Archive for Lineups

We know, in 2014, that lineup construction has little effect on winning. And yet, it’s not any less frustrating when managers set their batting orders in ways that seem to defy any semblance of logic. Lineup construction matters to us. We may know it’s not terribly important, but we’re fascinated in spite of ourselves.

The lineup position subject to the most debate is probably leadoff. Multiple writers and analysts have noted that players who would make the best leadoff hitters are normally too valuable to use in the leadoff position. Bill James wrote in his New Historical Abstract, “All of the greatest leadoff men … would be guys who aren’t leadoff men, starting with Ted Williams … if you had two Ted Williamses, and could afford to use one of them as a leadoff man, he would be the greatest leadoff man who ever lived.”

Every method I’ve seen to determine great leadoff batters produces names like Ted Williams, Barry Bonds, Mickey Mantle, Ty Cobb … players who are probably better suited to the second through fourth spots in the batting order. I think I’ve found a simple method that solves the problem. I’ve always been interested in singles hitters who walk. It’s a skill set that matches our image of the prototypical leadoff batter.

Most fans agree that a good leadoff man should get on base and run the bases well. Most fans further agree that a player who both gets on base and hits with power is more valuable a little later in the order, where he can drive in runs. If we accept that we probably can’t have two Ted Williamses, a realistic ideal of the leadoff batter has a high on-base percentage but doesn’t hit with a lot of power.

With this in mind, I’m adapting a stat I’ve talked about elsewhere to identify optimal leadoff men: OBP minus ISO. In my head, I’ve always called this reverse ISO, but that’s sort of a misnomer, and it’s a little unwieldy, so from here on let’s call this stat combination Leadoff Rating, or LOR. We know a good leadoff man gets on base, but most players with high on-base percentage are great all-around hitters. We know power hitters are usually better suited to other spots in the batting order, but many players with low ISO just aren’t that great. By subtracting isolated power from OBP, we can identify players specially suited to hitting leadoff.

This stat does not include baserunning (because I have no idea how to incorporate it with two percentages) but it turns out not to matter very much. A significant majority of players who rank well in LOR were also accomplished baserunners, and base stealers in particular. Among the top 300 hitters of all time (basically everyone with 2,000 career hits), I found a fairly strong positive correlation between LOR and SB (r=.465). The relationship is weaker if you only look at 1947-present (r=.356), but a degree of positive correlation is clear. In both data sets, n=300.

When you calculate LOR for the all-time top 300 hitters, the leader is Billy Hamilton. That’s Sliding Billy Hamilton, the Hall of Fame outfielder for Philadelphia and Boston in the 1890s, not the rookie phenom for the Cincinnati Reds. The original Hamilton retired with 1,782 singles, 1,187 bases on balls, and 376 extra-base hits. He hit .344/.455/.432, with an ISO of just .088, and an OBP higher than his slugging percentage. Hamilton also stole 912 bases. He is a superb example of the hitter we’re looking for, and he leads the new stat by a huge margin. His .367 LOR rates 12% higher than second-place Eddie Collins (.328). Here’s the top 75: Read the rest of this entry »

If you’re anything like most fantasy players, you may find yourself investing in similar players across multiple leagues. If you’re anything like me, those players seem to get injured more than others. If you are me, this year you invested in Mat Latos and Doug Fister everywhere you could… and are furious.

But if you need a placeholder for April while your starters heal, full-season projections might not be as relevant to your replacement decisions. While it’s always smart to go with skill as your primary determination, often the free agent pitching pool is fraught with pitchers that are more similar. In such instances, the pitcher’s April schedule could be of use. If you need a pitcher for one month and one month only, his May – September prospects are of little concern.

Either because I’m a simple man, or because I’m receiving $0 in compensation for this short piece, I decided a fair estimator would be to simply use the FanGraphs 2014 Projected Rankings and input each opponents Runs Scored per Game (RS/G) for each team on a schedule grid for the month of April. I then averaged out the projected RS/G of all opponents for each game in April. This is what I found.

What do we see here? First, as expected, on average the AL teams face more projected runs. You’re welcome for that valuable information. One interesting note, though, is that the San Francisco Giants will face an even tougher aggregate offense than four AL teams. What do we take from this? Maybe if you’re thinking about Tim Hudson vs. Marco Estrada in a shallow league for a rental, you take Hudson. In a shallower league in which this is a real decision, however, you can probably stream matchups with a high efficacy throughout the month. But as a FanGraphs reader (ego-stroke), there’s a fairly high probability that your most difficult decisions come in deeper leagues. So we shall redirect our attention to pitchers farther down the ranks.

“But DomRep,” you might smirk, “aren’t AL/NL differences factored into preseason rankings to a large degree?” Yes, observant reader, they are. This is why this table is much more useful when comparing pitchers in the same league. The NL is below:

In the NL, there may be a built-in feeling that, when two pitchers are similar, you’re probably better off just taking the guy from San Diego. Poppycock! San Diego will face the Dodgers, Brewers, and two AL teams this month (Tigers and Indians). Exclamation point! It should be noted that San Diego likely has a less pitcher-friendly park factor than they used to, but even still, a quick glance at the table above should help you decide to maybe choose Jhoulys Chacin, Taylor Jordan, or Tanner Roark over Eric Stults if you think they’re similar pitchers.

