This post is inspired by this fine post, which was inspired by this fine post. While this post would be more interesting with more data (pre-2013, is it out there?), I invite you to look a little bit more at how infield shifts might be affecting some players who changed teams this offseason.

The teams of the NL East, as noted by scotman144, conservatively used infield shifts in 2013, combining to just simply match the league’s most furious shifters, the Orioles. The NL in general avoided shifting, as NL teams combined for 9 of the bottom 10 spots in the Jeff Zimmerman-provided rankings. So perhaps, if all of these teams continue their shift-cynical ways, the ideas which I am about to hypothesize will hold merit.

I filtered the data on “WHICH PLAYERS HIT INTO THE MOST SHIFTS AND THE EFFECT ON THEIR BABIP?” to find out which players had the greatest discrepancy between BABIP with shift on vs BABIP with shift off. Then I limited the data to only those who had more than a few times having hit into the shift. Obviously small sample sizes are at play here so it would be nice to look at 2012 and prior data as well.

Jarrod Saltalamacchia hit into the shift 90 times last year with a 0.300 BABIP. His non-shift BABIP? .416. So perhaps his BABIP luck last year will regress, but so may his number of times seeing a shift, which could be good for his prospects in Miami.

Curtis Granderson missed a lot of time last year but when he did play he almost constantly got the shaft, er I mean shift. I wonder if he realized how much this was hurting his BABIP (shifted BABIP = 0.256, career BABIP = .303) and consciously moved to the NL East for this reason. If so, kudos to him or his agent.

Seth Smith also got shifted on quite a bit, at the tune of a .257 BABIP with shifts on. He hit an astounding .339 without the shift. Lastly I’d like to mention Robinson Cano, who, despite being shifted on 85 times last year, barely saw any noticeable difference in his BABIP with or without the shift. Take that shift! I’d like to see Cano try to grow a beard now that he’s out from under the the fascist anti-beard boot of the Yankees.

Do you want some more AL East shift data to chew on? Well take out your Red Man and munch on this: Carlos Beltran and Alfonso Soriano didn’t quite like their experiences of getting shifted on. Carlos got it 71 times for a .268 BABIP, where Fonz got it 62 times for a .274 BABIP. Both of these players should see nice HR bumps but let’s not discount the potential for a low shift-related BABIP for these players moving to the AL East full-time. I expect AL East teams to continue to shift aggressively — the data suggests they all ought to be doing it more. Perhaps this is the year NL teams start to shift more as well, but you never know?

This article was inspired by the phenomenal work on 2013 shift data at THT by Jeff Zimmerman:
http://www.hardballtimes.com/expanded-2013-infield-shift-data/

Brian McCann’s 5 year 85MM signing by the Yankees has been noted as a pretty good deal as far as Free Agent contracts go. I do not necessarily disagree since he brings leadership and not wholly quantifiable defensive contributions as a marquee catcher. He posted an ISO above the .200 mark in 2013 for the first time since 2009 and reached 20HR for the 7th time in 8 seasons despite only playing in 102 games due to injury. His generally above average OBP rebounded from a career low .300 in 2012 to .336. His heinous .234 babip from 2012 regressed upward somewhat back to .261. While there are many outward signs that his 2013 bounce back re-established him as a premier offensive contributor (122 wRC+) there are some other numbers that give me pause about his future in New York.

I found Jeff Zimmerman’s 2013 infield shift data article fascinating in so many different ways but one of the major takeaways that I got from it was the disparity of shifting frequency across MLB divisions. Granted, a division with more extreme ground ball pulling shift candidates may lead to more shifts. However, the league leading Orioles had 470 shifts implemented on ball in play events compared to just 473 shifts in the ENTIRE NL EAST in 2013 (108 of those 473 NL East shifts were implemented by the Braves). Overall there were 1800 ball in play shift events in the AL East in 2013 compared to 473 shifts in the NL East. 11 of the top 15 shifting teams in 2013 MLB were AL clubs. (AL East teams are #’s 1,2,6,8,16 overall in # of 2013 shifts)

This is where Mr. McCann and his offensive future comes in: Brian McCann hit into 123 shifts out of 402 PA (30% of PA) in 2013. He hit .179 on balls in play against the shift and .299 when the shift was not on. For comparison David Ortiz hit into 338 shifts in 2013 in 600 PA (56% of PA). Obviously there are smaller than ideal samples in this data and we all know babip fluctuates wildly. That being said the shift deflated McCann’s babip to some degree unquestionably last season and probably has been doing so for a while (I’d love to see this data for 2012, 2011 etc. broken out by batter).

If generally shift-conservative NL East teams were exploiting this aspect of McCann’s game then you can bet he’ll see even more shifts in the shift-happy AL East and across the AL in general. McCann’s GB/FB distribution has stayed slanted toward FB throughout his career around a 0.88 ratio. He has seen his babip decline like most MLB veterans do post-peak. There’s a good chance that his babip will continue to decline and perhaps quite precipitously upon his move to the AL East.

I’ll end this article with an intentionally scary and possibly not totally fair comparison since it’s a strictly left handed hitter compared to a switch hitter: McCann’s career line is .277/.350/.473 with a .289 babip and 0.88 GB/FB ratio. Mark Teixeira’s Left Handed Hitting career line is .267/.359/.518 with a .277 babip and 0.87 GB/FB ratio. If McCann’s batting average/babip were to decline at a similarly faster than normal rate like Teixeira’s I’d blame those shifty AL rivals. The short porch in New York may create some extra HRs but the AL East defensive environment could take those gains away and then some on balls in play.

It will be interesting to compare the 2014 shift data to the 2013 season and see which teams decided to implement the shift more and less frequently. The caveat must also be mentioned that not all shifts are created equal and some teams were much more effective at converting shift balls in play into outs than others. Does that have to do with superior personnel/positioning?

Thanks again to Jeff Zimmerman for the inspired shift research that made this piece possible.

