On December 8, 2010, the Boston Red Sox agreed to terms with Carl Crawford, inking the outfielder to a seven-year, 142-million-dollar deal, the largest ever signed by a position player that had never hit more than 20 home runs in a single season.  Although the majority of the population felt that the Red Sox had overpaid for his services, most considered it only a slight reach, and when factoring in Boston’s position on the win curve, their decision to splurge on a premium player could be justified.  Crawford was an established elite defensive outfielder coming off the best season of his career at the plate; an increase in power prior to the 2009 season had boosted Crawford to new heights just in time for his pay day, and in the final two years of his extension with the Rays, he posted WARs of 5.9 and 7.7, respectively.  In the immediate aftermath of his signing with Boston, FanGraphs’ own Dave Cameron declared him to be a true-talent 5-win player, and at the time, it was not difficult to imagine a scenario in which the 29 year-old Crawford continued to perform at peak levels before gradually declining in the final years of the contract.  If we assume that Crawford was in fact a 5-win player, then using the $/WAR figure accepted in the winter of 2010 (5 million dollars/win), 5% inflation, and a standard aging curve, the projection for Crawford’s contract would have looked something like this, with his 6-million-dollar signing bonus excluded from the analysis:

View post on imgur.com

Two things are striking when looking at this table.  First, on an unrelated note, league-wide inflation as a result of TV deals and increased revenue streams has far exceeded the expectations of 2010, actually surpassing 10% in order to reach the accepted value of 8-9 million dollars per win today in 2016.  Although the methodology did prove to be incorrect, I do still believe the results obtained here to be worthy of inspection, as they offer insight into teams’ valuations of Crawford as a player available in the free-agent market.  Second, the divergence between industry consensus and the arithmetic presented here is worth noting; most insiders felt that Boston had spent too much, while the data presented here suggests that the contract actually provided a bit of upside.  This disparity could perhaps be explained by a skepticism of defensive metrics in 2010, along with doubts about Crawford’s ability to age well, as a large portion of his value on the bases and in the outfield was tied up in his legs.  In order to account for this discrepancy, perhaps it is better to use a “worst-case scenario,” to subject Crawford’s performance to a more punitive aging curve over the life of the contract.  Instead of docking Crawford 0.5 WAR for his age-31 through -35 seasons, instead, he will lose 0.75 wins each year.  This steeper decline is forecast below:

View post on imgur.com

It appears that this table is a more accurate representation of front offices’ opinions about Carl Crawford, as shown by the deficit in the bottom right corner.  Using the more aggressive aging curve, the contract offered by the Red Sox does appear to be a slight overpay, and if they conformed to the opinion that the outfielder would decline more swiftly than other players of similar age, then they agreed to a contract in which there was no upside.  However, if Crawford’s performance fell anywhere between the standard aging projection and the “worst-case scenario,” as it was likely to, it seemed that both sides would be satisfied with the outcome.

As we all know now, this “worst-case scenario” projected in 2010 was a far cry from reality.  After suffering through a tumultuous year and a half in Boston and undergoing Tommy John surgery to repair a partially torn UCL, Crawford was unceremoniously dumped by the Red Sox and shipped to the Dodgers on August 25, 2012 as part of the infamous Nick Punto trade.  It appears that Crawford has finally hit rock bottom, with Los Angeles designating him for assignment on Sunday.  Crawford will almost certainly clear waivers, and assuming he asks to be released rather than assigned to the club’s AAA affiliate in Oklahoma City, the Dodgers will eat the remainder of his contract and essentially pay Crawford nearly 35 million dollars to disappear.  Rather than projecting future performance, let’s instead take a look back at Crawford’s production since signing with Boston:

View post on imgur.com

Although up-to-date $/WAR figures could have been used, I stuck with the estimates of 2010, in order to further emphasize how poorly this pact has been when compared to the organization’s expectations when they chose to sign Crawford.  Elbow injury notwithstanding, it is difficult to imagine how this contract could have soured so quickly.  Crawford has already cost his employers 85 million dollars more than his production would have warranted, and even if he latches on somewhere and plays out the remainder of the deal, it’s very likely that figure ends up more than 100 million dollars in the red.  So, how did this happen?  How did Carl Crawford, he of the 7.7 WAR in 2010, second in all of baseball, flop so badly, producing only 5.3 WAR since signing with the Red Sox?

Well, the most obvious answer is the boring one: Carl Crawford got old.  Fast.  From 2008-2010, Crawford’s final three seasons in Tampa Bay, he was actually the best defensive player in the MLB, posting a UZR/150 of 20.6 in left field, two runs better than his nearest competitor on the leaderboard.  A bit of regression and decline were certainly expected, as it is incredibly difficult to sustain this level of performance, but nobody could have expected the utter evaporation of his defensive value upon arriving in Boston.  Crawford posted a negative UZR during his time patrolling the Green Monster; some criticize the Red Sox for wasting his defensive abilities in what is considered to be the smallest left field in all of baseball, suggesting that he should have been moved to Fenway’s right field in order to better leverage his extraordinary range.  However, even before his elbow injury, Crawford was known for having a weak throwing arm, and with a partially torn UCL, it would have been nearly impossible for him to play anywhere other than left.

Even so, his damaged elbow fails to explain the mysterious loss of range that sent him tumbling down the UZR leaderboards, and instead of providing value as an elite defensive player, Crawford instead resembled an average corner outfielder during his time in Boston.  After being dealt to Los Angeles, Crawford’s defensive numbers did improve slightly, perhaps indicating that he never felt comfortable playing in front of the 37-foot wall, but by the time he arrived in Chavez Ravine, Crawford had already lost a step or two, placing a ceiling on his future defensive contributions.

This loss of speed was evident on the base paths as well, with Crawford never again imposing his will upon opposing batteries like he did during his time with the Rays.  From the time of his promotion to Tampa Bay in 2002 until the end of 2010, Crawford had stolen 409 bases in 499 attempts, for a success rate of nearly 82% and the second-highest stolen base total in all of baseball during that timeframe.  However, after signing with Boston, it seems as if Crawford became more timid as a runner, never attempting more than 30 steals in a single season.  Since 2011, Crawford owns a 79% success rate, quite similar to his career average, yet he’s running far less frequently, stealing only 71 bases in 90 attempts.  Whether due to a loss of speed or a lack of aggression, or perhaps a combination of the two, Crawford never regained his form as a base-stealer, resulting in the loss of a huge chunk of his base-running value.

Unlike his collapse in the outfield and on the base paths, Crawford’s decline at the plate cannot be explained by a loss of speed simply chalked up to age.  This dilemma is a bit more perplexing.  After posting the two best seasons of his career at the plate in Tampa Bay immediately prior to hitting free agency, Crawford’s production in the batter’s box cratered after signing with Boston in 2011, falling to levels only experienced by the outfielder during his first full season in the majors in 2003.  Since joining the Red Sox, Crawford has sported a more aggressive approach leading to fewer walks and more strikeouts, has exhibited less power than he did during his time in Tampa Bay, and his problems against left-handed pitching have only been exacerbated.  In a vacuum, none of these changes themselves would be damning, but in conjunction with one another, this trio has formed a nasty combination, only hastening Crawford’s demise.

Starting in 2006, as Crawford entered his offensive prime and started to become a force at the plate, his Zone%, the number of pitches he saw in the strike zone, began to decline as pitchers decided to carefully pitch around him rather than challenging him, falling from a high of 57% to only 43% in 2010.  During his MVP-level campaigns in 2009 and 2010, Crawford adjusted to these changes appropriately, cutting his swing rate and accepting the free passes being handed to him by opposing pitchers, adopting what could be considered somewhat of a slugger’s profile.  However, in 2011, perhaps feeling the weight of his new contract and worrying that hits rather than walks were needed to justify the nine-figure deal and appease Boston fans, Crawford gave these gains back, as his O-Swing% jumped by nearly three points.

View post on imgur.com

View post on imgur.com

Surprisingly, Crawford actually controlled the outside corner of the plate, but he expanded the zone in nearly every other direction.  By chasing balls rather than selectively punishing mistakes, Crawford effectively got himself out more than ever, posting a career-high K% and his lowest BB% since 2003.  Even when Crawford did make contact, the quality was often terrible, as his Soft% rose to a nearly unfathomable 26%, contributing to a 40-point drop in his BABIP and a subsequent, almost identical, fall in batting average.  Although some of the walks have returned since his horrendous 2011, Crawford’s strikeouts remain elevated, seriously limiting his offensive production.

The lack of quality contact has also affected Crawford’s power output, because although his fly ball and line drive tendencies have been in line with his career norms, Crawford is doing far less damage.  During his time in Tampa, Crawford had an ISO of .148, peaking at .188 in 2010.  In Boston and Los Angeles however, this number has fallen to .136, and he’s never posted a single-season ISO higher than .150.

View post on imgur.com

View post on imgur.com

This loss of power is most obvious at the top of the strike zone and on the outside corner, where Crawford is now capable of doing little to no damage.  Even in his wheelhouse, down and in, Crawford’s strength has eroded, leaving him as a shell of his 2010 American League MVP candidate self at the plate.

