Archive for August, 2017

Jordan Montgomery’s Fastball Avoidance

Yankee southpaw Jordan Montgomery is having a a capable rookie season at age 24, with a 3.92 ERA and 4.07 FIP over 108 innings, both good for second among qualifying rookie starters (although to be fair, there are only four). Montgomery has solid strikeout and walk rates of 8.25/9 and 2.75/9, respectively, and if he’s given up a few too many homers (1.25/9), well, so has pretty much everyone else this year. So far, so encouraging, especially for a guy who eluded the top 100 prospects lists, but Montgomery is going about it in a highly unusual way. Just 42.4% of his pitches have been fastballs this year, the fifth-lowest rate in the majors among qualifying starters.

Throwing fastballs is a young man’s game. No other under-25 pitcher has used the fastball less than 50% of the time this season. The next such pitcher down the fastball rarity list from Montgomery is teammate Luis Severino, (25th on the list) who throws his heat just with just over a 51% frequency. In fact, none of the other bottom-10 fastball users are under 28.

While career development can take many different paths, pitchers tend to throw more fastballs early in their careers and fewer as they age. Kershaw’s career, for example, follows this pattern almost exactly, while Adam Wainwright’s is somewhat similar, though his (low) fastball usage this year is somewhat higher than last year’s. It’s unusual in the current era to see a young pitcher come up and have sustained success throwing fastballs so infrequently.

Over the last five years, just 20 pitchers have used the fastball less frequently than Montgomery has this year, 15 of whom are (or were, in the case of the retirees) starters. Only two of the active pitchers are under 30: Cleveland reliever Bryan Shaw (29) and yet another Yankee, Masahiro Tanaka (28). (The perceptive reader perhaps will have divined that the Yankees staff as a whole has the lowest fastball usage in the majors.)

On the surface, Montgomery’s reluctance to cook with gas is understandable: his gas is flammable. According to FanGraphs pitch values, Montgomery’s curve and changeup are among the ten best in all the land, while his fastball is down at 50th. So Montgomery might be excused for being gun shy (that actually is a pun — it’s okay to laugh!), but as noted above, very few young pitchers have survived to baseball middle age by so assiduously avoiding the fastball. If Montgomery is to have long-term success, he will either need to bushwhack a hitherto unblazed career trail, or figure out a way to keep hitters honest with a few more fastballs.

For an example of the latter course, consider Corey Kluber. When he arrived in The Show he had a somewhat similar pitching profile to Montgomery’s: a very hittable fastball that he was reluctant to throw, coupled with other, more promising pitches (in Kluber’s case, the the cutter was initially the best, followed by the curve and then the change). According to pitch values, Kluber’s heater was quite a bit worse than Montgomery’s is now, and Kluber accordingly suffered during his first two seasons in 2011 and 2012. FIP saw his potential, however: Kluber’s best ERA in those formative seasons was 5.19, but his worst FIP was 4.29.

In the next two seasons, Kluber would cut almost two full runs off that FIP, on his way to a Cy Young Award in 2014. Four significant changes helped postpone the start of Kluber’s broadcasting career. First, he added velo, which rose from 92.0 in 2011 to 93.2 in 2013. Second, perhaps because of the additional speed, he threw fastballs more often. Much more often, rising from around 43% in his first two years to 53% in 2013. Third, he correspondingly reduced changeup usage, from 16.5% in 2012 all the way down to 4.8% in 2014. Fourth, perhaps because of this simplified approach, his curve went from being spotty in 2012 to a wipeout pitch in 2014.

Kluber thus became the ace on a World Series pitching staff. He would go on to top 50% fastball usage every year until now, when it has once again slipped to 45%. His fastball has never been a dominant pitch, but it effectively sets up his curve and cutter, which are. As he’s aged, Kluber has given back his velocity gains, but so far that has not significantly eroded his overall effectiveness.

