On November 20^th, the Cleveland Indians signed outfielder David Murphy to a 2 year/12 million dollar contract, hoping to see a bounce-back pair of seasons from him after an atrocious 2013. There is always risk involved when signing a player coming off of such a bad season, and it certainly doesn’t help that Murphy is on the wrong side of 30, but nonetheless, this was a wise allocation of resources by the Tribe.

After, for the most part, reaching base at a very solid clip in the years 2010-2012, posting OBPs of .358, .328, and .380, he plummeted to .282 in 2013. Additionally, he saw his wRC+ decrease from 129 in 2012 to a dreadful 73 in 2013. Suddenly, he was dangerously close to being nothing more than a replacement-level player, posting an unimpressive WAR of 0.4 despite playing 142 games. This sharp decline coming just one season after achieving a WAR of 3.9, suggesting he was closer to stardom than replacement level. How did this happen to Murphy? While it is difficult to quantify the effect of, as Murphy puts it, “Putting pressure on myself to step into a role and play a bigger part in the offense,” one thing is for sure: Murphy had horrendous luck in 2013. The sabermetrics community is becoming increasingly aware that BABIP involves many factors besides a player’s luck, so perhaps Murphy’s putrid .220 BABIP cannot simply be written off as nothing more than bad fortune. Then again, perhaps it can, as Murphy also posted a .295 xBABIP, suggesting that he made solid enough contact to achieve roughly a league average BABIP.

This is especially important considering that, even in a down 2013 for Murphy, he still did a stellar job of putting the ball in play with a K% of 12.4 compared to the league average of 18.5. This of course suggests that, given his propensity to put the ball in play, an increased BABIP would yield even more dramatic results than it would for most players. To put into context just how impressive that strikeout rate is, it is superior to that of both Miguel Cabrera (14.4%) and Mike Trout (19%). By no means does this make Murphy a better player than Trout or Cabrera, as Murphy is no superstar, but he sure does avoid strikeouts like one.

Not only does he put the ball in play, his power is not yet on the decline. While no one would describe David Murphy as a slugger, he’s no Ben Revere, either. For evidence of this, one need look no further than to his ISO, which has stood above what FanGraphs defines as the league average of .145 in all but one of his six full major league seasons. Obviously, he possesses a nice combination of good power and excellent contact skills. Furthermore, let’s say he posted a .295 BABIP to correlate with his xBABIP. As a result, his OBP would see an impressive uptick from .282 to a comparatively robust .332, just about in line with his career mark of.337. Or, in other words, only .007 points worse than Hunter Pence. Perception is a funny thing, isn’t it?

Certainly, we are talking about a player who will see a healthy progression in his offense from last season to this, but what about Murphy’s defense? Well, it turns out he is steady with the glove as well. While he has played most of his career in left field, all signs point to him spending most of this season in right field for the Indians. This should be no problem, as his UZR/150 in right field of 10.3 for his career is a clear indicator that he is more than capable of manning the position. In fact, that mark is actually greater than his UZR/150 in left field, 6.1. These numbers do not quite reflect defensive wizardry, but as seems to be the case with almost every element of Murphy’s game, paint a picture of a solid, reliable player.

Assuming Murphy experiences an offensive rebound of sorts, as the numbers suggest he should, and continues his well-above-average glove work, one could reasonably project him to be worth somewhere between two and three wins this upcoming season. Considering that the price of one WAR is thought to be somewhere in the six million dollar range, and that Murphy will receive a six million dollar annual salary in his two-year pact with the Tribe, he has a chance to be worth in excess of two times what he is being paid. Simply put, this addition was a savvy one by GM Chris Antonetti. There have been flashier signings this offseason, and hindsight is 20/20, but perhaps in the year 2020, when the Mariners are still on the hook for 96 million dollars worth of 37 year old, near replacement level Robinson Cano, they and heavy-spending teams like them might wish they had chosen the route the Indians did this winter. The bargain bin isn’t sexy, but it will undoubtedly prove to be a wise, cost-effective approach for the Indians in the case of Murphy.

Just by casually observing transactions over the past few years, any baseball fan would say that it really feels as if some of the top talent in the game has transferred from the NL to the AL, whether by trade or free agency. Ask any fan to name a player that has left the Senior Circuit for the Junior counterpart recently, and top superstar names immediately come to mind, most notably Albert Pujols and Prince Fielder. Now ask them to do the reverse, and it’s much trickier. Does Zack Greinke count, even though it’s been back and forth for him? There’s B.J. Upton, but how has he fared so far in the NL?

Let’s take a look at the free agents of this offseason to see if there’s anything that supports the idea that top talent is trending towards the AL. I took the list of all 96 major league contracts given out so far, not including players coming from Japan, and only grabbed contracts worth $5 million or more annually. After all, with all due respect, we’re looking at trends with top major league talent. That cuts the total to only 50 contracts. Here’s the breakdown.

31 originally from AL, 19 originally from NL

24 signed in AL, 26 signed in NL

10 re-signed with original team

So by quantity, National League teams actually signed more contracts that were worth at least $5 million annually this offseason. And the NL also managed to “steal” a net total of seven players away. In this regard, the offseason could be considered a victory for the Senior Circuit. But let’s look at quality now.

There were only five players who transferred over from the NL to the AL, but those five earned contracts totaling $315 million, while the twelve that went from the AL to the NL received deals that only added to $274 million. Now, you could argue that American League didn’t really take Shin-Soo Choo away, but that it just reclaimed him after a one-year hiatus. But Brian McCann has been an NL-lifer up until 2014, and Carlos Beltran hasn’t played a game as a member of the AL in almost a decade. Even Ricky Nolasco, also a NL-lifer, was enticed over with a $49 million deal.

Curtis Granderson and Jhonny Peralta highlight the players moving in the other direction, and Granderson’s $60 million dollar deal also happens to represent the largest amount of money any NL team used in free agency this year. Think about that. The New York Mets gave out the largest contract to a free agent this offseason for National League teams, and there were four deals larger in the American League, two by the other team in that city.

Out of the top 14 largest contracts by total money, 11 came from an AL team. Keep in mind, all these numbers are fluid, with four big-name free agents still floating out in purgatory, but the idea remains the same. The number of free agents that sign into both leagues are roughly equal, but the American League is just handing over more money to more of the top players available. Also, if we factor in Jose Abreu and Masahiro Tanaka, both of whom landed in the AL, the numbers would be even more skewed towards the Junior Circuit.

But maybe this was a one-year thing, a fluke. What about last offseason? Let’s do the same thing, with the same arbitrary $5 million annual salary cutoff.

There were a total of 41 contracts that met the cutoff. Here’s the breakdown.

28 originally from AL, 13 originally from NL

24 signed in AL, 17 signed in NL

13 re-signed with original team

In case any readers have forgotten, the big fish for the 2012-13 offseason were Josh Hamilton, Zack Greinke, and BJ Upton. Interestingly, these numbers paint an entirely different picture, with more free agents ending up in the AL, but the quality lying in the NL. Now, the two contracts really doing the heavy lifting for the National League are Zack Greinke’s and BJ Upton’s, who both came over from the AL. While they respectively had deals worth $147 million and $75.25 million, the next closest guy was Edwin Jackson with his $52 million.

So it almost looks like the last two offseasons have been a wash. There was a more extreme split this year with the “steal” contracts, as the AL flat-out dominated. But the 2012-13 offseason did feature the  NL getting more involved and outbidding their AL counterparts, in quantity and quality.

Let’s go one more year back into memory lane just to settle this. Which league takes more players away with larger, more exorbitant contracts?

This is the 2011-12 free agent summary, with the same cutoff. There were a total of 28 contracts that met the requirements.

12 originally from AL, 16 originally from NL

10 signed in AL, 18 signed in NL

6 re-signed with original team

This is the Albert Pujols and Prince Fielder offseason, so the most noticeable numbers are all in that bottom row. It’s ridiculous; the four players who transferred from the NL to the AL (Pujols, Fielder, Hiroki Kuroda, Carlos Pena) had contracts that added up to just $250 thousand less than the 18 players who ended in the NL. The average dollars amount is ridiculous, although it is of course boosted by the two big fishes. I think it’s safe to say that the American League had the more lucrative offseason, although their National League colleagues might be chuckling at the Pujols and Fielder deals now. From the AL point of view, hey, there’s always the Jonathon Papelbon deal to laugh at.

So what can we conclude? The AL has crushed the NL in two of the last three offseasons, with the National League coming away with slightly better results in 2012-13. The Junior Circuit has also dominated in terms of luring away big names, as teams have been able to acquire Pujols, Fielder, Choo, McCann, Beltran, and Michael Bourn in recent years. The NL has grabbed Greinke, Upton, and Granderson, but that’s about it. Peralta and Michael Cuddyer are nice, but not close to the level of the other guys.