Finally, and perhaps most troubling, since leaving Tampa Bay, it seems like Crawford has forgotten how to hit left-handed pitching.  Even in his prime, the lefty struggled against southpaws, boasting only a .308 wOBA, but since signing with Boston, his production against same-handed pitching has collapsed, with his wOBA falling nearly 30 points, leaving with him with a wRC+ of 73 against lefties.  And yes, we now have an answer, his platoon split absolutely matters.  The final straw came in 2013, when he posted an ISO 0f .084 and a wRC+ of 56 in 115 plate appearances against left-handers; since then, Crawford has become a platoon outfielder, almost never allowed to face lefties and failing miserably when he does, as evidenced by his -64 wRC+ against them this year (granted, in only 12 plate appearances).

So, there you have it.  Carl Crawford, the electric baserunner, phenomenal outfielder, and prodigious hitter of less than six years ago is soon to be unemployed, assuming he clears waivers and is released.  Does he have any baseball left in him, or is this 142-million-dollar man done?  In any other year, he might have been, but given the number of contenders that will need an outfielder and the limited supply, it’s very possible that a team will give him a chance.  However, it is unclear if Crawford even wants to continue playing, given that the team acquiring him will almost certainly place him in a platoon role, while he has stated that he doesn’t believe he is a platoon player.  If he does agree to play in a limited role, where could he land?  An obvious answer is Cleveland, yet during his time in Boston, Crawford didn’t get along well with current Indians’ skipper Terry Francona.  Somewhat comically, Boston is another obvious fit, as he could be a nice platoon partner for Chris Young, but we all know how his first stint with the Red Sox went.  Other teams that could be interested in the outfielder’s services include the Orioles, Nationals, Mariners, and White Sox, although they may look to make a bigger splash before settling upon Crawford.  Whether Crawford returns to the big leagues or not, his time as an impact player almost certainly ended years ago, and that’s a shame.

View post on imgur.com

No matter their team allegiance, fans of the game of baseball have to be disappointed by the outcome of Crawford’s career, as his prime was gone far too soon.  One of few players that could truly dominate the game in every phase, through a combination of injury, age, and perhaps a lack of mental toughness, Carl Crawford’s star was extinguished almost immediately after signing with Boston.

It seems that 2016 will be the year that Statcast begins to permeate Fantasy Baseball analysis. Recently there has been a wealth of articles exploring the possibilities of using these kinds of data. These pieces have provided relevant insights on how to improve our understanding of well-hit balls and launch angles. Also, they’ve facilitated access to information on exit velocity leaders and surgers, as well as provided thoughtful analyses to the possible workings behind some early-season breakouts.

However, there is still a lot we don’t know about Statcast data. For instance, we are uncertain of how consistent these skills are over time, both across seasons or within seasons. Also we don’t know what constitutes a relevant sample size or when rates are likely to stabilize. All in all, this makes using 2016 Statcast data to predict rest of season performance a potentially brash and faulty proposition. Having said that, we can’t help but to try; so here’s our attempt at using early-season 2016 Statcast data to partially predict future performance.

One of the early gospels of Statcast data analysis posits that the “sweet spot” for hitting homers comes from a combination of a launch angle in the range of 25 – 30 degrees and a 95+ MPH exit velocity. If this is indeed the ideal combination for hitting home runs, one could argue that players that have a higher share of fly balls that meet these criteria should perform better in other more traditional metrics such as HR/FB%.

Following this line of thought we dug up all the batted balls under the “sweet spot” criteria, and divided them by all balls hit at a launch angle of 25 degrees or higher (which MLB determines as fly balls) to come up with a Sweet Spot%. In an attempt to identify potential HR/FB% surgers, we compare Sweet Spot% and HR/FB% z-scores (to normalize each rate) for all qualified hitters with at least 25 fly balls and highlight the biggest gaps.  Here are the Top five gaps considering the games up to May 28^th:

Calhoun seems like a good candidate for a power uptick. He has the third-highest Sweet Spot% of 2016, and he has sustained similar Hard% and FB% to the previous two seasons. Yet somehow he has managed to cut his HR/FB% to less than half of what he put together in either 2014 or 2015.  More so, he has had some bad luck with balls hit in the “sweet spot”; his batting average in these kinds of balls is .500, whereas the league average is around .680. He is not killing fly balls in general, with an average exit velocity of 84.6 MPH, but if he keeps consistently hitting balls in the “sweet spot” range he should improve in the power department. Look out for a potential turnaround in the coming weeks and a return to 2015 HR/FB% levels.

Piscotty holds second place in the Sweet Spot% rankings. However, his FB% is very similar to what he did in 2015 whilst his Hard% is down from 38.5% to 32.5%. Lastly, he plays half of his games in Busch Stadium, which has a history of suppressing home runs. I would be cautious of expecting a major home-run surge, but in any case Piscotty is likely to at least sustain his performance in the power department, which would be welcome news to owners that got him at bargain prices.

Carpenter is another dweller of Busch Stadium, however his outlook might be a bit different. He is the absolute leader in Sweet Spot%. He is posting the highest Hard% and FB% marks of his career. Carpenter is also crushing his fly balls in general, with an average Exit Velocity of 93.7 MPH. Just as a point of reference Miguel Cabrera, Josh Donaldson and Giancarlo Stanton fail to reach an average of 93 MPH on their own fly balls. Lastly, he has had some tough luck with balls hit in the “sweet spot”, posting a batting average of just .420. Carpenter is already putting up the highest HR/FB% of his career, and he is a 30-year-old veteran of slap-hitting fame, but the power looks legit and perhaps there is more to come.

Denard Span and Yonder Alonso show up in this list not because of their Sweet Spot% prowess but rather due to their putrid HR/FB%. They barely crack the Top 50 in Sweet Spot%. They play half their games in two of the bottom three parks for HR Park Factor. Span is putting up his lowest FB% and Hard% rates since 2013, when he ended up with a HR/FB% of 3.4%. Meanwhile, Yonder’s rates most closely resemble those of 2012, when he had a HR/FB of 6.2%. Whilst their batting average of “sweet spot” batted balls is just .500, there is nothing to look here. In any case, their power situation looks to improve from bad to mediocre.

If you are interested in the perusing the Top 50 gaps between HR/FB% and Sweet Spot%, please find them below:

Note: This analysis is also featured in our emerging blog www.theimperfectgame.com

One would do well to recall that the last feature article written about Erick Aybar appeared in NotGraphs (#KeepNotGraphs), where he was pictured as the inept, rebel fleet commander Admiral Ackbar from the good section of Star Wars. Before, that there were articles that described him as, “Erick Aybar: Not as Bad as You Might Think,” and “Erick Aybar, Perennial Sleeper,” and “Erick Aybar: 2012 Sleeper.” Since then, Aybar hasn’t had an actual FanGraphs piece done on him. It looks as though people are still sleeping on him (but for good reason this time).

One of the most interesting parts of the novel 1984 is the concept of “Newspeak,” where the government twists and eliminates the meaning of certain words to serve its own purposes. In the novel, Winston, the protagonist, is educated by one his colleagues at the Ministry of Truth, Syme. He tells Winston, “A word contains its opposite in itself. Take ‘good,’ for instance. If you have a word like ‘good,’ what need is there for a word like ‘bad’? ‘Ungood’ will do just as well – better, because it’s an exact opposite, which the other is not.” In today’s society, particularly in the world of baseball, there is a great need for descriptors such as “ungood” so that people don’t feel bad.

There are numerous expletive-laden phrases that would aptly describe Erick Aybar’s season up to this point, but perhaps it’s best to just say he’s doubleungood. That’s the clearest way of saying that Aybar has been incredibly awful this season. This isn’t just about offense or just about defense. He has been mind-numbingly, historically bad offensively and pretty subpar defensively.

It’s lucky for Aybar that the Braves aren’t exactly their c. 1998 selves because he can hide relatively easily on this roster. The Braves have three of the league’s ten worst players by wRC+ (min. 100 plate appearances), so it’s not like he’s exceptional. Moreover, it doesn’t look like the Braves are terribly interested in winning, anyway, so at least he isn’t holding back a team with championship aspirations (you’re being glared at, Russell Martin).

This season, through 43 games (many of them started) and 161 plate appearances, he has amassed an unimpressive -1.7 WAR, worst in the league. Also absolute worst in the league is his wRC+, which is 11! That’s insane. It’s 89% worse than average! Even 90-year-old A.J. Pierzynski has a 39 wRC+. Consider this: Erick Aybar is running a .184/.222/.211 line. How can a major-league baseball player be this bad?

Well, it’s not terribly helpful to have a .223 BABIP, a number 78 points off of his career average (and basically league average) .301 BABIP. Just for fun, let’s say he has a .301 BABIP this season. That would add approximately nine hits to his total of 27 thus far, giving him a much more respectable .245 batting average. Now let’s say he maintains his ratio of hits to extra-base hits and see what that does to his slugging percentage (he ends up with one more double). This gets him to a much better .245/.279/.279 line. But that’s still probably not good enough to be a major-league player.

