The shift is one of the most discussed changes in baseball in many years. It is probably the biggest purely defensive change in decades (right?). Commissioner Manfred has publicly stated that he dislikes it. Players are actively working with hitting coaches to beat the shift. People are asking, how can we beat the shift? And some are starting to deny we can. FanGraphs comments predict that the shift will be bad for baseball, because less offense is less fun.

But just how big is the shift? Just how much has it changed the league?

Zero.

Okay, “Zero” is too strong. It might have changed something, but if it has we can’t tell.

Okay, that too is too strong, but, the number of obvious statistical correlates of an effective shift, seen in terms of league wide stats, is zero. Maybe we can tell, but if so, it can only be told in some serious data-mining that goes beyond obvious results, like number of outs, even in splits, since teams started shifting. No evidence exists of a change in the league-wide stats you would expect the shift to change. BABIP is unchanged. Grounder BABIP is unchanged. Left-handed batter BABIP is unchanged. In fact, BABIP is higher today than it was 40 years ago, but BABIP inflated about .02 from the 1970s to the 1990s and hasn’t evidently changed since.

The shift is a defensive strategy whose intent is to depress run expectancy on balls in play. The likely effect of the shift, if the strategy works, would be in increasing outs on balls in play. Here is a table of BABIP since 1995, the last 20 years:

Year    BABIP
1995   0.298
1996   0.301
1997   0.301
1998   0.300
1999   0.302
2000   0.300
2001   0.296
2002  0.293
2003   0.294
2004   0.297
2005   0.295
2006   0.301
2007   0.303
2008   0.300
2009   0.299
2010   0.297
2011   0.295
2012   0.297
2013   0.297
2014   0.299
2015   0.299

The apparent trend is obvious, if something can be obviously non-existent.

We can look deeper: how have lefties, whom the shift allegedly affects more, been hurt by the shift? Well, in 2015 lefty hitters had their highest BABIP (.301) versus lefty pitchers in the last 13 years (as long as FanGraphs data goes for that split.) Against right-handed pitchers, left-handed batters tied their second-worst season (.299) in the last 15 years, for a whopping one hit in 500 less than the average during that time (.301).

You see, the problem is that we need to look at grounders: fly balls and line drives aren’t really being affected, but grounders are, so in the long run, the shift is slightly depressing hits. Except the obvious correlate isn’t there either.  In 2015, grounders had a .236 BABIP, .004 higher than the 13-year average.

2015 isn’t some sort of outlier. In every easy-to-research split you might choose, BABIP fluctuations in the last 13 years are within the range of random variation. The recent years of the shift era show not even a statistically insignificant decrease in BABIP: in many of those splits, BABIP has by a hair increased. (See tables linked below.)

Another source of evidence that the shift works might be found by comparing defense-independent pitching models with non-defense-independent stats. Maybe BABIP leaves something out, but we see that runs are down relative to DIPS predictions. If so, one possible explanation is the shift. FIP, a great DIPS, is equal to 3*BB+13*HR-2*K + C, where C is a constant that makes league-average FIP equal league-average ERA. If C is smaller now, that suggest (but does not prove) that BIP outs have changed. C is bigger now (by just .0053, or .048 runs per inning), suggesting that more runs are scored from balls in play. It’s no proof, but if balls in play were a lot more frequently outs, we wouldn’t expect them, overall, to account for more runs and ERA would be down more than peripherals imply.

We can’t infer from this data that some individual hitters are unaffected by the shift. Jeff Sullivan’s recent piece on adjusting to the shift is what brought me to the data (I was seeking to investigate just how badly lefty hitters have been hurt, and discovered something far more interesting), and he mentioned Jimmy Rollins’ attempts to adjust to the shift. I recall a lot of speculation about Mark Teixeira being hurt by the shift. Maybe those guys are. Maybe they aren’t. Maybe they aren’t, but others yet to be named are. Things which don’t have league-wide effect may interact with particular skillsets in hard-to-identify ways.

It’s possible that the shift has changed things by reducing the value of range up the middle, allowing more offensively-oriented players to man those positions. But that seems more like an effect that we would see in future, not one we have seen, because it should take years of player development for those sorts of changes to have a league-wide effect.

It is possible that the shift increases strikeouts and depresses walks. It would be hard to know this, though. It is also possible that the shift has reduced the value of certain defensive skills (e.g., range) and that the decreased need for range has allowed teams to play more offensively-oriented guys up the middle, effectively cancelling the BABIP effects. It sounds farfetched to suppose that two of eight hitters being more offensively-minded can cancel an effect of a shift that should apply to eight of eight of them, but we haven’t ruled it out.

Overall, league scoring is down. But DIPS suggest this is mostly the result of more strikeouts, with a little home-run and walk noise thrown in. There are some ways in which the shift might be having an effect — please offer further hypotheses below. All the evidence here is correlational and correlation doesn’t imply causation. Even anti-correlation doesn’t imply non-causation (if people who drink more exercise more — both are correlated positively with wealth — drinking might get anti-correlated with bad health because exercise compensates for the health impact of drinking). But when no correlation is found and no obvious counter-effects can be sighted, the lack of a correlation suggests weak influence at best.

References:

League BABIP, 1975 to 2015

LHB v. LHP and LHB v. RHP, all available years

Ground Ball BABIP, all available years

Here in Canada, the Toronto Blue Jays’ recent playoff run in 2015 gave us a reminder of how exciting postseason can be when management, players, and fans all share the same goal and vision. Yet, as thrilling as playoff baseball can be, the true definition of success for a team comes down to it being able to win the last postseason game. Why? All teams that bow out of the playoffs — be it the League Division Series, the League Championship Series, or the World Series, ultimately lose their last postseason game. Only one team — the World Series Champion — ends its season by winning its last game in the calendar year!

Before we get ahead of ourselves about winning the last game in October/November, however, we must be reminded that a team cannot participate in the playoffs — let alone advance — unless it wins its division or a wild-card spot. Even with the newly-expended postseason format that saw both leagues (American and National) having two (as opposed to one) wild cards, it remains a challenge to secure one of the 10 playoff berths. One only needs to see how much obstacles Toronto overcame in the 2015 season, aided by then-GM Alex Anthopoulos’ fury of trade deadline activities (acquiring Troy Tulowitzki, LaTroy Hawkins, David Price, and Ben Revere within a span of four days from July 28th to July 31st) to bring an end to the Blue Jays’ 22-year postseason drought. To this end, the first order of business for a team should be getting into the playoffs.

In the simplest form, there are arguably three ways to try to make the postseason. One way is to try to “buy” a championship by signing one or more (if not all) the elite unrestricted free agents on the open market. Of course, this approach requires an ownership that has deep pockets and is willing to spend (sometimes without limitations). Traditional big spenders that come to mind include but are not limited to the New York Yankees, the Boston Red Sox, and the Los Angeles Dodgers. An alternative approach, put on full display by Pat Gillick when he guided Toronto to four American League East Division titles, two American League pennants, and two World Series championships from 1989 to 1993, is to build the core of the 25-man roster through smart drafting and player development and then bolster the lineup, starting rotation, and/or bullpen through trade-deadline deals (including rentals if the cost of prospect capital is within reason). Perhaps the least popular method (at least from the fans’ perspective due to the long-term patience required) — albeit arguably just as effective as the other two means — is to rely on continuous and sustainable home-grown talents strictly, much like the Cleveland Indians (which managed to win an impressive six American League Central Division titles and two American League pennants from 1995 to 2001) and Tampa Bay Rays (which managed to win an American League pennant, two American League East Division titles, and two American League Wild Cards from 2008 to 2013 despite having a very modest payroll).

If money is no object, it would be logical to conclude that most baseball executives would opt for the first route given that it is the shortest avenue to get to the promised land, at least in theory. After all, the Yankees are the owner of 27 World Series championships, by far the most championships of any teams among the four North American major sports, i.e., Major League Baseball, National Baseball Association, National Football League, and National Football League. The greatest strength of “buying” a championship is two-fold. On one hand, by taking an elite talent off the unrestricted free-agent market and/or the trade market, you can prevent your rivals from acquiring that talent, meaning that you are strengthening yourself while simultaneously weakening your opponent. On the other hand, you can afford to “make mistakes” because if the player that you signed and/or traded for did not pan out as anticipated, you can always go out and sign and/or trade for another elite talent as a replacement until you find the right one!

