On Tuesday (11/29), the Brewers signed former failed prospect Eric Thames to a three-year, $16-million contract. In doing so, they also DFA’d the co-leader for home runs in the National League, Chris Carter. Now, there has been some speculation that the Brewers made this move to save money, but regardless of what you think the motives behind the move may be, it certainly is an interesting one that deserves a closer look.

Thames came up with the Blue Jays after being drafted in the 7th round of the 2008 draft. He showed good power in the minors, belting 27 homers at AA to the tune of a .238 ISO in 2010. He continued this surge into 2011 and did a decent job with the Jays at the major-league level, but struggled to hit lefties. Then, in 2012, it fell apart. His ISO dropped nearly 30 points from the year before, and his strikeout rate increased to an even 30% from 22%. After bouncing around in the minors in 2013, he then went overseas to the Korean Baseball Organization (KBO) and signed with the NC Dinos, where he almost immediately ascended to god status, hitting 124 home runs in 388 games with a .371 ISO in three years. Not only that, but he won a Gold Glove in Korea and stole 40 bases in 2015.

Now, of course, it’s never that easy. You don’t get a 40/40 guy with decent defense in the MLB for $5 million a year. The KBO is notorious for being a hitter’s paradise, as the skill level isn’t nearly that of the MLB. Think of the KBO as essentially being AA, where any major-league-caliber player will thrive, just like Thames did. But does that mean Thames has actually improved? If you look at some former KBO stars like Jung-Ho Kang and Hyun-Soo Kim, you can see that both have had success in the majors, even though they haven’t come close to matching their numbers in Korea. Thames’ Davenport translations (per Eno Sarris) suggest he’ll be a beast, slashing .333/.389/.628. Looking at those numbers, you could easily argue that Thames would be a bargain for the Brewers, essentially matching Carter’s output while even adding more value on the base paths and in the field.

That being said, Thames is a rare case. We have his stats from when he flopped in the big leagues, and we also have his stats from when he tore up the KBO. Barring some sort of complete technical and mental overhaul, one could also easily argue that Thames’ weaknesses the first time around will be his downfall the second time around. Let’s take a look at some stats from the KBO and compare them to his time in the MLB.

As stated before, one of the issues Thames had was that when he made contact, the balls didn’t go anywhere worthwhile (like the stands). He slugged .431 with a .182 ISO from 2011-2012, which does not look good if you’re a major-league first baseman. In the KBO, he put that issue to rest, where he slugged .718 with a .371 ISO, which is essentially unheard of in the MLB. Let’s check that problem with power off the list. However, there still stands the issue of his strikeouts and walks. He struck out 26% of the time during his time in the bigs while walking only 6% of the time, which is a recipe for disaster. In Korea, he struck out 18% of the time and walked a whopping 14% of the time. Other KBO imports have shown that both strikeout and walk rates regress when moving from Korea to the majors. So, Thames solved that second problem, although based on available data, we can assume he’ll regress in both categories. Thames improved in both areas that he needed to, but was this only because he was facing lesser pitching in a hitter’s paradise, or did he make technical changes to his swing in addition to improving his plate discipline?

Below are two screen shots: the top is Thames getting ready to take Ryan Dempster yard in 2013, the bottom is Thames hitting one of his 47 home runs in 2015.

Look at the hands. In the top picture, Thames keeps his hands roughly around his ears right before his swing, while in Korea, he appears to load his swing lower, near his shoulders. This allows Thames to stay in the zone with his bat longer and have a bit of an upswing, which leads to higher exit velocity and an improved launch angle. Both of these qualities translate into more power and more strikeouts. Ted Williams first pioneered this idea, saying that a slight upswing leads to extended contact on the ball, while a level swing leads to a smaller impact zone.

This is a change many players have made, such as Josh Donaldson, Jake Lamb, and Ryon Healy. Eno Sarris wrote an excellent article on the changes Ryon Healy made to his swing. It looks like this is something Thames is trying to emulate and will hopefully carry over to the MLB.

It looks like Thames has made the adjustments that he has needed to become a successful player. Trying to project what player he’ll be is a bit difficult. Personally, I look at the Davenport projections and I’m a little hesitant to say Thames will hit .333 and slug .628, seeing as how his strikeout rate will almost certainly regress to levels close to his former major-league self. I don’t see his walk rate regressing down to that level, mainly because plate discipline is a skill that accrues over time, and pitchers will have to be more careful with Thames and his new approach at the plate.