As you can probably guess, Aybar’s plate discipline and power numbers suck quite a bit. His four doubles and 23 singles have given him a .027 ISO, which is the worst in the league by 16 points. He has a K-BB% of 14.3%, a number that’s meritorious as a pitcher (hint: Aybar isn’t a pitcher). His O-Swing% increased by five percentage points this year and his contact rate on pitches outside the strike zone decreased by five percentage points, leading to more strikeouts and worse contact when he actually hits it. At least he’s only a slightly below-average baserunner.

Unfortunately, his defensive numbers have been subpar this year also, but at least he’s not the worst player in the league in this category. Instead, he’s eighth-worst, with a raw UZR of -4.9 and a UZR/150 of -22.9. He isn’t committing too many errors, but his range is a definite factor. Aybar hasn’t completed a single play in the remote to unlikely range per Inside Edge. He’s also seen a marked drop in even chance fielding opportunities (down 6.7%) and likely opportunities (down 3%).

There aren’t a whole lot of good reasons for this. He isn’t injured (although he did have to get a chicken bone removed from his throat) and he doesn’t look injured. I can’t find a way to press the videos onto the article, but his swing looks a lot different from last year, at least from the right-hand side of the plate. I’m not a swing expert, but it looks like he isn’t using his hips to turn on the ball like he has in years past, which would explain the lack of power. Additionally, Aybar looks off-balance this year as compared to last year, when he was much better. Another thing to consider is that it seems like his swing has less lift than before, resulting in more ground balls and less power. On the other hand, maybe Aybar is just getting old. He’s 33 and hasn’t missed a lot of time in his career.

On the other hand, he actually was a very good player for a long time, a sleeper even. From 2008 through 2014, he was worth 20.1 WAR, combining passable offense for a middle infielder with good baserunning and decent defense. In fact, he was 57th* in WAR during that time period, better than more highly esteemed names like Carlos Beltran, Nelson Cruz, and David Ortiz. He was a very good player for a very long time, making more money than most people ever dream of. And that’s cause for positivity.

It stands to reason that Aybar will regress back to the mean. No one can sustain those numbers for a full season, if only because they would definitely get benched. There’s a reason why sample size and past performance matters and Mr. Aybar embodies it. If we expected him to keep playing at this level with the same amount of playing time, then he’d end up with the worst season in baseball history with a little over -6 WAR (not that six fewer wins would make that big of a difference to the Braves). But that isn’t going to happen. He’s projected to finish around zero, which would make him an average player the rest of the way. Based on his past performance, I fully expect that to happen and I want it to happen. It’s terribly sad when one of the game’s great, unknown players spirals into oblivion. Nonetheless, what he’s doing right now is insane and not for the right reasons.  Just as Admiral Ackbar managed to right the rebel fleet, Aybar can do the same with his performance.

*Fun fact: Mike Trout is 19th on that list. Remember, WAR totals from 2008 through 2014.

All statistics current through 5/26/2016

Last year, I suggested that Wilson Ramos might want to try hitting the ball in the air more.

It turns out, there is a Washington National who appears to have made an effort to put the ball in the air more, but that is not Wilson Ramos. It is their soon-to-be-erstwhile shortstop, Danny Espinosa.

Last year, Espinosa rode a hot start to a .240/.311/.409 line at the end of the season, good enough for a 94 wRC+. It was his first offensive season since 2012 that you would accept from a starting middle infielder, and you’d be excused for seeing it as a sign that he might be back to his 3-win form of 2011 and 2012.

This year, however, Espinosa is scuffling to a .201/.307/.288 line that has been inflated by five intentional walks. Overall his wRC+ is down to 58.

One might look at his 23% strikeout rate and note that, while poor, it is still better than his 27.5% career mark or 25.8% 2015 rate. (His plate discipline numbers are indeed better this year than last.) One might notice a .250 BABIP compared to his .296 career number and expect improvement there. Also noticeable is a 7.0% HR/FB rate when his career mark is 12.9%. So perhaps we could expect something more like his 86 career wRC+ going forward? Or at least his Steamer projection of 79? (That is, if Trea Turner weren’t highly likely to be called up shortly.)

Possibly, but there is something else about Espinosa’s numbers that create pause: he has become a fly ball hitter. Entering this season, Espinosa had never posted a full-season GB/FB ratio lower than 1.12, but this year he has hit 37 grounders and 43 flies for a 0.86 rate.

If you hit a lot of fly balls, your BABIP is going to suffer. If those flies don’t turn into home runs, it’s a double whammy, and Espinosa is certainly getting whammed pretty good by that combination.

This is the danger of fly balls. And they could become even more dangerous if you try to hit them.

I can’t read any player’s mind, so perhaps Espinosa just happens to be hitting the ball in the air more. But ground ball and fly ball rates stabilize pretty quickly, and how you hit the ball is one of the more controllable aspects of hitting (it’s where the ball goes that’s the rub).

Espinosa has had above-average power, so why not try to convert that into extra home runs by hitting more flies?

Another way to look at hitting grounders vs. hitting flies is the target launch angle. So another way to interpret “hit more fly balls” is “hit the ball at a higher angle.” Espinosa is hitting the ball at too high an angle, and it follows that if you intend to hit more fly balls, they may well on average end up launching at a higher angle than in the past.

Monday night was the clearest example yet of this problem: Espinosa hit fly balls at 56, 59, and 61 degrees in his three plate appearances, and all three were easy outs to left field. As for the exit velocity, his contact in the air spent much of this season around 95-96 mph, which is good, but that hasn’t done any good without the right launch angle, and now he’s also down to 94.5 mph on the season when he hits the ball in the air, with Monday’s 86, 89, and 92 velocities contributing to that decline.

This turned into an analysis of why Espinosa has been struggling even more than the most pessimistic might have imagined. Perhaps there is a general lesson as well, however, beyond the well-established fact that fly balls without home runs are nigh useless.

Some players might want to pick one approach and stick with it to improve as much as possible. This is especially true if that hitter isn’t a great one, because they might not get the results they are hoping for by changing things up. Although you could argue the potential rewards for a below-average hitter are worth the risk and it just hasn’t worked out for Espinosa, one might counter that the likelihood of the change working for a less-talented hitter is quite low. (And the risk in this particular case was even higher with the hot prospect on his tail, limiting the time he had available to work things out.)

Take Ramos, a better hitter than Espinosa over the course of their careers, but not a spectacular one either. He hasn’t changed a thing in ground/fly ball terms: his 2016 GB/FB ratio is basically identical to his 2015 ratio, but his BABIP has gone from .256 to .370 and he is hitting .333/.385/.512. That won’t continue, but his ROS projected wRC+ has improved to the 90’s, when his actual wRC+ in 2015 was just 63.

Consistency in approach can produce better results with time. If you want to change things up, beware the risks. You may end up with the worst of both worlds.

You could also end up succeeding, as Leonys Martin has.

Since dominating the Dominican Summer League as a 17-year-old shortstop, Xander Bogaerts has been considered one of the elite young talents in the game, heralded for his on-base ability, and specifically his power.  After being promoted to start the 2011 season in Greenville, the Aruban native continued to rake, proving his skills at every rung of the organizational ladder.  At each full-season minor league level, Bogaerts never ran a wOBA below .366, and his lowest ISO was a very respectable .169.  It seemed as if he were destined to inherit the throne left vacant in Boston since Nomar Garciaparra departed in 2004; fans drooled over his future as the Red Sox’s franchise cornerstone, anchoring the heart of the Boston lineup while playing a premium defensive position.

On August 19, 2013, with Stephen Drew mired in a slump and the Sox struggling, Bogaerts was promoted from Pawtucket and joined the team in San Francisco, thus beginning his tenure in Boston.  Bogaerts appeared in 18 games down the stretch, hitting only 1 home run and watching his K% balloon to 26%.  However, his struggles were mostly ignored as the team wrapped up the division, and all concerns were quieted by the maturity he demonstrated after being inserted into the Sox’ starting lineup on baseball’s biggest stage, as evidenced by his .386 wOBA during the postseason run culminating with a title.  At the tender age of 20, Xander Bogaerts was a World Series champion, appearing poised for a Rookie of the Year campaign in 2014.

Unfortunately, Bogaerts failed to meet expectations in 2014, posting his worst season as a professional by far.  After a hot start, he collapsed in the second half.  He continued to strike out in nearly 25% of his plate appearances, his 6.6 BB% was a career worst at the time, and he finished with a disappointing 82 wRC+.  Bogaerts’s struggles were driven by his inability to hit right-handed pitching, as he posted a measly .105 ISO against righties coupled with a 71 wRC+.  The following image should help to explain the decline:

After getting ahead in the count, righties attacked Bogaerts down and away, leading him to chase breaking balls and expand the strike zone.  In fact, on a per-pitch basis, the rookie shortstop was the fifth-worst hitter in baseball against the slider.  With his confidence shattered after a poor performance at the plate along with Boston’s decision to sign Stephen Drew midseason, outsiders questioned whether Bogaerts could recover from his prolonged slump, while some predicted that he would be the next big prospect to bust.