We can’t really fully confirm the AL has been more successful without going further back, but it’s safe to say the American League teams have been more aggressive over the last few years when targeting top free agents. However, something else that stood out is the number of free agents that are coming from each league. Add up the totals for the last three years, and there have been 71 from the AL and 48 from the NL. Remember these totals are only for free agents who signed contracts with at least an AAV of $5 million, but that’s a noticeable difference. Without looking at any references, I believe that’s due to National League teams locking up young talent sooner and more willingly than AL teams. This offseason alone, it seems the Atlanta Braves practically signed their entire organization to long-term deals. Homer Bailey just finished up an extension, and of course, we had Mr. Clayton Kershaw settle a deal with Los Angeles.

But that’s an article for another time.

Who can the Indians most rely on for a big hit?

The Indians were a very timely team last year and all of the players bought into Terry Francona’s style and unearthed the capacity of their talent. There are a lot of very good hitters on the Indians roster from Nick Swisher to David Murphy, but there needs to be that one guy in the lineup that the team can rely on for the big hit and that will lead the team throughout the season. There are really only two candidates for that spot — Jason Kipnis and Carlos Santana. Both are young and play non-premium offensive positions at a premium level. Each have had their issues, but are All-Star performers.

Carlos Santana was a part of a great deal by the Indians in 2008 when the team was out of contention and the Dodgers thought that Casey Blake would be an answer at third base. Blake may have finished his career with the Dodgers and provided a bit of power and some stability at third for a bit, but the Indians have won that trade by a large margin. In nearly 500 games since 2010, only Joe Mauer and Buster Posey have a higher OPS+ than Carlos Santana’s 130. He is also very durable; since he became the starter full-time in 2011, he averages 151 games per year, a very impressive rate for a catcher.

He does not only play catcher also, as he has played first throughout his career and took grounders at third this offseason. The versatility of Santana is a very important thing for the Indians. Yan Gomes exhibited last year that he is a solid catcher and may get even more of an opportunity to catch this year and that might even make the case for Santana to be even better offensively. When you look at Santana’s statistics, that is true; as he has moved away from catcher, his statistics have become more impressive. Last year, he was 7th in the American League in OBP at .377 and has 20+ home run power. A hitter that does hit a lot of fly balls, Santana also has a very solid 13.3% HR/FB rate. Santana has always been a player on the precipice of breaking out and as Santana moves out of the catcher’s position, this may be the season where he moves from being a very good player to a serious MVP candidate. The lineup for the Indians could be very good for the Indians this year and Santana is a main reason.

Jason Kipnis has been a solid producer for the Indians since he was called up in July 2011. It is rare for a second baseman to have a slugging percentage in the .450s but that was what Kipnis acheived last year. When combined with his above average defense and 30 steal per year speed, there is not a question that he is the best player on the Indians. But is he a difference maker at the plate? The assortment of skills is great for the Indians and he gives a lot to the team in many different ways, but is he the player that is a difference maker at the plate. As analyzed with Santana, he is a force at the plate and a potential 30 home run hitter; Kipnis brings a different skill to the team. Kipnis is a more balanced hitter that generates more line drives and is statistically more clutch than Santana. He is a bit streaky though and does not hit for power like Santana; also, Kipnis will probably never be a .300 hitter. He is patient and does not strike out much which makes him very valuable.

Currently the Indians have Kipnis as the three hitter and that is a great spot for him. If Michael Bourn and Francisco Lindor — in the future — are on base in front of him, Kipnis may have an opportunity to be a 100 RBI guy even without the prototypical power. He is the most important hitter in the Indians lineup and may potentially be better than Santana.

When will the Indians get a front line starter?

The biggest question for the Indians is if they can win in the tough American League with a bunch of pretty good starters rather than a few elite starters. The easy answer is no. To look a bit deeper than that simple answer, you have to see if the number one starter for the Indians, Justin Masterson, really is worthy of being an “ace”.

Justin Masterson was a young, sturdy swingman for the Red Sox in the 2008 season and the beginning of the 2009 season before he was a part of the package that lured Victor Martinez to Boston. Since then, Masterson has become a 200 inning a year pitcher with a heavy, ground ball inducing fastball. On a team with a couple solid and stable pitchers, Justin Masterson would be a great innings eater in the middle of the rotation. Unfortunately for the Indians, he is the staff ace. Last year’s team may have had the right idea with having a couple middle rotation type guys added with Masterson in Scott Kazmir and Ubaldo Jimenez to make a pretty good rotation, but neither of those players will be with the team in 2014.

Instead, he will be joined in the rotation with Corey Kluber, Danny Salazar, Zach McAllister, and Carlos Carrasco. There is a ton of upside there, but none of those pitchers have exhibited over any long stretch of time that that they are viable options for a playoff team. So the fate of the Indians lays in the hands of Justin Masterson to lead the rotation. Masterson was quite good last year before he got hurt, leading the American League in shutouts and accumulating more than a strikeout an inning. He was on the way to becoming a good pitcher and might still be. The only real glaring issue there is with Masterson is that the strikeout rate of 2013 is more similar to his numbers from when he was in the bullpen than when he was a starter in the past. Especially considering that the Indians just gave him $9.7 million in arbitration, it seems that the Indians were paying for the Masterson that they saw last year.

The better Masterson and the less volitile Masterson is one that has his strikeout rate near 7, works on getting his walks down, and induces ground balls. The infield defense for the Indians is good enough to turn the ground balls that Masterson creates into outs. This is how the Indians could get the most out of Masterson as well. If he presses for strikeouts, his pitch count will go up and he will not be as effective. The Indians may not be a playoff team with a Masterson led rotation, but this is the only option that they have right now.

The Indians had brought in Trevor Bauer in a trade with the Diamondbacks and saw progress from Danny Salazar at the end of the season. Each of those pitchers needs to compliment Masterson for the Indians to have any illusions of returning to the playoffs with the roster as currently constituted. The Indians may be making some moves in the near future, look at the fourth question, but at this point the rotation falls flat a bit.

How will the Indians reorganize their bullpen?

As alluded to in the previous answer, pitching is not a strong suit for the Indians, a problem that is not isolated to the starting rotation. The Indians have had a pretty solid bullpen over the past few years. Even if Chris Perez was inconsistent, he was still a viable option at closer and did get outs when it mattered. Vinnie Pestano was so solid in the eighth inning and was able to eliminate the major situations so there was little pressure when it came to Perez. Now Perez is gone after legal troubles were heaped on top of pitching problems. The Indians reworked their bullpen and it now comes downs to three pitchers to finish up the games- Cody Allen, Vinnie Pestano, and the newly acquired closer John Axford.

Cody Allen was a 23rd round pick out of High Point in 2011 and quickly began his assent through the Indians farm system, making it to Double-A Akron by the end of 2011 and the major league by July 2012. Allen has been the typical power pitcher in the big leagues, a lot of strikeouts combined with a bad walk rate. Allen is young and has been given ample opportunity by the Indians, so he may very well lower the walk rate, but there is a very alarming statistic that should temper expectations for the young fireballer. Over his 104 appearances in the major leagues, he has 24 shutdowns and 18 meltdowns, which, according to the analysis of shutdowns and meltdowns, makes him a below average reliever. That is something that needs fixing before the Indians move Allen into a more advanced role.

Vinnie Pestano is the most reliable arm in the Indians bullpen and probably should have been the Indians closer last year considering the issues that they had with Chris Perez. Over the 2011 and 2012 seasons, Pestano was one of the most shutdown relievers in baseball, frequently coming in during the more high leverage situations for the team and making sure that the Indians went into the ninth with the lead. That was not the case in 2013, as the Indians moved away from Pestano in the more pressure packed situations. In short analysis of his 2013 season, his walk rate spiked and ground ball outs turned into line drive hits and fly balls turned into home runs; these are not good trends and if they continue, Pestano may no longer be effective.

On the other hand, looking at the fact that he had every statistic trend in a negative way and lost velocity and command, it is actually pretty good that his ERA was only at 4.04 for the season. Pestano also revealed that he was injured for most of the 2013 season; this is not an excuse for his poor performance, but might be a reason to rationalize the drop off in ability. There is a strong case to be made for his rebound for the 2014 season and proper rehab may get him on the right track.

John Axford basically came out of nowhere to be the Brewers closer by the 2010 season and in 2011 had one of the best seasons for a closer in MLB history. His walk rate may have been a bit high, but other than that, the Brewers felt like they had a truly elite closer for the future. Since that point, Axford has since been traded to the Cardinals and is now trying to latch on to the Indians as the closer. There have been issues with his location of his fastball and that has led to a spike in his home run rate and his walk rate was awful in 2012.