Let’s look at his slash line from his time in the MLB — in 633 at-bats, Thames hit .250/.296/.431 with 21 homers and a walk rate of 6% and a strikeout rate of 26%. Assuming regression from Korea, let’s keep the strikeouts at 25%, up from 18% in Korea, and let’s up the walk rate to account for added patience and power to 10%. With the technical changes in his swing, we can also assume his batted balls will go further and get hit harder, so let’s bump the slugging up to .500, which translates into something like 30-35 HR. This puts his ISO right at .250, a step up from what we saw earlier in his career. We’re now looking at a slash line of roughly .250/.350/.500 with an above-average glove at first and 10 steals (the Brewers love to let their players run). That’s good. In fact, that’s better than Chris Carter, and the Brewers are getting this at half the price of what Chris Carter would cost. I think there are plenty of reasons to be excited about Eric Thames in 2017.

On November 19, the Oakland A’s signed Cesar Valdez to a minor-league contract. His last appearance in the major leagues was way back in 2010 with the Arizona Diamondbacks. Almost seven years ago. Since then, Valdez has been jumping from organization to organization, toiling as a journeyman reliever/starter in Triple-A. Not even a tweet by the organization is needed for these types of transactions. Just a normal organizational move. But this is not just any organizational move. A closer look at Valdez’ player page shows there is much more going on here than just adding organizational depth.

It needs to be noted that Valdez is already heading into his age-32 season. Whatever value the A’s pull out of him needs to be extracted quickly because father time is right on his tail. The A’s don’t expect him to be a long-term asset. They probably don’t really even expect him to make it the big leagues. His high-level numbers over the last two years suggest he should be a major-leaguer again.

In 2016, Valdez posted a 3.24 FIP in the offense-happy Pacific Coast League playing for the Astros’ Triple-A affiliate, good for third-best in the league. One could look at this and say ‘okay, so what, he had a good 140 innings in the minor leagues.’ What jumps out of the page is how Valdez was even better pitching in the Mexican League in 2015, another offense-happy environment. He led the league in FIP and it really was not even close. He had the second highest K/9 and on top of it all he led the league in innings. He absolutely dominated the Mexican League and followed that up with another showing of dominance in the PCL.

Valdez’ walks per nine fell from 1.57 in 2015 to 0.85 in 2016. That was the lowest BB/9 in the PCL by almost one whole walk. There was reason to doubt Valdez following his 2015 season. It was dominant, but it also could be seen as fluky. He posted an outstanding 9.02/1.57/0.50 line. One could ask how he gave up so few home runs, and maybe that walk rate was bound to shoot up against stiffer competition. Valdez earns credibility with his 2016 campaign. His strikeout rate dipped a bit, although it was still strong, but his walk rate almost halved and he kept that outstanding home-run rate. He sustained most of his gains even against more advanced competition.

Remember the name Cesar Valdez. He will be up at some point with the Oakland A’s. There is no way to predict outcomes such as Corey Kluber and Junior Guerra but Mr. Valdez is as good a bet as any to follow in their footsteps.

Have you heard of Michael Lorenzen?  You might have heard of Michael Lorenzen.  You’re a baseball fan, and he plays baseball.  But chances are, you haven’t heard of him.  He’s a mostly unremarkable relief pitcher for a very unremarkable Cincinnati team.  He put up a 2.88 ERA with a 3.67 FIP for the Reds in 2016, hurt by a 22.7% HR/FB rate.  But he did do something special last year, and that something special is worth noting.  Before getting into that, though, let’s take a trip to the distant past of 2009.
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The Padres have had an interesting year both on and off the field from the GM getting suspended for hiding medical information to trying to convert Christian Bethancourt into a Swiss Army Knife. One of the least interesting things about the Padres was the on-field product. In Year 2 of Prellermania, the Padres lost 94 games and spent time stocking the farm for 2018 and beyond. At present, there are few players of interest on the Padres. The one I find most interesting, however, is Travis Jankowski.

Jankowski just delivered 2.1 WAR playing in 131 games, primarily in CF, making him a useful player. A majority of this production comes from his defense and base-running, where he racked up 8 DRS and 3.1 BsR to make up for a below-average 82 wRC+. With that said, I believe Jankowski has additional upside that teams looking to upgrade in CF could target. Jankowski has some interesting metrics once you look past his surface stats that indicate there could be more upside than initially meets the eye.

This past season, Jankowski rated sixth in GB% at 58.4%, putting him in the company of Dee Gordon and Eric Hosmer. Jankowski also paced the league in going the other way, with an Oppo% of 39.1%. It seems obvious that Jankowski’s approach is to smack the ball the other way and let his 70-grade speed do the rest. Diving into Statcast, we find that Jankowski had an average launch angle of 2.4 degrees, and an average exit velocity of 86.2 MPH, backing up what we know about Jankowski’s groundball tendencies.