After admitting that 2014 was probably the “toughest season [he] ever had,” Bogaerts entered 2015 once again as Boston’s starting shortstop, hoping to recapture the stroke that propelled him to the big leagues so rapidly.  Although he collected a Silver Slugger and seemingly accomplished his goal, Bogaerts exhibited a vastly different approach, one in stark contrast with his minor-league track record.  While he retained his high on-base ability, rather than selectively punishing mistakes, Bogaerts became a more restless slap hitter, sacrificing power in exchange for contact.  He boosted his Swing% by almost four points, offering at nearly half of the pitches he seen, but his ISO fell to a career worst .101.  This change can be attributed to his increased willingness to use the entire field; Bogaerts boosted his Oppo% by 13 points but showed nearly no power when going to right field as evidenced by a Hard% of only 14.5.  He also become an above average hitter on a per-pitch basis when challenged with sliders, improving upon perhaps what was his biggest weakness.

This more aggressive approach resulted in a significant drop in Bogaerts’s K%, coupled with a smaller decline in his BB%.  He finished the year with a much-improved 109 wRC+, certainly playable when coupled with league-average defense at shortstop, yet he left much to be desired in the minds of talent evaluators around baseball.  Rather than demonstrating the power he had exhibited throughout his minor-league career, Bogaerts instead resembled a weak middle infielder.  Once destined for stardom, Bogaerts had been relegated to an average shortstop, definitely a valuable piece on a contending team, but not the player many had projected him to be.

Now over 40 games into the regular season, despite capturing success in 2015, rather than settling, it appears that Bogaerts has once again evolved.  A quick glance at his numbers may suggest his improved offensive performance can be chalked up to luck, as evidenced by his high BABIP, but a deeper look at his underlying peripherals indicates that Bogaerts may have once again altered his approach at the plate.  First, he is proving that the decrease in K% is legitimate; Bogaerts is once again running a strikeout rate below 16%, nearly five points better than league average.  This year, it also appears that he has developed better command of the strike zone, as the has cut down his swing rate while boosting his BB%, both to nearly league-average levels.  More important than these, however, may be the reemergence of Bogaerts’s power.  Through 40 games, Bogaerts is running an ISO of .157, a level that he never once reached during his miserable 2015 season.

Unlike other unsustainable power surges, it seems as if Bogaerts’s may be viable.  His HR/FB has risen by nearly six percentage points, yet it still falls below the league average.  Statcast also seems to confirm our findings, as Bogaerts’s average exit velocity has risen by three miles per hour since the end of last season, although this data is still relatively new and cannot be considered a perfectly reliable indicator of future performance.  The majority of Bogaerts’s damage this season has come to the pull side, as his wRC+ has jumped by almost 100 points, and it seems as if he is making a concentrated effort to elevate more of the balls that he hits to left, as his FB% to the pull side has increased by nearly four points.  His bloated wRC+ will almost certainly fall, as a 44.4% HR/FB ratio to left field is absolutely ridiculous, but Bogaerts’s new offensive approach suits him well.

As seen in the table, Bogaerts is also demonstrating more power going the other way, and although his solid contact has still not resulted in any home runs to right field, the singles of 2015 have transformed into doubles this season.  Although he still sees the same number of percentage of pitches in the strike zone, it seems as if pitchers are approaching Bogaerts with more trepidation because of his newfound power, as he is seeing fewer fastballs this season than at any point during his major-league career.

The projections are a bit skeptical, as they forecast a fall in both BABIP and ISO, but if Bogaerts is able to maintain his current level of production, or really anything near it, 2016 will be his most successful season in the major leagues, by far.  He has undergone a major transformation at the plate, yet he has essentially reverted to the hitter he was as a prospect shooting through the minor leagues.  The strikeout-prone 2014 Xander Bogaerts gave way to the slap-hitter 2015 version, which then evolved into the more selective and powerful current manifestation of the young shortstop.  Perhaps most intimidating, however, is the fact that Bogaerts remains only 23 years old, and his evolution may not be complete.  Overshadowed prior to this season by the likes of Carlos Correa, Francisco Lindor, and Addison Russell, Xander Bogaerts appears set on mashing his way back into the conversation as the best young shortstop in baseball.

Edit: Since this piece was submitted (May 23), several developments in the Martin narrative have arisen, notably some more astute analyses than mine (namely Jeff Sullivan’s great piece on Martin’s batted-ball profile & an extremely in-depth look at his swing mechanics by Jason Churchill over at ProspectInsider, do go check him out) as well as this walk-off dinger against the Oakland A’s. 

A lot has gone right for the Seattle Mariners in new GM Jerry Dipoto’s first season. At time of writing, they sit in first place in the AL West with the third-best record in the American League and the best road record in baseball. One potential factor in Seattle’s success that has, until recently, taken a backseat to Robinson Canó‘s resurgence and Dae-Ho Lee’s power-hitting heroics is the sudden onset of what could turn out to be an offensive breakthrough for outfielder Leonys Martin.

The Mariners’ acquisition of Martin and Anthony Bass in exchange for Tom Wilhelmsen, James Jones, and a PTBNL (Patrick Kivlehan) is one of several moves last offseason that seem to follow a common guiding principle: bring in players who’ve struggled in recent seasons but demonstrated real value in seasons past. This category includes the likes of Steve Cishek and Chris Iannetta, both of whom seem to have (thus far) rebounded from uninspiring 2015 campaigns.

Meanwhile, Leonys Martin is having the best season of his life. This is mostly remarkable due to the fact that his hitting isn’t, and has never really been, the source of his value. He’s never topped 89 wRC+ in any season, and his career high for home runs in a year is eight. He’s also been historically abysmal against left-handed pitching. From 2012-15, Martin slashed .233/.274/.298 with 53 wRC+ against southpaws; no outfielder in baseball posted fewer wRC+ in that same span (min. 300 PAs). His poor performance in the second half of 2015 (.190/.260/.190 with 22 wRC+ after the All-Star break) earned him a demotion in early August. That lackluster second half, coupled with the emergence of Delino Deshields Jr. as a capable replacement, made it a lot easier for the Rangers to part with him in the offseason (incidentally, DeShields was demoted in early May and Wilhelmsen has been the worst reliever in the majors this year by fWAR, so that’s something).

Going into this season, Steamer projected him for around 492 PA with a .241/.292/.350 slash line and 79 wRC+, in addition to eight homers and 22 stolen bases, putting him on course for 1.2 fWAR. While not exceptional, this likely would have been an adequate season for Jerry Dipoto given the cost, especially at Martin’s $4,150,000 salary, but Martin’s already managed to match that mark, posting 1.4 fWAR as of May 23rd, and he’s providing a great deal of that value with his bat.

Martin seems to have shook off a bit of whatever seemed to be plaguing him at the tail end of 2015. He’s slashing .252/.331/.467, which would, over a full season, leave him with a career-best OPS of .798 and 124 wRC+. He still hasn’t been able to hit lefties, but that’s what platooning is for. But by far the most eye-popping aspect of Martin’s game this year is what looks like a sudden influx of power. Martin’s mark of .215 ISO is easily the best of his career — his eight home runs have already matched his career-best single-season total — and it’s not even June yet. With no context, one could look at Martin’s line thus far and notice that he might be on pace to post a 30 HR/30 SB season, if not for the slight inconvenience called “At No Point In His Career Has Martin Demonstrated That He Might Even Touch 30/30”. And yet this is baseball, and this is 2016, the Year of the Bartolo Colón Home Run. Anything is possible.

So — what’s changed for Martin? And perhaps more importantly, where the heck did all these home runs come from?

We turn first to Martin’s batted-ball profile. For the last two-and-some seasons, Martin’s fly-ball percentage has actually increased. His 2015 mark of 33% was actually a career-best at the time, especially considering it was brought down by his abysmal second half. He’s picked it back up in 2016, with a gaudy 45% fly-ball rate. Of course, the sustainability of this figure is questionable (one might also point out Martin’s likely inflated HR/FB rate of 20.5% — opposed to a current league average of 12.1%), but at no point in his career has Martin hit fly balls with such consistency:

Other indicators of improved power add credence to this positive trend. Martin’s quality of contact also seems to have improved this year, as his hard-hit ball rate of 34.4% is vastly superior to his pre-2016 range of about 23 – 25%. It’s also true that home/road splits affect the narrative somewhat, as only one of his eight home runs occurred at Safeco Field. But I suspect that there may be more to Martin’s offensive resurgence than just hitting balls harder.

One of the feel-good narratives of this season is the positive influence that new hitting coach Edgar Martínez has introduced to the Mariners offense, which currently ranks 2nd in the AL in runs scored. Martinez was brought in to replace Howard Johnson in June 2015, hoping to fix an anemic Mariners offense that struggled early and often. To date, that new appointment has been received with praise from Seattle media and fans, but more importantly from the players themselves. Could it perhaps be the case that Edgar’s tutelage, along with Jerry Dipoto’s promise to mold the 2016 Mariners to fit his “Control the Zone” philosophy, has brought about a positive change in the way Leonys Martin approaches hitting?