Yet, there is no guarantee that being a big spender would necessarily get you a championship. In the 2015 season, the eight ball clubs with the highest payrolls — and I purposely limited the scope of my coverage to eight teams because there are only eight “true” playoff spots — as of the 2015 season are as follow: (1) Los Angeles Dodgers at $ 301,735,080; (2) New York Yankees at $221,256,867; (3) Boston Red Sox at $214,789,749; (4) San Francisco Giants at $187,088,630; (5) Washington Nationals at $165,655,095; (6) Detroit Tigers at $162,218,297; (7) Texas Rangers at $152,445,607, and (8) Los Angeles Angels at $151,348,162. As we can observe, among the eight teams with highest payrolls, all of which have a payroll in excess of $150,000,000, only three (3/8 = 37.5%) of the ball clubs — the Dodgers, the Yankees, and Rangers — made the cut! In other words, even if you spend money without reservation, it does not necessarily mean that success is guaranteed! In fact, based on this small sample, there is a (5/8 = 62.5%) chance that your team will be watching (as opposed to playing) postseason baseball even if your ball club has one of the highest payrolls in all of Major League Baseball.

Conversely, having a modest or low payroll does not necessarily mean that your team is completely out of running for the grand prize. Even though the odds may stack against you, at least from the surface, recent history suggests that the probability of a low-budget ball club making it to the playoffs is actually not terrible. Below are the eight teams with the lowest payrolls — again, I deliberately limited the range of my coverage to eight ballclubs because there are only eight real playoff spots — in the 2015 season: (1) Miami Marlins at $63,590,525; (2) Tampa Bay Rays at $73,582,652; (3) Arizona Diamondbacks at $76,639,242; (4) Cleveland Indians at $77,404,413; (5) Oakland Athletics at $80,376,830; (6) Houston Astros at $81,450,835; (7) Milwaukee Brewers at $94,010,873; and (8) Pittsburgh Pirates at $99,435,606. As we can decipher, among the eight teams with lowest payrolls, all of which have a payroll south of $100,000,000, there are actually two (2/8 = 25%) ballclubs that managed to secure playoff berths. Indeed, the difference between the number of the “rich” teams from among the eight ballclubs with the highest payroll that made the postseason — three in total — and the number of “poor” teams from among the eight ballclubs with the lowest payroll that made the playoffs — two in total — is only one team.

Hence, in statistical terms, there is not a massive gap in the chances of making the postseason between being one of the “rich” teams from among the eight ballclubs with the highest payroll (37.5%) and being one of the “poor” teams from among the eight ballclubs with the lowest payroll (25%) as the difference is only a mere (3/8 – 2/8 = 1/8 or 12.5%). As a matter of fact, if we were to take the average payroll of the eight teams with the highest payroll [($301,735,080 + $221,256,867 + $214,789,749 + $187,088,630 + $165,655,095 + $162,218,297 + $152,445,607 + $151,348,162)/8 = $194,567,186] and subtract the average payroll of the eight teams with the lowest payroll [($63,590,525 + $73,582,652 + $76,639,242 + $77,404,413 + $80,376,830 + $81,450,835 + $94,010,873 + $99,435,606)/8 = $80,811,372], which yields ($194,567,186 – $80,811,372 = $113,755,814), and then divide this difference by 12.5, i.e., the chances of making the postseason between being one of the “rich” teams from among the eight ballclubs with the highest payroll and being one of the “poor” teams from among the eight ballclubs with the lowest payroll, we can deduce that for every additional one percent (1%) in which a team wants to augment its odds of making the playoffs, it would cost that ballclub just less than 10 million dollars ($9,100,465.11). While the math suggest that you are inching closer to the promised land (at a rather slow pace of one percent) for each additional nine million ($9,100,465.11 strictly speaking) that you are dishing out, I am not so sure that the trade-off makes sense from a value (or cost-benefit) perspective unless money is no object whatsoever.

If spending money blindly is not the way to go, then it seems logical that the second or third approach (perhaps even a combination of the two) is the preferred option. Recent trends in the baseball industry seem to back this rational strategy as more and more teams are demanding “value” for their investments, meaning that they want to get the most bang for their bucks. Below are the eight teams with the lowest average cost per win in Major League Baseball for the 2015 season, as calculated and ranked by dividing the total payroll of all 30 teams by the number of wins (“W”) they have in the 2015 season: (1) Miami Marlins at $895,641.20 per “W;” (2) Tampa Bay Rays at $919,783.15 per “W;” (3) Houston Astros at $947,102.73 per “W;” (4) Cleveland Indians at $955,610.04 per “W;” (5) Arizona Diamondbacks at $970,116.99 per “W;” (6) Pittsburgh Pirates at $1,014,649.04 per “W;” (7) Oakland Athletics at $1,182,012.21 per “W;” and Minnesota Twins at $1,282,311.06 per “W.”

Among the eight teams with the lowest average cost per win in Major League Baseball for the 2015 season, there are once again two (2/8 = 25%) ballclubs that managed to secure playoff berths. This means that the probability of teams that emphasize values for their spending making it to the postseason is the same as that of ballclubs with lowest payroll in Major League Baseball for the 2015 season. Better yet, the chances of teams that emphasize values for their spending and ballclubs with lowest payroll in Major League Baseball for the 2015 season making it to the playoffs are only slightly worse than teams with highest payroll in Major League Baseball for the 2015 season (3/8 – 2/8 = 1/8 or 12.5%).

All things taken into account, I would opt for smart drafting and player development rather going for the shortcut of “buying” a championship if I were a GM, unless my budget is a bottomless pit. Bottom line, not only is there no absolute certainty that having one of the eight highest payrolls would mean a ticket to the playoffs, but as we have witnessed, the odds of making it to the postseason are not really that different for the eight teams with the lowest payrolls and for the eight teams with the lowest average cost per win in Major League Baseball for the 2015 season. Coupled with the unattractive fact that it would cost me nearly 10 million dollars to increase my team’s chance of making the playoffs by a mere one additional percent (and each percent thereafter), it seems obvious that smart drafting and player development is by far the most optimal plan.

The NL Central was one of the most talked about divisions in the back half of last season. The Cardinals, Pirates, and Cubs surged forward to control the three best records in baseball. For the Cubs, eventual rookie of the year Kris Bryant helped his team grab the second wild card spot while taking the league by storm. And the merchandise industry. With 23 of the top 100 MLB.com prospects being held by the NL Central heading into next year and many of those players with a 2016 ETA, it is only fitting to look at who might be the next Kris Bryant. Who will be called up in the next couple years and make an immediate impact that captivates the league?

With the Brewers and Reds in the midst of rebuilding, it is fair to say that although prospects like the Brewers’ shortstop Orlando Arcia (#6 MLB.com prospect) and Reds outfielder Jesse Winker (#34 MLB.com prospect) will likely have their shots in the Show, they will probably not have as big of an effect on the pennant race next season. For that reason, I did not include either team’s prospects despite them both having five top-100 prospects each. Fortunately, the Cardinals, Pirates, and Cubs all also have prospects knocking at the door who have the potential to impact the race for the NL central.

Willson Contreras (age 23) – C, Bats: R/Throws: R, Cubs (#1 C prospect, #50 overall prospect)

In Contreras, the Cubs have another young bat. With a smaller catchers fame of 6’1″ and 175 pounds, he led the Double-A Southern League in average (.333) as well as XBH (46). He also posted a strong wRC+ of 156. He began his 2015 campaign splitting time with Schwarber behind the plate in the minor leagues, but was seen as more likely to stay as a catcher with his above average arm. This allowed his former teammate to be called up as a left fielder while he continued developing his game in Double-A. He has the potential to be above average defensively if he can reach higher levels of consistency in his foot work, as noted by Dan Farnsworth at FanGraphs. His biggest step last year was improving his plate discipline and strength. Contreras ended the season with a walk rate of 10.9% ,higher than his previous year of 8.8 in A+, while cutting his strikeout rate down 8.9% to 11.9% in the process. He profiles as an athletic, contact hitting catcher who will provide many more doubles than homers. With more refinement, he could soon draw comparisons to Jonathan Lucroy.

