Archive for Outside the Box

Let’s Make Four Radical Changes to MLB and the Playoffs

Hello, I’m so glad you’re here. And since you’re here, you’re either open to fantastically wild ideas, or you’re a traditionalist who still can’t believe we have interleague play, wild-card teams, and one-game playoffs. You’re either more than happy to discuss why the DH should be universally adopted, or you’re here to tell me why the NL brand of baseball has “more strategy” because of all the situations regarding when to go to your bullpen instead of letting this happen.

Let me begin by saying that I too used to be, or maybe still am, a baseball traditionalist. I have great respect for the history of the game, but I’d also like to embrace the things that make it great and that can make it a better product for the future. This isn’t about mindlessly making changes to the status quo; rather, it’s choosing the best of what baseball has to offer and featuring it as much as possible.

With that in mind as the backdrop, here are the four radical changes I’d make to Major League Baseball to deliver on what I already see as being the strengths of the sport. At the same time, I propose these changes will minimize the things that are bad for the sport. And yes, the Sawchik Playoff series will be part of the solution in the wild-card round.

MLB Should Universally Adopt the Designated Hitter

Yes. They should. I hear your argument against it. Strategy, right? Or tradition that the pitcher should hit?  It’s a quaint notion. I respect your opinion, but thoughtfully disagree.

Bullpen strategy in baseball is evolving quickly to a point where this decision of “when to pull your starter” very rarely coincides with the decision of whether or not you want him to hit this inning. Reliever specialization and matchup-based decisions are more often than not the tipping point rather than a decision around whether or not to let your starting pitcher hit one more time. There are more frequent decisions around how long can I let a particular reliever pitch, should I use this reliever for more than three outs, or can this reliever pitch for a third consecutive day?

As for the tradition argument, I’d argue that most pitchers stopped trying to be professional hitters decades ago and it’s time we recognize this for what it is: a dying notion. This is about having the best product on the field for fans to watch. Pitchers in 2017 collectively hit .125/.163/.164.  This is bad for baseball.

Try this as a thought exercise. You’re already thinking about him — Madison Bumgarner. He’s a pitcher who can hit and hit home runs. Or if you prefer, Adam Wainwright. Take your pick! In the hypothetical world where the DH exists in the National League I’d argue you could let either of them DH — if you really wanted to see them hit. Would the Giants or Cardinals ever do this? The answer is no. They wouldn’t want to risk injury to a player whose primary role on the team is to take the ball every five days and throw it. So why are we still making them hit?

MLB Should Abolish the National and American Leagues

Now that we’ve universally adopted the DH, we don’t really need the distinction between the National and American League. We already have interleague play every day of the season. There are no NL and AL umpires. There isn’t an AL-only players union. We already associate all-time records with all of MLB and not league-only specific records. This gives us the freedom of making sensible decisions around radical re-alignment.

MLB Should Have Four Divisions and Make the Pennant Race Meaningful

Traditionalists will argue that the current playoffs no longer guarantee that one of the best teams will win the World Series. They’ll argue that the wild card has diminished the meaningfulness of winning your division. They’ll argue that interleague play is silly. I agree with them, but let’s embrace the fact that these things are not going away. What can we do to build upon these ideas and make them better?

First of all, interleague play and its “natural rivals” approach is very flawed from a competitive-balance perspective. I don’t want to eliminate it; rather, I want to embrace it and make it part of the landscape. The best part about baseball are the rivalries and traveling to ballparks in (and outside) of your area to watch teams play. Mets/Yankees? Royals/Cardinals? Yes please! But we can do better through radical geographical re-alignment to enhance these rivalries. At the same time, through natural geographical selection we pit market-size rivals against each other as well.

MLB East (7):  Mets, Yankees, Red Sox, Orioles, Phillies, Nationals, Blue Jays

MLB North (8): Cubs, White Sox, Brewers, Twins, Tigers, Reds, Indians, Pirates

MLB South (7): Marlins,  Rays, Braves, Astros, Rangers, Cardinals, Royals

MLB West (8): Dodgers, Angels, Padres, Diamondbacks, Rockies, Giants, Athletics, Mariners

This setup allows us to retain the geographic rivalries. The seven-team divisions can play each division rival 14 times. The eight-team divisions can play each division rival 13 times. This allows for a single series against every other team in baseball. If you were worried that the Cubs/Cardinals series was going away, it’s not. They still get to play every year.

This is a more balanced approach to scheduling and allows each team to see the game’s star players. Why should Twins fans only get a chance to see Giancarlo Stanton mash 500ft monster blasts once every blue moon? Does a Pirates fan even know who Mike Trout is? Why are we hiding the stars and confining them to their leagues and divisions? Let the fans see and appreciate all the star players.

This format will allow for four division winners, who will all be granted a bye in the first round of the playoffs. This will make for meaningful pennant races and bring back the excitement of winning your division. Winning a division against four other teams and playing those four teams nearly 80 times isn’t exciting. As a Brewers fan, by the time we get into August and September it’s all I can do to watch another series against the Reds or the Cardinals. At the same time, because you’ll only play four series against your divisional foes, it will make those four series just a little more meaningful – especially for the teams battling atop the divisions.

MLB Should Expand the Wild-Card Round To Eight Teams and Adopt the Sawchik/KBO Playoff Format

Travis Sawchik opined that MLB should adopt the KBO playoff format for the wild-card round. This is something I can support.

While we’re at it, let’s face it, the best team is probably not going to win the World Series anymore. Once we stopped playing for a league pennant and had one World Series to crown the best American baseball team, we introduced the idea of the best team not winning the title. It’s a fact that the regular season no longer has much of an impact on the playoffs. We’ve established this.

Joe Sheehan recently wrote in his newsletter that each team in the 2017 playoffs, through expected value calculations, would be expected to have a 4-3 record in any seven-game series, and a 3-2 record in any five-game series. More specifically, he wrote:

“It’s not that the postseason is ‘luck’ or ‘random.’ It’s simply that it’s short, too short for the true differences in ability among baseball teams to play out. You’d rather have the better team, but over five or seven games, ‘better team’ is an almost meaningless distinction except at the extremes.”

The playoffs are simply a tournament for the “better teams in baseball to determine a league champion.” If we wanted the best team to be the champion we’d quit after the regular season and see who had the most wins. It’s for this reason I’ve been suggesting that we as baseball fans #embracethetournament.

Top 12 Teams In Wild Card Era
Rank 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012
1 104-x 103-x 100-x 98-x 97-x 98-x
2 102-x 95-x 98-y 96-x 97-x 97-x
3 101-x 95-x 97-y 96-x 96-x 95-x
4 97-x 94-x 95-x 94-x 96-x 94-x
5 93-x 93-x 93-x 90-x 94-y 94-x
6 93-y 91-x 92-x 90-x 93-x 94-y
7 92-x 89-y 90-x 89-y 92-x 93-y
8 91-y 89-y 88 88-y 92-y 93-y
9 87-y 87-y 87-y 88-y 92-y 90
10 86 87-y 86-y 88-y 91 89
11 85-y 86 85 87 90-y 88-x
12 83 86 84 85 86 88-y

I’m not as radical as you think. I’m not telling MLB to change the rules to let the 12th-best team into the tournament — they already do that (2012 Cardinals). I’m not telling MLB to change the rules to let a wild-card team win the title — they already have (2014 Giants). I’m not telling MLB to change the rules to allow an 85 or 86-win team into the playoffs — they already have (2017 Twins, 2015 Angels).