Here’s the AL:

In the A.L., one might take a quick gander and be encouraged to use Garrett Richards over Bud Norris because they face the easiest and toughest April pitching schedules, respectively. Pseudo-sleeper Tyler Skaggs might also be expected to start out well.

As we mentioned before, preseason rankings and projections take league into consideration. So when considering two pitchers in different leagues, it might even help to take a quick peek at their respective schedule rankings within their own league. For instance, while San Diego (#14 NL schedule) can be expected to face less run-scoring potential this month on average than Anaheim (#1 AL schedule), this will be the case the whole season and is, therefore, factored in when rankings show Tyson Ross and Tyler Skaggs in similar places. But the rankings eke out that Ross’s month should be harder than his average month while Skaggs’s month should be easier.

If you’re in a position to stream relatively strong pitchers throughout April, this is probably useless to you. The sample size of a month’s worth of starts can also blow all of this up. It’s common practice to look at September strength of schedule for pitchers, but everyone tends to ignore April because their eyes are focused on the whole season. But if you’re anything like me, and Latos/Fister are giving you fits, hopefully you’ll keep strength of schedule in mind.

One of the offseason’s most talked-about moves was the trade that sent Prince Fielder to the Texas Rangers in exchange for Ian Kinsler and gobs of cash. While universally (and rightfully so) viewed as primarily a salary dump for GM Dave Dombrowski and the Tigers camp, the Rangers have gained a strong bat to place in the middle of their batting order alongside Adrian Beltre and Alex Rios.

Yet unlike the much-theorized David Price trade, the Fielder deal was not a pure salary dump. Fielder stumbled mightily in his production in 2013. In 2012, he posted a robust .313/.412/.528 traditional slash line, with an impressive .940 OPS and 153 wRC+. According to Baseball-Reference’s oWAR calculations, 2012 was Fielder’s third-most valuable year at the plate with a 5.4 mark. All of this stands in stark contrast to Fielder’s 2013.

Last year Fielder posted a much more pedestrian .279/.362/.457, .819 OPS, 125 wRC+ and 2.9 oWAR. While of course those are still above-average numbers, when attached to the name Prince Fielder and his ubercontract, Dave Dombrowski clearly had reason for concern. However, off-the-field issues are widely believed to have contributed to the dip in Fielder’s production, and natural regression may have also contributed to the fall from Fielder’s career-high traditional slash line. Fielder also enjoyed a career-high .321 BABIP in 2012, with his 2013 mark of .307 more in line with his normal marks.

So, the question presents itself; what exactly does Texas GM Jon Daniels have on his hands in the 2014 model year Fielder? There are a number of factors contributing to this answer. Firstly, while the batters ahead of him do not contribute to his slash line, they certainly do help counting stats such as RBIs. While RBIs are naturally an utterly useless stat when evaluating individual performance, men getting on base allow a hitter to create runs, and as runs are ultimately what win games, putting men on ahead of big bats such as Fielder is part of what goes into good team creation. Therefore, I will examine the clip at which we can expect there to be runners on base when Fielder bats for Texas as opposed to his stint in Detroit.

Secondly, I will also examine the impact Arlington itself will have on Fielder’s bat. Arlington has traditionally been a much more hitter-friendly location than Detroit. But how much exactly will Texas raise Fielder’s numbers?

The top of the 2013 Tigers lineup consisted of Austin Jackson, Torii Hunter, Miguel Cabrera in front of Fielder. Those first three hitters posted OBP’s of .337, .334, and .442, respectively. That averages out to a .371 mark, albeit an imperfect one due to Cabrera’s significantly higher individual mark (also, Cabrera hit a lot of home runs last year, and while that counts towards his OBP, that means the bases were empty when Fielder came to bat). We’ll refer to this average of the top of the order as tOBP, or “Top OBP” for the rest of the article for the sake of saving space.

The top of the 2014 Rangers lineup will be made up of Shin-Soo Choo, and either Elvis Andrus or Jurickson Profar before Fielder, who will bat third. There are a number of different projection systems we can use to forecast the upcoming season, for this article we’ll be using Steamer. Choo is given a .391 OBP, Andrus a .340, and Profar a .321. With Andrus in the lineup the projected tOBP is .365, with Profar it’s .356. So despite throwing his wallet at Choo and his obscene .423 2013 OBP, Jon Daniels in fact is giving Fielder less to work with in front of him.

Or is he? Part of the smaller (projected) tOBP in Texas is that Fielder simply won’t have the best hitter in the game hitting in front of him anymore. Also, one has to expect Fielder to be better at the plate this year. Steamer awards Fielder a substantial .290/.390/.516 line with a 142 wRC+ and 3.4 WAR, a major uptick over last year’s production. If we factor him into the projected Texas tOBP, with Andrus it’s a .374, and with Profar it’s .367. That’s something you like to see if you’re Adrian Beltre, who lead the league in hits last year and launched 30 homers.

