Stop me if you’ve heard this already. First base is a thin position right now. Sound familiar?  I thought so. For that reason, many of us will be bargain shopping this draft and auction season, and one name that comes up as a down-the-board option is Greg Bird.

Personally, I’ve had two major issues with ranking and projecting Greg Bird. The first is that he didn’t log any meaningful time last year due to injury. The second is in his 46-game, small-sample-size debut for the Yankees in 2015, he hit what I believed to be an exaggerated number of fly balls (51%). Further confounding the issue is that the percentage of those that turned into home runs (20.4%) seemed high compared to his output in the minors.

In my quest for a more perfect valuation of Greg Bird, I decided to grab all the game logs from Trenton and Scranton/Wilkes-Barre from 2015 and create my own larger sample size data set for his batted-ball outcomes. In the table below, I’ve listed his batted-ball outcomes from his minor-league games in 2015.

The following are his batted-ball outcomes for 2015 at all levels including his call-up with the Yankees later that summer.

The fly-ball rate (47.9%) is accompanied by a 16% infield fly ball proportion that was markedly better in his short stint with the Yankees (11%) than in his larger sample in the minors (18%). Through the solely statistical lens, I’d say he squared up a greater percentage of his small sample size fly balls with the Yankees. I did manage to confirm for myself that Bird does come with a very fly-ball-heavy batted-ball profile.

A large part of the reason fantasy league owners are excited about Bird is the park he plays in and the side of the plate he hits from. Yankee Stadium is a bomb-dropping paradise for lefties, and some of the success Bird had in his limited trial should be attributed to the more hitter-friendly parks he played in, versus what he saw in Trenton and Scranton/Wilkes-Barre. Courtesy of rotogrinders.com we can see Yankee Stadium plays with a 1.53 park factor for home runs in right field.

Though I couldn’t locate hand-specific park factors for Trenton and Scranton/Wilkes-Barre, both play at around 0.75 for homers, which are very pitching-friendly. Playing half his games in these two parks certainly could have been the limiting factor for Bird’s somewhat lackluster 9.2% HR/FB mark in the minor leagues in 2015.

While it’s fair to say we don’t know Bird’s true-talent level on HR/FB just from his statistics, I did perform some very simple math and calculate the difference in the two sets of park factors on home runs (~1.5 / ~0.75 = ~2x). It’s plausible that Yankee Stadium could offer a 2x boost on his HR/FB. While Bird might not be at a true-talent level of converting 20% of his flies into homers, he might be in the 18% neighborhood. Armed with this larger set of data, I began looking for comps for Bird’s fly-ball and HR/FB rates. My goal was to pull players from either the 2015 or 2016 seasons that had fly-ball rates over 45% and a home run to fly ball ratio at or above 18%.

This does turn up an interesting list of sluggers with a wide variety of outcomes. If I relax the requirements a little further, you’ll start to get into the Joc Pederson, Lucas Duda, Luis Valbuena and Colby Rasmus group. Obviously this is a mixed bag of player outcomes because we haven’t tackled their BB% or K%, which impact the HR/SLG/TB categories in roto leagues or the bottom line in points leagues.

Pederson, Duda, Rasmus, Carter, Sano, Moss and Napoli all have a much higher K% than Bird has shown in Double-A and Triple-A. In total, across all his MILB at-bats in 2015, Bird struck out only 17.5% of the time. Though you might speculate the pitcher-friendly confines of his home parks would dictate letting him put the ball in play was a more favorable outcome. In his limited stint with the Yankees in 2015, he posted a K% right around that 30% neighborhood, which brings him back to my favorite comp for his current skills — Mike Napoli.

Bird also has other issues to contend with for fantasy baseball value which include: lineup slot, platooning, and, most recently — Chris Carter. For the sake of imagining the range of outcomes for Bird, let’s assume he got full time at-bats in the sixth slot in the Yankees lineup. We know that the sixth spot in the AL lineups averages around 675 plate appearances. If we use an 11% walk rate for Bird, that will leave him with ~600 at-bats to do HR/SLG/TB damage. My guess is Bird isn’t good enough to avoid a platoon, so for the sake of a range of predictions on his output I’m going to use the FanGraphs fans-predicted number of plate appearances (553) to give what I feel is a best-case set of scenarios for Bird’s home-run totals.

Bird may already be the left-handed version of Chris Carter. I’m even more bullish on Greg Bird than I was before I started the investigation, and easily the high man on his HR output when considering Steamer, Fans, ZIPS and Depth Charts. His batting average will ultimately depend on where he settles in on his K% and his ability to blast liners and grounders through for hits. I think he’ll be an interesting Statcast case to monitor early this year.

Since earning a starting job with the Cardinals in 2013, Matt Carpenter has been one of the league’s best run producers, and one of the best OBP lead-off hitters. From 2013-2015, health was a staple for Carpenter, as he had 2109 PA (avg. 703), which ranked third, only behind Nick Markakis (which is a bit surprising) and Mike Trout. In 2016, Carpenter injured his right oblique on July 6th and was never quite the same after returning back from his DL stint. A lot of fans were surprised to see a power outbreak for him in 2015, Carpenter posting a career-high 28 home runs (in 665 PA) when he had only hit 25 homers in his previous 1766 PA. He made some changes to his approach at the plate in 2015 and strove to hit more fly balls, pull the ball more and to sacrifice some contact for some power.

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​Now let’s jump to 2016. It was a tale of two halves. His offensive production was finally impacted by an injury which directly affected his swing and, more specifically, his new power-enhanced swing path.

In a recent article by Jeff Sullivan from FanGraphs, he references data from Baseball Savant which indicates that the optimal launch angle for slugging percentage is between 20-29 degrees. Carpenter has increased his average launch angle from 17.2 degrees to 18.2 between 2015 and 2016. Continuing to increase his launch angle while playing injured likely contributed to his plummeting batting average in the second half, as he continued to try to hit fly balls and line drives but simply couldn’t create the same bat speed and power to carry the ball into gaps and over the fence.

Below is a 15-Game rolling average of Carpenter’s Weighted On Base Average for the 2016 season. He got injured during game 78 of the season, which can easily be identified on the chart. He clearly never got back to form after hurting his oblique, but he did have the fourth-best wOBA before his injury, getting beat out by only David Ortiz, Josh Donaldson, and Mike Trout.

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When playing healthy, his average swing speed was 62.7 MPH, but it dropped to 61.8 MPH after returning from the DL. His hard-hit rate also dropped by 6.7% and his soft-hit rate increased by almost the same amount. He clearly wasn’t the same hitter at the plate, and his numbers down the stretch took a massive hit.

