was not much young talent on the team. The emerging Chris Sale along with Jose Dariel Abreu and Matt Davidson do provide the White Sox young talent. The minor league system thrived last year and there are a couple players like Micah Johnson and Erik Johnson that could be nice producers for the White Sox in the future. This year may not be the team of 2014, but there are some opportunities for the future. The unfortunate thing for the White Sox is that the division is strong and will even get stronger so the White Sox need to make sure that their young players continue to develop.

5 You Know:

1. Chris Sale

2. Jose Quintana

3. Adam Dunn

4. Alejandro De Aza

5. Alexi Ramirez

5 You Will Know:

1. Erik Johnson

2. Matt Davidson

3. Jose Dariel Abreu

4. Marcus Seimen

5. Micah Johnson

5 You Should Remember:

1. Courtney Hawkins

2. Tim Anderson

3. Trayce Thompson

4. Chris Beck

5. Tyler Danish

Twenty-two players have hit 150 home runs or more by the age of 25 (Per baseball reference, the last season included is when a player is no older than 25 on June 30^th of that season).  The list below is a who’s who of players that hit for power at a young age. You’ll notice a large number of active players have accomplished this feat, and that 10 of the 17 retired players are in the Hall of Fame.

A few more active players look like they are about to join the club

Three favorites are Giancarlo Stanton, Mike Trout and Bryce Harper. According to the Oliver five year projection system, each of these players will reach over 150 home runs by the end of his age 25 season.

This chart shows each player’s current home run totals, the seasons played through so far, the number of additional home runs Oliver projects through the 25 season, the projected total runs by the age of 25 (Career HR + Oliver projected), and finally what each player would need to average to hit 150 runs by the age of 25. This last measure is interesting because it gives you an idea of what level each player would need to fall below to miss the mark.

Minor league players might knock out A-Rod for #1

Miguel Sano, Joey Gallo and Javier Baez make up a trio of minor leaguers who Oliver believes could also make the list.  Not only does Oliver project these three players will to fly past 150 home runs, he predicts Sano and Gallo could pass A-Rod for the most home runs by age 25.

*the Gallo projections are only through his age 24 season so if he kept up the home run pace he would be in the 270s at the age of 25

While Sano, Gallo and Baez have a high number of projected home runs, they also have a high number of projected strikeouts. Adam Dunn shows that you can be very successful as a player who strikes out & hits home runs frequently. But the three minor league players could be even more extreme. Dunn struck out 26% of the time and homered 5.7% of the time through his age 25 season.  The minor league trio are predicted to strike out between 32 and 43% of the time and homer between 7 and 8% of the time. Could these three players redefine the all or nothing hitter, or are they somehow breaking projection systems?

Reasons to be skeptical

The Oliver model is complex and would take a long time to completely dissect, but from what I can tell it has the following limitations (these limitations are intentional because they add other value to the projections system):

#1 The Assumption of Games – Oliver projections assume a player gets 600 major-league plate appearances every year. This is not necessarily a given because top minor league players will likely spend part of a season in the minors before moving up to the majors, or in Sano’s case miss games rehabbing an injury.

#2 Inherent Uncertainty –  First, projections based off minor league numbers have more uncertainty than those based off major league numbers. Second, each additional year projected in the future adds more uncertainty because each year you go out you are guessing what happened the previous year – vs. knowing what happened the previous year. Compounded, these two stated effects create a good deal of inherent uncertainty.

So, what does this all mean?

If the projections are anywhere close to correct, it looks like we are going to see a new breed of power hitter in the major league soon. Although the projections are far from foregone conclusions, it’s another great reason why we watch the game of baseball.