And speaking of homers, Fielder’s move to Arlington will help him in that department. The newly named Globe Life Park ranked seventh last year in home runs with a total of 107 being hit there. Comerica Park, where the Tigers play, ranked fourteenth with 99. This helps Steamer award Fielder 29 home runs, up from 25 last year.

However, can we possibly expect Fielder to exceed these projections? As mentioned earlier, Fielder’s down year was contributed to by a number of off-the-field issues according to Hunter. A change of scenery will definitely do Fielder well, and he also seems to have lost some weight if the pictures and video coming out of Spring Training are to be believed. For that reason I’m willing to bump up Fielder’s numbers by a few slots, and I expect him to be even better than what Steamer predicts. Because baseball is a fickle mistress I could easily be wrong, but call it a gut feeling. All in all, Jon Daniels may have caught lightning in a bottle here with his rather expensive gamble, and if Texas manages to overcome their pitching woes they should be a very dangerous team with Fielder anchoring their lineup.

The Milwaukee Brewers have had a really quiet off season. Just how quiet? They only signed two players to major league contracts. For a team that needed a lot of help, two major league signings doesn’t seem like a lot. However, they did get a lot of help this off season. The other teams in the NL Central have failed to make a splash big enough to make the central a three team race again, and this is a potential opening for the Brewers to move in.

The Brewers were, and are, not expected to make a playoffs appearance during the 2014 season, but is that really true? They could. They very well could, and here’s how:

First, the three other teams who made the playoffs last season have regressed. The Cincinnati Reds have not done anything to improve. They lost their, arguably, two most important players to free agency in Bronson Arroyo and Shin-Soo Choo. The two players combined for an even six wins above replacement. Their replacements (Billy Hamilton and Tony Cingrani) have a combined WAR of 2.9, a 3.1 difference! Albeit, the two players have not been major players in 2013 having spent most of the season in the minors, but that is more reason to be concerned. Who knows how two second year major leaguers with little experience under their belt will do to replace two All-Star caliber players. Will the loss of Choo and Arroyo hurt the Reds? Of course! And Hamilton and Cingrani may not be the best replacements for a team who won one of the NL Wild Card spots in 2013.

The other team who didn’t make moves AND who won the NL Wild Card series, the Pittsburgh Pirates, is in a tougher boat. They lost several key players in Marlon Byrd, Justin Morneau, and A.J. Burnett and they replaced them with, well, nothing really. The only major league signing that the Buccos pulled off was for Edinson Volquez who had an absolutely atrocious season in 2013 and is the least likely replacement for an ace. Plus, first base and right field are still questions with no viable replacements at those positions. So does this mean that the Pirates will be out of the playoffs? I don’t think that the front office will go down without a fight. They want to appease their fan base and they still have many pieces in place to win over 80 games again, but unless they upgrade the rotation, first base, and left field, they are not going anywhere.

The final team and NL Central winners are perhaps in the best shape to make the playoffs again. The St. Louis Cardinals have done enough to maintain their dominance in the central. With Jhonny Peralta and Peter Bourjos in the fold including dominant young players such as Oscar Taveras and Michael Wacha, the Cards are looking like they will win another central title. But the Brewers might have something to say.

Other than the Cardinals, the Brewers have made the most important moves to improve their ballclub for 2014. They addressed all of their issues: The rotation, first base, and a left handed relief pitcher (according to ESPN). The rotation was fixed momentously with the addition of Matt Garza. Garza, one of the most sought after starters during free agency, will help to form a powerful front three rotation. With Kyle Lohse and Yovani Gallardo leading the way and Marco Estrada and Tyler Thornburg rounding things out, the Brew Crew’s rotation is looking like it can compete with the best of them. Plus, the addition of Garza helps to address another issue. Will Smith, a lefty who was acquired in the Norichika Aoki trade, will move to the bullpen. Here, the Brewers are able to add to an already strong bullpen that features a strong back-end and now a stable and reliable left handed pitcher.

Although the Brewers never signed a first basemen to a major league deal, the ones that they were able to acquire will impact the ball club in many ways. Mark Reynolds and Lyle Overbay will help what was a weakness for the Crew last season. Their combination of power, defense, ability to platoon, and familiarity to the NL Central and other leagues will impact the Brewers as if they had signed a major league contract. Plus, the Brewers have many great players in place at other positions. Jean Segura, Carlos Gomez, Jonathan Lucroy, and even Ryan Braun will make a formidable lineup while young players like Khris Davis and Scooter Gennett have shown that they can play at the major league level.

Overall, the Brewers are a much better team and are starting to look much better than the 2013 season. They have addressed all of their pieces while other teams in the NL Central have regressed. Although the Brew Crew may not make the playoffs, as many predict, they will cause havoc and surely improve from the 74-88 record they posted last season.