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If we focus on his 2015 and the beginning of 2016 production, we are looking at an elite run generator and on-base machine. He ranks ninth in OBP, 12th in BB% and wRC, had the same OPS as Nolan Arenado, had the same wOBA as Edwin Encarnacion (tied for 11th), and lastly he and Joey Votto were the only hitters in that timeframe to have a combined medium+hard-hit rate over 90%. That is some elite company.

Health will be imperative for Carpenter in 2017. If he is able to avoid a major injury this year and show no ill effects in spring training from his oblique injury from last season, we could be looking at someone who could shatter his current projections. His hitting tool and batted-ball profile are quite similar to Joey Votto and Freddie Freeman, with a high walk rate and hard-hit rate, a high line-drive rate, and power in the 25-30 home run territory.

The following stats are from 2015 – July 6th, 2016.

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Putting Carpenter in that category of hitter might be a stretch for some; however, since making adjustments to his swing path and approach at the plate, he really isn’t that far off, as Carpenter, for the majority of these metrics, falls below Votto but ahead of Freeman.

He has withdrawn from the World Baseball Classic due to a back injury that his manager has indicated isn’t too serious. Nevertheless, he is definitely worth monitoring in the coming weeks leading up to opening day, to make sure he looks like his hard-hitting normal self.

Inspiration struck me after reading Jeff Sullivan’s piece yesterday on how Christian Yelich could morph into Joey Votto with continued changes, or shall we say improvements, to his batted-ball profile. Namely, hitting the ball in the air more. As Jeff rightly pointed out, Yelich hammers the ball as well as anyone in baseball; it’s just that, to date, he’s done so much more often on the ground. You know who doesn’t have Christian Yelich’s problem?  Nick Castellanos.

Castellanos has driven changes in his batted-ball profile, which were covered last May by Eno Sarris when he documented the change in Castellanos’ launch angles. Why should you care? Because he’s slowly morphing into Nolan Arenado, and now is the time to buy.

There have been only 10 players with at least 250PA each season since 2013 to grow their FB% year over year.

To be fair to Arenado, hitting more fly balls isn’t the only thing that’s made him the home-run king of the NL (now that Chris Carter has departed to the AL). It’s been his meteoric rise in HR/FB rate as well. There are 10 other players that would fit nicely on this table with Castellanos, but I’ll leave that as an exercise for the reader. Chances are, you’re already well aware of the other players that would join him on the list — I’m looking at you, Justin Turner.

For fun, if we were to project out a full season of at-bats with some growth for Nick Castellanos, we get an interesting range of outcomes for his HR totals:

Much like the Yelich-to-Votto comparison, there are some things that keep Castellanos from becoming Nolan Arenado — namely his strikeout rate, which is 24.6% to Arenado’s 14.6%. This limits the number of balls he puts in play and thus the number of fly balls and homers he can hammer. However, with a little bit of health, growth and maturation in approach, we could see a 30HR season out of Castellanos this year.

For many years, the undisputed king of velocity in Major League Baseball has been Aroldis Chapman, with his fastball that averages around 100 mph and regularly reaches higher. Few pitchers have even been able to approach the level of Chapman’s fastball since he came into the league, and none have surpassed him. However, in 2016, one pitcher finally did it. Mauricio Cabrera of the Atlanta Braves averaged nearly 101 mph on his fastball in 2016 and he regularly touched 103; but yet there was still a major difference between Cabrera and the incredible Chapman. Chapman struck out over 40% of the batters he faced last year, while Cabrera struck out less than 20%. Strikeouts are intuitively related to fastball velocity. The faster that a pitcher can throw the ball, the less time a batter has to react, making it harder to make contact. So how does a pitcher such as Cabrera, who throws as hard as anyone in the game, strike batters out at a well below-average rate?

I first thought that maybe his perceived velocity is not as great as his actual velocity, and sure enough Cabrera does gets very little extension toward the plate when he delivers the ball. He only extends about six feet toward the plate before he releases the ball, which is a full foot shorter than fellow reliever, Zach McAllister, and several inches shorter than average for fastball-heavy relievers. This lack of extension means that the velocity that the batter perceives is slower than the actual velocity coming out of Cabrera’s hand, because it has farther to travel before it gets to the plate. However, this is only a minor difference, as Cabrera’s perceived velocity is still above 100 mph. This is not a huge drop, but it does bring him closer to the pack, as many relievers get good extension that increases their perceived velocities above their actual velocities. Chapman, for instance, gets great extension toward the plate on his already incredible fastball, which results in his excellent perceived velocity of over 101 mph. Cabrera’s lack of extension is likely a contributing factor to his low strikeout numbers, but it does not seem to be the main culprit.

Next, I wanted to see if there was something about the spin rate on his fastball that doesn’t lend itself to strikeouts. Spin rates correlate quite strongly with strikeout rates. Pitchers with high spin rates on their fastballs typically generate more swings and misses, and thus more strikeouts. It turns out that Mauricio Cabrera does have a low spin rate on his fastball. His fastball spin rate of 2300 rpm is well below average for fastball-heavy relievers, which is probably a major reason why he doesn’t miss many bats.

While it makes intuitive sense that something like the amount of spin on his fastball could be the reason for his low strikeout totals, it is still puzzling to see that his spin rate is so low, because spin rate is typically correlated with velocity. For most pitchers, the harder you throw, the more spin you will put on the ball. Aroldis Chapman, for example, has one of the highest spin rates in the sample. In order to single out the spin rate from the velocity, I divided the spin rate by the velocity to find the Bauer Unit, named after Indians pitcher Trevor Bauer. Cabrera’s average Bauer Unit of 22.85 is one of the lowest in the entire sample of fastball-heavy relievers. This means that he has some of the lowest spin per MPH in the game. There must be something inherent in how Cabrera throws a baseball that just doesn’t allow him to generate the amount of spin that is typically commensurate of how fast he throws.

Cabrera’s low spin is not all bad, though. Just as high spin rates lead to strikeouts, low spin rates lead to ground balls. An average spin rate is really where you don’t want to be, as those are the pitches that get squared up more often. While Cabrera actually has an above-average spin rate for the entire population of major-league pitchers, his spin rate is one of the lowest in the league compared to his velocity. This effectively makes him a low-spin pitcher, and last year’s batted-ball numbers bear that out. Nearly 50% of the batted balls Cabrera gave up last season were on the ground, and he didn’t surrender a single home run all season despite giving up the hardest average exit velocity in the game last year on his fastball. Cabrera got away with that extreme exit velocity by only allowing an average launch angle of 5.9 degrees, which was one of the lowest among the fastball-heavy relievers. It is hard to do much damage on balls hit on the ground, even if they are hit 95 mph. While the myth that the harder the ball is thrown the harder the ball can be hit has largely been disproved, it is interesting to see that the pitcher who throws the hardest also gave up the highest average exit velocity.