Who will anchor the back end of the rotation?

The Royals are a good team that may be on the verge of being a great team. The 86 wins by the Royals last year were very solid and a lot of that success came from solid pitching. The Royals led the American League in ERA during 2013, but even with the top ERA there were problems with the rotation. These rotation issues may be expanded on in 2014, as the Royals let Ervin Santana leave during free agency. They have signed Jason Vargas and are looking for support from their strong minor league system, both of which will keep the Royals in the playoff hunt throughout the season. James Shields, the aforementioned Vargas, and Jeremy Guthrie are solid if not stable arms at the top of the rotation, but before the Royals can be seen as a true competitor for the playoffs, they have to figure out the back end of their rotation.

Bruce Chen has been in the major leagues for 15 years and has only started 30 games twice, has had an ERA over 5 seven times in his career, and has played for 9 different teams. Yet, as the 2014 season begins, a playoff competitor is relying on him to be a vital part to their success. These statistics are completely true and Chen should not be completely trusted and the Royals need to find a good way to have him fit in the scheme of their whole pitching staff. Chen was successful last year as a swing man, as he started 15 games and pitched in 19 other ones last year out of the bullpen. In fact, when you look at the splits for Chen from the 2013 season, it is revealed that he was most effective when he pitched every 3 or 4 days, and as a starter he averaged 5.8 innings per start and 1.7 per appearance as a reliever.

This year begins with the Royals keeping Chen as their number 4 starter. Chen has an ERA of 4.53 in the seasons during his career wherein he was primarily a starter, which compares closely to his career 4.49 ERA. A very good thing for the Royals is that in the past 4 years, Chen has pretty much been a league average starter and has averaged 24 starts a season. What is very foreboding for Chen is that he had a career high fly ball rate in 2013, paired with a career low ground ball rate and home run rate. A big question for 2014 is if the fly balls turn into home runs. Chen has always been a fly ball pitcher, but there is a huge difference between allowing 11% of fly balls to be home runs and 7% of fly balls to be home runs, especially if 52% of hits are fly balls; in fact, it was the difference of 10 home runs.

If this trend can continue, he could really help the Royals; a good omen is that in 3 of Chen’s 5 seasons in Kansas City, he has had a single digit home run/fly ball ratio. It really is a mixed bag for Chen, as a below average starter became a very good swing man last year. There are a lot of good young starters in the minor league system for the Royals and it might not be a bad idea for Chen to piggy back some of those young pitchers as they gain their footing in the big leagues.

Danny Duffy is one of the good young pitchers that the Royals are waiting on to bloom. Duffy has had a very spotty and injury riddled three year career in the big leagues. After a disastrous 20 starts in 2011, Duffy has only pitched 52 innings in the majors and has had some very odd trends. His strikeout rate has gone up over the past two years, but that has been at the expense of his control, as he is walking a hitter more per nine, leading to his strikeout to walk rate being better in a season where he had a 5.64 ERA than in parts of two seasons where he had a 2.94 ERA. He has become more of a fly ball pitcher, as a pitcher trending to strikeout more batters would, but two other statistics are indicators that Duffy may have some issues. His line drive percentage was up 6% last year from 2012 and he allowed no home runs even though he allowed 26 fly balls to the outfield as compared to 1 to the infield.

Those ratios would say that hitters are making solid contact and that balls may end up going over the wall. When combined with the fact that Duffy allows 5 walks per 9 innings, there is a lot to worry about in regards to avoid big innings. What is even more of a problem is that Duffy has only pitched 100 innings twice in a season since he was drafted in 2007. For the Royals to expect 150-175 innings out of Duffy he would need to double the amount of innings he pitched last year; and this is a player with an injury history that needs to also be examined. Duffy is a good pitcher and that is why the Royals have been patient with him, but the 25 year old lefty needs to show progress this year before he is passed in the organization by pitchers like Kyle Zimmer and Yordano Ventura.

There are other ways that the Royals can try to fix the back end of their rotation, one of which that will be discussed in a bit, but the Royals will first give the chance to Chen and Duffy to hold down the back of the rotation. Both have had success in the past and should be able to help the Royals this season. There are a couple pitchers waiting in the wings it they do fail and that depth is why the Royals rotation should not fall off much from the 2013 season. In fact, considering how ineffective Wade Davis and Luis Mendoza were, the rotation may even be better in 2014.

When will Yordano Ventura make it to the major leagues to stay?

The diminutive Dominican Ventura has been in the Royals system since 2008 when he signed at 17 and he has made an impact as a high strikeout pitcher and is the Royals prospect that is the closest to the major leagues. As Ventura has progressed, many have questioned his size yet no one has questioned his talent and Ventura made three starts for the Royals at the end of the 2013 season. The important thing now is finding a role for Ventura and seeing how he can help the Royals for the future and what role is best for him.

Yordano Ventura has defied his size issues and has developed into one of the better power pitching prospects in minor league baseball. On top of that, his walk rate has only been over 10% in a six start stint in AA in 2012. There are many pitchers that are deemed power pitchers and we accept that and assume that they will strike out a bunch of hitters; Ventura’s stuff does not need assumption, he throws 98 on average with a curveball, cutter, and changeup. His cutter may need a lot of work, but Ventura is ready to be a very good major league reliever just based on his curveball and, especially, his fastball. Those are out pitches and if the Royals do have an injury in their elite bullpen, Ventura could fill in the gaps of the bullpen.

That is not the long term vision that the Royals have for the talented righty. In fact, GM Dayton Moore came out last week and said that Ventura will be available for up to 200 innings this year. The Royals have not been shy to stretch out Ventura’s arm throughout his career, as he has started about 20 games a season in the past three seasons. What is very smart for the Royals is that they have waited for Ventura to progress through each level before they moved him to the next level of the minor leagues rather than rush him. He struggled a bit in AA in 2012 and the Royals sent him back to Northwest Arkansas to begin the 2013 and succeed their before moving him to AAA Omaha. In the same way, it would make sense for the Royals to figure out which role they need most from Ventura for the 2014 season and have him work either out of the rotation or the bullpen in Omaha rather than learn the ropes of the majors.