What I am suggesting is that the expanded playoff pool would increase the popularity of the tournament, and allow MLB to showcase their star players more. The wild-card round could certainly feature the KBO playoff format where the 4-8 seeds host the 9-12 seeds for a best-of-two home playoff series whereby the home team needs to win only one game and the away team needs to win both to advance. We won’t need any Game 163s because teams will have already all played each other three times during the regular season and we can break ties head-to-head.

In this format, this is what the 2017 playoffs would have looked like:

BYES:
#1 Seed – MLB West Champion – Los Angeles Dodgers
#2 Seed – MLB North Champion – Cleveland Indians
#3 Seed – MLB South Champion – Houston Astros
#4 Seed – MLB East Champion – Washington Nationals

WILD CARD ROUND:
(#12) St. Louis Cardinals @ (#5) Boston Red Sox
(#11) Minnesota Twins @ (#6) Arizona Diamondbacks
(#10) Milwaukee Brewers @ (#7) Chicago Cubs
(#9) Colorado Rockies @ (#8) New York Yankees

I’d prefer seven-game series for the Divisional round, Final Four and World Series, but could live with five-game series for the Divisional and Final Four rounds because, at the end of the day, it doesn’t really make it any more or less random.

Conclusion

Major League Baseball has a solid product, but it could be better. By allowing more playoff teams, even if for just one or two games, it creates a chance to see more of the league’s stars in the national spotlight. This is also achieved by letting every team in baseball play every other team in baseball each year (though I concede I don’t know the effects on scheduling). By re-aligning the divisions, MLB can emphasize the natural geographic rivalries without a hokey home-and-home interleague series, while these larger divisions bring back some meaningfulness to the term “pennant winner” by including a bye. Finally, the removal of the American and National Leagues allows for re-seeding of all the playoff teams based on record in each round (if #12 advances, they’d play #1 in the divisional series), and allows both leagues to play under a common DH rule. Don’t misunderstand my grasp on reality here; I understand this would likely never happen — but why not? Can you come up with a reason other than tradition?


Merrill Kelly: A Mid-Rotation Starter in Korea

How many teams are looking for a cheap starting pitcher to be a veteran presence for a young rotation? Looking for an upgrade over what they currently have for starting pitching? Or just need a warm body to fill the hole left by Joe Ross with someone not named Edwin Jackson? As far as I can tell, 10 teams are looking for a 3/4 starter such as Merrill Kelly, especially considering his stats that he has accumulated in this season (maybe he’ll get one more start to add to his excellent season so far) have been particularly impressive. All this when the Rays thought that Merrill Kelly was just a “AAA starter” who could be a bullpen guy in the big leagues.

Merrill Kelly in the minor leagues was a solid minor leaguer who would become a swingman with the Durham Bulls. In his age-25 season, he went 9-4 in 114 IP with a 2.76 ERA, a 3.74 FIP, and a 3.57 xFIP. Which looked good with his 8.53 K/9 and 2.92 BB/9, a .298 BABIP, and a 47.9% ground-ball rate as well. Perhaps he could a solid swingman/fifth starter in the big leagues. The Rays apparently thought otherwise and said either he’d be a bullpen pitcher for the MLB team or a starter in AAA. Merrill Kelly thought otherwise and went to South Korea to play for the SK Wyverns.

Merrill Kelly in South Korea was all right in his first season, with an 11-10 record in 30 games (29 starts), 181 IP, and an ERA of 4.13. With peripheral rates that weren’t as good (6.91 K/9 and 2.69 BB/9). His next season was similar, with a 9-8 record in 31 games, but a great 200 1/3 IP with similar rate stats: 3.68 ERA, 6.83 K/9, and 2.70 BB/9. This year has been very different for him, with a 15-7 record in 29 games and 185 IP with a 3.65 ERA; his rate stats are much more improved, at 8.90 K/9 and 2.14 BB/9.

What is he doing differently to get these improved stats? Why is his ERA as high as it is, despite getting more strikeouts and walking fewer batters? He is allowing more pesky little hits: that is, his defense is not getting as many outs made as it should (1.08 hits per inning this year, vs 1.03 hits per inning in 2015-2016 combined). He has also allowed one more homer and two more doubles than last year, in 15 1/3 fewer IP.

His repertoire:

-4 Seam Fastball – 92-94 MPH (back in 2015, he was throwing 88-91 MPH)

-2 Seam Fastball – couple of miles slower and has slight sink, and runs in an opposite direction. He mixes this pitch well with his fastball

-Cutter – He started to throw this pitch more once he got to Korea and has mixed it well with his other fastballs and change

-Slider – Has a good slider that can break sharply when he’s pitching well. About 83-87 MPH

-Curveball – Decent enough curve but probably not his best pitch. Up 78-80 MPH

-Circle Changeup – Good sinking and running movement. He throws it about 85 MPH. One of his top pitches

What has he improved? Velocity on his pitches, sharper movement to his fastballs and changeup, getting better with the cutter, and improving his control. (This quoted from this article on Reddit: Merrill Kelly scouting report and info, which I think explains his improvements, but I disagree with his assessment of Merrill Kelly’s talent.) Given the talent level of the average hitter in the KBO is around AAA level, he should be able to perform as around a low-3/high-4 starter, as I’d say he is better than the average starter. A funny thing of note is that the Rays have another version of Merrill Kelly named Ryan Yarbrough, who has pitched better than Kelly did at a similar age; hopefully they’ll give him a chance to prove the Rays wrong for letting Merrill Kelly go.

Since he is on the right side of 30 and will pitch the 2018 season at age 29, I’d offer him a three-year deal worth $6 million per year with incentives that could boost the value of the deal to around $24 million over three years, with an option for a fourth season at $7 million (buyout of $2 million) with incentives to boost the option value to $10 million. This is due to his risk, and likely lower than what Phil Hughes was offered after the 2013 season from the Twins.

Who are the 10 teams that could use Merrill Kelly as a starting pitcher? The answers might be more surprising at first glance than other answers. The best choice would be the Miami Marlins for the same reasons listed, but it could become a wild-card contender taking a chance for Kelly to make more money in a playoff cut. The second-best choice is one that is pretty questionable, depending on whether the Nationals are willing to take a risk on a player from the KBO and whether they want someone better than him. But he’d be great for them in place of Joe Ross, and would be an upgrade over their current options; plus he would be cheap enough to fit in their payroll. One issue is that the Nationals have a hitter-friendly park, but not having to face the Nationals would mitigate some of those concerns. The San Diego Padres would be the third-best choice due to the non-DH league, an extremely pitcher-friendly park according to MLB park factors, and multiple available rotation spots, but they are in a tough NL West and aren’t likely to be a playoff team.

The next one is questionable but they would certainly be able to make room for him — the Oakland A’s have always been unconventional, and the park is usually known for being pitcher-friendly. The Twins would be similar to the A’s in those respects and are in fact a playoff threat (I didn’t expect to be saying this about the Twins this year at all). The Royals are practically in a tie with the Twins and A’s due to a pitcher-friendly park, although their team is going to be worse due to many key players leaving (Cain, Hosmer, and Moustakas).

Despite the Rangers having a definite hole in the rotation (who would let Nick Martinez or A.J. Griffin start in an extreme hitter-friendly park?), they are the seventh-best option due to that park, the DH league, and just not having a great team in general. The White Sox are an even more extreme version of the Rangers, and are extremely bad as well; I doubt he’d want to play for such a poor team. Same with the Reds, except there is no DH, but the Reds might want to give younger options a try first. The Orioles have almost all the bad factors: A league with a DH, a hitter-friendly park, a tough division, a bad defensive team, and generally bad development staff that has done more harm than good for its pitchers.