Diving deeper is where it gets interesting. I found that Jankowski had an average EV of 83.5 MPH on balls above 10 degrees compared to 90.8 MPH on balls below 10 degrees. In simpler terms, Jankowski makes a majority of his hard contact on the ground. Given his status as a lefty-hit / righty-throw guy, this makes some sense as a guy whose bottom, more dominant hand pulls the bat through the zone early, making it more difficult to get the ball up in the air. Still intrigued, I wanted to find hitters with similar EVs on launch angles below 10 degrees and came up with the following:

This is an interesting group of players, headlined by superstar Xander Bogaerts and the solid Martin Prado, and yet it also includes the disappointing Jason Heyward and the DFA’d Alexei Ramirez. If anything, it shows how razor-thin the margin is for players with this type of profile.

Next, I looked at the same group’s batted-ball profile and took the average of their hit type and hit distribution to compare to Jankowski’s and came up with the following:

Looking at their batted-ball distributions, Jankowski stands as somewhat of an outlier in this group. Most notable is his how he rarely pulls the ball in favor of going the other way. With these tendencies, Jankowski is actually depressing his own value with the bat. When Jankowski goes the other way, he has an average EV of 84.5 MPH. Compare this to pulled balls, where his average EV is 89.1 MPH. In most cases, pulled balls are always going to be hit harder, but for someone as extreme as Jankowski, the opposite-field approach may be suppressing his overall offensive production. If Jankowski shifts his approach to drive more balls with authority to the pull side, he could push his bat closer to the league-average mark. As noted, Jankowski is a 70 runner and the additional chances on base would only serve to increase his base-running value. With these changes we are looking at a potential league-average bat from a guy who already has above-average defensive and base-running skills. This would be an insanely valuable piece. As we have seen, the trade market does not value defensive value the same as offense, so the acquisition price shouldn’t be prohibitive.

To have maximum value, Jankowski has to play CF, but with top prospect Manny Margot about ready to take over the position full-time, the Padres may deem Jankowski expendable. For teams not willing to pay the prospect price for Charlie Blackmon or not wanting to see Yoenis Cespedes play CF again, Jankowski represents an under-the-radar acquisition that could be had for a reasonable price. Given his skillset, Jankowski shouldn’t rack up the traditional counting stats rewarded in arbitration, and he could provide excellent value throughout his years of control. The Padres as a whole may not be very interesting but they have an interesting player in Travis Jankowski, who could provide immense value to a team with the foresight to acquire his services.

The best relief pitcher in baseball is not who you think he is. Most of you probably would not even include him in the top 10. If I were to take a poll on who is the best relief pitcher in baseball, the top voted would likely be Zach Britton, Dellin Betances, Aroldis Chapman, Kenley Jansen, and Andrew Miller. I will say that it is none of them. To illustrate my point, I will compare this mystery pitcher’s numbers to all of their numbers. Nothing too scary, just xFIP, K/9, and ERA. I also will not just tell you which pitcher produced which numbers. Where would be the fun in that? I will compare the numbers of all six pitchers and walk you, the reader, through determining which one is the best.

Pitcher A: 1.18 xFIP; 14.89 K/9; 1.45 ERA
Pitcher B: 1.92; 13.97; 1.55
Pitcher C: 1.17; 16.84; 1.16
Pitcher D: 1.75; 15.53; 3.08
Pitcher E: 2.41; 13.63; 1.83
Pitcher F: 2.09; 9.94; 0.54

At first glance, Pitcher F’s ERA of 0.54 is likely what stands out most. Alas, even calling him only by a letter cannot mask Britton. He has the lowest K/9 by far and the second-highest xFIP, so Britton is effectively taken out of consideration.

Pitcher D has an ERA over a run higher than any of the others. His K/9 and xFIP fit in the range but do not stand out. Thus, Dellin Betances is out as well.

Of the remaining four, Pitcher E rates the worst in each of the three categories. Goodbye, Kenley Jansen.

That leaves us with Pitcher A, Pitcher B, and Pitcher C. In this group, B is the worst across the board. Aroldis Chapman leaves the conversation.

Pitcher C is better than Pitcher A in all three statistics. Andrew Miller bows and exits.

Carter Capps stands victorious.

Yes, I know Capps did not pitch in 2016. I used his 2015 numbers. They stack up just as well against the elite relievers from that year as well. It is true that Capps pitched only 31 innings in 2015, but the stats I used are rates. Maybe a larger sample would have dragged him into mediocrity, but I doubt it. Capps was ahead of the field by such a large margin that even with regression in his 2017 return he would be #1.