Ventura averages about 5 innings pitched per game in the minor leagues and the Royals need to get that closer to 6 innings before he moves up to the big leagues. He also threw 16 pitches per inning in the major leagues, which is not terrible for a pitcher that strikes out as many batters as Ventura does. The best sign for Ventura, even more than the high strikeout rate, was that while in the majors he allowed a good amount of groundballs. He did allow 3 home runs in the 15.1 innings with the Royals, which is not a great omen, but there are so many other good factors that there is every reason to believe that Ventura will positively affect the 2014 Royals. The best thing for Ventura is to be in the minor leagues until early June, both helping the Royals assess what role they see Ventura fill at the big league level and so that he saves a year in arbitration.

In the end, Ventura is a high talent and the Royals will find a way to maximize his skill set. The repertoire that Ventura features would make him an instant impact arm out of the bullpen, but the Royals want to see if there is more from Ventura than just being a vital one inning arm. This will be a key plotline to watch unfold during this season and throughout Ventura’s young career.

How does Norichika Aoki impact the Royals lineup?

As an older average hitter that is above average at some skills, yet not spectacular at any skill, Aoki was vastly underappreciated in Milwaukee. Also, Khris Davis coming up from the minor leagues and showing a good amount of power and Ryan Braun coming back from a PED ban made Aoki quite expendable with the Brewers; the team was very willing to trade Aoki and the Royals were quite happy to extend an offer. Trading away the equally expendable Will Smith, the Royals landed a new leadoff hitter and a table setter for the RBI guys beneath him

The 2013 Royals were a good team that was missing an essential piece to a winning team — a leadoff hitter, and Aoki will fill that void very well. Since coming over to the United States, Aoki has shown that he will get on base 35% of the time, steal 25 bases a year, and play an excellent right field. This is vital for the Royals as right field was also a dead zone for the Royals in 2013. All of these are the positives for Aoki, but he did have some issues last year as compared to his rookie year. The 32 year old had a drop off in his power stats, as his slugging percentage dropped by 63 points. By getting 21 more hits in 2013 as compared to 2012, essentially Aoki hit singles where he was hitting doubles in 2012. This could be an issue, but the Royals just need to make sure that Aoki gets on base and is working the count at the top of the lineup.

Aoki is one of the toughest players in the majors strike out and did boost his walks during the 2013 season. The Royals are not asking for Aoki to do more than what is in his skill set and if he is able to do that, the team will be very good for it. His solid on base percentage and ability to create contact will be a huge boost to the top of the lineup. If his BABIP could creep into the .310-.315 as well, Aoki could even be a 200 hit guy for the team; the Royals knew what they got when they traded for Aoki and filled a lot of holes in what was a playoff contender. On top of the good addition of Aoki, the Royals added Omar Infante, which will also make Aoki a 110-115 run scoring threat.

Evidence through history shows that winning teams usually make at least one trade where they have good foresight to fill a huge need; the Royals did just this by adding Aoki to the team. Along with Omar Infante at the top of the lineup, Aoki will add value to the team as a tough out and create issues for defenses as a high contact hitter. The Royals lineup lacked a true leadoff hitter last year and the addition of Aoki may be the difference needed to make them a playoff team.

What can the Royals expect from Mike Moustakas?

The second pick of the 2007 draft out of high school in California, high expectations have abounded with Moustakas since he was drafted. Those expectations went even higher when, as a 21, he had 77 extra base hits between AA and AAA while cutting down his strikeouts by 23. The Royals felt that they had the third baseman of their future and Moustakas was a top 10 prospect coming into the season. In the 375 games that Moustakas has been in the big leagues, though, that promise has not been fulfilled and the Royals have exherted a lot of effort towards giving the proper opportunities to the high touted Moustakas. He is still young and for that reason the team will continue to allow him to develop, but there are a couple issues with his performance that need clearing up before he can become a star.

After his amazing 2010 season, Moustakas was called up to the big leagues and really has struggled since that point. The power that he exhibited during the 2010 season has been see in spurts during his tenure in Kansas City, most notably during the 2012 season, but there have been so many other issues with him that the Royals have consistently had to make excuses for him. In fact, his defense has really been the thing that has kept him in the good graces of the Royals brass, as he has rounded into a very good defensive third baseman. Since a poor 2011 season, Moustakas’ on base percentage has lowered each year, even with his walk rate raising.

An interesting observation is that Moustakas has seen less fastballs over the past two years and has struggled with off speed pitches. A fair guess is that in the minors Moustakas saw mostly fastballs and he maximized his opportunities against the four seam fastball. He has seen 8-10% less four seam fastballs and less sinkers as well over the past two years and has seen more sliders, curveballs, and changeups. Moustakas needs to adjust his approach at the plate to stay back on off speed pitches and possibly work to be more of a doubles hitter than a power hitter. It is a good thing for his future that his walk rate is getting better, but he will continue to struggle if he is not able to identify pitches and lower his strikeout rate.

His fly ball/home run ratio was a bit down during the 2013 season from where he was in 2012 and possibly if that gets a bit better, Moustakas may be able to inch up to 20 home runs again. The best situation for Moustakas is to not try to hit the ball out of the ballpark, continue to build up his line drive rate and become more of a 40 double player rather than a 30 home run hitter. His approach at the plate is way out of whack and, just from watching him, it appears that unless the pitcher is explicitly tipping his pitch, he is not able to identify a curveball from a slider or a changeup from a fastball. He needs to continue to work on pitch recognition and if he is able to improve on that, he will be around a .260 hitter with 20-25 home runs and 30-35 doubles at his peak.