No player’s career is a perfect template for another, but Kluber’s rapid evolution at the major-league level suggests some steps Montgomery could take to remain in the Yankees’ rotation. Efforts to enhance velocity don’t always end well, but Montgomery’s velo (91.9) is just about where Kluber’s was before he began his ascent, and it doesn’t seem out of the realm of possibility that Montgomery could add 1 mph or so to his heater, thereby making him more willing to throw it. If he’s more afraid of his fastball than the hitters are, success will likely elude him. Of course, almost every pitcher would like to find an extra mile per hour in between the couch cushions, but in Montgomery’s case that may be closer to a need than a want.

If Montgomery throws more fastballs, he could also throw fewer sliders. Though not a bad pitch, it is the weakest of his other offerings and the one he already throws least frequently (12%). Largely scrapping it would enable to focus on developing and using his curve and change, which are the pitches that will essentially determine whether the Yankees ever have a Jordan Montgomery Bobblehead Night. Coupled with a more effective fastball, these pitches could become devastating.

To be sure, top prospects drive the bus — out of the 2016 Cleveland Spiders 27+ WAR, around 16 came from four former top-50 prospects (Francisco Lindor, Carlos Santana, Jason Kipnis, and Lonnie Baseball). Two former top-50 pitchers (Trevor Bauer and Carlos Carrasco) contributed just over 5 of the around 19 WAR that the staff produced. But teams need to get value from their unheralded players as well. In 2016, Kluber’s 5.1 WAR essentially equaled Bauer and Carrasco’s combined.

The Yankees are certainly far more important to Jordan Montgomery than vice-versa, but his performance thus far suggests that he is more than a fringe rotation member; he may be a fringe impact starter. The rotation is the weakest link in a Yankees team that otherwise looks poised to compete for the AL East crown for years to come. It’s easy to imagine that only Severino will have been in both the 2017 and 2018 opening-day rotations. Even if Chance Adams and Justus Sheffield can progress quickly enough to make an impact next year, the Yankees will need help that lies beyond the glow of the top-prospect campfire. Jordan Montgomery could be that help if he can learn to love the fastball.


Kyle Freeland: The New Rockies Prototype

The Colorado Rockies have been one of the biggest surprises this season with a 58-45 record, after going 75-87 last season. Currently, FanGraphs gives them a 64.8 % chance of making the playoffs as a wild-card team. Despite an offense that ranks 29th with a wRC+ of 83, their defense and baserunning have been strong suits, with the eighth-ranked defense and fifth-ranked baserunning. Their pitching staff has been around the middle of the pack (24th in ERA, 19th in FIP, 17th in xFIP) but this is a huge feat while pitching half of their games at the hitter’s heaven of Coors Field. This year, success has come in the form of a young starting rotation that ranks fourth in ground-ball percentage (48.6) and 11th in HR/9 (1.27) among all starting rotations. That’s right, while playing half of their games at Coors Field, the starting rotation has given up fewer HR/9 than 19 teams. Much of the credit for this success goes to rookie left-hander and ground-ball machine Kyle Freeland.

Taken eighth overall in the 2014 draft out of the University of Evansville, Freeland spent two and a half seasons in the minors that included him missing time in 2015 with a shoulder injury, before being called up to start the 2017 season in the Rockies’ rotation. To date, Freeland has thrown 116.1 innings with a 3.64 ERA and a 4.71 FIP while having the third-highest ground-ball rate (57.0 %) among qualified pitchers, to produce 1.4 WAR. What immediately sticks out about Freeland is the huge difference between his ERA and FIP. While FIP is typically higher than ERA for ground-ball pitchers, Freeland is still an extreme case, with his -1.07 ERA – FIP. Like most ground-ball pitchers, he doesn’t get many strikeouts or swings and misses; his 14.4 K% is the third-lowest among the 71 qualified starters, and his swinging-strike rate of 6.9 % is the lowest among qualified starters. However, unlike most ground-ball pitchers, Freeland walks a ton of guys; his 8.8 BB% is 15th-highest among qualified starters. And even more unlikely, while pitching at Coors, he’s allowed the 17th-fewest HR/9 (1.01) to go with a .281 BABIP.