In trying to fix his walk rate last year, Axford overcorrected himself; his pitches became more hittable and his strikeout rate lowered from the double digit rates of the past. For the 2014 season, the Indians need to hope that Axford can balance his velocity with control and work lower in the zone to remove the risk of the home run. Moving from Miller Park to Progressive Field may help, but the Indians must make sure that the erratic closer can right the ship. At the least, he is a pitcher that the Indians did not invest a lot of money in and has experience closing, something that the Indians needed.

In the end, the Indians bullpen is not that bad, but there is a lot of risk in the bullpen. Cody Allen may develop into a bullpen ace and there is every reason to believe that he will continue progress throughout the season. He should be the closer of the future for the Indians and, honestly, should be the closer for the Indians this year. John Axford and Vinnie Pestano are different stories and need to right the ship to be effective. Each has had there own issues and the Indians might have some issues finishing out games if the two cannot fix their respective issues. A particularly bad omen for the Indians is that within their top three bullpen arms, Allen and Axford were top 20 in the league in meltdowns and Pestano had a 8:6 shutdown to meltdown rate.

What are the Indians going to do with Asdrubal Cabrera?

Asdrubal Cabrera has been with the Indians for a while and has been a lynch pin towards a lot of success, but there is a high probability that his time with the Tribe is nearing an end. Since coming up with the Indians in 2007, Cabrera has been steady but never great. He has been an All-Star twice and won a Silver Slugger, but the Indians are not in a place where they need an inconsistent shortstop that makes $10 million a year. This is the classic argument of economics versus talent. Cabrera is just an average player and there have been many teams that have made inquiries, mainly the Cardinals last year, and the Indians would be smart to move him while he still has value. Given all of this, the obvious question is why have the Indians not traded Cabrera?

The most obvious reason that the Indians have not traded Cabrera is that they have not been able to capitalize on his value at the right time. In 2011, Cabrera was a 25 home run/17 steal player and the Indians extended him through the the 2014 season at $16.5 million, essentially paying him to be a very good, yet not great player. In both 2012 and 2013, Cabrera has had very incongruent seasons so the Indians have not really been able to see if they need to get rid of Cabrera or if he will be a key part of a winning tradition in Cleveland.

In fact, the Indians have really never known what they have in Cabrera. In the first three seasons of his career, Cabrera was a well above average fielder that did a very good job of getting on base and was smart on the basepaths. After cratering in 2010, Cabrera reemerged as a power hitting shortstop whose entire approach at the plate refocused to hitting the ball out of the ballpark. This was a good thing in the 2011, but his on base percentage has diminished to the point that it might be a good thing if he changes his approach at the plate. In short, the Indians do not know what they have in Cabrera so they have had a problem moving him. Considering that he is scheduled to be a free agent, they might have their hands tied.

The reason that the Indians should be ready to move on from Cabrera is super prospect Francisco Lindor. Almost nothing else needs to be said about Lindor than that as a 19 year old in High-A and Double-A last year, he had more walks than strikeouts; he also had a better walk to strikeout rate in his 22 games of Double-A than his 83 in High-A. Lindor is every bit of a star in the making for the Indians as an elite defender at an elite defensive position that will hit around .300 and steal upwards of 30 bases.

If the Indians were in the playoff hunt and looking to make a move to become stronger, it might not be a terrible move to put Lindor at shortstop and near the top of the lineup with Michael Bourn and trade away Cabrera. He is not a bad player, but, when combined with the fact that he is going to be a free agent at the end of the year, his value may be minimal. If they are able to trade him to a team in the playoff hunt that desperately needs a shortstop and has depth in pitching, the Indians would be wise to trade Cabrera. If the Indians are hanging around in the race and Lindor looks like he needs some polishing, it would not be wise to rush him to the big leagues; it will be his job in 2015 and there is no reason to rush him.

Why are the Indians going to win 84 games?

In 2013, the Indians were a team that was very good and took advantage of certain opportunities and down years from the Yankees and Rangers, sneaking into the playoffs as one of the wild card teams. Even though they lost to the Rays in the wild card game, there were some nice pieces there. This season, though, there are too many teams that improved while the Indians regressed a bit. The bullpen is reworked and it should be fine, but it is still going to be a question mark and the rotation is a mess right now as compared to the top line teams in the American League.

This team will be tough throughout the year but I see too many similarities to the Orioles, and not in good ways. This would be more of a top 15 team rather than a top 10 team and even though good baseball will be played in Cleveland this year, a repeat appearance in the playoffs might not be in the cards. There is promise for the future in the reworked Trevor Bauer and the slick Francisco Lindor being added to the team but for now, this is the third best team in the AL Central.

On Wednesday, February 12th, Derek Jeter announced that he will be retiring at the end of the 2014 season. This has taken over baseball headlines, and rightfully so. Jeter, a lifetime New York Yankee, is their captain and has been their starting shortstop since 1996. He is a 13 time All Star, 5 time Silver Slugger award winner, 5 time Gold Glove winner, and a 5 time World Series champion. On top of all that, Jeter has long been considered one of the true class acts of the game. In 2020 when he is eligible for the Hall of Fame, he will almost certainly be elected to it with close to a unanimous vote. Derek Jeter’s playing career was nothing short of spectacular.

On the other side of the comparison we have Alan Trammell, who played his entire career with the Detroit Tigers. Manning shortstop from 1977 to 1996, Trammell is a 6 time All Star, a 4 time Gold Glove winner, a 3 time Silver Slugger winner, and a World Series champion. He is not in the Hall of Fame and is barely holding onto a spot on the ballot. His career was also spectacular.

When you compare the accolades that each earned, Jeter easily beats out Trammell. Funny thing about all of those awards mentioned above is that they are either voted on by a committee or earned with 24 other guys on the roster. The only way to truly compare their careers is to delve into their individual advanced statistics, so let’s do exactly that!

Offense
Let’s start with with the offensive side of the stats. Through 11,986 plate appearances, Derek Jeter has a career OPS of .828, a wOBA of .365, and an average wRC+ of 121. Jeter is also a member of the 3,000 hit club. In 9,375 career plate appearances, Tram has an OPS of .767, a wOBA of .343, and an average wRC+ of 111. Alan Trammell does not have 3,000 hits, coming up short with 2,365.

Shortstops are generally considered to have the least amount of offensive production among position players. Based off of the numbers from Scoresheetwiz, the average shortstop OPS is around .749. According to FanGraphs, in 2011 the average wOBA for shortstops was .303. The average wRC+ for shortstops during Trammell’s career fluctuated between 68 and 93, and 80 and 97 during Jeter’s career according to SABR. Among shortstops, all of Jeter and Trammell’s numbers are considered well above average, but the Captain clearly has the edge.

For Hall of Fame shortstops, both of their numbers stack up quite well. Among Hall of Famers, OPS fluctuates between .653 and .859, wOBA between .296 and .409, and wRC+ between 83 and 147. Jeter will be near the top in all three of those hitting categories when he enters the Hall, while Trammell would be more towards the lower middle. Needless to say, both have earned their spots among the all time greats based off of their performances at the plate.

Defense
Comparing Derek Jeter’s defense to Alan Trammell’s is where this article gets tricky. Defensive metrics have come a long way since Trammell’s day. Today, sabermatricians use advanced metrics such as Ultimate Zone Rating (UZR), and Probabilistic Model of Range (PMR). I’ll mention Jeter’s UZR, but I won’t use it to compare him to Trammell. The statistic I will use, which is widely considered to be the most accurate way of measuring defensive ability from 1954-2001, is Total Zone (TZ).

Alan Trammell’s TZ for his entire career at shortstop was 80, while Derek Jeter’s is -129. Total Zone isn’t as accurate as a defensive metric such as UZR, but when you have a 209 run difference, I think it’s fairly easy to distinguish the better fielder. Trammell only had a negative TZ in 5 seasons out of his 20. The only years that Jeter posted a positive TZ rating were 98′, 04′, and 09′.

The metric that I used to compare both of these players to other Hall of Famers was Defensive WAR. The lowest career Def in the Hall of Fame is 27.3, held by Robin Yount. The high Def is 375.3, which is from Ozzie Smith. Alan Trammell would actually be tied with Honus Wagner for 13th on the list of Def with 184.4, while Derek Jeter would be in last place with a Def of -25.7.

I am well aware of some of the seemingly spectacular plays that Derek Jeter made in the field. Unlike Trammell, I grew up watching Jeter. Yes, Jeter made some eye popping plays throughout his career, but people fail to acknowledge that there were numerous plays that he didn’t make. Judging by Jeter’s UZR, he cost the Yankees -67.8 runs throughout the more recent bulk of his career. He may have made some big plays along the way that will be remembered, but he cost the Yankees way more runs that theoretically could have made it so the big plays weren’t even necessary.

Bottom line, Alan Trammell was a much better defensive shortstop than Derek Jeter despite having fewer Gold Glove awards. Judging by Jeter’s advanced metrics, he really wasn’t that good of a fielder at all.