The situation of Mike Moustakas is very similar to many prospects, a team sees that there is promise with a player and just assumes that the production shown in the minor leagues can effortlessly transfer to the major leagues. If Mike Moustakas were to look for advice on how to properly adjust to the big leagues, he need not look further than his own dugout with Alex Gordon. He needs to work on what his talent set lends him to and not try to exert extra effort into things that are outside of his skill set. It is too early in his career to make any broad assumptions on his production, but at this point Moustakas is just a work in progress.

Why are the Royals going to win 87 games?

This is a team that has been on the verge of breaking out and being a playoff team and 2014 should be the season that all of the promise for the Royals comes to life. The second half of Eric Hosmer’s 2013 showed that he could be a star for the 2014 season and the Royals lineup should be very strong throughout. The addition of Norichika Aoki has been detailed in this article and he is one of the more underrated players in baseball and should be a great addition to the team as a leadoff hitter that is a table setter for the RBI guys behind him. There is not a lot of power in the lineup, but there are a couple guys in the lineup that have 20-25 home run power, which should provide enough offense to fuel a successful season.

As for pitching, James Shields will anchor what should be a stable rotation. There is not a pitcher in the rotation that is particularly exciting other than Shields, but Bruce Chen, Jeremy Guthrie, and Jason Vargas are innings eaters that will serve their purpose through the season. The rotation may not even need to be that awesome through the season, though, because the Royals have a very deep and elite bullpen, anchored by Greg Holland. At some point this season Yordano Ventura will be on the major league roster as well and should positively affect the team either in the bullpen or the rotation. This team will be a team to watch for the 2014 season and should play into October.

5 You Know:
1. Billy Butler
2. Alex Gordon
3. James Shields
4. Eric Hosmer
5. Jeremy Guthrie

5 You Will Know:
1. Yordano Ventura
2. Kyle Zimmer
3. Jason Adam
4. Sean Manaea
5. Miguel Almonte

5 You Should Remember:
1. Bubba Starling
2. Hunter Dozier
3. Adalberto Mondesi
4. Christian Binford
5. Jorge Bonifacio

Leading up to Spring Training for the St. Louis Cardinals, there were plenty of articles written about the incredible starting pitching depth of the Cardinals. They had seven legitimate options for the rotation, and it wasn’t a stretch to say eight. While there was always going to be competition in the rotation, Jaime Garcia’s injury opens up a much more focused competition for the Cardinals’ 5^th rotation spot. The four locks for the rotation are Adam Wainwright, Lance Lynn, Shelby Miller and Michael Wacha. While another pitcher could join the discussion, the battle for the final spot is essentially between Joe Kelly and Carlos Martinez. There really is no clear favorite, as Kelly is the incumbent, but Martinez carries much greater upside. The pitcher that fails to capture the 5^th slot in the rotation will likely serve as a late-inning reliever for the Cardinals, which may influence the Cardinals’ decision.

Based off Joe Kelly’s impressive performance last season it would be easy to assume he is the favorite to be the 5^th starter; however, his advanced metrics do not support his traditional statistics. While Kelly pitched to a 10-5 record with a 2.69 ERA, he had an FIP of 4.01 and an unsustainable 82.4 Left on Base % (LOB%). Joe Kelly also possesses a power sinker in the mid-90s, a plus change-up and solid-average curveball. Despite this power repertoire, Kelly has never struck out many batters, as he has a career K/9 of just 6.00. This is not overly concerning, but does leave Kelly vulnerable to high variability in performance, since he is so heavily dependent upon his defense.

I have, to this point, only pointed out Kelly’s weaknesses in order tamper expectations, but in reality, Kelly is a very talented starter. Kelly is a very strong groundball pitcher (career 51.4%), which has helped him limit his Hr/9 (career .78). To this point in his career, Kelly has done a great job of limiting runs, which is all that is really important. In 2013, Kelly allowed just 3.05 runs per 9 innings. The Cardinals certainly know the concerns with Kelly, but they are also aware of his upside. While Kelly is likely to serve as a late-inning option for the Cardinals if he is not named their 5^th starter, he has not been as effective as a reliever. In an admittedly small sample of just 37 innings in 2013, Kelly carried a 3.65 ERA and an opponent’s slash line of .284/.342/.435 as a reliever.

Now looking at Carlos Martinez, it is clear that Martinez is the starter with much more upside, as he can consistently reach triple digits and strike out nearly 9 batters per 9 innings. In a tiny sample of 28 1/3 innings at the Big League level last year, Martinez pitched to a 5.08 ERA, but a much better 3.08 FIP. Most of those innings came in relief, as he made just one start in the Majors, but he was still very impressive. While Martinez’s ERA was high, he was hurt by a high BABIP of .345 and a low LOB% of just 64.9%. Despite carrying substantial upside, Martinez has never thrown more than 108 IP in a professional season, which raises concerns about his ability to handle a starter’s workload for a full season. Also, unlike Kelly, Martinez is likely to thrive in a late-inning relief role, as he carried a 2.33 FIP in 23 2/3 IP as a reliever. If the two pitchers have similar evaluations at the end of spring training, then I believe Martinez will be relegated to the bullpen where he can thrive and further develop as an MLB pitcher.

While it may seem that Kelly is the front-runner to be the Cardinals’ 5^th starter, it is clear that each starter has plenty of positives and negatives. Kelly’s negative traits largely revolve around regression to the mean in many areas, such as LOB% and ERA. Whereas Martinez’s positives are very similar to his negatives, as there are many questions about how well he will do as a starter full time. It is always nice to dream on a player’s potential and stuff, he must also prove he can be effective in his role and Martinez has not yet done that. This will be a fun competition to watch in spring training. I believe Kelly will come out of spring training as the Cardinals’ 5^th starter because he has proven he can perform as a starter, but also because he is not as strong a fit for the bullpen. If Martinez is not named the 5^th starter, he can still be a lights out reliever, whereas, Kelly may not be as effective in such a role.

