Archive for Sinker

Back in mid-February — a truly different time for all of us — I applied to work at Statcast as an intern, a position that was unfortunately canceled in mid-March. However, I wrote an answer to a question that I intended to turn into an article at some point during the season. At the time, I figured I might write it in May, but a delayed season meant a delay to my piece as well.

Who would like to consider the curious case of Alex Presley? His career was relatively muted; he played for five teams in eight seasons as a fourth outfielder, only once cracking 100 games played and only once posting an OPS over .800. His Baseball-Reference page has him sporting a White Sox hat despite never having played a regular-season game for the team. He had a .620 OPS across 55 minor league games in 2018 and was released before he could make his way into July. He has the ignoble mark of having the second-lowest career WAR of any MLB player born in Monroe, Louisiana, finishing sixth out of seven players (Chuck Finley laps the field, and Presley finished above only Wayne Cage’s 0.1 career WAR). But Alex Presley was never supposed to be a star; rather, he was the now-forgotten harbinger of the launch angle revolution.

In the past several seasons, launch angle has absolutely been all the rage. Being able to capture new data has made an impact on the scene due in large part to fascinating statistics such as pitch movement, exit velocity, improved defensive statistics like OAA, and launch angle. During that time, teams have been changing their exit velocity drastically as well. In 2015, the earliest year with Statcast data, the measured average launch angle for all of baseball was 10.1. By 2019, it was 12.2.

In 2014, Pirates pitchers, the leaders of the sinkerball revolution, allowed an average launch angle of only 6.9 degrees. Since then, only three teams have been below 7.0 (the Rockies twice and the Cardinals once), and in 2018 and 2019, only three were under 10.0 and none were under 9.0. Additionally, even though the Pirates led the league in Barrel% by over a percentage point in 2014, the top teams in Barrel% in 2019 were much closer to a league-average launch angle. The data makes it clear: Launch angle is certainly going up. Read the rest of this entry »

Last July when the Oakland Athletics traded for Blake Treinen, Jesus Luzardo, and Sheldon Neuse, providing the Washington Nationals the services of relievers Sean Doolittle and Ryan Madson, the Athletics trade was more notably about the prospects of Luzardo’s pitching and Neuse at third base. The Athletics are in the middle of a definitive rebuild; outside of the Athletics organization, the Treinen piece of the trade was simply for his services as a simple bullpen body to hit average (hopefully) and pander on through the remnant of the season as Doolittle and Madson’s replacement.

Contextually, when the trade occurred last July, Treinen was 28 and hitting his ceiling in the Nationals development methodology. He lost hit job in April of 2017 then slowly settled into an awful 5.73 ERA with 48 allowed hits in the first half. There is no magical analytic which explains why he was bad, no pedantically bad situational deterioration – Treinen was simply bad.

Specifically, Treinen was bland on his first pitch (which is a telling sign of a pitcher struggling), lofting sweet, contact worthy pitches to the upper zone. Overall, batters swung and made contact throughout his first-pitch zones. Hence, the same area that created his bizarre downward trend was the first area where Treinen began his 2018 correction. He has cut high zone pitches on the first-pitch count, aptly cutting contact to the high zone. Batters are attacking his first pitch less, taking (or trying to take) a more principled approach to seeing him out.

The batting delay has created Treinen’s most formidable analytical point: the second highest and lowest qualified-reliever swinging strike rate and ERA at 18.8 percent and .93, respectively.

Any improvement this stark demands a resurgence across all pitching categories. First, Treinen has begun to shift his fastball placement. In 2017, on a micro fastball scale, Treinen offered either the fastball outside (44 percent balls) or distinctly inside (76.1 percent contact), failing to hit the lateral sides of the inside zone. That crisp distinctness allowed batters to perceive where his fastball was going to land, allowing a 156 wRC+. In 2018, he has avoided letting the fastball fall distinctly outside of the zone (30 percent balls, 72.7 percent contact), thus offering more variety within more controlled movement. His fastball has kept batters to a negative 20 wRC+.

