A philosophical question many people have likely pondered is the decision of whether it is more beneficial to be daring and to take risks, or to simply remain content with the status quo and use a more risk-averse approach. Being audacious requires a willingness to leave the comfort of society’s praise and expectations, and this ambition is too often discouraged. As a Baseball fan, one can relate these themes to styles of pitching and philosophies for being successful as a pitcher.

In the age of the juiced ball and home run spike, it would seem safe to say that the most prevalent style of pitching involves throwing lots of pitches towards the low-outside corner of the plate. If one thinks about the last time they watched a Baseball game, they would very likely remember the number of times they saw the catcher set up his target on the edge of the lower part of home plate. The idea is to basically throw the baseball as far away from the hitter as possible, while barely catching the plate. One would imagine that the idea is to generate ground balls and induce strikeouts, when pitchers throw to this location. Throwing pitches up in the zone is typically associated with allowing hitters to elevate the ball and get to more of their power.

Can one reasonably fight fire with fire, or should they simply use water? In Baseball terms: Is the art of ground-ball induction a worthwhile endeavor for pitchers, or should they challenge hitters more aggressively with their pitch locations?

Visually, these are the two examples that help one understand the essence of what the differing pitching philosophies entail:

Marcus Stroman painting the low-outside corner:

Chris Sale blowing hitters away with high heat:

Chris Sale was arguably the best pitcher on the planet last season; he was honestly chosen as an example for this piece because his statistics are a part of the data being analyzed here. Marcus Stroman’s numbers are also a part of the data being interpreted; his ground-ball rate of 62.1% ranked highest among all qualified starting pitchers in 2017. Sale, on the other hand, recorded the ninth-lowest ground ball rate among qualified starters, at 38.7%.

This investigation is going to look at the twenty starting pitchers across Major League Baseball who were best able to induce ground balls this past season, as well as the other twenty who generated the fewest number of them. To start, it is apt to examine the durability and effectiveness of the two different kinds of pitchers being evaluated. Below are two tables showing the ground-ball rates, games started, and innings pitched by two very different kinds of pitchers:

Ground Ball Artists’ Durability Statistics:

Leading the ground ball pitchers above is Marcus Stroman, who is the model for all pitchers striving to generate weak contact. Also included is Carlos Martinez and his impressive 9.53 K/9 last season, as well as Yankees ace Luis Severino. One can never forget Clayton Kershaw, of course. Martin Perez and Luis Perdomo do not appear to be much more than league average starters, and Andrew Cashner’s drop in strikeouts does not inspire confidence moving forward. Aside from those three players though, the rest are some very accomplished and talented pitchers.

Low Ground-Ball Rate Pitchers’ Durability Statistics:

Taking a look at the individual pitchers who generated the lowest percentage of ground balls, it is notable to see the back-to-back National League Cy Young Winner, Max Scherzer. Also included is Chris Sale, whom the writer of this article thinks was the best pitcher in Baseball last season. However, it is imperative not to forget about the man at the top of the table, Marco Estrada. He has actually been a very good player throughout the past couple seasons for the Blue Jays. It is simply hard to feel good about the future outlook of the man nicknamed “Estradabien” with his 89.8 mph average fastball velocity, who generates the least number of ground balls among qualified Major League starting pitchers. The point is really that there are varying levels of talent and performance in the group of pitchers in the table, which is a part of what makes this investigation so captivating.

If a pitcher is getting hitters to pound the ball on the ground, he is seemingly more likely to be efficient with his pitch count, and should theoretically be able to stay in the game longer. Though this theory does not hold true in the case of the pitchers being evaluated here. The qualified starting pitchers with the lowest ground ball rates averaged almost two more starts comparatively with those who had the highest ground ball rates in 2017. The same low ground-ball rate pitchers also pitched approximately seven more innings than the ground-ball artists threw this past season.