Overall, Martin’s plate discipline metrics show that his approach at the plate hasn’t changed too drastically from last season. If anything, his 70.4% contact rate is his lowest since 2012. One other thing sticks out here, namely that Martin seems to be more patient on pitches out of the zone and more aggressive on pitches in the zone. Compare the percentage of pitches he swings at in 2015 (left) to 2016 (right), courtesy of BrooksBaseball.net:

There is a relatively noticeable difference here, especially on high and outside pitches. According to PITCHf/x, his O-Swing% of 27.9 is easily the lowest of his career. Likewise, his Z-Swing% of 67.0 is his highest since 2012. These are generally good indicators that Martin is seeing the ball better or, at least, cut down on his tendency to chase pitches out of the zone.

And then there’s the matter of his batting stance.

Take a look at his stance for this home run on May 27, 2015, facing off against Scott Atchison:

Now check out his stance almost a year later, on May 22, 2016 in this at-bat against John Lamb.

An important thing to note about these stills is that I picked them mostly because of their similar camera angles. Martin’s foot position in other highlights is often obscured by the pitcher, or the pitcher is already in the middle of his wind-up, giving Martin time to square up before the pitcher’s delivery (as is slightly apparent in the at-bat against Lamb). But the vast majority of video evidence from this season is consistent with the idea that Martin has generally closed off his stance and now begins pretty much every at-bat with his feet squared to the pitcher. Now, I am aware that the batting stance is a rather fluid component of any baseball player’s oeuvre and can change for a number of reasons, not all of them being deliberately engineered to improve performance. I can’t seem to find anything about Martin having changed his stance online, aside from this ESPN piece from February of this year — but the focus of that article is on a legal issue Martin dealt with over the offseason, and the only comments offered on Martin’s approach seem to indicate that his stance hadn’t actually changed:

Martin also worked with a hitting instructor during the offseason in Miami. He altered his approach at the plate — his stance remains the same, he said — and he was pleased with the results when he faced pitchers in winter ball.

The most significant changes I’ve noticed as a result of comparing film from 2015 to film from 2016 are the aforementioned foot positioning and the fact that his hands are a little bit closer to his body this year. Generally speaking, though, it’s hard to really quantify the connection between a player’s stance and his performance. If this change in stance is deliberate, we can only really speculate as to the reasoning behind it. There are certainly good reasons to make the adjustments Martin has made. Bringing the hands closer to the body is often a nice starting point for a player who wants to make his swing a little more compact and less erratic. As for the foot positioning, there are a few benefits to batting with an open stance, especially for a left-handed hitter. One is that it enables left-handed hitters to see the ball better, especially when facing a left-handed pitcher. Another is that it eliminates the problem of the front foot stepping away from the plate on the swing, as batting from an open stance requires you to bring your front foot towards the plate in order to square up to hit the ball. It’s hard to say if Martin has previously had this issue in the past, but the fact that he’s changed from an open stance to a square stance likely indicates to me that whatever advantage he gained from an open stance may no longer be necessary. We don’t know if Martin has made these adjustments for the reasons listed above or if he has made them for any real reason at all, but he’s still made them all the same, and as it happens, they’ve been working out quite nicely for him.

That said, let’s not go overboard about a quarter-season of statistics just yet. Though Martin is posting career bests in almost any meaningful batting metric, there is still reason to believe he might still turn out to be an average or below-average hitter for the rest of the season. His on-base record is rather inflated by recent performances, he strikes out too much, and he continues to sport uninspiring numbers against left-handed pitching. All the same, his eight home runs this season aren’t going away, even if his fly-ball rate might. It’s unlikely, barring injury, that he’s not going to hit any more home runs for the rest of the year, so 2016 will most likely be a career year for him in the power department, and if his BABIP mark of .302 this year can regress back to his 2013-14 average of .326 rather than his poor 2015 mark of .270, 2016 may turn out to be a career year for him across the board. Martin’s offensive production has certainly been a pleasant surprise for the Mariners, and it would be interesting to know if altering his batting stance was a deliberate factor in producing an improved approach at the plate. If the Leonys Martin we’ve seen so far this year is anything like the Leonys Martin we’re going to see for the rest of the year, Jerry Dipoto may have stumbled upon a surprisingly high return on what was initially a low principal investment.

Similarly to a large portion of the FanGraphs community, I am a Philadelphia Phillies fan.  I was born in South Jersey just 20 minutes away from the stadium and grew up watching every game.  I was there for the tough times in the late 90’s / early 2000’s, and I was there for the glory days of 2007-2011.  After an abysmal last few seasons of baseball in Philadelphia, we have finally seen some promise this season leading us to believe that better days are coming soon.  One of the bright spots on the team so far this year has been Rule 5 pick, Tyler Goeddel.

After being selected in the first round of the 2011 MLB Rookie Draft, Tyler Goeddel began his professional career with the Tampa Bay Rays.  Goeddel was drafted out of high school as a third baseman and for the first three years of his minor league career that would be the only position he played.  In 2015, however, the Rays decided to move Goeddel to the outfield.  His athleticism allows him to play all three outfield positions and that type of versatility is very sought after by big league clubs.  While defense was never his problem, Goeddel’s bat didn’t develop as quickly as the Rays had hoped.  He was a career .262 hitter with 31 home runs across four full seasons in the minor leagues.  Ultimately the Rays made a tough decision and left him off their 40-man roster, knowing there was a great chance another team would select him in the Rule 5 Draft.  Shortly after, the Phillies did just that and selected Goeddel with the first overall pick of the 2015 Rule 5 Draft.

The Philadelphia Phillies have historically been excellent in finding talent in the Rule 5 Draft.  (2004 – Shane Victorino, 2012 – Ender Inciarte, 2014 – Odubel Herrera).  In the early going, I (like most Phillies fans) was very skeptical as to whether or not Goeddel could follow in the footsteps of players like Shane Victorino and Odubel Herrera and become a valuable contributor to our big league team.  Goeddel had a mediocre spring training but with no other serious competition in the corner outfield spots, there was no harm in keeping him around for a rebuilding year and seeing what the kid could do.

The beginning of Tyler Goeddel’s major league career could not have gone much worse.  Take a look below at his stats through his first nine games:

In only 16 at-bats, Goeddel recorded only one hit (a single), and struck out a whopping eight times!  Now obviously this is a VERY small sample size, and we should expect some struggles while adjusting to big league pitching.  Up until this point, Goeddel has never seen pitching above the Double-A level.  Now let’s take a look at his plate discipline stats over the same time frame:

O-Swing % – Percentage of time a batter swings on pitches outside the strike zone
Z-Swing % – Percentage of time a batter swings on pitches inside the strike zone
Swing % – Percentage of time a batter swings at a pitch, regardless of location
O-Contact % – Percentage of times a batter makes contact with a ball when swinging outside of the strike zone
Z-Contact % – Percentage of times a batter makes contact with a ball when swinging inside of the strike zone
Contact % – Percentage of times a batter makes contact with the ball when swinging
Zone % – Percentage of overall pitches thrown to batter that were in the strike zone

There is nothing noteworthy about his swing percentages as they are all just about equal to the league averages, but the contact percentages are quite alarming.  Through his first nine games, Goeddel only made contact 53% of the time he swung his bat.  Rather than just writing this off as a rookie being over-matched by big league pitching, I decided to dig deeper into these stats and figure out exactly where Goeddel was struggling.  Check out the video below that I put together which basically sums up the beginning of Goeddel’s career in 30 seconds:

Whether or not you realized from watching the above video, every one of these swing and misses came on a fastball.  They all also came in the upper portion of the strike zone.  Just by watching Goeddel’s at-bats through this point of the season, it was clear as day to see opposing pitchers were attacking Goeddel with fastballs up in the zone.  The chart below shows every fastball that was thrown to Goeddel over his first nine games.  It is broken up by hot and cold zones and shows his contact percentage versus the fastball at every portion of the strike zone:

This chart verifies for us what we saw in the video…Goeddel really struggled to hit fastballs up in the zone to begin the season.  At this point, everyone was frustrated.  Tyler Goeddel was frustrated because he knew he was much more talented than his results thus far have showed.  The Phillies organization was frustrated because they had such high hopes for Goeddel entering the season.  And most importantly, the Phillies fans were frustrated and began questioning what the Phillies could possibly see in this guy.  (Search for Tyler Goeddel’s name on Twitter and read old tweets from this time period if you don’t believe me!!)