When batters have been contacting his fastball, they have a 47.1 percent fly-ball rate. Perceptually, this is an alarming rate, less that placement becomes intrinsically important. In a string of reactions, Treinen is enforcing a greater chase rate (38.7 percent, increase from 30.8 percent) while decreasing his chase contact rate from 52.2 to 38.6 percent. This has cut the ability of batters to find barrel contact (2.1 percent), thus cutting his opposite field hit-rate to 19.8 percent. In short, Treinen is deriving contact that is easy to field.

Hypothetically, this might be a philosophical adjunct to the Athletics analytic mantra. The team is shifting on 30.4 percent of left-handed batters, an increase from 17.1 percent last season with the Washington Nationals. Neither team shift at a dramatic rate, but there is a slight difference between the Nationals fielding chart and the Athletics fielding chart behind Treinen. The slight difference may not be the main reason, but the Athletics awareness of how to help Treinen with more movement is, at minimum, an interesting note.

However, for all the jovial notation Treinen’s fastball is receiving, his main-pitch, the sinker, deserves even more praise. He has kept batters to a .200 average, already hitting 17 strikeouts on the sinker for a 56 wRC+. Much like the fastball, the sinker is moving less, but in a crisper fashion (9.7 rating down from 11.9). On a meta point, Treinen is simply more confident and educated in his pitching approach – on a simple eye-test, he is perceptually prepared where to throw. Scrupulous timing and more variety in placement of his sinker has lowered contact to 71.1 percent (was an egregious 86.2 percent last season). The one data-point which fundamentally incorporates how good his sinker has been is the increase in outside swing percentage (43 percent) while decreasing outside-contact (52.1 percent).

In short, pitches that were not meant to be hit, were being hit in 2018, and Treinen has prevented that from occurring. Fundamentally, this is on the breadth of a slight mechanical edit observable with a release point grouping to the right. In the example provided, between 2017 and 2018, Treinen is releasing his pitches with more elevation, signifying a change to his release philosophy.

The Athletics somehow have tapped into Treinen to bring out the best of him; the only question they have to answer is whether he is trade-bait or a long-term staple to the bullpen.

The White Sox’ rotation this year can charitably be described as “rocky”. They began the year projected to have the worst rotation in the majors by WAR and thus far they’ve ranked 28th, between the Jeter-decimated Marlins and the aging Rangers. That’s not terribly surprising considering they’ve given out the most walks by far at 4.61 BB/9; besides them, only the Cubs’ rotation is over 4 at 4.21. The White Sox’ rotation also has the lowest strikeout rate in the majors this year at 6.20 K/9. The only thing preventing them from having the worst FIP of any team’s starters is middle-of-pack home run prevention, but their home field is a launching pad come summer.

As I stated before, they weren’t expected to have a good roster of starters, but being a rebuilding club filled with young and therefore volatile players, there was at least theoretically the chance that they made the jump to competence and beyond earlier than expected and surprise people like the Braves have this year. That obviously has not happened, but back in February, when everything is possible, Rian Watt took a look at the surprisingly large error bars in the projections for Chicago’s starters. The backstories of their projected starters agreed with what those large error bars said about a wide range of outcomes.

Lucas Giolito, a former No. 1 global prospect traded to the Sox last year from the Nationals, looked very sharp in spring training, having apparently rediscovered the massive 12-6 curve and some of the fastball velocity that had made him such a vaunted prospect and pairing it with newly found command and an improving, fading changeup. Reynaldo Lopez, fellow right-hander and former top-100 prospect who came over from the Nationals, had disappointing strikeout numbers despite big stuff, between a fastball that averaged 95 MPH, above-average curve and average slider and change– perhaps an improvement in sequencing or location would tap into the strikeouts he clearly had the talent to produce. Carson Fulmer, former No. 7; overall draft pick, has a lively arsenal in which everything moves in unpredictable ways that hitters dislike, albeit unpredictable to him too; perhaps he could make a mechanical adjustment and find the control and therefore success he had in college. Carlos Rodon, former No. 3 overall pick, was out with minor shoulder surgery (bursitis) until June but can flash complete dominance with his overpowering fastball/slider combo from the left side. Everyone knows about the world-class talent of Michael Kopech, who is currently stuck vaporizing poor saps in Triple-A (12.13 K/9!) until he limits his walks to acceptable levels. Bringing up the rear were Miguel Gonzalez, Hector Santiago, and James Shields, three veterans for whom the reasonable hopes were “eat innings better than cannon fodder”.

