Playing with the wonderful new splits leaderboard that was just rolled out on these very pages has led me down a Tommy Pham-shaped rabbit hole.

Tommy Pham has a stat line that is currently boggling my mind.

.214 ISO, 10.9% BB%, .342 BABIP, and 9 HR in 183 PA…good to excellent offensive numbers, in my opinion. Yet despite all of these good to excellent offensive numbers, he sported a major-league-high 38.8% strikeout rate (min 100 PA) that dragged his wRC+ to a barely-above-average 105. This deserves some digging into.

Looking at this 15-game rolling K%, there were times this past season that his rolling K-rate was down to 20.8% (on August 12). The AMAZING thing happens the further right you look on that graph — he begins striking out at a rate that makes Bartolo Colon look patient, hitting a high of 66.7% in the middle of September. From the beginning of the season to August 12, Pham had a wRC+ of 126 — higher than the full-season numbers of Carlos Beltran, Nolan Arenado, and Jose Bautista. After August 12, his wRC+ was 40. 40! FOUR ZERO. That’s behind nine pitchers (min. 40 PA).

AND SOMEHOW

SOMEHOW

He managed to have a higher BABIP when he was walking through life in a strikeout-induced haze. After August 12, he ran a BABIP of .417 with a K% of 59.1%, meaning he didn’t put the ball in play much, but when he did, it was finding the holes. BABIP and wRC+ have an R^2 correlation of 0.23, so you’d sort of expect them to move up and down together. However, before he started striking out like he was afraid someone was going to outlaw strikeouts so he was getting them all in while he could, his BABIP was 89 points lower — .328.

That’s not just lower. That’s much lower. That’s the difference between Dexter Fowler and Albert Pujols. And somehow an 89-point difference in BABIP resulted in an 86-point difference in wRC+ in the wrong direction.

You’d think running a much higher BABIP would be the result of hitting more line drives. After all — that is the variety of batted ball that lands for a hit more often than any type.

BUT. IT. GETS. WEIRDER. He hit line drives 28.0% of the time up to and including August 12. After August 12, he hit line drives ONLY 7.7% OF THE TIME. So with a 28.0% line drive rate, he ran a .328 BABIP, but his 7.7% line-drive rate resulted in a .417 BABIP. WHAT KIND OF MAGIC IS THIS?

Well, you know. The magic of small samples. 183 plate appearances falls nearly 70 short of being half of a qualified season’s plate appearances. Weird things are going to happen when you are looking at smaller samples. Weird things are always happening in baseball; that’s part of its charm. We just don’t always notice because over the course of a season, some weird things will balance out other weird things and we’ll forget how weird things were at some point. That’s why it’s worth it to dive into the numbers — to remind yourself that fun things are always happening in baseball. You may even find yourself surprised with how interesting you find Tommy Pham at the end of it all.

While it may not be the most exciting Nationals story of the offseason, Wilson Ramos signing with the Rays and the subsequent trade for Derek Norris to replace him is a very big change for the Nats. Prior to tearing his ACL in September, Ramos was having an incredible 2016, and he really carried the Nationals offense through the first part of the year (with the help of Daniel Murphy, of course) when Harper was scuffling and Anthony Rendon was still working back from last season’s injury. Given Ramos’ injury history it makes sense to let him walk, but Nationals fans have reasons to be concerned about Norris.

After a few seasons of modest success, including an All-Star appearance in 2014, Norris batted well under the Mendoza line (.186) in 2016 with a significant increase in strikeout rate. What was the cause for this precipitous decline? Others have dug into this lost season as well, and this article will focus on using PitchFx pitch-by-pitch data through the pitchRx package in R as well as Statcast batted-ball data manually downloaded into CSV files from baseballsavant.com, and then loaded into R. Note that the Statcast data has some missing values so it is not comprehensive, but it still tells enough to paint a meaningful story.

To start, Norris’ strikeout rate increased from 24% in 2015 to 30% in 2016, but that’s not the entire story. Norris’ BABIP dropped from .310 in 2015 to .238 in 2016 as well, but his ISO stayed relatively flat (.153 in 2015 vs. .142 in 2016). Given the randomness that can be associated with BABIP, this could be good new for Nats fans, but upon further investigation there’s reason to believe this drop was not an aberration.