The 2013 All-Star Game has already been played, and the result was decided. The AL defeated the NL in a 3-0 effort in a game  that was filled with players of all different types. The aging veterans who want a last hurrah. The rising stars who are getting their first taste of what it is like to play among the elite in baseball. The overpaid superstars and the underpaid superstars. However, I thought it would be interesting to assemble an all-star team of players with large platoon split.

Call it an Island of misfit toys or misfit all-stars, if you’re feeling Moneyball-esque.

Catcher

Vs. RHP Jason Castro: PA’s 380, wOBA .371, wRC+ 137

Vs. LHP Derek Norris: PA’s 173, wOBA .426, wRC+ 177

Combined: PA 553, wOBA .387, wRC+ 149

Castro doesn’t actually lead all catchers against RHP. That honor belongs to Joe Mauer. However, Mauer ranks within the top three catchers against left-handed pitching, which makes him not really have a huge platoon split. Therefore I rendered him ineligible as a platoon partner. It makes sense that the Athletics would have a catcher who is so effective in hitting left-handers, because they also have John Jaso who is known to mash righties (.363 wOBA vs RHP). If there is anything an Astro fan should be happy about  — which there isn’t much — it’s the fact that Jason Castro eats right- handed pitching for lunch and he also is one of the better catchers in the league.

First Base

Vs RHP Chris Davis: PA’s 434  wOBA .473, wRC+ 203

Vs. LHP Nick Swisher: PA’s 224 wOBA .398 wRC+ 158

Combined: PA’s 658, wOBA 447 wOBA, wRC+ 187

Davis was considered the best first baseman, as he led the league in dingers and compiled a WAR of 6.8. While Davis was performing at near-immortal levels against right-handed pitching, he was also very vulnerable against left-handed pitching with wRC+ of 104 against LHP. Nick Swisher is an interesting case because he is a switch hitter, but really struggles against right-handed pitching with a wRC+ of 93. This makes me wonder if Swisher should consider going the Shane Victorino route, and drop batting lefty to focus solely on batting right-handed. We don’t know if this strategy works for everyone — it’s probably a case-by-case situation — but it’s something to keep in mind.

Second Base

Vs RHP Robinson Cano: PA’s 420, wOBA .410, wRC+ 160

Vs LHP Brian Dozier: PA’s 148, wOBA .421, wRC+ 171

Combined: PA’s 568, wOBA .408, wRC+ 161

I had a hard time picking Cano simply because while Cano is definitely better at hitting righties than lefties, he’s not that bad at hitting lefties. Last season, Cano had a wOBA of .343 and wRC+ of 114 against LHP. That’s not a bad mark, however it is a sizable enough difference to create a platoon split. On the other hand, this points out that Dozier is a little underrated, and if he is used in the right roles, he could be a very valuable player. I find this platoon an interesting dichotomy: an overpaid superstar in Cano and a cost-effective role player in Dozier.

Shortstop

Vs. RHP Ian Desmond: PA’s 507, wOBA .344, wRC+ 118

Vs. LHP Jhonny Peralta: PA’s 136, wOBA .414, wRC+ 164

Combined: PA’s 643, wOBA .344, wRC+ 126

Shortstop was by far the hardest position for which to make a platoon. The LHP side was easy with Peralta because he led all shortstops when it came to facing lefties. The problem came with the right-handed side because the guys who could hit righties well — such as Tulowitzki and Lowrie — could also hit lefties pretty well. I settled with Desmond because even though he is well balanced against LHP and RHP, he wasn’t as balanced as Tulo or Lowrie.

Third Base

Vs. RHP Adrian Beltre: PA’s 516, wOBA .370, wRC+ 129

Vs. LHP David Wright: PA’s 150, wOBA .454 wRC+ 199

Combined: PA’s 666, wOBA .397, wRC+ 143

There were a lot of good-hitting third baseman last year. Miguel Cabrera led all third baseman in hitting against right handers and left handers. Wright and Beltre are number two to Cabrera. They also both have large platoon splits. Wright can hit RHP, it’s just that the split between PA’s against RHP versus his PA’s against LHP is huge. Beltre, on the other hand, is somewhat insignificant against lefties.

Right Field

RHP Daniel Nava: PA’s 397, wOBA .392, wRC+ 146

LHP Hunter Pence: PA’s 178, wOBA .415, wRC+ 174

Combined: PA’s 575, wOBA .399, wRC+ 154

This is where things can get a little arbitrary because there are a lot of corner outfielders, and therefore a lot of corner outfielders who have platoon splits. You could sub out both outfielders for a combination of Michael Cuddyer and Giancarlo Stanton. However, I thought that it would be more fun to point out how undervalued Nava is. Nava had a breakout year in Boston, and he did so by destroying right handers. Pence actually isn’t all that bad against RHP, wRC+ of 119 against RHP, which is kind of surprising considering he’s a lefty with a long swing. Bruce Bochy should probably take more advantage of Pence’s ability to hit left handers well. I think that both players are underrated.