I would love to see one of the top six teams sign Kelly to a contract, since those would be best for him getting another contract after the first one expires. Can’t wait for him to get his shot in the big leagues, to prove his previous doubters wrong, and to have a long and successful career in the MLB.

All stats are owned by their respective owners (ESPN, FanGraphs, KBO, Reddit), I own none of the stats used. All stats are as of 9-23-2017.


What if Postseason Winners Got to Draft Postseason Losers?

The MLB playoffs had not changed its format for the past 13 years. This season, however, we will see a “minor” change taking place during the World Series. The home-field advantage will belong to the team with the best regular-season record, thus ending the already established tradition of it pertaining to the league that won the All-Star Game in July. As this is not a mind-blowing change, I’m here to propose something much more interesting that will probably never happen, but still.

What if after each round of the postseason, from the wild-card games to the league championships, the players of each losing team entered a pool from which the winning teams could draft some of them for the next round of the playoffs?

First of all, we must recognise that we hate when a player gets injured and misses playing time. Were it in our hands, we’d put our favourite players on the field for the 162 games, make them bat first, get as many plate appearances as possible, and see their numbers grow during the summer and into the autumn with pleasure. Even more, how frustrating it is when one of our favourite players, or just one of the best players of the game (hello, Mike Trout!) is stuck on a franchise that never ever makes it to the postseason, or that every time it does it seems to not be able to advance past the first round?

On top of this, there is the seeding and the way we watch underdogs trying to beat the odds and outplay the best teams of the regular season on a yearly basis, which in all honestly is nothing crazy given how much of a lottery the game becomes once we reach October. Wouldn’t it be great to do something to even the field a little and make the “bad” teams get more on par with the “good” teams during the playoffs?

Enter the Losers-Turned-Into-Winners Draft! Let’s explain the basics and then run some historical simulations based on them.

The idea behind this system is pretty simple. As things are nowadays, the best team from each division of the American and National Leagues automatically makes the playoffs, followed by two wild-card teams that can come from any of the divisions and are determined by their record during the regular season. We can therefore assume that the two wild-card teams from each league, which have a round of the postseason exclusively dedicated to them, are the two worst teams from each side of the bracket. Once a winner is named, that team advances to the Divisional Series and faces the best-seeded divisional champion. Seeds number two and three also go against each other, and after that the Championship Series of each league comes to fruition to determine who will face who in the World Series.

What I propose is to take advantage of the seeds assigned to each team at the start of the postseason, and play a two-round draft after each round of the playoffs is finalised, with the picking order going from worst-to-best remaining seeds. Each team would be able to pick two players, no restrictions applied to their position (so they can pick two batters, two pitchers, or a combination of both), and players from all losing teams would be available at the draft for any team, no matter the league they play for. Once a draft is completed, the players left unselected are removed from the pool, so players not selected during the draft held after the wild-card round are no longer available for the draft held after the Divisional Series, and so on.

This system would solve some of the problems fans need to deal with during each season, and most of all would make the playoffs as exciting and competitive as they could get. Every star player would get far more chances to win the World Series (who is going to pass on Kershaw if the Dodgers fall at any point?) during his career, players wouldn’t mind re-signing long-term deals with the franchises they’ve always played for as they would “only” need to reach the postseason in order to have a shot at the title from multiple angles and not only depending on the success of their team, low-seeded teams (supposedly worse than the rest of the field) would have influxes of talent as long as they progress as they would pick first in those drafts, and fans would have even more events to get excited about during an already exciting time. Don’t fool yourself, this is a win-win master plan!

Let’s take a look at how the 2016 MLB postseason could have changed had this draft-system being in place. To not make this too confusing, we will leave the results of each round as they were without taking into account the players taken by each team after each round’s draft. We would comment on how those picks could have affected the outcome of the playoffs, though.

The wild-card round made Toronto face Baltimore for a place in the AL Divisional Series against Texas. In the National League, San Francisco had to play against New York to stay alive. After those two games were played, the Blue Jays and the Giants made it to the second round. What would this have meant in our loser-draft system? Given the regular-season results, San Francisco (.537 W-L%) would have picked first and Toronto (.549 W-L%) second in a draft with a pool made out of the rosters of both the Mets and Orioles. Without much thinking applied to player valuations, these would have been the best-WAR players available per Baseball-Reference.com:

  1. Manny Machado, 3B (BAL): 6.7 WAR
  2. Noah Syndergaard, P (NYM): 5.3 WAR
  3. Zach Britton, P (BAL): 4.3 WAR
  4. Kevin Gausman, P (BAL): 4.2 WAR
  5. Chris Tillman, P (BAL): 4.1 WAR
  6. Jacob deGrom, P (NYM): 3.8 WAR
  7. Bartolo Colon, P (NYM): 3.4 WAR
  8. Chris Davis, 1B (BAL): 3.0 WAR
  9. Yoenis Céspedes, LF (NYM): 2.9 WAR
  10. Asdrúbal Cabrera, SS (NYM): 2.7 WAR

With a rotation already featuring Cueto, Bumgarner and Samardzija, among others, San Francisco could have added Manny Machado to replace Conor Gillaspie (1.1 WAR). Toronto may have followed that selection with that of Syndergaard (back up north!) in order to improve their rotation for the Divisional Series, and the last two picks could have gone either way with top-notch players on the board (San Francisco could have gone Yoenis’ way to move from Angel Pagan, and Toronto with Chris Davis to replace Justin Smoak at first). If that is not an improvement, you tell me what is.

Moving onto the Divisional Round, the Dodgers, Cubs, Indians and Blue Jays defeated the Nationals, Giants, Red Sox and Rangers, respectively. In this case, both Machado and Céspedes would become available again, and enter the draft pool for the remaining four teams. This again goes in favour of star players, as they would keep moving onto later rounds if they’re still good enough as to keep being selected round after round, and we all want to watch the best players competing for the highest stakes. These are the second round’s best available players, again per Baseball-Reference.com WAR (keep in mind all players from New York and Baltimore, barring those selected by San Francisco – now eliminated from contention – are no longer available):

  1. Mookie Betts, RF (BOS): 9.5 WAR
  2. Manny Machado, 3B (BAL/SFG): 6.7 WAR
  3. Adrian Beltre, 3B (TEX): 6.5 WAR
  4. Max Scherzer, P (WSN): 6.2 WAR
  5. Dustin Pedroia, 2B (BOS): 5.7 WAR
  6. Johnny Cueto, P (SFG): 5.6 WAR
  7. Tanner Roark, P (WSN): 5.5 WAR
  8. Jackie Bradley, CF (BOS): 5.3 WAR
  9. Rick Porcello, P (BOS): 5.1 WAR
  10. David Ortiz, 1B/DH (BOS): 5.1 WAR
  11. Madison Bumgarner, P (SFG): 5 WAR
  12. Cole Hamels, P (TEX): 5 WAR
  13. Buster Posey, C (SFG): 4.6 WAR
  14. Daniel Murphy, 2B (WSN): 4.6 WAR
  15. Brandon Crawford, SS (SFG): 4.5 WAR

By this point, and looking at the regular-season results, the seeding for the draft would make teams pick in the following order: Toronto (.549 W-L%), Los Angeles (.562), Cleveland (.584) and Chicago (.640). Judging by the wild-card draft picks already made by the Blue Jays and the rest of their roster, we may infer their first pick would be Mookie Betts to replace Michael Saunders in left field. Los Angeles would probably look to improve their offense with their first pick, which could have been Dustin Pedroia in order to remove Utley from the lineup. Cleveland, given their not-so-great pitching staff, would have selected Scherzer in a hurry, and Chicago may have closed the first round of selections with that of Buster Posey to get aging David Ross out from behind the plate.