Using the batted-ball Statcast data, it doesn’t appear that Norris is making weaker contact, at least from a velocity standpoint (chart shows values in MPH):

Distance, on the other hand, does show a noticeable difference (chart shows values in feet):

So Norris is hitting the ball further in 2016, but to less success, which translates to lazy fly balls. This is borne out by the angle of balls he put in play in 2015 vs. 2016 (values represent the vertical angle of the ball at contact).

The shifts in distance & angle year over year are both statistically significant (velocity is not), indicating these are meaningful changes, and they appear to be caused at least in part by the way pitchers are attacking Norris.

Switching to the PitchFx data, it appears pitchers have begun attacking Norris up and out of the zone more in 2016. The below chart shows the percentage frequency of all pitches thrown to Derek Norris in 2015 & 2016 based on pitch location. Norris has seen a noticeable increase in pitches in Zones 11 & 12, which are up and out of the strike zone.

Norris has also seen a corresponding jump in fastballs, which makes sense given this changing location. This shift isn’t as noticeable as location, but Norris has seen fewer change-ups (CH) and sinkers (SI) and an increase in two-seam (FT) & four-seam fastballs (FF).

The net results from this are striking. The below chart shows Norris’ “success” rate for pitches in Zones 11 & 12 (Represented by “Yes” values, bars on the right below) compared to all other zones for only outcome pitches, or the last pitch of a given at-bat. In this case success is defined by getting a hit of any kind, and a failure is any non-productive out (so, excluding sacrifices). All other plate appearances were excluded.

While Norris was less effective overall in 2016, the drop in effectiveness on zone 11 and 12 pitches is extremely noticeable. Looking at the raw numbers makes this even more dramatic:

2015                                                     2016

So not only did more at-bats end with pitches in zones 11 and 12; Norris ended up a shocking 2-for-81 in these situations in 2016.

In short, Norris should expect a steady stream of fastballs up in the zone in 2016, and if he can’t figure out how to handle them, the Nationals may seriously regret handing him the keys to the catcher position in 2016.

All code can be found at the following location : https://github.com/WesleyPasfield/Baseball/blob/master/DerekNorris.R

Adam Eaton, he of 6 WAR, is now on the Nationals and there is a lot of discussion happening regarding that.  It would seem that maybe 2 – 3 of those WAR wins are attributable to his robust defensive play in 2016. 20 DRS!

In Dave Cameron’s article “Maybe Adam Eaton Should Stay in Right Field,” Dave points out that Eaton led MLB with 18 assists and added significant value by “convincing them not to run in the first place.”

What Dave and most of the other defensive metrics that I’ve seen on the public pages tend to ignore is the characteristics of the ball in play, i.e. fielding angle and exit velocity, and these impacts on the outfielders performance.  So with only a bit of really good Statcast data I understand this is still hard to do, but it’s time to start.  You can easily envision that balls hit to outfielders in different ways (i.e. launch angle and velocity) can result in different outfield outcomes.  Whether it is the likelihood of an out being made on that ball in play, or whether it is how that ball interacts with runners on base.  Ignoring this data has nagged me for a while now, as I love to play with the idea of outfield defense (just look at my other community posts).

So can some of these stats explain Adam Eaton’s defensive prowess this season?  Maybe it’s possible.  I had downloaded all the outfield ball-in-play data from the 2016 Statcast search engine so I fired it up.  I have cleaned the data up to include the outfielder name and position for each play.  Using this I can filter the data for the situation Dave describes, which is:

A single happens to right field with a runner on first base.

Before we go into the individual outfielders, let’s look in general:

By looking in general at the plays, you can see that a player is significantly less likely to advance from 1^st to 3^rd on a single to right field if the ball is hit at 5 degrees vs 15 degrees.  It’s nearly double from ~20% at 5 degrees to ~40% at 15 degrees.  Wow. That’s huge, and with an R-squared of nearly 50%, we’re talking half of the decision to go from 1^st to 3^rd can be tied to the launch angle.  (The chart is basically parabolic if you go to the negative launch angles which do appear in the data set, but with much less frequency, which is why I removed those data points.  But it makes sense that it would be way.)

I did this same analysis using exit velocity and it wasn’t nearly as conclusive, though there was a trend downward, i.e guys were less likely to advance on singles hit at 100mph then they were for singles hit at 60 mph. The r-squared was ~13%.