An important thing to remember while looking at these stats, is that up until this point of his career Goeddel has been an every-day player.  Not only is he adjusting to big league pitching, but he is also trying to adjust to not having consistent at-bats.  Since the Phillies unexpectedly got off to such a hot start, an important decision needed to be made.  On one hand, they have this young promising player who will need consistent at bats in order to show his true potential.  But on the other hand, this team is surprisingly in the hunt in the NL East and may not want to allow Goeddel to go through his growing pains while they are competing for the division title.  Eventually, a decision was made and manager Pete Mackanin started to put Goeddel in the every-day lineup. Below are some quotes from Goeddel at this time speaking of the decision:

“Getting regular playing time and the confidence [from that] is huge, but I try to get started a little earlier on my swing so I can be on time with the fastball. You need to hit the fastball if you want to play up here, obviously. I feel like I’ve made that adjustment and it’s been a huge help.” – Tyler Goeddel

“I didn’t play how I wanted to play in April.  And I’m glad he’s (Pete Mackanin) giving me a chance, because I really didn’t play my way into a chance; he just gave it to me. So I’m trying to make the most of it.” – Tyler Goeddel

The video below (from 4/23/16) summarizes Goeddel’s early season struggles and the decision to give him more playing time:

The Phillies coaching staff deserves a lot of credit.  They recognized early on that Goeddel was struggling with fastballs up in the zone and prior to this game really worked with him in that area and promised him more playing time moving forward.  Here is a video of his next at bat in the game, where the pitcher tries once again to attack Goeddel with some high heat:

Goeddel responds with another base hit and his first RBI of the season.  Take a look below at how his stats over his next seven games compare to his stats from his first nine games.

You can very easily see that Goeddel drastically improved his contact percentage over this time frame, which resulted in a huge drop in his strikeout rate.  The video below is from 5/8/16, right after the stretch of stats we just evaluated.  Goeddel had a big hit late to tie the game for the Phillies and later came in to score the winning run.

As you could see, the hit came on a high fastball.  A few weeks ago, Goeddel could not touch this pitch…but all of a sudden he is beginning to prove that he can.  The next video is from after that game.  Tyler discusses the adjustments he has made and also how playing every day has contributed to his recent success:

This hit was the start of a new Tyler Goeddel.  Pitchers continued to attack him with fastballs up in the zone and Goeddel really started to make them pay.  This is what he did to a Brandon Finnegan fastball just a few days later:

Ever since that hit on May 8th against the Marlins, Goeddel has been the player the Phillies could have only hoped he one day would become.  He has flashed signs of brilliance in just about every game since that have Phillies fans drooling over what the future outfield could look like.  Even though he has made adjustments and is seemingly now catching up to big league fastballs, opposing pitchers continue to test him.  Check out the video below that I put together showing what Goeddel has done to fastballs in the upper portion of the strike zone over the last few weeks.

As you can clearly see, this is a different player than we saw early on in the season.  Take a look at how his recent stats compare to those early on:

Goeddel’s contact percentage over his first nine games was only 53%.  Over his last 10 games, it is 91%.  That is an incredible difference and clearly his adjustments are paying off.  In turn, his improved contact has led to a strikeout percentage of only 5.4% over his last 10 games.  The chart below shows how Goeddel has fared against the fastball since he noted his adjustments on April 23, 2016.

Now go back up to the top of the article and compare this chart to what it looked like at the beginning of the season.  More consistent at bats have clearly translated into him catching up to the fastball and the results thus far have been phenomenal.  I have to admit that I was a doubter early on, but I am now completely on board the Tyler Goeddel bandwagon.  This kid is only 23 years old and the fact that he was able to so quickly make an adjustment like this and immediately see results is remarkable.  Now that he is having some success, opposing pitchers will start to change their game-plan against him.  While the pace he is on now may not be sustainable over the course of a full season, I am confident that Goeddel will continue to make the necessary adjustments and help this Phillies team continue to find ways to win ball games.  Although the video below doesn’t exactly relate to his success at the plate, I had to throw this in here and it is a must watch if you have not seen it already:

The last video I will show features Goeddel’s post game interview after this throw:

Recent Quotes:

“It’s exciting.  Coming to the field everyday I’m expecting to see myself in the lineup. That’s a feeling I didn’t have last month. It’s a lot more relaxing, less stressful.” – Tyler Goeddel

“It was definitely a big adjustment, going from playing everyday my whole career to having a specific role, and then not performing well in my role, it was a little tough.  But, you know, they’re giving me an opportunity now and I feel like I’m playing better, which is nice. I’m happy for myself. I always knew I could play up here, but I needed some results to prove it to myself. I’m glad, finally, there are some results to show.” – Tyler Goeddel

I love how confident Goeddel is when he speaks of his game and I am so glad the numbers back him up.  I continue to be blown away watching him play every day, especially due to the fact that he has only been playing the outfield for one year.

Lastly, I want to show a few graphs.  The first one shows a rolling total of Goeddel’s strike out percentage so far this season.  The statistics earlier show you that it has decreased, but this graph makes it much easier to see his progression:

The next graph is another rolling total showing how Goeddel’s wRC+ has progressed throughout the season.  For those of you who are unfamiliar with the stat, wRC+ stands for weighted runs created plus.  It attempts to quantify a player’s offensive value in terms of runs.  An average wRC+ is 100.  Check out how Goeddel’s wRC+ has improved throughout the season:

What do you think, Phillies fans?  Can Tyler Goeddel keep this up?  Is the Tyler Goeddel that we have seen over the last few weeks the real Tyler Goeddel?  Are you ready to hop on the bandwagon yet or do you need to see more from him to believe?  Only time will tell, but I’m buying into the hype and am excited to see what the future holds for this promising young player.

Twitter – @mtamburri922

It seems that more and more often, we as baseball fans are constantly trying to “diagnose” the cause of a specific player’s struggles, and give our two cents on if everyone should — in the words of Aaron Rodgers — relax, or be concerned about the player’s deficiencies. I am not sure what it is; maybe it’s because talking about other people’s problems makes us forget about our own. Maybe it’s because we as humans simply like to tell other people how to do their jobs, because it makes us feel important. No one will truly ever know the exact answer to that question. With that being said, however, I am going to do exactly what I just talked about the previous four sentences; I am going to try to explain what is going on with Yan Gomes. In his first two seasons with the Tribe (223 games total), he accumulated 7.8 WAR, won a Silver Slugger award in 2014, and drew positive reviews for his framing abilities according to Baseball Prospectus (ranked 17^th out of 417 catchers in 2013 and 32^nd out of 382 in 2014 in the Framing Runs statistic). Framing runs essentially shows how many runs a catcher saves throughout a given season based on how many extra strikes they are able to get their pitchers from their framing abilities. The Indians, seeing a young and talented player still required to go through the arbitration process for several more years, locked Gomes up to a six-year, 23-million-dollar contract before the 2014 season. Taking a look at this chart, the Indians’ felt they were in for a huge bargain.

To briefly explain my methodology, I used the estimates for dollars per WAR (which adjusts for inflation) from an article by Matt Swartz from Hardball Times, and adjusted Gomes’ overall WAR per year by the generally accepted decline rates laid out by Dave Cameron of FanGraphs a few years back. Players on average perform at 90% of their previous year’s WAR output through age 30, 85% from 31-35, and 80% from 36 and up. When the Indians signed Gomes, he was coming off a 3.3 WAR season. Considering he was going into his age-27 season, he was probably nearing his peak year in terms of WAR. Therefore, right or wrong, I believe his true-talent level (and what the Tribe were expecting from him) in 2014 was right around 3.5 WAR. I adjusted his yearly totals accordingly until his contract expired — I did not incorporate team options for 2020 and 2021 into this. The Indians receive roughly 120 million dollars in surplus value for the length of Gomes contract, which would be an incredible deal for a small-market team.

Obviously, Gomes went out in 2014 and produced a 4.5 WAR season, even further increasing the bargain for the Tribe in the early goings of the deal. Since 2014, however, Gomes hasn’t been the same player at the dish. His defense still grades out favorably according to many defensive metrics, but his bat appears to have taken a big step back. It isn’t fair to judge him on 2015, considering he was injured early on in the season and never fully recovered. This year, there isn’t an injury excuse — that we know of anyways. Gomes is slashing a dismal .167/.204/.353 at the plate, and has been worth just 46 wRC+, meaning his hitting has been 54% worse than league average. Few things of merit before jumping into a more detailed analysis: he is running a .174 BABIP, which is tremendously lower than his career average of .302 and upon regression will raise his average. His walk rate is about the same, and he is only striking out 3% more than his “peak” season of 2014. While a 3% rise in strikeout percentage isn’t minuscule, Gomes has always been known as a free swinger (over the last four years, he is in the 75^th percentile in swinging strikes and 83^rd percentile in swing percentage).

So, the big question here is, what specifically is causing Gomes’ struggles? I am going to try to be as systematic as possible here, so that everything kind of builds upon itself. To quickly summarize his plate discipline statistics — because I don’t think there are really any surprises here — his out of zone, zone, and overall swing percentages in comparison to his career have increased, and his out of zone and overall contact percentages have decreased. I am not sure why his Z-Contact% has increased, but I don’t think that is of much consequence. It is clear that Gomes is swinging more, and making contact less.

Turning to his batted-ball statistics, there are several important changes that start to paint a better picture of why Gomes is struggling. For ease of communication, I have split the information into two tables below.