The near future for Contreras is uncertain. He will more than likely stay in the minors next year, most if not all of it in Triple-A, to develop further due to the durable Miguel Montero and veteran David Ross holding down the backstop for the Cubs. This is not to mention Kyle Schwarber, who could very well still have a future as a catcher (there have been rumors of him being the personal catcher for Kyle Hendricks in 2016). However, the contracts for Montero and Ross are up in 2017 and 2016, respectively. With Montero showing signs of decline, Ross closing in on retirement, and Schwarber’s uncertainty as a long-term catching option, Contreras will soon have a window of opportunity to establish himself as the everyday catcher for the Cubs. The question is if it will be next year or the year after.

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Tyler Glasnow (age 22) – RHP, Pirates (#2 RHP prospect, #10 overall prospect)

Outside of the 1-2 punch of Gerrit Cole and Francisco Liriano, the rest of the Pirates 2016 starting pitching does not look promising. Last year, the projected 2016 Pirates 3-5 starters Jeff Locke, Jon Niese,and Ryan Vogelsong had a FIP of 3.95, 4.41, and 4.53 respectively, all noticeably higher than the 2015 league average among qualified candidates (3.71). The Pirates farm system will be looking to fix this sooner rather than later in the form of two young pitchers: Glasnow and Jameson Taillon. For now, let’s focus on Glasnow. With his mammoth 6’8″ frame comes a high quality arsenal. His fastball and curveball both grade as plus or better pitches with an average changeup to compliment them. The issue with Glasnow is his command. In 41 IP in Triple-A during the second half of the season, Glasnow had a disturbingly high BB/9 of 4.83 (although his K/9 of 10.54 is also something to highlight). The problem stems from his mechanics, as his lanky body can sometimes make his pitching motion too long. An issue, but a fixable one. He draws comparisons to Tommy Hanson and, with projected improvements in his walk rates, looks to be on the verge to take his turn in the League.

It is more than likely that Pirates fans will get to see Glasnow get his turn this year. During the epic NL Central race last year, Pirates fans pleaded for Glasnow to be called up, but the Pirates decided to keep him in Triple-A to continue developing. A shaky back half of the starting rotation that also has questions of durability should allow the highly touted prospect to make his debut sometime this season. The timetable of this debut, however, is uncertain. GM of the Pirates Neal Huntington was quoted as saying that Glasnow and Taillon, the next prospect to be talked about, will appear in the second half of the season if not sooner.

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Jameson Taillon (age 24) – RHP, Pirates (#54 overall prospect)

The former second overall draft pick has certainly has had a mountain to climb to regain his status as a top prospect. He was close to reaching the MLB until injuries set in. Following his 2014 Tommy John surgery, he missed last year as well after surgery to repair an inguinal hernia. With almost 30 months of not pitching in-game, he is now going through the normal pitching progression in spring training. Taillon features the same pitching arsenal as Glasnow, but with slightly less explosive stuff and better command. In 110 IP in Double-A in 2013, he posted a 8.7 K/9 and a mere 2.9 BB/9. These are strong numbers, but old ones. Regardless, Taillon is still projected to be a top of the rotation starter if he can stay healthy and show that his recovery is complete.

Depending on how well Taillon does in spring training and the beginning of the minor league season, he could be the first of these five prospects to make his 2016 MLB appearance. With the issues previously noted about the Pirates rotation, he has a big chance at seeing a good amount of innings at the major league level next year. If Taillon shows that he can pick up where he left off in 2013, he will be a strong presence in the Pirates rotation.

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Alex Reyes (age 21) – RHP, Cardinals (#3 RHP prospect, #13 overall prospect)

Reyes is, in my opinion, the most dangerous man on this list. He is a young pitcher with explosive stuff in an organization that thrives in developing and refining young pitchers. And although I hate to admit it being a Reds fan, they have one of the better catchers in the game in Yadier Molina, who has been praised for working well with his staff. His fastball is his best pitch, hovering in the mid-90s, but has been clocked reaching triple digits (with spotty command) when he rears back. He also features a powerful curveball that he can use to throw for a strike as well as to get batters to chase. These two pitches are well complimented by his changeup, which although is just average, he knows how to use to make his other two pitches better. Reyes has been known to overthrow and lose command, but has the potential to settle as he is still only 21. He was handed down a 50-game suspension last season because of marijuana use that he will continue to serve at the start of next season. Before the suspension, he posted a 13.77 K/9 in 34.2 IP in Double-A after having a 13.71 K/9 in 63.2 IP of A+ ball. Yes, you read those numbers right. Oh, yeah, and he only gave up one home run all of last season.

Reyes knows how to pitch and, if he shows more development in his command in the minors next year, has a good chance at making his MLB debut. He may have even had a shot at making the Cardinals team out of spring training if he did not have to start the 2016 year under suspension. The Cardinals have a solid starting rotation that held up as one of the best last year, and one that added a good pitcher in Mike Leake, so there is no immediate rush for Reyes. However, do not be surprised if a mid-season call up of Reyes takes the league by storm in either the back end of the bullpen or even in the starting rotation itself.

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Josh Bell (age 23) – 1B/OF, Bats: S/Throws: R, Pirates (#2 1B prospect, #49 overall prospect)

Bell was taken as a corner outfielder out of high school but, with the Pirates loaded outfield and Bell’s below average defensive capabilities, he was moved moved to the gaping hole in the Pirates organization: first base. At 6’2″ 235 pounds, most expected him to thump the ball. To this point the switch-hitter has failed to show he can produce more than average power. This is due to his swing, in which his bulky lower half is not fully utilized. His strong suits are hitting for contact and good understanding of the strike zone. Last year he posted 130 wRC+ with a solid 0.88 BB/K ratio through 426 PA in Double-A, only to one-up those numbers with a ridiculous 174 wRC+ and 1.40 BB/K ratio through 145 PA in Triple-A. Though in all 571 combined PA, he managed just 40 XBH. It is unlikely he will develop more pop which means the continued success of his contact hitting skills and development of defense at first are all the more important to watch.

Since the Pirates do not have a solid option at first base, the unspectacular Michael Morse and John Jaso will more than likely give way to Josh Bell sometime next season. He will, however, start in the minor leagues and be given some extra time to develop his defensive work before being called up. It is plausible to see Bell being plugged into the Pirates late season lineup to provide a team with a questionable pitching rotation (that may or may not have Glasnow or Taillon in it) a boost in offensive production.

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2015 showed that former rebuilding teams could quickly emerge to be competitive by stacking their farm systems and having their young, talented players surge through the minor leagues. For the NL Central in 2016, I can see this trend continuing. With FanGraphs projecting the NL Central to have the Cardinals and Pirates chasing the Cubs for a playoff birth, prospects for these teams could mean the difference down the stretch between being a buyer and a seller, and getting a pennant or wild card birth. There’s a lot to be excited next season for these young players. With spring training games under way as I write this post, the wait is almost over.

Land and water tend to do two different things when it comes to heat – the land retains it, while water repels it. The land’s retention of heat gives way by the afternoon, causing the rising heat to create a vacuum, which sucks in cooler air sitting on the surface of the ocean. Cool air rushes into the coasts by mid to late afternoon.

Petco Park is less than one mile from the Pacific Ocean, making it susceptible to these afternoon sea-breeze gusts, which tend to pick up in the spring time and fade in the summer. Fortunately, the ballpark is situated east of Coronado Island [1], which helps to buffer the would-be stronger sea breezes that might affect fly balls. The spring time gusts, the Coronado Island buffer, and the “effect” on fly balls are all hearsay. We’ll look closer at each of these, starting with the sea breezes at the ballpark.

The Wind Matters

Let’s take a closer look at how the wind affects fly balls at Petco Park. Not that the common word of the good people of San Diego can’t be trusted; it’s just a matter of science. Below is a graph of every home run hit at Petco Park over the last two years and the approximate wind speed while the home run was hit. It seems like there’s no correlation between wind speed and distance of home runs.