This article is not about any of the eight pitchers above, or their struggles with control (Giolito, Fulmer), relative successes (Shields), or weirdness (Lopez, who is having some success despite still not getting many strikeouts). Instead, it’s… Dylan Covey?

Yes, the Dylan Covey who ran both an ERA and FIP over seven last year in seventy innings as a rookie, good for -1.1 WAR. Pitching like, well, cannon fodder is not exactly an auspicious start to one’s major league career. Brief background of Covey: He was considered an elite high school arm, the riskiest category of draft picks, thought of high enough to be selected fourteenth overall in 2010 by Milwaukee– one pick after the White Sox selected a certain stick-figure lefty at a little-known Florida college whom Covey out-dueled earlier this June. During his pre-signing medicals, though, Covey was diagnosed with Type 1 diabetes, and he decided not to sign in order to learn how to deal with the disease before the stresses of pro ball. He chose to attend San Diego State and three years later was selected in the fourth round by Oakland.

After another three years of middling results hampered by injuries, Oakland left him off the 40-man roster despite an encouraging AFL and Chicago pounced in the Rule V draft. It was a bit of an unusual choice in that Covey was quite raw, almost akin to the Padres’ Rule V hijacking of prospects straight from A-ball, because Covey had thrown all of six starts at his highest level (Double-A). After hearing that, it probably makes a lot more sense why A) he got rocked the way he did last year and B) there was and is still hope for him. Although he was 25, the rawness showed, but the White Sox were entirely alright with absorbing the losses, as they would only help them pick higher in the 2018 Draft anyways (Nick Madrigal says hello).

Ironically, when he was drafted fourteenth overall in 2010, he was considered as safe as any high school arm could possibly be, on the basis of a low to mid-nineties sinker, above-average curve, ideal workhorse frame (currently listed at 6-2/195), and remarkably clean mechanics for his age. Ground balls, control, good health, and a reasonable number of strikeouts sounds like the perfect profile of a high-floor starter prospect. Of course, it didn’t work out that way in 2010, nor did he really come around while with Oakland. Thus, one might reasonably conclude, this article is being written because he appears to be finally delivering on his talent in his second year with the White Sox.

And so he has. Of course, the disclaimer of “small-sample size” applies here, as Covey has seven starts, and 35.1 innings total in those starts this year, but still, those 35.1 innings have been a complete reversal from his performance in 2017. He’s gotten a shot only because two rotation spots needed filling before Kopech was ready (i.e. past his Super Two deadline). First, Gonzalez went down with a shoulder injury in mid-April; that spot was filled by Santiago sliding from the bullpen into the rotation as he was signed to do. By mid-May, Fulmer’s wildness became too much to bear, and he was sent down to Triple-A to work on that, and Covey was called up to Chicago to get his second shot in the bigs. He’s taken that chance and run with it.

Thus far this year, Covey is the proud owner of a 2.29 ERA, 2.17 FIP, 3.31 xFIP, and 3.48 SIERA, good for a 1.3 fWAR (!) that currently leads all White Sox pitchers. No, I don’t think Covey is suddenly the third-best pitcher in baseball, and yes, that SIERA is a over a run higher than the FIP, and that’s because Covey has yet to give up a home run. That SIERA is still really good, though: among starters this year with at least 30 IP, the highest bar Covey clears, that would be good for 29th, slotting between Blake Snell and Alex Wood. Other pitcher evaluation metrics mostly agree: Baseball Savant’s xwOBA-against judges him at .293, 21st-best among starters. Baseball Prospectus’ DRA, how ever, does not like what he’s done, as his DRA this year is 5.38. There have been 4 unearned runs against him this year, so BBRef’s RA/9 dings him for that but still evaluates him well at 3.31 (Note: two of those unearned runs scored as inherited runners off a reliever). I cannot say why DRA hates him, but when a black-box statistic is in complete disagreement with literally every other ERA estimator, I have to ignore it.