Total Value
Oh no, this is where I bring out that WAR mumbo jumbo. If you’ve read anything from me before, you probably know that I am an advocate of using Wins Above Replacement to analyze a player’s total value. While it shouldn’t be the end all, be all statistic, it is great to use when comparing two players’ total contributions on the field.

Derek Jeter has a career WAR of 73.7, and Alan Trammell has a career WAR of 63.7. Despite Jeter’s poor defense throughout his career, he hit well enough to still prove more valuable than Trammell. I think that’s a testament to how truly great of a hitter Jeter was. When compared to other Hall of Famers, both WARs fit in nicely. Honus Wagner holds a large lead for WAR at 138.1, while John Ward is in last with a 39.8 WAR. When Jeter enters the Hall, he will be 4th on the list, and if Tram was in the Hall, he would be 11th.

Conclusion
Overall, Derek Jeter had a better career than Alan Trammell, but both are much deserving of spots in the Hall of Fame. To almost any baseball fan, Jeter is considered a first ballot Hall of Famer. Why then, is Allan Trammell being completely overlooked? The voters in the BBWAA need to sit down and reexamine Trammell’s career. Trammell didn’t have the New York media following that Jeter has gotten to experience throughout his legendary career, but media coverage shouldn’t be what decides who goes into the Hall and who doesn’t. Allan Trammell deserves justice, and when you compare his numbers to the greatest players to ever play his position, you will see that he ranks right up there with them.

Who is Nick Castellanos?

The Detroit Tigers made some serious adjustments to a team that was in the World Series in 2012 and on the verge of the World Series in 2013. Each of those will be analyzed below, but first it is important to look at what the Tigers did add this season in the way of Nick Castellanos. The first round pick for the Tigers in 2010 has progressed very rapidly through the minors and the soon to be 22 year old was already planned to be a part of the major league roster for the Tigers in 2014, but the transactions of the offseason accelerated the game plan for Castellanos with the Tigers.

The original plan for Castellanos was for him to make the team and potentially play left field, rather than third base which is his position of choice where he is a pretty good fielder; blocked by two-time MVP Miguel Cabrera at third base with Prince Fielder at first. The lack of potential for the future of Fielder sent him to Texas, Cabrera to first, and now the Tigers are ready to see if Castellanos is worth the lofty prospect rankings and the potential future at third.

So what can the Tigers get from Castellanos? First off, they get a much better defensive third baseman. Now the Tigers will not be getting the next Brooks Robinson at third, but his above average arm and range is a marked improvement over Miguel Cabrera’s balky third base defense over the past two seasons. In fact, Cabrera is a somewhat decent first baseman and that will help the Tigers as well. The real calling card for Castellanos, though, is his hitting. It would be foolish to believe that Castellanos will be as good in 2014 or even 2015 as Fielder is at the plate, but the upside is absolutely there and the Tigers are wise to look into it.

During the 2012 season, Castellanos had a fantastic statistical season at High-A Lakeland but he had a lot of hidden statistics that may have shown that it was a bit of a fluke, chiefly that a lot of his stats went down while in Double-A Erie and that his BABIP was absolutely ridiculously high (.486). Although his numbers plateaued a bit in Triple-A Toledo in 2013, when combined with his numbers in Erie in 2012, he showed that the double power that he had in Lakeland could translate to home runs, as he hit 18 last year. Also, he bettered his strikeout and walk rates from High-A while rising his isolated power. The difference between the .405 average in Florida and the .276 average in Ohio was the BABIP, which was at .307 last year.

The easiest conclusion to derive from this data is that Castellanos may be a bit dependent on BABIP to be an elite hitter, but the Tigers have to like a hitter than has been in the 35 double, 15 home run range in the minors over the past two years. As he continues to lower his strikeout rate, Castellanos should be able to be trusted in the Tigers lineup as a .280-.290 hitter that frequently challenges for the doubles crown in the AL and gives the Tigers a solid middle of the order contributor. For the 2014 season, he will be one of the key competitors for the Rookie of the Year title.

When will the Tigers realize that they made a mistake in trading Doug Fister?

The Tigers had a very solid rotation last year that could lead the team into 2014 and the future when they decided to make a the second of their major moves, trading Doug Fister to the Washington Nationals. Before we can analyze what the Tigers have lost, we must look at who they are going to fill the void left by Fister with. Drew Smyly was a starter in the major leagues and came up with the Tigers in 2012 as a starter as well and he actually did a pretty good job as a starter in the 18 starts that he had. The Tigers were a competing team, though, and the team added Anibal Sanchez to the rotation, put Smyly in the bullpen and he led the team to the World Series as a shut down lefty out of the bullpen. His versatility was huge for the team and could have continued to be a great tool for the team going into the future, but the team decided that there was more value out of Smyly than that of a late inning reliever and a swing man starter.

The Tigers found a better use for Smyly in the rotation and added a couple more prospects in trading Doug Fister to the Nationals. Fister was a price controlled innings eater with a fantastic ground ball rate that would have played up more with the much improved infield defense. He was arbitration eligible in 2015 but for a 30 year old pitcher that stood to make $7.2 million, the Tigers would have gotten a lot of production out of Fister for a very respectable price in 2014.

What the Tigers got in the trade will make the difference. The Tigers traded for flexibility and a change of pace. Steve Lombardozzi may not be a great player, but he can play all over the infield and outfield, is young, and is a cheap movable piece if need be. Every winning team has a super utility player that can fill in the gaps that occur throughout the season; Lomardozzi may not be a big contributor with his bat or glove during the 2014 season, but his ability to play almost anywhere on the diamond will allow other players to take a night off and keep them fresh. Ian Krol will now fill the role that Drew Smyly once had in the bullpen, albeit without the ability that Smyly has. Krol was solid in his first 9 appearances of his big league career with the Nationals, only allowing 3 hits and striking out 12, but once the league had seen him a bit his final appearances drove his ERA up to 3.95. He can also provide length, as he was a starter in the minors, so yet again the Tigers opted for versatility rather than filling a void.

The crown jewel of the trade was Robbie Ray, a top 10 left handed prospect in baseball. After a rough go at the Carolina League with High-A Potomac in 2012, Ray righted the ship in between Potomac and Double-A Harrisburg this past year, lowering his ERA back into the mid-3 range while boosting his strikeout rate in Potomac. There was a bit of a dip in strikeout rate and a slight uptick in ERA while in Harrisburg, but he lowered his walk rate, a good sign for a pitcher with a walk rate in the 4’s. He could join the Tigers during this season if needed, but he is a good insurance policy for the future.

This is where it gets a bit curious for the Tigers; it is a bad omen for the future of Rick Porcello in Detroit, that’s obvious, but what if this means that the Tigers do not feel good about signing Max Scherzer? The Tigers would have been in a good place in 2014 as they were constituted before the trades of Fielder and Fister, but the Tigers may be scared for the future. The trade of Fielder will be dissected below, but the trade of Fister was really just a way for the Tigers to have insurance for if they lose one of their aces. The Tigers would prefer a rotation that includes both Scherzer and Ray in the future, but the lack of high level minor league pitching talent made it necessary to get a young arm for Fister this offseason before they were left trying to pick up the pieces in the future. Yes, Scherzer is not a free agent until 2015 and the Tigers may have been able to win a World Series with Fister in tow this season, but the Tigers needed to get something for the future and Robbie Ray could be a very solid pitcher.

The important thing for the Tigers to do this season is to not get caught up in the potential success of Fister, but rather remember the larger plan. To sufficiently analyze this trade, we need to look at the future. This trade was a shrewd decision by the Tigers to create a bit more viability for the future and a rotation with Scherzer, Verlander, Sanchez, Smyly, and Ray in 2016 would be outstanding. In 2014, the Tigers are relying on their other advantages (lineup, top 3 pitchers in the rotation) and hoping that the playoffs would be a certainty even without Fister. This is risky business, but if it works out, the Tigers could be very happy with this trade.

How will Brad Ausmus impact the 2014 Tigers?

Amongst all of the the changes that the Tigers made, the most interesting one may be is that they no longer have the steady hand of Jim Leyland and now have Brad Ausmus at the helm. Conventional wisdom in baseball is that former catchers may extremely good managers and throughout his career, Brad Ausmus was the type of catcher that was a game manager and was very cognitive in the way he called a game. This cognitive approach will be brought on to the Tigers and it may be considerable addition to the team.

The Tigers as a team may be moving in a different direction all together, as they had previously been a slow, clunky power hitting team. When you look down the lineup and see Ian Kinsler, Jose Iglesias, Austin Jackson, and Andy Dirks or Rajai Davis, you see guys that are not prototypical power hitters, but rather hitters that can affect the game on the bases and with small ball. Brad Ausmus may be able to help change the team for the better and make them more pliable in the future. Ausmus was seen as an elite catcher in intellect and in playing small and he will be able to bring that to the Tigers.