Of course, strikeouts aren’t just about swinging strikes; you have to get called strikes as well. Throughout Cabrera’s minor-league career, he struggled to throw strikes consistently. So much so that many thought his strike-throwing ineptitude might prevent him from ever even reaching the big leagues. However, once he started pitching in the majors, he suddenly discovered how to find the strike zone. Of course, walking four and a half batters per nine innings is still poor, but that mark represented his lowest walk rate since rookie ball in 2012. Even with the high walk rate last year, he actually threw strikes at an above-average rate. His Called Strike Probability, according to Baseball Prospectus, was 47%, which is slightly above league average. For a guy like Cabrera who has always struggled with control, it is probably a good thing to see him filling up the strike zone at an above-average clip. However, the tendency to pitch within the zone could result in more contact and thus bring his strikeout numbers down. Since he doesn’t command his pitches well, he cannot nibble at the corners or trust himself to throw his pitches just off the plate to generate swings and misses. This allows hitters to either lay off pitches that are safely outside, or lock in to the pitches that are squarely in the zone. This could be another significant cause for his lack of strikeouts.

Another reason Cabrera doesn’t strike out many batters is because he doesn’t possess a bat-missing secondary offering. His secondary pitches are all used primarily to get hitters off of his fastball. He throws the hardest change-up in baseball at 91 mph, and a mid-80s slider with good depth. The change-up got squared up pretty often in 2016, which makes sense, seeing that he throws the pitch with the velocity of a league-average fastball. The slider also does not get many whiffs, but hitters were not able to do much damage off of it in 2016. Batters only slugged .136 off of his slider last season, and the pitch generated the highest rate of fly balls of any slider in the game. Perhaps what is even more significant is that hitters had an average exit velocity against his slider of 85 mph and an average launch angle of 30 degrees. For reference, hitters that hit the ball with an exit velocity of 85 mph at a 30-degree launch angle went 4 for 72. His slider may not be a swing-and-miss offering, but it sure seems to be a good out pitch for him.

It looks like Cabrera’s low spin rate on his fastball relative to its velocity is the main reason for his lack of strikeouts. However, it is also likely that that same low spin rate allows him to induce an extreme amount of ground balls, which helps him limit the damage from the opposing batter. His lack of extension toward the plate and his tendency to live in the strike zone are also contributing factors. He also doesn’t have a secondary offering that gets many swings and misses. His slider, however, does produce a great deal of pop-ups, which is another way he limits damage on his batted balls. A major reason for his success last season despite his low strikeout totals and high walk numbers was that he didn’t give up any home runs. While a complete lack of dingers is very unlikely to persist, the types of batted balls he allows on his fastball and slider make it difficult for batters to hit it deep off of him.

Cabrera walks too many batters, and while I wouldn’t be surprised to see some progression in his strikeout rate, I don’t expect him to ever strike out batters at the same rate as someone like Chapman. He should be able to persist for several years as a good late-inning reliever, but he probably will never reach the elite levels that his fastball might suggest.

Before spring training started, Scott Lauber at ESPN explored whether Rick Porcello could match his 22-win season from 2016. The short answer? No. Probably, almost definitely, not.

Conventional wisdom would swiftly say that, too, though. Three pitchers netted 20 wins last year, two in 2015, and three in 2014. And over those three years, none of the pitchers repeated the feat.

With wins speaking to much more than simply the pitcher on the mound, there are two things to consider when digging into the question: What could Porcello repeat, and what could the Red Sox offense?

Let’s start with the offense. Lauber’s article acknowledges that the Sox scored a league-leading 5.42 runs per game last year, and 6.83 per Porcello start. The biggest difference between this year’s and last year’s team is Mitch Moreland replacing David Ortiz. You could close your eyes and dip your hand into a bowl of cold spaghetti like it’s a Halloween Horror House and pull out the contrast between their production. As is, Moreland is projected to be worth about half a win next season. Alone, that suggests how the Sox could have struggles producing the same way in 2017.

But there are other questions to answer, too. How will top prospect Andrew Benintendi fare? Will Pablo Sandoval make any difference or continue to be negligible? I’m not suggesting the Sox won’t be good. It would be hard for them not to be. But they have enough variables going into the year that Porcello getting another 20+ wins is largely on him, which could be difficult for reasons beyond conventional wisdom.

These numbers tend to feed into each other, which is why they’re useful in seeing just how good Porcello was, and how well things broke for him last year. His pitching profile was relatively similar to past seasons, though. It’s not like Drew Pomeranz discovering a new pitch or Brandon Finnegan changing a grip. Porcello’s sinker (or two-seamer, depending which stat site you reference) gets a lot of the credit for his exceptional performance, but differences in his curveball may reveal reasons for it, too.

None of these changes are insignificant. The h-movement tells us Porcello’s curve ran away more from right-handed hitters and in on lefties. The v-movement tells us it dropped more. Add in how it was three mph slower and it rounds out how the pitch fell off the table more. He worked the zone more up and down over the plate than he did side to side in the two years prior, so it could have messed with batters more when the rest of his pitches moved as they have.

According to Lauber, Porcello mimicking anything close to 2016 will come down to “keeping hitters honest with his off-speed pitches.” Opponents hit .190 against his slider and .174 against his changeup. That could concern pitch-sequencing. Take a look at how he distributed his offerings in general, and then when ahead or behind in the count.

While the numbers don’t detail specifically when each pitch was thrown, they indicate that Porcello was eerily similar no matter what the count was. Sequencing isn’t about finding a magic combination of pitches; it’s about making sure a hitter can’t tell what’s coming. It certainly seems he was successful at it.

This data shines light on the tiny changes that might make a big difference in the game, which is one of the most fascinating aspects of baseball. But even more interesting is a quote from Dave Dombrowski in the ESPN piece, where he said, “I don’t think [Porcello] will try to do too much anymore.”

By itself, that reads like a generic sports-interview statement. But think about what the concept of “trying to do too much” really means in baseball: trying to do too much of one thing. A guy tries to hit a five-run homer or hit 100 on the gun every time; really tries to impose his will over the game by doing something impossible. Porcello wasn’t relying on any one pitch in 2016. And what Dombrowski is hinting at here, intentional or not, is there’s a certain amount of surrender that’s necessary for faring well in baseball.

Lauber tells how Porcello best explains his 2016 success by saying he “better understands what makes him effective.” Maybe that has to do with knowing how much the game controls versus how much he can, which let him harness his own abilities more.

I fear a lesser 2017 from Porcello could be called a disappointment by some, but an advanced understanding doesn’t always mean advanced success. The reality is it was a great year aided by good luck, probably buoyed by the cognizance that has allowed Porcello to be a contributing major-leaguer since he was 21. Maybe he isn’t as good this coming season, but it doesn’t take away from the player he is.