Center Field

Vs. RHP Shin-Soo Choo: PA’s 491 wOBA .438, wRC+ 183

Vs. LHP Carlos Gomez: PA’s 140, wOBA .421, wRC+ 171

Combined: PA’s 631, wOBA .430, wRC+ 179

Choo is easily one of the worst defensive center fielders in the game, and he probably should shift over to a corner outfield spot in Texas. A lot of people express concern over the Choo contact because of the poor defensive play combined with a massive platoon split. Choo is godly against RHP, but below average against LHP (wRC+ of 81). The three-year, $24 million contract extension that the Brewers gave Gomez looks like it was a steal. Not only did they get a guy who punished left handers, but they also got a guy who led the NL in WAR, had great defense, and even some decent pop.

Left Field

Vs. RHP Dominic Brown: PA’s 381, wOBA .366, wRC+ 133

Vs. LHP Justin Upton: PA’s 164  wOBA .422, wRC+ 174

Combined: PA’s 545, wOBA .382, wRC+ 145

There isn’t anything interesting about why I picked these two, other than the fact that I did consider Matt Holliday instead of Brown. However,  Holliday’s split wasn’t as large as Brown’s. I wouldn’t expect Dominic Brown to perform as well against righties again; he’s in for some serious regression to the mean.

If these platoons were put into practice you could probably get as good or better production than the elite hitters in baseball. This list, just like the actual all-star game roster, is diverse. You have players who are considered elite — such as Choo, Cano, Wright, and Beltre — and then the undervalued guys such as Dozier, Nava, Norris and Castro. It’s surprising that most teams don’t take more advantage of platoons since they could get elite production from two players for a fraction of the cost.

Below are two tools for Ottoneu FGPoints players to be used for the 2014 MLB season.  The first tool is a roster building tool that will provide 2013 statistics, including platoon splits, for offensive players.  Ottoneu players can use this tool to construct their team and prepare for 2014 auction drafts.

The second tool is a 2014 player projection tool that Ottoneu players (and commissioners) can use to estimate player projections for the 2014 season.  The tool incorporates Steamer, Oliver, and 3 Year Average stats for each player and then allows you to enter your own projections for the 2014 season.  Your own projections (will auto-populate FanGraph’s “Fans” projections as of 2.8.14…you can override these projections by entering your own) will load the team dashboard at the top of the tool and provide you with a summary of what you can expect from your Ottoneu team in 2014.

Roster Breakdown w/platoon splits:

http://bit.ly/1iCKkvl

2014 Team Projections Tool:

http://bit.ly/1eh614z

The signing of Shin-Soo Choo gives the Rangers a player with strong on-base skills, solid power, and decent corner-outfield defense. The signing also left a gaping hole in the outfield for the Reds. Choo was one of three Reds starters that got on base at an above-average clip. He was easily the first- or second-best offensive player for the Reds in 2013. While he was miscast in center field, Choo brought a great deal of value to a team that needed his particular offensive skill set.

Walt Jocketty has stated that Billy Hamilton is the new center fielder and will likely bat leadoff for the 2014 Reds. Hamilton starting in center field should come as no surprise as the Reds do not have many other options. The wisdom of Hamilton batting leadoff is at least up for debate. You can easily go look at his projections for 2014 and draw your own conclusions, but I would like to at least provide some context.

Every baseball fan knows about Hamilton’s speed. He is ferociously fast. He stole 155 bases in the minors in 2012 and successfully stole 13 bases in 14 attempts in limited major league action in 2013. Speed is nice , but it is certainly not close to the most important skill for a player in the leadoff spot. Reds fans may know this best of all from watching Corey Patterson, Willy Taveras, and Drew Stubbs flounder at the plate. Those players were wickedly fast, but as the saying goes, you can’t steal first base. None of them had the on-base skills to bat leadoff, but they found themselves there anyway because of their speed. To avoid this list of failed Reds leadoff hitters, Billy Hamilton will need to get on base enough to justify being at the top of the order. That is the obvious question: can Hamilton get on base to use that blinding speed of his to turn singles into doubles and doubles into triples? There are signs that he can but others that he shouldn’t in 2014.

The 2012 season launched Hamilton into top-20 prospect territory. He obviously broke the stolen-base record, but he also showed some ability with the bat. In a 132 games between high A and AA, Hamilton hit .311/.410/.420. He had 14 triples. His walk rate rose dramatically from the year before. Hamilton looked like a perfect leadoff hitter through two levels.

Then 2013 and AAA came. Hamilton slashed .256/.308/.343. His walk percentage dropped from 16.9% in 50 games in AA (small sample size noted) to 6.9% in 123 games in AAA. it was arguably his worst season as a professional. He looked completely overmatched at times and questions about his ability to get on base resurfaced.

So which is the real Billy Hamilton, and what does it mean for 2014? Hamilton’s ceiling is likely between his 2012 and 2013 minor league performance. In five seasons as a minor leaguer, Hamilton slashed .280/.350/.378. Coupled with his speed and potential excellent defense in center field, that slash line could make him an All-Star-caliber player. The hope is that 2013 was a product of learning a new position and a significant drop in BABIP from over .370 to .310.