So now that we see that the angle the BIP comes to the outfield can make a big difference, who were the lucky recipients in the outfield of runner-movement-prevention balls in play?  When filtered to remove anybody who made fewer than 20 of this type of play, you end up with Eaton at No. 2 with an average angle of 4.44 (Bryce Harper, his now-teammate and also mentioned in Dave’s article in conjunction with his similarly excellent runner-movement-prevention, comes in at No. 3.  Possibly not a coincidence.)

You may notice my total number of plays for Eaton doesn’t match the total referenced by Dave per Baseball-Reference. I filtered out the plays where Eaton was in center field (which were several).  I believe that my analysis from the Statcast data had Eaton with 48 plays of this type (I think Dave’s article mentioned 52 per BR? Not sure what the difference is).

So in conclusion, I do think it’s very possible that Adam Eaton’s defensive numbers this past season, in particular with regards to his “ARM” scoring, could have been dramatically influenced in a positive direction simply by the balls that were hit to him and the angle they came.  Clearly this is something he has absolutely no control over whatsoever and it could fluctuate to another direction entirely next year.  I do think this area of analysis, in particular for outfield plays, whether it’s catches, assists, or even preventing advancement for runners, is a very ripe field for new approaches which in time should give us a much better idea of players’ defensive value.

That said, in this simple analysis the angle only accounted for ~50% of that runner-movement-prevention and that still leaves arm strength and accuracy as likely significant contributors, both of which I believe Eaton excels at.  And of course he did throw all those guys out.  So Eaton should be fine, likely well above average, but just don’t expect those easy singles to keep coming to him.

Bryce Harper just had a down season. That seems like a weird thing to write about someone who played to a 112 wRC+, but when you’re coming off a Bondsian .330/.460/.649 season, a line of .243/.373/.441 seems pedestrian. Would most major-league baseball players like to put up a batting line that’s 12% better than average? Yes (by definition). But based on his 2015 season, we didn’t expect “slightly above average” from Bryce Harper. We expected “world-beating.” We didn’t quite get it, but there’s one thing he is still amazing at — no one in the National League can work the count quite like him.
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Giancarlo Stanton has missed significant playing time since his MLB debut in 2010 and has never played more than 150 games of a 162-game season (145 and 123 games being his next two highest totals). In spite of his injury-shortened seasons, Stanton has still been among the league home-run leaders in 2011, 2012, and 2014 (his 150, 123, and 145-game seasons, respectively).

Career-wise, Stanton has amassed a total of 208 home runs, good enough for 16th-most of any player through their age-26 season and among the likes of Miguel Cabrera and Jose Canseco.

Given Stanton’s injury-plagued career, his career home-run numbers are a lower bound on what he may have accomplished had he played full, injury-free seasons following his debut. To quantify how Stanton’s injuries have suppressed Stanton’s career power numbers thus far, I extrapolated the home-run totals of Stanton’s injury-shortened seasons into full-season hypothetical home-run totals (hHR) using the formula below:

hHR = FLOOR(HR/G * 162)

The formula simply assumes that Stanton maintains his HR/G rate through a whole 162-game season and then conservatively rounds down. We can now compare home-run totals between the real Giancarlo Stanton and our hypothetical Giancarlo Stanton. I excluded his 2010 debut from the extrapolation.

The real Stanton never led the MLB in home runs, but our hypothetical Stanton climbs into the MLB lead in three of his hypothetical seasons (2012, 2014, and 2015).

Career-wise, our hypothetical Stanton would have hit 275 total home runs. This hypothetical Stanton adds 67 home runs to his real total, jumping from 16th to second place on the Age-26 leaderboard, only 23 home runs behind the far-away leader, Alex Rodriguez.

Of note, using the same formula to calculate Stanton’s career strikeout totals predicts a whopping 1271 strikeouts for our hypothetical Stanton. His 977 strikeout “real” total through age 26 (second-highest) balloons and surpasses Justin Upton’s age-26-leading 1026 for a clear command of first place.

In reality, Stanton is a three-time All-Star, a Silver Slugger (2014), and a Home Run Derby champion (2016), and he historically ranks among the best in home-run totals for his age, all while facing injury issues in all of his first six full big-league seasons. Our hypothetically-healthy Giancarlo Stanton greatly improves his career numbers and garners himself a few MLB home-run crowns, giving a glimpse into how much larger his career numbers could be today had his first six full seasons been injury-free. As Stanton’s career progresses, it will be interesting to see where his home-run totals end up, and, unfortunately, how much greater they could have been.

Credit to Baseball-Reference for all publicly available data.