With pretty much every roster spot already stacked for every team, the second round would become some sort of a best-available-pick affair. I’m betting on Toronto getting Manny Machado and finding a spot for him, taking advantage of the designated-hitter slot in the lineup. The Dodgers could improve their pitching rotation with the addition of Johnny Cueto. Cleveland’s outfield would welcome the addition of Jackie Bradley more than anything. And finally the Cubs would close this round by going the pitching route and picking Madison Bumgarner.

Without taking those additions into account and respecting what happened in real-world MLB, after the Divisional Round finished the two teams making the World Series for the 2016 season were the Chicago Cubs and the Cleveland Indians, which means every player from Toronto’s and Los Angeles’ rosters (including those being picked in the first two drafts) become available in the final postseason draft event. Let’s take a look at the best players on the board by their regular-season WAR:

  1. Mookie Betts, RF (BOS/TOR): 9.5 WAR
  2. Josh Donaldson, 3B (TOR): 7.5 WAR
  3. Manny Machado, 3B (BAL/SFG/TOR): 6.7 WAR
  4. Corey Seager, 3B (LAD): 6.1 WAR
  5. Dustin Pedroia, 2B (BOS/LAD): 5.7 WAR
  6. Johnny Cueto, P (SFG/LAD): 5.6 WAR
  7. Clayton Kershaw, P (LAD): 5.6 WAR
  8. Noah Syndergaard, P (NYM/TOR): 5.3 WAR
  9. Justin Turner, 3B (LAD): 5.1 WAR
  10. Aaron Sanchez, P (TOR): 4.9 WAR
  11. J.A. Happ, P (TOR): 4.5 WAR
  12. Edwin Encarnación, 1B/DH (TOR): 3.7 WAR
  13. Marco Estrada, P (TOR): 3.5 WAR
  14. Joc Pederson, CF (LAD): 3.4 WAR
  15. Kevin Pillar, CF (TOR): 3.4 WAR

As can be seen, five of the best 15 players available come from teams already out of contention, with Manny Machado being the only one having made it through the first two postseason drafts by going from Baltimore to San Francisco to Toronto, which proves his value among his peers. The Blue Jays, both from their original roster and their picks, provide nine of the 15 players, while the Dodgers only add four original men and two acquired through the draft.

In terms of what Chicago and Cleveland could do in order to create the best possible rosters with the World Series in mind, multiple approaches could be taken by them. Both teams made the finals without playing in the wild card, so they only have two draftees each between their players – not that they need much more. As Cleveland finished the season with a worse record, the Indians would pick first, and they’d probably take Clayton Kershaw because you just simply don’t pass on the best pitcher of his era. Chicago’s pitching is already stacked, so they would probably look at the outfield and bring Mookie Betts in. Jose Ramirez had a great season for Cleveland in 2016, and it would be hard for the Indians to leave Donaldson on the board, although they may look at the outfield options and pick someone like Pillar or Pederson to get Lonnie Chisenhall out of the lineup. Let’s go Joc Pederson here. Finally, Chicago would close the draft by taking Johnny Cueto, as they don’t even have holes to fill in their offense at this point.

And with this third and final couple of draft rounds, the postseason would end in a World Series win for the Cubs over the Indians in a series that would feature two incredibly great teams that through the course of the playoffs would have added the names of Betts, Scherzer, Cueto, Kershaw, Bradley, Bumgarner, Posey and Pederson to their rosters. Are you telling me those eight players wouldn’t make the final meetings of the season much more exciting than they could ever be? While I haven’t applied much thought to each selection and I’ve based them mostly on each player’s WAR or flagrant team needs, the process could turn into a really tough war between teams at the time of picking players not only for their benefit but also to block other franchises from taking them, and improving spots where they may lack a player of certain quality, be it in their hitting lineup or in their pitching rotation.

This winners-draft-losers type of draft will probably (definitely) never happen. There would be much trouble implementing it and a lot of collateral implications that make it impossible to be a real thing. But hey, at least we can dream of a parallel world where Mike Trout could reach the World Series each and every seas– oh, yes, I forgot he plays for the Angels…


dScore: End of August SP Evaluations

I went over the starters version of dScore here, so I’m not going to re-visit that here. I’ll just jump right in with the list!

Top Performing SP by Arsenal, 2017
Rank Name Team dScore +/-
1 Corey Kluber Indians 69.41 +2
2 Max Scherzer Nationals 62.97 -1
3 Chris Sale Red Sox 56.82 -1
4 Clayton Kershaw Dodgers 55.26 +1
5 Noah Syndergaard Mets 47.39 +2
6 Stephen Strasburg Nationals 47.24 +5
7 Danny Salazar Indians 43.46 +16
8 Randall Delgado Diamondbacks 42.00 +1
9 Luis Castillo Reds 37.99 +5
10 Alex Wood Dodgers 40.72 -8
11 Zack Godley Diamondbacks 39.55 -1
12 Luis Severino Yankees 39.24 +1
13 Jacob deGrom Mets 36.69 -1
14 Dallas Keuchel Astros 37.37 -8
15 James Paxton Mariners 35.81 +1
16 Carlos Carrasco Indians 34.23 +4
17 Sonny Gray Yankees 30.59 UR
18 Brad Peacock Astros 29.98 +6
19 Lance McCullers Astros 32.18 -11
20 Buck Farmer Tigers 31.31 UR
21 Nate Karns Royals 30.21 -2
22 Zack Greinke Diamondbacks 29.45 -4
23 Charlie Morton Astros 28.55 UR
24 Kenta Maeda Dodgers 27.40 -7
25 Masahiro Tanaka Yankees 26.83 -3

 

Risers/Fallers

Danny Salazar (+16) – dScore never gave up on him, despite him being absolute trash early on this year. He came back and dominated, launching him up the ranks even farther in the process. Current status: injured. Again.

Sonny Gray (newly ranked) – If there were any doubts about the Gray the Yankees dealt for, he’s actually surpassed his dScore from his fantastic 2015 season. He’s legit (again).

Alex Wood (-8) – Looks like the shoulder issues took a bit of a toll on his stuff, but dScore certainly isn’t out on him.

Dallas Keuchel (-8) – Keuchel’s stuff isn’t the issue. He’s still a buy for me.

Lance McCullers (-11) – Poor Astros. Maybe not too poor though; their aces have gotten hammered but haven’t fallen far at all. McCullers is going to bounce back.

 

The Studs

Some light flip-flopping at the top, with Kluber taking over at #1 from Scherzer. The Klubot’s been SO unconscious. Everyone else is pretty much the usual suspects.

 

The Young Breakouts (re-visited)

Zack Godley (11) – He’s keeping on keeping on. He barely moved since last month’s update, and I’m all-in on him being a stud going forward.

Luis Castillo (9) – He’s certainly done nothing to minimize the hype. In fact, he’s added a purely disgusting sinker to his arsenal and it’s raising the value of everything he throws. Also, from a quick glance at the Pitchf/x leaderboards, two things stand out to me. He seems to have two pitches that line up pretty closely to two top-end pitches: his four-seamer has a near clone in Luis Severino’s, and his changeup is incredibly similar to Danny Salazar’s. That’s a nasty combo.