Where this is made even better is that there is the MVP of baseball in Miguel Cabrera in the middle of the lineup. Ian Kinsler and Torii Hunter must buy into Ausmus’ philosophies in front of Cabrera and there may be even more opportunities for run production in the lineup. The analysis of the Tigers has looked into a lot of the trades that the Tigers have made and each of the two trades made by the team, as well as the signing of Rajai Davis, were to cater to Ausmus’ style. Defense and base running will be more important and the a utility player like Steve Lomardozzi should also open up opportunities for Ausmus to use his bench more often. This team will look a lot different during the 2014 season and if they are able to adhere to the new philosophies of Ausmus it will continue to breed success in Detroit.

What were the Tigers thinking when they traded Prince Fielder for Ian Kinsler?

In 2012, the Tigers made a bold move, signing Prince Fielder for $200+ million with the vision of making a playoff team even better. A World Series appearance and ALCS appearance later, Fielder’s lack of production led the team to trade him to the Texas Rangers for Ian Kinsler. It is critical to look first at what the Tigers traded. Prince Fielder is a monster of a man and his power numbers and durability were the key reasons that the Tigers were ready to ink him to the $214 million, 9 year contract that they signed him to right before Spring Training 2012. His two seasons in Detroit were insignificant if not unspectacular. Both years he played 162 games and knocked in over 100 runs, but the 50 home run seasons looked very much a thing of the past, as he hit 30 home runs in 2012 and only 25 in 2013.

In 2012, Fielder was a .300 hitter for the first time and did have more walks than strikeouts, but after a bad year at the plate, a lack of power, and continued poor defensive play, the Tigers cashed in their chips with Fielder and walked away from the table. Most of Fielder’s contract will be covered by the Rangers and the power alleys at the Ballpark in Arlington should help Fielder greatly. As for what the Tigers got in return for Fielder, Ian Kinsler, albeit a great player in his own right, might not even be the best asset received in the trade. As alluded to earlier in the Fister and Ausmus pieces, the Tigers are all about flexibility this year; this trait will also be held by the front office. Joe Nathan may have been a bit of a luxury grab for the team, even though the Tigers desperately needed a closer and their bullpen is a bit of a mess, but other than that the Tigers wanted to be able to keep the team that they have.

Justin Verlander and Miguel Cabrera are locked up and the Tigers wanted to be able to do the same with Max Scherzer, something that could only happen with a trade of Prince Fielder. Internally, and wisely at that, the Tigers decided that keeping Scherzer was more important than keeping Fielder so they moved Fielder. If financial flexibility were the only thing that the Tigers got in the trade, that would have been a win. The fact that they were also able to get an All-Star at a premium position is even better. Ian Kinsler may be a very streaky hitter and may not have that high of an average for a hitter at the top of the lineup, but he does bring a power-speed combination to a position that normally does not produce power. A two-time 30 home run/30 steal player, Kinsler will bring a different element to the Tigers from the top of the lineup.

The Tigers should be excited to have a versatile power hitter at the top of the lineup. Over the past five years, he has been above a league average power hitter and has had nearly as many walks as strikeouts a season. Kinsler may be a bit of a downgrade on Fielder, but when you evaluate the fact that the Tigers were able to get Fielder’s massive contract off of the books, the Tigers have to be happy with the trade.

Why are the Tigers going to win 89 games?

The lineup is not very deep other than Miguel Cabrera and the bullpen is not very deep other than Joe Nathan. It is as simple as this. If Nick Castellanos and Bruce Rondon can play big parts in their new respective roles and if the Tigers make me VERY wrong and come out ok in the Kinsler-Fielder trade, then this is a team well on its way to 95 wins. At this point in time, those are huge ifs, so much so that huge expectations for the 2014 Tigers should be tempered.

This is not reason to fear for the future of the Tigers. As this preview has gone over many times, the Tigers made some serious organizational moves this year and there will be some growing pains. This is the type of team that just needs to make it to the playoffs, where in a short series the strength of the upper third of the rotation and the antics of Miguel Cabrera can make them extremely dangerous.

This is a team that needed to prepare itself for the future rather than win 100 games in 2014 and then hope that everything would be ok. Doug Fister would have been a free agent right after Scherzer and if he continued to pitch well, he would have asked for big time money, especially if the Tigers had paid Scherzer nine figures in 2015. Prince Fielder was also an albatross of a contract and the Tigers needed to dump that to correctly function. These were the fact of business and the Tigers may have set themselves up better for the future with the trades that they made, even if it hurts the 2014 season.

5 You Know:

1. Miguel Cabrera

2. Justin Verlander

3. Prince Fielder

4. Torii Hunter

5. Victor Martinez

5 You Will Know:

1. Bruce Rondon

2. Nick Castellanos

3. Drew Smyly

4. James McCann

5. Corey Knebel

5 You Should Remember:

1. Jake Thompson

2. Jonathan Crawford

3. Robbie Ray

4. Devon Travis

5. Steven Moya

Advanced statistics in baseball have an image problem. A romance problem, if you will. Specifically: the idea of a grizzled scout looking out onto the battlefield and seeing the kind of gritty player who wins ballgames, well, that has romance. A dude plugging wOBA and wRC+ into a spreadsheet? In the words of ESPN, “We’re all gonna go dateless!”

A point must be made: the opacity of the acronyms themselves is a major factor in the perceived complexity of the statistics. Imagine integrating them into regular conversations, if you don’t already do so (and still have friends). “He’s above average as a hitter. You can tell from his double-you are see plus.” “Whoa, dude, that sounds too damn complicated.” “The guy’s got terrible range at shortstop, though. That’s why he can make highlight-reel plays with a terrible UZR.” “Oozer? I hardly know ‘er!” And so forth.

We statheads, cocooning ourselves in things like RA-9 WAR and expecting our friends to catch up, might make it easier on them by explaining what we measure in plain English. There are FanGraphs writers who are very good at this; it’s why they get paid money for what they do. Some other folks need a little help.

My modest proposal is to revise the acronyms we use to signify some of our favorite statistics. With a little luck, a little savvy, and a medium-height English literature graduate, we can create new terms which both summarize the needed statistic and are catchy to say aloud. For example:

– isolated power (ISO). ISO is used to show a hitter’s raw power. Batting average is hits divided by chances for hits; ISO is extra bases taken divided by chances for hits. And we can make that even more clear by calling it Hitting Ultra Long, Knowledgeable Statistic Measuring Ability to Stroke Homers (HULKSMASH).

EXAMPLE: “Jose Bautista was a pretty unremarkable hitter for most of his career, until September 2009, when he came out of nowhere with an amazing HULKSMASH.”

– weighted runs created plus (wRC+). What lies behind this dorky name? Well, we first measure roughly how many runs a player creates with his bat, using hits, walks, and so on. Then we create a putative average and set that at 100. Then everything’s scaled so that, for instance, 120 means you’re 20% better and 5 means you’re 95% worse than average.

Wouldn’t it be useful if the name wRC+ explained itself in plain English? For instance, we might explain that we’re comparing runs added by a player to a putative average. In other words, Comparing Runs Added to Putative Mean of All Players (CRAPMAP).

EXAMPLE: “The New York Mets lineup is all over the CRAPMAP. Last year David Wright’s CRAPMAP coordinate was 155 but Kirk Nieuwenhuis was way down at 72.”

In light of the negative connotation of “crap,” we might consider reversing the scale so that higher numbers mean more crappiness.

– ultimate zone rating (UZR). This measures how good you are at defense, but I don’t know how it works. The proposed replacement acronym reflects this central mystery, but it also describes the statistic much better than UZR, which for all I know could measure how “in the zone” somebody is. Let’s change it to Fielding: Official Numerical Descriptive Utility of Excellence (FONDUE).

EXAMPLE: “Last year, with all his throwing issues, Ryan Zimmerman was one of the worst defenders in baseball as measured by FONDUE.”

– baserunning (BsR). Okay, this one’s pretty simple, so simple I don’t even know why we gave it such a silly abbreviation. Was BSR taken? Or just BR? Anyway, we don’t need to worry about it anymore, because now we’re checking on Hitters Effectively Running Bases, Assessed Logically (HERBAL).

EXAMPLE: “The Colorado Rockies are hoping that outfielder Charlie Blackmon will supply them with a lot of HERBAL this year.”

– batting average on balls in play (BABIP). Simple, you think. But more descriptive yet is Batting Average Regarding Fair Contact Only if Playable (BARFCOP).

EXAMPLE: “I don’t think he can sustain that success going forward. No hitter, no matter how good, can escape the consequences of having such an erratic BARFCOP.”