When Robinson Cano signed his 10-year, $240 million deal with the Seattle Mariners, it validated two things: (1) that the going rate for players who can consistently put up +5 WAR is at least $200 million, and (2) a second baseman who can hit like a first baseman is extremely valuable. There aren’t a lot of second baseman in the league who have the 30-homer, .500+ slugging percentage, and .316+ ISO, seasons that Cano does.

Second baseman aren’t considered to be players who have an excess of power. You can make an argument for guys like Ian Kinsler and Dan Uggla. However, neither is the player he used to be. Uggla is a shell of his former self, who can run into a dinger every now and then, but he’s not going to return to the power threat that he once was. While Kinsler has shown some above-average power for a second baseman, most of that power can be attributed to the friendly confines of  The Ballpark in Arlington. Kinsler’s power has also been waning over the past three years, as both his home run totals and slugging percentage have been in decline.

Kinsler’s Power Stats

2011: HR 32, SLG .477,  ISO .223

2012: HR 19, SLG .423, ISO .166

2013: HR 13, SLG .413,  ISO .136

Kinsler is obviously declining as a power threat, and the change from The Ballpark at Arlington to Comerica Park will probably not be kind to him, either. However, just because Kinsler is not hitting for above-average power doesn’t mean that he’s not a valuable second baseman. Kinsler can still hit for some power, and his glove is decent enough to make him one of the better second basemen in the game.

Uggla’s value is derived from his ability to draw walks and hit home runs. He has always had  trouble making contact, which in return drove down his OBP, making power the main reason he was good.

Uggla’s Power Stats

2011: HR 36, SLG .453, ISO .220

2012: HR 19, SLG .384, ISO .164

2013: HR 22, SLG .362, ISO .183

Like Kinsler, Uggla’s power has declined. However, this is to be expected given that he is 34 years old. What is more concerning is Uggla’s decline in slugging percentage, as he has had sub .400 slugging percentages for the past two years.  In both his 2012 and 2013 season, Uggla’s value derived solely from dingers. Uggla has  become a one-dimensional player when it comes to his bat.

Despite that two of the most powerful second basemen in baseball are declining in power, there remains hope in the form of the San Diego Padres’ new, young second baseman Jedd Gyorko.

Gyorko has the potential power of a first baseman. Last year, he hit 23 home runs, had a slugging percentage of .444, and ISO of .200. Considering that he was playing in Petco Park, which decreases homers by 13% for right-handers, his 2013 campaign was very impressive.

ZiPS and Steamer project Gyorko to hit between 20-25 homers next year, and to be somewhere between a +2.5 – 3.5 WAR player. Even if Gyorko’s 2014 campaign mirrors conservative projections, he is still going to be a top-10 second baseman.

Gyorko does comes with flaws. There are definitely some holes in his swing, which make him prone to strikeouts. He also is not going to have a high OBP. Gyorko is going to be a powerful bat with a decent glove, which recalls Uggla. Uggla has certainly had his struggles, and it’s not looking like he will turn things around. However, previously he was similar to what Gyorko appears to be: decent glove, above-average power.

Many of those who follow baseball — front offices, fans, certain baseball writers — seem to have profiles for positions. First basemen, third basemen and corner outfielders are thought of as powerful. Shortstops, center fielders  and second basemen are thought of as  having quick hands and being speedy. However, a player like Gyorko is valuable because he sets himself apart from the typical second baseman profile. Instead of being speedy and hitting for a high average, he’s powerful. Second basemen that hit like first baseman are rare, and that’s why Gyorko is a special player.

The Milwaukee Brewers have had a really quiet off season. Just how quiet? They only signed two players to major league contracts. For a team that needed a lot of help, two major league signings doesn’t seem like a lot. However, they did get a lot of help this off season. The other teams in the NL Central have failed to make a splash big enough to make the central a three team race again, and this is a potential opening for the Brewers to move in.

The Brewers were, and are, not expected to make a playoffs appearance during the 2014 season, but is that really true? They could. They very well could, and here’s how:

First, the three other teams who made the playoffs last season have regressed. The Cincinnati Reds have not done anything to improve. They lost their, arguably, two most important players to free agency in Bronson Arroyo and Shin-Soo Choo. The two players combined for an even six wins above replacement. Their replacements (Billy Hamilton and Tony Cingrani) have a combined WAR of 2.9, a 3.1 difference! Albeit, the two players have not been major players in 2013 having spent most of the season in the minors, but that is more reason to be concerned. Who knows how two second year major leaguers with little experience under their belt will do to replace two All-Star caliber players. Will the loss of Choo and Arroyo hurt the Reds? Of course! And Hamilton and Cingrani may not be the best replacements for a team who won one of the NL Wild Card spots in 2013.

The other team who didn’t make moves AND who won the NL Wild Card series, the Pittsburgh Pirates, is in a tougher boat. They lost several key players in Marlon Byrd, Justin Morneau, and A.J. Burnett and they replaced them with, well, nothing really. The only major league signing that the Buccos pulled off was for Edinson Volquez who had an absolutely atrocious season in 2013 and is the least likely replacement for an ace. Plus, first base and right field are still questions with no viable replacements at those positions. So does this mean that the Pirates will be out of the playoffs? I don’t think that the front office will go down without a fight. They want to appease their fan base and they still have many pieces in place to win over 80 games again, but unless they upgrade the rotation, first base, and left field, they are not going anywhere.

The final team and NL Central winners are perhaps in the best shape to make the playoffs again. The St. Louis Cardinals have done enough to maintain their dominance in the central. With Jhonny Peralta and Peter Bourjos in the fold including dominant young players such as Oscar Taveras and Michael Wacha, the Cards are looking like they will win another central title. But the Brewers might have something to say.