It was in November, yet we may already have the most fascinating free-agency signing of the offseason. Traditionally, free agency is for contending major-league clubs looking to overpay players in hopes that they can deliver a championship. The Milwaukee Brewers went off the beaten path and may be using free agency as a vessel to help their rebuild.

This year’s free-agent class, headlined by Edwin Encarnacion (34) and Carlos Beltran (39), has a shortage of quality bats. The 2016-2017 free-agent class will more than likely be defined by complementary players rather than typical studs who will impact a pennant race. This lack of possible assets forced the Milwaukee Brewers to get creative. The Brewers’ signing of KBO baseball star Eric Thames, four years removed from his last MLB at-bat was…genius?

First, let’s see how we got here.

The Brewers were unhappy with Chris Carter manning the first-base position. It is not often a team will cut a player after he hit 41 home runs, but that is exactly what happened. Carter’s overall lack of production outweighed the power output. Posting a .218 batting average, coupled with a 33.1% strikeout percentage, Carter performed slightly better than a replacement-level player. After cutting ties with Carter, Milwaukee looked at its free-agent options.

With his coming off a 47-home-run season, it is unrealistic for the Brewers to sign All-Star Mark Trumbo (30). The only other impact bat would be Mike Napoli (35). Napoli should benefit from the scarcity of sluggers this offseason. In 2016, Napoli had a nice bounce-back campaign, launching 35 home runs and making headlines such as “Party at Napoli’s.” However, the party stops at first base. Napoli is a below-average baserunner and defender, causing his VORP (Value Over Replacement Level Player) to total just 1.0.

The Brewers would have to be in love with Napoli’s ability to swing the stick for the club to decide to pull the trigger. But a 35-year-old slugger with poor defense is likely not a good fit for any National League team, let alone the rebuilding Brewers.

As for the rest of the free agents, there is a theme of mediocrity. Moreover, each of them will be over the age of 30 by opening day. Even if the remaining players are able to defy the odds and maintain their levels of performance, it will be nothing more than a stop-gap signing.

After a 73-89 campaign in 2016, the Brewers are not in “win now” mode. Over the past two years, the Brewers have sold, sold, and sold some more. Each trade Milwaukee made brought in quality talent, and according to MLB.com Milwaukee now has MLB’s #1 farm system. Milwaukee has eight players cracking the top-100 prospect list that will be making themselves known as soon as next year. So for a team in rebuilding mode, why sign Eric Thames? Low risk; high reward.

Per Adam McCalvy, Thames will make $4 million in 2017, $5 million the year after, and $6 million in 2019. The team also holds an option on his contract for 2020 for $7.5 million, with a $1-million buyout. That totals out to $16 million guaranteed. Fiscally, it boils down to this: Approximately $25 million for two years of Carter or 3-4 years of Thames for $16-$24.5 million, including bonuses.

In 181 major-league games, Thames posted a .250 batting average with 21 home runs. He had a respectable .727 OPS in that time. This bodes well in comparison to recent Cubs signee Jon Jay who had a similar .774 OPS in his first two seasons. Thames found himself out of the league, while Jon Jay continued his successful career. After 2012, Thames found work in the aforementioned KBO. Over three seasons, Thames averaged 42 home runs while hitting .347 and earned an MVP award in 2015. Oh, and there’s a 30-minute highlight reel of just home runs.

Pitching in Korea cannot be compared to the talent in Major League Baseball. There is a big difference between putting up numbers in Korea and doing so in MLB. However, Jung Ho Kang and Hyun Soo Kim are supporting evidence that succeeding can be done. One thing is evident when watching Thames swing: he has raw power to all fields.

If Thames performs similarly to his 2011-2012 form, then Milwaukee has lost nothing. The deal would simply mean they swapped two replacement-level first basemen while simultaneously saving money. But if Thames shows that he truly is a new player, Milwaukee will once again be front and center during the trade deadline. Thames could be the premier left-handed bat on the trade market while also having a dream contract for contending clubs. The value of his bat along with contractual control over him through 2020 at only $16 million guaranteed could bring in multiple top prospects. This is the dream scenario of course, but hey, it can’t hurt to dream.

It was recently reported that the Nationals would not meet the hefty demands of Bryce Harper. These reports come from Bob Nightingale of USA Today and consist of a demand of $400 million for 10 years or more. This is beside the point though. After the report, I was browsing around on Facebook when I saw someone point out that because of Harper’s defense, he isn’t even worth $300 million. This got me thinking, what is Bryce Harper really worth?