– weighted on-base average (wOBA). First of all, what’s with the lowercase W? Is wOBA the iPad of stats? Second, this is another term whose meaning is unclear. We could explain to readers that wOBA weighs various outcomes (single vs. home run) and makes the more important outcomes a more important part of the equation.

Or we could go with the coolest acronym and call it Weighted Hitting Assessment Measuring Meaningful Outcomes (WHAMMO).

EXAMPLE: “Joey Votto is a great guy. He’s always going to have his WHAMMO sitting among the very best.”

And finally, the most important stat of all:

– wins above replacement (WAR) or victories over replacement player (VORP). To the average baseball fan, WAR is a bit of a nebulous concept. “Mike Trout is worth ten wins.” “Uh, whaddya mean?” Now, if you explain it for twenty more seconds, they’ll understand just fine. But wouldn’t you rather we had something everyone can understand and get behind? Wouldn’t you rather have it that nobody would dare speak an ill word about WAR?

Well, that’s possible. We just call it Baseball Excellence Exceeding Replacements (BEER). Same concept. Same math. Same powerful analysis. Just measured in BEER.

“Well, it’s like this. Imagine if the average AAA guy was worth zero BEERs, and the average major leaguer was worth, say, two BEERs.”
“Okay.”
“Mike Trout is worth ten BEERs.”
“I’ll be damned.”

Before you know it, everyone in baseball will be talking the language of statistical analysis. And we won’t all be going dateless. We’re the ones with the BEER.

Who else will give stability in the rotation other than RA Dickey and Mark Buehrle?
The Blue Jays had a lot of issues last year — many of them stemming from the lack of consistent pitching. The aforementioned Dickey and Buerhle were supposed to be joined in the rotation by Josh Johnson and Brandon Morrow to make a very formidable quartet; unfortunately this was not the case, as Johnson and Morrow combined to make 26 unsuccessful starts for the 2012 Jays. This is probably where one could start when trying to see why the Jays only won 74 games. Even though Dickey and Buehrle were both reliable options for the Jays in 2013, they were not the picture of consistency and were not the true aces that would be needed to get through the logjam that is the AL East.

With Johnson now gone for San Diego, the Jays have to figure out who is going to hold the middle of the rotation. Brandon Morrow is a very talented pitcher, but health and inconsistency have hurt his assent to being a good pitcher. A former top 5 pick out of Cal by the Mariners, Morrow has seen his K rate diminish from almost 11 to 7 per 9 innings in his 4 years with the Jays. During the 2012 wherein Morrow had a sub-3 ERA, his K rate was a bit under 8, but he also focused heavily on his ground ball rate and, quite frankly, was a bit more lucky with his BABIP. 2013 was a lost season for Morrow in many ways and for the Jays to be competitive at all during the 2014 season, Morrow needs to give the Jays more stability for the team to be successful.

In fact, considering that Buehrle is more of a work horse than a staff ace and that Dickey is both getting older and loses a bit from his knuckle ball when he is inside of a dome, Morrow may need to be relied upon to be the top pitcher for a winning Jays team. Considering that during his 4 years in Toronto Morrow has only averaged 19 games started, this is would be seen as a reach for even the most optimistic Jays fan.

As for the back end of the rotation, both JA Happ and Kyle Drabek, the projected 4 and 5 starters, have shown spurts of success in the big leagues, but neither are the answer for the Jays. Happ would fit very well in a rotation with pitchers that have pedigree and not in one where he is relied upon heavily, although some in depth analysis of Happ shows promise. He strikes out enough of hitters and is able to pitch himself out of bad situations. On the other hand, Kyle Drabek has been a huge disappointment for the Jays since they received him in the Roy Halladay trade from the Phillies. Drabek has regressed since being called up to the majors in 2010 and has seen drastic issues with his control leading to frequent demotions. A positive experience in the minors in 2013, and a severe cut in walk rate while in the minors, has given Drabek another chance in the big leagues, but patience may be wearing thin in Toronto for the 26 year old.

When will Aaron Sanchez or Marcus Stroman be in Toronto to help the team?
The minor league system for the Blue Jays is not very deep, but there are silver linings in that both Aaron Sanchez and Marcus Stroman are top 100 prospects in baseball and might both be able to help in Toronto this season. Marcus Stroman was taken with the 22nd pick of the 2012 Draft out of Duke and the Jays did not know if he would start or prepare to be the closer of the future for the Jays when the team drafted him and he started his minor league career as a reliever. After a PED suspension, Stroman moved up to AA and moved into the starting role and became a much better pitcher in every statistic.

While with New Hampshire, Stroman solidified himself as a power pitcher with very good control and considering that Stroman was a college pitcher, he is probably not very far from the big leagues. His height at 5’9 may be an issue but with a fastball, cutter/slider, curveball, changeup mix and velocity in the mid-90s, Stroman should not have a problem in the big leagues. If he does not have an issues in AAA, Stroman may even make a very early debut in the majors. There is still a chance that Stroman may break camp on the Jays roster, but that might not be the best of decisions. It is not that his talent should be questioned, in fact he may be a top rookie of the year candidate if he is in the starting five, but the Jays need to see what they have with the pitchers that are already in the projected rotation before they move onto Stroman. If Kyle Drabek is not doing too well or if there is an injury in the rotation or bullpen, the versitility of Stroman would be a huge boost to the team.

In the case of Aaron Sanchez, the 21 year old may need a bit more polish but his upside is much higher than any player in the Jays organization. As with most younger players, Sanchez has had his issues with control, but in his season at High-A Dunedin, he cut his walk rate by one per 9, exhibiting that he has put in the effort to work on his control issues. The Jays would look to get his walk rate into the mid-2s before they see him in the big leagues and he does need to build a bit more command of his pitches, but it would not be farfetched to see Sanchez in the big leagues during the 2015 season. Sean Nolin may also be able to help the Jays from the minors this year as well, but fans of the Jays should look to see both the promising Stroman and Sanchez in the big leagues by 2015.

How can the Blue Jays get the most out of Jose Bautista?
The Blue Jays have two truly elite players on there team, one of which is pretty much a certainty in position in the order and role on the team and the other with the opportunity for versatility that could lead to the team becoming better. Edwin Encarnacion is going to be right in the middle of the lineup and that is a good spot for a player that has developed into a very patient hitter, but, even with the improved approach, he still does not work the count as much. Conversely, Jose Bautista works the count very well and in the five years that he has been with the Jays he has exhibited a proficiency in getting the count in his favor and making the pitchers work. For a team that was middle of the road in on base percentage in 2013, it would be great for the Blue Jays to have a hitter like Bautista to not only work the count but to get on base via walks.

What would be the downside for the Jays is if Bautista loses some of the elite power exhibited throughout his time in Toronto. If Baustista’s focus moves from power statistics to getting on base, this may be a counter-intuitive venture for the team. Although the logic for the Jays to move Bautista to the second spot in the lineup is a sound one, the drop in power may be an issue. When looking at his numbers, there is also a negative trend on his plate discipline and even though this was over a shorter amount of time in the past two seasons because of injury, Bautista might be press a bit too much in the second spot of the lineup and sap the power that he utilized so well.

Essentially this comes down to what the Jays have other than Bautista in the lineup and answering the question of if it better for the team to employ Bautista to drive in runs or for the team to be able to get him on base, and in tandem get the pitchers to have to throw more pitches, and then have enough talent to produce runs from players other than Bautista. This is why guys like Colby Rasmus and Adam Lind need to continue to progress so that the team can thrive. Putting Melky Cabrera or Brett Lawrie ahead of Bautista and Encarnacion in the lineup is not a great idea either, as both hitters are extremely impatient and will not get ahead of the count.

Bautista should be the second hitter in the Jays lineup and be able to maintain his power numbers from the past and the rest of the team should be able to take advantage of the opportunities created by the change in the lineup. Both Bautista and Encarnacion may be able to knock runs in, but it was shown last year that there were not enough opportunities created in front of them to create the big innings that Toronto was looking to capitalize on. With Bautista near the top of the lineup, and with the continued production of Rasmus and Lind, the Jays lineup may be considerably more potent this season.

What will the Blue Jays do about the bullpen?
This may be an odd question considering that the Jays actually had a good bullpen for extended periods of last year. Steve Delabar was an All-Star, Casey Janssen had an ERA in the 2.50s, Brett Cecil was very solid, and Sergio Santos even came off of the DL to look very impressive. So why is there a question about the Jays bullpen?

The issue begins with the fact that the elite relievers in April, May, and June became duds for the remainder of the season. All-Star Delabar and the elite lefty Cecil had ERAs in the 1.50 up until July and, respectively, had a 6.41 and a 5.49 ERA from the month of July on, so the elite relievers from the beginning of the season were not there as the season ended. Even the steady Janssen saw his ERA rise as the season grew longer. Fortunately for the Jays, Sergio Santos was getting healthy at this time and pitching at an elite level so that mitigated some of the issues that the other pitchers were having. Even in the case of Santos, though, there is a long injury history that must be observed before the Jays can rely on him to be a consistent option out of the bullpen.