James Paxton (15) 

 

The Test Case

Buck Farmer (20) – Okay, so to be honest when he showed up on this list, I absolutely thought it was a total whiff. By ERA he’s been a waste, but he’s really living on truly elite in-zone contact management, swinging strikes, K/BB, and hard-hit minimization. His pitch profile is middling (not bad, but not great either), so I really don’t think he’s going to stay this high much longer. He’s certainly doing enough to earn this spot right now, and I’d expect him to not run a 6+ ERA for much longer.

 

The Loaded Teams

Yankees – Luis Severino (12), Sonny Gray (17), Masahiro Tanaka (25) / Some teams have guys higher up, but the Yankees are loaded up and down.

Astros – Dallas Keuchel (14), Lance McCullers (19), Brad Peacock (18), Charlie Morton (23) / Similar to the Yankees. Morton and Peacock are having simply phenomenal years.

 

The Dropouts

Rich Hill (39)

Trevor Cahill (35)

Marcus Stroman (28)

Poor Rich Hill. Lost his perfect game, then lost the game, then lost his spot in the top 25. Cahill’s regressed to #DumpsterFireTrevor since his trade to the Royals. Stroman really didn’t fall that far…and his slider is still a work of art.

 

The Just Missed

Jordan Montgomery (26) – Too bad the Yankees couldn’t send down Sabathia instead. This kid is good.

Aaron Nola (27) – #Ace

Carlos Martinez (29) – Martinez simply teases ace upside, but frankly I think you can pretty much lump him and Chris Archer (30) in the same group — high strikeouts, too many baserunners and sub-ace starts to move into the top tier.

Dinelson Lamet (32) – He’s absolutely got the stuff. He could stand to work on his batted-ball control though.

Jimmy Nelson (34) – dScore buys his changes. He finished at #148 last year. I’ll call him a #2/3 going forward.

 

Notes from Farther Down

Jose Berrios is all the way down to 47. His last month cost him 19 spots, but frankly it could be much worse: Sean Manaea lost 39 spots, down to 87. Manaea really looks lost out there. I don’t want to point at the shoulder injury he had earlier this year since his performance really didn’t drop off after that…but I’m wondering if he’s suffering from some fatigue that’s not helped by that. He’s pretty much stopped throwing his toxic backfoot slider to righties, and that’s cost him his strikeouts. Michael Wacha is another Gray-like Phoenix: he’s up to 52 on the list, once again outperforming his 2015 year. I’m cautiously buying him as a #3 with upside. And finally, buzz round: Mike Clevinger (33)Alex Meyer (36)Robbie Ray (38)Rafael Montero (41), and Jacob Faria (43) are already ranked quite highly, and outside of Montero and maybe Meyer I could see all of them bumping up even higher. Clevinger’s really only consistency away from being a legitimate stud.

 

My next update will be the end-of-season update, so I think I’m going to do a larger ranking than just the top 25; maybe all the way down to 100. Enjoy the last month-plus!


The Correlation Between BABIP Rate and Three True Outcomes

First things first, I would like to credit my friend Elling Hofland for coming up with the main idea of this piece. He’s the one who provided me with his thoughts and theories that allowed me to expand on this topic in the first place. Give him a follow on Twitter for sports and stats-related banter; his handle is @ellinghofland.

BABIP, or batting average on balls in play, is an incredibly useful stat. It does a fantastic job at using both luck and quality of contact to give a better grasp as to how a player actually performs during batted-ball events. These batted-ball events only take up a certain percentage of a player’s plate appearances. BABIP rate focuses on how many plate appearances a player has relative to the number of batted-ball events they have. To calculate BABIP rate, you take at bats minus strikeouts and home runs, plus sacrifice flies, and divide that by plate appearances. For example, if a player has 600 PA during a single season along with a 300 batted-ball events, they have a BABIP rate of .500.

Now, if you look at the three variables taken out of that equation, you’re left with walks, strikeouts, and home runs, otherwise known as the “three true outcomes.” These are called true outcomes due to the fact that none of them (for the most part) involve defense on the field. A shortstop can’t screw up a strikeout, walk, or a home run. You can take these three true outcomes and turn them into a rate as well. If you add up a player’s strikeouts, walks, and home runs and then divide them by plate appearances, you get TTO rate.

Let’s look at Mike Trout. In 2017, Trout’s BABIP currently sits at .369. However, he has a BABIP rate of .550 along with a TTO rate of .435, meaning that 55% of his at bats end with a ball in play, while 43.5% of his plate appearances result in a strikeout, walk, or home run. Both BABIP rate and TTO rate are useful stats, as they essentially show how well and how often a player makes contact. While BABIP itself is useful, it can be hard to tell how luck is involved in a batted-ball event when it isn’t hit over a fence for a homer. BABIP rate attempts to bridge the gap between BABIP and the three true outcomes.

Miguel Sano is a well-known slugger. In his three seasons in the majors, he’s smashed the ball when he’s hit it, boasting exit velocities of 94.0 in 2015, 92.3 in 2016, and 93.1 in 2017. Despite these consistent EVs, his BABIP has fluctuated from 2015 to 2017, with marks of .396, .329, and .385, respectively. If we look at his BABIP rate from 2015-2017, they look like this: .429, .478, and .473. Despite the difference in his BABIP from 2016 to 2017, his BABIP rate has stayed nearly the same, meaning that he’s still making the same amount of contact with the ball despite fewer balls falling for hit in 2016. Looking solely at BABIP, it could be argued that 2016 was his “regression” to where he should be after sporting an incredibly high BABIP in 2015. In 2017, one could say his high BABIP is a cause for concern, as he may just be getting lucky. However, his BABIP rate shows that isn’t the case.

Let’s look at another player, Brandon Phillips. Phillips’ BABIP has been incredibly consistent during his past three years, sitting at .315 in 2015, .312 in 2016, and .305 in 2017. Additionally, his BABIP rates have been .820, .816 and .802. Phillips puts the ball in play nearly 80% of the time on a regular basis.

So, as you can imagine, there is a real link between BABIP rate and TTO rate. The more contact a player makes, less they tend to walk or strikeout. Thus, a high BABIP rate equals a low TTO rate. This is exactly what we see if we attempt to correlate these two stats. Below is a snapshot of a graph that shows TTO rate vs. BABIP rate.

TTO vs BABIP rate

Players names aren’t included because, A) it clutters the graph, and B) they aren’t necessary at this point. Accompanying this graph is a trend line with an R squared value, otherwise known as a correlation coefficient. Essentially, an R squared value measures how well your model fits your data, or in this case, how closely correlated  TTO and BABIP rate are to each other. It turns out that the R-squared value is .991, which means that the relationship between BABIP rate and TTO rate fit very well together: in fact, you’ll find that TTO rate and BABIP rate are almost the exact opposites of each other. The players with the top 10 lowest BABIP rates in the MLB all have TTO rates of .437 or higher, meaning that their at bats result in an outcome of a walk, home run or strikeout 43.7% of the time. Inversely, players with the lowest BABIP rates all have TTO rates of .225 or lower.

We can also derive more information from these numbers using this correlation. Players who have a low BABIP rate have a very high OPS. Remember, these players also have high TTO rates. The top 10 players, Judge, Sano, K. Davis, Souza Jr., Reynolds, Morrison, J. Upton, C. Santana, Lamb, and Stanton all have an OPS of .841 or higher. The players with the highest BABIP rates (or lowest TTO rates) have an OPS of .798 or lower.