However, not all wind is created equal, so the directional changes of the wind might have some influence on the flight of the ball. In the 2014 and 2015 seasons, the directional path of the wind for 261 home runs was registered (the wind was either “calm”, “variable”, or “NNE” which registered in only one case).

Most home runs were hit while the wind was blowing in the west-northwesterly (WNW) direction. Given that center field is due north of home plate that would mean that a majority of wind is probably blowing over the Western Metal Supply Co. brick building. My guess (I’m not a meteorologist) is that the wind is drawn in from the ocean, over the top of Coronado Island. Here’s a bird’s eye view of Petco; the arrow indicates where the wind is coming from – it’s the WNW direction from home plate.

So, this begs the question: How does WNW wind affect the distance of home runs? If we only look at the 101 home runs hit while the wind was blowing from the WNW direction, we begin to see something going on (r = – .21, p = .04. For every 1.53 mph faster the wind blows from the WNW direction, 1 foot is lost from every home run hit (R2 = .04, p = .04, n = 101). 

No other individual direction of wind registered a significant influence of the distance of home runs hit, nor did the combination of every other wind direction have any effect. So much for the Coronado Island buffer.

It’s a decent speculation that the direction in which a home run was hit (left, right, center) might be more or less affected by the WNW wind. However, the direction that the home run was hit had no effect on the relationship of the distance of the home run, with respect to the speed of the wind. Exit velocity (the speed of the ball off the hitter’s bat) is an obvious predictor of home run distance. Exit velocity did show the weakest correlation with home run distance when hit in the WNW direction as compared to every other direction [2]. It’s likely that lower exit velocity means that the home run hit spent more time spent in flight, and was thus more susceptible to WNW winds that suppressed its total distance, regardless of the direction that it was hit.

Addressing the hearsay

Wind direction and wind speed were recorded ten minutes before every hour of every home game for the last two seasons [3,4]. No surprise, WNW winds dominate during the course of every home game.

Wind speed does seem to be higher in the afternoon a compared to the evening, peaking in the late afternoon.

Additionally, May tends to have the strongest winds, but July and August have produced stronger winds than April. The theory that the spring is windier than the summer isn’t entirely true, but the spring does contain the windiest month of the regular season (May).

Why does this research matter?

Obviously, the pitcher and the batter are going to matter most. But, the WNW wind explains about 4% – 5% of the reason why the home run ended up where it did (R2 = .044). If you’re the Padres and you play 81 home games a year 4% – 5% might mean something to you [5].

Here’s a crazy idea: let’s say you’re the Padres and you’re playing an afternoon (3pm – 5pm) game and the winds are blowing in from the WNW (there are at least 22 home games this 2016 season that will be played between 3pm and 5pm). If it’s early in the game, start Carlos Villanueva, who has a career 40.4% FB%, and if it’s later in the game, use Jon Edwards who had a 67.6% FB% in 52 innings between AAA and majors last season. Meanwhile, give Matt Kemp a break (who has a career 36% FB%) and platoon rookie Travis Jankowski who showed a 27% FB% in 34 games last year with the Padres.

Caveats

Why did I only choose the last two years? Wind patterns and sea breezes can change over time [6]. If we rewind the years, we may or may not see similar results. I felt that the last two years were a decent idea about what we could expect from 2016, any further back, and I might have run into a different profile. Don’t agree with these results? Add a few years, and let’s see if the trend holds — I’m all for more objectivity.

Yes, sea breezes could entail the “marine layer” which brings a body of cool and moist air into the ballpark, and I might take a look at that with my next article. However, it’s not the moisture that will suppress home runs — it’s the cool air. Warm air expands and lowers the air density, which results in less resistance on the baseball. Therefore the cooler the air is, the higher the density. Water (H2O) is less dense than atmospheric O2 and N2, therefore if there’s more moisture in the air, we’d see less resistance on the baseball [1]. Temperature, dew point, humidity, and pressure had no effect on the distance of home runs between 2014 and 2015.

[1] http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/2011/jun/01/marine-layer-formidable–faraway-fences/

[2] Of the 4 directions that reported significant effects: North Northwest (r = .674, p < .01, n = 16), Northwest (r = .473, p < .01, n = 45), West Northwest (r = .393, p < .01, n = 101), West (r = .591, p < .01, n = 36)

[3] http://www.weatherforyou.com/reports/index.php?forecast=pass&pass=archive&zipcode=&pands=petco+park%2Ccalifornia&place=petco+park&state=ca&icao=KSAN&country=us&month=04&day=28&year=2015&dosubmit=Go

[4] https://www.wunderground.com/history/airport/KSAN/2016/02/23/DailyHistory.html?req_city=San%20Diego&req_state=CA&reqdb.zip=92101&reqdb.magic=1&reqdb.wmo=99999

[5] Quality of batter and/or pitcher was not tested in a multiple regression model, nor were any other predictor variables beyond wind speed. 

[6] See Coors Field effect: http://m.mlb.com/news/article/45755012/with-subtle-changes-to-dimensions-padres-hope-petco-park-plays-fair

The Pirates are no stranger to losing. In fact, they went 20 straight years without making the playoffs before 2013. That is painful. Before 2013, the last time they had made the playoffs was when Ronald Reagan was in office. However, they are becoming familiar with a new friend to end this pain of losing: the ground ball. Almost a year ago, Travis Sawchik wrote an intriguing book entitled Big Data Baseball which shed light on the ground ball as well as defensive shifting. So the fact that they lead all of baseball in GB% over the last three years came as no surprise. The surprise came when I looked at how much they lead by. The Pirates are, as a staff, leading the second-place team in GB% by almost 3% over the last three seasons. (51.1 GB%) While this number looks insignificant on the surface, putting it into some context makes all the more astonishing. The second-place GB% leader is the Dodgers at 48.3%. The last-place finisher in this category, the Dodgers’ LA counterpart, finished at 41.8%. This means that the range between the second-place team and the last-place team is 6.5% while the difference between the Pirates and Dodgers is 2.8%. Their rotation this year is set to be comprised of (with their GB% over the last three seasons):

1. Gerrit Cole (48.6 GB%)
2. Francisco Liriano (52.0 GB%)
3. Jeff Locke (51.6 GB%)
4. Jon Niese (51.2 GB%)
5. Ryan Vogelsong (41.1%)

These five average out to a 48.9 GB%. This is including the clear outlier in Ryan Vogelsong who was recently acquired via the Giants and who will post better ground ball numbers under pitching coach Ray Searage. These five will pair up with save machine Mark Melancon and steadily growing Tony Watson, and the Pirates are set to be the under-valued ground ball juggernaut that they have been accustomed to being over the last three seasons. However a steady flow of grounders is only a real weapon if there are infielders to stop them.

Jordy Mercer will likely accumulate much of the starting shortstop action as the absence of Neil Walker will make Josh Harrison slide into the second-base position, leaving room for Jung-Ho Kang at third, pending his return from knee surgery. Getting rid of Neil Walker may prove wonders for the defense of the Pirates infield.

Mind you this fielding arrangement is a tentative one — if it comes to fruition, it will improve the overall defense of the Pirates dramatically.

This is the Pirates’ most commonly started infield for the 2015 season (with UZR values from 2015):

1B: Pedro Alvarez (-14.3)

2B: Neil Walker (-6.8)

SS: Jordy Mercer (1.5)

3B: Harrison/Kang (0.7)

This comes out to an average UZR of -4.7 per position, not doing the starters any justice. Now, here is the Pirates’ projected starting infield for the 2016 season (with UZR values from 2015):

(Projected infield from MLB.com)

1B: John Jaso (???- Only played five innings at first over career)

2B: Josh Harrison (0.2)

SS: Jordy Mercer (1.5)

3B: Jung-Ho Kang (1.6)

Granted Jaso is a mystery as to what he will do at first; we can assume, or hope, that he won’t be as bad as Pedro Alvarez. Even if he is below average, the defensive improvement will be significant from Alvarez. While they are losing power in their lineup, the defense may make up for some of the home runs they are losing from Alvarez. With Kang and Harrison on the rise and pitchers that are keeping the ball out of the air, the Pirates could be poised to have a fourth straight good season. While the Cubs look like they’re going to take the division, Pittsburgh could have a potential Wild Card run in their future.