Notice how in all of Gomes’ professional seasons, his groundball-to-fly-ball ratio has gone down. This could be considered a good thing, since he does possess a ton of raw power, and everyone knows you can’t hit home runs on the ground — okay, technically you can, but Gomes doesn’t have Dee Gordon speed. The next thing that jumps out is his 14.7% pop-up rate, which is good for 25^th highest out of 192 qualified hitters. His increased fly-ball rate, coupled with his bloated IFFB%, could explain why his BABIP is so low — balls in the air are caught more often than balls on the ground. More importantly, though, it seems that there could be a pitch-recognition problem, considering his isn’t quite squaring up balls as consistently as he has in the past. To go into this concept further, let’s take a look at the next chart.

Gomes is pulling the ball more than he ever has in his entire career — excluding the cup of tea he had in the bigs in 2012. Not to mention, he has basically abandoned taking the ball the other way. Looking at his quality of contact stats, he is hitting the ball “hard” less often than he typically has throughout his career, too.

Sure enough, Gomes has been below the league average in exit velocity for the majority of the season. So, to recap what I have already found, Gomes is hitting a ton of fly balls and pop-ups, is pulling the ball more and taking it the other way less, and is hitting the ball softer than usual. What does this all mean? I think it illustrates that Gomes is struggling with breaking balls.

Looking at Gomes’ spray angles against hard, breaking, and offspeed pitches, it appears that he is not recognizing breaking balls well this season.

For those that aren’t familiar with Brooks Baseball’s spray angle data, it essentially shows the average direction which balls are hit on the field. So, a positive spray angle (as depicted on the graph) means that the hitter tends to pull that pitch, and a negative spray angle means they tend to take it the other way. A recent FanGraphs Community Blog post by an author named Brad McKay explained the significance of spray angle well, in my opinion. He surmised that similar spray angles for different pitch types suggests that a player “was able to recognize and wait back equally well for both pitch types,” something that I happen to agree with. Looking at Gomes’ Silver Slugger Award winning year, it appears that Gomes tracked and hit fastballs and breaking balls at a similar spray angle, while also hitting offspeed pitches almost identical as well. This shows that Gomes was picking up the ball well in 2014. Fast-forward to 2016, and you can see that those angles have changed, and Gomes is now pulling breaking balls more than he does against fastballs. This suggests that something isn’t right with Gomes’ pitch recognition. He has almost reverted back to more of what he was in 2013. Interestingly enough, Gomes hit really well that season in 88 games played. The difference from then to now, however, is the pitch sequencing.

The approach against him has done a complete 180. The lefties — who used to pound him with fastballs when ahead in the count — now go to their breaking balls, while the righties — who used to pound him with breaking balls when ahead in the count — now attack him with fastballs. Essentially, the way pitchers (both lefties and righties) attacked Gomes in 2013 is consistent with how one would traditionally pitch to an aggressive, right-handed power bat. Here’s what I think has happened now. Pitcher’s have realized that Gomes is not picking up breaking balls the way he was in the past, causing him to have to sit breaking ball on the majority of pitches. He does this with the hopes of picking up the breaking ball early enough to decide whether to swing or not swing. With this in mind, right-handed pitchers know that because Gomes is sitting breaking ball, he will have a harder time catching up to the fastball many times. Simultaneously, left-handers know that they can attack him earlier with their fastballs (which are generally a pitch righties see well from lefties) to get ahead in the count, and then try to put him away with the breaking ball. In a sense, Gomes is completely and utterly discombobulated at the plate. Here are his heat maps vs. righties, broken down into “hard stuff” and “breaking balls.”As expected, the “hard stuff” is up, while the breaking balls are started over the middle of the plate and break down and away. Next, the lefties.

Lefties have attacked him with fastballs low, and inside, and use this to set up the breaking ball on Gomes’ back foot, which is incredibly difficult to hit (especially for someone not picking up those types of pitches well). Gomes is hitting .177 against the 55 sliders he’s seen this year, and is hitting .000 against the 35 curveballs he’s seen. His averages against harder pitchers are not much better.

Now that we have identified the problem, is there a way to fix it? I don’t know what Gomes is doing behind the scenes, but in my opinion there are three different ways to go about this. For one, I think Gomes should study the way pitchers are attacking him (which I would assume he is already doing). Using this knowledge, I think Gomes could benefit from being a little more patient at the plate. Instead of swinging out of his shoes all the time, he might be better suited remembering how pitchers are attacking him, and waiting on a pitch he not only can drive, but knows is most likely coming (helping to eliminate the guessing game he is playing right now). Lastly, I think he could simply practice recognizing pitches on the pitching machines teams have in the clubhouse. Gomes could spend time every day tracking a set amount of pitches, working to improve his ability to discern spin on the baseball upon its release. Then, he could put that pitch recognition to the test by actually attempting to hit the pitches when they are thrown. These are pretty simplistic solutions, and I am sure Gomes is working tirelessly trying to break out of his slump already. These are just my best guesses on how to improve this deficiency in Gomes’ game going forward in 2016.

I still believe in Yan Gomes, and so should you. He has proven he can be a successful big-leaguer, and one of the top catchers in the league. Catchers are judged more on their defense than on their bat, and catchers who can do both are considered a premium. In other words, Gomes could still be considered a solid MLB catcher, even if he doesn’t ever regain his old form at the plate. It is my opinion, however, that we should not sell him short at the plate. The ability is there, it just needs a little refining right now. For the sake of Indians’ fans everywhere, let’s hope Gomes can unleash his inner “Yanimal” sooner rather than later; the fate of the Indians season depends on it.

References

http://www.fangraphs.com/statss.aspx?playerid=9627&position=C

http://www.brooksbaseball.net/h_landing.php?player=543228&time=year&startDate=01/01/2016&endDate=01/01/2017&s_type=13

http://www.brooksbaseball.net/h_landing.php?player=543228&time=year&startDate=01/01/2016&endDate=01/01/2017&s_type=13

http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/the-cost-of-a-win-in-the-2014-off-season/

https://baseballsavant.mlb.com/player?player_id=543228&pos=2&player_type=batter

http://www.fangraphs.com/community/the-tulowitzki-hypothesis/

Let me preface this article by saying that I watch A LOT of baseball.  I also have an extensive analytical background and am always analyzing baseball stats looking for value in players.  Last week, I was watching an Orioles game and the starting pitcher was a player I have never heard of.  His name is Tyler Wilson.  While watching the game, I was very impressed with his overall make-up and the confidence he displayed in each one of his pitches.  Many times what separates a pitcher from being able to start at the big-league level versus being destined for the bullpen is the ability to throw multiple pitches.  The ability to throw each of those pitches effectively, however, can be what separates a good starting pitcher from a great starting pitcher.  The more I watched of Wilson, the more intrigued I became about his future outlook, and the more motivated I became to write this article.  (I went back and watched all of Wilson’s starts this year before writing this article.)

To give you a little background, Tyler Wilson has never been an elite prospect.  He attended college at the University of Virginia, where he was overlooked by fellow staff-mate, and future 1st round pick, Danny Hultzen.  Wilson was drafted by the Orioles in the 10th round of the 2011 MLB Draft.  Ever since being drafted, he has quietly excelled at every level.  He doesn’t have the dominant strikeout numbers that you look for in pitching prospects, which is a big reason he has gone overlooked for much of his career.

After climbing his way through the organizational ladder, Wilson made his major league debut with the Orioles last year and eventually made the team this year out of spring training.  Although he made the team in a bullpen role, early season injuries to the Orioles pitching staff opened up an opportunity and Wilson has really taken advantage of it.  Enough of the background though.  Let’s move on to what I saw while actually watching him pitch.

Tyler Wilson features a cutter and a two-seam fastball.  Each of these pitches sit in the 89-91 mph range and both show a great amount of movement.  The cutter is most effective against right-handed batters when thrown on the outside portion of the plate.  Check out the video below to watch him fool Kansas City Royals outfielder Lorenzo Cain with three straight cutters:

He essentially gave Cain, a very good hitter, three of the exact same pitches in a row…and Cain couldn’t touch them.  In every start this year, Wilson has pounded the outside corner with this cutter and has had fantastic results.  Don’t think by any means though that he is a one trick pony.  As soon as you start to expect that cutter on the outside corner, Wilson will come right back in on you with a two-seam fastball:

Look at the horizontal movement on that pitch!  Absolutely filthy!  Wilson has showed a ton of confidence in both of those pitches so far this season as he uses them to pound both sides of the strike zone and his command of them has been exceptional.  He is not afraid to throw them in any count and they are equally effective vs both left-handed and right-handed batters.