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career and pitch movement data from FanGraphs; pitch usage from Baseball Savant

The player that all Milwaukee Brewers fans, and baseball fans for that matter, should be watching most closely this spring is Eric Thames. Thames, after three incredible seasons in the KBO, signed a three-year, $16-million deal to man first base for the Brewers. The front office likes what they see from the 2015 KBO MVP, but admittedly did not scout him in person while he was playing overseas; instead, they relied on video to make their assessment of his game. I’ll admit, I can’t wait to see Thames play this year; the mystery, concerns, and potential all make for great theater, but there is one question that keeps haunting me at night: How do former MLB payers fare when they play overseas and then return? As much as this post is about Thames, it is also about those few players who have done what he is doing.

I approached this by looking at all the major-league players who have played in both Korea and Japan over the past 10 years. I could have gone further back to the days when Cecil Fielder was playing in Japan, but the game, both in North America and across the Pacific, has changed significantly since then. The argument could be made that the game has changed significantly over the past 10 years — it changes every season — but that is the beauty of baseball.

I wanted to isolate Korea only, but, perhaps not surprisingly, there were too few players to make anything of that. Out of the several hundred total players in both these leagues over the past 10 years, only a total of 11 players who began their career in MLB returned to MLB after an overseas hiatus. That’s 11 between the KBO AND NPB. 11! Four players from the KBO and seven from NPB. Here’s a graph that shows their names and WAR before and after their careers in Japan and Korea:

(Numbers courtesy of baseball-reference.com)

The outcome for these players is, well, not good. A select few players like Lew Ford and Chad Tracy carry the “pre-Japan/Korea WAR” section thanks to longer, successful careers in MLB before they changed leagues. It also seems unfair to compare these players to each other due to their careers, or lack thereof, upon their return. For example, Ford’s 79 plate appearances are incomparable to Wilson Valdez’s 966. But, in every case, the story arch is the same: Begin their professional baseball career in North America, make it to the majors as a 20-something, decline at the major- and minor-league level, go to Japan/Korea, return to North America in a very limited capacity and fail to make an impact with a major-league-affiliated team.

If the careers of these 11 players is a trend, then Eric Thames is in for a lot of trouble.

But there is reason to believe that Thames is the exception to the rule. Will Franta wrote a convincing Community Research article about the reason to believe that Eric Thames will do well. Additionally, various projections believe that Thames could be anywhere from a 1.2 to 2.2 WAR player with mid- to high-20 home-run totals and an above-average wRC+. Dave Cameron wrote an article analyzing the projections for Thames and concluded that he has the potential to be “the steal of the winter,” and for three years and $16 million, that could very well be true.

But there are factors going against Thames. It isn’t all too often professional players find their footing at the major-league level in their 30s (Thames will be 30 on Opening Day). Plus, with several other corner infielders in the form of Hernan Perez, Travis Shaw, Jesus Aguilar and others who could fill in at first if need be such as Ryan Braun and Scooter Gennett, a team in the middle of a rebuild might not completely be opposed to disposing the incumbent starting first baseman if another star emerges. Even comparing career KBO and NPB players to their transitions to MLB, we can see that there are a lot more Tsuyoshi Nishiokas than Jung-ho Kangs, which is why players like Kang, Ichiro Suzuki, Hideo Nomo, and Yu Darvish are lauded when they succeed in the majors.

I believe that Eric Thames will not be like the 11 others who, by and large, failed in their returns. Thames is intriguing and there is a lot to like about him — and a lot to worry about with him. There are pros and cons to his game. I believe that he will be a great addition to a team that, honestly, could afford to wait for him to assimilate completely to the game.

Background

Back on 2016-Nov-11 I posted WAR and Eating Innings.

Basically, I was looking at reliever WAR and concluded that giving a lower replacement to relievers isn’t quite correct. Inning for inning, a replacement reliever needs to be better than a replacement starter, because eating innings has real value. But reliever/starter doesn’t actually capture the ability to eat innings, and I gave several examples where it fails historically.

I don’t have roster-usage numbers and don’t want to penalize a pitcher for sitting on the bench, but outs per appearance makes a nice proxy for the ability to eat innings; and in a linear formula that attempts to duplicate the current distribution of wins between relievers and starters, this gives roughly 0.367 win% as pitcher replacement level (as opposed to the current 0.38 for starters and 0.47 for relievers), and then penalized the pitcher roughly 1/100^th of a win per appearance.

The LOOGY needs to be pretty good against his one guy to make up for that penalty, but for a starter it will make almost no difference.

That’s pretty much the entire article summarized in three paragraphs. By design, this doesn’t change much about 2016 WAR — it will give long relievers a modest boost, and very short relievers (LOOGYs and the like) a very modest penalty, and have an even smaller effect on starters.

So why did I bother?

Well, first, there are historical cases where it does matter; but more to the point, I was thinking that relievers are being undervalued by current WAR, and to examine this I needed a method to evaluate a reliever’s value compared to a starter’s value, and different replacement levels complicate that.

Why Do I Think Relievers Are Undervalued?

You could just go to this and read it; it shows that MLB general managers thought relievers were undervalued as of a few years ago. But that’s not what convinced me. What convinces me is the 2016 Reds pitching staff. 32 men pitched at least once for the Cincinnati Reds in 2016. Their total net WAR was negative.

Given that the Reds did spend resources (money and draft picks) on pitching, if replacement level is freely available, then that net negative WAR is either spectacularly bad luck, or spectacularly bad talent evaluation.

32 Reds pitchers were used; sort by innings pitched, and the top seven are all positive WAR, accounting for 5.6 of the Reds’ total of 6.7 positive WAR. Of their other 25 pitchers, only three had positive WAR: Michael Lorenzen (reliever, 50 innings, part of the Reds’ closer plans for the coming year), Homer Bailey (starter, coming off Tommy John and then injured again, only six appearances), and Daniel Wright (traded away mid-season, after which he turned back into a pumpkin and accumulated negative WAR for the season).

It sure sounds like the Reds coaches knew who their best pitchers were and used them. Their talent evaluation was not spectacularly bad. But they had 17 relievers with fewer than 50 innings, and not one of them managed to accumulate positive WAR for the year.

Based on results, we can list the possible mistakes in who they gave innings to: Maybe they could have used Lorenzen a bit more. That’s it; otherwise it’s hard to improve on who they gave the innings to. They also usually gave the high-leverage innings to their best relievers.

So, if replacement level is freely available, why did the Reds coaches give a total of 574.2 innings to 22 pitchers who managed between them to accumulate no positive WAR and 7.1 negative WAR?

If that’s just bad luck, it is spectacularly bad luck; and spectacularly consistent, as the Reds seem to have known in advance exactly who was going to have all this bad luck.