BABIP rate can tell us a lot of about a player. Just by glancing at a player’s BABIP rate, you can have an instant idea of how often the player walks, strikes out, or hits dingers. Not only that, but it you can tell you a lot about their offensive production. High TTO rates usually mean high hard-hit rates along with high exit velocities. BABIP rate also helps understand BABIP itself better and teaches that you can’t judge a player by BABIP all the time. In most cases, players with an over-inflated BABIP (relative to past performances), just tend to mash the absolute heck out of the ball, as told by their low BABIP rates and high TTO rates. On the opposite end, players with a steady BABIP will have very high BABIP rates and tend to be contact hitters that put the ball in play and don’t hit for power. BABIP rate, along with its correlation to TTO rate, has the potential to be a powerful, tell all offensive stat.


Maikel Franco Is Adjusting

Baseball Prospectus, in their 2015 scouting report of Maikel Franco, had this to say:

“Extremely aggressive approach; will guess, leading to misses or weak contact against soft stuff; gets out in front of ball often—creates hole with breaking stuff away; despite excellent hand-eye and bat speed, hit tool may end up playing down due to approach…”

We saw early this year, and even last year, that exact prediction come to life. Franco seemed to be flailing about vs the soft stuff, beating too many pitches into the ground, and even popping too many up. He never really stopped hitting the ball hard, but we saw too many of those hit in non-ideal ways. For most of the first part of this year the slider gave him absolute fits, and Alex Stumpf wrote about that here. He’s striking out at a career-low rate (13% on the year), but he still isn’t really walking that much although it’s bounced up a percentage point from last year (7.3% in 2017).

Here’s a rundown of his career batted-ball profiles:

ballprofile

I was watching the Phillies game vs. the Marlins on the 18th, and Franco went 3-4 with the go-ahead HR off Dustin McGowan. His HR came on a slider middle-away — literally the exact pitch that’s done nothing but given him fits all year. I also noticed that his batting stance seemed to be different. More upright, quieter. I pulled up a highlight video of an at-bat from early May. Here’s a screencap of his stance just before the pitcher starts his delivery:

francold

That AB ended in an RBI line drive to right. Here’s a screencap of the HR in question from Tuesday, at a similar point in the pitcher’s delivery:

franconew

Now if that’s not a mechanical change, I don’t know what is. He’s closed off his stance, eliminated a lot of the knee bend, and seems to have raised his hands juuuuuust a touch. It could be the difference in the camera angle though. Phillies hitting coach Matt Stairs mentioned they’d been trying to get Franco to cut down on his leg kick, so let’s look at that too:
Old leg kick:

oldlegkick

New:

newlegkick

Shortly after contact, old:

pocold

and the recent HR, similar point:

newpoc

The “leg kick” seems to be more of a toe tap, and hasn’t changed. What did change, though, is the quality of his follow-through. His head is on ball, he’s better transferred his weight to his front foot, and the results follow. The old AB was a line-drive single opposite field, which looks less of an intentional opposite-field hit and more of a product of bad mechanics. Being so open, he really could only go to right field with authority. If he tried to pull it he’d roll over the pitch. That also would cause him to struggle with the breaking pitch away, which he’d bounce to second. Closing off has allowed him to better get the bat head into a more ideal position to cover the whole plate with authority. He’s always had the bat control to make contact everywhere, but it looks now like he’s improved his chances of making quality contact all over the zone. Here’s the same look at his batted-ball profile since the start of July:

bballnew

Here’s some assorted metrics, same time period:

kbbnew

vs. his career metrics:

metricscareer

He’s cut his grounders by over 10%, raised his liners by 3%, and turned the rest into fly balls (8%). He’s likely always going to have a pop-up issue, but his pull/center/oppo profile is back to where he was at in 15/16, and he’s hitting the ball hard at a higher rate than ever. Also, his strikeout rate is 6%(!!!!!!)!!!!! He’s making more contact than ever, and that contact is better than ever.

We’ve seen Franco get us hyped before, but never before has there been this type of major mechanical change to point to. Miguel Sano did something similar preseason by raising his hands and quieting his pre-swing load, and it’s paid dividends. Since I started this article, Franco went 2-4 with a single, double, and sac fly; and three of those batted-ball events were hit at 100+mph (the single and double; he was robbed by the 3B on a sharp liner as well).

Going back to his 2015 scouting report: Franco’s still aggressive, if not slowly becoming less aggressive the more he’s in the majors. By changing up his stance, however, he’s closed up the two major holes in his report: getting out in front of the breakers away, and bad contact on soft stuff. Keep an eye on this. One of the more frustrating hyped prospects seems to have made the transformation we all hoped he would, right in front of our eyes.


The Bad Aaron Judge Comps

Aaron Judge is good.  Some might say he is great.  The front-runner for AL Rookie of the Year and MVP is the face of MLB for 2017, but the face of MLB for the future?  Unfortunately, maybe not.

It’s hard to find something negative to say about the New York Yankees right fielder, but in order to play devil’s advocate and not get our hopes up too high about Aaron Judge, just in the event that he has a down season, I was able to find some rather unflattering comps for the slugger.

First, there’s his minor-league career.  Aaron Judge was a pretty good prospect ranking first in the Yankees’ system in 2015 and 17th in baseball according to MLB Pipeline.  However, just because a prospect is ranked highly does not mean they are without flaws.  Judge would strike out in at least 21 percent of his plate appearances in all levels in the minor leagues.  This article from 2016 even identified Judge’s proficiency to strikeout:  

Judge’s Triple-A debut at the end of 2015 did not go well. He slashed .224/.308/.373, well below both his career levels and expectations. More alarming, he struck out a career high 28.5-percent of the time (74 times in 260 plate appearances). [The 2016 season] has been more of the same. His batting average is a bit deceiving sitting at .284 (heading into this weekend), considering he currently has a nice .354 BABIP compared to last seasons .289. His plate discipline is troubling.

Perhaps the lofty expectations of Judge have him pressing. You simply can’t overlook the fact that his strikeout rate is nearly identical to the small sample size of last season’s Triple-A numbers (27.2-percent). It has to be at least a slight bit worrisome that this is a trend and not a slump. His walk right is dropping daily to a new career low (6.8-percent or eight walks in 103 plate appearances).

The article seems to point to his plate discipline as his main flaw — as other evaluators have — but is overall positive with his prospect status.  But his strikeout tendency should not be overlooked.  He has failed to improve on that statistic in his short major-league career, where he has struck out in 32 percent of his plate appearances between his call-up in 2016 and now.  However, because he also takes his walks, his walk percentage is rather high, which puts him in exclusive company.

Since 2000, there have only been four players with at least 300 plate appearances who have struck out in over 29 percent of their plate appearances and walked in at least 16 percent of them: Jack Cust (2007, 2008, 2010, 2011), Ryan Howard (2007), Adam Dunn (2012), and Aaron Judge (2017).  All of these seasons resulted in wRC+ well above 100, which means that they were productive players; however, these player were known to be the embodiment of the “three-true-outcome” hitters.  Dunn had five consecutive seasons of 40 or more home runs, but also led the league in strikeouts four times; Cust led the league in walks once and strikeouts three times; and Howard led the league in home runs twice and strikeouts twice.  Admittedly, these comps are not encouraging.  Although these players were not horrible in the simplest definition, their careers were short-lived and their production sharply declined.  For Cust and Dunn, it forced an early retirement, and Howard a well-publicized and sad end to an illustrious career.