Of course, the instinct of any saber-savvy fan is dismiss this as a fluke, small sample, etc. Anything can happen in small samples– once upon a time, Philip Humber threw a perfect game! That’s what I said, so when I trawled through Covey’s peripherals just to make sure this was a fluke, I kept expecting to find something or another that screamed regression. If there is a statistical red flag for harsh regression beyond his steadfast refusal to give up a home run, it remains as elusive to me as the average Bigfoot. His K% is a bit above average at 22.2% (starters’ average this year is 21.7%), his walk rate is a little better than average at 7.4% (avg is 8.2%), for a just above average K-BB% of 14.8% (avg of 13.6%). His LOB% is a bit low at 71.1% (avg 73.0%), and his BABIP-against is maybe a touch unlucky at .333 (avg .288). His WHIP is a smidge worse than average at 1.30 (avg 1.28). There is, in sum, absolutely nothing out of the ordinary there; by those measures he looks like a league average or slightly above starter. Which isn’t bad, as it suggests that his floor is that of a perfectly cromulent major-league starter, which is already a great outcome for a Rule V pick and vast improvement over last year.

Where Covey starts getting real interesting is when you start looking at the ways in which he might be suppressing home runs. I already told you that Covey’s primary pitch as a high schooler was a heavy sinker, and he’s gone back to his roots with it this year. In 2017, he threw fastballs about 60% of the time, splitting usage about evenly between his sinker and a four-seam. This year, he’s throwing even more fastballs, up to 68.3%, but he’s ditched the four-seam almost entirely; those are nearly exclusively sinkers he’s thrown. The point of a sinker is to get ground balls, and boy oh boy has his sinker done so.

Put simply, Covey’s been a ground ball machine. Among all starters with at least 30 IP this year, he’s tops in ground ball rate at 61.0%. The sinker has done most of that work; when batters put it in play, they beat it into the ground 68.1% of the time, 8th among starters. As one would expect, he’s also not allowed many fly balls; his FB% is a tiny 23.5%, seventh-lowest among his peers. Also unsurprisingly, he’s got the fourth-highest GB/FB, at 2.56, of starters. If his FIP is low because he’s not allowed a home run, well, it’s at least in part because it’s rather difficult to get a home run out of a grounder. When examined more closely, the metrics on his sinker back up its excellent results.

First of all, he’s added some velocity to it. This year his sinker is averaging 94.4 MPH, compared to last year’s 92.9 MPH. The addition of 1.5 to 2 MPH this year versus last is found in all his other pitches, too. Throwing harder across the board: always a good sign! It’s more than just respectably hard. Although Statcast classifies it as a 2-seamer, the pitch has the 29th-lowest average spin rate among either sinkers or 2-seamers this year.

While that and the velocity of the pitch (26th-fastest in the same mix of starters’ 2-seams & sinkers) are both good-not-great numbers, the combination of the two is actually pretty unusual– fastball velocity and spin rate usually have a positive correlation. Less spin is good in this case; the spin is mostly backspin, and the less backspin on a sinker, the more it sinks and (probably) the better it is. Of the 25 starters that throw their 2-seamers/sinkers harder than Covey does, only two– Erick Fedde and Fernando Romero, both rookies with small sample sizes themselves, also have lower spin rates. Stephen Strasburg and Sal Romano also throw harder and barely missed the spin rate cutoff. For comparison, the 2018 preview on Fedde’s FG page describes his sinker as “potentially premium”, Romano and Romero both have their fastballs graded by the FG prospect experts as 70s (plus-plus), and Strasburg rarely throws his 2-seamer.

In short, his sinker is elite for the sum of its parts. It’s generated an exactly league-average 6.8% whiff rate, which doesn’t sound special, but when it’s put in play, hitters can’t help but beat it into the ground. Its grounder/ball in play rate is an incredible 68.1%, 4th among starters and 10th among all pitchers this year. As would be expected, hitters haven’t done too well against it, with a xwOBA against of 0.324, checking in at 13th of all starters’ sinkers/2-seamers.

The three guys ahead of him on the starter list– Trevor Cahill, J.A. Happ, and Marcus Stroman— are interesting for comps, too. None strike out a ton of guys– all have career K/9s under eight– and none walk too many either, like Covey. Unsurprisingly, Stroman and Cahill, sinker/slider righties like Covey, are No. 2 and  No. 3 in starter GB% after Covey. Cahill’s having his best year yet in the A’s rotation, having upped his strikeouts to almost 9 K/9, cut his walks to 2 BB/9, and limiting home runs enough that ERA & ERA estimators are all around 3. Stroman, though he’s been hurt and not pitched well this year, has a track record of four years of being a solid No. 2 starter, especially according to SIERA.