(I am 15 and this is my first article. Open for criticism!)

The game is on the line. It’s the bottom of the 9th inning, runners on first and second with two outs for the Mets. Justin Turner drives a fly ball off the bat at a speed of 88.3 mph. All hope for the Braves looks to be lost. In a blink of an eye or just .02 seconds Jason Heyward reacts and races out of center field traveling 18.5 mph to make an incredible diving catch to save the game.

This data set was one of the earlier Statcast recordings released to the public. It shows how important such information could potentially be to clubs in the future. Statcast can record data such as Acceleration, Route Efficiency, Reaction Time, Max Speed, Distance Covered and more. Although not all of their data is available to the public, I wanted to further explore how a baseball club would benefit by using this technology to research defensive analysis on improving a player’s abilities and a club’s defensive positioning.

First off, a team could compile this data and separate each player’s metrics by direction. Players move differently when heading in different areas of the field. It’s obviously easier to move forward than running backward, so having this data would allow teams to identify key information and make comparisons down the road. This can be done so by separating a fielder’s range into eight different quadrants (see graphic below). Once that is done, averages are created based for each quadrant. For instance, on average, what is Brett Gardner’s route efficiency when moving right? When moving in quadrant 6, what is Charlie Blackmon’s average reaction time?

Quadrants

#1: Forward

#2: Right Forward

#3: Right

#4: Back Right

#5: Backwards

#6: Back Left

#7: Left

#8: Left Forward

All this information, separated into different quadrants, will help in visualizing and breaking down defensive ability. When we have averages of acceleration, max speed and reaction time it can create a visual graphic or “Statcast Range” to witness how much distance a player could potentially cover in a certain amount of time. For example, lets say Jason Heyward’s average reaction time, acceleration and max speed when going left was .02 sec, 15.1 ft/s^2 and 18.5mph respectively. We know using this information Heyward could cover approximately 81 feet in 4 seconds. Time can help us represent a player’s estimated “Statcast range.” Each player’s range will look differently as they may show in which directions they are better at fielding. We can then use this analysis to compare fielders and also adjust defensive positioning.

This information will help guide a team in improving its players’ abilities. Teams can compare players much easier and understand what flaws coaches must look into fixing. For example, if a fielder has below-average route efficiency or reaction time to a certain part of the field, this information can be relayed to the coaching staff to further improve a player’s ability over time. In order to put this in perspective, Eugene Coleman of the University of Houston found that the average major-league ballplayer ran 24 feet per second. Using this number, having 0.04 more seconds means the average major leaguer can cover 11.5 more inches of ground. That’s almost a foot more and within only .04 seconds. If a ballplayer cuts down his reaction time, improves his route efficiency, and more, he would be able save time in covering several more feet of ground and thus improving his defensive ability.

To adjust a player’s defensive positioning, a team would have to combine its knowledge from this analysis with the understanding of a hitter’s batted balls. If they know a certain player is a pull hitter and hits to certain parts of the field, they can track his batted-ball locations, hang time and exit velocities to project areas in the field to which he may hit. Using what we know about a fielder’s Statcast metrics and “Statcast Range “ a player’s positioning could be adjusted. Doing so would lead to more accuracy. Improving the range of a team’s fielders will help save distance and time. The ability to increase production of more outs will provide a club with a better advantage for winning the game.

Dynasty leagues test the deepest mettle of a fantasy baseball owner. Most good dynasty leagues have a lot of strong owners who have a pretty good view of ballplayers. The key to being a successful dynasty owner is to find players who are undervalued by others. If you can add players to your roster at a relatively cheap cost who have positive net returns for you, you are ahead of everyone else who was unwilling to roster that player.

The American League Central has many up-and-coming, talented players with names like Lindor, Buxton, Kepler, Rodon, Sano, and more. However, one player whose stardust has worn off is Oswaldo Arcia. This stocky Twins outfielder is still only 24 years of age, but with lots of youth coming up in Minnesota he has been surpassed in GM Terry Ryan’s eyes. This does not mean that you, as a dynasty league GM, should be overlooking him. Arcia’s calling card has always been his power, coming from a smooth lefty swing and a strong lower half. 2013 saw him hit 14 homers in a debut effort with the Twins, and 2014 saw 20 more homers at the big-league level. It was not to be in 2015, however, as he struggled mightily with injuries and strikeouts. Strikeouts will be an issue for most power hitters, and Arcia is no exception. However, it is tantalizing power that should draw you as a dynasty owner in. There are two scenarios here: One, Arcia is owned by an owner disgusted by his recent performance and selling low, or two, he is available on the waiver wire. Either way, he is a guy to go get right away, and with a further look, it should be obvious why you need to go out and acquire him.

The Twins have a crowded outfield; they had a crowded outfield last year, and it is not getting any better with Max Kepler coming into the picture. DH is going to be held down with some combination of Miguel Sano and Joe Mauer, and Arcia is going to have to have a monster spring to find playing time. Weird, I’m telling you to go get him, yet I’m telling you that he won’t play?? Think about it: This is an opportunity to buy dirt-cheap low on a player. There were reports out of Rochester, the Twins’ AAA affiliate, of him hitting 450 foot homers. I saw one of them myself. The talent is certainly there.

At this point, I should warn that some wonder about an attitude problem. This can be chalked up to early big-league success followed by struggles. All this kid needs is a change of scenery. He plays an only slightly below-average left field, although he is more comfortable in right, and has an accurate throwing arm from the outfield. His defense isn’t bad enough to keep him out of lineups, and even if it becomes so, he can still DH. A trade to any other team in the American League would give this powerful 24-year-old a chance at reaching his potential. He has been in the Twins organization since he was 16. He was a top-100 prospect prior to 2013 according to BA, BP, and MLB.com. He has been around so long that his younger brother Orlando, a shortstop prospect for the Brewers, has taken the entire spotlight. Don’t let the younger bro overshadow the older — Oswaldo is a power bat who can hit 30 homers in a season given 145 games. He will have to sit against the toughest lefties, the Chris Sales of the world, but what lefty finds guys like that easy? It is a tremendous buy-low opportunity for any dynasty team looking for upside; it is not often you find a guy with 70+ raw power that has shown it in games just lying around on the cheap. Go get him now, and you won’t regret it!

For this list there will be two requirements:

1. The players under consideration must not have thrown even a single pitch in the major leagues. This throws out notable names such as Steven Matz, Jon Gray, and others who have already done so.
2. The players under consideration must be projected to graduate from the prospect label in 2016 and have a significant influence on a major-league team. This throws out notable names like Julio Urias, Lucas Giolito, and others who are projected to be unlikely call-ups for the 2016 season.

So here we go, my projections for the top five pitching prospects you should keep an eye on for your fantasy team in 2016.

1. Tyler Glasnow

Team: Pittsburgh Pirates

Throws: Right

Height/Weight: 6’8”/225

Age: 22

Projected Path: Opening day rotation

Rundown: Nobody in this year’s projected rookie class boasts a bigger frame or, more importantly, a bigger fastball than Glasnow. Standing at an intimidating 6’8”, Glasnow is known to be able to pound the catcher’s mitt repeatedly with an upper 90s fastball that routinely overpowers hitters. MLB.com gives his fastball a 75 on the 20 to 80 scale, a truly remarkable grade. Add that to an above-average power curveball and an improving changeup, and it is easy to see why scouts rave about this guy’s immense upside.

But really, who cares about what scouts think? Not me, and neither should you. Let’s check out some upper-minor-league numbers Glasnow produced in 2015. Glasnow’s largest body of work in 2015 came in AA where he threw an even 63 innings over a span of 12 starts. Here he struck out a remarkable 33.1% of batters while only walking a respectable rate of 7.7% of batters he faced. His strikeout rate was tied with fellow highly-touted right-hander Jose De Leon for tops in all AA leagues among pitchers who threw at least 60 innings. Throw in his respectable walk rate, and he led all AA pitchers with the same inning restrictions in K-BB%. In AA he had an ERA of 2.43 while only stranding 66.4% of baserunners, a statistic generally attributed to luck. Again the average LOB% from 2015 was 72.3%, so one can assume he was a little unfortunate giving up some of those runs. With that said, his ERA could have easily looked more like his FIP which was an outstanding 1.98.