I am crazy for saying Carter Capps is the best relief pitcher in baseball. Or am I, really? If Capps pitches as well in 2017 as he did in 2015, just over a larger sample, I believe many of you will agree with me. Some of you may even agree with me after reading this.

So, let me be the first to say it: Carter Capps is the real best relief pitcher in baseball.

Browsing through the unqualified FanGraphs WAR leaders for 2016, one may come across what seems like an anomaly at No. 69. Just ahead of certified breakout stars such as Jonathan Villar and Trevor Story, grizzled veterans such as Asdrubal Cabrera and Troy Tulowitzki, and an All-Star catcher in Yasmani Grandal, sits Royals back-up outfielder Jarrod Dyson, at 3.1 fWAR in just 337 plate appearances. If a well-educated-baseball individual were asked to name this mystery outfielder who placed just above these solidly above-average everyday players, Jarrod Dyson wouldn’t be one of the first 30 outfielders most would name. How did Dyson make it so far up this list? And what is he doing rotting on the bench behind the likes of Paulo Orlando, or even the corpses of Alex Gordon and Lorenzo Cain for that matter?

Jarrod Dyson ended up being the most valuable Royal this year. Even more valuable than Danny Duffy and Salvador Perez, despite having the ninth-most plate appearances on the team. So what’s the problem? The problem is Dyson’s profile is far from sexy. He owns a career .325 OBP and only seven home runs in over 1500 plate appearances. His wRC+ is below average for an American League outfielder at 86. Where Dyson extracts his value is in his defense and baserunning, two ways of evaluating a player that are still slow to catch on.

Since Dyson starting seeing semi-regular playing time in 2012, he ranks fourth in FanGraphs BsR behind Mike Trout, Billy Hamilton, and Rajai Davis, all of whom had more plate appearances than Dyson. If stolen bases are your cup of tea, Dyson ranks sixth since 2012, behind five guys who all had more plate appearances. The numbers are there to show how great of a baserunner Dyson is; the problem is getting front offices to realize just how valuable baserunning can be, especially when it comes to a player like Dyson who owns a decent, but not great career OBP.

It doesn’t stop at Mr. Dyson’s baserunning. If the Royals don’t use him as a pinch-runner off the bench, he is used as a defensive replacement. Obviously the Royals think highly of Dyson’s defense, and the numbers agree. Of the outfielders with at least 1000 innings, Dyson ranks fourth since 2012 in FanGraphs’ UZR/150. Even in limited playing time, competing against some who have played twice as many innings, Jarrod ranks 15th in FanGraphs’ defensive value. Jason Heyward, the man who just signed an eight-year, $184-million contract last offseason, is the only other player who ranks in the top 15 in both baserunning and outfield defense according to FanGraphs. What’s perplexing about this is that it’s not as if Heyward is a slugger on top of his outstanding defense and baserunning; he would only be considered a slightly above-average hitter by most measurements. So why isn’t Dyson considered in the same vein as Heyward? Sure, Jason Heyward, former first-round pick and All-Star, has more of a track record, but Jarrod Dyson should at least have been given a chance to start by this point.

Jarrod Dyson shows there is still progress to be made on the analytics front. The inexplicable handling of Dyson can be attributed to a mistrust in advanced statistics. If we are going to consider Mike Trout to be the best player in baseball based on metrics such as WAR, then players such as Dyson need to be given the same consideration. What separates Mike Trout from David Ortiz, Miguel Cabrera, and Josh Donaldson is what makes Jarrod Dyson at least an above-average starting outfielder, if given the chance.

With the offseason in full swing, there are a number of contenders looking to fill their vacancies at catcher. After surveying the market, the most common names featured have been Brian McCann and an injured Wilson Ramos. After that, you hear rumblings of the Athletics dangling Stephen Vogt and another exercise in how teams value pitch-framing with Jason Castro. There is a player, however, I feel is being overlooked and could provide value to a contender. Alex Avila isn’t the sexiest name on the free-agent market but could be a sleeper candidate for a team willing to roll the dice.

When combing through the free-agent leaderboards, I discovered a couple of interesting data points that show how Avila could break through with the bat. First, I calculated “Good Contact %” by adding together Medium and Hard Contact %. Alex Avila was the leader at 91.3%. Other notable players on this list include Justin Turner, fifth at 87.9%, and the recently-signed Kendrys Morales, seventh at 87.2%.