Covey’s secondary pitches– slider (15.6% usage), curve (8.2%) and split-finger changeup (8.7%)– are all about average or better. The slider’s whiff rate is 13.5%, not spectacular but solidly above the league-average slider whiff of 9.0%. It’s not been murdered when it gets hit, either; Statcast’s xwOBA against the pitch is a pitiful .209, good for 16th among starters’ sliders. The change is an effective swing-and-miss pitch too, also with an above-average whiff rate at 15.6%. Hitters haven’t hit the change well either, with a xwOBA against of just .220, 16th among starters’ changeups. The curve hasn’t generated many swings-and-misses (just 2 out of 44 thrown, 4.5%) but hasn’t killed him at an xwOBA of .273, about middle of the pack for starters.

Baseball Savant sure doesn’t think that Covey’s just been extremely lucky in home-run suppression, but just to be sure, I went to go see what xStats.org thought of him. It thinks he should have given up 1.5 homers so far. Ignoring for a moment the fact that one cannot in fact hit half a home run, although a ground rule double seems close to it, that works out to a deserved rate of 0.382 HR/9. Which, in case you’re wondering, would still be good for fourth-lowest HR/9 of starters— Covey of course currently has the lowest of all at 0. Not perfect, then, but damn close to it. The other names in the top 10 lowest HR/9 are unsurprisingly for the most part really good to great pitchers: Arrieta, Nola, Severino, Bauer, Chatwood (???), deGrom, Buehler, Cueto, and Carlos Martinez, in ascending (towards lowest) order.

So that’s Dylan Covey in 2018: a pitcher with an excellent bread-and-butter sinker, two very good secondaries, and a passable fourth pitch. He’s not walking many, striking out close to a batter per inning, getting ground balls like they’re going out of fashion, and bucking the home run trend. I’m particularly reminded of Stroman in overall profile, but Covey has the advantages of size, a bit of youth, a home field with dirt instead of turf (grounders come off turf faster, meaning more hits), and a considerably younger and rangier infield behind him. He’s also got Don Cooper and Herm Schnieder on his coaching staff, which makes it less likely that he’ll be derailed by either mechanical or health issues. I for one didn’t see this coming, but the White Sox’ patience has already been rewarded with an unexpected breakout by Matt Davidson, so why couldn’t they have found another post-prospect gem? It’s at least interesting to note that Dallas Keuchel and Jake Arrieta, probably the best examples of guys who became great pitchers out of more or less nowhere after given time to reinvent themselves on rebuilding squads, are both in the top 20 in ground ball rate for starters– the category, of course, wherein Covey currently reigns supreme. I don’t really know what more to say. Small sample size notwithstanding, how about Dylan Covey, No. 2 starter?

Notes on process: with a small sample size of just seven starts at time of writing, the minimum cutoffs I employed to compare Covey to other pitchers were usually the minimum that he himself cleared– 30 IP with his 35.1 IP, 10 PA for his xwOBA against his curveball that has 13 PAs, etc. As he gets more starts, the exact numbers and rankings will of course change; the rankings are there not to be exact but rather to give some context for the raw numbers, most of which are obscure enough that the average reader likely cannot evaluate how “good” it is. Everyone knows a 2.29 ERA & 2.16 FIP are great, but I doubt many readers can instantly discern how good, say, a xwOBA of .220 against a certain pitcher’s changeup is. I also made the decision to evaluate almost exclusively against other starters’ 2018 years, as the baseball is again different this year and relievers are increasingly a different, turbo-powered breed of pitcher that cannot fairly be compared to starters.

You know his story: David Price is a $217-million man with a 4.74 earned run average, and the people of Boston aren’t happy. It’s another Crawford-Sandoval-Ramirez waste of money. Things are headed downhill for the 31-year old veteran. Or are they?

First, the bad news: the 2016 version of David Price has been worse than the 2015 David Price, and way worse than the top-caliber pitcher Boston signed him to be. And the ERA shows it.