This question should not only be looked at in a negative light, though. The beginning of this answer should be examined further; the Jays did have a very good bullpen for long stretches throughout the season. The Jays could have a very deep bullpen and they have a huge luxury in their bullpen as well — two left-handed pitchers that they can trust, as Aaron Loup has also been a huge contributor to the Jays cause in the bullpen. Where the Jays’ depth in the bullpen could be useful is if Brett Cecil needs to move back into the rotation for any reason or if any of the younger pitchers discussed earlier would be a part of the bullpen. The Jays have a lot of opportunity to have a truly elite bullpen but they need to make it through an entire season and not tire during the stretch run.

Why are the Blue Jays going to win 81 games?
The Blue Jays will be able to hit the ball and that will make them a tough team to play. There is no way to work around it: any lineup with two hitters that have hit more than 40 home runs in a season, a former batting and steals champion, and a mix of players throughout the lineup that are poised to break out will score a lot of runs. The change in the lineup will also help; with Jose Bautista on base more often and working the pitch totals moreso at the beginning of the lineup, the remainder of the lineup will have greater opportunity to thrive.

The issue is the pitching. The starting pitching is in a rough place right now and, judging by the second half of last season, the bullpen may not be as solid as it looked early in 2013. The 81 wins for the Blue Jays may be very gracious by the end of the season, but there are opportunities that the Jays need to take advantage of. There is the chance that Aaron Sanchez and Marcus Stroman may be all that they are advertised as and they might be able to help the big league team this year. Brandon Morrow’s health is always a question, but if he stays healthy, he will be a great addition to the team. There is no way to say that the team will be 7 wins better than last year, but the injuries did mount up last year and, if the team stays healthy, this year’s team should have a much better outcome.

5 You Know:
1. RA Dickey
2. Jose Bautista
3. Edwin Encarnacion
4. Mark Buehrle
5. Jose Reyes

5 You Will Know:
1. Marcus Stroman
2. Aaron Sanchez
3. Sean Nolin
4. Anthony Gose
5. AJ Jimenez

5 You Should Remember:
1. DJ Davis
2. Daniel Norris
3. Alberto Tirado
4. Roberto Osuna
5. Franklin Barreto

What do Andrew McCutchen, Buster Posey, Jay Bruce, and 12 other players have in common? They will all be in their age 27 season for 2014 and so we should expect that as a group their wOBAs will decline by 3 points on average. That may not sound like a lot, but it is the start of what will likely be the slow, steady offensive decline phase of their careers. Some will defy those odds, but which ones, and what might be signs of imminent decline?

To begin to answer these questions, I examined how hitters’ aging trends would be affected if certain skills did not decline with age. For example, how would a hitter age if his BABIP was consistently league average? I used wOBA as the measure of performance. The two age profiles in Figure 1 show this story. The solid line shows how players typically age, peaking at age 26, and declining steadily from there (see below for technical details on how this figure was constructed). The dashed line draws out a hypothetical age curve that assumes players’ BABIP is constant over time. Because players under age 30 tend to have above average BABIP, the dashed line is below the solid line for these young players. Conversely, older players would benefit from having their actual BABIP replaced by an average BABIP. The overall consequence of adjusting for BABIP is an age profile that is flatter—meaning that the effect of aging on wOBA is reduced.

Figure 1. Change in wOBA Age Profile when Adjusting for BABIP

The effect is reduced, but not eliminated. What other skills decline with age and how important are they to the decline in wOBA with age? Although swinging strike percentage, K rate, BB/K, and fly ball percentage all have important relationships with wOBA, these factors have little impact on the aging of wOBA. The wOBA age profile adjusted for these factors in Figure 2 is just slightly flatter than the unadjusted profile. This is because swinging strike percentage and K rate typically peak before age 26 and show little decline with age. To the extent that the adjusted curve in Figure 2 is flatter, trends with age in BB/K are most responsible.

Figure 2. Change in wOBA Age Profile when Adjusting for Swinging Strike Percentage, K%, BB/K, and Fly Ball Percentage

Figure 1 demonstrated that BABIP plays an important role in the aging of wOBA. Adding both BABIP and HR/FB skills to the others from Figure 2 explains the entire decline in wOBA after age 26. Indeed, if a player’s BABIP and HR/FB skills (along with the others I’ve mentioned) remained average throughout his career, he would actually show continuous improvement through at least age 30. Figure 3 shows this result. The flatness of the adjusted line indicates that the full set of statistics used in the adjustment does a very good job of accounting for trends in wOBA with age.

Figure 3. Change in wOBA Age Profile when Adjusting for All of the Above and HR/FB

So what does this mean for McCutchen and the others in our list? We may learn the most about how they will age based on observing trends in their BABIP and HR/FB rates from here on out. Doing so will be challenging because these are also among the least reliable measures of performance in a single season. Even so, a decline in these skills could indicate substantial performance losses to come. Additionally, players whose value derives from high walk or contact rates may age less precipitously than others.

A productive avenue for future analysis might be to assess whether there is a relationship between the amount of improvement in BABIP or HR/FB skills a player experiences before age 26 and the amount of decline in those skills after age 26. If so, then we might be able to better predict how a player’s offensive skills will age. However, we can learn a lot about averages, and our long-run projection for any particular player’s performance might improve, but it will always remain uncertain.

Technical Details

The age profiles adjust for what is often referred to as survivor bias—the fact that not all of the players in the sample at age 20 are also in the sample at age 35. To do this I used a technique commonly used by economists and others called fixed effects regression (see Jonah Rockoff’s work on changes in teachers’ performance with experience for one example). I run a regression that includes individual player fixed effects, ensuring that the relationship between wOBA and age is calculated using within-player variation in wOBA over time, rather than variation in performance across players. Consequently, the results are not affected by changes in the composition of MLB players by age. To calculate the adjusted profiles, I account for the other statistics as additional controls. Doing so means that when I adjust for BABIP, I am also adjusting for skills that are related to BABIP. Therefore my results do not depend on any particular model of how BABIP is related to performance. The above results are based on the 1,346 players who played in the majors for at least two seasons between 2002 and 2013. An alternative sample that is restricted to just the 304 players who played at least eight seasons during this period produces similar results, although the average wOBA levels are higher and the curves are less precisely estimated.

About the Author: Elias Walsh spends too much of his free time working with baseball data and trying to win his fantasy baseball league (or so his lovely wife informs him). His day job is a research economist at Mathematica Policy Research, where he conducts research to inform education policy decisions.

This is a list of the top five organizations in baseball. The teams and order were determined by the organization’s overall success and how economically they got there.

1) St. Louis Cardinals

The Cardinals are easily the best organization in baseball. They are a model of consistency, as they have made 10 playoff appearances since 2000, including four World Series appearances and two World Series Championships. The Cardinals have been able to have such prolonged success due to their ability to develop their own talent. They have never been constrained by a large contract eating up too much of their salary, and even let Albert Pujols walk rather than commit too much money to one player. 2013 was an excellent example of this club’s ability to develop its own talent, especially pitchers. In 2013, the Redbirds turned to 12 rookie pitchers, who threw a combined 553 2/3 innings with a 3.17 ERA. The organization’s commitment to build through the draft, rather than Free Agency, has contributed to its sustained success and ranking as the top organization in baseball.

2) Boston Red Sox

The Red Sox have appeared in the Postseason seven times since 2000. More importantly, they have reached the World Series three times in that span, culminating in three World Series Championships. While the Red Sox have quite a financial advantage over other organizations, the Red Sox have still built up their core through the draft. They have developed their own stars, like Dustin Pedroia, Jon Lester, Jacoby Ellsbury and Clay Buchholz. The Red Sox farm system is still stocked with talent, including Xander Bogaerts, Henry Owens and Allen Webster. Like the Cardinals, the Red Sox are often able to fill holes with internal candidates, such as Jackie Bradley Jr. taking over for Jacoby Ellsbury. While the Red Sox have had their share of bad contracts, especially Carl Crawford’s 7-year, $142 Million deal, they are able to survive such poor decisions. In the case of Crawford, the Red Sox pulled off a miracle trade to the Dodgers to dump his salary and still acquire talent in return. As long as the Red Sox continue to focus on developing their own talent, they will hold their position as one of the top organizations in baseball.