Other than the Cardinals, the Brewers have made the most important moves to improve their ballclub for 2014. They addressed all of their issues: The rotation, first base, and a left handed relief pitcher (according to ESPN). The rotation was fixed momentously with the addition of Matt Garza. Garza, one of the most sought after starters during free agency, will help to form a powerful front three rotation. With Kyle Lohse and Yovani Gallardo leading the way and Marco Estrada and Tyler Thornburg rounding things out, the Brew Crew’s rotation is looking like it can compete with the best of them. Plus, the addition of Garza helps to address another issue. Will Smith, a lefty who was acquired in the Norichika Aoki trade, will move to the bullpen. Here, the Brewers are able to add to an already strong bullpen that features a strong back-end and now a stable and reliable left handed pitcher.

Although the Brewers never signed a first basemen to a major league deal, the ones that they were able to acquire will impact the ball club in many ways. Mark Reynolds and Lyle Overbay will help what was a weakness for the Crew last season. Their combination of power, defense, ability to platoon, and familiarity to the NL Central and other leagues will impact the Brewers as if they had signed a major league contract. Plus, the Brewers have many great players in place at other positions. Jean Segura, Carlos Gomez, Jonathan Lucroy, and even Ryan Braun will make a formidable lineup while young players like Khris Davis and Scooter Gennett have shown that they can play at the major league level.

Overall, the Brewers are a much better team and are starting to look much better than the 2013 season. They have addressed all of their pieces while other teams in the NL Central have regressed. Although the Brew Crew may not make the playoffs, as many predict, they will cause havoc and surely improve from the 74-88 record they posted last season.

Ubaldo Jimenez: Check.

Suk-min Yoon: Check.

A.J. Burnett: Check.

Ervin Santana: Nope.

The first three names have all signed contracts within a week and a half, the last one has not. Ervin Santana, a top 50 free agent according to many, is still unsigned and, according to MLB Trade Rumors top 50 free agents list, the only starting pitcher unsigned. So what does that mean for Santana? Well, it means that he may garner a large contract with a large sum of money from a desperate team, or he’ll be robbed of what he’s actually worth. Steve Adams of MLB Trade Rumors predicted that Santana would receive a 75 million dollar contract over five years. Pretty good by any standards, but most likely not what he will get. Jimenez received 50 million while Matt Garza received 50 million as well only weeks ago, while Ricky Nolasco early on in the winter received a 49 million dollar contract. Of course, the annual average salary varies for each player, the highest guarantee salary is 25 million less than that predicted for Santana. So although he may still receive his projected 75 million, the likelihood of that happening looks slim. At this point in the stage, a four year deal seems logical, but I think with an annual salary of ~12 million, perhaps less. Although his career numbers and career in general don’t garner a salary like this, teams will match this price, or exceed it, in order to fill a hole.

The fact that Santana, and many other free agents, took so long to sign does not bode well with the player’s association and reflects negatively on the qualifying offer. The fact that a team is passing over a player with ties to a draft pick means A) that teams value their picks more so than ever and B) that the ability to win now is not as important as the future. Let me explain.

Option A makes sense. Many teams have depleted farm systems a la the New York Yankees and the Los Angeles Angels, so restocking their farm system and building towards the future (whether that be future trades, future post season aspirations, etc) is a viable, and necessary, option for all teams whereas option B is only for a few teams. Not every team is in a position to win now, so signing a player tied to their draft picks would be a lose-lose, but then you have the other teams who can win, and can win now. The Yankees clearly have attested to this. They have signed players tied to draft picks and thus lost those picks, but they are in an excellent position to win now, and for the future. You see, since a team loses a draft pick, they are obligated, but not obliged, to sign players to long term deals in order to make the signing worth wile. The Seattle Mariners believe this as do the aforementioned Yankees.

Thus the qualifying offer, although in place to help players which it does, can hurt teams and players alike. Teams can’t make respectable offers to players without losing their draft picks, and if they do, they tend to offer the player more money than he is worth. While the players, on the other hand, receive large paydays and security for their families, they do have to wait for a team to take a chance on him, if they even want to and lose their draft pick. And Santana perfectly reflects this. The notion that a team in need of a player (the Toronto Blue Jays for example) is not willing to offer a worthwhile deal to a player because they need the picks, while the player has to hope that what he receives is a viable, and legitimate, contract.

In conclusion: I do not like the qualifying offer. It ruins a team’s ability to sign a free agent while at the same time makes a player less valuable since his is tied to a draft pick.

So last year in my 10-Team, 35 man roster, dynasty fantasy baseball league, I found myself in need of some starting pitching after the first two months of the season. I was last in my league in quality starts, and near the bottom in ERA and WHIP. Manny Machado was my cornerstone 3^rd baseman, and he was hitting a fiery .355 for the month of May. For how good he is, I did not believe he was a batting title contender, so was interested in seeing what I could get for him.

Enter Justin Verlander. The Tigers’ ace, (at the time) had a 1.83 ERA and was 3-2 in April, and had hit a rough spot in May where he surrendered 16 ER in 12.2 innings. After going 17-8 with 239 K’s in 2012, I felt like this was a great time to buy low on the guy, while selling high on Machado. So I traded the Orioles’ phenom for the Mr. Kate Upton. Well, safe to say, that WAS NOT the trade that ended up winning me the league. From the end of May forward, Verlander posted a 3.36 ERA for the remainder of the season and was walking batters like it was the cool thing to do, posting a 3.07 BB/9 (which is AWFUL for him). He ended the season with a 3.46 ERA and only 13 wins, which were his worst totals in those categories since 2008. This isn’t an argument against Machado’s lack of offensive ability, which I will discuss at a later date. Instead, I will be telling you why Verlander’s performance last season was a fluke, and he will regain his Cy Young form in 2014.

As pitchers age, they usually lose a little oomph on their fastball. People will probably look at Verlander and assume this is the reason why he was less effective in 2013.