At first glance, I believe that Harper is worth at least $300 million. As a matter in fact, I won’t even make a final decision until the end of this article. I’m discovering his value with you. We’ll first look at his defense, since that is the claim against Harper. For continuity and consistency, I will use FanGraphs’ version of defensive, offensive, and base-running values.

When it comes to Harper’s defense, his values have been up and down for his career. Last year they were up. And down. But up, since I’m using FanGraphs stats, and thus UZR (Ultimate Zone Rating) will be used for my determination. The person from Facebook was likely using DRS (Defensive Runs Saved) because that was -3 while UZR was 8.7 for 2016.

Obviously defensive metrics like these are taken with a grain of salt because they have yet to be perfected. An 8.7 UZR is good. It isn’t top-tier, but it is definitely good. Plus the fact that right field isn’t the most inconsequential position. To make an impact in right field, a good arm is usually needed, and Harper had that in 2016. Yet 2015 was different, though, as both his arm rating and UZR were in the negative. Other than his 2014 UZR, everything else has been positive. His career totals are 17.4 for UZR and 16.3 for his arm. Like I said before, neither is is necessarily Gold Glove caliber, but he is definitely no scrub in the outfield. Even DRS, the metric I presume the Facebook man was using, has a total of 24 defensive runs saved for Harper on his career. So 2016 was his only year in the negative, and that was only -3.

Since I don’t want to only look at UZR and FanGraphs’ Arm ratings, I’ll also take a look at his Inside Edge fielding. All that does is show how often Harper executes on plays considered routine, likely, even, unlikely, remote, and impossible in descending order of probability. Except for routine plays, the rest have relatively small sample sizes on a season-wide basis for Harper. Each category has at least 30 samples for his career though, so the minimum number of samples to accurately represent the population is met. For routine plays, Harper performed as one would expect. He converted 99.6% of the plays in 2016 and 99.1% for his career, easily within the range of 90%-100% for the category. The next category, likely, has a range of 60%-90%. Harper was smack dab in the middle at 75% in 2016, but there were only 16 instances. Of the 70 in his career, he made 78.6% of the plays, well above the minimum expected of 60%. He performed even better in the even and unlikely categories. Remote plays were his only downside as he hasn’t made any of those plays in his career, but given the 39 instances it is hardly representative of his defensive play as a whole. He isn’t known as a burner and has been told by his coaches to tamp down the aggressiveness.

As a whole, his defense isn’t in question. Is it elite? No. He isn’t Jason Heyward or Mookie Betts in right field, but he was still fourth in the MLB in UZR for right fielders, so I don’t think his fielding is holding back his earning potential. If anything it may even be boosting it. Who wouldn’t want one of the premier hitting threats who can play a solid right field?

Because I want to save the more debatable part of Harper for last, we’re going to look at his base-running ability now. FanGraphs has the BsR (Base-Running Runs above average) stat, which sums up a player’s runs above average in terms of stolen bases, caught stealing, extra bases taken on hits, and double plays hit into. That gets boiled down to how many wins a player adds on the base paths. Harper’s BsR in 2016 stood at 2.4, or 2.4 runs added above the average player. He has 11.2 on his career.

To break it down, we will look at Harper’s wSB (weighted stolen bases), UBR (Ultimate Base Running), and wGDP (weighted ground into double plays). The wSB stat basically calculates how much a player helps by successfully advancing a base or hurts by being caught stealing. The Book gives success rates necessary for a base-stealer to add positive value in different situations. wSB simply adds together all the successes and failures and their weighted values (after all, a caught stealing is more costly than a stolen base is rewarding). In Harper’s case, he stole 21 bases in 2016, his highest total. He was also caught stealing 10 times. In all, he cost his team -0.3 runs trying to steal bases last year. It is an inconsequential amount, but for his career it is at -1.0. That is still too small to matter, but he is probably better off staying put unless he is sure he can make it to the next base. UBR and wGDP are higher on Harper. They are 5.5 and 6.7 for his career, respectively. Overall, Harper is a good base-runner. Still not elite, but he isn’t costing his team when running.