I don’t really believe it is bad luck. Thus, I don’t really believe that the Reds pitchers were below replacement, and the alternative is that replacement (at least for relievers) is too high.

GMs Still Agree: Relievers Are Undervalued by WAR

The article I referenced above was from the 2011-2012 off season; maybe something has changed.

As I write this (2017-Feb-24), FanGraphs’ Free Agent Tracker shows 112 free agents signed over the 2016-2017 off-season. 10 got qualifying offers and thus aren’t truly representative of their free-market value. 22 have no 2017 projection listed, and most of those went for minor-league deals (Sean Rodriguez and Peter Bourjos are the exceptions, and they aren’t pitchers). I’m going to throw those 32 out.

That leaves a sample of 80 players, 28 of them relievers or SP/RP. A fairly simple minded chart is below:

(Hmm, no chart. There was supposed to be a chart. Don’t see an option that will change this. Relief pitcher Average $/Year=5.7105*projected 2017 WAR with an R² of 0.585; everyone else Average $/Year=4.6028+1.401*projected 2017 WAR with an R² of .5917. Note that the “everyone else” line, if you could see it, is below the relief pitcher line at 0 WAR, and then slopes up faster from there.)

R² values aren’t great, and overall values per WAR are low because most of the big paydays are on multiyear contracts where value can be assumed likely to collapse by the end of the contract (I’m not including any fall-off). But the trend continues — MLB general managers think relievers are worth more than FanGraphs thinks they are.

The formula I give above (replacement of 0.367 win% with a −0.01 wins/appearance) is based on trying to reproduce the FanGraphs results. But if the FanGraphs results are wrong, then so is my formula.

Why the Current Values Might Be Wrong

I’ve shown why I think the current values are wrong, but what could cause such an error?

Roster spots change in value over time. That’s all it takes; the reliever is held to a higher (per-inning) standard because historical analysis indicated that he should be. But if roster spots were free, then it would be absurd to evaluate starters and relievers at all differently. The difference in value depends on the value of a roster spot; or, if using my method, the “cost” imposed per appearance needs to be based on the value of a roster spot.

Prior to 1915, clubs had 21 players, and no DL at all. In 1941, the DL restrictions were substantially loosened, and a team could have two players on the DL at the same time (60-day DL only at that time). In 1984, they finally removed the limits to the number of players on a DL at a time; in 2011, a seven-day concussion DL was added, and a 26^th roster spot for doubleheader days; in 2017, the normal DL will be shortened to 10 days.

21 players and no DL makes roster spots golden. You simply could not have modern pitcher usage in such a period.

Not to mention the fact that, in 1913, you’d never have been able to get a competent replacement on short notice. Jets and minor-league development contracts both also dropped the value of a roster spot.

25-26 roster spots, September call-ups to 40, and starting this year you can DL as many players you want for periods short enough that it’s worth thinking about DLing your fifth starter any time you have an off day near one of his scheduled starts. Roster spots are worth a lot less today; it’s not surprising that reliever WAR seems off, when it was based on historical data, and the very basis for having a different reliever replacement level is based on the value of a roster spot.

Conclusion

When I started this, I was hoping to produce a brilliant result about what relief-pitcher replacement should be. I have failed to do so; there’s simply too little data, as shown by the low R² values on the chart I tried to include above, to make a serious try at figuring out what general managers are actually doing in terms of their concept of reliever replacement level.

But the formula I suggested back in November has an explicit term acting as a proxy for the value of a roster spot, and that term can be adjusted for era. If you drop the cost of an appearance from 0.01 WAR to some lower value, raising replacement a bit to compensate, you’ll represent the fact roster spots have changed in value over time.

Given any reasonable attempt to estimate the cost per appearance based on era, I don’t see how this could be worse than the current methods.

It’s no secret that Felix Hernandez struggled in 2016, looking little like the ace Mariners fans had come to expect from 2009-2014. After a good-but-not great 2015, there was some hope that Hernandez would fix what ailed him and come back as the fire-breathing ace he’s been for more than a half-decade.

Instead, he had the worst season of his career, striking out 7.2 per nine, walking 3.8 per nine, and allowing 1.1 home runs per nine. His sudden decline from ace to barely-passable fourth starter has baffled fans and media members alike. Many point to his declining velocity — his fastball averaged just 90.5 miles per hour in 2016, the lowest of his career.

Of course, the real answer has nothing to do with velocity. The answer is far simpler. The Muddy Mound Game Conspiracy has been hidden from the public’s memory for long enough, and it’s time to wake up, sheeple! Those close to me have called me a “muddy-mound truther,” as if that’s a negative thing. But, folks, don’t believe what they’re telling you. I’ve got the facts, and once you’ve taken in this mind-blowing information, you’re not likely to ever trust a grounds crew again.

The muddy-mound game is the day everything changed for Hernandez. I’m talking, of course, about June 1, 2015, when the Mariners faced the Yankees at home.

Because of a malfunction with the Safeco Field roof, rain covered the mound, making it muddy and slippery. Hernandez visibly had trouble with his stride leg in his delivery, and was seen at times scraping the dirt out from between his cleats.

Through the first three innings, Hernandez was perfect, striking out three and inducing five ground-ball outs. And then, in the top of the fourth inning, as the rain came down harder and covered the mound, Hernandez appeared to land awkwardly on his first pitch to the inning’s second batter, Chase Headley.

At that point, it was clear something wasn’t right. Hernandez would walk five batters in the next inning-and-two-thirds (after having walked just 15 in 70.2 total innings up until that point in 2015) and give up seven runs before being removed.

This is the point, almost exactly, where Hernandez’s command abandoned him. From this game forward, Hernandez has had 46 starts, and has walked 3.4 per nine. In the 46 starts leading up to this game, he was averaging just 1.9 walks per nine. It seems unlikely that an ace pitcher would lose his command entirely in the span of two innings, but the numbers say that’s exactly what has happened.

Mariners fans may recall that in 2009, Hernandez began to add a Luis Tiant/Fernando Valenzuela-esque twist to his windup. Hernandez himself said that he had picked it up from watching teammate Erik Bedard. It should be noted that Hernandez made the jump from “promising young pitcher” to “perennial Cy Young contender” in 2009. The twist in his windup may not be directly responsible for Hernandez’s ascension to the throne, but it certainly played a large role.

In the chart below, you’ll see four sets of data. The first column is from when Hernandez debuted through the 2008 season. Row two spans 2009 until June 1, 2015 — from when he first started adding the twist, until the muddy-mound game. Row three is the 46 starts before June 1, 2015, and row four shows us the 46 games including, and since, the muddy-mound game.

So, not only has Hernandez declined dramatically since the fourth inning of that game, but it’s actually been the worst stretch he’s had in his entire career. Oddly enough, this stretch has come right after the best stretch of his career.