Based on the table above, you can see how he has lost some velocity on his fastball. For more detail, follow this link to view his velocity charts for 2013 and compare it to his prior years. If you notice, in his first five starts of 2013, his fastball average was hovering around the 93 mph mark, well below his average of the last four years, 95.2 mph. In those first five starts, Verlander posted an ERA of 1.83, had a K/9 of 9.38, WHIP of 1.19, and held batters to a .242 average. Even with a fastball that seems to be slowing down, Verlander has still found a way to retire batters, and more importantly, still strike them out. So the argument that his fastball is becoming “too hittable” isn’t necessarily correct.

BABIP, for those of you who don’t know, is the percentage of time that if a batter makes contact with a ball and puts it in the field of play, it will go for a hit. Generally, the league average for hitters falls somewhere between .290-.310. But there are plenty of factors that can influence BABIP, such as a player’s skill, defense behind a pitcher, and our good friend LUCK. More on that in a moment, but first, let’s establish what factors influenced Verlander’s BABIP. From 2008-2012, Verlander had an average BABIP of .282, which is below the league’s average range of .290-.310. Based on this sample size, we can assume Verlander’s skill set is above the mean for pitcher. Secondly, Defense. According to baseballreference.com, the Detroit Tigers ranked 12^th out of 15 AL teams last year in errors and double plays. On a more optimistic note, they were 4^th in fielding %. Those numbers indicate that they were a mediocre, at best, defensive team, which would cause Verlander’s BABIP to slightly increase toward the league mean. Lastly, we don’t have a way to measure luck, but Verlander’s 2013 BABIP was way above his recent average of .282, sitting at .316.

Point being, there were too many balls that were put in play that fell for hits considering all the conditions I stated above for Verlander.

It was not just his inflated BABIP that led to a down year in 2013 for Verlander. He posted a five-year high in BB/9, at 3.09. When you walk people and then give up hits, runners are bound to score. In 77.2 innings in June and July of last year he walked 33 batters. In the final 97.2 innings of last season and the playoffs, he only walked a combined 22 batters. He was able to regain his control in the second half that he had lost mid-way through 2013. I think the control he demonstrated toward the end of 2013 will carry over into 2014.

One more random stat to consider: Verlander’s IFH% (infield hit percentage) for his career sits at 5.9%. Last season, that stat jumped up to a recent high at 8.3%. Reasons for that stat being high could result from the inefficiencies of Miguel Cabrera at 3^rd base, or inconsistent defense of Jhonny Peralta. The Tigers now have the more athletic Nick Castellanos at 3^rd, and made a mid-season trade last year for Jose Iglesias. Both of those additions provide upgrades defensively for the Tigers compared to last year.

With everything that I’ve discussed, this guy is being way undervalued in fantasy drafts this year, going in the 5^th or 6^th rounds depending on the format. If you can grab him in the 4^th over guys like Zach Greinke or Madison Bumgarner, I would do so. He still strikes people out at a high rate, posting 217 K’s last year. Also, don’t forget that he pitches for a team with one of the most potent offenses in the game. When Verlander’s BABIP regresses, his improved defense and control kicks in, he will regain his righteousness.

At first, I thought of beginning this with a game of blind resume, but c’mon! You read the title! Not only did you read the title, when you did so you more than likely had one of two reactions. If you are a sabermetrics enthusiast, perhaps your first thought was of two relatively comparable pitchers in terms of effectiveness. If traditional statistics are more of your thing, or if you’re Jack Zduriencik, this comparison would seem highly ridiculous to you. However, are these two players, Weaver and Volquez, really all that different? Well, once you strip away all of the labels, preconceived notions, and flaw-laden statistics, the answer may just be that no, they aren’t.

Let me begin this by acknowledging that Jered Weaver is inarguably more accomplished than Edinson Volquez. His highs have been higher, and his lows not nearly as low. Player evaluation isn’t about the past, however, it’s about the future, and a closer look suggests that the future may in fact be brighter for Volquez than for Weaver. ERA may not be a completely useless statistic, after all, what is more important for a pitcher than avoiding the allowance of runs, but it certainly is no good at predicting future pitching success. So yes, while Weaver’s ERA of 3.27 suggests he is an ace, and Volquez’s mark of 5.71 suggests he shouldn’t even be in the league, xFIP, a stat far superior to ERA when it comes to forecasting what the future holds, tells an entirely different story. Believe it or not, despite the massive disparity in ERA, it was Volquez who possessed the stronger xFIP last season at 4.07 to Weaver’s 4.31. It is interesting that once the variable that is team defense is removed, the two pitchers now appear remarkably similar. Additionally, SIERA paints a similar picture. While Weaver’s number is slightly better in this case, 4.22 to 4.34, that difference is negligible in comparison to the difference in ERA.

Another signal that these two pitchers are not nearly as different as one might think is BABIP. It is worth nothing that Weaver has always sustained BABIP numbers well below average, for his career he sits at .271. Meanwhile, Volquez has consistently been above the league average at .306 for his career. However, one key sign suggests that both of these players could begin to see a reversal of fortune when it comes to balls hit in play. Last season, Edinson Volquez owned a line drive rate of 22.8%. While it is true that higher line drive rates might lead a pitcher to have a higher BABIP, Jered Weaver was less than one half of a percent better, at 22.4%. In all likelihood, Volquez’s BABIP of .325 from last season will not be quite as high this season, while Weaver’s mark of .268 may very well increase a bit.

Perhaps the single most concerning factor for Jered Weaver is his declining velocity. While Edinson Volquez is also experiencing a dip in his velocity, it is occurring at a glacial pace relative to Weaver. Since 2010, Weaver has seen his average fastball go from 89.9 MPH, not all that impressive to begin with, to 86.5 last season. That is a difference of 3.4 MPH, a frightening decline to say the least, especially for a player who is already struggling to strike out batters to begin with(6.82 K/9 last season.) Meanwhile, Volquez has only experienced a 1.1 MPH decline in that same timeframe, and last season threw his average fastball a staggering 6 MPH faster than Weaver did. It’s not as if Weaver is a decade older than Volquez either, as they are separated by less than a year. Edinson Volquez is aging better than Jered Weaver. It’s just that simple.