Now it’s time to take a look at the stuff behind those results. Freeland features primarily a three-pitch mix of a four-seam fastball, sinker, and cutter, while also possessing a slider and changeup. His four-seam and sinker are his two best pitches (and only two pitches he has with a positive pitch value according to FanGraphs). As a left-handed pitcher, Freeland has above-average velocity on his fastball, averaging 92.8 MPH with his four-seam and 92.0 MPH with his sinker. Both of these pitches have above average arm-side run and sink, with his four-seam averaging 5.75 inches of horizontal movement with 6.34 inches of vertical movement (it really means that this pitch, on average, drops 6.34 inches less than a pitch thrown at the same velocity with no spin) and his sinker averaging 7.92 inches of horizontal movement and 3.51 inches of vertical movement (the lower the number, the more sink a pitch has).

His fastball and sinker both have above-average sink, but his sinker actually has less horizontal movement than an average sinker and is more of a two-seam/sinker hybrid (Statcast categorizes it as a two-seam while the folks over at Brooks Baseball classify it as a sinker). Yet both of these pitches generate a ton of ground balls and combined are used 65.8 % of the time by Freeland, which is the third-highest FB% among qualified starters. On the other hand, Freeland throws his cutter 20.5 % of the time at an average of 86.9 MPH with -0.46 inches of horizontal movement, to go with 3.18 inches of vertical movement. Due to this vertical movement, Statcast (differing from Brooks Baseball once again) classifies the cutter as a slider despite its low horizontal movement. Freeland’s cutter is truly a cutter/slider hybrid as it has a lot of tilt (like a slider) but doesn’t have much horizontal movement (like a cutter).

The way he uses this arsenal varies greatly when facing left-handed hitters and right-handed hitters. Against righties, Freeland throws his sinker 37.1 % of the time, his four-seam 30.7 % of the time, and his cutter 17.1 % of the time. The idea here is to mix in the sinker thrown down and away with a four-seam thrown in, and a cutter thrown either down and in or over the outer edge of the plate as a backdoor pitch. Against lefties, Freeland throws his four-seam 44.4 % of the time, his sinker 14.0 % of the time, and his cutter 33.0% of the time. Just like against righties, Freeland throws these pitches in the same areas of the zone, throwing his four-seam to his glove side, sinker to his arm side, and cutter to both sides. However, all that changes is how much he uses each pitch. Against both righties and lefties, Freeland pounds the lower outer half, but isn’t afraid to come back inside, usually up and in. This mix is tough for hitters on either side of the plate as these three different pitches all come from the same arm slot and start off heading in the same direction, but break off in different directions, allowing Freeland to miss the middle of bats and generate ground balls. This arsenal has also allowed Freeland to be almost equally effective against righties and lefties. Although it is a small sample, he has faced 102 lefties that have produced a slash of .271/.317/.409, good for a .310 wOBA, and 398 righties that have produced a slash of .253/.345/.398, good for a .324 wOBA.

Only 24, Freeland remains in the early stages of his career, and a sample of only 116.1 innings is nothing. Although he has gotten soft contact at a 25.0% rate, which is the best in the league, we can probably still expect some regression on balls in play. However, since Freeland is a pitcher that relies on the ground ball, his ERA will most likely not regress all the way up to his FIP, especially with strong infield defense behind him. The biggest issue for him to fix in order to sustain his success will be his walk rate. With his high fastball usage, Freeland has no excuse to continue to walk guys, and increased control should come as he ages. Most importantly, the Rockies will be leaning on him as they make a push for their first postseason appearance since 2009. Best-case scenario, Freeland becomes a fixture in the Rockies rotation as their new prototype for success at Coors Field, and leads them into the postseason for the first time since Ubaldo Jimenez was their ace. Worst-case scenario, Freeland experiences extreme regression as his high walk rate and lack of strikeouts come back to haunt him. Based on his stuff and pedigree, Freeland appears to have what it takes to stay in the rotation down the road, but if not, there will always be a role for him in the bullpen, where he can go and throw 75 % fastballs (or more) while generating a ton of ground balls (a la Scott Alexander). Either way, he looks like he can have big-league success while pitching in the big league’s toughest ballpark.