But there’s more! It’s not just boring data that shows dramatic decline. There’s been a visible change in Hernandez windup over the last year and a half since this game. I’m going to play right into my enemies’ hands here — as they would say, I’m putting on my tinfoil hat. But, the joke is on them, because now they can’t hear my thoughts.

Three things stand out — Hernandez has reduced the torque of his twist, he’s lowered his hands, and the position of his stride leg is inconsistent. I took a series of images of Hernandez at the top of his windup, detailing the changes. To the undeniable proof!

First, we have an image from Hernandez’s perfect game against Tampa Bay on August 19, 2012:

The twist is as prominent as ever in this game; the front of Hernandez’s shoulder is basically facing the viewer. His hands are close to his neck, and his arms are raised high enough for us to read the jersey script. Hernandez’s drive leg is bent at a slight angle. Considering he threw a perfect game with 12 strikeouts with these mechanics, it would seem that these represent a good version of his windup.

Let’s jump ahead. This one comes from April 18, 2015 — Hernandez’s second home start of the year.

For the most part, things look similar here. He’s turning slightly less, but we can still read the jersey script, and see most of the front of his left shoulder. Moving on!

Nothing appeared too different in his next few starts, though he didn’t look exactly the same as the previous image. This image is from the first inning of the infamous muddy mound game itself:

Some small tweaks, but for the most part, things appear the same. Considering Hernandez was dominating during this stretch, it’s hard to argue with the results.

Here’s an image from Hernandez’s first slip off the mound in the fourth inning:

Unfortunately, Hernandez spent most of the rest of his outing after slipping pitching from the stretch, so it’s hard to find an example of his windup immediately after the injury. It’s hard to tell from this image, but this came on the first pitch of the second at-bat of the fourth inning. Hernandez falls off the mound, looks a little ginger on his left foot, but shakes it off and returns to the mound. The story is the same for the very next pitch. Hernandez appears to be visibly uncomfortable, on his way to walking five batters and throwing a wild pitch.

Small changes to his motion became evident throughout the rest of 2015, and the best example of these changes came on September 10 against the Rangers:

It’s clear that his hands have lowered, though his front shoulder still seems pretty well twisted to face us, the viewer. It’s also notable that Hernandez’s stride leg is now wrapped more around him at an angle, whereas before it was closer to perpendicular with the ground. Hernandez didn’t give up a run in this game, but did walk four batters.

In Hernandez’s second home start of 2016, April 29 against the Royals, we see not much has changed:

His hands have raised slightly, but still cover the jersey script more than before. Where his shoulder once squarely faced the camera, it appears almost to be pointing straight at the batter in this picture. His stride leg still appears to be almost wrapped around his drive leg — consistent with the last image, but more dramatic than at any point before that. It’s worth noting that Hernandez walked 18 batters in just 32.2 April innings in 2016.

Skipping ahead to Hernandez’s return from the disabled list, things appear to be more problematic:

Hernandez’s hands are now at an all-time low, almost entirely covering the jersey script. The front shoulder still faces the batter more than it used to, and the angle of his stride leg seems as wrapped over the drive leg’s knee as ever.

The last exhibit from the 2016 season comes on September 5 against Texas:

Hernandez’s hands appear to have lowered even a little further. His stride leg is angled so much that it’s almost passing over his drive leg’s knee from our point of view. While his front shoulder once looked square and broad to the viewer, we now essentially just see the side of Hernandez’s arm, and little of the shoulder itself. At this point, he’s twisting less than ever, his hands are at their low point, and his stride leg is the most out-of-whack it’s ever been.

The final piece of evidence — and I apologize for the quality, but winter-league baseball isn’t streamed at the quality of MLB games — is from Winter Ball. Observe:

The camera angle here isn’t exactly the same as Safeco Field, but as the most recent piece of evidence of what Felix is doing, it should be included. First, some good news: Hernandez’s stride leg is more perpendicular with the ground than it has been since the first three innings of the muddy-mound game itself. His hands have been raised up above the jersey script partially, though not quite as high as before the injury occurred.

The bad news, though, is the worst news. Hernandez has less of a torso-twist in his windup than ever. In fact, we can’t even see his shoulder at the top of his windup — the only image where this is true.

Watching the video, the twist seems less dramatic than at any point. It should be mentioned that in the video this was lifted from, Hernandez’s line is: 1 IP, 2 H, 2R, 2BB, 1 K. He also threw a wild pitch with no one aboard, and threw the ball into center field for an error when the runner on first took off early.

So why did the King stop twisting so much? It’s hard to say. Hernandez has been known throughout his career as a guy that doesn’t watch much film of himself. He didn’t even start throwing bullpens in between starts until late in 2016. I exchanged messages with 710 ESPN Mariners Insider, Shannon Drayer, to confirm that both of those statements are true.

My hypothesis? He subtly changed his motion to not feel pain in his ankle after slipping on the muddy mound. Less twist means less torque, which means less force landing on the ankle, and that his legs will land just a bit sooner. This has caused his legs to be “ahead” of the motion of his upper body, and with that he’s lost his feel for his command.

As someone who doesn’t watch film, it seems entirely believable that once Hernandez got healthy, he didn’t realize he was doing anything wrong, and the bad habits he picked up to compensate for his injury became his new normal.

Velocity would be nice, but Hernandez, more than anything, needs to rediscover his command. He pitched at an ace level in 2013 with a 91.3 MPH average fastball. Velocity doesn’t usually return with age, but command can.

The path toward re-discovering his command appears clear. Hernandez needs to return to his older wind-up, when he twisted so much that the batters could read his name and number on his jersey. He became an ace when he began twisting, and began falling apart when he stopped twisting.

It appears that he made progress in winter ball with his hands and his stride leg. Though I remain skeptical that his performance is going to rebound in any significant way until he makes like Chubby Checker and starts doing the twist again.

Brett Miller does the agate page for the print edition of the Seattle Times. He is also a proud Washington State University alum, and good at drinking beer and taking criticism. Complain about this article directly to him at bmiller@seattletimes.com.

I chose to stick with hitters in this article, because pitching prospects are extremely difficult to predict, and I think the pitchers who do get the hype are typically deserving. However, I do see a trend of some unnoticed hitting prospects turning out great careers in the majors. Let’s get right to it.

1. Travis Demeritte – 2B – ATL

In 2016, Demeritte went from the Rangers’ to the Braves’ system and spent the entire year in high-A ball, where he dominated at the plate. A 2B with power like Cano, good speed and the ability to get on base is such a rarity.

In my opinion, Demeritte has the highest chance of being a perennial All-Star out of these five prospects. The middle infield in Atlanta has an extremely bright future. I’m predicting that Demeritte will make his splash in 2018, and make his first ASG appearance by 2020 (age 25). Let’s look at his numbers from a season ago:

Let’s compare these to the four All-Star 2B in 2016 and Brian Dozier.