So we have a 29-year-old left-handed-hitting catcher who makes good contact and plays the toughest position on the defensive spectrum. So why isn’t there more chatter about Alex Avila? The two biggest culprits lying in the stat line would be his groundball and strikeout tendencies. In 2016, Avila ran a 52% groundball rate and a 37% strikeout rate. Even then, Avila still managed to produce a 104 wRC+ which, given the low bar for catchers, is excellent. Diving into Statcast, we find that Avila had an average exit velocity of 92 MPH, which groups him in the same bucket as J.D. Martinez and Chris Davis. The disclaimer here is Martinez and Davis had over 300 batted balls and Avila had fewer than 100.

This is where there may be hidden value waiting to be unlocked. Avila has an average launch angle of 7.5 degrees, which is suboptimal for a slow-footed catcher. Given his exit velocity, if he could increase his average launch angle into the 15-30 degree range he could exponentially improve his offensive production. If he shifted his approach to drive balls in the air to his pull side, he could unlock additional power and maximize the contact he does make. Last season, Avila ran a pull percentage of 38%. Given his left-handedness and groundball tendencies, he is easily shiftable, which depresses the value of his bat. Avila only managed to hit seven homers last year, but with an offseason to work on a change in approach, I firmly believe he could unlock additional power.

Avila would definitely benefit from being the strong side of a catching platoon. If I am Dan Duquette and the Baltimore Orioles, I am moving to sign Avila to be the strong side of a catching platoon in hopes he could undergo a Trumbo-esque transformation by maximizing contact in a hitter-friendly environment. At present, Steamer projects Avila for 1.2 WAR in 2017, which on the open market should garner a commitment of just under $10 million on a one-year deal. If nothing changes, Avila can still be a serviceable option in a platoon, but if these changes were to take hold, we could be looking at the steal of the offseason.

The National League Cy Young Award race is looking like it is going to be closer than the 2016 presidential election. Kyle Hendricks has the sparkling ERA and solid peripherals while Max Scherzer has the sexy strikeouts and the innings pitched of a workhorse. Jon Lester, meanwhile, was the ace of the Cubs and got the first start over Hendricks in the playoffs despite having slightly worse numbers because of his reputation as a big-game pitcher. All three candidates are deserving and have a legitimate chance to win the election; let’s just hope the 30 voters all show up.

With starters getting the hook quicker and quicker over the past few years, pitching is increasingly becoming a race to the bullpen rather than a one-pitcher marathon. In light of this, we’re going to compare these pitchers through their first five innings pitched each start. This will show how the pitchers pitched while they were at their peaks in each game rather than while they were tired or overworked from being left in too long. In theory, this should give a statistical boost to Max Scherzer because his manager Dusty Baker is notorious for leaving starters in too long (see 2003 Cubs pitchers). Scherzer and Lester should also get a slight edge because Hendricks was given a pretty short leash this year. He has not had to pitch under excessive conditions as often as Scherzer or Lester have.

Through innings 1-5 this year, the edge actually ends up going to Kyle Hendricks with the lower FIP, HR/9, wOBA, and a sparkling 1.68 ERA. Although Scherzer has that ugly 1.12 HR/9, it is mainly due to the high number of fly balls given up. The 47.2% of automatic outs via pop-outs and strikeouts should allow him to continue as one of the best pitchers in the NL for a couple more years. Lester hangs in with solid numbers across the board, although his FIP and xFIP are the highest of the group.

After the fifth inning this year, Hendricks really hit a wall, supporting a 3.87 FIP and 4.17 xFIP. Scherzer takes a small hit overall but still pitches at a Cy Young level late in the game. Lester continues to pitch solidly as well, although the 2.26 ERA is suspiciously low considering his 3.63 FIP in the late innings. Hendricks’ poor performances after the fifth inning help explain why Joe Madden decided to go with Lester in Game 7 of the World Series in the fifth inning against the Indians rather than Hendricks. Although the playoffs do not count towards Cy Young voting, the fact that Maddon brought in Lester on short rest because he did not trust Hendricks in the biggest game of the year shows how cautious Maddon has been with his ERA-title winner in late-game situations this year.

Another thing to consider is that Lester and Scherzer are considered the “aces” of the staff. They know going into each game that they are expected to pitch to the seventh, eighth, or ninth inning. They have to pace themselves while Hendricks has the luxury to empty his tank through five and allow the bullpen to close out the contest. Or, since each pitcher threw under 60 innings after the fifth, this may be like the presidential polls and is just too small of a sample size to matter.