One final worrisome element of Jered Weaver’s game lies in his extreme fly-ball tendency, an issue that will only become worse given the aforementioned loss in velocity. Last season, he posted a FB% of 46.8, a higher percentage than fly ball artist Aaron Harang, who sat at 44.3%. As a general rule of thumb, when you’re surrendering more fly balls than Aaron Harang, you’re surrendering too many fly balls. By contrast, Edinson Volquez is extremely effective when it comes to keeping the ball out of the air and on the ground. Last season, he ranked 16^th among qualified starters in terms of avoiding fly balls, achieving an excellent FB% of 29.6. You don’t need to be a mathematician to know that the difference between 46.8% and 29.6% is a significant one.

By no means was the purpose of this piece to disparage Jered Weaver, nor to pretend that Edinson Volquez is flawless. Simply, to point out an example of two players who have inexplicably gained reputations they do not deserve. Jered Weaver is a good major league pitcher, nothing more, and the numbers prove that to be so. Similarly, while Edinson Volquez may never be described as overly reliable or consistent, he is nowhere near the train wreck some like to make him out to be, regardless of whether his ERA says otherwise. His ERA is surface and his ERA is noise. His peripherals are substance, and they are what truly matter.

Many expected the 2013 Nationals to roll through the National League East and contend for a World Series. Some even suggested they had potential to win 100 games.  The Nationals ended up winning 86 games and losing the division by ten games amidst injuries and poor production. The 2014 Cardinals begin Spring Training with similarly high expectations. They just won the Nationals League pennant and by most accounts, had a great off season. But just like the Nationals of last year, the Cardinals are not without their flaws and susceptibilities. I concede that the Cardinals are far more likely to have a great season than not. They are probably one of the five best teams in all of baseball. But for the fun of it, let’s consider the factors that could make 2014 a challenging year for Cardinals’ fans.

RISP regression

The Cardinals famously hit .330 with runners in scoring position (RISP) in 2013. It was the highest RISP average in baseball history topping the 2007 Tigers (.311). The Cardinals had a number of above average to excellent hitters, so we would expect them to hit well in these situations. But .330? When the Cardinals won the World Series in 2011, they led the league in hitting with RISP with a .290 average, 40 points off their 2013 mark. The 2012 team hit .264 with RISP. The Cardinals are likely to return to earth and hit somewhere between their 2011 and 2012 versions. This drop in hitting with RISP will probably reduce their run totals.

Matt Carpenter is how good, again?

I can’t believe my eyes every time I look. Matt Carpenter accumulated 7.0 WAR last year? I know he was good. I know he was VERY good. But is Matt Carpenter a superstar type player? He very well may be. We would be foolish to rule it out. But Carpenter may also turn out to be a 3-4 WAR player with one monster year. He was poor defensively in 2012 (-7.8 Def) but solid in 2013 (1.3 Def). We still don’t know what kind of defender he really is, and he is moving back to third base this year. Carpenter hits extremely well but .318/.392/.481 are difficult numbers to duplicate. The Cardinals probably aren’t counting on Carpenter to put up those numbers again, but they need to make up that lost WAR somewhere.

Young guys not ready

The Cardinals will likely give a large number of at bats to Kolten Wong and super prospect Oscar Taveras. By all accounts Taveras has star potential, but young players often struggle to adjust to the Major Leagues. Even Mike Trout struggled to a .220/.281/.390 in his first 135 plate appearances as a 19 year old. Taveras is a couple years older than Trout was at that point, but he is also replacing Carlos Beltran. Beltran is a poor defender at this point, but he still hit well in 2013 with a .296/.339/.491 slash line. Taveras may become a star one day, but in 2014, he may not be an upgrade over last season.

Kolten Wong has the inside track to play second base every day. He hit well in the minors but struggled mightily in his short stint in the big leagues. While we can’t make predictions based on 62 plate appearances, Wong did nothing to inspire confidence with a .153/.194/.169 slash line and 4.8% walk rate. He won’t be that bad, but the Cardinals must have some concerns about his ability to hit every day at the Major League level.

Old guys declining

Yadier Molina and Matt Holliday combined for 10.1 WAR in 2013. They will be 32 and 34 during the 2014 season, respectively. Neither player is ancient, but they are both due for some decline soon. Holliday has remained steady the last three years as a 4.5-5 WAR player. His defense has been poor the last two years and won’t get much better. He derives his value from his bat. In the last two years, Holliday’s ISO has dropped from .229 in 2011 to .190 in 2013. Holliday’s numbers may not fall off a cliff, but he certainly may regress some.

Molina had an excellent year in 2013. He recorded a career high .319 batting average. His defense is impeccable and probably better than we can quantify at this point. BUT, his batting average was a result of a career high .338 BABIP, 32 points higher than his previous high. His ISO also dropped from .186 in 2012, to .159 in 2013. Molina had an ISO of under .100 for four straight years from 2007-2010. As he gets older, his ISO could drop back into that range. Catcher is a tough defensive position and Molina’s offensive decline may be accelerated due to the strain of catching every day. Molina and Holliday will likely both be good players in 2014. However, producing over 10 WAR again will be difficult.

Good (but not great) pitching

This factor is the hardest one for me to see. The Cardinals certainly have plenty of talent. Nonetheless, Adam Wainwright turns 33 this season and had a career year in 2013, something he isn’t likely to replicate. Jaime Garcia is coming off shoulder surgery on his pitching arm. Michael Wacha was impressive in a small sample size, but he has started only 26 regular season games as a pro and 17 of those were in the minor leagues. The league hasn’t had time to adjust to Wacha yet. These factors could cause problems for the Cardinals pitching staff in 2014.

Conclusion

Are all these things likely to happen? No. But any combination between these things and bad injury luck could cause a fate similar to the 2013 Washington Nationals. The Nationals 2013 season proved once again that any team is vulnerable regardless of perceived talent and/or expectations. The Cardinals are no exception.