3) Tampa Bay Rays

Ever since Stuart Sternberg took over as owner of the Rays in 2006, they have been one of the best-run organizations in baseball. Operating with one of the smallest payrolls in baseball, the Rays quickly turned it around under new ownership, as they reach the playoffs and World Series for the first time in the organization’s history in 2008. Since 2008, the Rays have had five seasons of at least 90 wins in six total seasons. Their success, despite being located in one of the smallest markets of any MLB team, can be attributed to their shrewd personnel decisions and reliance on young Major Leaguers under team control. The Rays have not drafted particularly well, since 2007 when they landed David Price and Matt Moore. Despite little success in recent drafts, the Rays have acquired young, controllable talent by trading veteran players, who were nearing Free Agency. The two best examples of this strategy are when the Rays traded Matt Garza to the Cubs and landed Chris Archer, among others, and when the Rays traded James Shields for Wil Myers and Jake Odorizzi. Their ability to remain competitive, despite being located in one of the smallest markets in baseball, earns them the designation as one of the top organizations in baseball.

4) San Francisco Giants

The Giants are not exactly a model of consistency, as they’ve only made the Postseason five times since 2000, but they have reached the World Series three times in that span, including two Championships since 2010. The Giants have not made the Postseason in consecutive seasons since 2002-2003. However, despite their inconsistencies, the Giants should certainly be commended for their success in the amateur draft. Through the draft, they have built a strong core of talent, including Buster Posey, Tim Lincecum, Matt Cain, Brandon Belt and Madison Bumgarner. They have also had a lot of success by acquiring many failed prospects, such as Ryan Vogelsong, Joaquin Arias and Angel Pagan. In order to remain among the top organizations in baseball, the Giants must continue to be successful through the draft and avoid bad contracts like the one they gave to Barry Zito.

5) Oakland Athletics

The A’s are best known as the first team to fully embrace advanced metrics, but also as an organization that has not had much success once it reaches the Postseason. Since 2000, the A’s have reached the Postseason seven times; yet have only reached the ALCS just once. After a five year period between 2007-2011, in which the A’s never reached the Postseason, the A’s have now reached the playoffs for two straight seasons. Much of their recent success has been due to some incredibly savvy trades. This is exemplified by the fact that the Athletics initially acquired 23 of all 44 players that appeared in a game for them last season via trade. The Athletics have never had an advantage financially, as they have always been located among the bottom 3^rd of teams in payroll and player in one of the smallest markets in baseball. This fact has forced the Athletics to search for cheap talent through the waiver wire. Also, like the Rays, they have had to trade more expensive players nearing Free Agency in order to supplant their roster with younger and cheaper talent. With one of the best front offices in baseball, the A’s seem poised for sustained success.

The 2013 All-Star Game has already been played, and the result was decided. The AL defeated the NL in a 3-0 effort in a game  that was filled with players of all different types. The aging veterans who want a last hurrah. The rising stars who are getting their first taste of what it is like to play among the elite in baseball. The overpaid superstars and the underpaid superstars. However, I thought it would be interesting to assemble an all-star team of players with large platoon split.

Call it an Island of misfit toys or misfit all-stars, if you’re feeling Moneyball-esque.

Catcher

Vs. RHP Jason Castro: PA’s 380, wOBA .371, wRC+ 137

Vs. LHP Derek Norris: PA’s 173, wOBA .426, wRC+ 177

Combined: PA 553, wOBA .387, wRC+ 149

Castro doesn’t actually lead all catchers against RHP. That honor belongs to Joe Mauer. However, Mauer ranks within the top three catchers against left-handed pitching, which makes him not really have a huge platoon split. Therefore I rendered him ineligible as a platoon partner. It makes sense that the Athletics would have a catcher who is so effective in hitting left-handers, because they also have John Jaso who is known to mash righties (.363 wOBA vs RHP). If there is anything an Astro fan should be happy about  — which there isn’t much — it’s the fact that Jason Castro eats right- handed pitching for lunch and he also is one of the better catchers in the league.

First Base

Vs RHP Chris Davis: PA’s 434  wOBA .473, wRC+ 203

Vs. LHP Nick Swisher: PA’s 224 wOBA .398 wRC+ 158

Combined: PA’s 658, wOBA 447 wOBA, wRC+ 187

Davis was considered the best first baseman, as he led the league in dingers and compiled a WAR of 6.8. While Davis was performing at near-immortal levels against right-handed pitching, he was also very vulnerable against left-handed pitching with wRC+ of 104 against LHP. Nick Swisher is an interesting case because he is a switch hitter, but really struggles against right-handed pitching with a wRC+ of 93. This makes me wonder if Swisher should consider going the Shane Victorino route, and drop batting lefty to focus solely on batting right-handed. We don’t know if this strategy works for everyone — it’s probably a case-by-case situation — but it’s something to keep in mind.

Second Base

Vs RHP Robinson Cano: PA’s 420, wOBA .410, wRC+ 160

Vs LHP Brian Dozier: PA’s 148, wOBA .421, wRC+ 171

Combined: PA’s 568, wOBA .408, wRC+ 161

I had a hard time picking Cano simply because while Cano is definitely better at hitting righties than lefties, he’s not that bad at hitting lefties. Last season, Cano had a wOBA of .343 and wRC+ of 114 against LHP. That’s not a bad mark, however it is a sizable enough difference to create a platoon split. On the other hand, this points out that Dozier is a little underrated, and if he is used in the right roles, he could be a very valuable player. I find this platoon an interesting dichotomy: an overpaid superstar in Cano and a cost-effective role player in Dozier.

Shortstop

Vs. RHP Ian Desmond: PA’s 507, wOBA .344, wRC+ 118

Vs. LHP Jhonny Peralta: PA’s 136, wOBA .414, wRC+ 164

Combined: PA’s 643, wOBA .344, wRC+ 126

Shortstop was by far the hardest position for which to make a platoon. The LHP side was easy with Peralta because he led all shortstops when it came to facing lefties. The problem came with the right-handed side because the guys who could hit righties well — such as Tulowitzki and Lowrie — could also hit lefties pretty well. I settled with Desmond because even though he is well balanced against LHP and RHP, he wasn’t as balanced as Tulo or Lowrie.

Third Base

Vs. RHP Adrian Beltre: PA’s 516, wOBA .370, wRC+ 129

Vs. LHP David Wright: PA’s 150, wOBA .454 wRC+ 199

Combined: PA’s 666, wOBA .397, wRC+ 143

There were a lot of good-hitting third baseman last year. Miguel Cabrera led all third baseman in hitting against right handers and left handers. Wright and Beltre are number two to Cabrera. They also both have large platoon splits. Wright can hit RHP, it’s just that the split between PA’s against RHP versus his PA’s against LHP is huge. Beltre, on the other hand, is somewhat insignificant against lefties.

Right Field

RHP Daniel Nava: PA’s 397, wOBA .392, wRC+ 146

LHP Hunter Pence: PA’s 178, wOBA .415, wRC+ 174

Combined: PA’s 575, wOBA .399, wRC+ 154

This is where things can get a little arbitrary because there are a lot of corner outfielders, and therefore a lot of corner outfielders who have platoon splits. You could sub out both outfielders for a combination of Michael Cuddyer and Giancarlo Stanton. However, I thought that it would be more fun to point out how undervalued Nava is. Nava had a breakout year in Boston, and he did so by destroying right handers. Pence actually isn’t all that bad against RHP, wRC+ of 119 against RHP, which is kind of surprising considering he’s a lefty with a long swing. Bruce Bochy should probably take more advantage of Pence’s ability to hit left handers well. I think that both players are underrated.

Center Field

Vs. RHP Shin-Soo Choo: PA’s 491 wOBA .438, wRC+ 183

Vs. LHP Carlos Gomez: PA’s 140, wOBA .421, wRC+ 171

Combined: PA’s 631, wOBA .430, wRC+ 179

Choo is easily one of the worst defensive center fielders in the game, and he probably should shift over to a corner outfield spot in Texas. A lot of people express concern over the Choo contact because of the poor defensive play combined with a massive platoon split. Choo is godly against RHP, but below average against LHP (wRC+ of 81). The three-year, $24 million contract extension that the Brewers gave Gomez looks like it was a steal. Not only did they get a guy who punished left handers, but they also got a guy who led the NL in WAR, had great defense, and even some decent pop.

Left Field

Vs. RHP Dominic Brown: PA’s 381, wOBA .366, wRC+ 133

Vs. LHP Justin Upton: PA’s 164  wOBA .422, wRC+ 174

Combined: PA’s 545, wOBA .382, wRC+ 145

There isn’t anything interesting about why I picked these two, other than the fact that I did consider Matt Holliday instead of Brown. However,  Holliday’s split wasn’t as large as Brown’s. I wouldn’t expect Dominic Brown to perform as well against righties again; he’s in for some serious regression to the mean.

If these platoons were put into practice you could probably get as good or better production than the elite hitters in baseball. This list, just like the actual all-star game roster, is diverse. You have players who are considered elite — such as Choo, Cano, Wright, and Beltre — and then the undervalued guys such as Dozier, Nava, Norris and Castro. It’s surprising that most teams don’t take more advantage of platoons since they could get elite production from two players for a fraction of the cost.