So far, Harper has graded well in both fielding and base running. In neither aspect of the game is Harper an elite player (though he’s arguably pretty close in the field). For Harper, and pretty much every player that makes big money in the MLB that isn’t a pitcher, the hitting is what will make and break him. The last two years have shown both sides of the spectrum of what Harper may turn out to be. In 2015, he was one of the two best players in baseball. Okay, he was the best. He flat-out outperformed Mike Trout (the true 2015 AL MVP, but that’s a debate for another time). Harper dominated in every form at the plate two years ago. If it weren’t for his negative defensive grade for the year, he would have broken the 10 fWAR barrier that only Trout has broken since 2004. He hit 42 home runs with 118 runs score and 99 RBI. If you don’t like those raw stats, he went and hit a batting line of .330/.460/.649. If you prefer metric stats, he went out and led in every iteration of runs created as well as wOBA. That stat line alone is worth $400 million.

But, we aren’t looking at one year of production. His 9.5 fWAR of 2015 is an anomaly so far. His second-highest is 4.6 in his rookie year. Last year it was 3.5. A 3.5-win player is not worth $400 million. A 4.6-win player is not worth $400 million. A 9.5-win player is. So, what is Harper really worth? Some (most) point to a reported injury that Harper had this past year that he played through anyway. This injury would have held him back. How much, though, we don’t know. We also don’t know if he will rebound to the 2015 version of him. Was that year a breakout year put on pause or was it in fact an anomaly?

To answer those questions, we need to dig a bit deeper than just his metric stats. In terms of exit velocity, Harper took a large step back from 91.4 mph to 89.5 mph in 2015 and 2016, respectively. In terms of home runs, Harper hit 19 in 2015 off of fastballs while regressing to eight last year. If it is a matter of catching up to fastballs, an injury definitely makes sense. 23-year-olds don’t suddenly lose their bat speed. That begins to happen at 33. When it comes to Harper’s batted balls, he increased the number of fly balls he hit and decreased in line drives. That usually translates to more home runs, but a drop in exit velocity answers that. Harper did hit more infield flies that in 2015. It was only a 3.1% change, but it does suggest he was just missing a bit more than the year prior.

Looking at the differences between the two years and what changed, I’m going to believe that he was injured. When reading online, most analysts believe that, and Harper even said he was injured. Only the Nationals said he wasn’t. With an injury, I have to believe that Harper was hampered by that rather than just a complete regression in skill. Harper has his hitting, and with the offseason to rest and heal he should come back and mash again.

One more tidbit about Harper’s hitting before we’re done here, though. His batting average of balls in play (BABIP) sat at a measly .264. That is well below the average of .300. One could look at Harper’s diminished exit velocity and how often he hit the ball soft, medium, and hard. Well, his average exit velocity is right around league average. He also was under league average for soft hits and above in hard hits. So that should translate to a bit above a .300 BABIP. Because of this, I’m going to factor in that Harper was pretty unlucky last year and his stats would look better if more balls fell into play like they should have.

Unfortunately, we aren’t quite done in determining Harper’s value. Since I’m going to believe that Harper was injured last year, that just adds to a pretty lengthy injury history. Lengthy injury histories aren’t something that teams like, but most of his have come from his aggressiveness on defense in his first few years. He took the pedal off the metal in 2015 and it translated to on-field success. If he continues to do that, I think he should be able to stay on the field.

Harper will also be 26 years old when he hits the open market in the 2018-2019 offseason. That is quite a bit younger than most free agents and it gives enough time for teams to lower their payrolls in time for a bidding war of great magnitude if they so choose (looking at you, Yankees). He will still have about six more years in his prime after he signs his potential mega-deal.

In prior years, teams have spent about $8 million per win above replacement. Obviously some players produce more than what they are being compensated for. No one is going to pay Mike Trout $80 million for one year. But, $40 million for a year isn’t out of the question, especially for someone of Trout’s caliber. This isn’t about Trout though, this is about Harper and what teams will pay him. He is said to be demanding $400 million for 10+ years. Is it conceivable that a team will pay him $40 million per year for 10 years if they expect similar success to 2015? Yes. He outperformed Trout and I think we can agree teams would hand him that amount of money in a pinch. It’s just a matter of whether or not it will happen.

Because I think Harper had an injury that didn’t allow him to play to his standard last year and he was unlucky with his hits, I do believe he can again reach his 2015 production. And because I believe he can get there again, I then have to believe a team will pay him at least $40 million for at least 10 years. I wouldn’t be surprised to see a contract similar to Giancarlo Stanton’s in terms of length — 13 years. For 13 years, Harper would only have to reach an annual average of $30 million, which is much, much easier to come by. So yes, when Bryce Harper reaches free agency where teams can bid as much as they can, some team will pay him that much. Of course, Harper can underperform again this coming season, and it would be hard for him to command that kind of contract. I don’t think that will happen. Based on what he showed in 2015 and why he didn’t do as well last year, he is more than likely to ramp up production in 2017.