This finding begs the question: Are pitchers who are less interested or talented at generating ground balls more durable than the pitchers who are more successful in doing so? Half of the twenty ground ball inducing pitchers (10) went on the 10-day Disabled List last season at least once, while only twenty percent of the pitchers with the lowest ground-ball rates (4) required time on the Disabled List. It would appear based on this data, that ground-ball pitchers are more injury prone comparatively with pitchers who seem less interested and able to induce ground balls.

Staying healthy is obviously a significant part of being a successful player, especially in the case of pitchers. The table below, however, shows the important stats one is usually looking for when comparing these two different kinds of pitchers:

2017 Performances of High and Low Ground-Ball Pitchers

This data slightly favors the high ground-ball pitching philosophy, which is quite an interesting development. Yet at this point it is still not necessarily clear whether one approach is favorable to the other. The data representing the results of both pitching philosophies is simply too similar to come to a sound conclusion thus far.

Thus it would be prudent to view the 2018 projections for both kinds of pitchers, to have an idea of what pitching philosophy is potentially going to make the players more successful moving forward. Steamer projects the High ground-ball pitchers to produce an average WAR of 2.65 in 2018, with the Low ground ball pitchers expected to produce 2.35 WAR on average. Again, there is a slight inclination to lean towards the ground-ball approach, yet the difference in projected performance from both types of pitchers is marginal. At this point it would seem like a good idea to simply accept that there are different ways of pitching, and depending on the pitcher’s skillset, he should pitch to his strengths.

Taking a look at how the two different styles of pitching fared in 2016 is also important. The high ground ball rate pitchers produced an average WAR of 2.72, in comparison with the 2.65 WAR put up by the pitchers with the lowest percentages of ground balls. Given that there has not been a significant difference in production between the two different styles of pitching over the last two seasons, could this be related to the home-run spike and juiced baseballs?

Despite suspicion that these themes could have been related to how pitchers have performed and approached their location of pitches to hitters, the fact that there was not a significant difference in performance between the two different ground ball rates does not provide evidence for them being a real factor in this investigation. While it would be more satisfying to say that throwing the ball up in the zone is preferable to painting the low-outside corner of the plate, or vice versa, there simply is not sufficient evidence for either being truly better than the other.

In this case the answer seems to lie in the middle – aces like Chris Sale and Max Scherzer are clearly having success with high heat up in the zone to hitters. Marcus Stroman is keeping hitters from making quality contact by keeping the ball down and throwing a great sinker. Luis Severino is using some of the best velocity of any starter in the Major Leagues to generate ground balls. Perhaps this was always too binary of an exploration of what is an inherently open-ended question. Hopefully, this article has at least helped advocate for pitchers who challenge hitters up in the zone, without criticizing the admirable approach of keeping the ball down in the zone and inducing ground balls.

All data used in this piece was taken from Fangraphs.

Tyson Ross is going back to San Diego on a minor league deal! This is realistically concerning a veteran released by the Rangers, coming back for his second go-round on the rebuilding Padre pitching carousel. However that much is obvious, and thus one may wonder where things went awry for the him during the 2017 campaign. After all, Ross produced 4.3 WAR in 2015 for the club. He has proven to be a valuable and talented pitcher in previous seasons, so looking at the ways in which he may rediscover what made him prosperous during the aforementioned years is an intriguing investigation.

To grasp the essence of the struggles Ross has experienced, one must examine the specific aspects of his 2017 decreases in performance. Ross was the Padres’ 2016 opening day starter, yet was shelled in the start and spent the rest of the season on the DL with shoulder inflammation. He had thoracic outlet syndrome surgery on his shoulder between the 2016 to 2017 seasons, which seems to have taken away from the quality of his stuff. He spent the 2017 season with the Rangers, yet was relegated to a bullpen role in September after a dismal ten starts. The Rangers released him on September 12th, 2017.