Before we decide who should ultimately serve the one-year term as the National League Cy Young Award winner, we should look at one more thing. The Cubs defense. Yes, Hendricks has a great GB% and is fantastic at limiting contact, as his adjusted contact score is 75 (Lester and Scherzer are 88 and 92 respectively). However, Hendricks and Lester had one of the best defenses to ever be assembled behind them doing work on all the balls in play. The Cubs as a team allowed a .255 BABIP, which is .042 points better than average and .033 points better than the Nationals. Their FIP-ERA gap is 0.62 while the Nationals are right around league average with an FIP 0.06 higher than the team ERA. So, while Hendricks and Lester both had a hell of a season with 2.13 and 2.44 ERAs respectively, the top-notch defense the Cubs deployed behind them deserves a lot of the credit.

If I had to pick who I thought deserves the Cy Young award, I would pick Scherzer, followed closely by Hendricks. Through the first five innings of games, his FIP is comparable to Hendricks’, so it comes down to whether I would take the longevity of Scherzer, or the contact management of Hendricks. While the 75 adjusted contact score is fantastic, he doesn’t quite get to the 1.07 gap in FIP-ERA without fantastic fielders and a little luck behind him. Scherzer threw the most innings in the NL this year and was the undeniable ace of the Nationals’ staff. The two Cubs pitchers may lose the Cy Young race, but they will be just fine with the hardware that they already earned this year.

It’s safe to say 2016 was a disappointing year for Jose Bautista. After posting three consecutive seasons with a WAR greater than 4, Bautista posted his lowest mark since 2008. The Toronto Blue Jays were ousted in the American League Championship Series for the second consecutive year and have looming decisions on how to go forward. Bautista is a polarizing figure in the baseball world and is a free agent in a relatively weak class. The big question teams will be asking is whether Bautista’s 2016 was more indicative of further decline or if there is a chance he rebounds. The 36-year-old will be looking for his last big payday.

Bautista’s defensive game continued to deteriorate. After posting a -12.5 UZR/150 in 2015, Bautista had a -9.3 UZR/150 this past season. Moreover, he finished second to J.D. Martinez for the right field Iron Glove. The main takeaway here is that Bautista is no longer good defensively and we shouldn’t expect him to get better. Unless a team wants him playing in the outfield, his future likely rests at first base or in the DH role. That’s not say a team cannot be playoff contenders with a poor right fielder. The aforementioned J.D. Martinez and Mark Trumbo were both below-average fielders this past season and both teams were in the thick of the playoff race. Moreover, being a good base-runner has never been part of Bautista’s game. Which brings us to his offensive value.

Jose Bautista will be paid on the basis of his bat. With his bad defence and sub-par base-running, teams will be lining up for Bautista due to the offensive numbers he has put up since his breakout in September of 2009. Since 2010, only three players have had a higher wRC+, and nobody has more home runs. On the surface, Bautista’s 34-point drop in wOBA and 26-point drop in wRC+ show a declining bat. Factor in his age, and things aren’t looking so rosy. Digging deeper, it is possible this was somewhat of an anomaly and Bautista will have a better offensive season in 2017. This is what makes Jose Bautista the winter’s most intriguing free agent.

Jose Bautista Walk and Strikeout Rate

Bautista’s walk rate remained elite. The Dominican slugger is one of the more selective hitters in the league, having the tenth-lowest swing percentage since 2014. The strikeouts rose, becoming much closer to the league-average 20.6% strikeout rate. Since 2014, Bautista has the 65^th-best swinging strike rate at 7.3%, tied with notable players such as Adrian Beltre and Joey Votto. Bautista’s swinging strike rate in 2016 was 7.2%. This suggests his strikeout rate has more to do with an increase in called strikes than swinging strikes.

It’s been said that when a player can no longer catch up to a fastball, the end is nigh. The swing is slower, leading to more swinging strikeouts and an increase in weak contact.

FB SwStr%: League and Bautista

Bautista’s been below league average at swinging and missing on fastballs throughout his career. He saw an uptick in 2016, but it was still better that most. Moreover, among players to see at least 1000 pitches, Bautista ranked 11^th in the league in average fastball exit velocity on line drives and fly balls, at 97.8 MPH against. Overall, Bautista can still hit the fastball.

In a similar method as shown here by Andrew Perpetua, I took a look to see if Bautista was getting lucky or unlucky.