The 2016 season was a frustrating one for the promising 26-year-old San Francisco Giants second baseman Joe Panik. After posting 4.1 fWAR in only 100 games in 2015, Panik posted 2.1 fWAR in 127 games in 2016. A solid season, especially in limited playing time, but there was definitely more to be desired for Panik. This would most likely be a career year for someone like his fellow infield mate Kelby Tomlinson, but Panik is capable of much more than this. Taking a few looks at Panik’s number line and Statcast profile shows that he is an excellent candidate for a bounce-back 2017 season.

At first glance, I don’t think Joe Panik’s 2015 season was as appreciated as it should have been. He didn’t even qualify for the batting title (432 PAs) and yet finished 38th among position players in fWAR. He was the 27th-best hitter according to wRC+ among those with over 300 PAs. Keep in mind that 2015 was Panik’s first full season in the major leagues and he is one of the best, if not THE best, fielding second basemen in the league. It seems like Panik has been around forever after his postseason heroics on the 2014 Giants squad, but it is easy to forget he got his first start of his career in late June of 2014. A 6-fWAR pace in his first full season in the big leagues in nothing to scoff at.

Unfortunately, injuries are what has held him back early in his career. Lower-back inflammation limited his playing time in 2015 and a nasty concussion and groin issues plagued him throughout the 2016 season. Some wonder whether those back issues carried over into the 2016 season. Even if they didn’t, suffering a concussion is enough to warrant that Panik was nowhere close to 100% in 2016.

Even without taking account for the injuries, there are reasons to believe 2017 is going to be different. Panik’s elite plate discipline is what is going to keep him at least mildly successful for years to come. He was one of three players to have a BB/K ratio over 1, sandwiched between plate discipline aficionados Ben Zobrist and Carlos Santana. Yes, he was ahead of even the likes of his teammate Buster Posey and Joey Votto. He doesn’t walk much, but he keeps the strikeouts down. Both rates were right around 9%. That leaves room for an incredible amount of balls in play.

Panik has run a decently high BABIP throughout his professional career. For his minor-league career it stayed mostly around .320-.330. In his 73 major-league games in 2014 it was .343. And in 2015 it was .330. All numbers that would indicate he is a line-drive-type hitter who run a better-than-average BABIP. But something changed in 2016. His BABIP fell to .245, second-worst among qualified hitters. Low BABIPs are reserved for power hitters such as Jose Bautista and Todd Frazier who don’t rely on balls in play but rather balls over the fence, not for contact hitters such as Joe Panik. A BABIP that low is concerning but there are of course explanations.

Joe Panik would not have made it this far if he were always running a BABIP as low as he did in 2016. Panik was one of the most unlucky hitters in 2016. There is no way Panik can be expected to run a BABIP as low as he did, and I would even venture to guess that it creeps up back over .300. His Statcast numbers suggest he was hitting the ball about as hard in 2015. The real difference is the angle at which he was hitting the ball. Panik traded line drives for many more ground balls in 2016. Bad luck and a change in launch angle combined contributed to the down season from Joe Panik.

My guess is that a weird injury-plagued season is what led to his disappointing 2016 campaign. There is too much evidence in Panik’s history that suggests 2016 is not the real Joe Panik, and we can expect a return to being the elite contact hitter he is capable of being in 2017.

The Atlanta Braves recently signed pitcher Jacob Lindgren. Drafted as a relief by the Yankees out of Mississippi State in 2014, he was thought to be a candidate to ascend through the minor leagues quickly and join the major-league club within a year. That he did, as he dominated his way through the minors, albeit in short stints. His longest look came in AAA in 2015 where he held great numbers. He made his debut that year too.

Though Lindgren found his way onto the Yankees roster quickly, it was all for naught, as he sustained an injury to end the 2015 season and only pitched seven innings this past year. His performance with the Yankees two years ago was subpar, which led to a demotion before his injury. He also struggled in spring training before sustaining his second injury.

