Anomalous Baserunning

One of the beautiful things about WAR is the way it assigns value to separate, unique elements of player performance. Perhaps one of the lesser-appreciated elements of WAR is BsR, which measures the value of a player’s baserunning.

BsR contains two separate components: wSB and UBR. wSB describes a player’s value added through base stealing, and UBR measures the cumulative value of a player’s base path advancements outside of stealing.

One might imagine that these two components demand similar skill sets. To excel in either, a player must have a: reasonable speed and b: good instincts on the base paths. Indeed, it would be fairly surprising to see a great disparity between the two components for any given player’s baserunning.

In a quest to discover the most puzzling baserunners, I searched for the largest absolute difference between wSB and UBR over a player’s career. There were several noteworthy constraints, a: our UBR data begins in 2002, limiting the search to the past 13 seasons and b: a general difference in magnitude between wSB and UBR. Because UBR governs all base running events outside of stolen bases, players typically see far more opportunities to accrue UBR than wSB value.

To adjust for this factor, I assigned each of the 685 qualified players a percentile rank for wSB and UBR. After sorting by the largest absolute difference in percentile, the truly anomalous base runners became apparent. Consider:

 

Table 1: From 2002-2014, Largest Absolute Differences in wSB and UBR Percentile

Rank	Name	wSB	wSB Percentile	UBR	UBR Percentile	% Difference	BsR
1	David DeJesus	-16.5	0.00%	19	95.00%	95.00%	2.5
2	Cristian Guzman	-7.2	2.30%	16.7	92.60%	90.30%	9.4
3	Casey Blake	-11.6	0.10%	12.9	88.10%	88.00%	1.4
4	Clint Barmes	-5.9	4.60%	15.2	91.00%	86.40%	9.3
5	Dan Uggla	-7.2	2.30%	12.5	87.50%	85.20%	5.3
6	Juan Uribe	-10.7	0.20%	10.1	85.00%	84.80%	-0.6
7	Brad Wilkerson	-8.8	1.30%	10.5	85.50%	84.20%	1.7
8	Austin Kearns	-4.6	10.30%	15.3	91.50%	81.20%	10.8
9	Reed Johnson	-6.2	4.20%	10.4	85.30%	81.10%	4.3
10	Carlos Guillen	-7	2.90%	9.4	83.30%	80.40%	2.5
11	Barry Bonds	3.7	85.90%	-15.8	6.70%	79.20%	-12.1
12	Jack Wilson	-5.9	4.60%	9.4	83.30%	78.70%	3.5
13	Yunel Escobar	-7.3	2.10%	8.3	80.70%	78.60%	1
14	Hunter Pence	-3.5	17.50%	20.5	96.00%	78.50%	17
15	Marlon Byrd	-5.1	8.60%	11.2	86.80%	78.20%	6.2
16	Jamey Carroll	-3.7	15.90%	17.5	93.50%	77.60%	13.9
17	Jason Kendall	-5.9	4.60%	8	79.00%	74.40%	2.1
18	Neil Walker	-5.3	7.40%	8.8	81.50%	74.10%	3.5
19	J.D. Drew	-4.3	12.10%	10.6	86.10%	74.00%	6.3
20	Moises Alou	2.3	82.40%	-12.3	9.00%	73.40%	-10

 

Well, there he is — among the anomalous, David Dejesus reigns supreme. While the average player carries a 22% difference between wSB and UBR percentile, Dejesus clocks in at more than 3.5 standard deviations above the mean. In 123 career stolen base attempts, Dejesus has succeeded in swiping the extra bag only 63 times. That’s certainly a less-than-stellar success rate. Nonetheless, Dejesus’ uncanny knack for taking extra bases on balls in play salvages his value as a baserunner; while Dejesus’ failures as a thief cost his team more than 15 runs, his ability to advance on the basepaths during the course of play has credited his team roughly 20 runs, or 2 wins.

Similarly, Cristian Guzman, Casey Blake, Clint Barmes and Dan Uggla all cost their teams with the stolen base, but ultimately produced positive baserunning value due to their ability to advance extra bases on balls in play. With two exceptions, the top 20 is filled with players who struggled to steal bases but excelled in running them.

Of the top 20 differences, only Barry Bonds and Moises Alou possess a baserunning disparity driven by a positive wSB and negative UBR. Strangely enough, by 2002 both players had already seen a decline in their stolen base totals. Nonetheless, each managed to accrue positive value via thievery, only to give it back (and then some) throughout the course of their time on the base paths.

Ultimately, there exists a relatively easy solution for players who hurt their teams via the stolen base: stop attempting steals. By minimizing their exposure to negative outcomes in base stealing, players can maximize their baserunning value. Unfortunately for players who possess a negative UBR, there is no simple solution. While players can minimize their stolen bases attempted, they cannot avoid the daily labor of running the bases. For most of the “anomalous” players in the table above, a small tweak of strategy could have improved their value over time. In the case of David DeJesus, a league average wSB could have saved his teams close to 20 runs — roughly 2 wins. Although hitting and defense deserve the attention they receive, WAR’s baserunning components play a fascinating role in player valuation.

Statistics courtesy of FanGraphs and Baseball-Reference.