Still, Hamilton was very inconsistent at the plate in 2013 and didn’t prove he could hit AAA pitching for an extended period of time. The major leagues are an obvious step up in competition, and it would be surprising to see him match his .280/.350/.378 minor league career slash line in 2014. Steamer projects him to have a .305 OBP, and after last year, it is easy to see why.

While it is very possible Hamilton could surpass gloomy projections, the Reds probably shouldn’t risk it in 2014, at least at first. It makes much more sense to see how Hamilton adjusts to major-league pitching in a less important part of the lineup (7th for instance). He would get fewer at bats and would not be so heavily scrutinized if he struggled adjusting to the level. If he performs well, he can always move up in the lineup, but the Reds likely have better leadoff options than Hamilton to begin the year.

If Hamilton plays excellent defense in center field and has a good year on the bases, he will provide solid value for the Reds. To fill Choo’s shoes, he will have to hit closer to his career minor league mark as opposed to his 2013 numbers. In 2014, that may be difficult.

A recent article by ncarrington brought up an interesting point, and it’s one that merits further investigation. The basis of the article points out that even though two teams may have similar team average on-base percentages, a lack of consistency within one team will cause them to under-perform their collective numbers when it comes to run production. A balanced team, on the other hand, will score more runs. That’s our hypothesis.

How does the scientific method work again? Er, nevermind, let’s just look at the data.

In order to gain an initial understanding we’re going to start by looking at how teams fared in 2013. We’ll calculate a league average runs/OBP number that will work as a proxy for how many runs a team should be expected to score based on their OBP. And then we’ll calculate the standard deviation of each team’s OBP (weighted to plate appearances), and compare that to the league average standard deviation. If our hypothesis is true, teams with a relatively low OBP deviations will outperform their expected runs scored number.

Of course, there’s a lot more to team production than OBP. We’re going to conquer that later. Bear with me–here’s 2013.

A few things to keep in mind while dissecting this chart: 668.5 is the baseline number for Runs/(OBP/LeagueOBP). Any team number above this means that they are outperforming, while any number below represents underperformance. The league average team OBP standard deviation is .162

That chart’s kind of a bear, so I’m going to break it up into buckets. In 2013 there were 16 teams that exhibited above-average variances. Of those, 11 outperformed expectations while only 5 underperformed expectations. Now for the flipside–of the 14 teams that exhibited below-average variances, only 2 outperformed expectations while a shocking 12(!) teams underperformed.

That absolutely flies in the face of our hypothesis. A startling 23 out of 30 teams suggest that a high variance will actually help a team score more runs while a low variance will cause a team to score less.

Before we get all comfy with our conclusions, however, we’re going to acknowledge how complicated baseball is. It’s so complicated that we have to worry about this thing called sample size, since we have no idea what’s going on until we’ve seen a lot of things go on. So I’m going to open up the floodgates on this particular study, and we’re going to use every team’s season since 1920. League average OBP standard deviation and runs/OBP numbers will be calculated for each year, and we’ll use the aforementioned bucket approach to examine the results.

Team Seasons 1920-2013

Small sample size strikes again. Will there ever be a sabermetric article that doesn’t talk about sample size? Maybe, but it probably won’t be written by me. Anyways, the point is that variance in team OBP has little to no effect on actual results when you up your sample size to 2000+. As a side note of some interest, I wondered if teams with high variances would tend have bigger power numbers than their low variance counterparts. High variance teams have averaged an ISO of .132 since 1920. Low variance teams? .131. So, uh, not really.

If you want to examine the ISO numbers a little more, here’s this: outperforming teams had an ISO of .144 while underperforming teams had an ISO .120. These numbers remain the same for both high and low variance teams. It appears that overachieving/underachieving OBP expectations can be almost entirely explained by ISO.

I’m not satisfied with that answer, though. Was 2013 really just an aberration? What if we limit our samples to only teams that significantly outperformed or underperformed expectations (by 50 runs) while having a significantly large or small team standard deviation OBP.

Team Seasons 1920-2013, significant values only

The numbers here do point a little bit more towards high variance leading to outperformance. High-variance teams are more likely to strongly outperform their expectations to the tune of about 20%, and the same is true for low-variance teams regarding underperforming. Bear in mind, however, that that is not a huge number, and that is not a huge sample size. If you’re trying to predict whether a team should outperform or underperform their collective means then variance is something to consider, but it isn’t the first place you should look.

Being balanced is nice. Being consistent is nice. It’s something we have a natural inclinations towards as humans–it’s why we invented farming, civilization, the light bulb, etc. But when you’re building a baseball team it’s not something that’s going to help you win games. You win games with good players.

Teams that get on base often score more runs than those that don’t. We know this, and it comes as no surprise. In 2013, the Red Sox had the highest team OBP (.349) and also scored the most runs in MLB. The Tigers had the second-highest team OBP (.346), and they scored the second-most runs. Team OBPs can tell us a lot about the effectiveness of an offense (obviously not everything), but they can also be misleading if proper context isn’t applied.