Though he was a starting pitcher for a year with Mississippi State, his short 5’11 stature meant he was all but destined for a career in the bullpen. He dominated in college which led to the Yankees’ belief in his ability to reach the majors. He has a good fastball-slider combination that he can use to strike out batters. His fastball doesn’t jump at batter like some, but the low- to mid-90s heat can still be utilized successfully in this league. The combination of his two best pitches can lead to success as long as he can further develop his command and sequencing.

Lindgren was the Yankees’ seventh-ranked prospect in 2015 according to MLB.com, but his injuries led to him falling of that board. Still just 23 years old, he can regain that prospect stature he had before with a successful run with the Braves. A rebuilding team, Atlanta may even give him the opportunity to complete his development in the MLB bullpen rather than in the minors. He proved what he can do in AAA, so all that’s really left is for him to pitch successfully in the majors.

The reason that Lindgren is even on the Braves is due to the fact that the Yankees ran out of room on their 40-man roster. Facing heavy competition from other relief pitchers in New York, especially with Jonathan Holder (who FanGraphs writer Jeff Sullivan deemed the most dominant relief pitcher in the minor leagues), Lindgren didn’t really have a spot with the Yankees this coming year. Rather than waste his time in New York, they cut him loose to give him a shot elsewhere.

Last month, the St. Louis Cardinals made one of their signature under-the-radar moves that has characterized their organization in the 21st century. They signed 31-year-old outfielder/first baseman Chad Huffman to a minor-league contract. Huffman played for the Detroit Tigers’ Triple-A affiliate in Toledo in 2016. He was the best hitter in the International League and it wasn’t particularly close. He was tops in the league in OPS and wRC+, and led the league in wRAA by almost 10 runs. However you look at it, he dominated. It’s hard to figure out why Huffman didn’t get any kind of shot at the big leagues in 2016.

A former second-round pick by the San Diego Padres way back in 2006, Huffman was actually quite successful in his first go-round through the minor-league system. He was the Padres’ sixth-ranked prospect after the 2006 season and remained in their top 25 throughout his tenure there. His solid plate-discipline skills and non-sexy but decent power numbers most likely held him back from being ranked in the top 20 where he belonged. Huffman looked like he was on his way to getting a real shot in the big leagues.

His career took a turn in April of 2010 when the New York Yankees claimed him off waivers. His numbers in Triple-A took a step backwards and when he finally did get his shot in the major leagues, he failed to take advantage of it. His 2010 with the Yankees was his one and only time in the majors. He spent time in Triple-A with the Indians in 2011-12 and with the Cardinals in 2013, posting numbers very similar to his early minor-league days. Once again, it seems as though Huffman was deserving of some kind of shot in these years. He posted an OBP over .350 in each season and never had a wRC+ under 112. Somehow, a real shot continued to evade him.

Rather than rot away in Triple-A, Huffman took off for Caracas, and then Japan a year later. He actually posted worse numbers overseas, but something must have changed outside of the States because he came back an even better hitter than before. Most recently, 2016 was a career year for Huffman, if one is allowed to call a year in Triple-A a career year. If he were not blocked by the likes of Miguel Cabrera, Victor Martinez, J.D. Martinez, and Justin Upton, he would’ve been on the Detroit Tigers roster at some point. It is hard to imagine any other team Huffman wouldn’t have seen the light of day on. Up to this point, it seems as though the 31-year-old has been incredibly unlucky. So 2017 might be the year he gets his chance to shine in his second stint in the Cardinals organization.

As of right now, Mr. Huffman is on the Cardinals 40-man roster. With the subtractions over the last two offseasons of Matt Holliday and Jason Heyward, the Cardinals are in need of a new fourth outfielder and maybe even a starter depending on their confidence in Tommy Pham. Matt Carpenter is penciled in as the starting first baseman but there is no doubt he won’t be spending all his time there, being the third baseman by trade that he is. In that case, Matt Adams would become the starting first baseman, leaving them in need of a backup. Barring more offseason additions to the roster, it seems as though Huffman has a clear shot at a roster spot. Once you start taking into account how injury-prone the likes of Carpenter, Adams, and Pham are, and taking into account any other injuries that may play out, Huffman must be feeling pretty good about the situation he finds himself in.

What other organization would a no-name minor leaguer rather find himself in? the Cardinals have built one of the most successful professional sports organizations of the 21st century on guys like Huffman. Matt Carpenter, Aledmys Diaz, Jeremy Hazelbaker — the Cardinals churn these types of players out like no other. Chad Huffman is the next name in the long line of St. Louis Cardinals who came out of nowhere.