But it’s not just Aaron Judge’s strikeout and walk percentage — it’s also his raw strikeout numbers.  Judge is on pace to strike out over 200 times this season.  While it’s already been established that he is strikeout-prone, it does not serve him justice that the 200-strikeout threshold is upon him.  No player who has struck out 200 or more times in a season has had a very high average.  As the legendary Pete Rose noted, the highest single-season average for a player with 200 or more strikeouts was .262 (Chris Davis holds that honor).  The short list of 200 single-season strikeout players is a whopping five players long: Mark Reynolds, Adam Dunn, Chris Davis, Chris Carter, and Drew Stubbs.  Kris Bryant had 199 in his rookie season (he was called up late to the bigs due to service-time considerations, so it’s likely that he would have joined this club), and Ryan Howard had 199 twice and Jack Cust had 197 once.  Dunn, Howard, and Cust again…

I love Aaron Judge, and I love 500-plus foot home runs, but we also have to be realistic and rational in our love and praise for the slugger.  The worst thing that the New York sports world can do is rattle this kid if, and when, he goes from being an All-Star to the 25th man on a roster.  There is nothing I want to see more, as a Yankees fan and a baseball fan, than Judge succeed; it’s good for the sport.  But I also don’t want to get my hopes up too high, because nothing stings more than a player of his caliber going down the path of Adam Dunn, Jack Cust, or Ryan Howard.


Introducing XRA: The New Results-Independent Pitching Stat

There are a multitude of ways that we can judge pitchers. Most people look at earned run average to gauge whether a pitcher has been successful, while many old school announcers will still cite a pitcher’s win-loss record. ERA is a nice, easy way of looking at how a pitcher has performed at limiting runs, but it doesn’t come close to telling the whole story. In the early 2000s, Voros McCracken created the idea of Defense Independent Pitching Stats or DIPS, which credited the pitcher only with what he could actually control. Fielding Independent Pitching was born from this theory and only took into account a pitcher’s strikeouts, walks and home runs allowed. It turns out that a pitcher’s home run rate is not terribly consistent, thus xFIP was created by Dave Studeman to normalize the home run aspect of the FIP equation by using the league home run per fly ball rate and the pitcher’s fly ball rate.

In 2015, a new metric was developed by Jonathan Judge, Harry Pavlidis and Dan Turkenkopf called Deserved Run Average or DRA. This new stat attempts to take into account every aspect that the pitcher has control over and control for everything that he does not, thus crediting the pitcher only for the runs that he actually deserves. DRA, however, is still dependent on the result of each batted ball. If the batter hits a ball deep in the gap and it rolls to the wall, the pitcher is charged with a double, but if the center fielder lays out and makes a remarkable catch, the pitcher is credited with an out. When evaluating pitchers, why should it matter whether they have a Gold Glove caliber defender behind them or not? It shouldn’t, and that’s where Expected Run Average comes in.

Expected Run Average or XRA gives pitchers credit for what they actually can control. FIP attempts to do this as well but assumes that pitchers have no control over batted balls. While the pitcher does not control how the fielders interact with the live ball, he does have an impact on the type of contact that he allows. XRA is based on a modified DIPS theory that the pitcher controls three things: whether he strikes the batter out, whether he walks the batter and the exit velocity, launch angle combination off the bat. After the ball leaves the batter’s bat, the play is out of the pitcher’s hands and should no longer have any effect on his statistics. The goal is to figure out a way to measure, independently of the defense and park, how each pitcher performs on balls in play. Since 2015, StatCast has tracked the exit velocity and launch angle of every batted ball in the majors. Each batted ball has a hit probability based on the velocity off of the bat and its trajectory. The probability for extra bases can also be determined. These batted ball probabilities have been linearly weighted for each event including strikeouts and walks to give each player’s xwOBA, which can be found on Baseball Savant. This is the perfect way to look specifically at how well a pitcher has performed on a per plate appearance basis.

Once xwOBA is found, then XRA can be calculated. The first objective is to find the pitcher’s weighted runs below average. To do this, I used the weighted runs above average formula from FanGraphs except I made it negative since fewer runs are better for pitchers.

wRBA = – ((xwOBA – League wOBA) / wOBA Scale) * TBF

For example, Max Scherzer has had a .228 xwOBA so far this season and has faced 487 batters. After finding the league wOBA and wOBA scale numbers at FanGraphs I can plug these numbers into the formula.

– ((.228 – .321) / 1.185) * 487 = 38.22

Max Scherzer has been 38.22 runs better than average so far this season, but now I need to figure out what the average pitcher would do while facing the same number of batters. To find this I need the league runs per plate appearance rate and multiply that number by the number of batters that Scherzer has faced.

League R/PA * TBF = Average Pitcher Runs
.122 * 487 = 59.41

So a league average pitcher would have been expected to surrender 59.41 runs facing the number of batters that Scherzer has so far this season. Now that we know how the average pitcher should have performed we can find the expected number of runs that Scherzer should have surrendered so far this season by subtracting his wRBA of 38.22 from the average pitcher’s runs.

Average Pitcher Runs – Weighted Runs Below Average = Expected Runs
59.41 – 38.22 = 21.19

Based on Scherzer’s xwOBA, he should have only given up 21.19 to this point in the season. If this sounds incredible it’s because this is the lowest mark of any starting pitcher though the first half of the season. Finally, XRA is found by using the RA/9 formula by multiplying the expected number of runs allowed by 9 and then dividing by innings pitched.

(9 * Expected Runs) / Innings Pitched = XRA
(9 * 21.19) / 128.33 = 1.49

Max Scherzer’s XRA of 1.49 is easily the lowest of any starter through the first half. The second best starter has been Chris Sale who has a 2.15 XRA. Of course these names are not surprising as they each started the All Star Game and are both currently the front runners for their leagues’ respective cy young award.

Here is a list of the top ten qualified pitchers:

Pitcher XRA
Max Scherzer 1.49
Chris Sale 2.15
Zack Greinke 2.26
Corey Kluber 2.33
Clayton Kershaw 2.34
Dan Straily 2.87
Lance McCullers 2.89
Chase Anderson 3.11
Luis Severino 3.17
Jeff Samardzija 3.23

And the bottom ten:

Pitcher XRA
Matt Moore 6.58
Kevin Gausman 6.47
Derek Holland 6.32
Matt Cain 6.26
Ricky Nolasco 6.26
Wade Miley 6.17
Johnny Cueto 6.10
Martin Perez 5.97
Jason Hammel 5.95
Jesse Chavez 5.84

Full First Half XRA List

It is interesting to see that three members of the Giants rotation rank in the bottom seven in all of baseball. In fact, AT&T Park is such a pitcher-friendly park that once you park adjust these numbers, Moore, Cain and Cueto become the three worst pitchers in baseball. It’s not surprising then why the Giants are having such a disappointing season.

One measure of a good stat is whether or not it matches your perception. Therefore, while it is interesting to see Dan Straily as one of the best pitchers in baseball and Johnny Cueto as one of the worst, it is much more assuring to see Max Scherzer, Chris Sale and Clayton Kershaw as some of the very best in the sport. The numbers for relievers also reveal how dominant Kenley Jansen and Craig Kimbrel have been. This is all good evidence that XRA is doing what it is supposed to do, accurately displaying how good pitchers have actually been, independent of all other factors.

Another important characteristic of a good stat is how well it correlates from year to year. While ERA is the most simple and popular way to look at pitchers, it is not very consistent. XRA is much more consistent than ERA and FIP and also compares favorably with xFIP. However, it is not as consistent as DRA. DRA controls for so many aspects of the game that it should be expected to be the most consistent. However, being the most predictive or most consistent stat is not necessarily the goal of XRA. The real goal is to show how well the pitcher actually did, and XRA seems to do this remarkably. While not being as consistent as a stat like DRA, the level of consistency is extremely encouraging and puts it right in line with the other run estimators.