Ross has always battled injuries throughout his career, which is the primary concern above all else. That much is obvious. However that doesn’t mean there aren’t other parts of his profile to consider. Comparing his 2015 career year to his 2017 season statistically, one notices many red flags. His BB/9 rose drastically from 3.86 in 2015, to an alarming 6.80 BB/9 last season. Walks were always a somewhat prevalent part of his profile as is, yet this high of a walk rate certainly raises eyebrows. His 61.5% ground ball rate from 2015 decreased to 46.8% in 2017. His heat maps of pitches in 2015, compared with 2017, illustrates why his ground ball rate decreased so drastically, and shows a part of why his ERA ballooned to 7.71 last season:

2015:

2017:

Ross threw more pitches towards the low outside corner to right-handed hitters in 2015, that he did less of in 2017. In the lower part of the zone, he more often caught the middle part of the plate, which explains a part of why he didn’t induce as many ground balls, and was hit so hard last season. One can identify, based on the data presented above, that the primary culprit of Ross’ struggles was pitch location; he threw more pitches over the heart of the plate, and fewer toward the outside corners. What is puzzling is why Ross threw so many pitches up and in to right-handed hitters, as one can see in the top left hand corner of the chart, in 2017. After all, he didn’t get a single whiff on pitches in that location all year! See the chart below:

2017:

Ross likely didn’t mean to throw pitches in that upper-left hand location on the chart, yet the fact that he did so often is indicative of his struggles with command. In video analysis, there were subtle differences in how Ross finished his delivery in San Diego compared with in Texas. He wasn’t finishing his delivery as well as he could have at times in 2017 with the Rangers, which was a likely cause for his missing up and in to hitters with noticeable frequency.

Another significant issue for Ross was the deterioration of his stuff. His average fastball velocity, for example, dropped from 93.9 mph in 2015 to 91.6 mph this past season. His slider also lost velocity, which dropped from 87.2 mph in 2015 to 84.7 mph in 2017. He has lost about two ticks in velocity since he had thoracic outlet syndrome surgery on his shoulder. Perhaps he won’t get his old velocity back, in which case he’ll have a smaller margin of error.

Ross threw a cutter more often in 2017, which was an interesting development, however the implementation of the pitch did not have a significant effect on his performance. Ross very rarely throws a changeup, and primarily relies upon his fastball / sinker and slider combination. Given that he really only uses a single secondary pitch, one would expect that it is more affected by his drop in velocity. One of the ideas of throwing a slider is to make it look like a fastball that breaks away late, fooling a hitter who is hopefully out in front of the pitch. Obviously Ross is not throwing as hard as he used to, so there’s more time for the hitters to see all of his pitches, comparatively with the velocity of his stuff in 2015.

Ross’ slider had a 12.2% whiff rate in 2017, whereas in 2015 it drew a 23.4% whiff rate. His slider has always been his wipeout pitch, and the fact that it has not been as effective is a reflection of his loss in velocity and ability to command pitches this past season. The movement on his slider was not significantly different this season compared to 2015. Thus, the decrease in velocity, along with Ross’ command issues, can be most logically blamed for his rough 2017 campaign. Check out his slider location in 2015, followed by where he threw it last year:

2015:

2017:

Above it’s clear that Ross didn’t locate his sliders particularly well last season. In 2015, he did a much better job placing it on the outside corner away from right-handed hitters, and burying it in to left-handed hitters with consistency. The intention looks similar on both charts, though the execution of putting the ball where he wanted to was superior in 2015, compared with his efforts to do so in 2017.

He should be throwing his pitches low and away more often, as he did in 2015 with the Padres. If he can do more of that, and retain his old velocity, he could end up being a steal for the Padres in 2018. That will help him induce more ground balls, whiffs, and weak contact. Being able to throw his fastball and sinker down and away will go a long way in terms of generating the ground balls he was so previously talented at generating.

Hopefully Ross will regain his velocity, and have better command of his pitches next season. In San Diego he flourished with Padres pitching coach Darren Balsley, and he’ll have every chance to win a job in the rotation this spring. It should be good for him to be working with Balsley again, and to return to an organization where he is likely fairly comfortable. Given the home run spike and juiced ball, it makes sense to root for guys like this to get back to being the impressive pitchers people hope they can be once again.

All the data used in this article is from Brooks Baseball.