The Cardinals scored 783 runs in 2013, good enough for third in MLB. The rival Reds scored 698 runs, 85 fewer than the Cardinals. There are many reasons for this gap in runs scored, but I would like to examine just one of them.  The Cardinals had a team OBP of .332 while the Reds had a team OBP of .327. On first look, it appears that the Cardinals and Reds got on base at a similar rate. But a major difference exists below the surface. Take a look at the chart below of the top eight hitters by plate appearance for both teams (Chris Heisey gets the nod over Ryan Hanigan as to not have two Reds’ catchers on the list).

The difference is quite evident. The average OBP in 2013 was .318. Seven of the top eight Cardinal hitters got on base at an above-average clip. Besides the pitcher, there is one easy out in that lineup. The Cardinals maintained a ridiculous batting average with RISP, but that matters much more because they always had people on base.

On the other hand, the Reds had two on-base Goliaths. Joey Votto and Shin-Soo Choo camped out on the bases. They became one with the bases. The problem was that the Reds had only one more player with an above-average OBP, Jay Bruce at .329. The other five players struggled to get on base consistently. Three of them had OBPs under .300.

So while the Cardinals achieve a high team OBP through balance, the Reds had two hitters who significantly raised the team OBP. Take Votto and Choo away, and the other six Reds on this list have a combined OBP of .305. That is a staggering low number for six of the top hitters on a playoff team.

What does this teach us? Well, team OBPs do not provide insight into how balanced a lineup a team has. The Reds would be foolish to think they have a lineup that gets on base enough to be an elite offense. With the loss of Choo, the Reds offense may struggle to produce runs at a league-average clip as Votto and Bruce could be stranded on base countless times.

A balanced lineup was a major factor in the Cardinals scoring the most runs in the National League. Their team may have had an excellent .332 OBP, but their top eight hitters by plate appearance had a .355 OBP. As a group they were excellent. The Red Sox were similar in that their top eight hitters by plate appearances all had above-average OBPs with Stephen Drew coming in eighth at .333. Think about that! The Red Sox eighth-best hitter at getting on base was 15 points above league average.

Even though the Reds finished 6th in team OBP in 2013, their on-base skills were lacking. While the Cardinals had only a five-point advantage in team OBP over their rival, they were much more adept at clogging the bases. Team OBPs are great, they just don’t always tell the whole story.

Given the speedy obsolescence of my last blog post, I am left to conclude that Dan O’Dowd and Bill Geivett either don’t read my blog, or they don’t give a shit what an immodest blogger has to say about the Rockies. It’s likely both. Indeed, after the Rockies traded Dexter Fowler and signed Justin Morneau last week, there’s no use rehashing alternatives and possible failures. The task now is to think about what the Rockies can do with the roster that they do have. Last week, I wrote about the construction of the Rockies’ roster in the long-term and on a macro scale. This week, I want to think about what the lineup might—and, yes, should—look like on a micro level. What did the daily lineup look like in 2013? What will the daily lineup look like in 2014? Can it be a recipe for immediate success? What does the structure of the lineup tell us about the organization? Because the pitching staff is the area most likely to go through changes between now and opening day, I’m limiting myself to the position players and their offensive production.

The consensus among those who think about these things is that most managers follow orthodoxies that determine what types of hitters can hit where—speedy guys are lead-off hitters, and power hitters hit in the four or five hole. However, there is evidence that these managerial codes are non-optimal. The big caveat, however, is that research indicates optimizing lineups might only account for a handful of runs a year, and maybe one or two wins. But sometimes one or two wins can be the difference between postseason play and spending October noting the changing leaves. My goal here is not to compare the probable 2014 lineup with a more optimal one and argue that it constitutes the difference between success and failure. Rather, I suggest that a daily glance at the Rockies one through eight in 2014 can illuminate broader directions regarding where the team is going. Or not going, as the case may be.

Here is what I think the Rockies daily lineup will look like come April (for the sake of simplicity, I’ll only consider lineups against right-handed starting pitchers):

1)      Charlie Blackmon, LF

2)      DJ LaMahieu, 2B

3)      Carlos Gonzalez, CF

4)      Troy Tulowitzki, SS

5)      Michael Cuddyer, RF

6)      Wilin Rosario, C

7)      Justin Morneau, 1B

8)      Nolan Arenado, 3B

9)      Pitcher

The immediate result of the Fowler trade is that the Rockies have lost their leadoff hitter. Fowler fit the profile of a conventional choice to lead off games. Namely, he is fast. Still, Fowler was a good fit to hit leadoff, but it was not because of his speed, but because he was among the best on the team in getting on base. This should be the primary metric for a leadoff hitter because guys need to get on base in order to score runs. Despite hitting just .263, Fowler’s 13% walk rate elevated his OBP to .368. For comparison, Rosario hit .292, but his free swinging style and 3% walk rate put his OBP at just .315. Even without the threat to steal (Fowler stole 19 bases in 28 attempts), his ability to get on base made him the best candidate on the team to hit in the one hole. Without Fowler, I think Walk Weiss (or Bill Geivett, or whoever the hell makes these clubhouse decisions) is going to go with Blackmon (and sometimes Corey Dickerson) in the leadoff spot, only because Blackmon fits the profile that values speed first. If we assume that Blackmon splits time with Dickerson in left field as well as leading off games, they collectively project (per Steamer) to get on base at a .325 clip in about 700 plate appearances, hardly enough to justify hitting first.