The suspect is pitch selection, and the culprit is a sinker that doesn’t sink. Price has a two-seam fastball that over his seven-year career he has thrown some 30% of the time. In his prime, it clocked in at 94-95 mph, but since then he’s dropped almost two mph.

Usually, that level of velocity leak wouldn’t be a big deal, because if there’s enough movement and deception, batters will be fooled either way. But Price’s sinker is different.

Brooks Baseball reports that “His sinker has well above-average velocity, but has little sinking action compared to a true sinker and results in more fly balls compared to other pitchers.” Uh-oh. “Little sinking action?” There needs to be at least some element of vertical movement for a sinker to be fully effective, or, in Price’s case, a little extra velocity. But now he has neither.

The results show it. Last month, he surrendered 10 home runs, more than the previous two months combined. Also in June: 31% of his pitches were sinkers, nearly 10% more than the month before. Coincidence? I think not. He’s also allowing a .241 Isolated Power on sinkers, only three points less than Mike Trout this season. And maybe the most convincing statistic: hitters are pulling the ball 10% more than they did last year, which means they are making more solid contact and not having to stay back on his fastball. Price’s pitches are slower, and it’s making a difference.

Why is he losing velocity? There’s two possibilities and they point in completely opposite directions. The first is age. Price is 31 and he’s nearing the point where most starting pitchers start to fall on the aging curve and eke velocity. If this is the case, it’s going to be a long seven years for the Red Sox. But there is another possibility. Price has played in Tampa Bay for most of his career, where the temperatures are never 40 degrees like Boston in April. It’s entirely possible that the cold ‘froze’ him up this spring and as the season continues, he’ll regain his speed. Most likely, it’s a combination of both. But either way, it’s never a good sign when pitchers slow down.

Price has always gotten away with leaving sinkers up in the zone because they showed 94-95 mph on the radar gun. But now hitters are seeing 92mph fastballs fly straight down the middle of the plate and stay there.  Why doesn’t he just put the ball on a tee? Nine out of 10 major-league hitters will knock that pitch into the stands every time. Just look at the stats: He’s surrendered just two fewer home runs than he did last season even though he’s pitched 112 fewer innings (2015: 17, 2016: 15), and he’s allowed an average of 1.25 home runs per nine innings, which is 32 percent worse than his career average (0.84). Sinkers are sending the man to his grave.

They’re also killing his ERA. 38% of his earned runs are from home runs, and if you set his home runs to eight instead of 17, his ERA would be 4.01 instead of 4.74, a 0.73 difference. (8 is the number he had allowed last year at this point in the season.) In fact, his strikeout and walk totals are even better than last season, but the home runs negate all of it.

But we can’t blame everything on the sinker, either. Price has definitely been unlucky this season. His home run to fly ball ratio is 15.5%, an unsustainable mark, his .323 BABIP .035 more than his career average, and his LOB% 10 percent less than the 2016 league average. These will balance out in time. But his sinker is the real problem.

The only way to truly limit home runs is to limit fly balls, and for Price, the only way to limit fly balls is to stop throwing sinkers that don’t sink. The solution is (1) throw harder, or (2) find another pitch to replace his sinker. Option one is still TBD. Option two could be filled with either a change or slider — two pitches that he has used to complement his fastball but never to the level that he uses his sinker. The outlook is grim either way.

Price is still a very experienced pitcher, and once his HR/FB, LOB%, and BABIP rates come down to earth, things will even out. But if he wants to be successful for the Red Sox for the entirety of his stay, there’s a longer-term issue at stake, and if his velocity continues to leak, I’m not sure what type of David Price we’ll be looking at a year from now.

As we start a new baseball season, I start a new season of my own. This is my first – of many I hope – analysis and write-up on baseball that I am submitting. I am an avid fan, a numbers geek, an aspiring writer and lastly a bored software engineer. I am also very fortunate. I have a close connection with a former major league player and the ability to leverage his vast experience and knowledge of the game. Hopefully, I can parlay the knowledge I have learned from many years of observation along with the knowledge I have gleaned from my connection to realize my goal as a contributor to the sabermetric community and to the enjoyment of baseball fans everywhere. Here we go!

Question

Is the effectiveness of a sinker dependent on from which side of the rubber the pitcher throws?