Some things to keep in mind as we compare these players: Demeritte was playing in A+ ball, but he did play an average of 12 less games than these major-leaguers. As you can see, it’s basically a two-man race (other than Dozier’s 42 HRs) between Altuve and Demeritte here. While we cannot expect these A+ ball numbers to translate directly against ML pitching, Demeritte definitely deserves more attention in top-prospect lists. While he’s not quite as speedy as Altuve, he has more power, and he walks at a far higher rate. The one glaring weakness is the K numbers for Demeritte. However, some of the top players in the league K at very high rates. As long as the OPS stays high, it doesn’t really matter how a guy makes outs anymore.

I should note that 2016 was a breakout year for Demeritte; in years past he didn’t quite live up to his potential, and also served an 80-game PED suspension. These could be the main reasons why he hasn’t garnered much attention yet. He still has to prove himself to most. However, I’m sold. I’d pencil him in for the majority of the 2020s’ ASGs right now.

2. Ramon Laureano – OF – HOU

Laureano has all the tools: he can play any OF spot well, he has speed and pop, and he gets on base. Houston’s farm has taken a bit of a hit due to some trades in the last two years, but that’s because they knew they had guys like Laureano who don’t have super high trade value, but have a chance to be great ML players like the guys they traded. Let’s look at Laureano’s 2016 numbers.

The numbers speak for themselves. This is the making of a star; where is the hype? I know it’s not a huge sample size, and we don’t have much to go off from the previous year either, but in A+ and AA last year he put up those phenomenal numbers you see above.

If those aren’t All-Star numbers, then I don’t know what are. Laureano’s ability to play all three OF spots will keep him in the lineup everyday and help his chances of making it to the ASG. When he does get the call-up, if his numbers stay relatively close to this, there’s no way he doesn’t make three to four All-Star Games. As of now, he’s more of a speed threat, but as he develops, the speed/power combo will even out and he will be an Andrew McCutchen-type player. Keep tabs on this guy.

3. Christin Stewart – OF – DET

While researching Stewart, I couldn’t find an article more recent than September of 2015. There’s no one talking about him…why? As we know, Detroit is aging and looking to deal top players. So, I’m assuming we will be seeing a lot of opportunities for young guys to step up and prove themselves. Detroit’s system isn’t super deep, but that could change anytime if they do decide to move some key pieces. Regardless, I see Stewart as the prospect to watch moving forward; he has the tools to be an All-Star. Let’s check out his numbers from 2016.

The power is impressive, and by this chart he looks even a bit better than the two previous guys I mentioned. However, with the K numbers pretty high up there, and not a whole lot of speed, Stewart is a player that could fall into slumps. Often times, adjusting to the majors can be challenging, and some top prospects never quite figure it out. While Stewart’s MiLB numbers are pretty insane, his slump potential makes him a pretty risky pick here. However, I do believe that if he does indeed figure it out, he will make it to a few ASG and serve as an everyday player in this league for a decade. HRs and BBs get it done. Keep an eye on Stewart.

4. Jason Martin – OF – HOU

Another Houston OF prospect…another future All-Star? I think so. The future is certainly bright over at Minute Maid Park: Altuve is a cornerstone, Correa is a centerpiece, Springer is a baller, and they have prospects for days. If they can just figure out how to pitch, they could be a WS contender for the next eight years.

Why Martin, though? Let’s check out his 2016 numbers from high-A ball.

Impressive, to say the least. At just 20 years old, he pumped out 23 homers in 121 games. He walks every eight at-bats, and he also grabbed 22 bags on the season. The ability to walk and run (lol) will typically keep guys out of major slumps. While Martin is not a highly-touted prospect at this point, I think he will be a household name by 2022. I expect him to get the call-up in 2019 and play a significant role during a pennant race that year. In 2020, he will burst onto the scene and prove his worth to this franchise.

With Houston’s current build, this might be a guy we see dealt if they are trying to add talent at the deadline this year. That doesn’t change my prediction, however. I see Martin suiting up for the ASG a few times throughout his career. Stay posted.

5. Tom Murphy – C – COL

You can’t keep putting Yadier Molina in there every year. And with Buster Posey most likely making that change to 1B full-time within three years, Jonathan Lucroy getting dealt to the AL, Kyle Schwarber playing OF, etc, pathways for guys like Tommy Murphy open up. Making the All-Star Game as a C is not saying as much as other positions, in my opinion. A decent hot streak in the first half will inflate your hitting numbers. For example, Derek Norris in 2014. It may seem like he was the best catcher in the league at the halfway point, but, as usual, it evened out by season’s end.

With that being said, Murphy has proven he has pop, and playing in Colorado is a huge advantage for him. While I don’t think he will be a Hall-of-Fame catcher, I do think he’s flying under the radar right now and will probably open some eyes in 2017. I’d say he makes two appearances in the ASG before 2022. However, once he gets up near 30 and he’s no longer playing in Colorado, I think he will have trouble keeping a job.

I have him on the list, first of all, because he meets the criteria, and also because I think people should pay attention to him, and lastly because he’s ML-ready, unlike the rest of these guys. Trevor Story didn’t have a whole lot of hype; most people didn’t expect him to make the team out of spring, but with the Jose Reyes situation, the kid got a shot and as we all know, he ran with it. I’m not saying Murphy will make a cannonball-esque splash like Story, but I think he will turn some heads and maybe even get some ASG votes this year. Anything can happen, especially in Colorado. Keep tabs on him.

Honorable Mentions

Dylan Cozens – OF – PHI

There’s not a lot of buzz surrounding Cozens, which is surprising to me, because usually when we see 40 HR in 134 games, we really perk up. In his age-22 season, he played all 134 games at the AA level for the Phillies affiliate, Reading Fightin’ Phils, a place where most Phillies prospects prosper. The reason why Cozens doesn’t quite make the cut here is because of the words, “future All-Star.” He is one of those lefties that mash in the right ballpark and against RHP, but usually career platoon hitters, even if they are highly effective, don’t make the ASG.

Rhys Hoskins – 1B – PHI

Hoskins is another AA player in the Phillies system. He probably has a little bit more of a well-rounded hitting ability than does Cozens, but he’s a 1B, and that’s an overloaded position. You have to be incredible to crack that ASG squad, and I just don’t think Hoskins will ever be quite at that level. I do believe he will pan out to be an everyday guy for a good amount of time in this league. He has really good power and he gets on base, two things that will keep you in the lineup more often than not.

Bobby Bradley – 1B – CLE

Bradley is another guy I would keep an eye on; I’m just not sold on him yet. He has a a lot of raw power, but a really high K rate in the low levels of the minors. Also, he’s a 1B, so once again, really hard to make the ASG at that position.