Either way, Glasnow proved to be dominant in AA and was later called up to the next level. In 43 innings of AAA ball he struck out a similarly great 27.6% of hitters. He walked some extra guys, leading to a high 12.6% BB%. Unsurprisingly, he was able to strand more runners in AAA, 73.3% of them to be exact, and yielded a 2.20 ERA. His FIP was 2.82.

Final take: Go get this guy. If he’s available late for a cheap price, Glasnow could be the ultimate diamond found in the rough. His best strength is in his strikeout numbers which plays really well for fantasy. The only weakness to his game is the walks. If he can find a way to limit walk totals, Glasnow could join the conversation for top young arms in 2016 and beyond.

2. Jose Berrios

Team: Minnesota Twins

Throws: Right

Height/Weight: 6’0”/190

Age: 21

Projected Path: Opening day rotation

Rundown: Perhaps more polished than Glasnow, Jose Berrios is a very strong name to have on your radar. As an undersized righty, Berrios hits mid-90s with his fastball, but will mainly live in the lower 90 range. He also throws a slurve-like breaking ball with various velocities as well as an above-average changeup. The best thing about Berrios is his plus command. As a 21 year old, he walked only 6.5% and 4.7% of batters in 90⅔ innings in AA and 75⅔ innings in AAA respectively. His strikeout numbers were also strong with a 25.1% mark in AA and a 27.7% effort in AAA. An interesting note on Berrios was his major improvement from AA to AAA. His K-BB% improved by 4.5%, as well as his FIP and ERA numbers.

Final Take: I was going back and forth for quite sometime trying to decide who was more valuable between Berrios and Glasnow. In the end I chose Glasnow mainly due to the unprecedented strikeout potential as well as the national league benefit. However, that by no means says that Berrios can’t be better. Led by his impressive ability to limit walks, go into your draft with Berrios’ name in mind.

3. Blake Snell

Team: Tampa Bay Rays

Throws: Left

Height/Weight: 6’4”/180

Age: 23

Projected Path: Opening day rotation

Rundown: Blake Snell is one of the most intriguing names in the prospect heap for 2016, partly because he came into the year as a relatively unknown 22-year-old in the Tampa Bays Rays A+ affiliate. The other part is that in 2015 he didn’t let up a run until his 50th inning of work. He escaped A+ ball in 21 innings without letting up a run and then rattled off another 28 scoreless innings in AA. Eventually though, he did prove to be human as he let up a first-inning home run to the Cubs’ Wilson Contreras ending his scoreless inning streak at 49. Nevertheless, he put up astounding numbers across three levels of the minor leagues in 2015.

Like Glasnow, Snell’s best tool is his ability to strike hitters out. He does this with a low to mid-90s fastball as well as an above-average slider and changeup. His biggest flaw is the walks, as he walked over 10% of the batters he faced in both AA and AAA. Like Berrios, he posted his best K-BB% numbers in AAA. In 44⅓ there he struck out 33.3% of batters and only walked 7.6%, good for an incredible 25.7% K-B%. Although it is very difficult to project his basic run-prevention skill without the aid of batted-ball type or velocity, he certainly excelled in that area in 2015. In 21, 68⅔, and 44⅓ innings in A+, AA, and AAA his ERA was 0.00, 1.57 and 1.83 respectively.   

Final Take: Like I said at the beginning, Blake Snell is intriguing. Walks will hold him down, strikeouts will bring him up. If you like what see take a shot and thank me later. He has the potential of an elite starter.

4. Jose De Leon

Team: Los Angeles Dodgers

Throws: Right

Height/Weight: 6’2”/185

Age: 23

Projected Path: Mid/late season call up

Rundown: The only thing holding De Leon back from being closer to the top of this list is the Dodgers’ management. Most likely, he will not make the team out of camp and will head to AAA to start the year.  However, due to the Dodgers’ thin staff and postseason desperation, De Leon is bound to make a splash sometime in 2016. As mentioned earlier, he was tied with Tyler Glasnow in K% in AA during the 2015 season among pitchers with more than 60 innings pitched. De Leon pitched a total of 76⅔ innings at the AA level through 16 starts. Before that, also in 2015, he threw 37⅔ innings at the A+ level. He put up ridiculous numbers there, striking out batters at a rate of a nearly unheard of 40% while only walking 5.4% of hitters. His walk rate increased a little bit in AA, but he still boasts better command than the likes of Glasnow and Snell. De Leon pairs his low to mid-90s fastball with a slider and changeup.

Final Take: Although De Leon is unlikely to make the team out of spring camp it is worth keeping this guy on your fantasy radar. Pay attention for any news on a potential call-up, and if you find any, don’t waste time to add him to your roster. In deeper formats, De Leon certainly deserves a late-round draft choice.

5. Josh Hader

Team: Milwaukee Brewers

Throws: Left

Height/Weight: 6’3”/160

Age: 21

Projected Path: Mid/late season call up

Rundown: After coming to the Brewers in the Carlos Gomez deal, Hader quickly improved his prospect stock by increasing his K-BB% by almost 10% with the move from the Astros AA affiliate to the AA affiliate of the Brew Crew. Although he started his only 7 games with Milwaukee, Hader spent time both starting and coming out of the pen before the deal in Houston. Over there he was not nearly as impressive with a higher BB% as well as significantly lower K% in 65⅓ innings. Like I promised, things got better in his 38⅔ innings for the Brewers in AA. Hader struck out a robust  32.9% of hitters while only walking 7.2%. Overall, Hader finished sixth in K-BB% among starters under 25 in AA who logged more than 60 innings. Hader pairs his mid-90s fastball with an average changeup and curveball. Due to his shot forward with the Brewers, and the lack of organizational pitching skill combined with likely trades of veterans either during the offseason or before the July trade deadline, Hader could be looking at a potential midseason call-up where his ability to get strikeouts would be an asset, especially in the NL. On top of this, Hader has better command than most 21-year-olds.

Final Take: Hader’s upside is real. A strong fastball, paired with above-average command bodes well for National League pitchers. Now all he has to do is continue his success in the minor leagues for the Brewers, and he will almost certainly see a call-up to the big-league rotation. If this happens make sure you remembered his name.

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Stats and research courtesy of FanGraphs and MLB.com

Brian. Cashman.

Probably one of the more unpopular figures in New York sports (for no good reason) has struck again and made a great deal for the Yankees.

I’m a Cashman defender, through and through. I think that 15 playoff appearances in 18 seasons, 6 pennants, and 4 championships is a stellar résumé, and that he doesn’t get enough credit for it, regardless of how big the payroll is, or how much control he really had early on. We’ve seen Cashman at his best these past few seasons. Sure, they haven’t been the most successful for the Yankees; anything less than a championship is a failure. That’s the Steinbrenner way, and the way it should be. But we’ve seen that Cashman can operate without an infinite payroll and can make moves other than opening the Yankee’s checkbook.

You can criticize Cashman for some free agent signings, sure. You can say he didn’t have to do much to win his first championships and inherited a great roster; that’s more than fair. You can’t, however, deny that Cashman is a master of trades, especially recently. He understands trading from a surplus as well as anyone. And he does so to acquire either low-risk, win-now pieces, or young, talented, potential-filled, cost controlled pieces.

And with this latest trade of Adam Warren and Brendan Ryan for Starlin Castro, Cashmoney has done it again!

Before we dive into this latest case of Cashman genius, let’s highlight some of his recent gems.