I was in Florida in mid March for spring training, talking with a minor league coach when he mentioned that he and a former all star pitcher were in a disagreement about how to throw a sinker. Their debate centers on where a pitcher should stand on the rubber to throw a sinker most effectively. We all understand that a pitcher should not move all over the rubber to become more effective on a single pitch. This would obviously tip off the hitters as to what type of pitch might be coming. But for argument’s sake, a team might have some newly transformed position players learning to throw different pitches. Wouldn’t a team want to know if, for some pitches, it was more beneficial to stand on one side of the rubber than another?

I consider myself a pretty observant guy, but I will have to admit that I never really paid much attention to where a pitcher stood on the rubber. To me the juicy part is watching the ball just after it is released. The dance, dip, duck and dive a pitcher is able to command of the ball is where the action is as far as I am concerned. So watching what a pitcher does before he even starts his motion was asking a little much. Nonetheless, I was certain that with so many pitchers in the majors, that a breakdown of data would show that there was not a singular starting point on the rubber. Every pitcher is different, right?

Setup

I started my analysis by downloading the last 4 years (2009-2012) of PitchFx data. Most of us know this already but by using PitchFx data there are some limitations to analysis. Unlike Trackman, PitchFx initially records each pitch at 50’ from home plate, not the actual release point of the pitch. For PitchFx this data point is called “x0”, and for all intents and purposes this is pretty good data, as for most pitchers their strides are approximately 5 to 6’ from the rubber, and with arms length added in we are talking about a difference of a couple of percentage points from being the same as the release point metric from Trackman. But full disclosure, it is not exactly the release point. Another factor that I didn’t measure is a pitcher’s motion to the plate. Some pitchers throw “across” their bodies and not down a straight line, and even fewer open up their body to the batter (stepping to stride leg’s baseline). Also, there is probably a bit to glean from going between the stretch and wind-up, but again without doing a very in-depth study I assume no factor in the analysis. Lastly, arm length is an unmeasured factor. For example, I didn’t check to see if there were any right-handed pitchers with extra long arms standing on the first-base side of the rubber distorting the data.

I started by combining the PitchFx Sinker (SI) and Two-seam fastball (FT) data into a single database. The reason to combine the data is due to the fact that the grips for each pitch are the same, combine this with a two-seam fastball can and a sinker break the same way (down and in to a RH batter from a RH pitcher), and lastly they are also somewhat synonymous in major league vernacular. Maybe somewhere along the line the pitch was invented twice (north or south), the name given is based on region like when asking for a Coke… it’s a “soda”, a “pop”, or a “tonic” depending on where you are in the states. Maybe in the South it was labeled a sinker and the North it was taught as a “two-seamer”? Either way it’s the same pitch as far as I am concerned, and the etymology of pitch naming is a different topic for a different time.

Back to the question above about every pitcher being different, I was wrong. Using the 2012 data I created a frequency distribution for right-handed pitchers (figure 1), and as you can see there is definite focal area at around -2’ point from the centerline of the pitching rubber (and home plate).

Figure 1 – Right-handed pitchers in 2012

This shows that most pitchers start from about the same side; which I determined to be the right side of the rubber (3^rd base side). I determined this by adding 9” to one-half the length of the pitching rubber (24”) which comes to 21” (9”+12”). Add in arm length and you can see that using an x0 that is less than or equal to 2’ (remember we are using negatives here) should prove that the pitcher is throwing from the right side.  I would like to add that the 9” used above is based on the shoulder width of an average man, which is around 18”. This metric is based on studies on the “biacromial diameter” of male shoulders in 1970 (pg. 28 Vital and Health Statistics – Data from the National Health Survey). I think we can all agree that the 18” is probably conservative by today’s growth standards. I mentioned in the limitations of the analysis written above, I don’t account for arm length or pitcher motion. Therefore I needed to make sure that there are right-handed pitchers who are throwing from the left hand side of the rubber; just not a bunch of super long-armed, cross bodied throwers.  With the data in hand I was able to identify which pitchers had thrown the ball closer to centerline of the rubber and therefore would be good candidates for standing on the left side of the rubber. The first pitcher who had a higher (>-2) x0 value was Yovani Gallardo of the Milwaukee Brewers. Without knowing Gallardo’s motion I needed to go to the video. From the video, you can clearly see that Gallardo starts on the left side of the rubber and throws fairly conventionally, straight down the line to the batter.