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As you can see, Bautista’s slugging was fairly close to its expected value. Bautista’s lowest slugging percentage over the past five years was .498. There is a big difference in batting average, likely due to the big difference between expected BABIP and actual BABIP. To look into this disparity further, I looked at Alex Chamberlain’s expected BABIP formula. Using that formula, the xBABIP was .287, a lot closer to Bautista’s batting average. Bautista has been a career .260 BABIP hitter. Some of that is due to him popping out a lot and a lack of speed. Lastly, by taking a look at xISO, Bautista also underperformed by both metrics. Through Chamberlain’s formula, Bautista’s expected Isolated Power would be .265, and under the work of Andrew Dominijanni, his expected ISO would be .257. Bautista’s .217 ISO was his lowest mark since 2009. It is likely that Bautista was a tad unlucky in regards to outcomes. The story told by the multiple variants of xBABIP, xISO, and xAVG all point toward a better fortune for the Dominican slugger.

Another potential concerning issue with Bautista was the drop in contact on pitches outside the zone. With a career 64.7% O-Contact percentage, this number dropped to 60.4%, the lowest since 2009. You can see the difference between 2012-2015 and his 2016 contact percentages in various parts of the zone below.

Bautista Contact% 2012-2015

Bautista Contact% 2016

While his zone contact rate looks consistent, his contact made outside the zone away from Bautista decreased. To compensate for this, Bautista swung slightly less on pitches outside the strike zone. If he continues to struggle to make contact on pitches outside, then Bautista will continue to take more chances on borderline calls. The overall contact rate remained solid and he continued to pull the ball at the same rate, showing that Bautista still has good bat speed.

Another riveting aspect of Jose Bautista is that over his career, he hasn’t had a platoon split. Against right-handers, the six-time All-Star has a career 131 wRC+, and against southpaws he owns a 135 wRC+. The current Steamer Projections peg Bautista to be worth 2.9 Wins Above Replacement, with a 128 wRC+.

Jose Bautista showed some signs of decline. He made less contact on outside pitches, and he saw a decrease in offensive stats such as wRC+ and Isolated Power. The three-time Silver Slugger however continued to show strong plate discipline, and continued to hit the ball hard, using the same approach he has over the past few years. Furthermore, many expected stats point toward Bautista being somewhat unlucky with balls in play. With a wRC+ of 122, it is clear he can still hit and a rebound in offensive numbers isn’t out of the question. With the sub-par season he had, he could very well be one of the better value sluggers in the market. ­It will be a fascinating offseason for the Dominican slugger.

Despite their World Series Game 5 win, the Cubs came under fire Monday morning for their lack of hustle. On Mike & Mike ESPN Radio, Mike Greenberg commented that the Cubs seem to be lacking hustle, as evidenced by slow home-plate-to-first-base times by Jorge Soler on his Game 3 triple and Anthony Rizzo on his Game 5 double. Soler assumed a fly out or foul ball, and Rizzo assumed a go-ahead home run. Buster Olney added, “It’s interesting you say that, because I had a conversation with one of the veterans in this World Series…and that’s exactly what he said. ‘This is the World Series, how can that happen? It’s a different generation.’”

That’s right, this is the World Series, the biggest baseball stage, the postseason when even average fans tune in to watch and learn from some of the best players in the game. In today’s baseball market worth billions, where players in their late teens and early twenties are paid 10 or more times the average American salary, maybe a lapse in hustle or a hard 90-time is acceptable, if not necessary, during the regular season of 162 games in order to avoid injury or excessive exhaustion. You wouldn’t want your star player pulling a hamstring on a routine infield groundball in August, would you? Of course not. But c’mon, this is the World Series! Most of these players have never played for higher stakes. Is the “lack of hustle” a generational problem? What ever happened to the commitment Joe DiMaggio had to playing hard just in case someone was watching for the first or last time?

Your organization hasn’t won a title in 108 years. Why wouldn’t you approach every play as if it was the last? You’d think they would in the World Series; especially given Game 5 could have been the last. Greenberg and Olney failed to even mention Javier Baez’s Game 5, second-inning strikeout where he refused to run to first base on a dropped third strike, looking increasingly frustrated with his World Series offense (2 for 18 with 7 strikeouts, and 16 runners left on base after that at bat).

Let’s take a look at some numbers by analyzing the Win Expectancy (WE) for the Cubs before and after each of these three plays (Soler’s triple, Baez’s strikeout, and Rizzo’s double) to show the importance of maximizing every opportunity and play. These three players were caught up in the moment and took things for granted on the biggest stage of their sport, a time when small mental errors could make the ultimate difference in winning a game and the championship. We’ll also look at the WE if each play had ended with a different outcome. All WE are obtained from The Book: Playing the Percentages in Baseball, by Tom Tango, Mitchel Lichtman and Andrew Dolphin.