Catcher JR Murphy to the Twins for outfielder Aaron Hicks, November 2015- I like Murphy a lot. He seemed like a great guy, and was a good player, but the Yankees were loaded with catchers. McCann is locked in for 3 more seasons and is basically immovable with his contract. Gary Sanchez has been destroying the Arizona Fall League and seems like a legit power bat. Austin Romine is somewhat boring, but has the skills to be a serviceable backup catcher, and many are still high on Luis Torrens. He missed last season with an injury, but is still viewed as a solid prospect. Murphy was merely a commodity. Hicks, once a top prospect, is a switch-hitting 26 year old outfielder, and seemed to turn the corner last season, posting the highest average, slugging percentage, wOBA, and WAR of his career. He hits lefties very well too, batting .307 against southpaws last season. At worst, Hicks is an above average fourth outfielder who will play very solid defense, and provide speed and right handed pinch-hitting ability off the bench. At best, he has a similar career turnaround to Carlos Gomez (as Paul Sporer notes), and becomes the All Star outfielder he was once expected to be. He’s under team control through 2019.

Infielder Martin Prado and RHP David Phelps to the Marlins for RHP Nathan Eovaldi and 1B/OF Garrett Jones, December 2014- Garrett Jones was obviously a bust but this was still a great trade for the Yankees. A lot of the Yankees trades have worked out, but a good way to look at trades (or life in general if we really want to get deep here) is to not be so results-oriented. Use your resources to make the best decision possible, and let the pieces fall where they may. The Yankees traded a fringe starter/long reliever and aging utility man for a power lefty off the bench and a promising, young, flame-throwing arm. And it worked out really well. David Phelps is David Phelps, and Martin Prado wouldn’t have won the Yankees the pennant last season. Nathan Eovaldi looked like a changed man under Larry Rothschild’s guidance last season. Adding a nasty split to go with his high-90’s fastball has done wonders for him. He’s able to change hitters’ eye-levels more effectively, meaning more strikeouts and less hard contact. It paid off last season. He won 14 games and got better as the season progressed, striking out 8 batters per 9 innings, and posting a 3.67 ERA in the second half. Eovaldi looks like he’s on his way to being a solid 2-3 starter, and is under team control through 2017.

RHP Shane Greene to the Tigers, received shortstop Didi Gregorius from the Diamondbacks, December 2014– This may go down as one of the better trades the Yankees have ever made. Big statement, I know. But the Yankees traded a barely major league starter for what looks like the shortstop of the future. At the time, Greene was viewed as a back of the rotation starter at best. Fast forward a year and he posted an ERA of nearly 7, and may not have a job next season. Gregorius, meanwhile, overcame a slow start and turned into one of the Yankees most valuable assets. He hit .294 with a .762 OPS in the second half, ranked as the 4th best shortstop in baseball(!) per fWAR, and played stellar defense. Jorge Matteo is on the horizon, but Gregorius is the shortstop of the present and the future if he keeps this up. I envision a breakout season coming for the Dutchman. He’s under team control through 2019.

All 3 of those trades were low-risk deals, dealing from a surplus for high-upside guys under team control for the foreseeable future. Two have worked out very well, and the third has a great chance to.

(Side note: When I was looking through spotrac.com for these exact contracts, and was reminded that Jacoby Ellsbury is under contract through 2021, I almost threw up.)

Cashman, however, has also showed he can make great trades in season for win-now players. In 2014, he gave up Vidal Nuno for Brandon McCarthy. They lost McCarthy that offseason, but Nuno is no Clayton Kershaw and McCarthy was great for them down the stretch, performing at an ace-like level; he had a sub 3.00 ERA. The deal he made for Chase Headley that season was similar. While fans may be understandably upset at it now, as Solarte had a solid season last year, and Headley, for the most part, did not, it was a really good trade at the time and still could be for the future. Solarte had just a few months of MLB experience and while he started off hot, he was drastically slowing down. Headley had a 31 home run season, All Star appearance, and Gold Glove under his belt. The Yankees locked Headley up this past offseason through 2018, and will want him to improve. Solarte actually had a higher average, wOBA, wRC+, and WAR last season. Headley, though, has proven he can be an All Star player, and he should rebound this season, especially defensively. And the point is, at the time, it was a really smart move. The Yankees also included Rafael De Paula in that deal, but has done nothing of note and is still floating around the minors.

I also feel obligated to mention the Kelly Johnson for Stephen Drew trade in 2014 with the Red Sox. Probably the most hilarious trade I’ve ever seen for so, so many reasons, but I digress.

Back to the deal at hand. Warren and Ryan for Castro. A fringe starter/middle reliever and a veteran, light-hitting (to be generous), backup middle infielder for a 25 year old, 3-time All Star, once top prospect, yet still very promising middle infielder. I know that sounds too simple, but that really is what this deal is.

Brendan Ryan… let’s just get this out of the way early. This is addition by subtraction for the Yankees if we’re being honest. He’s a .234 lifetime hitter with 19 home runs in 2,872 plate appearances. I wish I was making that up, but I’m not. And for a guy who supposedly has a great glove, I saw him make/not make a number of questionable plays last season. He was wasting a roster spot. Now his role can go to someone more promising like Dustin Ackley or Rob Refsnyder.

Parting ways with Adam Warren isn’t easy, but it’s not the end of the world. Warren is a good pitcher. I liked watching him grow these past few seasons and wish the Yankees could have kept him in the rotation last season, where he was very reliable, although he did seem to also find a niche as middle/late inning reliever. Warren “knows how to pitch” to use a cliche. He doesn’t blow you away, but he works his fastball in with his offspeed stuff well, locates his pitches, and gets people out. Pitchers usually improve when they move to the NL, and with this opportunity to finally be a starter, I expect Warren to be a nice addition for the Cubs next season. He should be a solid back of the rotation starter, or reliable reliever if they go that route. Not sure Adam Warren is the key to ending their century long World Series drought, but he doesn’t hurt them, that’s for sure.

The idea that the Yankees are giving up some Cy Young caliber starter, however, is absurd. Like I said, Warren is a 4-5 starter and the Yankees just don’t have room for him. Tanaka, Severino, Eovaldi, and Pineda are all rightfully ahead of him. And Sabathia, Nova, and Mitchell are in the mix as well. Plus, it’s almost a certainty that the Yankees will add another starter this offseason, so there really was just no room for him in the rotation. He would’ve been a nice arm in the bullpen, as the Yankees need another right-hander out there so Dellin Betances can rest more, but he can be replaced. There’s always plenty of right-handed relievers available on the free-agent market, and the Yankees have some in-house candidates as well. This does, however, make trading Miller even dumber, but that hopefully shouldn’t be happening anyway. The bottom line is, while Warren is a nice pitcher, he was no more than a middle reliever/depth starter for the Yankees. Turning him into Starlin Castro is gold by Cashman.

Speaking of Castro, let’s get into the real headliner of the trade. Castro will be just 26 at the start of the 2016 season. He’s been an All Star, he’s got a proven bat, and while he’s had some troubles, he seems to be trending in the right direction. He’s got a career slash of .281/.321/404. His wOBA is .316 and his wRC+ is a below-average 96. Every full season he’s played, he’s hit between 10 and 14 home runs. Now, none of these numbers set the world on fire, but there’s been very promising stretches sandwiched in there, and when you consider he’s a middle infielder, these numbers look much better.

The problem with Castro has been inconsistencies. Last season he was not very good offensively, and he wasn’t in 2013 either. But he had very promising seasons the rest of his career; 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2014. Over those 4 years, his wRC+ was 99 or higher each season, he’s hit at least .283 in all of them (over .300 twice), and has averaged a WAR of 2.9 per 162 games. Those are really good numbers, especially for a middle infielder. We can’t completely discount his two poor seasons, but a change of his scenery may be all he needs, as the talent is clearly there.

Along the lines of a change of scenery is his position change from short to second in August of last season. In his 33 games at second base last year, he hit 5 home runs, drove in in 22 runs, and had a slash of .339/.358/.583. Small sample size, yes, and logically there should be no relationship between what position a guy’s playing and his ability to hit, but maybe that’s the case for Castro. If he feels more comfortable at second, it could be enough to get his mind right and allow his talents to take over. He’s still before his prime, and he’s under team control through 2020 for an affordable salary. It’s a risk the Yankees needed to and can take. Stephen Drew just had the worst year and half I’ve ever seen, and while Ackley and Refsnyder have potential, they’re not as good as Castro. Ackley can now have a utility role, while Refsnyder can perhaps be used as part of a package deal to get a frontline starter.