The Blurring of the Line Between Buyers and Sellers

Four trades of relative significance occurred last Friday. With all due respect to Howie Kendrick, the other three trades are my primary interest. The Mets and Orioles, each far separated from the top of their divisions, made deals to beef up their major-league teams, dealing young players in the process. On top of that, the Mariners and Rays, just 2.0 games from each other in the wild-card race, made a deal to address their respective weaknesses. These deals seem to re-affirm a belief that began to surface with the introduction of the second wild card, but has likely never been as pronounced as this year (in part due to the mediocrity of the American League, in all likelihood). The line between buyers and sellers has blurred, leaving many teams dabbling on both sides.

As of July 29th, FanGraphs lists the Mets’ playoff odds at a measly 8.1%, which makes sense given their 48-53 record and 13.5-game deficit in the NL East. In fact, that exact record is shared by the lowly Marlins, who felt the need to deal their closer, A.J. Ramos. The Mets acquired Ramos despite virtually no chance to compete for a title this year. Now, the validity of the trade is up for debate, as relievers are highly volatile and the Mets roster is flawed enough to argue they should fully rebuild. What really matters, though, is that the Mets opted to start their winter shopping early, as opposed to simply selling off short-term assets and waiting for the offseason. With Ramos under control for 2018, the team clearly felt that they have enough to simply retool their roster, giving them a shot in ’18.

The O’s made a similar but yet very different move, adding Jeremy Hellickson from Philadelphia. Hellickson is a pure rental, and the Orioles, to this point, have not been a good team. At 48-54, FanGraphs gives them a 2.6% chance of making the playoffs. The primary reason for that record in a starting rotation that has been an unmitigated disaster, with just one pitcher (Dylan Bundy) posting an ERA below 5.00 (4.53). Even amid rumors of Baltimore dealing away some primary pieces, Dan Duquette must have seen an opportunity to add some stable innings to a rotation that is anything but stable. Ken Rosenthal of Fox Sports reported after the deal that Baltimore could still deal off pieces. That seems to hint that Baltimore has interest remaining competitive as long as possible, but not at the cost of mortgaging the future in what’s been termed a “seller’s market.”

Finally, we have the very interesting trade between Seattle and Tampa. Neither player on their own is of huge interest, as Erasmo Ramirez boasts a 4.80 ERA, while FanGraphs pegs Steve Cishek at a -0.1 WAR. However, with limited control left, both are clearly win-now assets, moving between teams that are contending for the same playoff spot. Jerry Dipoto’s love of trades has been well documented, but this is possibly his most fascinating. The motivation is clear, as Seattle has a need in the back end of its rotation, and Tampa Bay has worked effortlessly to revamp its entire pen. But we rarely see teams move players off the big-league roster when contending in July, and it’s even more rare to see a deal between two teams competing against each other for a playoff opportunity.

Whether due to increased parity, opportunistic general managers, or simply an odd one-day coincidence, it appears as though teams are taking a less rigid stance on buying and selling. With just about everyone in the American League within shouting distance of contention, we may be in for one of the more interesting trade deadlines in recent memory (ed. note: now complete!). And if your favorite team is out of it, you may still have a reason to get excited these next few days, as teams like the Braves threaten to make moves toward contention regardless. With a unique trade market, many clubs may see fit to stick their toes on both sides of the line, re-assembling their roster without the limitations that a rigid approach brings.