Mariners starter James Paxton is going to win the 2017 American League Cy Young award. You heard it here first.

In baseball, there is no better time of year to have bold, lofty, and irrational expectations than in spring training. But there are numbers to back up this claim, even though he is a 28-year-old who has never made more than 20 starts in a major-league season.

Here is why this is going to happen.

Paxton has always pitched at the level of a top-of-the-rotation starter

There has never been a question about his talent. Paxton debuted in September of 2013, and took the league by storm immediately, posting a 1.50 ERA over 24 innings in four starts. In 2014, his ERA was 3.04 in 74 innings. His worst season, 2015, still featured a decent 3.90 ERA in 13 starts. Not ace-like numbers, but numbers that would put him in the top two or three of most rotations in baseball.

Paxton’s ERA was similar in 2016 (3.79) to his 2015 number, but he made dramatic improvements.

Utilizing a new arm slot taught to him by Tacoma pitching coach Lance Painter, his average fastball velocity rose from 94.2 in 2015 to 96.8 in 2016 — an almost unprecedented gain for a starter. Paxton gained newfound command with his new arm slot, walking just 1.8 batters per nine innings, one walk fewer than his already-good career mark of 2.8.

Digging a little deeper into advanced stats, Paxton’s numbers are similar to the game’s elite. Looking at the FIP of pitchers who threw at least 250 innings from 2013-2016 (the four seasons Paxton has spent time in the majors), Paxton’s 3.32 is 25^th in the league. Teammate Felix Hernandez No. 22 with a 3.27 FIP. The chart below shows where Paxton stands among other left-handed starters.

Paxton’s FIP over the past four seasons is eighth-best among major-league left-handers, and third-best among just the southpaws currently in the American League. That’s consistency.

Looking at 2016, Paxton’s 2.80 FIP ranked fourth-lowest in all of baseball among pitchers with at least 120 innings, and first in the American League. The next-closest American League pitcher, Corey Kluber, had a 3.26 FIP.

When Paxton is on the hill, he’s as good as just about anyone in the league. And his best numbers have come in his most recent season.

At 28, Paxton might still have room to improve. Paxton improved dramatically in 2016 in three major areas that he was already good at — strikeouts, limiting walks, and preventing home runs. In any case, Paxton’s ability to be a top-tier starter is obvious.

About that injured elephant in the room

It’s hard not to notice that Paxton has by far the fewest innings pitched among elite left-handers. It’s true, Paxton hasn’t been able to stay on the field. But his injury history doesn’t reveal the types of injuries one would expect to be recurring or career-derailing.

Paxton has been on the disabled list three times in his career, for a strained left oblique and shoulder inflammation in 2014, a strained tendon in his left middle finger in 2015, and for a sore pitching elbow after getting hit with a line drive in 2016. He also had start pushed back a day due to a torn fingernail.

This paints a picture of bad luck as much as being chronically injury-prone. Paxton has had trouble staying on the field, but it hasn’t been one faulty limb or ligament that just won’t get right. Perhaps he’ll suffer another major injury in 2017, but his injury history alone doesn’t include enough evidence to see it as an inevitability.

The 2017 AL Cy Young field isn’t that intimidating

Clayton Kershaw doesn’t pitch in the American League, so why can’t Paxton reach the summit of the junior circuit? The competition all have their own flaws.

2016 Cy Young winner, Boston’s Rick Porcello, is coming off the best season of his career by far. Not to mention, his teammates and fellow Cy Young contenders David Price and Chris Sale will take turns stealing the spotlight from one another.

It also remains to be seen how Sale adjusts to the right-handed-hitting haven of Fenway Park; teammate David Price saw his surface numbers suffer moving into the hitters’ paradise that is Fenway Park — his ERA ballooned to 3.99.

Among other contenders, Detroit’s Justin Verlander will be turning 34 and is coming off of his best season since 2013. It’s probably more likely that his current ability falls somewhere in between his very good 2014-15 and his Cy Young-caliber 2016.

The most credible threat to Paxton is Cleveland’s Corey Kluber, and he’s now on the wrong side of 30. Kluber also benefited from an above-average defense in 2016, while Paxton had one of the league’s worst defensive teams playing behind him.

As it stands, a thin field, as well as three top contenders’ home ballparks playing against them, gives a healthy Paxton as good of a chance as anyone.

Don’t forget the new outfield defense

Despite his outstanding FIP, Paxton’s ERA was a good-not-great 3.79, and his record was just 6-7. Certainly not Cy Young numbers.

But with a much-improved defense behind him, shaving a run off of his ERA isn’t unrealistic, and would likely increase his win and innings totals.

In 2016, the Mariners outfield defense was atrocious. Nori Aoki took the scenic route to every fly ball. Seth Smith and Nelson Cruz turned in defensive efforts that would be hard to call average in a slow-pitch softball league.

In The Fielding Bible’s defensive runs saved (DRS) stat, the Mariners 2016 outfield had a -27 DRS, making them better than just the Twins, Tigers, and Orioles.

Jarrod Dyson (+19 DRS), Mitch Haniger (+1) and a healthy Leonys Martin (-2) could help turn one of the worst outfields in baseball in 2016 into one of the very best. Paxton will certainly be one of many pitchers benefiting from a greater number of fly balls being turned into outs.

It’s also worth noting that the infield’s three worst gloves — Adam Lind (-2), Dae-Ho Lee (-3) and Ketel Marte (-2) — will be wearing different uniforms in 2017.

With the Mariners upgrading so many spots on defense, Paxton’s ERA should drop significantly. The difference between a 3.80 ERA and 2.80 ERA over 200 innings is 22 runs. If the defense saves him anywhere close that many runs, the additional wins would certainly follow.

Okay, so how does this make him a Cy Young contender?

Everything is in place for Paxton to take his rightful place in the upper echelon of major-league starters. He has the talent, and now a defense behind him that will help him cash in on his nearly limitless potential.

What he needs more than anything is a little good luck with the injury bug. Considering his luck over the past few years, he seems due for that. If that happens, American League hitters will certainly notice.

Paxton is one of the league’s five or 10 best pitchers. Pairing his ability with what should be one of the league’s best defenses should reduce his record and ERA to put him in a peer group with elite guys like Chris Sale, Corey Kluber, and Madison Bumgarner.

(I didn’t mention Clayton Kershaw because he is, of course, peerless.)

James Paxton will be your 2017 American League Cy Young award winner. See you at the award ceremony — or the loony bin.

Brett Miller does the agate page for the print edition of the Seattle Times. He is also a proud Washington State University alum, and good at drinking beer and taking criticism. Complain about this article directly to him at bmiller@seattletimes.com.