While his fastballs both seemed to be plus pitches upon first glance, I started to have thoughts that this guy might be for real as soon as he started throwing his curveball.  Wilson’s breaking ball sits in the 77-79 mph range.  I was astonished by how well he was able to locate his curve and the amount of movement on each and every one he threw.  Watch him send White Sox slugger Jose Abreu down swinging in the video below:

Abreu had no chance.  In his most recent start against the Twins, Wilson’s curve looked even better.  Check out the one he threw to Byung-Ho Park:

Both of those pitches came in a 2-2 count.  Many pitchers are scared to throw a breaking ball in a 2-2 count, especially to players with plus power such as Abreu and Park.  If you miss your target, two things can happen.  One — you leave the ball up in the zone and it gets hit out of the stadium.  Two — you throw it in the dirt; the hitter lays off; and now you have to pitch to this slugger with a full count.  Wilson isn’t scared to throw his curveball in any count and that is what makes him so dangerous.  You never know when to expect it, but at the same time you have to expect that he can throw it at any moment.

The last pitch in Wilson’s arsenal is his changeup.  This pitch has a ton of downward movement and produces a lot of groundballs.  While there were many better examples that I could have shown you of his change-up in action, I wanted to show one of his bad ones.  Even when he missed his target, the batter was still fooled by the amount of movement on this pitch.  Check out the following pitch to Royals SS Alcides Escobar:

The catcher set up down in the zone and Wilson clearly misses his target.  Luckily it didn’t seem to matter as the pitch had an insane amount of horizontal movement, running in on Escobar and jamming him.

Take a look at the chart below, showing the vertical and horizontal movement on each of Wilson’s pitches:

The middle portion of this chart is empty.  All five of his pitches have a tremendous amount of movement, and none of them move in the same direction.  The fact that he is able to command each of these pitches so well and keep hitters guessing with which one will come next is the reason why he has had so much success.  A big reason why hitters are having trouble guessing his pitches is because of how well Wilson is able to repeat his delivery.  The chart below shows Wilson’s release point for each type of pitch:

As you can see, his release point is almost identical with all five of his pitches.  At this point, I have watched all of his starts from this season and was very impressed.   I then decided to do some research and was immediately impressed with stats such as his career BB rate and low WHIP, but wanted to dig further.  I began to look through the PITCHf/x data because I was curious to see how effective each of his pitches actually were.  Based on the PITCHf/x value metric, all of his pitches so far this year have graded as above average.  If you are not familiar with the PITCHf/x value scale, someone who has a fastball ranking of zero means that he possesses an average fastball.  Any value above zero means that pitch is above average.  Obviously the higher the number, the better the pitch.  The same goes for negative numbers and pitches being below average.  See the table below for the breakdown of Wilson’s arsenal:

Based on the above values, the change-up has been Wilson’s most valuable pitch this season with his curveball close behind.  Obviously it is very early in the season and we are working with a small sample size…but that doesn’t mean we can’t have fun!  While doing this research, I set out the goal to find every starting pitcher who throws five or more above-average pitches.  Below is the list of players who fit that description:

IP = Innings Pitched
FA = Fastball
FT = Two-Seam Fastball
FC = Cut Fastball
SI = Sinker
SL = Slider
CU = Curveball
CH = Change-up
KC = Knuckle Curveball
EP = Eephus

There are only five pitchers who have thrown five or more pitches above average so far this season!  Wilson is in great company, as the other four pitchers are all All-Star-caliber players and borderline household names.  Being that this is such a small sample size, I decided to look back at last year’s stats to see how many players fit this description over a full season.  Using the same parameters and setting the minimum IP to 100, the following table was produced:

Once again, the names on this list are some of the top pitchers in baseball.  A few of these pitchers have a pitch that graded out as below average, but since they had five or more different pitches all individually grade as above average, they made the final cut.

As you can see, it is very rare to have a pitcher who has five legitimate plus pitches.  I am very interested to see if Tyler Wilson can maintain these results over the course of a full season, and I really hope he is given the opportunity to do so.  If he continues to pitch the way he has been, the Orioles will have no choice but to leave him in the rotation.  Although he has had limited success, Wilson has struggled in each of his starts when facing the lineup the third time around.  This could be due to the fact that he is still in the process of being stretched out from his bullpen role.  When in the bullpen, you don’t have to prepare to face the same hitter three times.  I am hopeful that once he is fully stretched out and back into his starter mentality, he will be able to make the necessary adjustments and continue to throw all of his pitches with confidence.  If he can continue to make quality pitches as he faces the lineup for a third time, I believe Tyler Wilson has the chance to become a very special pitcher.

Memorable quotes I heard during the TV broadcasts:

“Everyone thinks that I pitch with a chip on my shoulder but I really don’t.  I just go out and compete.  I don’t think of it that way.” – Tyler Wilson

“I think he understands himself.  He can maintain his game-plan throughout the game.  He’s going to keep us in the game and give us a chance to win.  What more can you ask for?” – Pitching Coach Dave Wallace

“I love that he can make the ball run in and then cut away.  He pitches to both sides of the plate.  Not a lot of young pitchers can do that.” – Manager Buck Showalter

…no Buck, not a lot of young pitchers can do that.

Twitter – @mtamburri922

After shutting out the Chicago Cubs offense over six innings of 10-strikeout ball, Drew Pomeranz lowered his season ERA to 1.80 and FIP to 2.61. He currently ranks 3^rd among qualified starters in K% and is tied for 11^th in WAR. Furthermore, Pomeranz has faced four of the top five offenses in the National League, as well as having had a season opener at Coors Field, hence we cannot claim stat padding against mediocre competition. While a .250 BABIP and 82.1 LOB% may not exhibit the greatest signs of stability, Pomeranz is finally reaching the potential that garnered him a top-30 prospect ranking from Baseball America. So what has Pomeranz done to unlock this potential?

Pomeranz has discovered his newfound success by neutralizing right-handed bats. Earlier in his career, Pomeranz’ relative struggles against righties led many to wonder whether his ultimate fate rested in the bullpen. In fact, heading into 2016 many doubted whether he could even earn a spot in the Padres rotation; he couldn’t even earn a mention in Jeff Sullivan’s positional preview post. This sentiment was understandable given his career .340 wOBA against and 7.1 K-BB% when facing right-handed hitters up to this point. In 2016, however, he has lowered the wOBA against to a measly .240 while striking out 34% of righties. By dropping 100 points of wOBA, he’s essentially transformed his average opposite-handed plate appearance from Kyle Seager to Omar Infante. As with any dramatic improvement in performance, a confluence of factors has led to Pomeranz’ success.

Since debuting in 2011, Pomeranz has gradually raised his vertical release point up nearly half a foot. This more over-the-top delivery has undoubtedly provided him greater deception against righties. More noticeably, however, Pomeranz has brought his changeup back from the dead. Early in his career, Pomeranz threw his change roughly 9% of the time to righties. From 2013-2015, when 72% of his appearance came out of the bullpen, Pomeranz lowered that rate to 3%. This season, however, Pomeranz is utilizing his change-piece over 15% of the time against right-handers. Throwing it around 87 mph, Pomeranz’s change nearly perfectly mimics his sinker in both velocity and movement, but to differing results. Pomeranz generates an above-average 44% fly balls on balls in play with his change, while the sinker gets 67% groundballs. This deception, combined with Pomeranz’s pitcher-friendly home park, have led to a dearth of quality contact on the changeup, as illustrated by the .111 ISO against on the pitch.

Despite the resurgence of Pomeranz’s changeup, his improved curveball has been the true game-changer.  He trails only the enigmatic Rich Hill in percentage of pitches that are curveballs; likewise, he employs it over 43% of the time against righties, up from 23% over his career before joining San Diego. His 4.6 curveball pitch value trails only the Phillies duo of Aaron Nola and Jerad Eickhoff, and their club’s experimental pitching philosophy, so far in 2016. After leaving the breaking-ball-murdering confines of Coors Field in 2014, Pomeranz witnessed a significant increase in both vertical movement and velocity. This, however, does not explain his recently-discovered success. Similarly, he has kept his Zone% on the curve right around his career average of 43%. The key lies in where out of the zone he locates the ball. This season, Pomeranz is hitting low-and-gloveside off the plate with almost 30% of his curves to both righties and lefties alike. Prior to this campaign, Pomeranz only hit that spot about 10% of the time, as he more evenly distributed his curveballs across the zone horizontally. Whether a change in approach or simply improved mechanics and command, Pomeranz is finding tremendous success with his hook. Using the curve against righties, Pomeranz has raised his Whiff% to a career-high 16.4% in addition to generating a career-high 39.6 Swing %. Furthermore, nearly three-quarters of his balls in play off the curve are grounders and he has yet to permit a single fly ball on the pitch vs. right-handed hitters.

As Eno Sarris noted in his discussion with him last December, Pomeranz’s success hinges on three things: “his health, his changeup, and his curveball.” Seven starts into the season, Pomeranz’s progress on these three fronts has led him to success against righties and helped him unlock his prior potential. He’s gone from a guy the Athletics traded for spare parts to a solidly above-average starter for the Padres. Perhaps the most encouraging aspect of this emergence: Pomeranz is still only 27 years old. With almost three more years of service time left, and an inevitable sell-off of Tyson Ross, Andrew Cashner, and James Shields on the horizon, Pomeranz could potentially parlay his improvement into an ace role on the Padres staff. Of course, Pomeranz could find himself on the market in the near future, and he would certainly fetch more than Yonder Alonso and Mark Rzepczynski this time around.