I wanted to keep this as simple as possible, breaking up the pitchers in two categories – Left side or Right side. Without looking at video for each pitcher I had to come up with a tipping point for classifying the side based on the x0 data I had available. If we simply take what we determined above and correlate it to the left hand side we will come up with 1 (starting on left side of rubber) and an x0 of 0. But it isn’t quite that simple. The frequency chart shows that there are less than 1000 balls thrown in 2012 with an x0 greater than or equal to 0. Gallardo threw 504 pitches himself in 2012. So we have to increase the scope a bit. By arranging the x0 data into quartiles we see that upper or lower quartile – depending on handedness – is around -1 or 1 (remember we are using negatives) so for a right handed pitcher the x0 splits are:

For left handers:

As I am trying to stay conservative, and the fact that these are not release point numbers I use 1 and -1 as the cut off for classification based on the handedness of the pitcher. Using these numbers provided a pretty clean break in the distributions (90-10%).

Findings

So who was right, the all star pitcher or the minor league pitching coach? Is there an advantage depending on where the pitcher stands on the rubber? Neither – both of them. It’s a tie.

What can I say; my initial analysis is a bit anticlimactic, but not because of lack of effort.  To denote the labels below:

• LH or RH (Handedness)
• RR or LR (Right or Left Rubber)
• B – Balls
• K – Strikes
• P – In play (No Outs)
• O – In play (Outs)
• BackK – Called Strikes
• FT – Two seam fastballs
• SI – Sinkers
• Efficiency – O/(P+O)
• XSide – Cross Side (i.e. RH-LR or LH-RR)
• Same side – LH-LR or RH-RR

The efficiency is so very close. Twelve-hundredths (.12) of a percent is not a lot – 169 outs out of 140678 – but give any Chicago Cub fan five of those outs in 2003 and Mr. Bartman would be an afterthought. Which, I am sure is the way he and all Cub fans around the world would like it. The efficiency is the same, no other way to put it which is the beauty of statistics and sabermetrics. Numbers can say so much, even when they are the equal.

But the analysis wasn’t all for naught, there are some nuggets to glean from the numbers above. As a segue, I am currently watching Derek Lowe of the Texas Rangers pitch on opening night and from the left side of the rubber he throws a sinker and it dips back over the rear part of the plate for a called strike. With all of the similarities within my analysis the most striking observation is the difference in called strikes depending on the side of the rubber. If a pitcher, coach or manager could get a strike or a strike out without the fear of having a batter get a hit or moving a runner forward they would do it every time. With a five percent difference in getting a strike and not having the worry of the ball being put into play would be an interesting thing to know in some tight situations with runners on base. My thought on the difference revolves around the back door being open a little wider when it comes to getting called strikes. With a pitcher throwing X-side you can definitely see a pattern of called strikes on the same side of the plate from which the pitcher throws from. Positive numbers in figures below indicate right side of plate (1^st base side)

With today’s specialization where pitchers are matched up to batters based on handedness, the ability for a pitcher to throw a strike as it tails back over the plate or close to the plate (or maybe not even close for some of the pitches above ) is essential. It appears that umpires are a little more flexible with their perception of the strike zone for these pitchers as well.

Closing

I didn’t get the results that I anticipated when I started this analysis, and that is great! As a society we are determined to have a winner! Just as there is “no crying in baseball”, there are no ties in baseball. Even when there is a tie; like on a close play at first – it proverbially goes to the runner. We can’t settle for a tie…. hockey reduced ties by adding a shootout after overtime.  College football removed the tie by introducing sudden death (hopefully the bowl playoff with help eliminate the subjective BCS tie). With no clear cut advantage (read – TIE) identified in my analysis means that a more in depth analysis could/should be performed to validate. Maybe expanding the percentage of X-side pitchers to 15-20, or identifying when pitchers are throwing from the stretch and removing those instances would alter the results and provide a much needed winner? If after all analytical statistical avenues have been exhausted there’s still not a proven advantage, we can always resort to having the coach and player settle it with a coin flip?