Whereas the decision to bat Fowler first made sense both by conventional and unconventional thinking, the number-two hitter is where the Rockies really made a mistake. I expect it to be repeated in 2014. Over the course of the year, a mélange of as-of-now below average hitters were placed in the two spot—mostly whoever happened to be playing second base, meaning either Josh Rutledge or LaMahieu. The total slash line of all two hitters for the 2013 Rockies? .256/.290/.341. Aside from the pitcher’s spot, the collective average and OBP of the two hitter was better than only the seven spot, and the slugging percentage was the worst among position players. The Rockies essentially placed their worst hitter between the one and three spot. If the Rockies, as I suspect, go with LaMahieu to hit second, they’re going to repeat the error. The other player I can envision Weiss placing in the two hole is Arenado—who projects to be the only position player with worse offensive numbers than LaMahieu.

What throws this mistaken lineup construction into such stark relief is that research suggests that the two spot is precisely where the team’s best hitter should be placed. Sky Kalkman argues that a team’s three best hitters should be placed in the one, two, and four holes, with high OBP leaning towards the one and two spots and power at the four spot. The next best two should be hitting in the three and five spots, and the worst hitters placed in spots six through eight (in the National League). If the Rockies daily lineup looks like what I think it will, then two of the team’s three worst hitters will regularly hit one and two.

Then what should the lineup look like? Baseball Musing’s lineup analysis allows the interested fan to input a name, OBP, and slugging percentage, and it purports to output the optimal team lineup based on runs per game. The calculus is based on past performance taken from data either from 1959-2004 or the steroid inflated statistics from 1989-2002. As Jack Moore observes, both models are flawed because neither is applicable to the game today and the simulations take place in a vacuum without context. Additionally, the RPG outputs are inflated beyond reason. But regardless of whether or not the RPG outputs can be taken at face value, the tool has some use because it enables you to see RPG differentials among different lineup constructions. Using the more inclusive 1959-2004 model and 2014 Steamer projections, the supposed optimal lineup—the one that ostensibly would produce just over five runs per game—looks like this:

1)      Tulowitzki

2)      Gonzalez

3)      Blackmon

4)      Morneau

5)      Cuddyer

6)      Arenado

7)      LaMahieu

8)      Rosario

9)      Pitcher

This lineup is enticingly unconventional. It provides for the Rockies’s best hitters to have the most opportunities to get on base and score runs. Still, I wouldn’t follow it. For one, the team’s best hitters at getting on base also happen to be the ones with the most pop. So there is no easy way to favor OBP at the one and two spots and power at the four and five spots. I would love to have an OBP Carlos Gonzalez and a home run hitting one, but we have to make do with the fortunate curse that they are the same person—at least we do now, as Fowler reached base about as often as Gonzalez in 2013. This lineup would also be risky because the two through four hitters are all left-handed, which would make it easy for the opposition to marshal its lefty specialist late in a close game. Conversely, I would construct the Rockies daily lineup as follows, this time with projected slash line (again, per Steamer):

1)      Gonzalez – .297/.376/.547

2)      Cuddyer – .281/.343/.474

3)      Rosario – .278/.316/.515

4)      Tulowitzki – .300/.376/.534

5)      Morneau – .276/.345/.461

6)      LaMahieu – .289/.328/.392

7)      Arenado – .277/.318/.446

8)      Blackmon/Dickerson – .276/.326/.455

9)      Pitcher (based on 2013 production) – .140/.176/.165

In my mind, this lineup is the one most likely to produce the most runs for the Rockies. Ideally, I would rather have Gonzalez hitting second rather than first, but the rest of the roster limits this flexibility. The possibility of Gonzalez leading off has been raised, but I don’t think there is much to the talk. Other than Gonzalez’s first half season with the Rockies in 2009, he’s only led off when Jim Tracy thought it could pull him out of a horrid slump. Tulowitzki is certainly a better hitter than Cuddyer, but Tulo’s power coupled with Cuddyer’s ability to get on base (even if he’s in for some serious regression in 2014) make hitting Cuddyer second and Tulo fourth the best play. The three and five spots will produce more outs than the one, two, and four spots, but the upside of Rosario’s power mitigates the risk of those outs, as would Morneau’s relatively higher OBP and ability to hit about one fifth of his balls in play as line drives.

Again, this exercise does not identify the path to success and the path to failure for the Rockies in 2014. The team is unlikely to make the playoffs regardless of how the lineup is structured. But what it should do is serve as a reminder to pay attention to the daily details and to think beyond inherited baseball wisdom. If the daily lineup turns out to replicate past mistakes, then I think it points to a much larger organizational problem of resisting even the simplest and most easily integrated baseball analytics. But if Weiss runs out lineups that defy convention, then it might suggest that the franchise has a baseball plan in addition to a business plan.