On a larger scale, this trade shows the genius of Cashman’s trading ability, and the Yankees’ continued win-while-rebuild mode. They’re keeping their top prospects, yet still are getting younger and more athletic by trading from areas of surplus and buying low and selling high on players. For all the talk of the Yankees being an old, veteran team, they very quietly are assembling a great, young core. Gregorius, Castro, Greg Bird, Aaron Judge, Matteo, Refsnyder, Hicks, Severino, Eovaldi, Pineda, Tanaka, and Betances are all either top prospects, proven players, potential budding stars or somewhere in between. Not one of them is older than 27 and all are under team control for the foreseeable future. With this young core, and a ton of money coming off the books very soon, the future is bright in the Bronx. You can thank Brian Cashman for that.

When I started this piece the Red Sox were going hard for David Price, but they hadn’t signed him yet, and it still wasn’t anywhere close to being a guaranteed deal. Now Price has signed with the Red Sox and Greinke is headed to Arizona (who saw that coming), so this piece is no longer realistic (as though it ever was). I still think it is interesting to think about however, so here you go.

Situation: Price signs elsewhere and the Red Sox are forced to pursue Greinke. As some have hypothesized, Greinke is inclined to stay in the National League so he can continue to hit. To sign him, the Red Sox will have to overpay by a significant margin. Either that or let him hit?

Okay, first a clarification: Greinke would not be the new DH (could you imagine replacing Ortiz on his retirement tour with Greinke). No, he would be given the opportunity to bat, say, in twenty-five of his starts next year (in the contract it would then be determined, the number of games Greinke would get to hit the following years, based on how he hit in the previous year). A few of those starts will be inter-league games, possibly a couple of them would be to give Ortiz a day off, but mostly Ortiz would hit for another player on the field. You might say that wins are money and that since this would cost you wins you should just cough up the money to get Greinke to come to Boston. But what if this would hardly cost you any wins at all? What if the team could be just as good when Greinke hit?

The first thing to do is to find out how good Zack Greinke has been at hitting. In hit National League career he has a wRC+ of 67, though over the last three years he has seemed to improve, hitting to a wRC+ of 87. To give a comparison, Madison Bumgarner, known as a very good hitting pitcher who has even pinch-hit on occasion, has a career 49 wRC+ and a 73 wRC+ over the last three years. It does seem like Greinke has improved, hitting-wise, lately, but he is a pitcher, and you can’t expect too much out of him, so we will take his median wRC+ over the last three years, 74, as a reasonable true talent. So this was a starting point to compare this to other players.

The first name that seems interesting is Ryan Hanigan. Unlike some other Red Sox players who haven’t hit that well of late, no one really expects him to improve. Over the last three seasons he has a wRC+ of 75. This is basically equal to Greinke’s prescribed true talent, so it seems as though we could break even. Against righties however, Hanigan had a wRC+ of 69 over the three-year span, and it was even worse last year at 62. So, it seems that against righties, Greinke, whose wRC+ hardly drops in his three-year sample size, might even be the better hitter. Additionally, Greinke is actually the better baserunner as well. Over the last three years, Greinke is the best baserunning pitcher in baseball, with a BsR score of 0.5, slightly above average. He joins only four other pitchers as above-average baserunners over that time period. Hanigan on the other hand is a below-average baserunner, with a BsR of -4.0 over the last three years. This is just another reason for Greinke to hit instead of Hanigan.

If Hanigan really was the backup catcher, then, assuming Greinke was the better hitter against righties, the Red Sox would already be close to working out a good way for to hit Greinke. Hanigan would become Greinke’s personal catcher, and Greinke would hit instead of Hanigan against righties. Hanigan though is only the backup catcher until Vazquez is healthy. While he has had a setback in playing winter ball, he is expected back early next year. So Greinke hitting for Hanigan may only be an option for around a month.

Vazquez, Castillo and Bradley are all other options to hit for against righties. Bradley and Castillo have had 65 and 69 wRC+’s against righties, respectively. These would seem like great options to pinch hit for, except for the fact that they are supposed to be good candidates to improve. Depending how they do early in the year, both could be able to be hit for by Greinke, though it wouldn’t be great for their confidence. Vazquez actually hit slightly better against righties in his very limited tenure in Boston, though that could reverse itself, since he is right-handed. So it seems as though the Red Sox can piece together 10-15 games where, because of personnel or days off, it makes enough sense to have Greinke hit against righties. They still need 10-15 more starts however.

This brings us to facing lefties, and Pablo Sandoval. Last year was a bad year for Sandoval, but even before that he was bad against lefties. Over the last three years he has had a wRC+ of 61 against lefties. Last year it was even more horrendous, however, as he had a score of 21. Pair this with his -15.1 Def rating last year, and it seems obvious he should not be playing third base with a righty on the mound. The Red Sox may sit Sandoval against lefties anyway, but this could be an opportunity to hit Greinke and get better defense. If the Sox were planning on having Greinke hit, they would do well to try to find a cheap, good-fielding third baseman. If the Red Sox could find someone like Gordon Beckham, who is an inexpensive, above-average defender at third base, that would be a big upgrade on defense. He had a positive 5.5 Def rating playing mostly third last year, and cost the Braves only $1.25 million plus incentives. There are probably countless others, though, that could fill this role.

Sandoval had a wRC+ of 99 against righties last year, so it doesn’t seem like he would be hit for against righties, but if his defense or hitting doesn’t improve, he could be a candidate to be hit for once in a while, even against righties. This is especially the case, given the importance of third base defense when Greinke is pitching. Looking at Greinke’s batted ball spray chart, you see a lot of ground balls. Focusing on those ground balls, you can see third base got a decent amount of attempts, especially ranging left and right, which is Sandoval’s weakness. So, at the rate Sandoval played last year, though he is expected to improve at least slightly, Greinke could hit for him all the time, with a good defender at third.

One other thing that should be mentioned is what will happen once Greinke leaves the game. When bullpen pitchers come in, they would then occupy Greinke’s batting spot. This is not as big an issue as it may appear, because bullpen pitchers will usually get pinch-hit for, but it would force Farrell to manage more of a National League game. It is unfortunate that the DH cannot be moved around in the batting order like every other position, but the Red Sox would just have to make use of their fairly deep bench.

Additionally, since 2010 the National League has only scored around six fewer runs per year than the American league from the seventh inning onward. This is the time in the game when the starter is generally out of the game, so National League teams can pinch-hit for their relievers. Since Greinke would only bat in 1/6th of the games, this averages out to be a run per year, or about 1/10th of a win. It could be even less than that since the Red Sox have a quality bench. So the disadvantage of having bullpen pitchers with lineup spots seems to be incredibly minuscule, even almost unnoticeable.

On average, around a third of pitchers are lefty. If the Red Sox try to line up Greinke against lefties, you can probably assume that it will happen around a dozen times. If Greinke gets six starts in April, he will probably face a righty in about four of those games. Greinke will bat for Hanigan on those occasions and for Sandoval against lefties, leaving nine more batting days for Greinke. The Red Sox could probably find nine more days to both take the defensive upgrade and have Greinke bat, rest a slumping player, or simply give starters a day off here and there. These might be slight disadvantages for the team, but could possibly be neutralized with the possible upgrades when Greinke bats for Hanigan and Sandoval.

Overall, if Greinke continued to be the great pitcher he is, a great offense would not be as important to the Red Sox on his pitching days. While on the whole it is probably a slight disadvantage to have Greinke bat, it seems to be very small, and not worth shelling out a few more tens of millions of dollars. The biggest question mark in this is Greinke’s true batting talent. While he has hit well in his career, he has totaled less than 400 plate appearances over his entire career. Anything could happen in this small sample size, so it is hard to know. This probably will never happen, but it is interesting to think about. For now though the Red Sox have Price, and the Diamondbacks just shelled out $206 million for Greinke, so the Red Sox are just as well not even thinking about him hitting in Boston.

We might as well wait until 2020, when Bumgarner will hit the open market, until we think about this again.