XRA is a stat that takes luck, defense, and ballpark dimensions out of the equation. When evaluating a pitcher, he shouldn’t be penalized for giving up a 350-foot pop fly for a home run in Cincinnati while being rewarded for that same pop fly being caught for an easy out in Miami. With XRA, no longer will people have to quibble about BABIP, since it is results-independent and removes all luck from consideration. A ground ball with eyes will now be treated the same whether it squirts through for a single or is tracked down for an out. Pitching ability will no longer need to be measured with an eye on the level of the defense. It takes a good offense, a good pitching staff and a good defense to make a great team, and with XRA we can finally separate all of these important factions.


Losing Contact: The Shift From Singles to Power Hitting

The panel on ‘The Changing State of Sabermetrics: at the 2017 SABR convention in NYC with panelists Joel Sherman, Mark DeRosa, Vince Gennaro and Mike Petriello claimed that fewer balls are going into play and singles are actually down. They posed the question, “Are singles still a thing?”

With that in mind, we aimed to verify if these claims are true and what makes people feel that players are hitting fewer singles in today’s game.

We used data that’s current as of July 2, 2017.

NOTES:

 

Below you will see two charts illustrating the number of hits, home runs and strikeouts per game.

You can conclude three things from these graphs:

  1. Over the past 10 seasons, strikeouts have been increasing dramatically — 1.94 K/Game in the AL and 1.52 per game in the NL.
  2. Over the past 3 seasons, singles per game have dipped.
  3. Over the past 3 seasons, HR per game have spiked higher than ever before.

 

al-hits-per-game
Plot 14

To get a good picture of the change in the distribution of hits, we broke down the AL and NL in the following two graphs. From these graphs you can conclude three things.

  1. Percentage of HR are spiking higher than ever before.
    1. AL home runs are up 4.6% from 10.3% to 14.9% since 2014
    2. NL home runs are up 4.32% from 9.85% to 14.17%  since 2014
  2. Percentage of singles are lower than ever before.
    1. AL singles down 4% from 68% to 64% since 2014
    2. NL singles are down 4.85% from 68.44% to 63.59% since 2014
  3. These spikes somehow started in 2014.

 

 

Plot 20
Plot 22

With strikeouts per game over the last 20 years rising 1.752 strikeouts per game in the AL (6.456 per game to 8.210 per game) and in the NL 1.5 strikeouts per game (6.754 per game to 8.255 per game), we wanted to see how this has affected offensive performance in terms of both batting average (BA) and batting average on balls in play (BABIP). For those unfamiliar with BABIP, it measures how often non-home-run batted balls fall for hits. This metric assesses how effective a particular hitter is at putting balls in play that lead to hits. The graphs below show how BA and BABIP are correlated.

  1. In the AL batting averages have dropped .271 to .255 over the past 20 years while BABIP has remained rather steady around .299.
  2. In the NL batting averages have dropped .263 to .254 over the past 20 years while BABIP has remained rather steady around .299.

 

Plot 18
Plot 16

Conclusion:

Singles are decreasing at an alarming rate, yes. However, they’re still the most prevalent type of hit in the game. This trend is supported by the panel’s feeling that the shift has led to vastly improved defense and pitchers making better use of SABR data. Conclusively tying shifts to better defense is a bit harder, however, as shift data is difficult to obtain.

Additionally, home runs and strikeouts are increasing to all-time historic highs. This confirms the general sentiment on the panel that batters are now willing to take bigger risks to go for the HR, resulting in more home runs and strikeouts.

In follow-up pieces, we are going to look into why this may be happening, and attempt to look into how this helps generate fan interest.


There Is Hope for Kevin Siegrist

To say that Kevin Siegrist has really struggled in 2017 would be an understatement. After allowing 15 earned runs in 31 appearances through June 22, he was placed on the DL with a cervical spine sprain. With an ERA near 5, Cardinals fans have been left wondering what happened to the player who led the league in appearances (81) and finished third in holds (28) in 2015.

At first glance, Siegrist has an obvious issue — a very clear and very serious velocity problem. Take a look at this graph.

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The velocity of his fastball has decreased every year since 2013. It hovered around 95.8 mph at one point, but more recently it’s dropped well below 93 mph. That’s a significant decrease, as the steep slope indicates. And for the first time, Siegrist, who is a reliever, has a fastball velocity well below a league average that includes starting pitchers.

If you have ever looked at aging curves, for hitters or pitchers, then you know that skills decline with age. Certainly, pitching velocity is no exception to this rule. Still, Siegrist is an extreme case.

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Velocity very clearly declines with age and Siegrist has fallen right in line with this trend. For the first two or three years of his career, his changes in velocity pretty closely matched the aging curve. However, for the last two years, there has been a marked decrease.

In case you haven’t gotten the point, here’s one more graphic that shows Siegrist’s velocity problem.

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This slope looks more like something I would ski down than data you want to see from a pitcher’s velocity. Clearly, Siegrist had an excellent stretch in 2015 and he produced the numbers to back that up. Other than that, we see a pretty consistent decline.

So, is that it for Kevin Siegrist? A slow decline into oblivion? I don’t think so. I actually expect him to far surpass expectations in the second half of the year.

What if I told you, Siegrist has actually improved this year? He’s not telegraphing his pitches. He has improved his tunneling. (For extra reading, here are primers on tunneling from The Hardball TimesBaseball Prospectus, and FanGraphs.)

Essentially, tunneling is the ability of a pitcher to repeat his delivery with similar, if not identical, release points. If a pitcher is able to do this, a batter has less time to recognize the pitch and a lower chance of getting a hit. If a pitcher’s release points are completely different, say for his fastball and changeup, a hitter can more easily distinguish between the two and put a better swing on the ball.

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These are Siegrist’s release points from 2015 (his most successful year).

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And here are the release points from the first half of 2017.

Let’s keep in mind we’re talking about inches here, not feet. Still, the differences between these two years are significant. The release points from 2015 are more spread out than the data from 2017. Siegrist has improved his ability to replicate pitch deliveries. Unfortunately, due to his decreased velocity, this hasn’t resulted in any type of noticeable success.

In 2015, the changeup and the slider release points overlapped nicely, but the fastball release points stick out like a sore thumb. In 2017, with the addition of a cutter, there is much more overlap among the pitches. If he can keep this up, it should translate to long-term success.

Moving away from release points, pitch virtualization data confirms the same hypothesis: that Kevin Siegrist has improved his ability to replicate his delivery.

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This is the data from 2015. To the average viewer, and even probably to you and me, this doesn’t look too bad. At the 55-foot mark, the pitches have pretty similar locations. Even at the 30-foot mark, it’s probably pretty difficult to distinguish between five of his six pitches.

If we compare it to the 2017 data, we see a considerable difference.

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It’s pretty clear, right? At 55 feet, the release points aren’t “pretty similar,” to use my own wording, they’re practically identical. And the trajectories remain extremely close to one another until about the 20-foot mark, when they break. 20 feet at 93 miles per hour (an all-time low velocity for Siegrist) gives the batter about a tenth of a second to decide what to do.

There is no denying that Kevin Siegrist has a velocity problem that he would do well to fix. And if the first half of 2017 is any indication, it needs to happen fast. It is unfortunate that he has not been able to reap the benefits of an improved delivery. The consistency in release points that Siegrist has shown during an abysmal 2017 is encouraging and should provide a source of hope going into the second half of the season.