Jorge Soler (Age 24)

Game 3, Series tied 1-1

Bottom 7^th, Cubs trailing 1-0 with 2 outs

Triple to right field

WE before at bat: 29.1%

WE after triple: 35.0%

WE after next batter ends inning 26.5%

For the sake of this article, let’s assume (which is assuming a lot with an inside-the-park home run) Soler runs hard out of the batter’s box and rounds the bases for an inside-the-park home run, tying the game. The WE for the Cubs would have jumped to 52.2%, a major swing (nearly double) from where that inning ended. The Cubs lost that game 1-0 to give the Indians a 2-1 series lead.

Javier Baez (Age 23)

Game 5, Indians leading series 3-1, Cubs one loss from elimination

Bottom 2^nd, Cubs trailing 1-0 with 2 outs and a runner on 1^st

Strikeout, dropped third strike (ball in dirt), Baez does not run to 1^st base

WE before at bat: 41.9%

WE after strikeout: 39.4%

Again, for the sake of this article, let’s assume Baez runs hard to first on the dropped third strike and reaches base, which rarely ever happens in Major League Baseball. However, this is the World Series and Game 5 is an elimination game. You never know what can happen. Though the data for the number of baserunners reaching on a dropped third strike isn’t available, such instance would be scored with either a passed ball or wild pitch on the play (a battery error). Take a look at the number of passed balls and wild pitches in MLB over the past 10 seasons, as provided by Baseball Reference.

A catcher is scored with a passed ball on average every 14-15 games, while a pitcher is scored with a wild pitch on average every third game. If anyone can provide data for the number of times a batter has reached base on a dropped third strike, it would only strengthen the claim that Baez’s chances of reaching base were slim. Regardless, remember it’s an elimination game in the World Series. For the sake of proving a point, let’s look at the scenarios if Baez had reached base.

The ball did skip quite a distance from catcher Robert Perez, so let’s take a look at WE if Baez reached first, leaving the Cubs with runners on first and second with 2 outs: 44.1%.

How about if Roberto Perez threw the ball away into right field, causing a 1^st and 3^rd situation (let’s note that catcher errors are also very rare): 45%.

Even though Baez reaching first base on a dropped third strike (which was far from guaranteed by running) would have only added about 5-6% to the Cubs WE, there is no excuse for Baez to have a lapse of effort and allow Perez an easy, no-pressure throw to first base because there was no runner hustling down the line. At the very least, run hard and make it look good for the millions of people watching. Not to mention the thousands of people who spent a week’s wage on tickets to Wrigley. They, along with your teammates, want to see you running to first base instead of walking back to the dugout.

Instead, the Cubs were left with their two weakest hitters (David Ross and Jon Lester) to lead off the next inning, which resulted in a 1-2-3 inning for Indians starting pitcher Trevor Bauer, who took a 1-0 lead into the fourth inning.

Anthony Rizzo (Age 27)

Game 5, Indians leading series 3-1, Cubs one loss from elimination

Bottom 4^th, game tied 1-1, 0 outs, first batter after Kris Bryant game-tying home run

Double to right field

WE before at bat (after Bryant home run): 56.3%

WE after double: 63.4%

The back-to-back extra-base hits certainly turned the momentum of the game in the Cubs’ favor. Two batters (Bryant and Rizzo) increased the Cubs’ WE from 43.7% to 63.4%, a major increase in a game they eventually won 3-2 to force a trip back to Cleveland for Game 6.

A better throw from right field would have made a very close play at second base, so let’s look at the WE for the Cubs had Rizzo been thrown out at second base on his hit off the right-field ivy: 53.4%. His lack of hustle from home plate to first base, as he admired what he thought was a go-ahead home run, could have cost the Cubs 10% on their WE.

Conclusion

There is certainly no guarantee that any individual exertion of hustle will lead to a different outcome in a baseball game. Running out a groundball will not guarantee an infield hit, but it puts pressure on the fielder to make a clean play. Running hard on a fly ball has no measurable effect on whether a fielder will catch it or not, but it puts the runner in the best possible position to advance an extra base on a rare dropped ball. Running hard to first base after a dropped third strike does not make a difference in the outcome of the play 99% of the time, and it certainly doesn’t change the 0-for-1 with a strikeout in the box score. But it puts pressure on the catcher to retrieve the ball in a clean manner and make an accurate throw to first base. Let’s not forget that hustle is the right thing to do. It’s more about the precedent, not the result. It’s about the example we want MLB players on the biggest stage to set for younger players worldwide. DiMaggio likely wouldn’t recognize some aspects of today’s game. He, like many other players, never took anything for granted. Despite the fact that Soler and Rizzo still ended up with extra-base hits, and Baez most likely would have been thrown out at first base anyway, shouldn’t we hope that on this kind of stage the very best will play the game to its absolute potential?